World Political Science Review 2015; aop
Adolfo Garc é *
Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept from Selected Policy-Change Events in the Tabar é V á zquez Administration (Uruguay, 2005 – 2009) Abstract : In recent years authors have paid increasing attention to the study
of contextual factors that shape the use of research into a country ’ s public
policies. One of the most significant recent contributions to this body of lit-
erature is Campbell and Pedersen ’ s concept of Knowledge Regimes, which
focuses on the central characteristics of the relevant social research in a
given country. This article is a critique of this concept based on the study of
three key policy-change events during the Tabar é V á zquez administration in
Uruguay. In order to explain the dynamics of social research it is not merely
enough to understand the main features of the supply side; it is also necessary
to study the demand. This critical perspective has led to the construction of a
new concept.
Keywords: expertise; knowledge regimes; research and public policy nexus;
Uruguay.
Original reference: Garc é , Adolfo (2014). “ Reg í menes Pol í ticos de Conocimiento:
Construyendo un nuevo concepto a partir de eventos de cambio seleccionados
en pol í ticas p ú blicas del gobierno de Tabar é V á zquez (Uruguay, 2005 – 2009), ”
Revista de Ciencia Pol í tica 34:2, 439 – 458.
DOI 10.1515/wpsr-2014-0020
*Corresponding author: Adolfo Garc é , Professor in Political Science at Universidad de la
Rep ú blica, Constituyente 1502, CP 11200, Montevideo, Uruguay,
e-mail: [email protected]
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2 Adolfo Garc é
1 Introduction Well-known authors such as Harold Wilensky 1 (1997), Margaret Weir and Theda
Skocpol 2 (1993) have pointed out that nations differ considerably as to how
and how much their respective political systems use specialized knowledge
(the results of research) in policy making. In the long term some countries (like
Germany and Chile) have a high propensity to use information and results from
research in their public policies; whereas the experience in other countries (like
the USA and Uruguay) shows there can be a considerable disjunction between the
world of research and that of decision making. 3
Following up on this insight, John Campbell and Ove Pedersen have been
developing a typology of knowledge regimes from a political economy perspec-
tive, and this has contributed to our understanding of the features of social
research supply in a given country. In this article we will argue that besides ana-
lyzing the supply side it is also necessary to study and analytically hierarchize
the demand side.
This paper is organized as follows: in the first section we present and discuss
the concept of Knowledge Regimes developed by Campbell and Pedersen (2011) .
In the second section, we study three change events in public policies in Uruguay
to examine the strengths and weaknesses of this theoretical approach. In the
third section we return to the theoretical discussion and present a new concept
aimed at developing Campbell and Pedersen ’ s ideas.
1 Wilensky says, “ As a student of comparative political economy and social policy for 30 years,
I have interviewed more than four hundred politicians, budget officers, experts on taxing and
spending, health and welfare officials, and labor and management personnel in nineteen rich
democracies for my project on the politics of taxing and spending. I would like to share my obser-
vations about the similarities and differences among these nations in the interplay of knowledge
and public policy. It is clear that intellectuals, including social scientists, have typically had
tense relationships with men and women of power in all these countries. But it is also clear that
the disjunction between research and policy is perhaps most extreme in the US. The similarities
are rooted partly in the universal limitations of social science; the differences are due to the di-
verse contexts in which research is applied ” (1997: p. 1242).
2 Weir and Skocpol reviewed the various “ Keynesian responses ” to the 1929 crisis in the US,
Great Britain and Sweden. In a key passage they say: “ The distinct specific structures of States
shape the ways in which researchers and their ideas are used in the design of public policies at
given times ” (1993: p. 96). (Translated by AG).
3 Our aim in this article is not to review the state of the art in the age-old heated debate about the
use of research and specialized knowledge in decision making and public policies. The reader
who is interested in this aspect can consult Stone et al. (2001) , Nutley et al. (2007) , Jones et al.
(2009) and Carden (2009) . A more specific discussion of the connection between political struc-
tures and the use of social research can be found in Garc é (2011) .
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 3
2 Knowledge Regimes: An Important but Insufficient Conceptual Contribution
At the present time, the concept that is closest to what we need is Campbell and
Pedersen ’ s (2011) notion of Knowledge Regimes: “ Knowledge regimes are the
organizational and institutional machinery that generates data, research, policy
recommendations and other ideas that influence public debate and policymak-
ing ” (Campbell and Pedersen 2014: p. 3). According to these authors, to define
a country ’ s knowledge regime it is necessary to study two structural variables:
the policy-making regime and the type of capitalism that prevails, as formulated
by Peter Hall and David Soskice. In line with this logic, Campbell and Pedersen
propose four kinds of knowledge regimes.
Both the type of capitalism and the kind of policy-making regime affect the
kind of Research Units (RUs) and the dynamic of the ideas market. In each case
the logic is as follows:
– MARKET-ORIENTED. In countries with a liberal market economy and a decen-
tralized policy-making regime (the US) the marketplace of ideas is open and
competitive. To affect policies, the actors in the public policy decision-mak-
ing process (especially interest groups) take advantage of specialized knowl-
edge. The dynamic of knowledge is adversarial.
– CONSENSUS-ORIENTED. In countries where capitalism is coordinated and the
policy-making regime is decentralized (Germany), the marketplace of ideas is
less competitive. Therefore, although decentralization fosters the existence of
numerous RUs, few of them are oriented to promoting specific ideas or interests,
and the knowledge they produce is mainly oriented to constructing consensus.
– POLITICALLY TEMPERED. In countries with liberal capitalism and a central-
ized policy-making regime (the UK), the marketplace of ideas is competitive
but there are few opportunities for the actors in public policy design to make
Campbell and Pedersen ’ s Typology of Knowledge Regimes
Type of Capitalism
Liberal Market Coordinated Market
Public policy-making regime
Centralized, closed State POLITICALLY REGULATED
(United Kingdom)
STATIST-TECHNOCRATIC (France)
Decentralized, Open State MARKET-ORIENTED
(United States)
CONSENSUS-ORIENTED (Germany)
Source: Author ’ s elaboration based on table 8.1 of Campbell and Pedersen (2011 : p. 186).
