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    Political Islam and International Relations

    Elizabeth Shakman Hurd

    Assistant ProfessorDepartment of Political Science

    Northwestern University!" University PlaceEvanston# $% !&!'

    eshurd(northwestern)edu'*+)*+),*"&

    Please do not cite or distribute without permission)

    Presented at the Annual -eetin. of the American Political Science AssociationAu.ust /"# &!!

    Philadelphia# Pennsylvania

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    $l s0a.it bien d0aborder la 1uestion de fond2 l0islam est3il compatible avec la

    la4cit56 -ais alors# de 1uelle la4cit5 parlons3nous6"

    37livier 8oy# Vers un Islam europen, "")

    9he attempt to understand -uslim traditions by insistin. that in them reli.ion

    and politics :two essences modern society tries to keep conceptually and

    practically apart; are coupled must# in my view# lead to failure)

    39alal Asad# Genealogies of Religion# &'3&periences of the ?est as the template for a

    universal knowled.e)@& 9his observation applies to the knowled.e about political $slam0

    .enerated by secularist epistemolo.y) 9he conceptions of secularism underlyin. social

    in1uiry determine the kinds of 1uestions that are askable0 and worth askin. about

    secularism# reli.ion and politicized reli.ion)/ As Hirschkind su..ests# =.reater

    reco.nition must be .iven to the way ?estern concepts :reli.ion# political# secular#

    temporal; reflect specific historical developments# and cannot be applied as a set of

    universal cate.ories or natural domains)@*

    9his paper has two obBectives) Cirst# $ analyze the terms throu.h which political

    $slam0 is understood in contemporary $nternational 8elations) European and American

    understandin.s of political $slam0 rely upon commonly held secular definitions and

    assumptions about reli.ion and politics) As a result# they do not consider the

    fundamental 1uestion that motivates the conceptual work of this essay2 in what ways do

    "=?e need to ask the fundamental 1uestion2 is $slam compatible with laicism6 ut then# of whichlaicism are we speakin.6@ :author0s translation;)&-itchell &!! p) +)/Asad "

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    assumptions about what reli.ion0 is and how it relates to politics0 determine the kind of

    1uestions worth askin. about political $slam0 and the kinds of answers one e>pects to

    find6 $ ar.ue that secularist habits# dispositions and interpretive traditions are part of the

    cultural and normative foundation of contemporary $nternational 8elations) 9hey are an

    implicit part of the ontolo.y of this research tradition), As a result# $nternational

    8elations re1uires and assumes a particular kind of reli.ious0 subBect that is produced

    throu.h a series of practices that are at the core of modern secularist authority)

    Second# this paper e>plores the effects of these secularist understandin.s upon

    contemporary European and American forei.n policy toward $slamic0 political actors

    and movements) $ ar.ue that one variation of these secularist dispositions contributes to a

    tendency in European forei.n policy to seek to en.a.e and transform political $slamists0

    both politically and economically) A second variation contributes to a tendency in

    American forei.n policy to try to eliminate $slamist0 actors and movements by starvin.

    them both diplomatically and economically) 9his en.a.e0 versus stran.le0 policy

    dichotomy has led to si.nificant transatlantic tensions# as ower su..ests2

    9he commonality of views that bound the United States and Europeto.ether is fadin.) Since September ""# &!!"# after a brief flurry ofto.etherness# they have been unmistakably driftin. apart) 9he sense of aterrorist threat has initiated a profound transformation in U)S) forei.npolicy# but one that Europeans do not share and do not be.in tounderstand) 9his misunderstandin. is mutual) $t affects all aspects ofinternational relations# from mediation :of the lack of it; in the -iddleEast to cooperation :of the lack of it; in defense and from disruptions oftrans3Atlantic trade to policy on weapons of mass destruction)+

    9his paper e>plains these policy diver.ences and opens possibilities for new ways of

    think about and relatin. to political $slam)0 Secularist epistemolo.y provides the terms

    throu.h which crucial distinctions are made between public and private# reli.ious and

    ,?hite &!!!# p) /)-ahmood &!!,# p) //)+owers &!! p) //)

    3&3

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    political and sacred and secular) 9hese modes of apprehendin. political $slam0 have

    si.nificant political conse1uences in international relations)

    Political Islam: Background to the concept

    9he term political $slam0 was coined in the " has

    described as the =rise of movements and ideolo.ies drawin. on $slamic referentsFterms#

    symbols and events taken from the $slamic traditionFin order to articulate a distinctly

    political a.enda)@' Cor Ayubi political $slam0 refers to =the doctrine andGor movement

    which contends that $slam possesses a theory of politics and the State)@ &!! p) "))

