POLIREV SET 1 FINAL.docx

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CASE 1:

Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) vs. Commission on Human

Rights

[GR 155336, 25 November 2004]

Second Division, Chico-Nazario (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act 8522, otherwise known as the General

Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional

Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the

Commission on Human Rights (CHR). These special provisions tackles Organizational Structure and

the Use of Savings. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then

Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Reciña and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V.

Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution A98-047 n 04 September

1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the

Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla

positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four

Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the

Office of the Commissioners. On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for

the upgrading or raising of salary grades of certain positions in the Commission. It, likewise,

provided for the creation and upgrading of other positions. To support the implementation of such

scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount

generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution A98-062 dated 17

November 1998, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source

of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four

Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget

and Management (DBM) with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin

Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification

scheme, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum

dated 29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be

rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of

the Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association (CHREA), in representation of the rank

and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the

CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with

appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and

upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a

Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office

that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-

Central Office denied the same on 9 June 2000. Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM

and the CSC, CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the

pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and

reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s

fiscal autonomy. The CHREA filed the petition for review.

Issue: (1)Whether or not CHREA is a proper party to bring the suit in Court.

(2)Whether or not CHR is a constitutional Commission and as such enjoys fiscal

autonomy.

Held: (1) It has been held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is

in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, CHREA, which

consists of rank and file employees of CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions

benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the

demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the

CHR’s upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission’s savings

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or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the

benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived. Further, the personality

of the CHREA to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA’s

request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s

personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits

of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled

jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,

justice, and due process.

(2) The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.20

Palpably, the Court of Appeals' Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

CASE 2:

JELBERT B. GALICTO vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012EN BANCFACTS:

Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). He is currently holding the position of Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA.

Respondent Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic of the Philippines (Pres. Aquino).

Based on findings that “officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 “urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].”

Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled “Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes.” He issued EO 7 and has the duty of implementing it. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.

EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees.

Respondent Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. is the incumbent Executive Secretary and, as the alter ego of Pres. Aquino, is tasked with the implementation of EO 7. Respondent Florencio B. Abad is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) charged with the implementation of EO 7.

The petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth , he “ stands to be prejudiced by EO 7 , which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCCS and curtails the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation. The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.

The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies. The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection.

They claim that the President exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages. In addition, EO 7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI employees.

Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known as the “GOCC Governance Act of 2011.” Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner lacks locus standi. Whether or not Petition has been mooted by supervening events. (Enactment of RA10149)

HELD:


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We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by subsequent events.

On Issue #1 Locus Standi: --- GALICTO HAS NO LOCUS STANDI.“Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial

interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question” when (1) he

can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected

by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."

In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.

On Issue # 2: Moot and Academic --- THE PETITION HAS BEEN MOOTED BY SUPERVENING EVENTS.

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

The new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without any legal constraints.

A moot case is “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.” “[A]n action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events.”

This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly

empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., “the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on

an issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a ‘flesh and blood’ case for the Court to resolve.”

CASE 3:

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS),

pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50

dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and

outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18

September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a

Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per

share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for

the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the

execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong

Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the

matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and

consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits

that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a

historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud

legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of

independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all

intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that

since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which

is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel

business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of

the national economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional


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provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to

the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to

play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture.

This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine

Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of

being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the

Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE

HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at

P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and

deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the

51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching

bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of

the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and

needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that

qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to

fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling

stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural

heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as

pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from

granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also

argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the

former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

CASE 4:

Kilosbayan v Guingona Jr.

G.R. No. 11375; May 5, 1994

Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 1 of its charter, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. The office of the president approved “Contract of Lease” with, respondent Philippine gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the installation, establishment and the operation of online lottery and telecommunication systems required and/or authorized under the said contract.

Petitioners questioned the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of RA 1169, as amended by BP 42 which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign”. Petitioners further contend that PGMC is a 75% foreign or controlled corporation and therefore cannot be granted a franchise to establish a telecommunications network pursuant to Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner have legal standing to file the petition at bench.

HELD: YES. In line with the liberal policy of the court on loans stand; ordinary taxpayers, members of congress, and even association of planters and non profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before the court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. The petition at bench is of transcendental importance to the public; the issues raised are of paramount public interest and of category even higher than those involved in other case.

CASE 5:

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.

FACTS: Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice submitted 2 memoranda asking the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure.

