Poli+Digests+Art+X+et.seq..doc

7/27/2019 Poli+Digests+Art+X+et.seq..doc

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ART X LOCAL GOVERNMENT

262. GANZON VS. CAlocal govt supervision of the president

Administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo City, by the city

officials on the grounds of abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, arbitrarydetention, etc. (this stemmed from the case where Mayor Ganzon took the office keys ofCouncilor Ong, such that Ong had to hold office at the plaza.)

The administrative complaint was filed before the Secretary of Local Government

praying for the suspension or removal of Ganzon. He was preventively suspended for 60 days.

In the meantime, a prima facie case for the arbitrary detention was also found to exist

(after Mayor Ganzon simply detained a certain Pancho upon his orders, without anywarrant0. He was thus preventively suspended for another 60 days.

Mayor Ganzon filed an action for prohibition against the Secretary of DILG. He was able

to get a preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the Secretary issued another order of preventive suspension, for another 60

days. The vice-mayor became the Acting Mayor. Ganzon filed for another petition for prohibition in this case.

Ganzon claims that the Secretary was biased, and hostile against him because he

refused to join the LDP party, and for his alleged refusal to operate lotto in the city. His main argument was that the Secretary of DILG is devoid of any authority to suspend

and remove local officials. He claims that the Consti does not allow the President, toexercise the power of suspension or removal over local officials. He claims theconstitution provides for self-rule by LGUs and by deleting the phrase as may beprovided for by law stripped the President of the power of control over LGUs. He claimsthat the deletion is significant since the power of the President is provided for by law andhence no law could provide for it any longer.

ISSUE: Whether the Sec of DILG can suspend the mayor? What is the effect of the deletion?

SC: YES.The omission of the phrase signifies nothing more than to underscore local governmentsautonomy from Congress and to break Congress control over local govt affairs. However,the Consti did not intend for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of allauthority over municipal corporations, particularly discipline.

Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of LGUs, as in the federalgovernment of the US. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star,though not control of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under theConstitution, and as the supervision clause itself suggest, is TO WEAN LGUS FROMOVERDEPENDENCE ON THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

Local Autonomy is not instantly self-executing provision of the Consti. It is subject to thepassage of the Local Govt Code (LGC). In spite of the autonomy, the Consti places the localgovt under the general supervision of the Executive. The Consti allows Congress to includein the LGC, provisions for the removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress mayexercise the power of removal, and as the existing LGC has done, delegate its exercise tothe President.


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The deletion of the phrase as may be provided for by law was meant to stress, theobjective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control ofits affairs. The Consti did nothing more. Insofar as existing legislation authorizes thePresident (through the Sec. of DILG), to proceed against local officials administratively, theConstitution contains no prohibition.

Also, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. Supervision is overseeing orthe power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.Investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser power than altering.As to the invocation of certain cases where the President was denied the power of suspendor remove, in those cases, the reason why she was denied the power was not because thePresident could not exercise it, but it was denied because the law lodged the powerelsewhere.As we said, supervision and removal are not incompatible terms, and one may stand withthe other, notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under theConstitution.

FINALLY, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local governmentstructure instituted through a system of decentralization. Autonomy is not meant to end the

relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and LGUs.Otherwise, it would usher a regime of federalism. LGUs are subject to regulation, howeverlimited, and for not other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

There is decentralization of ADMINSTRATION when the central government delegatesadministrative powers to political subdivisions to broaden the base of government power. Itrelieves the central government the burden of managing local affairs. The presidentexercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs areadministered according to law. He has no control over their acts in that sense that he can

substitute his own judgment (no power of control). Decentralization of POWER, involves theabdication of political power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The autonomousgovernment is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum interventionfrom central authorities.

Summary:1) Our decentralization means THE DEVOLUTION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, not the

power, to the local levels. The local officials remain accountable to the centralgovernment in the manner provided for by law (LGC).

2) The New Constitution does not prescribe federalism.3) The change in language was meant to deny legislative control over local governments; it

did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations4) Since LGUs remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may by law, impose

disciplinary action against the local officials (LGC)5) Supervision and investigation are not inconsistent. Investigation is not the same as

control.

**Here, the court said that under the LGC, the preventive suspension should not exceed 60days.


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263. BORJA VS. COMELECterm of office of local elective officials

1988: Jose Capco was Vice Mayor of Pateros.

1989: When the Mayor died, he succeeded as mayor. 1992: He ran for mayor and won for a term of 3 years

1995: re-elected mayor

1998: wants to run for mayor again.

Borja, another candidate for mayor, sought disqualification, on the ground that Capco

has served already 3 consecutive terms. In the elections, Capco won and was proclaimed mayor.

This is a petition for certiorari to set asise the proclamation of Comelec.

Borja contends that Capcos term from 1989-1992, when he succeeded the Mayor,

should be considered as a service of one full term. Hence, he should be considered tohave served 3 consecutive terms. He claims that it is irrelevant the he became mayor bysuccession because the purpose of the constitutional prohibition was simply to limit the

number of terms of elective local officials, thereby preventing a monopoly of politicalpower.

ISSUE: Should the succession to office be counted as a term?

SC: NO. NOT COUNTED.We consider the historical background of the Article X. The members of the Con-Con wereas much concerned with preserving the freedom of cho0ice of the people vis--vis theprevention of monopolization of political power. Based on the intent of the framers, indiscussing the term limits, the drafters did so on the assumption that the officials concernedwere SERVING BY REASON OF ELECTION.

Two terms must be distinguished: service of term and election. The first is derived from theconcern about the accumulation of power as a result of prolonged stay in office. The secondis derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish togovern be preserved.

To bar the election of a local official because he has already served 3 terms, although thefirst was as a result of succession by operation of law, rather than by election, would violatethe fundamental tenet of representative democracy.

Also, the first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials. The secondsentence provides for the voluntary renunciation of office for the full term for which hewas elected. The term served must therefore be one for which the official was ELECTED. Thepurpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of

terms an elective official may serve. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected,because he is simply continuing the service of the official which he succeeds, such officialcannot be considered to have fully served the term (notwithstanding his voluntaryrenunciation of office prior to its expiration).

