Political Economy of Development Crises.How History Matters in the Congo

Simon HartmannAustrian Research Foundation for International

Development, Vienna

Andreas ExenbergerInstitute for Economic Theory, Policy and History,

Innsbruck

Preliminary Draft Paper submitted to theDSA Annual Conference 2012 in London, 3 November 2012

Schedule

Contemporary crises in the DRC

Framework (and why it is relevant)

Short historical overview

Application of the framework. ie political centralization

Economic and Human Development Crises

UNDP/HDI, Penn World Tables, forthcoming in Exenberger/Hartmann (2013)

Violent Crises (I): 1998-2007

Coghlan et al. (2007: 13)

Violent Crises (II): 1960-1998

Ndikumana/Emizet (2005: Table 3.1)

The Framework (I)

Step II: Recontextualization of Crises

Step I: How History Matters:Reorganization and Categorization

channels continuity ineffective institutional change

institutional change

non-institutional change

institutions persistence change change persistance

outcomes persistance persistance change change

informal norms

persistence/very slow change

recontextualization

crises (poverty/violence) economic capabilities/limitation of violence (governmental/non-governmental)

transmission continuity/ineffective institutional change/institutional change/non-institutional change

The Framework (I)

Step II: Recontextualization of Crises

Step I: How History Matters:Reorganization and Categorization

channels continuity ineffective institutional change

institutional change

non-institutional change

institutions persistence change change persistance

outcomes persistance persistance change change

informal norms

persistance/very slow change

recontextualization

crises (poverty/violence) economic capabilities/limitation of violence (governmental/non-governmental)

transmissions continuity/ineffective institutional change/institutional change/non-institutional change

The Framework (II)Institutions and Outcomes Categories (see Acemoglu/Robinson 2012)categorization indicators

political centralization monopoly of violence (military, police …), taxation/public goods, non-governmental violence, secessions, inter-state/inter-regional wars, the ability to increase accountability of local rulers (versus despotismus), juristictional hierarchy, stratification …

plurality entry barriers, monopolies, respect for civil liberties (association, assembly … free media), number of organizations (non-elite), access to organization, empowerment …

rule of law access to courts, independence of judiciary, generality, abstractness and certainty …

property rights risk of expropriation, property rights, efnorcement, the definition (private, community, land, labour (serfdom, slavery) or capital, entre barriers …

The Framework (II)Institutions and Outcomes Categories (see Acemoglu/Robinson 2012)categorization indicators

political centralization monopoly of violence (military, police …), taxation/public goods, non-governmental violence, secessions, inter-state/inter-regional wars, the ability to increase accountability of local rulers (versus despotismus), juristictional hierarchy, stratification …

plurality entry barriers, monopolies, respect for civil liberties (association, assembly … free media), number of organizations (non-elite), access to organization, empowerment …

rule of law access to courts, independence of judiciary, generality, abstractness and certainty …

property rights risk of expropriation, property rights, efnorcement, the definition (private, community, land, labour (serfdom, slavery) or capital, entre barriers …

Short Historical Overview

© Simon Hartmann, in Exenberger/Hartmann (2013: Table 1)

Political Centralizationperiod formal institutions outcomes categorization informal norms

precolonial diversity of political systems: relative centralized kingdoms, kings, councils, local rulers, tributes, army (kingdom of kongo > 20,000 soldiers), also decentralized social groups

new class of warlords in the kingdom of kongo, luba and lunda, „decentralized despotism“,traditional rule weakened: disintegration of kingdoms (kongo …), increase in number of secessions (sonyo ...), conquests (ndongo ...), plurality in forms of control

plurality in forms of power and control, emergence of a new class of warlords

age sets, secret socie-ties, … legal security backed by powerful chiefs, power transition from spiritual and traditional to economic and military, decentralized despotism on the rise

colonial Berlin Treaty 1884/84, colonial doctrines, „triple alliance“(administration-business-church), colonial army (19,000-40,000 soldiers, admin.), mercenary armies (private), indigenous intermediaries, colonial tax system (non-monetary, monetary)

replacement of “old chiefs” with “new chiefs”: 400 in the early 1890s, 6,000 in 1919, traditional chiefs sustained influence - “straw man”, weak centraliz-ation, non-monetary tax – direct raise of income, monetary taxation - labor mobil-ization, taxation played a minor role, public goods (railway, streets, schools, medical care), informal seces-sions/conquer of Eastern regions (Arabs)

power symbiosis among elites (triple alliance, local rulers), /institutional changes, informal rules altered (”alienation of leadership”)