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4 Adolfo Garc é
their preferences and interests felt. This situation fosters the existence of
relatively few RUs (both public and private) and leads to a dynamic of knowl-
edge that is predominantly adversarial between partisan positions.
– STATIST-TECHNOCRATIC. In countries with coordinated capitalism and a
centralized policy-making regime (France), the marketplace of ideas is closed.
This does not stimulate the existence of RUs that are partisan or oriented to
promoting specific ideas or interests. RUs embedded in the state predomi-
nate, and the knowledge produced is perceived by society as neutral.
The concept of a knowledge regime, as formulated by Campbell and Pedersen,
is an enormous step forward but it has some limitations. Firstly, by definition, it
only deals with the supply side of research, and therefore the demand side and
also the institutions and actors that mediate between supply and demand are
automatically accorded secondary importance. Secondly, it is too closely tied to
the characteristics of the economy. When studying the dynamic of specialized
knowledge it is important to take into account the relative roles of the State and
the market, but the emphasis on economic structure and its main actors (firms)
means that consideration of political institutions and their key organizations
(political parties) is relegated to a secondary level. Third, the concept is too static.
As the authors themselves acknowledge, it does not take sufficient account of the
possibility that the features of a knowledge regime may change over time ( Camp-
bell and Pedersen 2011 : pp. 188 – 189).
These limitations, particularly the first two, suggest that another concept can
be constructed that is more focused on politics and less inspired in economics.
This would enable us to consider all the dimensions that are important in the
political dynamic of research and not just those that have to do with structures,
actors and other central features of research knowledge supply.
To expedite matters at this point we shall now switch from a deductive to an
inductive approach. Criticism of existing concepts and the construction of new
ones both require an examination of empirical evidence. As Gerring (2007) would
argue, just as comparisons of “ big N ” are suitable for refuting hypotheses, case
studies are eminently suitable for moving forward in constructing theory. In par-
ticular, case studies can generate novel hypotheses about causal relations and
thus construct new concepts. For this reason, in the following section we shall
analyze the role of specialized knowledge in three change events that occurred
during the President Tabar é V á zquez administration (2005 – 2009) in Uruguay.
First, we shall study the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (PANES) that was
launched in the first year of his presidency, then the founding of the National
Research and Innovation Agency (ANII), and third, we shall review the failed
attempt to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US. These processes have
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 5
some features in common but they involved different political actors and differ-
ent epistemic communities.
This methodology, which puts the focus on studying change events, is to a
large extent inspired by the work of Tussie (2009) . She agues that studying policy
changes enables us to better visualize the impact of research on public policies.
“ The choice of policy change is key to this work, as it emphasizes the capacity
of research to modify a status quo and to catalyze the knowledge-based policy
discussion to another level ” (2009: p. 2). However, the role of research is not only
made manifest in episodes in which change occurs, as Tussie seems to suggest,
but can also be perfectly visible in episodes in which attempted reforms are frus-
trated. At any rate, cases of failure are as important in terms of methodology as
cases of success ( Garc é 2011 ).
3 Research and Public Policy in Uruguay: Three Change Events
In describing each of the three change events we shall follow the same sequence.
After putting the change event in context, we apply the classic scheme formu-
lated nearly 30 years ago by Kingdon (1984) , which accounts for how change
was generated in each case and the opportunity for innovation it allowed (policy
window), distinguishing between the three streams (problem stream, policy
stream and political stream), and then summarize of the outcome of the event.
Lastly, we analyze the extent to which Campbell and Pedersen ’ s concept of Knowl-
edge Regimes can help in understanding what happened, and examine what the
concrete event in question could contribute to the construction of a new concept.
3.1 The Conditional Cash Transfer Programme
It has often been said that the flagship of the V á zquez administration was the
Emergency Plan (PANES). This was the Uruguayan version of a Conditional
Cash Transfer Programme (CCT) that was widely applied in Latin America, and
which is a typical case of policy paradigm diffusion. As we shall see, President
V á zquez was the key actor. He had to keep a promise he had been making
since 1999 to implement an “ Emergency Plan ” to fight poverty and indigence,
and for this purpose he set up the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES),
which quickly made an alliance with the (public) University of the Republic
(UDELAR).
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6 Adolfo Garc é
3.1.1 The Problem, The Alternative, The Opportunity and The Outcome
– The problem. In the mid 1990s, poverty was not an important issue in Uru-
guayan politics. The country had managed to combine its structural adjust-
ment to the prevailing economic climate with poverty reduction. The trend for
poverty to fall, which had begun 10 years earlier, went into reverse around 1995
(PNUD 1999) 4 but the main social indicators only started to worsen at the end
of that decade. At the dawn of the 21st century the country went into economic
meltdown with an extraordinary rise in unemployment (which climbed to 20%)
and poverty (which reached 30%). A number of academic studies at the time
helped bringring the question of poverty in general – and child poverty in par-
ticular – at the centre of the debate. The most well known of these was a study
by the IPES of the Catholic University (UDUCAL – Universidad Cat ó lica) under
the leadership of two sociologists, Fernando Filgueira and Ruben Katzman. In
2001 they published their Panorama of Infancy and the Family in Uruguay . It
had a massive impact on public opinion and the political parties because it
laid bare the fact that more than half the children in the country were born into
poor households. The Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Parliament)
echoed public alarm by setting up a special commission to study poverty. The
country ’ s situation got even worse in December 2001 when a financial crisis
began, and the government suspended banking operations in August 2002. In
this context there were more and more reports about the deteriorating social
situation. In August, just when the financial system was collapsing, it emerged
that some children at a public school in Montevideo “ were eating grass. ” 5
Poverty had become a most serious problem in Uruguayan society.
– The alternative . This social emergency sparked a debate not only in Parlia-
ment but among the population about what institutions and social policies
would be best suited to fight poverty, and people discussed whether a “ social
authority ” should be established, as the ECLAC (Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean) was recommending. In this climate the
Frente Amplio (FA), a “ Broad Front ” coalition of leftist parties which was
favorite to win the forthcoming general election, began to draft more com-
prehensive plans. Their candidate for the presidency was Tabar é V á zquez. In
4 Poverty fell steadily from 1985 to 1994 (from 37% in 1986 to 12.8% in 1994) but it increased
again – albeit only slightly, from 1995 to 1998 (from 14.7% to 15.5%). See UNDP (1999: p. 29).