This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.


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The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.

Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula claiming that he Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.

ISSUE: whether or not COA must respect the fiscal autonomy and judicial independence of the Supreme Court?

HELD: The court found Atty. Candelaria’s recommendation to be well-taken. It is true that COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. But this authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

However court emphasized and discussed the Separation of Powers among the 3 branches of the government and Judicial Independence of the Supreme Court.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch. Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions

free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence." Decisional independence "refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law. On the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government. Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body.

Individual judicial independence which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear – or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear – criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.

According to the court a truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. Our Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained. All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly stating the Court’s powers, but also by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of government to interfere with the Court’s affairs.

Court added that Fiscal Autonomy is one of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government.

When it comes to scope and extent of fiscal autonomy, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders.


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By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.

The court ruled that the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs. Therefore the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Court reasoned that Full autonomy, among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.

CASE 6:

Sanidad vs. Comelec

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991

calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to

resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement, the

powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by

the President of his present powers.

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,

Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the

provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of

votes in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite

relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full

text of which is quoted in the footnote below.

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating

the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The

Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of

the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a

constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the

people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following

amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have

the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced Prohibition

with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and

conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect

Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as

well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise,

control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent

President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a

consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?

2. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed

therefor a sufficient and proper submission?


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HELD:

Issue 1 – Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the

Constitution?

As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National

Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter

fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment,

the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.

Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in

the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to the dictates of

the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be

within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power

of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is

yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim

Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to

propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross

legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a

constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim

National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the

urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf

of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.

Issue 2 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame

allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date

when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months

after the approval of such amendment or revision."

CASE 7:

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), et al. vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, et al.

G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012

MENDOZA, J.: EN BANC

FACTS: The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND

For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder – P 8,327,000,000.00

X x x x x

Special Provision

1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.

According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. Verily, the power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, "does not include the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive Department." By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.

ISSUE: whether or not the implementation of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004) by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.


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RULING: NO. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, the Court held that:

Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one, which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard.

**Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch, which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel.

CASE 8:

Santiago v. COMELEC

270 SCRA 106

March 19, 1997

Facts: Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to amend the constitution, to lift term limits of Elective officials, by People’s amendments to the constitution granted under

Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission of this proposition to the people—“Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art. VI, Section 4 of Art. VII, and section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?”

The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, The IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.

Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and Delfin’s Petition to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative under sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments;

1. The Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by congress. No such law has been passed.

2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

3. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the “conduct of initiative on the constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws”, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or amendments to the Constitution are concerned since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

4. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of the people’s initiative.

5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose.

The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and granted the Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.

ISSUE: 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision?

2. Whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said constitutional provision?

3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?


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4.Whether the lifting of the term limits of elective national and local officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an amendment to the Constitution?

HELD: NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Although said Act intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that system and accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing the Constitutional changes.

2. NO. the COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is void, as expressed in the Latin maxim “Potestas delegate non delagari potest”. In every case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the delegation itself is valid.

3. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and nationals is an amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the petition was granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

CASE 9:

Jovito Salonga vs. Hon. Ernani Paño etc.

G.R. No. L-59524

February 18, 1985

Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

FACTS:

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. One Victor Burns Lovely Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room in Manila. Police and military authorities found in Lovely’s possession several pictures taken sometime in May 1980, at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held in the latter’s residence in Los Angeles. Petitioner Jovito Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in those pictures, which also includes, Lovely.

As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought to AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the NISA. Shortly afterwards, Mr. Victor Burns Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives and damage to property.

September, 1980 when bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila causing injuries to a number of persons and properties. On same month, the President’s anniversary television radio conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Burns Lovely, Romeo was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driver his elder brother, Victor to Jovito Salonga’s residence in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980 and the second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980.

The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating that petitioner had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.

On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila, name Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. Another bomb has exploded on October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech at the PICC. Within the next 24-hours, arrest, search and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who are apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner, Jovito Salonga. Victor Lovely offered himself to be a “state witness”.

On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center, where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.

On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed “under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga” still without the benefit of any investigation or charges.


Page 10 of 26

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” stating the date and time of his investigation. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despiae assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by Judge Advocate General’s Office to the Ministry of Justice.

On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violated RA No. 1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP Blg 31, in relation to Article 142 of the RPC.

On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conference and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye.