(Fr. Bs comment was that in case of members of the House of Reps, if one is electedrepresentative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter howshort, will be considered as one term).


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However, there is a difference between the case of a vice mayor and a member of theHouse. The vice mayor succeeds by operation of law. ON the other hand, a representative isELECTED to fill the vacancy. IN a real sense, the representative serves a term for which hewas elected. That is why his service of unexpired term is correctly counted as his first term.

In short, in the case of ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, they succeed from another by

operation of law (there is no more election).

Thus the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to beelected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that anindividual has served 3 consecutive terms, he must also have been elected to the sameposition for the same number of time before the disqualification can set it. (see primer forthe 3 scenarios)

7/25/2005 11:22:24 PM Last saved by pat


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264. SOCRATES VS. COMELECterm of office recall

Several barangay officials convened into a PRA Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate

the recall of Socrates, who was the mayor of Puerto Princesa. They passed a resolution declaring a loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his

recall. They requested for recall elections with the Comelec. Comelec gave due course.

Hagedorn, filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor.

Several residents however, filed a petition for disqualification of Hagedorn on the ground

that he has served as mayor for 3 consecutive full terms, immediately prior to the recallelections, and is now running for his 4 th term.

Comelec denied the petition. Hagedorn was cleared to run in the recall.

ISSUE: Is a recall election valid?SC: YES. When the PRA adopted the recall resolution, their terms of the members had not

yet expired. They were all de jure barangay officials with no legal disqualification toparticipate in the recall assembly under the LGC. Further, Socrates was given notice of thePRA meetings and all other documents.

ISSUE: Is Hagedorn qualified?SC: There are 2 parts. The first provides that an elective local official cannot serve for morethan 3 consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count indetermining the 3-term limit.

The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office does not interrupt the continuityof service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office interrupts continuity ofservice, and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being counted as aconsecutive term.

After 3 consecutive terms, the elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for afourth term. The prohibited election refers only to the NEXT REGULAR ELECTION for thesame office. A RECALL ELECTION (even if subsequent to the 3 rd term), is no longer coveredby the prohibition.1) A subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after 3 rdconsecutive terms.2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

What the consti prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following the 3consecutive terms. It does not prohibit subsequent re-election for a fourth term, as long asthe re-election is not immediately after the end of the 3rd consecutive term. A recall election

in the midway in the term following the 3

rd

consecutive term is a subsequent election butnot an immediate re-election after the 3rd term.

Neither does the Consti prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run inany other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the consti prohibits isa consecutive 4th term. Thus, the prohibited election refers only to an immediate reelection,not to a subsequent one. The framers did not intend the period of rest who has reachedhis term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.


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Hagedorns candidacy (in the recall elections of 2002) is not an immediate reelection afterhis 3rd term which ended 2001. The immediate re-election that the Consti should havebarred him from seeking refers to the regular elections in 2001. But he did not run for re-election in 2001.

He did not run for re-election in 2001 precisely because he has served for 3 consecutive

terms, 1992-1995, 1995-1998, 1998-2001. It was Socrates who ran in 2001. Hagedornbecame a private citizen as of 2001.

The period between 2001 and 2002 when the recall election was held, was clearly aninterruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, NOT BECAUSE OF HISVOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION, BUT BECAUSE OF LEGAL PROHIBITION. His TERM is not aseamless continuation of his previous 3 terms. AN INVOLUNTARY INTERRUPTIONOCCURRED which broke the continuity of service as mayor.

The consti does not require that the interruption or hiatus should be a full term of 3 years.The clear intent was any interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause isinvoluntary, is sufficient to break an elective officials continuity of service.

Also, Hagedorns term does not retroact to that of Socrates. The court cannot declare asconsecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not. To retroactHagedorns term would create a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the peopleto choose their leaders through popular elections. The recall term is not factually a fourthconsecutive term.

Thus, an interruption of continuity of service implies a fresh start of a new term. An officialelected in a recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpiredterm is in itself one term for purposes of counting 3 term limit.

DAVIDE DISSENTS:He says that for one to be able to run again after 3 consecutive terms, he has to rest for the

entire 3 years immediately succeeding the 4th

term.


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265. TAN VS. COMELECcreation of a province

There was a BP 885, creating the new provice of Negros del Norte.

Various residents of Negros Occidental, filed a case for prohibition to stop the Comelecfrom conducting the plebiscite.

They contend that the BP is not in accord with Art X.

Under the LGC, the requisites for the creation of a new province are:

1) 3,500 sqm of territory 2) 5,000 population 3) annual income of P10M for the last 3 consecutive years 4) shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province to

to less than the minimum The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte,

namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava,Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador

Benedicto. They claimed that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of Negros Occidental

other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to benot in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of Mandamus be issued, directed tothe respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite atwhich all the qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existingshall participate

The provincial treasurer however claims that all the requisites were satisfied.

ISSUE: Should the voters in the remaining areas be allowed to participate in the plebiscite?

SC: YES.The consti makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority ofvotes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, dividedor merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable toconclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarilybe substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can becreated the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic willdemonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parentprovince of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. Theother affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the motherprovince to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No.3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling

law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areasaffected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or unitsaffected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the BatasangPambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring theevident reality that there are other people necessarily affected.In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of BatasPambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertainedapprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province,this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the


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legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute aself-serving phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additionalstatement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far fromtruth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. Thesubstantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the otheradverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the

petitioners.

Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte,the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay,Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has beenmade regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidentalwill be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar millswhich contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "tocreate Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as NegrosOccidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but"amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involvedwas a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitutionanticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary.

Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged'. 'abolished' as used in the constitutionalprovision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to eachother. A province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provincesmerged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitelythe boundary being substantially altered."It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or itsboundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all thevoters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of itsboundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true. "

The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void

and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is riot,however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basisto do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 andalso because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance withthe criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for thecreation of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does notexist.

The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province ofNegros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy thearea requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlierdiscussed.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the newprovince of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are alsodeclared null and void.