5 See Hugo Carro ’ s article about Uruguay for BBC World (Thursday 8 August 2002): “ Thousands
of Uruguayans … were shocked by news that stunned the nation: hunger was so widespread in
the country that some children at school number 128 were eating grass. ” See:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/crisis_en_el_sur_/newsid_2181000/2181335.stm .
Accessed on 7 July 2013.
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 7
the previous electoral campaign in 1998 and 1999 he had talked about how
necessary it was to implement an emergency plan to tackle poverty, and now,
campaigning in the crisis, he promised to do so. Consideration of other expe-
riences in the region played a decisive role in converting this slogan into a
public policy initiative. Since the mid 1990s governments throughout Latin
America – on the right as well as on the left – had been following in the
pioneering footsteps of Brazil and Mexico and considering relief measures
focalized on the most vulnerable sectors of the population. The distinctive
feature of these programmes was that they were based on money transfers
to poor households conditional upon the head of the family complying
with certain obligations. This system of Conditional Monetary Transfer Pro-
grammes (PTCs) spread rapidly in the region in line with a classic pattern of
policy paradigm diffusion ( Sugiyama 2011 ), and by 2011 CCTs were in opera-
tion in 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and disbursing ben-
efits to some 113 million people (19% of the population). The experience in
Brazil ( Bolsa Familia ), which began in 2003, had a particularly strong influ-
ence in Uruguay because there were close links between the PT (the Brazil-
ian Workers ’ Party) and the FA. In 2004, with support from institutions like
FESUR and the World Bank, FA leaders and poverty specialists acquired
detailed knowledge about how some of these experiences operated.
– The opportunity. Jorge Batlle, who was president during the crisis, did not
consider it necessary to implement a CCT. His priority was to get the economy
moving again and restructure the financial system. The opportunity to
change the policy paradigm to combat poverty came when the FA won the
election and assumed power. Equality is a core value in the FA, as it is in all
leftist parties, and V á zquez, the president-elect, had to visibly emphasize his
commitment to pursue it. A basic pillar in the new government ’ s mandate
was to tackle the social emergency.
– The outcome . As soon as he assumed power, V á zquez went straight into
action. To fulfil his promise to implement an emergency plan he assigned
a ministerial level cabinet place to the Communist Party and established a
Ministry of Social Development (MIDES). This sent a clear signal to the elec-
torate that, unlike previous governments, his administration was most def-
initely concerned with social problems. To carry out the plan and execute
other social policies, the government organized the Ministry of Social Devel-
opment as quickly as possible. Two faculties in the UDELAR (University of
6 Of these two cooperation experiences, the one that involved the Institute of Economics of the
FCE and A, won an international prize as the best practice of collaboration between research and
politics: the PEGnet Best Practice Award of 2009.
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8 Adolfo Garc é
the Republic) provided the newborn institution with the technical assistance
essential to designing and implementing the plan. 6 The Faculty of Social Sci-
ences carried out a census of poor households throughout the country to
gather precise information, and the Institute of Economics (Faculty of Eco-
nomic Sciences and Administration) drew up an Index of Critical Needs (ICC)
to determine which of the households in the census would benefit from the
plan ’ s assistance scheme. The BPS (Banco de Previsi ó n Social), the country ’ s
social security administration, used its computerized system to analyze the
ICC and generate a group of households eligible for benefits.
The plan was implemented but, with all due respect to the university spe-
cialists for the role they played, the determining factor was political. At least
three key decisions were not technical but based on politics. First, the PANES
aimed at the lowest 20% of households below the poverty line, which amounted
to 8% of the population. This decision was taken before the UDELAR poverty
researchers became involved and responded to criteria that were strictly politi-
cal ( Rius 2012 ). Second, the mechanism to select households based on the ICC
was also influenced by political considerations. The MIDES authorities decided
to make the initial criteria for inclusion in the plan more flexible to speed up
implementation (as any delay would be politically costly) and they required
that the index be changed to include more households ( Labat 2012 : pp. 69 – 71).
Third, the decision to terminate the PANES scheme was also eminently politi-
cal. It would have been uncomfortable for the FA to undertake their next elec-
tion campaign admitting that the social emergency was persisting, and so the
PANES was replaced by a scheme called the Equity Plan in 2007. 7
3.1.2 The Case and the Concepts
On a theoretical level, the analysis of the PANES draws the following conclusions:
1. First, although the government adopted a paradigm (the CCT) that was
popular in the region, in order to adapt and implement it they employed the
UDELAR, a university with strong loyalties to the FA.
2. Second, although academics played a very important role, political rationale
was a factor in all the key decisions:
7 In the list of the gaps between design and implementation it is also important to mention that
the conditionalities in education and health required by researchers and funding organizations
(in this case the IDB) were not checked or controlled, as was later admitted by the MIDES authori-
ties themselves ( Amarante and Vigorito 2012 : p. 23). In this case, it may be that the gap was not
due to political considerations but to an institutional lack of ability on the part of the State to
demand fulfilment of the conditioning criteria.
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 9
– In setting up the MIDES, the president had to send a clear message to
leftist voters.
– In appointing the MIDES authorities, the president had to bring the Com-
munist Party into his cabinet ( Garc é 2006 : p. 7).
– In the decision to go ahead with the PANES, the president knew that execut-
ing it could increase the FA ’ s political capital, as observed in other countries.
– As regards the timing of the PANES, it had to be put into operation in the
first half of the new administration ’ s first year without fail, and it would
not be able to last more than 2 years.
– As regards the quantitative definition of the target population, it was
decided on the basis of political (and not technical) considerations that
the plan should cover 200,000 beneficiaries.
3. Third, State structures assisted in the policy ’ s rapid implementation. The
MIDES was built up in step with the progress of PANES implementation.
There were not, and there could not have been, institutional restrictions on
the change. The fact that the BPS has a high level of technical capacity made
it possible to apply the ICC and delineate the target population.