Petitioner Jovito Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since the, he has suffered serious disabilities.

On October, 15, 1981, the counsel for petitoner filed a motion to dismiss the charged against petitioner for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. However, the respondent judge denied the motion.

On January 4, 1982, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including herein petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that the prosecution to justify the filing of information against him has established no prima facie case. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines.

The respondent call to adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari.

ISSUE:

Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently over the presumption of innocence and warrant his conviction?

HELD:

The Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner.

The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Tañada, one of the brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course negate personal knowledge on his part.

Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place.

In the issue presented by the prosecution for the procedural issue, infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be


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free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him.

Furthermore, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged "participation" in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely and Tañada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.

However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the "activities" of petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:

On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements declared: 'To the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.

It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances sufficient for a finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of force and for that purpose it has linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to rely on aliens for its supporters and financiers.

The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States is not only inexplicable but without foundation.

The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined.

The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his

many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posed with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the picture proves nothing.

It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.

The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts.

We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

CASE 10:

Tañada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18

FACTS

On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations, agreeing on behalf of the RP, to submit the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities. On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97, concurring in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.


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ISSUES

1. Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its 3 annexes contravene Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Philippine Constitution?

Petitioners' argue that the "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution.

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof.

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community."

2. Do the Provisions of said agreement and its annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by the Congress?

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.

By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pactasuntservanda — international

agreements must be performed in good faith. . "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.

The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

3. Do said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial power by the SC in promulgating rules on evidence?

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.

The requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.

By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue — derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.

4. Was the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its annexes sufficient, and/or valid, considering that it did not include the final act, ministerial declarations and decisions, and the understanding on commitments in financial services?

(The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof." The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.)

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and


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Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion.

"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years.

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.

CASE 11

SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R No. 159085

FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation on July 27, 2003, the President issued Proclamation No. 427, declaring a state of rebellion and General Order No. 4, directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress rebellion. The Oakwood occupation ended on the evening of the same day but the President did not lift the State of Rebellion. She only did on August 1, 2003through Proclamation No. 435. Several petitioners questioned Proclamation No. 427 on the ground that such act of the President was an unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power. The petitioners include Sanlakas and PartidoManggagawa, Social Justice Society, Rep.Sulpico and Sen. Pimentel.The Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President violated the Constitution when she issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4

HELD: No.The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII.

Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.

The Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State.

Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987

CASE 12:

DETAILED DIGEST: (Sorry ang haba kasi ng case sobra, pero may maikling version ako sa dulo. J.)

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID et. al. vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et. al.

G.R. 171396

May 3, 2006

FACTS:

1. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency as accorded in the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The Pres.. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief as provided in Sec. 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. Accordingly, by virtue of the powers vested to her under the Constitution as Pres. of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, she hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; PGMA (through the SolGen) cited that the proximate cause behind the declaration was the circumstances and intercepted information that there are conspiracy among some military officers (Magdalo Group), leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat and/or assassinate Pres. Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the Pres. and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

2. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after and after all these petitions had been filed, the Pres. lifted PP 1017 by issuing Proclamation No. 1021.

3. Thereafter, 7 petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality the said PP and G.O. Petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5:


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a) The Office of the Pres. announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies. As such, Members of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU while staging a rally near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police, citing PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.

b) Police also arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist, and other known lefties and political oppositions such as Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Satur Ocampo (BayanMuna) Retired Gen. Monatano (Phil Constabulary) Teddy Casiño, etc.

c) Operatives of the CIDG of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune, pro-opposition paper, Malaya and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. According to them, the raid is meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government."

Petition Ground for filing:

G.R. No. 171396Filed by Randolf S. David

(1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

G.R. No. 171409 Filed by Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co.

(1) challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." (2) they also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences,

G.R. No. 171485Filed by Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other Congressmen

(1) Usurpation of legislative powers, (2) Violation of freedom of expression (3) the act was a declaration of martial law, and (4) PGMA gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis.

G.R. No. 171483Filed by KMU and NAFLU-KMU G.R. No. 171400 Filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI)

(1) PGMA exercised the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.

G.R. No. 171489 Filed by Jose Cadiz et al.

(1) PP 1017 is an "arbitrary (2) unlawful exercise by the Pres. of her Martial Law powers. (3) arguendo it is not really a declaration of Martial Law, it amounts to an exercise by the Pres. of emergency powers without congressional approval.