“unification of the territory through military conquest, and economic destruction of pre-exisitng kingdoms“, decentralized despotism

post-colonial Constitution&laws, personalistic, single party state, Armed Forces (50,000 soldiers + 15,000 DSP, 30,000 police), all executive powers for the president, nationalization program (zairianisation), taxation (income tax, etc.),

directly controll of the DSP and let the rest deteriorate, appropriation/distri-bution, public goods deteriorate, secessions: for example the katanga (1960-63), and south kasai (1960-61) secessions, the simba rebellion (1964), katanga (1977), mobutu (1965) and kabila (1997) coup,) … weak centralization, after 1998 de-facto secession of the eastern territories (1/3 of the country)

power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local rulers)/institutional changes

decentralized despotism

Political Centralizationperiod formal institutions outcomes categorization informal norms

precolonial diversity of political systems: relative centralized kingdoms, kings, councils, local rulers, tributes, army (kingdom of kongo > 20,000 soldiers), also decentralized social groups

new class of warlords in the kingdom of kongo, luba and lunda, „decentralized despotism“,traditional rule weakened: disintegration of kingdoms (kongo …), increase in number of secessions (sonyo ...), conquests (ndongo ...), plurality in forms of control

plurality in forms of power and control, emergence of a new class of warlords

age sets, secret socie-ties, … legal security backed by powerful chiefs, power transition from spiritual and traditional to economic and military, decentralized despotism on the rise

colonial Berlin Treaty 1884/84, colonial doctrines, „triple alliance“(administration-business-church), colonial army (19,000-40,000 soldiers, admin.), mercenary armies (private), indigenous intermediaries, colonial tax system (non-monetary, monetary)

replacement of “old chiefs” with “new chiefs”: 400 in the early 1890s, 6,000 in 1919, traditional chiefs sustained influence - “straw man”, weak centraliz-ation, non-monetary tax – direct raise of income, monetary taxation - labor mobil-ization, taxation played a minor role, public goods (railway, streets, schools, medical care), informal seces-sions/conquer of Eastern regions (Arabs)

power symbiosis among elites (triple alliance, local rulers), /institutional changes, informal rules altered (”alienation of leadership”)

“unification of the territory through military conquest, and economic destruction of pre-exisitng kingdoms“, decentralized despotism

post-colonial Constitution&laws, personalistic, single party state, Armed Forces (50,000 soldiers + 15,000 DSP, 30,000 police), all executive powers for the president, nationalization program (zairianisation), taxation (income tax, etc.),

directly controll of the DSP and let the rest deteriorate, appropriation/distri-bution, public goods deteriorate, secessions: for example the katanga (1960-63), and south kasai (1960-61) secessions, the simba rebellion (1964), katanga (1977), mobutu (1965) and kabila (1997) coup,) … weak centralization, after 1998 de-facto secession of the eastern territories (1/3 of the country)

power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local rulers)/institutional changes

decentralized despotism

Political Centralization (I)period formal institutions outcomes categorization informal norms

precolonial diversity of political systems: relative centralized kingdoms, kings, councils, local rulers, tributes, army (kingdom of kongo > 20,000 soldiers), also decentralized social groups

new class of warlords in the Kingdom of Kongo, Luba and Lunda, traditional rule weakened: disintegration of kingdoms (kongo …), increase in number of secessions (sonyo ...), conquests (ndongo ...), plurality in forms of control

plurality in forms of power and control, emergence of a new class of warlords

age sets, secret societies, …legal security backed by powerful chiefs, power transition from spiritual and traditional to economic and military, decentralized despotism on the rise

Political Centralization (II)period formal institutions outcomes categorization informal norms

colonial Berlin Treaty 1884/84, colonial doctrines, „triple alliance“(administration-business-church), colonial army (19,000-40,000 soldiers, admin.), mercenary armies (private), indigenous intermediaries, colonial tax system (non-monetary, monetary)

replacement of “old chiefs” with “new chiefs”: 400 in the early 1890s, 6,000 in 1919, traditional chiefs sustained influence - “straw man”, weak centralization, non-monetary tax – direct raise of income, monetary taxation - labor mobiliza-tion, taxation played a minor role, public goods (railway, streets, schools, medical care), informal secessions/conquer of Eastern regions (Arabs)

power symbiosis among elites (triple alliance, local rulers), /institutional changes

“unification of the territory through military conquest, and economic destruction of pre-exisiting kingdoms“, decentralized despotism. Rules of the game gradually shifted (,”alienation of leadership”)

Political Centralization (III)period formal institutions outcomes categorization informal norms

post-colonial constitution&laws, personalistic, single party state, Armed Forces (50,000 soldiers + 15,000 DSP, 30,000 police), all executive powers for the president, nationalization program (zairianisation), taxation (income tax, etc.),

directly control of the DSP (det. of the rest), appropriation/distribution, public goods deteriorate, secessions: ie Katanga (1960-63), and south Kasai (1960-61) secessions, the Simba rebellion (1964), Katanga (1977), Mobutu (1965) and Kabila (1997) coup,) … weak centraliza-tion, after 1998 de-facto secession of the eastern territor-ies (1/3 of the country)

power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local rulers)/institutional changes

deterioration of public goods, decentralized despotism

Political Centralization (IV)

pre-colonial colonial post-colonial categorization

plurality in forms of power and

control, emergence of a new class of

warlords

power symbiosis among elites (triple

alliance, local rulers),

/institutional changes (colonial

doctrines …)

power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local

rulers)/institutional changes

persistent weak political

centralization/change in institutions =

ineffective institutional change (IIC)

How history matters in the Congo: Political Centralization

Weak centralization (as IIC) and povertySocieties with very different governance approaches were forced to align under a

new set of political rules which were mainly extractive. Strong political centralization has never been a necessary condition for participation in rent-seeking

See for example the role of taxation

Non-institutional factor: geography (“rimland country”, Herbst 2000)

Advanced question: Why the DRC persists as a collapsed state?