3.2 The Establishment of The National Research and Innovation Agency
In 2006, the Presidency introduced a bill to set up the National Research and Inno-
vation Agency (ANII), and parliament passed it. This was a milestone in innovation
policy in Uruguay. To understand this institutional initiative we have to examine
the progress made in the scientific community in the years before the FA ’ s electoral
victory. This was another instance of President V á zquez keeping one of his prom-
ises. During the election campaign he formulated the slogan “ Uruguay Innovator ” to
stress the importance his government would place on innovation, science and tech-
nology. However, the measures proposed in his electoral platform did not include a
specific plan to set up an agency, although they did figure among the recommenda-
tions formulated and widely disseminated by specialists in 2003 and 2004.
3.2.1 The Problem, The Alternative, The Opportunity and The Outcome
– The problem. Uruguay ’ s innovation policies were never particularly sophisti-
cated. For many years domestic industry developed under the protection of
mechanisms in the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, which
was widespread in Latin America (multiple exchange rates in the 1930s and
1940s; tariff, fiscal and credit instruments in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s).
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10 Adolfo Garc é
Before the dictatorship (1973 – 1984), the State University did not have a policy
of cooperating with the business sector. Quite the contrary in fact; its most
active elements prioritized an alliance with the workers that was geared to an
anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist global transformation of society.
In the early 1960s some innovation-promotion policies began to emerge
and the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICYT)
was set up, but it was only after the dictatorship ended that more energetic
initiatives began to appear in this field. In 1985 the Basic Sciences Develop-
ment Plan (PEDECIBA) 8 was established, and in 1989 the Faculty of Science.
In the meantime the UDELAR began to develop policies to connect univer-
sity research processes with the business sector ’ s innovation requirements,
a move inspired in the Triple Helix approach. 9 A key actor in all these ini-
tiatives was the country ’ s scientific community, which consisted basically of
researchers at the UDELAR. During the following decade, until the 1999 – 2002
crisis, some progress was made including important institutional changes
like the reconfiguration of the National Agricultural Research Institute and
the founding of the National Science and Technology Board in the Ministry
of Education and Culture. Support for research increased with initiatives like
the creation of funds to be awarded on the basis of competitions, and the
National Researcher ’ s Fund was established.
However, it was only after the catastrophe of 1999 – 2002 that far-reaching
diagnoses were made of this whole question and the need for a much more
energetic public innovation policy was installed on the public agenda ( Davyt
2011 : pp. 112 – 113). The key step forward took place in 2003 when Friedrich Ebert
Foundation in Uruguay (FESUR) launched the project called CIENTIS (Science,
Technology, Innovation and Society), coordinated by FA Senator Enrique Rubio
(at that time President of the Senate Science and Technology Commission). In
this initiative nearly 300 people including academics, politicians and experts
in innovation took part in a course of seminars and other knowledge-sharing
events that lasted a year and were geared to drafting a programme to develop
science, technology and innovation. The final document had a big impact
( Davyt 2011 : p. 115) and the political parties incorporated its recommendations
into their programming for the 2004 election.
– The alternative. The most important document generated in this context was
produced by a group of UDELAR researchers under the direction of the dean
8 The PEDECIBA was set up in 1995 (as a permanent programme) in the 1995 budget legislation
(Law 16,736, Articles 386 and 387). It covers the following areas: biology, computer science, phys-
ics, mathematics and chemistry.
9 The basics of this approach can be accessed at: http://www.triplehelixconference.org/the-
triple-helix-concept.html .
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 11
of the Faculty of Social Sciences at that time, Luis B é rtola. The document was
drafted as part of a series of consultations contracted by the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) to offer the new government technical inputs. This
team reported that the country was in a state of “ innovation indigence ” char-
acterized by low R&D expenditures, a scarcity of researchers, a weak demand
for innovation, a supply concentrated in the public sector and problems with
the coordination of supply and demand ( B é rtola et al. 2005 : p. II).
According to this diagnosis, this “ innovation indigence ” was due to the
national economy ’ s lack of dynamism in the long term. To overcome these
obstacles, three broad objectives were proposed: i) to establish an innovation
culture geared to changing social attitudes by generating measures to stim-
ulate innovation that should be part of a strategic innovation, science and
technology plan; ii) to coordinate the various actors in the system by reform-
ing the design of institutions to allow public policies to be coordinated; and
iii) to increase the number and improve the quality of human resources.
Among other initiatives, the proposed re-engineering of institutions would
include forming an Innovation Cabinet made up of some ministers and other
important figures in the innovation system, and setting up a National Scien-
tific Research, Technology and Innovation Development Agency.
A key point in the plan was its “ relative autonomy ” with respect to
country ’ s scientific community. In other words, these institutions would be
structured in such a way that its policies could be formulated by government
authorities and not scientists. The Innovation Cabinet would coordinate poli-
cies in this area, and the agency would evaluate, select and finance activities
to be executed in the framework of the plans that had been made. This pro-
posal to set up an agency was not completely new as in fact a series of similar
ideas had already been put forward since the end of the 1990s by some of
the UDELAR ’ s most respected experts in innovation like Rodrigo Arocena
and Judith Sutz ( Davyt 2011 : p. 109). In addition, the CIENTIS document had
called for “ new institutional architecture ” (2003: p. 19).
– The opportunity. The window to introduce new innovation policies opened
when the FA won the election. The change of government generated a favora-
ble political climate for two reasons, the first of which has to do with presi-
dential leadership. Tabar é V á zquez gave the issue high priority. In this case,
as was the cas when the PANES was set in motion, ideas and interests con-
verged. First, like the vast majority of the country ’ s political elite following
the 1999 – 2002 economic and social debacle, V á zquez sincerely believed that
innovation was important. He also had to push ahead with ambitious meas-
ures in innovation, science and technology to compensate for other decisions
he had made, like appointing Danilo Astori Minister of the Economy. Many
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12 Adolfo Garc é
leftist voters felt that the economic plans Astori had been defending since he
entered the Senate in 1995 were a long way from traditional FA positions and
too close to the neo-liberal policies the other parties were pursuing.
The second reason has to do with the close links between the FA and the
academic world. For the first time in decades, power was in the hands of a
political party with deep roots in the scientific community and the UDELAR
in particular. We cannot say what would have happened if the FA had not won
the election, but it is very likely that either of the other main parties would have
also tried to push ahead with the recommendations of the CIENTIS project and
the B é rtola report. However, it is very difficult to make changes or implement
new policies without support from the social sectors that have a direct interest.