G.R. No. 171424Filed by Loren B. Legarda

(1) Violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern

4. SolGen on his Consolidated Comment countered that:

a) The petitions should be dismissed for being moot as there was no actual case since the act was already lifted by PP 1021;

b) Petitioners in GR Nos. 171485 (Escudero et al.) 171483 (KMU et al.), 171400 (ALGI), 171489 (Cadiz et al.) and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing;

c) PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis;

d) PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances.

ISSUES:

1. PROCEDURAL:

a) WON the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.b) WON petitioners in GR Nos. 171485 (Escudero et al.) 171483 (KMU et al.), 171400

(ALGI), 171489 (Cadiz et al.) and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing; 2. SUBSTANTIVE:

a) WON the declaration and issuance of PP 1017 have factual bases.b) WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

o Facial Challengeo Constitutional Basiso As Applied Challenge

HELD:

1. PROCEDURAL

A. MOOT and ACADEMIC

The Court holds that Pres. Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it.

The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present:

a) there must be an actual case or controversy;b) petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and d) the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the

case itself.24

The respondent contended that since the act complained of was already lifted by PP 1021, the first requisite is lacking, that there cease to be an actual case or controversy and the case must be treated as moot and academic.

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, even moot and academic, if:

a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;b) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;c) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide

the bench, the bar, and the public;d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.


http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/may2006/gr_171396_2006.html#fnt24

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All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.

* An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;

*A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

B. LEGAL STANDING

The Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi, the issue being of “transcendental importance”.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest. Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."

However, in many cases already decided by this Court, locus standi being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance."

However, by way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Thus eventhough, Cadiz et a.l (who have failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as institution or its member may suffer), and Legarda (no personality as taxpayer as there are no allegation of illegal disbursement of pub funds) generally have no personality to file the petition, given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review. Hence, this Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

2. SUBSTANTIVE

A. FACTUAL BASES

Petitioners failed to show that Pres. Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.

A reading of the SolGen’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the Pres. was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Judging the seriousness of the incidents, Pres. Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

B. CONSTITUTIONALITY

Facial Challenge: A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

Facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored. A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must





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establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness, which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." However, llike overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.

Constitutional Basis: The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three (3) important provisions, thus:

i. First provision: Calling-out Power (Constitutional) "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"

Held: Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

ii. Second provision: “Take Care" Power (Unconstitutional) "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;"

Held: The petitioners assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Section 1, Article VI categorically states that legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

iii. Third provision: Power to Take Over (Unconsitutional) “In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.”

Held: Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to (1) declare "a state of national emergency" and (2) to exercise emergency powers. To the first, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Held: Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. (G.R. No. 171409) also contends that the term "emergency" refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane" and similar occurrences. Court rule that this a limited view of "emergency”. Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a)economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security.

As applied Challenge President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. It

mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence , the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal. The right of the petitioners against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, should not be violated. During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty.


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G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

DIGEST OF DIGEST: (Pang-gaya kong tamad J)

FACTS:1. On February 24, 2006, PGMA issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency as there were circumstances and intercepted information that there are conspiracy among some military officers (Magdalo Group), leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat and/or assassinate Pres. Arroyo.2. The 7 petitions were filed against constitutionality of PP 1017.3. One week after and after all the 7 petitions had been filed, the Pres. issued PP 1021 that declaring that state national emergency had ceased and so PP 1017 lifted.

ISSUES:1. WON the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2. WON petitioners have locus standi to file the case.

3. WON the declaration and issuance of PP 1017 have factual bases.

4. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 unconstitutional.

HELD:

1. The Court holds that Pres. Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, even moot and academic, if:

a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;b) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;

c) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;

d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.

2. Eventhough, Cadiz et a.l (who have failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as institution or its member may suffer), and Legarda (no personality as taxpayer as there are no allegation of illegal disbursement of pub funds) generally have no personality to file the petition, given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review

3. Petitioners failed to show that Pres. Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the SolGen’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the Pres. was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.Judging the seriousness of the incidents, Pres. Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

4. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet


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been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

CASE 13: #13 Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.

FACTS:On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.

On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her action.

On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.

Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301, 190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo's Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanao's inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.

ISSUE: Whether the court may rule on the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.

HELD: No, but it is not unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18.The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusinMaguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.

