AUGUST 2012 Constitutional law Bill of rights; due process . Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due process. … Since petitioner was given the opportunity to defend himself from the charges against him, as in fact he submitted a Counter-Affidavit with the PAGC, though he failed to comply with the order for the submission of position paper, he cannot complain of denial of due process. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012. Bill of rights; unreasonable searches; exclusionary rule . Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines , G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012. Bill of rights; warrantless arrests; flagrante delicto . Section 5[ of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure] provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Transcript
AUGUST 2012
Constitutional law
Bill of rights; due process. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due process. … Since petitioner was given the opportunity to defend himself from the charges against him, as in fact he submitted a Counter-Affidavit with the PAGC, though he failed to comply with the order for the submission of position paper, he cannot complain of denial of due process. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.
Bill of rights; unreasonable searches; exclusionary rule . Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012.
Bill of rights; warrantless arrests; flagrante delicto. Section 5[ of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure] provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro. Ambre, however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. …
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012.
Public officers
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. We have ruled that dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus separate and distinct from penal and civil liability.
Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case filed before the Ombudsman are based on the same subject matter is of no moment. It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that the administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge. Accordingly, the dismissal of two criminal cases by the Sandiganbayan and of several criminal complaints by the Ombudsman did not result in the absolution of petitioner from the administrative charges. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. Under the ”threefold liability rule,” any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of the other. Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012.
Ombudsman; power to dismiss erring public officials . As a last ditch effort to save himself, petitioner now puts in issue the power of the Ombudsman to order his dismissal from service. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in dismissing him from service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3, Article XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770, which only vests in the Ombudsman the power to recommend the removal of a public official or employee. …
It is already well-settled that “the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.” As we have explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals [503 Phil. 396 (2003)], “the fact ‘[t]hat the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with [the] order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action [under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s ‘recommendation’ is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.” Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012.
JULY 2012
Constitutional Law
Bill of rights; right of confrontation. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness’ credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. Go, et al. v. The People of the Philippines and Highdone Company, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012.
Bill of rights; right of confrontation; conditional examination of witnesses. But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure…
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’ deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case against the accused…
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris [G.R. No. L- 48883, August 6, 1980] that the constitutional requirement “insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.” Go, et al. v. The People of the Philippines and Highdone Company, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012.
Bill of rights; right to privacy. Clearly [citing Morfe v. Mutuc (130 Phil. 415 [1968]) and Ople v. Torres (354 Phil. 948 [1998]), the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks [G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007], this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute…
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection, this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden [26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433], in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security…
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
Constitutional construction; verba legis non est recedendum . One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Eminent domain; determination of just compensation. We also declared in National Power Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation [G.R. No. 160725, September 12, 2008] that Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended (which provides a fixed formula in the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right of way) is not binding upon this Court. This is in keeping with the established rule that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al., G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.
Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of President. [I]t has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 541 (1939)]: “With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that ‘The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.’ This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.” Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well
as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; civilian police force; authority of local executives over police. Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.” A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations … In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of local executives. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions. Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a “national law enforcement agency,” to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement agencies. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency…
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora [G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001], the Court affirmed that the President’s authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus: “But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), ‘the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.’ For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President.” Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization; rationale. And in Domingo v. Zamora [G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003], the Court gave the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority in this wise: “The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office ‘to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.’ The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.” Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization; nature. Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) [of the Administrative Code] gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora, the Court noted: “However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.”
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees’ tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly “under the Office of the President.” On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
Eminent domain; what constitutes “taking.” The NPC, relying on [Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395], argues that the CA erred when it ordered the payment of just compensation for the properties in question, given that most of the properties were subject only to an aerial easement of right of way, with the NPC requiring the use of the area above the subject lands for its transmission lines. We have already established in a number of cases the flaw behind the NPC’s argument. At the heart of this argument is the mistaken assumption that what are involved are mere liens on the property in the form of aerial easements. While it may be true that the transmission lines merely pass over the affected properties, the easement imposes the additional limitation that the landowners are prohibited from constructing any improvements or planting any trees that exceed three (3) meters within the aerial right of way area. This prohibition clearly interferes with the landowners’ right to possess and enjoy their properties…
Apart from interfering with the attributes of ownership, we have articulated in our observation in National Power Corp. v. Sps. Gutierrez [271 Phil. 1 (1991)]that these transmission lines, because of the high-tension
current that passes through them, pose a danger to the lives and limbs of those in the surrounding areas, and, thus, serve to limit the activities that can be done on these lands. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al., G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.