– The outcome . According to the Kingdon model we have been using, there is
no pre-established sequence in the flow of problems, alternatives and politi-
cal viability. Sometimes the necessary political leadership exists and the
problem is a priority on the agenda, however no suitable solutions are avail-
able at the technical level. Other times viable solutions may be available but
cannot be applied either because the problem is not on the agenda or due to
prevailing political conditions.
Something along those lines happened in the case we are examining. The
concrete proposal to set up a specialized State agency to implement innova-
tion policies in the framework of government agenda priorities was formulated
nearly 10 years before the problem of “ innovation indigence ” in general and
the need for institutional changes in particular came to the fore in the politi-
cal arena. The economic crisis and the impending switch to a left-wing gov-
ernment generated a powerful incentive for academics to formulate and make
public their demands for a genuine innovation, science and technology policy.
V á zquez picked up on this demand during the election campaign and incorpo-
rated it into his platform. Once elected, he followed the recommendations in the
IDB consultancy initiative ( B é rtola et al. 2005 ) and convoked a Ministerial Inno-
vation Cabinet (GMI). This body set up an operational team to draft a strategic
plan, and the same team drafted the bill to establish the National Research and
Innovation Agency (ANII). This came before Parliament in August 2006 and was
passed in December of that year.
3.2.2 The Case and the Concepts
On the theoretical level, the process of setting up the ANII suggests the following
conclusions:
– First, it is very clear that in the whole process of the “ social construction ” of
the problem of innovation and of formulating alternatives, the country ’ s sci-
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 13
entific community and particularly UDELAR researchers played an important
role.
– Second, the case of ANII clearly shows that even if a problem is complex, it
tends to be picked up by the political actors and incorporated as a priority
onto their electoral platforms and government agendas when it is understood
by the general public. Seen from this perspective, even the worst crises can
give rise to good opportunities.
– Third, it is evident that when an issue is strongly installed on the public
agenda, it is possible that the dynamic of political competition may not
impede the formation of consensus. In other words, even in highly competi-
tive political systems (as is the case in Uruguay), specialized knowledge can
be used to construct consensus.
– Fourth, it emerges that international cooperation can play a very important
role in the dynamic of ideas. FESUR ’ s support for the CIENTIS project was
a key factor in developing public opinion about the issue and affecting the
parties ’ programme design processes. In addition, the IDB ’ s support also had
an impact insofar, as some innovation policy proposals that had been in the
process of formulation since the 1990s were quite well developed. This meant
that when Tabar é V á zquez became president a very detailed institutional re-
engineering plan for the National Innovation System was already available.
3.3 The Failure of the Free Trade Agreement with the US
In 2005 and 2006 President V á zquez, with support from the powerful network
of economists that controlled economic policy, pursued a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) with the USA. Opposed to this initiative was a broad coalition made up of
political sectors of V á zquez ’ s own party, union actors (especially from union
syndicates), and leftist intellectuals and academics, who eventually blocked the
president ’ s initiative. This conflict was a confrontation between two networks
of experts who invoked different bodies of empirical evidence and knowledge.
However, in the end it was not empirical evidence but, yet again, the president ’ s
calculations that swayed the balance and decided the matter.
3.3.1 The Problem, The Alternative, The Opportunity and The Outcome
– The problem. Like other countries in Latin America, Uruguay had very high
levels of protectionism in the first half of the 20th century but it was only in
the mid 1950s, when the country entered into a long period of stagflation,
that this strategy began to be seen as a problem. Little by little this situation
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14 Adolfo Garc é
gave rise to a different approach that was instigated by important neo-liberal
figures in Uruguay such as Ram ó n D í az who argued quite early that “ a small
country must be an open country. ” Trade opening became the paradigm at
the start of the 1970s, but the changeover was gradual.
An important step in this process was taken when Uruguay joined the MER-
COSUR in 1991. For nearly 10 years there was a near consensus in political and
academic circles in favor of this pattern of international insertion – which came
to be termed “ open regionalism ” – and regional integration was seen as a plat-
form for trade relations with the rest of the world. This consensus was broken by
the crisis of 1999 – 2002. The country ’ s economy collapsed when demand from
Brazil plummeted (because of devaluation in 1999) and demand from Argentina
fell dramatically (because of the 2001 financial crisis). This shock in the region
came on top of a series of academic studies insisting that Uruguay ’ s main obsta-
cle to achieving an acceptable rate of long term growth was its weak capacity
to guard against adverse external shocks. The V á zquez government ’ s economics
team, which was made up of prestigious economists with high levels of academic
training, was very conscious of this problem.
– The alternative . In the middle of the 2002 crisis, when the whole country was
discussing the problem of how to free people ’ s savings that were trapped
in the bankrupt banks (the so-called “ corralito ” whereby bank accounts
were frozen) President Jorge Batlle let slip a phrase that had a big impact
on public opinion. He said the worst “ corralito , ” the most damaging to
Uruguay … was the MERCOSUR. This view was shared by most economists in
the various political parties. The alternative to a policy of “ open regionalism ”
(the trade insertion pattern coming up to the 2002 crisis) was trade inser-
tion “ the Chilean way ” (a strategy of pursuing multiple bilateral trade agree-
ments), and this option was gaining general acceptance as a legitimate move.
Uruguay already had a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Mexico, which had
been negotiated and signed by President Batlle himself, and this helped to
show the public that this alternative had good potential. Batlle continued to
seek FTAs and he managed to seal a bilateral investment treaty ( Porzecanski
2010 ). The main economists in the Tabar é V á zquez administration favored
this alternative, as became clear when the USA let it be understood that it was
disposed to move towards signing an FTA with Uruguay.
– The opportunity. The window of opportunity to pursue this policy was open
in 2005. President V á zquez announced that he supported the initiative by
Danilo Astori, his Economics Minister, to sign an FTA with the USA. It should
be mentioned that V á zquez is a medical doctor by profession and does not
necessarily have strong convictions on the question of trade integration.
The reason he inclined towards the FTA option was that he had great confi-
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 15
dence in Astori ’ s technical ability; in fact Astori was his favorite minister. Like
Astori, he had come to the conclusion that Uruguay should emulate Chile ’ s
trade insertion strategy ( Porzecanski 2010 : pp. 120 – 122).