Two.Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus —

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the President and Congress respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it.


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But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill its duty without pre-empting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene without need of a call within 24 hours following the President's proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.

The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.

Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot and academic.

CASE 14:

G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN vs Sec. Ermita

Azcuna, J.

FACTS: The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further

assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.

The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.

As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the


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Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

ISSUE: WON B.P. 880 is unconstitutional

HELD: B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, it reiterates the basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny."

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.

CASE 15:

ROQUE, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R. No. 188456 September 10, 2009VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS: Petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award.

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national and local polls, however, came and went and were conducted still using purely manual elections. On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369 was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2007 elections, as funds were not appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due to time constraints.

RA 9369 calls for the creation of the Comelec Advisory Council (CAC). CAC is to recommend the most appropriate, applicable and cost-effective technology to be applied to the AES. To be created by Comelec too is the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) which is tasked to certify, through an established international certification committee, not later than three months before the elections, by categorically stating that the AES, inclusive of its hardware and software components, is operating properly and accurately based on defined and documented standards.

In August 2008, Comelec managed to automate the regional polls in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), using direct recording electronics (DRE) technology in the province of Maguindanao; and the optical mark reader/recording (OMR) system, particularly the Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS), in the rest of ARMM. What scores hailed as successful automated ARMM 2008 elections paved the way for Comelec, with some prodding from senators, to prepare for a nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local polls, with the many lessons learned from the ARMM experience influencing the technology selection for the 2010 automated elections.

Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released the Request for Proposal (RFP), also known as Terms of Reference (TOR), for the nationwide automation of the voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

To address the possibility of systems failure, the RFP required interested bidders to submit, among other things: a continuity plan and a back-up plan.

Under the two-envelope system designed under the RFP, each participating bidder shall submit, as part of its bid, an Eligibility Envelope that should inter alia establish the bidder’s eligibility to bid. On the other hand, the second envelope, or the Bid Envelope itself, shall contain two envelopes that, in turn, shall contain the technical proposal and the financial proposal, respectively.


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Subsequently, the Comelec Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC), earlier constituted purposely for the aforesaid project, caused the publication in different newspapers of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid for the procurement of goods and services to be used in the automation project. Meanwhile, Congress enacted RA 9525 appropriating some PhP 11.3 billion as supplemental budget for the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.

Under the RFP, among those eligible to participate in the bidding are manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a joint venture. A joint venture is defined as a group of two or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for a particular contract.

Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and Smartmatic, the former incorporated under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Smartmatic, on the other hand, was organized under the laws of Barbados. For a stated amount, said JV proposed to undertake the whole automation project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200 PCOS machines. Following the opening of the passing bidders’ Bid Envelope and evaluating the technical and financial proposals therein contained, the SBAC, declared the above-stated bid of the JV of TIM-Smartmatic as the single complying calculated bid. As required by the RFP, the bid envelope contained an outline of the joint venture’s back-up and continuity or contingency plans, in case of a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which shall result in the delay, obstruction or nonperformance of the electoral process.

After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC then directed the joint venture to undertake post-qualification screening, and its PCOS prototype machines––the Smarmatic Auditable Electronic System (SAES) 1800––to undergo end-to-end testing to determine compliance with the pre-set criteria.

In its Memorandum of June 01, 2009: Systems Evaluation Consolidated Report and Status Report on the Post-Qualification Evaluation Procedures, the SBAC Technical Working Group (TWG) stated that it was undertaking a 4-day (May 27 to May 30, 2009) test evaluation of TIM and Smartmatic’s proposed PCOS project machines. Its conclusion: "The demo systems presented PASSED all tests as required in the 26-item criteria specified in the [RFP]" with 100% accuracy rating.31 The TWG also validated the eligibility, and technical and financial qualifications of the TIM- Smartmatic joint venture.

On June 9, 2009, Comelec issued Resolution No. (Res.) 860832 authorizing the SBAC to issue, subject to well-defined conditions, the notice of award and notice to proceed in favor of the winning joint venture.

TIM and Smartmatic, pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), caused the incorporation of a joint venture corporation (JVC) that would enter into a contract with the Comelec. On July 8, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a certificate of incorporation in favor of Smartmatic TIM Corporation. On July 10, 2009, Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract for the lease of goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of PhP 7,191,484,739.48, payable as the "Goods and Services are delivered and/or progress is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments." On the same date, a Notice to Proceed was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM Corporation.

Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all intents and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009 Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract adverted to. Among others, petitioners pray that respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the automation project.

As a preliminary counterpoint, respondents question the legal standing or locus standi of petitioners.

Petitioners depicted the covering automation contract as constituting an abdication by the Comelec of its election-related mandate under the Constitution, which is to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Worse still, according to the petitioners, the abdication, is in favor of a foreign corporation that will be providing the hardware and software requirements. And when pressed further, petitioners came out with the observation that, owing in part to the sheer length of the ballot, the PCOS would not comply with Art. V, Sec. 2 of the Constitution prescribing secrecy of voting and sanctity of the ballot.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to sue. 2. Whether or not the automation constitutes a wholesale abdication of the COMELEC's constitutional mandate for law enforcement. 3. Whether or not the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot.

HELD: 1. YES. To have legal standing, one must, as a rule, establish having suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal government conduct; that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The prescription on standing, however, is a matter of procedure. Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court has often relaxed the rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens and taxpayers, when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. Where the issues of public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed.

2. NO. There is no abdication of Comelec’s mandate and responsibility. The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution86––and the Omnibus Election Code for that matter––relates to the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relating to the conduct of elections to public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral exercise. And how did petitioners come to their conclusion about their abdication theory? By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation contract, Comelec relinquished, so petitioners claim, supervision and control of the system to be used for the automated elections. To a more specific point, the loss of control arose from the fact that Comelec would not be holding possession of what in IT jargon are the public and private keys pair.

The Court is not convinced. There is to us nothing in Art 3.3 of the automation contract, even if read separately from other stipulations and the provisions of the bid documents and the Constitution itself, to support the simplistic conclusion of abdication of control pressed on the Court. Insofar as pertinent, Art 3.3 reads:

3.3 The PROVIDER shall be liable for all its obligations under this Project and the performance of portions thereof by other persons or entities not parties to this Contract shall not relieve the PROVIDER of said obligations and concomitant liabilities.SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track record in automatedelections, shall be in charge of the technical aspects of the counting and canvassing software and hardware, including transmission configuration and system integration. SMARTMATIC shall also be


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primarily responsible for preventing and troubleshooting technical problems that may arise during the elections.

The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in charge of the technical aspect of the counting and canvassing wares does not to us translate, without more, to ceding control of the electoral process to Smartmatic. It bears to stress that the aforesaid designation of Smartmatic was in fact an eligibility requirement imposed, should the bidder be a joint venture.

Art. 6.7 of the automation contract, providing:6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the Commission En Banc, the entire processes of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall be conducted by COMELEC’s personnel and officials, and their performance, completion and final results according to specifications and within the specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis added.)

But not one to let an opportunity to score points pass by, petitioners rhetorically ask: "Where does Public Respondent Comelec intend to get this large number of professionals, many of whom are already gainfully employed abroad?" The Comelec, citing Sec. 390 and Sec. 5 of RA 8436,91 as amended, aptly answered this poser in the following wise:

x x x COMELEC, in the implementation of the automated project, will forge partnerships with various entities in different fields to bring about the success of the 2010 automated elections.

Public respondent COMELEC will partner with Smartmatic TIM Corporation for the training and hiring of the IT personnel as well as for the massive voter-education campaign. There is in fact a budget allocation x x x for these undertakings. x x x

As regards the requirement of RA 9369 that IT-capable personnel shall be deputized as a member of the BEI and that another IT-capable person shall assist the BOC, public respondent COMELEC shall partner with DOST and other agencies and instrumentalities of the government.

In their respective Memoranda, public and private respondents categorically rejected outright allegations of abdication by the Comelec of its constitutional duty. The petitioners, to stress, are strangers to the automation contract. Not one participated in the bidding conference or the bidding proper or even perhaps examined the bidding documents and, therefore, none really knows the real intention of the parties. As case law tells us, the court has to ferret out the real intent of the parties. What is fairly clear in this case, however, is that petitioners who are not even privy to the bidding process foist upon the Court their own view on the stipulations of the automation contract and present to the Court what they think are the parties’ true intention.

The RFP/TOR used in the recent bidding for the AES to be used in the 2010 elections specifically mandated the use of public key cryptography. However, it was left to the discretion of the bidder to propose an acceptable manner of utilization for approval/acceptance of the Comelec. Nowhere in the RFP/TOR was it indicated that COMELEC would delegate to the winning bidder the full discretion, supervision and control over the manner of PKI [Public Key Infrastructure] utilization.