    3/3

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    Hefner and Salvatore are onto somethin. important when they identify the

    diversity of commitments within these movements and e>tent to which political $slam0 is

    often presumed to diver.e from normal0 politics) Political $slam0 is interpreted

    monolithically by secular analysts as epiphenomenal# as a diver.ence andGor infrin.ement

    upon neutral secular public space# as a throwback to pre3modern forms of -uslim

    political order# or as a combination of all of the above) ?idely held interpretive and

    evaluative frameworks about $slam and politics form the cultural and reli.ious backdrop

    out of which Europeans and Americans understand and en.a.e with political $slam)0

    9wo sets of secularist assumptions are operative in this cultural backdrop) $n the first#

    which $ describe below as laicism# political $slam0 appears a superficial e>pression of

    more fundamental economic and political interests and an infrin.ement of irrational

    forms of reli.ion upon would3be secular public life in -uslim3maBority societies) $t

    threatens democratic public order and marks a step toward theocracy) $n the second#

    described below as Kudeo3Lhristian secularism#0 political $slam0 appears as an

    undemocratic commin.lin. of $slam and politics that stands in sharp distinction to the

    modern :Lhristian or Kudeo3Lhristian; separation of church and state)"/ Distinctions

    between reli.ious and political authority are not only historically absent from -uslim3

    maBority societies but are unthinkable due to fi>ed characteristics of the $slamic reli.ion)

    $n both of these interpretive traditions# each of which is discussed at len.th below#

    political $slam0 appears as a refusal to acknowled.e the privile.ed status of the private

    sphere and a trans.ression of secularist cate.ories of public and private)"*

    9he problem with this understandin. of political $slam0 is# as Lonnolly ar.ues#

    that it adopts as =neutral terms of analysis several concepts and themes that became

    "/Hurd &!!*)"*Cor a related ar.ument re.ardin. the alle.ed refusal of the $ranian hosta.e takers of "

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    authoritative only throu.h the he.emony of Mparticular forms of ?estern secularism)@",

    Euro3American secularist epistemolo.ies have produced particular understandin.s of

    political $slam#0 at the same time that# to paraphrase Euben# they =conceal their

    mechanisms of production0 within claims of obBectivity resultin. in ima.es which say

    less about what Mpolitical $slam0 really is0 than about the ways in which Msecularist

    assumptions derived from ?estern history and e>periencesOproduce our understandin.s

    of Mit)@" $n other words# secularist epistemolo.y relies upon and produces a particular

    kind of reli.ious0 subBect and a particular understandin. of normal politics0 that lends a

    particular colorin. to theopolitical practices in -uslim3maBority societies) 9he effect of

    this production of reli.ious subBectivity is to e1uate the appearance of $slamic0 reli.ion

    in political0 practice with fundamentalism and intolerance)

    9hese framin. effects0 have not .one unnoticed) 8aymond aker for e>ample

    alludes to a ?estern tendency to frame political $slam0 in ne.ative terms in his account

    of the New $slamist movement in E.ypt)"+ As aker ar.ues# =there are no sound

    scholarly reasons for the critical .ap in the ?estern understandin. of $slamOlan.ua.e

    barriers and cultural differences have meant that these important aspects of mainstream

    $slam that flow from New $slamist interpretations have been lar.ely i.nored in the

    ?est)@"' Cawaz er.es has remarked that# =the underlyin. cultural values of Americans

    play a maBor role in shapin. most policy makers0 perceptions of $slamists)@"plained by aker

    ",Lonnolly "

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    and er.es) Althou.h the causalities are comple># secularist epistemolo.y contributes in

    crucial ways to the constitution of these otherwise ine>plicable cultural0 barriers)

    9he second step in my ar.ument is to su..est that these secularist evaluations of

    political $slam0 have si.nificant policy conse1uences in international relations) Cirst# in

    secular analyses forms of politics identified as $slamist0 appear almost e>clusively in

    their trans.ressive andGor re.ressive capacity# and tend to be e1uated and conflated with

    fundamentalism)0 As van der eer and %ehmann note# =when reli.ion manifests itself

    politicallyOit is conceptualized as fundamentalismO$t is almost always interpreted as a

    ne.ative social force directed a.ainst science# rationality# secularismFin short# a.ainst

    modernity)@&! ertrude Himmelfarb for e>ample associates $slamic fundamentalism with

    =disa.reeable ima.es of female subBu.ation and abuse# reli.ious intolerance and

    persecution# despotic .overnments and caste systems# child labor and illiteracy# and other

    unsavory practices that are hardly consonant with the vision of a universal moral

    community)0@&" Secularists like Himmelfarb are 1uick to associate political $slam0 with

    the trans.ression of universal norms in part because =from the point of view of

    secularism# reli.ion has the option either of confinin. itself to private belief and worship

    or of en.a.in. in public talk that makes no demands on life)@&& ecause the forms of

    politics identified by secularists as political $slam0 do not conform to either of these

    re1uirements# secularist epistemolo.y e1uates them with do.matism and fanaticism)&/

    Political $slam0 is defined a priorias a threat to the privile.ed status of the private

    sphere and as a step toward theocracy) 9his presumptive trans.ression is often linked