Impeachment; nature of. Impeachment, described as “the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,” was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that “the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution… Corona v. Senate of the Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.
Impeachment; power of judicial review. In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. [G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003], we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice [G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011], the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one year bar provision …
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts. Corona v. Senate of the Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, “from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only.” Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the Court finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Court’s conclusion that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, and impeachment. In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the roles which a particular house plays, regardless of whether the two houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of government.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of government. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Public officers
Public officers; authority of city vice-mayor to enter into contracts. Under [Section 456 of the Local Government Code], there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Arnold D. Vicencio v. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.
Public officers; compensation and allowances. The issuance of Resolution No. 464 by the NHA was without legal basis. At the time of its issuance in 1982, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 had already expressly repealed all decrees, executive orders, and issuances that authorized the grant of allowances to groups of officials or employees despite the inconsistency of those allowances with the position classification or rates indicated in the National Compensation and Position Classification Plan.
Petitioners’ contention that P.D. 1597 only repealed Section 4 of P.D. 985, but not Section 2 thereof, is without basis. While Section 2 of P.D. 1597 only mentions Section 4 of P.D. 985, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 specifically refers to all inconsistent laws or issuances.
Thereafter, or in 1989, R.A. 6758 further reinforced this policy by expressly decreeing that all allowances not specifically mentioned therein, or as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates prescribed.
Under Section 12 of R.A. 6758, all kinds of allowances are integrated in the standardized salary rates. Below are the exceptions: 1. Representation and transportation allowance (RATA); 2. Clothing and laundry allowance; 3. Subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels; 4. Subsistence allowance of hospital personnel; 5. Hazard pay; 6. Allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and 7. Such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM.
Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents as of 1 July 1989, which were not integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized.
In this case, the incentive allowances granted under Resolution No.464 are clearly not among those enumerated under R.A. 6758. Neither has there been any allegation that the allowances were specifically determined by the DBM to be an exception to the standardized salary rates. Hence, such allowances can no longer be granted after the effectivity of R.A. 6758. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012.
Public officers; validity of per diems paid to ex-officio members of PEZA. PEZA’s insistence that there is legal basis in its grant of per diems to the ex officio members of its Board does not hold water. The constitutional prohibition explained in [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815, February 22, 1991] still stands and this Court finds no reason to revisit the doctrine laid down therein as said interpretation, to this Court’s mind, is in consonance with what our Constitution provides … In Civil Liberties Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio position. This Court ruled: “It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.” Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Commission on Audit and Reynaldo A. Villar, Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012.
Public officers; liability of public officer executing contract without authority. Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. The public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioner’s act of entering into a contract on behalf of the local government unit without the requisite authority therefor was in violation of the Local Government Code. While petitioner may have
relied on the opinion of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him from his personal liability under P.D. 1445. Arnold D. Vicencio v. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.
Public officers; suspension order. While the suspension of a public officer under [Section 13 or Republic Act No. 3019] is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the information” filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.” The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.
Public officers; suspension order. The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, [Luciano v. Mariano (148-B Phil. 178 [1971])]likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.
No estoppel against Government. In Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit [425 Phil. 326 [2002]), this Court stated that public officers’ erroneous application and enforcement of the law do not estop the government from making a subsequent correction of those errors. Where there is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties on account of an error committed by public officials in granting the benefit. Practice, without more – no matter how long continued – cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012.
Local government
Local autonomy; devolution; reservation in favor of national government. While [Section 17 of the Local Government Code] charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus: “(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.”
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU…
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned. Pimentel, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012.
Other laws
Agrarian reform; procedure for acquisition. The procedure for acquisition of private lands under Section 16 (e) of the CARL is that upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the DAR shall proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries… Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012.
Agrarian reform; control and possession of agricultural land. We, however, agree that petitioner must now turn over possession of the 109-hectare land. The matter has already been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al. [G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012], when we ruled that the Constitution and the CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught. We stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. From [Sections 2(10) and 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)], it is clear that a GOCC must be “organized as a stock or non-stock corporation” while an instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. Examples are the Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government corporate entities. They are not, however, GOCCs in the strict sense as
understood under the Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the legal relationship and status of government entities. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into no par value shares as provided in Section 74 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525, E.O. No. 6546 and EO No. 7987 that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its stockholders.