The role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining to their operation. As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its

operators would provide assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.

And if only to emphasize a point, Comelec’s contract is with Smartmatic TIM Corporation of which Smartmatic is a 40% minority owner, per the JVA of TIM and Smartmatic and the Articles of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM Corporation. Accordingly, any decision on the part or on behalf of Smartmatic will not be binding on Comelec. As a necessary corollary, the board room voting arrangement that Smartmatic and TIM may have agreed upon as joint venture partners, inclusive of the veto vote that one may have power over the other, should really be the least concern of the Comelec.

3. NO. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a "three feet" long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known.

The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created––to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the Comelec’s exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on Comelec’s part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

CASE 16:

GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (679 SCRA 614) 2012

FACTS:

These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu but because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.

The first case is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary restraining order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision rendered by the Office of the President, dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the


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Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition

primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The second case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside the Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and the Notice of Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President, the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.

On 23 August 2010, a dismissed police officer, former Manila Police District Police Senior Inspector (Captain) Rolando Del Rosario Mendoza, hijacked a tourist bus, and held hostage a group of twenty-one foreign tourists and four Filipino tour assistants.Mendoza was a bemedaled police official who served the Philippine National Police (PNP) for thirty years prior to his termination ordered by the Office of the

Ombudsman. For the liberty of his hostages, Mendoza’s lone demand was his reinstatement in service. Mendoza claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service.The 10-hour hostage drama ended with the murder of eight and the injury of seven. Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper.In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie.

The IIRC made the following findings:

Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration (with regard to his dismissal for having committed grave misconduct) to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.

When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final order resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by resolving the reconsideration that same day since it was already pending for nine months and the prescribed

period for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot resolve it that same day, then they should have acted decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once the reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of Mendoza for the hostage-taking. Had they done so, the crisis may have ended peacefully, without necessarily compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the negotiators, Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his demand for release of the final decision or reinstatement was met.But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.

In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than P 300 Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD:

For case GR No. 196231:

According to R.A. 6670, Section 8(2), grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:

Section 8.Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-

x xxx


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(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.

Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under

Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint.

Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative

supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service

Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).

In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally categorized into investigatory power, prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire and obtain information and the function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.50 In order to ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was provided with an over-all deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. However, well into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a provision for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military establishment was necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed forces of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have become the common soldiers' "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption and neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:

In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal association outside the chain of command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact, an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the rank and file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement of RAM has kept precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the implied accusation being that most of the resources are used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations dominated by enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual aid societies.This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment, just as it champions the common people against bureaucratic

indifference. The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary foot soldier get through with his grievance to higher authorities. This deputy will, of course work in close cooperation with the Minister of National Defense because of the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers, when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may not have to fall back on their own informal devices to obtain redress for their grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise troop morale in accordance with a major professed goal of the President and the military authorities themselves. x xx

The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the military establishment shall likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied) The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale


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and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.

Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political

independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."52 And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as "protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor

for that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman'sDeputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.

In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the Ombudsman's independence in this wise -The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and

prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.

However, the same discussion cannot be applied to the tragic hostage-taking incident, which was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action.

Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in his hands.Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed

upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.

Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than diligent performance of official duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall short of the constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust, considering the OP's factual findings of negligence and misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it appropriate to refer the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for further investigation of the charges in OP Case No. 10-J-460 and the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanctions, if any.

Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of backwages and benefits corresponding to the period of his suspension.

For Case GR No. 196232:


Page 26 of 26

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.

Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to remove her from office upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.

The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring that the change of plea under the PLEBARA was warranted and that it complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed the accused Major General Garcia to immediately convey in favor of the State all the properties, both real and personal, enumerated therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-gotten properties, ordered the corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of ownership of said properties to the Republic of the Philippines. In the meantime, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the Sandiganbayan that an Order70 had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on November 5, 2010 allowing the transfer of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as approved by the Sandiganbayan. Immediately after the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010 Resolution had been substantially complied with, Major General Garcia manifested71 to the Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness for sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife and two sons.

The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in

administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.

Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case."76 Hence, in light of the apparently strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.

The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the pending administrative proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left to the complete and effective resolution of the administrative case before the Office of the President.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.


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