    &!an der eer and %ehmann "

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    rhetorically to the alle.ed -uslim proclivity for terrorism and totalitarianism# both of

    which also refuse to honor the privile.ed status of the private sphere)&*

    A second policy conse1uence of Euro3American secularist epistemolo.y is that

    the forms and de.rees of separation between public and private# sacred and secular# $slam

    and politics that doe>ist in contemporary -uslim3maBority societies either do not appear

    at all# or appear as ill3fittin. imitations of a ?estern secular ideal) 7n the one hand#

    attempts to ne.otiate secular0 modalities of differentiation between reli.ion and politics

    are depicted as derivative discourses0 of a more successful and authentic ?estern secular

    ideal) Political $slam#0 on the other hand# is depicted in oppositional terms vis3Q3vis

    these derivative secularist discourses and represented as a unitary and unified threat to

    otherwise viable local variations of ?estern secularism) %e.itimate ne.otiations over the

    terms in which reli.ion enters into public life in -uslim3maBority conte>ts that take place

    under the headin. of political $slam0 are occluded as a result)

    Political $slam0 is neither merely a backlash a.ainst modernization# nor an

    epiphenomenal e>pression of more fundamental material interests# nor an attempt to

    revivify anachronistic local tradition# thou.h each of these factors may be operative to

    some e>tent) Political $slam0 is a modern lan.ua.e of politics that challen.es#

    sometimes works outside of# and :occasionally; overturns fundamental assumptions about

    reli.ion0 and politics0 that are embedded in the forms of ?estern secularism that

    emer.ed out of %atin Lhristendom) 9hese forms of secularism are themselves social and

    historical constructs)&, 9he secularist settlement# as Lonnolly ar.ues# is a =division of

    labor that fell out of that historic compromise within predominantly Lhristian states@ that

    =provided fra.ile protection a.ainst sectarian conflict and intolerance for a few

    &*-cAlister &!!"# p) &&!)&,Hurd &!!*)

    3+3

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    centuries)@ However# he continues# it also =spawned practices of public life too do.matic

    and terse to sustain the creative tension needed between democratic .overnance and

    critical responsiveness to the politics of becomin.) And the destructive orientations it

    supported to non3Lhristian countries left a lot to be desired too)@& 9he impact of these

    destructive orientations0 are felt today in ?estern representations of political $slam)0

    9his is not to deny that there are forms of $slamism# such as those espoused by

    Rhomeini and his followers in post3revolutionary $ran# the Armed $slamic roup :Crench

    acronym $A; in Al.eria# the National $slamic Cront :N$C; in Sudan# the 9aliban in

    Af.hanistan and Al3Jaeda .lobally# which aretrans.ressive or re.ressive by almost any

    standard of Bud.ment) :9he e>tent to which al3Jaeda can be le.itimately associated with

    any version of $slamic0 tradition is 1uestionable# however# because the .roup adamantly

    reBects the authority of all established $slamic authorities) Accordin. to Larapico# =Al3

    JaedaOdo not respect or abide by $slamic law as understood by those who know what it

    is about) 9hey are reactionary nihilist3anarchists with no positive vision or pro.ram2

    even the .oal of an $slamic state per se is more imputed than articulated)@&+; 9hese

    parties and movements# however cate.orized# threaten the status of almost any

    conceptualization of a private sphere and any attempt to democratically ne.otiate the

    relationship between reli.ion and politics# and deserve international condemnation) ?ith

    re.ard to such cases# $ a.ree with Al.erian historian -ohammed Arkoun in his

    observation that# =the tyranny of faith in militant $slam is no more acceptable than the

    tyranny of reason)@&' Tet these e>treme forms of $slamist politics are the e>ception rather

    than the rule)&

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    widespread public support in North Africa# the %evant or the Arabian Peninsula for a

    .roup callin. itself al3Jaeda# much less al3Jaeda in EuropeOal3Jaeda is not

    representative of $slamism and its pronouncements are not consonant with those of any

    maBor $slamist party)@/!

    -y point is that not allforms of what secularist authority desi.nates as political

    $slam0 pose this kind of threat) 9here is more .oin. on than is su..ested by authoritative

    secularist cate.orizations) As %eine and Salvatore ar.ue# =the vocabulary of social

    science :in turn influenced by the .rammar of theories of civil society; cannot completely

    capture the rich and comple> idiom of these movements)@/" Political $slam0 raises

    important critical 1uestions about the foundational principles of collective life# includin.