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A non-stock corporation must have members. Moreover, it was not organized for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to manage all government reclamation projects. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; Constitutional requirements. Furthermore, there is another reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: “Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.”
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common good but failed the second one – economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing reclamation companies being operated by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created essentially to perform a public service considering that it was primarily responsible for a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of lands belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with the public interest. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. This Court is convinced that PRA is not a GOCC either under Section 2(3) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code or under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The facts, the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA was not organized either as a stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by Congress to operate commercially and compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property tax. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
Government contracts; public bidding requirement. Public bidding, as a method of government procurement, is governed by the principles of transparency, competitiveness, simplicity, and accountability. By its very nature and characteristic, a competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open competition and in order to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public contracts. Except only in cases in which alternative methods of procurement are allowed, all government procurement shall be done by competitive bidding. In the case of Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co, Inc. [G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 & 155661, May 5, 2003], the Court held: “Competition must be legitimate, fair and honest. In the field of government contract law, competition requires, not only bidding upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, the same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest; and not designed to injure of defraud the government.” It has been held that the three principles in bidding are the offer to the public, opportunity for competition, and a basis for the exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear John Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.
Government contracts; public bidding requirement; approved budget of contract must be disclosed. Under the law, the PSC-BAC is mandated to disclose not only the description of the items to be procured, and the eligibility requirements, among others, but also the approved budget of the project. Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public bidding. Thus, it should be conducted fairly and openly with full and free opportunity for competition among bidders. It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it … Consequently, the provision in the “Instruction to Bidders” stating that no award of the contract shall be made to a bidder whose bid price is lower than the allowable government estimate (AGE) or AAE is not valid. The rule on the matter is clear. The PSC-BAC is obliged to observe and enforce the same in the procurement of goods and services for the project. The law on public bidding is not an empty formality. A strict adherence to the principles, rules and regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only to preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on the procedure. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear John Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.
FEBRUARY 2012
Constitutional Law
Autonomous Region; plebiscite requirement. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act– require ratification through a plebiscite. While it agrees with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, it disagrees that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite. Also, Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 10153 cannot be seen as changing the basic structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional
government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to “perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.” Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Citizenship; proceeding for declaration of Philippine citizenship. There is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. The Republic of the Philippines v. Nora Fe Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012.
COMELEC; authority to hold special elections. The Constitution merely empowers the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of Sections 5 and 6, which address instances when elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881. More important, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections and COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Commission on Audit; authority to determine if price is excessive; power to conduct post-audit. The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA “shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.” Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 07-012; relevance of brand of an equipment as basis for what is reasonable. The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA “shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.” As such, CDA’s decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use, including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COA’s auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDA’s
preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012 (guidelines on evidence to support audit findings of over-pricing). 3.1 When the price/prices of a transaction under audit is found beyond the allowable ten percent (10%) above the prices indicated in reference price lists referred to in pa[r].2.1 as market price indicators, the auditor shall secure additional evidence to firm-up the initial audit finding to a reliable degree of certainty. 3.2 To firm-up the findings to a reliable degree of certainty, initial findings of over-pricing based on market price indicators mentioned in pa[r]. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheets and/or price quotations indicating: a) the identities/names of the suppliers or sellers; b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the requirements of the procuring agency; c) the specifications of the items which should match those involved in the finding of over-pricing; and d) the purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned transaction. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012; no retroactive effect. In Arriola v. COA, this Court ruled that the disallowance made by the COA was not sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was based on undocumented claims. The documents that were used as basis of the COA Decision were not shown to petitioners therein despite their repeated demands to see them; they were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited suppliers. Absent due process and evidence to support COA’s disallowance, COA’s ruling on petitioners’ liability has no basis. We categorically ruled in Nava v. Palattao that neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum No. 97-012 can be given any retroactive effect. Thus, although Arriolawas already promulgated at the time, it is not correct to say that the COA in this case violated the afore-quoted guidelines which have not yet been issued at the time the audit was conducted in 1993. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; pre-audit. On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs). Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct pre-audit. The Supreme Court found that there is nothing in section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the Court. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012.