Last saved by pat7/26/2005 12:04:35 AM


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ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

266. ROMULO VS. YNIGUEZ

impeachment proceedings

Petitioners comprise more than 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan. They filedResolution # 644, for the impeachment of President Marcos together with a verifiedcomplaint

This was referred to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Govt. The Committee found the complaint insufficient in form and in substance. They

disapproved and dismissed all the charges. They submitted a report to the Batasan and sent it to the archives. Later, MP Ramon Mitra petitioned to revive the complaint. This was denied by the

Batasan The petitioners now file this case for PROHIBITION to restrain the enforcement of the

Batasan Rules of Procedure for Impeachment. The wanted to compel the Committee torecall its resolution. They sought to annul the resolution.

They claim that the Rules of Procedure are unconstitutional because they empower asmaller body and overrule the complaint which is already endorsed by 1/5 of themembers. They claim that the power to impeach or not to impeach belongs solely to theBatasan as a collegiate body.

They further argue that the Rules imposes an illegal condition precedent in order thatthe complain for impeachment can proceed to trial. They say that the Rules of Procedureimpose an additional requirement, which is not required by the Constitution. For theConstitution merely requires the endorsement of at least 1/5 for the initiation of theimpeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, the Speaker of the House Yniguez claims that the petition should bedismissed because the Court has no jurisdiction over the same, it being a political

question. He also says that the Rules of Procedure are constitutional and that becausethe Batasan is a sovereign body, within its own sphere, it has the power to dismiss thecase.

ISSUE: What the petitioners are really seeking is to compel the Batasan to proceed with thehearing on the impeachment of the President, since more than 1/5 had filed a resolution forimpeachment. Has the Court have jurisdiction to order the Committees to recall from theArchives and report out the resolution for impeachment? Can this court order the Batasan toconduct trial on the charges contained in said complaint for impeachment?

SC: NO.When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for recall of the resolution, this had the effectof confirming the action of the Committees in dismissing the complaint for impeachment.That the Batasan, by a majority vote, dismiss the complaint cannot be seriously disputed. Amajority vote of all the members of the Batasan thus confirmed the action of theCommittees, makes it mathematically impossible to obtain at least 2/3 vote for conviction.What purpose would be served by such a proceeding if it is already obvious that therequired 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained? DISMISSAL OF THE IMPEACHMENTCOMPLAINT WAS IN ORDER.


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The dismissal by the Batasan of the Mitras motion is an exercise of powers that have beenvested upon it by the Constitution and is beyond the power of this court to revieew. ThisCOURT CANNOT COMPEL THE BATASAN TO CONDUCT THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS.

Further, the said Committee cannot recall from the Archives the resolution dismissing theimpeachment complaint without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan when it

denied Mitras motion.

As to the constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure, THEY ARE VALID.The provision in the Constitution requiring the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of allmembers for conviction is not violated by the provision in the Rules of Procedure authorizingthe dismissal of the petition by a majority vote of the Batasan since with such number ofvotes, it is obvious that the 2/3 vote necessary for conviction can no longer be obtained.

The provision in the Constitution providing that an impeachment complaint may be initiatedby a vote of 1/5 of the members is not violated by the provision in the Rules of Procedureauthorizing the Committee on Justice to dismiss the complaint, when it finds that thecomplaint is insufficient in form and in substance. Their purpose is merely to determinewhether the complaint for impeachment initiated by the 1/5 members warrants being

referred to the Batasan for trial. They are not properly part of the initiation phase of theimpeachment proceeding but of the trial phase.

Nevertheless, said Committee on Justice is still required to submit its report to the Batasanwho has the ultimate decision whether to approve or disapprove the report.

More importantly, the Rules of Procedure are ALWAYS WITHIN THE POWER OF THEBATASAN TO MODIFY, CHANGE OR REPLACE AT ANY TIME. They do not have the force oflaw but are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenientconduct of the proceedings. They may be waived or disregarded by the batasan itself andthe courts have no concern!


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267. IN RE: RAUL M. GONZALEZDisbarment vs. Impeachment

Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint toJustice Fernan. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (ananonymous letter).

The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarmentsought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to dosomething about it.

The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution of the SC,dismissming the charges made by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. Inthat resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he should not be heldadministratively liable for making serious accusations against Fernan.

ISSUE: Can a SC justice be disbarred during his term of office?

SC:A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be aMember of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may beremoved from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during theincumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with anyoffense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

(That is why the SC resolved to dismiss the disbarment case against Justice Fernan.)

Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the

Consti, members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provisionproscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officerwho may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding hisoffice with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of theclear mandate of the Consti.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold anyoffice of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shallnot extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But theparty convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial andpunishment according to law.

The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to

immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is that there is a fundamentalprocedural requirement that must be observed before such liability ma be determined. Amember of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route ofimpeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (thatis, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.

Last saved by pat 7/26/2005 11:59:31 PM


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268. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REP.Impeachment initiation

This is the impeachment case against Chief Justice Davide. Two impeachmentcomplaints were filed against Davide. The first was on June 2 2003, by President Erap,against all the SC justices. The second was on October 23, 2003, filed by CongressmanGilbert Teodoro et al. against Davide.

Petitioners intervenors, filed a case in court claiming that no impeachment proceedingsshall be iniated against the same official more than once within one year.

Sen Pimentel opposed, citing US vs. Nixon, that questions regarding impeachmentinitiated by the House are beyond judicial review because the sole power to try is atextually demonstrable commitment of all issues regarding the impeachment to theHouse.

It is also argued that the House rules on impeachment defines INITIATING as whenthe House acts on the complaint as a collective body. That is, when the Committee onJustice votes in favor of the impeachment, OR when the House reverses a contrary voteof the Committee on Justice.

The House rules on impeachment further provides that impeachment proceedings aredeemed initiated if:

A) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that a verified

complaint or resolution is sufficient in substance B) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee

that the complaint is insufficient in substance. C) by the filing or endorsement before the Sec-Gen of a verified complaint or

resolution by at least 1/3 of the members of the house. There were several amicus curiae invited. Commissioner Regalado and Fr. B. were

there

SC:Regalado is of the same view as Fr. Bernas, that the word initiate in the Constitution,means to file, both adding however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to setthe complaint moving.