    secularist collective life) 9he shift of many $slamist movements in recent years away

    from radical politics and toward a more cultural0 orientation does not attest to the

    failure of $slamism0 as 7livier 8oy has su..ested)/& As le has shown# the result of

    this shift is that# =instead of disappearin. as a reference# $slam penetrates even more into

    the social fiber and ima.inary# thereby raisin. new political 1uestions# 1uestions not

    addressed solely to -uslims but concernin. the foundational principles of collective life

    in .eneral)@//

    $n sum# most varieties of political $slam0 operate outside both the epistemolo.ical

    and e>planatory confines of secularist tradition and secularist $nternational 8elations

    theory) y failin. to conform to the cate.ories available to $nternational 8elations

    theorists for understandin. reli.ion and politics# these forms of politics pose a challen.e

    the epistemolo.ical and cultural assumptions of the academics and policy3makers who

    /!Larapico &!!,)/"-ark %eine and Armando Salvatore# Socio38eli.ious -ovements and the 9ransformation ofLommon Sense0 into a Politics of Lommon ood0# in %eine and Salvatore &!!,# p) ,")/&8oy "

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    have been immersed in these secularist traditions) 9he rise of different traBectories of

    political $slam0 provides an opportunity to revisit these assumptions and to rethink the

    policy recommendations that follow from them)/* 9he ne>t two sections focus on two

    traBectories of secularism# laicism and Kudeo3Lhristian secularism# and their

    conse1uences for forei.n policy toward political $slam)0

    Laicism, political Islam, foreign policy

    Political scientists are socialized in the tenets of classical liberalism with its

    emphasis on the benefits of a strict separation of reli.ion and politics) 9his is laicism)

    %aicism is a form of political authority that is particularly influential in contemporary

    European forei.n policy) $t is most powerful when it appears as the natural order that

    emer.es when there is no ideolo.y present#@/,rather than as =a specific fashionin. of

    spiritual lifeO carved out of Lhristendom)@/ %aicism denominates itself as public#

    neutral and value3free# and denominates reli.ion as its private# affective and value3laden

    counterpart) 9he public sphere is the domain of reason# obBectivity# deliberation and

    BusticeI and the private the domain of subBectivity# transcendence# effeminacy and affect)

    %aicism warns a.ainst reli.ion0 in the public sphere and construes it as unnatural#

    undemocratic and even theocratic) 8eli.ion is assi.ned a fi>ed place out of this sphereI it

    is to be e>cluded from the spheres of power and authority in modern societies as well as

    /*An e>ample is -ahmood &!!, :"

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    from political analyses of these spheres) 9he relationship between reli.ion and politics is

    thus subBect to a set of rules considered to be universally applicable re.ardless of cultural#

    historical or political circumstance)

    %aicist representations of political $slam0 correspond to what Daniel# in his

    discussion of Lhristian3$slamic relations in the "< th3century# describes as =the two

    e>tremes of administrative pra.matism and missionary fanaticism)@/+ $n the former#

    political $slam0 is represented as an epiphenomenal e>pression of more fundamental

    structural# material or psycholo.ical interests) 9he $slamic resur.ence is seen as =a

    product of socioeconomic and political woesI it is locally rooted)@/' 8o.er 7wen#

    raham Culler# Cred Halliday# assam 9ibi# and# in some of his writin.s# Kohn Esposito#

    adopt variations of this approach) 7wen describes political $slam0 as a response to =the

    perceived failures of the secular developmentalist ideolo.ies and strate.ies which had

    been used to le.itimate most newly independent re.imes)@/

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    nationalismOstren.thened new voices who appealed to an $slamic alternativeO@*/

    Political $slam0 is portrayed as a backlash a.ainst modernity in .eneral and unBust

    domestic economic and political conditions in particular)

    $n a second variation of laicism# political $slam0 is represented as a threat to the

    scientific mana.ement of the modern public sphere that must be controlled) As

    Hirschkind describes this position# the term =political $slam@ is adopted to identify =this

    seemin. unprecedented irruption of $slamic reli.ion into the secular domain of politics

    and thus to distin.uish these practices from the forms of personal piety# belief# and ritual

    conventionally subsumed in ?estern scholarship under the unmarked cate.ory

    =$slam)@@** $n this view# political $slam0 is represented as =opposed to the principles of

    modern livin. and inconsistent with the .ame of modern politics# science and

    development# and therefore deservedly facin. e>tinction)@*, $t is a menacin. departure

    from the norm of the separation of reli.ion and politics# and harbors the potential to be

    irrational# dan.erous and e>tremist) Political $slam0 is a refusal of the privile.ed status

    of the modern private sphere and a trans.ression a.ainst secular democratic cate.ories of

    public and private)

    %aicism is what -ahmood describes as an =evaluative stance@*in which

    political $slam0 emer.es as either a reaction a.ainst unfavorable political and economic

    conditions andGor a dan.erous infrin.ement upon modern secular discourse and

    institutions) $n both cases# =the neolo.ism $slamism0Oframes its obBect as an eruption

    of reli.ion outside the supposedly =normal@ domain of private worship# and thus as a

    */Esposito "

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    Actual American policies toward $slamic movements and states reveal a

    deep residue of ambivalence# skepticism# and mistrustOthe United States

    has not only supported its traditional friendsFin their fi.ht a.ainst

    $slamistsFbut has done little persuade them to open up the political field

    to e>istin.# le.itimate opposition forces),!

