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POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: Simulation in Kosovo Arben Qirezi 9/15/2015 SUPPORTED BY.

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POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: Simulation in Kosovo Arben Qirezi 03/23/22 SUPPORTED BY
Transcript

POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: Simulation in Kosovo

Arben Qirezi

04/19/23

SUPPORTED BY

Aim of the Study

• Informing all involved stakeholders

• Fostering the debate about electoral systems

• Informing public on electoral systems

• Identifying motives for various political preferences by political parties

Which electoral systems

• Single Member Plurality (SMP)

• Alternative Vote (AV)

• Single Transferable Vote (STV)

Debate on Electoral System in Kosovo during 2001

• Disagreements between Kosovar and International representatives.

• Exclusion of this topic from the talks on Constitutional Framework for PISG.

Which systems were discussed in 2001?

• LDK and PDK representatives wanted SMP with the support of some Western countries

• OSCE insisted and prevailed on PR with reserved seats

Effects of the SMP

Strengths and Weaknesses of the SMPSMP

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES

Simplicity Disproportionality

Direct representation of voters in districts Majority of votes are lost-go in vain

Stable government Opportunities for political dialogue are reduced

Voters know for which policies they will vote More ideology is ingrained in politics and political

tensions can be higher

Reduces number of parties Damages smaller parties and reduces political

options

Method for creation of districts

• Ten districts were created in muniicpalities with less than 1% of voters

• Remaining 110 districts were distributed proportionally

• One municipality – One District

Simulation for Prizren

Trends

• Domination of bigger parties• Less opportunity for ethnic parties• Opportunity for disaggregation of the minority

votes• De-motivates ethnic voting• Larger parties may reach out more to minority

voters

Simulation in Peja

Trends

• Parties with string geographic base have good chances with SMP (AAK)

• SMP may, however, change the situation.

Simulation in Gjakovë

Trends

• Same trends like in Peja – geographic base

• Gjakova supports the claim that SMP can foster changes because fo the importance of the candidate

Simuliation for Gjilan

Trends

• Parties that do good in PR because of their wide spread of vote, will not do well in SMP if they do not have geographical base (VV)

Alternative Vote

ALTERNATIVE VOTING ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

EENABLES THE CHOICE AMONG MANY CANDIDATES AND ALLOWS PREFERENCES

ENABLES AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARTIES/CANDIDATES AND TACTICAK VOTING NOT ALWAYS INSTIGATED INA MODERATE WAY

DIRECT REPRESENTATION A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ITIAL VOTES MAY BE LOST

HAS A MODERATING EFECT THE NUMBER OF MINORITIES IN KOSOVO IS TOO SMALL FOR THIS SISTEM

How does AV works

• Alternative vote is very much recommended in multi-ethnic countries

• Alternative vote can moderate ethnic leaders• It can be voted for first, second …preference• Candidate that in the first round has more

votes, but lacks 50% + 1 will not achieve to be elected because he lacks the preferential votes

How AV functions?

Single Transferable Vote (STV)STV

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES Direct vote for the candidate Voting process is complex Direct representation of voters and gives chance to all parties

Counting is even more complex

Has moderating effects There can be agreements between parties for tactical voting

As a result of fostering tactical voting, may facilitate easier coalition formation

STV generates PR, but may confuse policies

STV characteristics

• Multi-member districts

• 3 – 5 candidates per district

• Voters may vote for more than one candidate and party according to their preferences

STV Characteristics

• Optional preference Vote for one, up to many preferences

• Mandatory prefence More than one and up to all candidates in the

list.

STV functioning

• Kuota Droop = {Total number of valid votes/Total number of seats+1} + 1.

• 1+(1,000/5+1)=167, 67

STV example from a district in Ireland

• Valid votes: 33,404 • Candidates: 5• Seats: 3

• Quota Droop: 33,404 / 4 = 8.351+1 = 8,352

Counting of votes in STV• First round – First preferences

• Second round – second preferences of eliminated candidate

• Third round – Left over from the elected candidate as second preferences, or from the third preferences of the eliminated candidate until the next candidate(s) reaches the Droop Quota

Main conclusions related to Kosovo

SMP• Convenient because of the

scale of ethnic homogeneity• Problem of accommodation

of parties• Huge political turn around

due to evolution according to PR

• Minority representation is a problem, but can be solved

Two-round system• Not convenient for

assembly elections• Convenient for presidential

and mayoral elections• The last mayoral elections

have proven the ability of two-round system to generate change

Main conclusions related to Kosovo

Alternative vote• Generates moderation• Small number of minorities• Counting can be

problematic

Single Transferable Vote• The most realistic

alternative• Attractive• May generate moderation

and change• Increases accountability of

MP-s• Counting can be

problematic

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION


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