Constitutionality; locus standi. Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7 ordering (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a
suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. The Supreme Court was not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, “as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry.” Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
DAR Administrative Order No. 01; 2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands under RA No. 6657; procedure; commencement. Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) – After determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP, and upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the NO (CARP Form No. 5-1). Corolarilly, Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, which outlines the steps in the acquisition of lands, details that in the 3rd step, the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office (DARMO) should conduct a “preliminary ocular inspection to determine initially whether or not the property maybe covered under the CARP,” which findings will be contained in CARP Form No. 3.a, or the Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report. Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Ruben Alcaide (deceased), substituted by Gloria Alcaide representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries, G.R. No. 167952, February 1, 2012.
Declaratory relief. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
Double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is
legally correct. In other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.
Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, viz: The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant’s express consent. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. Artemio Villareal vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al. G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080, February 1, 2012.
Due process; deprivation of the State’s right to due process. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest. The State’s right to be heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the public prosecutor properly undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for the punishment of the guilty. The prosecutor’s role in the administration of justice is to lay before the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge may or is disposed to do. The prosecutor owes the State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape unpunished. In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what evidence to present or who to call as witness. In this case, the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that
other evidence could be secured. People of the Philippines, v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), et al., G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012.
Elections; synchronization of ARMM elections with local elections. The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from Sections 1, 2 and 5 of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. It is to be considered that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. Article X of the Constitution, entitled “Local Government,” clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments. That the Constitution mentions only the “national government” and the “local governments,” and does not make a distinction between the “local government” and the “regional government,” is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections. Datu Michael Abas Kida, et. al v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Eminent domain; just compensation. When the State exercises its inherent power of eminent domain, the Constitution imposes the corresponding obligation to compensate the landowner for the expropriated property. When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the implementation of its agrarian reform program, the constitutional provision which governs is Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. Notably, this provision also imposes upon the State the obligation of paying the landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the government’s agrarian reform purposes. That the compensation mentioned here pertains to the fair and full price of the taken property is evident from the exchange between the members of the Constitutional Commission during the discussion on the government’s agrarian reform program. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012.
Equal protection clause. The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
it applies equally to all members of the same class. Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. It was not seen how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from. Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.
Executive agreement; requisites. An executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a narrower range of subject matters. Despite these differences, to be considered an executive agreement, the following three requisites provided under the Vienna Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must governed by international law. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
Executive Power; power to classify or reclassify lands. The power to classify or reclassify lands is essentially an executive prerogative, albeit local government units, thru zoning ordinances, may, subject to certain conditions, very well effect reclassification of land use within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Reclassification decrees issued by the executive department, through its appropriate agencies, carry the same force and effect as any statute. As it were, PD 27 and Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each forming, by virtue of Sec. 3(2), Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, a part of the law of the land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs . Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Irrepealable law. The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which the Supreme Court sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
President; judicial courtesy. Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. In other words, the principle of “judicial courtesy” applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin. Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is founded upon. Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that,
based on the voting, “the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted.” Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
President; power to appoint officer in charge. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power. The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments. he first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The second group of officials the President can appoint are “all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.” The second sentence acts as the “catch-all provision” for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment. There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
State immunity; doctrine of state immunity. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. Piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business. Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest it with immunity. It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original
charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
State immunity; waiver by submission to arbitration. In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is reason to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case. Under the provisions of The Conditions of Contract which is an integral part of the Contract Agreement,, if any dispute arises between Northrail and CNMEG, both parties are bound to submit the matter to the HKIAC for arbitration. In case the HKIAC makes an arbitral award in favor of Northrail, its enforcement in the Philippines would be subject to the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special Rules). Rule 13 thereof provides for the Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award. Under Rules 13.2 and 13.3 of the Special Rules, the party to arbitration wishing to have an arbitral award recognized and enforced in the Philippines must petition the proper regional trial court (a) where the assets to be attached or levied upon is located; (b) where the acts to be enjoined are being performed; (c) in the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties; (d) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides; or (e) in the National Capital Judicial Region. From all the foregoing, it is clear that CNMEG has agreed that it will not be afforded immunity from suit. Thus, the courts have the competence and jurisdiction to ascertain the validity of the Contract Agreement. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
Supreme Court; respect to factual findings of administrative agencies. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Taxpayer’s suit; standing. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012.
Administrative Law
Administrative Rule; due process; publication, when required. The Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Considering that the regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied Sections 3 and 9 of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down. Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.