The political conditions at the time were excellent. First, both V á zquez
and Astori had extraordinarily high approval ratings. Second, public
opinion was strongly favorable (around 60%) to the FTA ( Porzecanski
2010 : p. 130). Third, although V á zquez knew the plan would meet resist-
ance in his own party he trusted in his ability to overcome it. He had done
this several times before on important issues, like in his election campaign
in July 2004 when he made the surprise announcement, without prior
consultation, that if he was elected president he would appoint Astori as
Minister of the Economy. The fourth favorable consideration was that the
opposition parties were clearly in favor of an FTA. All in all, it seemed the
political opportunity could not have been better.
– The outcome . The attempt at obtaining an FTA with the US failed. The plan
provoked widespread opposition on the left and many actors joined together
to try to block it. This coalition was made up of players of considerable weight
including some ministers (among them the Chancellor (Foreign Minister)
Reinaldo Gargano), some factions in the FA (including the one headed by
Jos é Mujica, who had received the most votes in the 2004 election), the union
movement, and a powerful network of leftist academics who were experts in
political change. This network, which was a real epistemic community 10 mainly
made up of researchers at the University of the Republic, played a very impor-
tant part in formulating and spreading a modern argument against free trade.
Their spokespeople claimed that while FTAs might favor economic growth in
the short term, in the long run they ended up working against development
insofar as they inhibited innovation processes. This argument was much more
compatible with the tradition of the left, which since the 1960s had included
proposals of a structuralist (ECLAC) type, than to that of supporters of the FTA
with the USA, who were easily labeled by their opponents as “ neo-liberal. ”
V á zquez had to retreat in order to remain the leader of the coalition of left-wing
parties. In terms of political survival this was the right move. Danilo Astori sub-
sequently lost to Jos é Mujica in the primary election to succeed V á zquez as the
FA candidate for the presidency in July 2009, and one of the main reasons for
his defeat was precisely that he had worked to promote the FTA with the US.
10 An epistemic community is a network of experts with shared values and beliefs about the prob-
lems and challenges in a particular policy field. The developmentalist epistemic community was
made up of a wide range of academics including engineers, specialists in development, economists,
historians, sociologists and political scientists. Most of them were researchers at the UDELAR.
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16 Adolfo Garc é
3.3.2 The Case and the Concepts
On the theoretical level, the following conclusions can be drawn from the frus-
trated attempt to establish an FTA with the US:
– First, the case of the FTA underlines yet again the importance of academic
institutions, and in particular the UDELAR, in the knowledge regime in
Uruguay. On both sides of the debate – in the coalition that promoted the
FTA and also in the opposition that frustrated it – university experts played
a key role.
– Second, this case illustrates that partisan knowledge and adversarial logic pre-
dominate. Both sides wielded theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.
– Third, it laid bare the marked pluralism of the policy design regime in the
country: not even the most politically powerful president in the history of
modern Uruguay could impose his will over determined opposition.
– Fourth, it reminds us that State structures in Uruguay are technically weak. In
the polemical debate that broke out, not one office in the public administra-
tion played an important role, not even the Chancellery (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs) bureaucracy.
– Fifth, it makes clear how important the political parties and their ideologies
are. The technical arguments that were most powerful politically ended up
being those that fitted best with the government party ’ s ideological traditions.
– Sixth, it provides support for the hypothesis that political calculation is the
prime factor. In the end V á zquez retreated when it became evident that he did
have enough support within the FA. If he had pressed on he could have ended
up paying a big political price in terms of jeopardizing his own leadership.
3.4 Similarities and Differences in the Three Change Events Analyzed
The table below gives a summary of the information analyzed.
4 Towards a New Concept The above analysis of the three change events helps to show the limitations of the
concept of Knowledge Regime as formulated by Campbell and Pedersen. First, it
clearly demonstrates the importance of studying the demand side very thoroughly.
Second, it suggests that the dynamic of social research may not depend so much
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 17
Si
mila
ritie
s Di
ffere
nces
Pro
ble
ms
Aca
de
mic
in
sti
tuti
on
s a
nd
un
ive
rsit
y
ne
two
rks
pla
yed
a k
ey
role
in
th
e “
so
cia
l
con
str
uct
ion
” o
f th
e t
hre
e p
rob
lem
s.
Bo
th i
n t
he
ca
se
of
ide
nti
fyin
g t
he
pro
ble
m o
f “ i
nn
ova
tio
n i
nd
ige
nce
”
an
d i
n t
ha
t o
f th
e v
uln
era
bil
itie
s i
nvo
lve
d i
n “
op
en
re
gio
na
lis
m, ”
UD
ELA
R a
cad
em
ic n
etw
ork
s p
laye
d a
de
cis
ive
ro
le.
On
th
e o
the
r h
an
d,
in t
he
“ s
oci
al
con
str
uct
ion
” o
f th
e p
rob
lem
of
po
vert
y th
e I
PE
S/U
CU
DA
L (C
ath
oli
c U
niv
ers
ity)
pla
yed
a v
ery
imp
ort
an
t ro
le.
Alt
ern
ati
ves
The
un
ive
rsit
ies
(pu
bli
c o
r p
riva
te)
an
d t
he
ir
rese
arc
he
rs w
ere
als
o k
ey
in d
esi
gn
ing
an
d/o
r im
ple
me
nti
ng
th
e i
nn
ova
tio
ns.
UD
ELA
R a
cad
em
ics
did
a lo
t o
f w
ork
tha
t le
d t
o t
he
fo
un
din
g o
f th
e A
NII
, th
e
imp
lem
en
tati
on
of
the
PA
NE
S,
an
d p
rovi
din
g
the
th
eo
reti
cal b
asi
s fo
r b
lock
ing
th
e F
TA.
So
me
tra
ns
na
tio
na
l in
sti
tuti
on
s (
lik
e t
he
IDB
an
d t
he
Eb
ert
Fo
un
da
tio
n)
he
lpe
d t
o
de
sig
n o
r im
ple
me
nt
cha
ng
es
.