During the oral arguments, Fr. B clarified that the word initiate appearing on theprovision, the House of Reps shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of theimpeachment xxx No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one yearrefers to 2 objects, IMPEACHEMENT CASEAND IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

Fr. B says the common verb is to initiate. The object in the first sentence is impeachmentcase. The object in the second sentence is impeachment proceeding. Following theprinciple ofreddendo singuala, sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished from theterm proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided bythe Senate.

The above-quoted provision provides that the House, by a vote of 1/3 of all its members,can bring a case to the Senate. I is in that sense that the House has exclusive power toinitiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is


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made to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arrive at aconclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate comes from the Latin wordINITIUM, which means to begin. ON the other hand, proceeding is a progressive pronoun. Ithas a beginning, middle and end. It takes place not in the senate but in the House, andconsists of several steps.1) there is filing of a verified complaint by either Member of the House, or by a private

citizen, endorsed by any Member of the House,2) there is a processing of the complaint by the proper committee of Justice, who mayreject or uphold the complaint.3) whatever the action of the Committee, the resolution must be forwarded to the House forfurther processing.4) there is a similar processing of the same complaint by the whole House which eitheraffirms or overrides the decision of the Committee, by a vote of 1/3 of all the members.

If at least 1/3 of the members upholds the complaint, the Articles of Impeachment areprepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House initiates anIMPEACHMENT CASE. It is at this point that a public officer is SUCCESSFULLY IMPEACHED.

In short, INITIATED AN IMPEACHMENT CASE = SUCCESSFULLY IMPEACHED =

SUCCESSFULLY CHARGED WITH AN IMPEACHMENT CASE BEFORE THE SENATE.

Fr. B further explains that the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the complaintis transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House of the proceeding,and the beginning of another proceeding, which is the TRIAL. Also, the impeachmentproceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution on to it by theCommittee because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the Houseis already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, THEPROCEEDING IS INITIATED OR BEGINS WHEN A VERIFIED COMPLAINT IS FILED ANDREFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE FOR ACTION. This is the initiating step.

The one year bar simply means that NO SECOND VERIFIED COMPLAINT may be accepted orreferred to the Committee on Justice for action more than once within the period of oneyear. This interpretation is founded on common understanding of the meaning of toinitiate which means to begin. (also because the consti was ratified by common people).

Thus, it is without doubt that the term to initiate refers to the filing of the impeachmentcomplaint couple with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. Since initiation takesplace by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to theHouse Committee on Justice, or by the filing of at least 1/3 (79) of the members of theHouse, the meaning of Sec 3(5) becomes clear.

** The House Rules on Impeachment ARE VOID. They clearly contravene ArtXI Sec 3(5)because their rules give the term initiate a meaning different from filing. **

7/27/2005 12:39:15 AM Last saved by pat(read original)


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269. ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO.

Impeachment

This is the same case where the assumption of GMA as president was challenged by

Erap. Flashback: Impeachment case for corruption was filed against Erap. The Impeachment

Court convened and when the senate voted against the opening of the 2nd envelope,allegedly containing damaging evidence against Erap, (showing that Estrada had moneyin a bank account under Jose Velarde), the prosecutors walked out.

The impeachment trial was postponed indefinitely and then there was Edsa 2.

Thereafter, criminal cases were filed against Erap before the Ombudsman.

When he resigned, it will be noted that the Senate passed a resolution, declaring the

impeachment court, FUNCTUS OFFICIO.

Erap contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the criminal cases since hehas not been convicted in the impeachment case.

SC:When impeachment proceedings have become moot and academic due to the resignation ofthe President, the proper criminal cases may now be filed against him. Since theimpeachment court was functus officio, it would be unreasonable to demand that he be firstimpeached then convicted before he may be criminally prosecuted. To do so would result tohis perpetual bar to prosecution. He would have been in a better situation than a non-sittingPresident, who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings, and yet he can be theobject of criminal prosecution.

Erap contends that he was not convicted in impeachment proceedings so he could not be

criminally prosecuted.

SC:The judgment in an impeachment case has a limited reach and the consequence of thejudgment. It extends only to the removal from office and disqualification to hold any otheroffice. The public officer is still liable to prosecution, and a conviction in the impeachmentcourt is not a condition sine qua non for this criminal prosecution.

Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during their period ofincumbency and tenure, but not beyond. Public office is a public trust. This constitutionalpolicy will be devalued if the Court would sustain the a non-sitting president enjoysimmunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

7/27/2005 12:39:15 AM Last saved by pat (see syllabus)


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270. ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGAN BAYANtanodbayan powers

Governor Zaldivar of Antiques sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and the

Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the hearing of his criminal case on theground that the case filed by Tanodbayan Gonzales was without legal and constitutionalauthority.

He contends that under the 1987 consti, only the Ombudsman has authority to file cases

before the Sandiganbayan. He prays for the restraining orders against Gonzales.

SC:Under the 1987 constitution, it is the Ombudsman, as distinguished from the Tanodbayan,that has the duty to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act oromission of a public official, when such appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.

The consti also provides that the Tanodbayan shall become known as the Office of theSpecial Prosecutor.

Since the duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (now the SpecialProsecutor), is clearly without the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and todirect the filing of the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, except if upon the orders ofthe Ombudsman.

Now, the Special Prosecutor Gonzales, is merely a subordinate of the Ombudsman, and caninvestigate and prosecute cases only upon the latters authority. The special prosecutor

cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do soby the Ombudsman. He also does not have the power of subpoena, because this was alsotransferred to the Ombudsman.

It is also incorrect to say that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as long as hehas not been replaced, for the fact is that he has never ever been the Ombudsman. TheOmbudsman is a new creation of the 1987 constituion, and is different from the tanodbayanunder PD 1607. The Special Prosecutor cannot have the right to hold a over a position ofOmbudsman, which he never held in the first place.

CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST ZALDIVAR NULLIFIED.SECRETARY GONZALEZ TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS ANDFILING CRIMINAL CASES.


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271. MACALINO VS. SANDIGAN BAYANsandigan bayan

Tan was charged with estafa thru falsification of official documents along with Macalino.

Macalino was then a manager at the treasury department of the PNCC, a GOCC. Tan wasthe owner of Wacker Marketing.

The 2 allegedly conspired to defraud the PNCC, in preparing applications for demand

drafts with PNB. Trial proceeded.