Void government contract; payment for services. Parties who do not come to court with clean hands cannot be allowed to profit from their own wrongdoing. The action (or inaction) of the party seeking equity must be “free from fault, and he must have done nothing to lull his adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing vigilance on the part of the latter.” Here, even with the respondents’ supposed failure to ascertain the validity of the contract and the authority of the public official involved in the construction agreements, there is no such confusion as to the matter of the contract’s validity and the equivalent compensation. As found by the court a quo, petitioner had assured the contractors that they would be paid for the work that they would do, as even DPWH Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion had told them to “fast-track” the project. Hence, respondents cannot by any stretch of logic, be deprived of compensation for their services when – despite their ostensible omissions – they only heeded the assurance of DPWH and proceeded to work on the urgent project. DPWH v. Ronaldo Quiwa, et. al, G.R. No. 183444, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform
Agrarian Reform Law; agricultural lands. The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. Section 3(c) of RA 6657 defines “agricultural lands” as “lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs . Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; applicability of PD 27, RA 6657, and Proclamation 1637. From the standpoint of agrarian reform, PD 27, being in context the earliest issuance, governed at the start the disposition of the rice-and-corn land portions of the Doronilla property. And true enough, the DAR began processing land transfers through the OLT program under PD 27 and thereafter issued the corresponding CLTs. However, when Proclamation 1637 went into effect, DAR discontinued with the OLT processing. The tenants of Doronilla during that time desisted from questioning the halt in the issuance of the CLTs. It is fairly evident that DAR noted the effect of the issuance of Proclamation 1637 on the subject land and decided not to pursue its original operation, recognizing the change of classification of the property from agricultural to residential. When it took effect on June 15, 1988, RA 6657 became the prevailing agrarian reform law. This is not to say, however, that its coming into effect necessarily impeded the operation of PD 27, which, to repeat, covers only rice and corn land. Far from it, for RA 6657, which identifies “rice and corn land” under PD 27 as among the properties the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless, no less provides that PD 27 shall be of suppletory application”. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796; 161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; certificates of title; merely an evidence of recognition by the government; inchoate right. While the PD 27 tenant-farmers are considered the owners by virtue of that decree, they cannot yet exercise all the attributes inherent in ownership, such as selling the lot, because, with respect to the government represented by DAR and LBP, they have in the meantime only inchoate rights in the lot––the
being “amortizing owners.” This is because they must still pay all the amortizations over the lot to Land Bank before an EP is issued to them. Then and only then do they acquire, in the phraseology ofVinzons-Magana, “the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding.” Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796; 161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; private rights; just compensation. As payment the farmer-beneficiaries who were given the 75 CLTs prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1283, as amended by Proclamation 1637, are deemed full owners of the lots covered by 75 CLTs vis-à-vis the real registered owner. The farmer-beneficiaries have private rights over said lots as they were deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS Townsite reservation or at least are subrogated to the rights of the registered lot owner. Those farmer-beneficiaries who were issued CLTs or EPs after June 21, 1974 when Proclamation 1283, as amended, became effective do not acquire rights over the lots they were claiming under PD 27 or RA 6657, because the lots have already been reclassified as residential and are beyond the compulsory coverage for agrarian reform under RA 6657. Perforce, the said CLTs or EPs issued after June 21, 1974 have to be annulled and invalidated for want of legal basis, since the lots in question are no longer subject to agrarian reform due to the reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate to non-agricultural purposes. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agricultural tenancy relationship; de jure tenant; grounds for ejection provided by law. Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee. This rule proceeds from the principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law, in this case Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844. SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.– Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections 25 and except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession; (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event orforce majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section 29; (5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or (7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section 27. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.
Agricultural tenancy relationship; requisites; may be established through written or oral contract. The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.