The
re w
ere
big
dif
fere
nce
s i
n t
he
am
ou
nt
of
do
me
sti
c d
es
ign
in
the
alt
ern
ati
ves
. In
th
e c
as
e o
f th
e P
AN
ES
, a
mo
de
l th
at
wa
s v
ery
wid
es
pre
ad
in
th
e r
eg
ion
wa
s i
mp
ort
ed
in
acc
ord
an
ce w
ith
th
e
cla
ss
ic p
att
ern
of
po
licy
dif
fus
ion
. In
th
e c
as
e o
f th
e A
NII
, d
om
es
tic
gro
un
dw
ork
se
em
s t
o h
ave
be
en
mu
ch m
ore
co
ns
iste
nt
an
d d
eci
siv
e.
The
re a
re a
lso
dif
fere
nce
s i
n t
he
kin
ds
of
kn
ow
led
ge
in
volv
ed
. In
th
e
cas
e o
f th
e s
ett
ing
up
of
the
AN
II,
acc
um
ula
ted
re
se
arc
h c
on
trib
ute
d
to b
uil
din
g c
on
se
ns
us
. In
th
e c
as
e o
f th
e F
TA,
res
ea
rch
ha
d a
n
ad
vers
ari
al
dyn
am
ic a
nd
wa
s u
se
d b
y th
os
e i
n f
avo
r a
s w
ell
as
by
tho
se
ag
ain
st
the
Pre
sid
en
t ’ s
in
itia
tive
.
Po
liti
cal
op
po
rtu
nit
ies
Th
e c
ha
ng
e o
f g
ove
rnm
en
t a
nd
as
su
mp
tio
n
of
po
we
r b
y a
n o
pp
os
itio
n p
art
y w
as
de
cis
ive
in
ho
w e
ach
op
po
rtu
nit
y fo
r
cha
ng
e w
as
cre
ate
d.
The
pre
sid
en
t ’ s
le
ad
ers
hip
wa
s a
ke
y fa
cto
r
in p
rom
oti
ng
th
e t
hre
e c
ha
ng
es
an
d i
n
su
bs
eq
ue
ntl
y p
utt
ing
th
e b
rak
e o
n o
ne
of
the
m (
the
FTA
).
In t
he
tw
o s
ucc
es
sfu
l ca
se
s t
he
pre
sid
en
t h
ad
ma
de
fir
m p
oli
tica
l
com
mit
me
nts
. H
e h
ad
be
en
pro
mis
ing
an
“ e
me
rge
ncy
pla
n ”
sin
ce
the
19
99
ele
ctio
n c
am
pa
ign
, a
nd
he
ha
d m
ad
e i
nn
ova
tio
n o
ne
of
the
ma
in p
illa
rs o
f h
is p
latf
orm
in
20
04
. In
co
ntr
as
t, i
n t
he
fa
ile
d
att
em
pt
to e
sta
bli
sh
an
FTA
ne
ith
er
his
co
nvi
ctio
ns
no
r h
is p
oli
tica
l
com
mit
me
nt
wa
s a
s s
tro
ng
. P
oli
tica
l p
lura
lis
m d
id n
ot
imp
ed
e c
ha
ng
e
in t
wo
of
the
th
ree
ch
an
ge
-eve
nts
stu
die
d.
So
urc
e:
au
tho
r ’ s
ela
bo
rati
on
.
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18 Adolfo Garc é
on the political economy factors that these authors emphasize because, if that
were so, the knowledge regime in Uruguay would be similar to that in Germany
(for reasons that are explained below) but this is most manifestly not the case.
4.1 The Demand for Research and Its Actors as Decisive Factors
The three processes analyzed above show that demand is a decisive factor in
the use of social research. There is no way to understand the introduction of the
PANES, the founding of the ANII and the problematic FTA episode without focus-
ing on the role the president ’ s leadership played in all three initiatives. Similarly,
in all three cases it is essential to take account of the FA ’ s ideological and insti-
tutional features and of that party ’ s links with networks of university academics.
The FA has a very strong ideological commitment to equality as a key value, and
the fact that the PANES was introduced so quickly can be traced directly to this
tradition. The FA also has an equally strong anti-imperialist tradition, and this is
a factor in understanding why the plan for an FTA with the USA was blocked. In
addition, the party ’ s internal factionalism is a key institutional factor in under-
standing why the president was forced to abandon that initiative. Lastly, the fact
that the FA has deep roots in the UDELAR is crucial to understanding why the FA
government was able to so easily utilize the contributions from the university net-
works that served to lay the foundations for the two changes (PANES and ANII)
that were successfully made.
Campbell and Pedersen ’ s concept of Knowledge Regime is a very important
contribution in this field but it does not shed light on two crucial dimensions of
the dynamic of specialized knowledge. Neither the demand for research nor the
actors involved in this aspect (leaders and political parties) are adequately con-
sidered. To understand how any market works – and this applies equally to the
market for ideas – the features of the demand side have to be studied to the same
depth as the features of the supply.
4.2 Uruguay is not Germany
According to Campbell and Pedersen ’ s typology, Uruguay should be similar to
Germany insofar as it has the same kind of capitalism (coordinated market) and
the same kind of policy making regime (pluralist). These authors maintain that
this combination, which prevails in Germany, generates a knowledge regime ori-
ented to consensus. In these cases the idea market is, at least in theory, relatively
uncompetitive, and there are few research units oriented to promoting specific
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 19
interests. The knowledge they generate should be geared to constructing a con-
sensus and be perceived by society as neutral. However, none of these features
apply to Uruguay.
It is true that, like Germany, Uruguay has few research units oriented to promot-
ing specific interests. As it became clear in our examination of the change events
during the V á zquez administration, the research units in the universities in general
and the UDELAR in particular, are very important actors in the policy design process.
But specialized knowledge, even when the underlying intention is most decidedly to
be neutral, ends up being widely used by the parties and their factions in the battle
for political power. Technical rationality is firmly subordinate to political rationality,
and this too was clearly demonstrated in the three cases analyzed above.
The truth is that the dynamic of specialized knowledge in Uruguay is much
more like the North American model than the German. In Uruguay, like in the US,
specialized knowledge is a formidable weapon in the struggle for power. The big
difference between the two countries is that while the main actors in the USA are
interest groups that employ think tanks in their battles for influence, in Uruguay
the main protagonists are political parties. Note that the type of capitalism in
these countries makes no important difference when it comes to understanding
the main factors that underlie the dynamics of social research. In fact, to under-
stand what kind of specialized knowledge is in play and its political dynamic, it
is less important to understand how the economic market is regulated (or not, as
the case may be) than to ascertain what factors structure the policy market.