During the initial presentation of evidence, Macalino filed a MTD on the ground that the

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer. He contendsthat the PNCC, is not a GOCC with original charter. He also argues that public officers

under RA 3019 are defined as elective and appointive officials and employee, permanentor temporary, classified or unclassified, receiving compensation, even nominal, from thegovernment

ISSUE: Is Macalino, the employee of PNCC, a public officer?

SC: NO.Inasmuch as PNCC has no original charter, because it was incorporated under the generallaw on corporations, it follows that Macalino is NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER. Thus, theSandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the SB has jurisdictionover a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as co-principal,accomplice, or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime that is withinthe jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

CRIMINAL CASE IN THE SB DISMISSED.


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274. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Government, the GSIS decided to sell through public

bidding, 30-51% of the shares in Manila Hotel. This was to provide management expertise andfinancial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding, 2 bidders participated, 1) Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino

Corporation, and 2) Renong BHD a Malaysian firm connected with Sherator Hotels. MPHCs bid was P41.50 per share. Renong BHDs bid was P44 per share.

Under the bidding rules, the highest offer will be declared the winning bid.

Prior to the declaration of Renong BHD as the winner, MPHC offered to match the bid to P44 per

share. They sent a managers check for P33M to match the bid. GSIS refused to accept MPHCs matched bid since Renong BHD already won.

MPHC filed a case for prohibition for the issuance of TRO against Renong BHD.

MPHCs contends that under Article XII Se 10, the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino

nation and has practically become a historical monument (blah blah blah) sacredness and nobilityof independence (blah blah blah) that it has become part of national patrimony.

MPHC contends that since 51% carries with the ownership of the hotel, any transaction covering

51% of shares of Manila Hotel will clearly be covered by the term national economy. (thus, itshould be owned by Filipinos, not foreigners)

MPHC also contends that because Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony, it should be preferred

after it has matched the bid of Renong BHD. (They argue that the rules provide for matchingbids).

GSIS argued that:1) Art XII Sec 10 is merely a statement of principle and policy and that it is not self-executing.2) Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony since it refers only to lands of publicdomain . (see Sec 2 of Art XII). GSIS argues that the fact that so many famous guests have slept in

the hotel and that many events have transpired there does not make the hotel a patrimony of thenation.3) Granting that the Manila Hotel is national patrimony, what is being sold is only 51% of the shares,not the actual hotel building nor the land upon which it stands. Certainly, 51% equity cannot becounted as national patrimony.4) The provision on matching bids should apply only if for any reason the winning bidder cannot beawarded. Here, Renong BHD could still very well be awarded the shares, so there is no point inrecognizing matching bids yet.

SC: SEC 10 ARTICLE XII IS SELF EXECUTING!!!It is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelinesor implement laws for its enforcement. When the constitution mandates that the grant of rights,privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preferenceto Filipinos, it just simply means that QUALIFIED FILIPINOS SHALL BE PREFERRED.

SC: THE MANILA HOTEL IS A LIVING TESTIMONIAL TO PHILIPPINE HERITAGE (blah blah).The patrimony of the nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our richnatural resources but also to the CULTURAL HERITAGE OF OUR RACE. It also refers to our intelligencein arts, sciences and letter. Therefor, we should develop not only our lands, forests mines and othernatural resources but also the MENTAL ABILITY OF OUR PEOPLE. It is the GRAND OLD DAME OFHOTELS IN ASIA.

The term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refersnot only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as it could have very well used the term natural


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resources, but instead it used patrimony, which meant, it included the cultural heritage of theFilipinos.

How has it become a landmark?.it was called the cultural center of the 1930s..it was the site for inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth..it is the official guest house of the Philippine Government, playing host to dignitaries and official

visitors (who are accorded the traditional Filipino Hospitality) (see footnote for list).it was converted by the Japanese as a military headquarters..it was renovated and reaped international recognitions, an acknowledgement of Filipino talent andingenuity..it was also the site of a failed coup detat.For more than 8 decades, the Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, lovesand frustrations of the Filipinos. (blah blah blah blah blah) Its existence is impressed with publicinterest, its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty independence and nationhood.THE MANILA HOTEL HAS BECOME PART OF OUR NATIONAL ECONOMYAND PATRIMONY.

Even if what is sold is merely the equity of 51%, it comes within the purview of the constitutionalprovision for it comprises the majority or controlling stock. Anyone who acquires it will have ACTUALCONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THE HOTEL. Hence the 51% EQUITY CANNOT BE DISSOCIATEDWITH THE HOTEL AND THE LAND ITSELF.

The framers also used the word shall instead of must (the state shall give preference toqualified Filipinos) This embodies the so-called Filipino First Policy. That means that Filipinos shouldbe given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges, and rights covering national patrimony.Further, the word qualified is inserted. the preference shall be given to those who can makecontribution to the common good because of CREDIBLE COMPETENCE AND EFFICIENCY. (It certainlydoes not mandate the Filipino First Policy when the Filipino citizens or organizations are incompetentor inefficient).

Here, MPHC was considered by GSIS to be a qualified bidder, in accordance with its guidelines. MPHChas been found to have proven management expertise in the hotel industry.

Also, even if Renong BHD offered the highest bid, it is NOT YET THE WINNING BIDDER. The rulesprovide that the highest bidder shall be declared the winning bidder only after it has negotiated and

executed the necessary contracts. Since the Filipino First Policy bestows preference to qualifiedFilipinos, the MERE TENDING OF HIGHEST BID IS NOT AN ASSURANCE THAT THE HIGEST BIDDERWILL BE DECLARED THE WINNER.Before GSIS could award the winning bidder, it has to abide first by the dictates of the Constitution.After all, all bidders are presumed to know the provisions of our Constitution.

Also, under the Bidding Rules, the provision of allowing to match the highest bid must be UPHELD ifwe are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy. Thus, Filipino bidders should be allowed to

match the bid of a foreign entity. The constitutional policy is A SUFFICIENT REASON not to awardthe block of shares to a foreigner notwithstanding its giving of the highest bid. The FilipinoFirst Policy is the strongest reason.

The court understands that their decision may discourage foreign investors. But the

Constitution is always understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are givenfactors which investors must consider when venturing into business.