Jurisdiction of DAR; DARAB. The DARAB has been created and designed to exercise the DAR’s adjudicating functions. And just like any quasi-judicial body, DARAB derives its jurisdiction from law, specifically RA 6657, which invested it with adjudicatory powers over agrarian reform disputes and matters related to the implementation of CARL. The Supreme Court need not belabor that DARAB’s jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Doronilla property, cannot be conferred by the main parties, let alone the intervening farmer-beneficiaries claiming to have “vested rights” under PD 27. As earlier discussed, the process of land reform covering the 1,266 hectares of the Araneta estate was not completed prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1637. So the intervenors, with the exception of the 79 tenant-beneficiaries who were granted CLTs, failed to acquire private rights of ownership under PD 27 before the effective conversion of the Doronilla property to non-agricultural uses. Hence, the Doronilla property, being outside of CARP coverage, is also beyond DARAB’s jurisdiction. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Social justice; laches. There can be little quibble about Duran, et al. being guilty of laches. They failed and neglected to keep track of their case with their lawyer for 14 long years. As discussed above, Atty. Lara died even prior to the promulgation of the DARAB Decision. Even then, they failed to notify the DARAB and the other parties of the case regarding the demise of Atty. Lara and even a change of counsel. It certainly strains credulity to think that literally no one, among those constituting the petitioning-intervenors, had the characteristic good sense of following up the case with their legal counsel. Only now, 14 years after, did some think of fighting for the right they slept on. Thus, as to them, the CA Decision is deemed final and executory based on the principle of laches. Agrarian reform finds context in social justice in tandem with the police power of the State. But social justice itself is not merely granted to the marginalized and the underprivileged. But while the concept of social justice is intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an injustice. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Public Land
Public Land Act; alienable and disposable land. Public Land Act requires that the applicant for registration must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land must have been either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. Certifications of the DENR are not sufficient to prove the foregoing.
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Republic of the Philippines v. Lucia Gomez, G.R. No. 189021, February 22, 2012.
Public Land Act; confirmation of of imperfect titles. It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable public land must be “open, continuous, exclusive and notorious” in character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, the Supreme Court explained that the intent behind the use of “possession” in conjunction with “occupation” is to emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be “in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted”. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. Republic of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012.
Public Officers
Public officer; preventive suspension. The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for 90 days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. Clearly, by well-established jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer who has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon government of public funds or property. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al. G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.
Public officers; liability for overpricing; personal and solidary liability; reimbursement. The Court upholds the COA’s ruling that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the overpricing in the computers purchased by CDA. The directive for the payment of the amount of disallowance finally determined by the COA did not change the nature of the obligation as solidary because the demand thus made upon petitioner did not foreclose his right as solidary debtor to proceed against his co-debtors/obligors, in this case the members of the PBAC charged under Notice of Disallowance No. 93-0016-101, for their share in the total amount of disallowance. Petitioner is therefore liable to restitute the P881,819.00 to the Government without prejudice, however, to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable with him. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Public officials; holdover. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. The Supreme Court has already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Signing bonus; legality. There is no dispute that the grant of a signing bonus had been previously disallowed by the express mandate of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo). On July 22, 2002, this Court declared in SSS v. COA that Social Services Commission’s authority to fix the compensation of its employees under its charter, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161 as amended, is subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, which provides for the consolidation of allowances and compensation in the prescribed standardized salary rates. While there are exceptions provided under Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No. 6758 in observance of the policy on non-diminution of pay, the signing bonus is not one of the benefits contemplated. This Court also ruled that the signing bonus is “not a truly reasonable compensation” since conduct of peaceful collective negotiations “should not come with a price tag”. hat MIAA’s Board of Directors did not make a mistake and their real intention was to reward the successful conclusion of collective negotiations by some pecuniary means is belied by simultaneous approval of the grant and the CNA between SMPP and MIAA betrays their real intention. Moreover, prior to the issuance of AOM No. JPA 03-35 declaring the subject benefit illegal, there was no effort on the part of its Board of Directors to rectify the alleged mistake in nomenclature. It was only after then Corporate Auditor Manalo and Director Nacion called MIAA’s attention as to the illegality of a signing bonus that MIAA alleged that the subject benefit is a CNA Incentive. Easily, such is a mere afterthought.Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 194710, February 14, 2012.
Signing bonus; return of illegal bonus. Good faith is anchored on an honest belief that one is legally entitled to the benefit. In this case, the MIAA employees who had no participation in the approval and release of the disallowed benefit accepted the same on the assumption that Resolution No. 2003-067 was issued in the valid exercise of the power vested in the Board of Directors under the MIAA charter. As they were not privy as to reason and motivation of the Board of Directors, they can properly rely on the presumption that the former acted regularly in the performance of their official duties in accepting the subject benefit. Furthermore, their acceptance of the disallowed grant, in the absence of any competent proof of bad faith on their part, will not suffice to render liable for a refund. The same is not true as far as the Board of Directors. Their authority under Section 8 of the MIAA charter is not absolute as their exercise thereof is “subject to existing laws, rules and regulations” and they cannot deny knowledge of SSS v. COA and the various issuances of the Executive Department prohibiting the grant of the signing bonus. In fact, they are duty-bound to understand and know the law that they are tasked to implement and their unexplained failure to do so barred them from claiming that they were acting in good faith in the performance of their duty. The presumptions of “good faith” or “regular performance of official duty” are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 194710, February 14, 2012.