    Development and forei.n assistance pro.rams prioritize the privatization of reli.ion in

    the name of modernization# development and democratization) 9his mentality peaked

    durin. the heyday of modernization theory in the "ists within U)S) forei.n policy3makin. circles re.ardin. the compatibility between

    political $slam and democracy) U)S) discourse# replete with implicit references to

    $slamists0 political behavior# views revolutionary $slam as antidemocratic and

    autocratic)@,/ Nasr a.rees2 =as secularism is commonly viewed as a prere1uisite for

    viable democracy# the rise in the fortunes of $slamic revivalism is viewed with alarm)@,*

    Tet# as Asad and others point out# .iven the structures of authority in these societies

    reli.ious0 activists of any kind# e>tremist or not# have little choice but to en.a.e state

    ,!er.es "

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    discourses0 of a more successful and authentic ?estern secular ideal),' Secularism is

    thus =dictomized between a noble ?estern invention and an i.noble non3?estern

    imitation)@,amples of

    accommodation# and most %ebanese Shi0a do not reBect the le.itimacy of all temporal

    states# thou.h they find the %ebanese state# as it has functioned# ille.itimate)@"

    A third conse1uence of the laicist framin. of political $slam0 is that it precludes

    effective en.a.ement between secularists and what Hefner has identified as moderate

    civil $slamists0 such as the -uhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama in $ndonesia and the

    New $slamist movement in E.ypt)& aker describes the latter as an influential moderate

    $slamist movement that emer.ed out of the -uslim rotherhood rou.hly two decades

    a.o2

    ,'See LhatterBee :"

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    Under authoritarian conditions# they have constituted themselves as a

    fle>ible and resilient =intellectual school#@ neither attached to one

    particular movement nor an e>tension of official authority# yet

    nevertheless able to .ive coherence to their collective interpretive and

    practical work in a multitude of fields)/

    Cramin. political $slam0 as either epiphenomenal or as an infrin.ement upon neutral

    public space eclipses the democratic potential of forms of $slamism pursued by the

    E.yptian New $slamists# the 9urkish Kustice and Development Party :KDP;# Rhatami0s

    reform movement in $ran# Kamaat3i3$slami in Pakistan and other similar movements) As

    Asad su..ests# these instances of what Lasanova describes as deprivitized reli.ion#0 and

    others such as the "

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    $n short# =all forms of $slamism :from its more militant to its more 1uiescent; are seen as

    the products of a rovin. irrationality)@+&

    Kudeo3Lhristian secularism is based on the assumption that distinctions between

    reli.ious and political authority are not only absent from the history of -uslim3maBority

    societies# but are not e>pected to materialize in the future) As %ewis ar.ues in an

    e>ample of this thesis# =the identity of reli.ion and .overnment is indelibly stamped on

    the memories and awareness of the faithful from their own sacred writin.s# history and

    e>perience)@+/ Harris has su..ested that# =a future in which $slam and the ?est do not

    stand on the brink of mutual annihilation is a future in which most -uslims have learned

    to i.nore most of their canon# Bust as most Lhristians have learned to do) Such a

    transformation is by no means .uaranteed to occur# however# .iven the tenets of $slam)@+*

    $slamic civilizations# accordin. to this view# lack any indi.enous form of secularism and

    reBect the secularism imported from the ?est)+, As arber su..ests# =$slam posits a

    world in which the -uslim reli.ion and the $slamic state are cocreated and inseparable#

    and some observers ar.ue it has less room for secularism than any other maBor world

    reli.ion)@+ %ewis describes this scenario as a =clash of civilizationsFthe perhaps

    irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival a.ainst our Kudeo3Lhristian

    herita.e# our secular present# and the worldwide e>pansion of both)@++ $nIslam and the

    !est# he ar.ues that political and reli.ious authorities have become increasin.ly separate

    in the ?est since the rise of secularism# and increasin.ly united in the -iddle East since

    the rise of $slam in the +thcentury L)E)2

    +&-ahmood &!!,# p) "

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    $slam wasOassociated with the e>ercise of power from the very

    be.innin.O9his association between reli.ion and power# between

    community and polity# canObe seen inOthe reli.ious te>ts in which

    -uslims base their beliefs) 7ne conse1uence is that in $slam reli.ion is

    not# as it is in Lhristendom# one sector or se.ment of life re.ulatin. some

    matters and e>cludin. othersI it is concerned with the whole of life# not a

    limited but a total Burisdiction)+'