Privatization may enhance business viability but it should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial objective should not be pursued at the expense of nationalpride and dignity. Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being ademocratic and republican state. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the peoplemust be the goal. (hmmm??)


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We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property. We are talking about a historic relic!A place with a history of grandeur!! (blah blah blah)7/28/2005 12:12:25 AMLast saved by pat

PUNO DISSENTS. Article XII Sec 10 should be pro-Filipino but NOT ANTI-ALIEN! (alien!!!) It should be

pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos but it is not-anti alien as to absolutelybar aliens the grant of rights, privileges and concessions.

Also, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos must be balanced with

the need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners, ifnecessary.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of preferential right. I

submit that the preference of a Filipino bidder arises only if it ties the bid of theforeign bidder.

While the Filipino First Policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand

that we wrong an alien! Our policy maker can write laws giving favored treatment toFilipinos, but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws. Afterthe laws are written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and Foreignersalike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects against all unfairness.We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigners.

PANGANIBAN DISSENTS: The majority opinion constitutes UNADULTERATED JUDICIAL LEGISLATION. Bidding

becomes a ridiculous sham WHERE NO FILIPINO CAN LOSE AND WHERE NOFOREIGNER CAN WIN!!


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275. TELEBAP VS. COMELEC

This was a prior case where BP 881 required radio and television to give free

Comelec time for the use of candidates for campaigning during the elections. GMA claims it has been suffering losses because of this. (P22M) It claims that the

law amounts to taking of private property without just compensation.

SC:BP 881 was a regulatory scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates in anelection in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns.A=All broadcasting whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Afranchise is a privilege among other things. It is subject to amendment by Congress inaccordance with the consti provision that any franchise or right granted shall be subject toamendment, alteration, repeal by Congress WHEN THE COMMON GOOD SO REQUIRES.

Thus, the amendment of franchise is not a taking of property without just compensation.What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free airtime forthe benefit not only of the candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters,so that they will be fully informed of the issues in the election!? IT IS THE RIGHT OF THEVIEWERS, NOT THE RIGHT OF THE BROADCASTERS, THAT IS PARAMOUNT.

In truth, the broadcasting companies which are given the franchises DO NO OWN THE

AIRWAAVES AND FREQUENCIES. They are merely given temporary privilege of usin them.Since a franchise is a mere privilege, it may be reasonably be burdened with theperformance by the grantee of SOME PUBLIC SERVICE.

The claim that they would be losing advertising revenues is based on the assumption thatairtime is a finished product, which has become the property of the company (like oilproduced from refining). But as we have said, Airtime is not owned by broadcastcompanies.)

Also, BP881 does not amend the petitioners franchise, but is merely an enforcement of aduty VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED BY GMA, IN ACCEPTING A PUBLIC GRANT OF PRIVILEGE.Comelectime should be considered part of the public service time which the stations arerequired to furnish the government for the dissemination of public information, under their

Franchise.

(see orig for other arguments)

PANGANIBAN, DISSENTS The invocation of the COMMON GOOD odes not excuse the unbridled and clearly

excessive taking of a franchisees property. IT IS THE STATE WHICH DOES NOT OWNTHE AIRWAVES, but merely allocates and regulates its use. The state cannot extract


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any onerous or unreasonable post facto burdens from the franchisee without dueprocess and just compensation.

277. TATAD VS. SEC DOE

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA8180, or Oil Deregulation Law.

Brief History: 1971 there was no regulation of oil industry, oil companies were freeto enter

and exit the market. Then there was an oil crisis which prompted the creation of the Oil IndustryCommision. In 1973, Petron was created to break the control of foreigners in the local oil industry.In 1984, the OPSF was created to cushion the effects of changes in oil prices. 1987, the ERB wascreated to regulate the energy sector.

During the Ramos years, the thrust of the Philippine Energy Program was privatization and

deregulation. Petron was privatized, and the RA 8180 was enacted. Price controls were lifted.

OPSF was abolished. The petitioners argue (among many others) that the law violates Sec 19 Art XII which

provides that the State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.They argue that the law allows the formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell,the 3 existing oil companies.

The DOE on the other hand, argues that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage

new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is mean toguaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum. They argue that there are new players whohave entered the Philippines after deregulation and have captured 3-5%market share.

SC:The Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system. Sec 19 is anti-trust in history and inspirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition againstrestraint of trade and unfair competition, as well as the regulation of unmitigated monopolies.

Competition is thus the underlying principle of sec 19.

In a competitive economy, the market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how muchshall be produced, and on competition, among procedures to determine who will manufacture it.Competition alone can release the creative forces of the market. Ideally, it requires the presence ofnot one, not just a few, but several players.

In this case, it cannot be denied that our oil industry is operated an controlled by an oligopoly ofPetron Shell and Caltex. All other players belong to the Lilliputian league. The tariff differential of 4%works to their immense benefit by erecting a high barrier to the entry of new players.

New players would have to build refineries of their own, otherwise they would hve to increase theirproduct costs by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven filed. The argument that the 4% willinduce new players to invest in oil refineries is putting the cart before the horse. The first need is to

attract new players they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.

As to the inventory requirement, only PEtron Shell and Caltex could comply with it in view of theirexisting storage facilities. Prospective competitors will find it difficult to comply with the inventoryrequirement since the will first have to construct storage facilities and spend billions on it (otherwise itwould have to contend with the 4% increased production cost). Thus the cost of inventory scaresprospective entrants.


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As to the claim that there are new players, the alleged new players however do not belong to the classand category of Petron Caltex and Shell. There is still a lack of players with the comparable clout ofthe 3.

The law is therefore NULL AND VOID. The separability clause will not save it from unconstitutionality.The void provisions so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. Contrary to theintent of the provisions, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit

fair competition, encourage monopolistic powers and interfere with free interaction of market forces.Before deregulation, the 3 had no real competitiors, but did not have a free run of the market sincethere was government control of pricing. Now after deregulation, the 3 still had no real competitiorsand yet are no longer subject to government control. Thus RA8180 provides for a deregulated marketwhere competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.276. TANADA VS. ANGARA

This was the case on the WTO. the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as

articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving"Philippine access to foreign markets. especially its major trading partners, through the reductionof tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products."