4.3 The Status of Science in a Given Society and Political System
In Uruguay, the US and Germany the policy design regime is pluralist. But while in
the first two countries the knowledge market is open and research tends to be used
in an adversarial and partisan way, in Germany the prevailing perception is that
knowledge is neutral and is used to build a consensus. Why is Uruguay like the US
rather than Germany ? In this section we shall argue that the crucial difference could
be traced to the value society and the political system place on social research .
Campbell and Pedersen assert that a coordinated economy will generate
knowledge oriented to consensus. However, there are good reasons to think that
the causal relation may be reversed. If a society tends to confer a special status
to scientific knowledge it will probably regard as legitimate the use of scientific
research as a basis for building consensus about public policies. For this very
reason it will tend to construct institutions capable of producing this knowl-
edge to regulate the market “ rationally. ” Similarly, it is probable that the more
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20 Adolfo Garc é
representative of society (and less elitist) the political parties are, the greater will
be their distrust of the role that more learned minorities play and of the special-
ized knowledge that distinguishes them.
It is not only State structures that tend to reflect the extent to which society
trusts science. Political parties, insofar as they express predominant values, tend
to reproduce these patterns. The more enlightened a society is, the more the polit-
ical parties will regard intellectuals with reverence and tend to trust in the social
utility and neutrality of science. On the other hand, the more anti-intellectual a
society is, the more intensely the political parties will use specialized knowledge
as an instrument to achieve their goals.
4.4 Sketching a New Concept: Political-Knowledge Regimes
We can construct a new concept on the basis of the features of the policy design
regime and the value society places on science. We shall call this the Political-
Knowledge Regime . The policy design regime has a big effect not only on the char-
acteristics of the supply of specialized knowledge but also on the demand for
it. As Campbell and Pedersen show, pluralism favors the formation of an open
idea market and intense competition among different strands of knowledge. On
the other hand, a centralized policy design environment generates a more closed
idea market.
The value that society puts on science also has a big influence on the supply
of and demand for research. In countries where the predominant culture is more
rationalist, the demand for research tends to be greater and there is general accept-
ance that science can be neutral. On the other hand, in countries with a politi-
cal culture that is suspicious of expert knowledge, there will be less demand for
Typology of Political-Knowledge Regimes
General valuation of science in the political system (Predominant cultural tradition)
Rationalism Enlightenment Pragmatism Anti-intellectualism
Policy design regime
Centralized I III
TECNOCRACY PLEBIAN MAJORITARISM
Decentralized II IV
TECHNOCRATIC PLURALISM PLEBIAN PLURALISM
Source: author ’ s elaboration.
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Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 21
scientific knowledge, and science will tend to be used instrumentally as a means
to an end. Based on these two variables, the following typology can be sketched
out:
Before continuing, we should make it clear that no normative bias should be
sought in this discussion. With that in mind, let us examine in greater depth each
of the quadrants in the table above.
– TYPE I. TECNOCRACY. The combination of centralization and rationalism
generates a State-driven intense use of social research. The political parties
frequently appeal to experts and tend to delegate considerable responsibili-
ties to them in the definition of public policies. Academic knowledge is very
important as a trampoline for people ’ s political careers and a sine qua non
condition for them to attain positions in the government. A good example of
this type in Latin America is Chile, which seems to have inherited a German
influence and a positivist influence in which science is highly valued.
– TYPE II. TECHNOCRATIC PLURALISM. The combination of pluralism and
rationalism generates an open market for ideas in which alternative policy
paradigms compete. Science is highly valued and this generates consider-
able development in the social sciences and in research applied to public
policies. Like in type I (technocracy), there are State structures that favor the
use of knowledge in policies. University education and academic merit are
important to attain a position in the government. A good example of this type
is Brazil.
– TYPE III. PLEBIAN MAJORITARISM. The combination of centralization and
anti-intellectualism do not favor the formation of a competitive or demand-
ing market for ideas. The use of research need not be of low intensity but it is
strictly subordinate to the strategies of the leading actors, who mainly resort
to experts when they want to give their decisions legitimacy and strengthen
their hegemony. Argentina would be an example of this type.
– TYPE IV. PLEBIAN PLURALISM. The combination of pluralism and anti-intel-
lectualism generates a comparatively low level of specialized knowledge use,
which basically serves as an instrumental function in public policies. Plural-
ism favors an idea market that is open and competitive, but politics clearly
dominate technical rationality. Specialized knowledge is essentially a weapon
in the power struggle among the main political actors. Like in a type III system
(plebian majoritarism), State structures clearly show the stamp of the pre-
dominance of political rationality. A good example of this type is Uruguay.
Needless to say, this is no more than a first attempt at constructing this
concept, and as such it needs to be debated. From a theoretical perspective,
it is open to the same criticism as any other attempt to generalize. First, it
is not so easy to define a country ’ s public policy production regime, or the
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22 Adolfo Garc é
predominant discourse about “ reason ” and science in a society or a political
system. 11 And, as always when a discussion is raised to such a high level of
abstraction, the question is inevitably asked: surely, within the same country,
aren ’ t there big differences between different regions and sectors ? Secondly,
like the concept of Knowledge Regime from which it is derived, this new
concept is overly static. As noted above, the time factor has not been incor-
porated into the discussion. The question arises: might it not be impossible
to find empirical evidence of important change processes in either of the two
variables that make up the Political-Knowledge Regime ?
In any case, it is evident that the only way to evaluate the specific contri-
bution a new typology might make is to try to apply it in a variety of contexts.
I hope that this article may help to stimulate not only case studies but also
comparisons between countries.
Acknowledgments: I drafted the first version of this text at the Institute of Politi-
cal Science in the first semester of 2013 with support from Politics & Ideas: a think
net ( http://www.politicsandideas.org/ ), and I would like to give special thanks
to Andrea Ord ó ñ ez, Enrique Mendiz á bal and Vanesa Weyrauch with whom I dis-
cussed the main ideas in this article. I would also like to thank Am í lcar Davyt
(Faculty of Sciences) and Camilo L ó pez (ICP – Faculty of Social Sciences).
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