    9his perspective also makes its way into European commentaries) Lonsider the

    followin. e>cerpt from a &!!/ book review by A)L) raylin. of the$inancial Times2

    $t is hard not to feel that one of many thin.s the Palestinian philosopher

    Edward Said criticizes western observers forFnamely# seein. $slamic

    civilization as frozen and backward3lookin.# fallin. behind the scientific#

    technolo.ised# industrialised west because it is locked in an unpro.ressive

    medievalismFmay be ri.ht after all) E>planations for this are

    uncomfortable to offer# but both ?heatcroft and Cletcher imply a plausible

    one) It is that the dis%unction &et'een religious and secular aspects of life

    in the 'est, and its openness to de&ate, self()uestioning and change, is

    precisel 'hat traditional Islam lac*s) As a result# it is in the westOthat

    technolo.ical and industrial pro.ress has occurred) And with this pro.ress

    have come more fle>ible forms of social or.anization# leadin. :however

    fitfully; to the evolution of democracy and human ri.hts)+ and

    contested) As Ayoob ar.ues# =the distinction between temporal and reli.ious affairs and

    the temporal authority0s de facto primacy over the reli.ious establishment continued

    '/eor.e ?) ush# cited in Davis &!!)

    3&/3

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    throu.h the rei.n of the three .reat Sunni dynastiesFthe Umayyad# the Abbasid# and the

    7ttoman)@'* Halliday maintains that =a separation of reli.ion and state# indeed a reBection

    of all worldly# political activity# is Bust as possible an interpretation of $slamic thinkin. as

    anythin. the $slamists now offer)@', %apidus su..ests that a =fundamental

    differentiation@ between state and reli.ion has e>isted in -uslim societies since classical

    Umayyad and Abbasid periods)' He ar.ues that the inte.ration of state and reli.ious

    community has characterized only a small se.ment of -iddle Eastern and other -uslim

    linea.e or tribal societies)'+ Esposito notes that the relation between -uslim reli.ious

    and temporal authorities# includin. Shi0i $slam in $ran# has been ambi.uous) As he

    ar.ues# =despite the popular ?estern ima.e of Shi0i $slam as a reli.ion of revolution and

    martyrdom# its relationship to the state in $ran throu.hout $slamic history has been

    diverse and multifacetedOthe relationship of the ulamato the state in $ranian history

    varied from royal patrona.e to opposition# dependin. on the sociopolitical conte>t)@''

    9here is disa.reement over the proper relationship that should obtain between political

    and reli.ious authorities in -uslim3maBority societies# and a ran.e of institutional

    arran.ements have reflected this conflicted relationship historically) As -uhammad

    Asad ar.ues# =the political ordinances of Jur0an and SunnahOdo not lay down any

    specific form of state2 that is to say# the shari0ah does not prescribe any definite pattern to

    '*Ayoob &!!*# p) perience with independentvalues# leaders and or.anizations) Crom the middle of the tenth century effective control of theArab3-uslim empire had passed into the hands of .enerals# administrators# .overnors# and localprovincial lordsI the Laliphs had lost all effective political power) overnments in $slamic landswere henceforth secular re.imesFsultanatesFin theory authorized by the Laliphs# but actuallyle.itimized by the need for public order) Henceforth# -uslim states were fully differentiatedpolitical bodies without any intrinsic reli.ious character# thou.h they were officially loyal to$slam and committed to its defense)@'+%apidus "

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    which an $slamic state must conform# not does it elaborate in detail a constitutional

    theory)'tent to which $slamic

    law is e1uipped to serve as a blueprint for .overnance is subBect to debate)

    ar.ues# =rather than an unchan.in. reli.ious ideolo.y established "*!! years a.o#

    -uslim politicsOhas been shaped by broad chan.es in the state and society# especially

    those related to mass education# urbanization# socioeconomic differentiation# and the

    popular desire for public participation)@

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    politics involvin. =a .eneral mobilization of people around cultural# political# and social

    issues that are presented and interpreted throu.h an $slamic idiom)@

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    elements of both may be present) As -ahmood writes# =to read the activities of the

    mos1ue movement primarily in terms of the resistance it has posed to the lo.ic of

    secular3liberal .overnance and its concomitant modes of sociability i.nores an entire

    dimension of politics that remains poorly understood and undertheorized within the

    literature on politics and a.ency)@"!!

    Secularist epistemolo.y misses these dimensions of politics precisely because

    political $slam0 works outside of the epistemolo.ical assumptions of the authoritative

    public settlements that emer.ed from %atin Lhristendom# includin. particular formations

    of secularism) Political $slam0 contests the terms throu.h which secularist epistemolo.y

    or.anizes reli.ion and politics) $t stands apart from the most fundamental

    epistemolo.ical and ontolo.ical assumptions of the secularist settlement as it evolved out

    of %atin Lhristendom# includin. the rationalist assumptions that serve as the foundation

    of modern European3inspired formations of collective life)"!"