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines 'Io place nationals and products of

member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO-intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the SupremeCourt, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandateof the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectivelycontrolled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote thepreferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Simply stated, does the Philippines Constitution prohibit Philippine particioation in orldwide trade

liberazation and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a globaleconomy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying

(1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate inthe ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for theprohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of publicfunds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of governmentproperties and resources by respondent heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.

FACTS: On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and

Industry (Secretary Navarro fr brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco the Final Act. Embodying the Results of the UruguayRound of Multilateral Negotiation ( Final Act, for brevity).

By signing the Final Act,2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:

"(a) to submit, as approciate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their

respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordancewith their procedures and

(b0 to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the

President of the Philippines.4 On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate

adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the AgreementEstablishing the World Trade Organization."5

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is

hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the Presidentof the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization."6

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the

Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) andthree (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof "


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On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO

Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations andDecisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

--0ARGUMENTS: Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating

"economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment"

clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in theMinisterial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in FinancialServices.

It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the

WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing asFilipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. Theyallegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutionalconflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on thePhilippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrativeprocedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements.20 Petitioners furtherargue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play innational development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domesticmaterials and locally produced goods.

On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter

provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalisticportions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should berelated to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof, (3) that readproperly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution, and (4) that the WTOAgreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines fromthe harshness of sudden trade liberalization

ISSUES:(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISESTATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NOJURISDICTION?(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXESCONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE 11, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII. OF THE PHILIPPINECONSTITUTION?(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITSANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS INFINANCIAL SERVICES?

SC:In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch isseriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the dutyof the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.

We should stress that, in deciding to take Jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review thewisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or passupon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will itrule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing /removing tariffs, taxes,subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise itsconstitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreementand its three annexes.

SC:


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These principles in Article 2 are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcementthrough the court.23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power ofjudicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case ofKilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato.24 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II andsome sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise toa cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights butguidelines for legislations."

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII. apart from merely laying down general principlesrelating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to theother sections in said article, especially Secs. I and 13 thereof which read:"Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nationfor the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life forall, especially the underprivileged.In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be givenoptimum opportunity to develop. x x xxxxx x x x x xSec. 13. The State pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms andarrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity."

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, etal.,31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementinglaws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation toput it in operation. It is per se Judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itselfstates, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions coveringnational economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers toexceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII isselfexecuting or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions inthe Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. Andwe hold that there are.

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor andenterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world

on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only againstforeign competition and trade practices that are unfair.32 In other words, the Constitution did notintend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services inthe development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimitedentry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. Infact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreigncompetition that is unfair.

Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and tradepractices including antidumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against importsurges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can availof these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, localindustries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of theeconomy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have

been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, therespondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer theship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be setaside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simplybecause we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction ofthis case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economicpolicy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed graveabuse of discretion.


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Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy"35 doesnot necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither"economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community.""Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware ofoverdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky oreconomic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in

such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities."36The WTO reliance on "most favored nation." "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination"cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity thatapply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality andreciprocity,"37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic andforeign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic tradeenvironment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete withthe best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have showncapability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipinoentrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and toprosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nordoes it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total

proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims tomake available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the worldat the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favorthe general welfare of the public at large. The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls"by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoralexercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements basedon grave abuse of discretion.

----there was also an argument that the WTO GATT infringes on the power to tax by Congress.

SC:Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the restof the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy ofpeace, equality, Justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."43 By the doctrine ofincorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which areconsidered to be automatically part of our own laws.44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rulesin international law is pacta sunt servanda - international agreements must be performed in goodfaith, "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation onthe parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in itslegislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligationsundertaken."45By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By theirvoluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greaterbenefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live withcoequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree tolimit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact

and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitationsimposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed bytreaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. Theage of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here."47-----As to the concurrence by Senate:A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture is an instrument which records the winding up of theproceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiariesattending the conference."54 It is not the treaty itself It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a


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protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the "Final ActEmbodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in justone page55 in Vol. I of the 36volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signingsaid Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competentauthorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act requiredfrom its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. The MinisterialDeclarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. The WTO Agreementitself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts,58

Last saved by pat 7/28/2005 9:53:51 AM

278. CARINO VS. CHRCommission on Human Rights

Some 800 public school teachers (members of the MPSTA) initiated a mass concerted

action on a Monday, a class day, to dramatize their plight resulting from the failure of

public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from the classes, and converging a the

Liwasang Boniface, gathering in peaceable assemblies The Secretary of Education, Isidro Carino, issued a RETURN TO WORK ORDER within 24

hours, or they will face dismissal. The respondents failed to heed the RTW order, and were administratively charged. They

were also preventively suspended for 90 days. Their motion to suspend was denied by the investigating committee. Their MR was also

denied. Eventually, a decision was rendered against the respondents. Some weredismissed, while others were suspended.

They filed a certiorari with the RTC. But it was dismissed. They went up to the SC,

claiming a violation of their rights to peaceably assembly. The SC directed them to take

their appeal to the CSC first. In the meantime, the also filed a complaint with the CHR, complaining that when they

participated in the mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements asteachers allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons unknown to them.

The CHR conducted its own investigation. The CHR subpoenaed Secretary Carino and

other school superintendents. Sec. Carino filed a MTD, on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action

because the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case. CHR denied the MTD. It made clear that it does not feel bound by the SCs decision and

that it was bound to hear and decide the case on the merits. (whether or not the massactions constitute a strike) (whether the mass actions are justified) The CHR intendsthat it will try and decide or hear and determine or exercise jurisdiction over the

teachers case. It intends to adjudicate, to determine with character of finality anddefiniteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by Sec. Carino(in the admin case) and currently subject of appeal.

ISSUE: Does the CHR have the power to act like a court of justice, or even as a quasi-judicial agency? Does it have adjudicatory powers?

SC: NONE.


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The SC declares that the CHR has no such powers. It was not meant to be another court orquasi-judicial agency. The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudicativepower is that it may INVESTIGATE, (RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT) asregards claimed human rights violations, involving civil and political rights. BUT FACT-FINDING IS NOT ADJUDICATION. It cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court ofjustice, or even a quasi-judicial agency. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining

therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.