JANUARY 2012
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial versus right to speedy disposition of cases. The right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In this case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. An examination of the petitioners’ arguments and the cited indicia of delay would reveal the absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that attended the proceedings. Petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the alleged breach of the right in question was not raised below. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Constitutionality of PD 755, 961, 1468. This case cannot be resolved without going into the constitutionality of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in particular. For petitioners predicate their claim over the sequestered shares and necessarily their cause on laws and martial law issuances assailed by the respondent on constitutional grounds. This case is for the recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity of certain enactments, which in turn is rooted in the shares being public in character, purchased as they were by funds raised by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing and police powers of the state. As may be recalled, P.D. No. 755, under the policy-declaring provision, authorized the distribution of UCPB shares of stock free to coconut farmers. On the other hand, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 authorized the PCA to utilize portions of the CCSF to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCSF levies with UCPB interest free. The CCSF, CIDF and like levies that Philippine Coconut Authority is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.
In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, could have been the only plausible means by which close to a purported million and a half coconut farmers could have acquired the said shares of stock. It has, therefore, become necessary to determine the validity of the authorizing law, which made the stock transfer and acquisitions possible.
It is of crucial importance to determine the validity of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of the constitutional proscription against the use of special funds save for the purpose it was established. Otherwise, petitioners’ claim of legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and indirectly over SMC shares held by UCPB’s subsidiaries will have no leg to stand on, P.D. No. 755 being the only law authorizing the distribution of the SMC and UCPB shares of stock to coconut farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually stating and holding that the coco levy fund shall not be considered as a special – not even general – fund, but shall be owned by the farmers in their private capacities.
A. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. To hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
The Court rejected the idea of what appears to be an indirect – if not exactly direct – conversion of special funds into private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong to, or are a part of the coconut industry, the free distribution of shares of stocks purchased with special public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be justified. The fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds – or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. The said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the government.
B. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should revert to the general fund. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government,
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF “to advance the government’s avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry.” The CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to support consumer purchases of coconut products. The protection of the entire coconut industry and the consuming public provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut levy fund. P.D. No. 276 intended the fund created and set up therein not especially for the coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit the improvement of the industry would doubtless redound to the benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing
perspective, the following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: “[the coconut levy] fund and the disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by them in their private capacities;” or the coconut levy fund shall not be construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of the general fund of the national government later on; or the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the coconut farmers for free, violated the special public purpose for which the CCSF was established.
Not only were the challenged presidential issuances unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution of the shares of stock for free to the coconut farmers and, therefore, negating the public purpose declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut industry. They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut levy fund as private fund to be disbursed and/or invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities, contrary to the original purpose for which the fund was created. To compound the situation, the offending provisions effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which normally can be paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made by law. The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund – a special fund of the government – to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.
C. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of the national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to “accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development.” The said law gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any other mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same will be
undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or restrictions that would advance the law’s national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
D. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468 violate Article IX (D) (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 takes away the coconut levy funds from the coffer of the public funds. It privatized revenues derived from the coco levy. The same provision is carried over in Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468. These provisions violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the Constitution, which states in pertinent part that the Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As an independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, “[n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.” Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government, and consequently renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the coconut levy funds is an example of an investment of public funds. The conversion of these special public funds into private funds by allowing private individuals to own them in their private capacities is something else. It effectively deprives the COA of its constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle such accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased using special public funds into pure and exclusive private ownership has taken, or will completely take away the said funds from the boundaries with which the COA has jurisdiction. Obviously, the COA is without audit jurisdiction over the receipt or disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being unconstitutional. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Decisions; statement of fact and law. Complainant alleges that respondent members of the CA’s Sixth Division violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the petition for review was based. He insists that the decision promulgated by the CA’s Sixth Division had no legal foundation and did not even address the five issues presented in the petition for review. Section 14 provides that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without starting the legal
basis therefor.” The Court held that the complaint was unfounded. The essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary. Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al., A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012.