    $dentifyin. the epistemolo.ical limits of secularism makes it possible to identify

    some forms of political $slam0 as criti1ues of Euro3American traditions of secularism)

    As Asad ar.ues# =the important point is what circumstances obli.e $slamism to emer.e

    publicly as a political discourse# and whether# and if so in what way# it challen.es the

    deep structures of secularism)@"!& Sayyid Jutb# as Euben shows# appears in this li.ht as a

    dissenter from the epistemolo.ical and ontolo.ical foundations of the traditions of

    secularism that have come to or.anize public life in the ?est) Jutb criticized post3

    Enli.htenment political theories that e>clude reli.ious authority from politics)"!/ He

    "!!-ahmood &!!,# p) /,)"!"Euben &!! p) /*)"!&Asad "

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    ar.ued that the European imposition of a division between faith and reason# or what

    erman describes as the =liberal idea that reli.ion should stay in one corner and secular

    life in another#@"!*upon the -uslim peoples had resulted in their alienation and

    humiliation)"!, As Euben has shown# Jutb0s theory challen.es secularism in a way that

    parallels internal ?estern reassessments of Enli.htenment tradition)"! His criti1ue of

    soverei.nty# for e>ample# stands as a =a rebuttal to the epistemolo.ical assumption that

    truths about the worldFpolitical or moralFcan be reached by way of human faculties#

    and that knowled.e of such truths can le.itimate human mastery over nature and human

    nature# and the e>clusion of divine authority from the public sphere)@"!+

    $dentifyin. the epistemolo.ical limits of secularism also helps to e>plain why

    political $slam0 is perceived as more threatenin. to ?estern ways of life than political

    Lhristianity) 9he latter also challen.es the secular publicGprivate distinction on a variety

    of levels# often to a remarkable de.ree) Tet the reception of political Lhristianity in

    ?estern democracies differs from the reception of political $slam#0 as su..ested by the

    fact that the term political Lhristianity0 is rarely if ever used despite the public role of

    Lhristianity in European and American politics and forei.n policy)"!' 9his is because

    Euro3American secularist traditions evolved out of Lhristianity and remain indebted to

    Lhristian traditions in si.nificant ways) Even in many laicist traBectories of

    secularization# public Lhristianity is seen as a way station on the road to liberal

    own shade)@ erman &!!/# pp) &*3&

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    colonies# includin. the United States# understand and relate to the rest of the world# and

    in particular the $slamic world)

    $n contemporary $nternational 8elations theory and practice# European and

    American forms of secularism are viewed as the standard3bearers) Non3?estern models

    of reli.ion and politics are seen as attempts to either appro>imate ?estern ideals or react

    violently a.ainst them) As rovo.ui ar.ues# =the vast maBority of contemporary

    international theoristsOhave failed to reco.nize the validity of non3?estern lan.ua.es of

    politics and their intended moral orders as le.itimate conte>ts for ima.inin. the

    alternatives to the present moral order)@""& -any of the forms of politics desi.nated by

    secularists as political $slam0 are such non3?estern lan.ua.es of politics) 9hese

    lan.ua.es of politics operate lar.ely outside the epistemolo.ical confines of secularism

    and secularist $nternational 8elations theory) 9hey throw into disarray the fundamental

    terms throu.h which secularism or.anizes reli.ion and politics) $n addition# as Ayoob

    points out# many of these movements seek to challen.e ?estern he.emony in

    international relations# refusin. to =accept the current distribution of power in the

    international system as either le.itimate or permanent)@""/ As a result of these

    epistemolo.ical and political challen.es# secularists are 1uick to attribute the -uslim

    refusal0 to acknowled.e the special status of the secularist private sphere as a harbin.er

    of despotism in -uslim3maBority societies and a threatenin. challen.e to the ?estern

    or.anization of the publicGprivate divide) 9his leads to an indictment of the potential of

    $slamic tradition to contribute to the public life of -uslim3maBority societies# makin. it

    difficult# if not impossible# to ima.ine a non3he.emonic and non3do.matic role for $slam

    in public life# discourse and institutions)

    ""&rovo.ui "

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    9his epistemolo.ical narrowin. presents a maBor stumblin. block for secularist

    policy3makers in both Europe and the United States) As Coucault noted# =the problem of

    $slam as a political force is an essential one for our time and for years to come# and we

    cannot approach it with a modicum of intelli.ence if we start out from a position of

    hatred)@""* 9he blanket ascription of threat to all forms of $slamist politics starts out from

    such a position) $t empowers radicals who ar.ue that the ?est aspires to .lobal

    he.emony throu.h a crusade a.ainst $slam#0 while silencin. their rivals who are either

    i.nored or classified as radicals and dismissed as fundamentalists)0 $t fails to address the

    nuanced realities of contemporary politics in -uslim3maBority countries# in which

    movements like Hezbollah and Hamas have .ained a stron. and le.itimate political and

    cultural foothold that cannot be effortlessly washed away) As 9amimi observed after the