To be considered a judicial function, the reception of evidence and making factualconclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority ofapplying the law tothose factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determinedauthoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may

be provided for by law. THIS FUNCTION, the CHR DOES NOT HAVE.

Under the Constitution, the CHR was created as an independent office. Under its powers,the Constitution grants the CHR the power to investigate all forms of human rightsviolations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiativeor on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules as itmayadopt, and in case of violation of its rules of procedure, cite for contempt. In the course of

any investigation conducted by it, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any personwhose testimony or whose possession of evidence is necessary to determine the truth. Itmay also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, agency in theperformance of its functions.BUT IT CANNOT TRY AND DECIDE CASES. To investigate is not to adjudicate. Whether inthe popular or technical meaning, these terms are different. The purpose of an investigationis to discover and find out, and obtain information. Nowhere included is the notion ofsettling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by applicationof the law to the facts established in inquiry. To adjudicate means to determine finally.

Hence, the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and should not try andresolve cases on the merits. (or adjudicate). It cannot do so even if there be a claim that in

the administrative disciplinary proceedings under Sec. Isidro, their human rights had beentransgressed.

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of DECS, being within the scopeof its disciplinary powers. This is also within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC, and SC.

In the end, the investigation done by the CHR would serve no useful purpose. If itsinvestigation should result in conclusions contrary to that of the Sec of DECS, it would haveno power to reverse that decision. Reversal thereof can only be done by the CSC and lastlyby the SC. The only thing that the CHR can do, is to refer the matter to the appropriategovernment agency (CSC) to inform it of the Secs error.


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279. EPZA VS. CHR

PD1980 was issued creating the Cavite EPZ. Before EPZA could take possession of the

area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural productswithout permission from the EPZA.

To convince the intruders to depart, EPZA paid P10,000 to those willing to accept and

sign a quitclaim. Valles was one of them.

10 years later, she filed a complaint with the CHR complaining of their eviction. She

claims that a bulldozer and crane leveled their area, and they did not stop when Vallesshowed a copy of a letter from the President allegedly postponing the bulldozing. In fact,Valles claims that the EPZA engineers said, The President in Cavite is Gov. Remulla!!!

CHR issued an order of injunction, commanding the EPZA and Gov. Remulla to desis

from their acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further orders from theCHR. They were also asked to appear before the CHR.

Gov. Remulla again bulldozed the area 2 weeks later. CHR issued another injunction order.

EPZA filed with the CHR a motion to lift the injunction since it had no authority to issue

one. CHR denied. EPZA filed a certiorari and prohibition against CHR.

ISSUE: Does CHR have the power to issue injunction or restraining order against supposedhuman rights violators?

SC: NONE.The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legalaid to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated should not be construed

as conferring jurisdiction to issue a TRO or writ of injunction. Jurisdiction is conferred onlyby the Consituttion or by law. It is never derived by implication.

The preventive measures mentioned in the Constitution simply refers to the remedieswhich the CHR MAY SEEK FROM THE PROPER COURTS IN BEHALF OF THE VICTIMS. Notbeing a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction t issue the writ, for a writ ofinjunction may be issue only by the judge of any court.

8/1/2005 5:57:09 PM Last saved by pat


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280. GARCIA VS. FACULTYacademic freedom

(another case by Justice Fernando..sorry kung medyo magulo)

Garcia was enrolled at the Loyola School of Theology (LST) for MA Theology. Later, when

she was to enroll for the first sem, LST informed her that she is barred from re-admission to the school. The reason for her denial of admission was (as relayed to herby Fr. Antonio Lambino SJ) that the faculty found her questions too frequent and notalways pertinent to the subject matter, and that it had the effect of slowing down theprogress of the class (much like delaying tactics sa law school). Finally she was told thatshe should find a faculty that is more compatible with her orientation. She was referredto UST.

At UST, she was informed that she could enroll for Ecclesiastical Studies but all in all it

would take 4 to 5 years more, whereas if she continued in LST, it would take only 2

more years. Fr. Lambino on the other hand contends that while she was enrolled at the LST, the

degree is really granted by Ateneo (because LST is in collaboration with ADMU). Laystudents admitted to the LST have to take up courses which should be officially admittedby the Dean of the Grad School of Ateneo, in order for them to be considered asadmitted to the degree program. Fr. Lambino argues that Garcia , even if she wasenrolled at LST, no acceptance by the Dean of Ateneo was given. This means that shewas not in fact accepted to the degree program, but was merely allowed to take somecourses during the summer for credit. Furthermore, Garcia did not have to pay a singlecent, because she was allowed to take it free of charge. Hence, Fr. Lambino claims thereis no duty on its part to admit Garcia for the next sem.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia can compel the Admissions Committee of Loyola School of

Theologyto continue her study.

SC:Mandamus wrong remedy. There is no clear duty to admit Garcia because she is obvsioulynot studying for priesthood since she is a lay person and a woman. Even granting that sheis qualified for priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of LST to admit her, since theschool has the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitation of space,facilities, professors, class size, etc. What the student possesses is a privilege rather than aright.


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Furthermore, the constitution recognizes institutions of higher learning to enjoy academicfreedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studiesin his particular speciality and thereafter make known or publish the result of his endeavorswithout fear that retribution would be visited on him, in the event that his conclusions arefound distasteful or objectionable. (parang thesis).

Another view of academic freedom is that the school decides for itself its aims andobjectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interferenceexcept when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere ofautonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.

There are the 2 kinds of academic freedom, ie 1) autonomy of the university, and 2)freedom of the individual university teacher. The conditions for academic freedom in auniversity are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the followingfunctions:

1) admission and exam of students2) curricula for courses of study

3) appointment and tenure of office of academic staff4) allocation of income among different categories of expenditure.

It is the business of a university to provide the atmosphere most conducive to speculation,experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 4 essential freedoms,

to determine on academic grounds1) WHO MAY TEACH,

2) WHAT MAY BE TAUGHT,3) HOW SHALL IT BE TAUGHT,

4) WHO MAY BE ADMITTED TO STUDY. Justice Frankfurter

The LST acknowledge t

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