Due process; right to be heard. Petitioner COCOFED’s right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of partial summary judgments before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its “Class Action Omnibus Motion” dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around 400 documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documents comprise their evidence to prove the farmers’ ownership of the UCPB shares, which were distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” Viewed in this light, the Court rejected petitioners’ allegations about being deprived the right to adduce evidence. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Eminent domain; just compensation. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In this case, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the commissioners properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were expropriated by petitioner. The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements. The members of the new committee even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provides the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. The committee members based their recommendations on reliable data and considered various factors that affected the value of the land and the improvements.
The Court also upheld the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that
of the expropriated properties. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) vs.Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012.
Ombudsman; due process. Petitioners were not denied due process of law when the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the affidavits and other evidence on record. Section 5(b)(1), Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, provides that the hearing officer may issue an order directing the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified position papers on the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer may consider the case submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing officer determines that, based on the evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will be conducted. But the determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound discretion of the hearing officer. As the petitioners have failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing officer’s determination should be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by this Court. The Court likewise find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case was already undergoing trial before the hearing officer, should not have been applied. The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are not subject to its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them. Here, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due process. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
Ombudsman; power to impose penalties. In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. The provisions of R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S.
Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
Public funds/assets. The coconut levy funds are special public funds. Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. In this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by UCPB using coconut levy funds. On the other hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. These companies were acquired using or whose capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the case of UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the CIIF Oil Mills to coconut farmers, and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portions distributed to the supposed coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78. And as the administrator of the CIIF holding companies, UCPB authorized the acquisition of the SMC shares. In fact, these companies were formed or organized solely for the purpose of holding the SMC shares. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding companies used borrowed funds from UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion. Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using coconut levy funds – funds that have been established to be public in character – it goes without saying that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be regarded and treated as government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned by the Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently existing laws. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Election Law
Supreme Court; review of decision of a COMELEC division. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
One exception to the above rule is that the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed. Douglas R. Cagas vs. the Commission on Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012.
Public Officers
Public employee; grave misconduct. Grave misconduct consists in a government official’s deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present. In particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or reputation to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Rigging by a public official of bidding in the organization where he belongs is a form of corruption. As a public officer, private respondent had the duty to protect the process of public bidding in his organization. A ruling that would absolve private respondent of any liability for rigging the bids in the government office where he works on the pretext that he was not a member of the bids and awards committee would encourage public officers who are not members of bids committees to make an industry of rigging bids, using their offices and official reputations. National Power Corporation vs. Civil Service Commission & Rodrigo A. Tanfelix, G.R. No. 152093. January 24, 2012.
Public officers; reassignment; detail versus reassignment. The issue here is whether or not respondent’s reassignment constitutes constructive dismissal entitling her to reinstatement and back wages. The Court ruled in the affirmative. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service. Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency head’s unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job. Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
The Court distinguished between a detail and reassignment. A detail, as defined and governed by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Civil Service Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. On the other hand, a reassignment, as defined and governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7), means that an employee is reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries. The principal distinctions between a detail and reassignment lie in the place where the employee is to be moved and in its effectiveness pending appeal with the CSC. A detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately effective.
Having ruled that respondent was constructively dismissed, the next question is whether she is entitled to reinstatement and back wages. The Court held that she is entitled to reinstatement but not to full back wages and benefits. An illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Civil Service Commission vs. Minerva M.P. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; reorganization; termination of employment. The issue here is whether the NEA Board had the power to terminate all of NEA’s employees in connection with a reorganization of the agency. Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out. Petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not include the power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower complement. The Court disagreed and affirmed the termination of the employees. Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board’s powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith. United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; temporary and coterminous employees. No officer or employee in the Civil Service can be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions, as it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are temporary and coterminous in nature. Here, petitioner’s appointment was temporary as he did not have the required career executive service eligibility. An appointee without such eligibility cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity. A temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment’s notice. As to those with eligibilities, their right to security of tenure pertain to their rank but not to the position to which they were appointed. Petitioner never alleged that, at any time during which he held the position in question, he had acquired the requisite eligibility. Petitioner’s temporary appointment was also coterminous, or one that is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at the latter’s pleasure. As such, his replacement was not a removal but rather an expiration of term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same. The acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without cause. One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause. Samuel B. Ong vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012.