    Palestinian elections of &!!# =Hamas is not isolated at allI it has more windows open to

    it today than ever before)@"", lanket ascriptions of threat and indiscriminate anti3$slamic

    rhetoric and policy stren.then the radical frin.e elements of such .roups and

    disenfranchise their more moderate rivals) As 7ttaway concludes in a recent report from

    the Larne.ie Endowment# =No matter what the United States says or does# the $slamist

    parties will remain the stron.est players in the politics of Arab countries) 9he only

    1uestion is whether they will continue to manifest that stren.th by competin. in elections#

    as they have done lately# or whether they will do so throu.h violence)@""

    -y ar.ument leads to three conclusions re.ardin. how Europeans and American

    decision3makers should understand and respond to political $slam)0 Cirst# we need to

    think hard about definitions) Althou.h they do contest many of the fundamental

    assumptions embedded in ?estern traditions of secularism# the modalities of politics

    ""*Coucault# cited in 85e &!!,)"",aess &!!# p) &+)""7ttaway &!!)

    3/"3

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    desi.nated by secularists as political $slam0 are not necessarily aberrant) 9he 1uestion of

    how any particular instantiation of political $slam0 measures up vis3Q3vis indices of

    democratization or pluralization must be determined on a case3by3case basis) As Ayoob

    ar.ues# =no two $slamisms are alike because they are determined by the conte>ts in which

    they operate)@""+ Althou.h political $slam0 may appear in a trans.ressive or re.ressive

    capacity in some instances# it will not appear e>clusively in that capacity)

    Second# the forms and de.rees of separation between $slam and politics that do

    e>ist in contemporary -uslim3maBority societies are not ill3fittin. imitations of a ?estern

    secular ideal) 9hey are local modalities of separation and accommodation between

    reli.ion and politics that may or may not have any relation to the forms of secularism that

    emer.ed from European Lhristendom) 9hese European3inspired modalities of secularism

    need not be eliminated or overcome# but they do need to be parochialized0 in

    Lhakrabarty0s sense of the term)""'

    9hird and finally# democratic modalities of separation and accommodation in

    -uslim3maBority settin.s can and often are promul.ated by those currently identified as

    $slamists)0 Cor political $slam0 cannot be automatically situated in oppositional terms

    vis3Q3vis secularist0 or separationist discourses) $t is not a monolithic ontolo.ical threat

    to otherwise viable local variations of ?estern0 secularism) $nstead# like the traditions

    of secularism described in this paper# it is a discursive tradition mobilized in different

    ways with differin. conse1uences) $t is a tradition of ar.umentation) $t is a discourse in

    which relations between metaphysics# politics and contemporary forms of political order

    are deliberated and contested) $t is a lan.ua.e of politics)

    ""+Ayoob &!!*# p) ")""'Lhakrabarty &!!!)

    3/&3

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    Larapico# Sheila) Rillin. %ive '# Noisily2 9he 3'# %iberal Dissent and the %ondon ombin.s)0iddle East Report 1nline:Kuly "*# &!!,;)

    Lhakrabarty# Dipesh)0rovinciali8ing Europe2 0ostcolonial Thought and 6istorical 3ifference)Princeton2 Princeton University Press# &!!!)

    LhatterBee# Partha) The 5ation and its $ragments2 Colonial and 0ostcolonial 6istories)Princeton2 Princeton University Press# "# uilain) 9he Cor.otten Swamp2 Navi.atin. Political $slam)0iddle East 0olic$X2 &:&!!&;2 ,3'")

    Eickelman# Dale C) and Kames Piscatori)uslim 0olitics) Princeton2 Princeton University Press#"anne %) Lomparative Political 9heory2 An $slamic Cundamentalist Lriti1ue of8ationalism)0#ournal of 0olitics,

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    %awrence# ruce)3efenders of God2 The $undamentalist Revolt against the odern /ge) SanCrancisco2 Harper Z 8ow# "

    3/3

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    7ttaway# -arina S) Promotin. Democracy after Hamas0 ictory)0 Larne.ie Endowment for$nternational Peace ?orkin. Paper Series# Cebruary &!!):http2GGwww)carne.ieendowment)or.GpublicationsGinde>)cfm6fa[viewZid["+

    Revie'4 Kune &!!,)

    9ibi# assam) Post3ipolar 7rder in Lrisis2 9he Lhallen.e of Politicised $slam)0illennium2#ournal of International "tudies &is de :K)P) -ayer# ed);3emocrac in /merica, Vol4 ;) New Tork2 Doubleday#"

    ?hite# Stephen R) "ustaining /ffirmation) Princeton2 Princeton University Press# &!!!)

    Tavuz# -) Hakan)Islamic 0olitical Identit in Tur*e) New Tork2 7>ford University Press#&!!/

    http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17978&prog=zgp&proj=zdrlhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17978&prog=zgp&proj=zdrlhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17978&prog=zgp&proj=zdrlhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17978&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl

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