Esmeña, Kimberly Marie F.

DE LLANA vs. ALBA

Facts:

This case pertains to the question of constitutionality of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating

Funds Thereof and for Other Purposes.". That is the fundamental issue raised

in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or

for Prohibition considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition,

seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of

the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any

action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners sought to bolster

their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing

as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to

fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter

appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall

be deemed completed.

Issue:

Whether or not the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with

the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges Under

Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that there has not been shown

unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Batasang Pambansa is

expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the

process toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants,

as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from

the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the

Supreme Court. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination

by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-

existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of

removal, there is an office with an occupant whowould thereby lose his

position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question

of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the

incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to

its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the

office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of

the judiciary.

In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be

in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as

far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the Supreme Court be

consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear

need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic

principle that the Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions. No

question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme

Court could not have its say prior tothe action taken by either of the two

departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case

where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into

who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created bythe reorganization.

That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.

There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial

power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is

to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the

conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of

the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded.

The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,

even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with

distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the

basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would

save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be

preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the

Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any

unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand

the most rigorous test of constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of

constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting

within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long

been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that the

Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of

reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that

it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government

is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them

either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their

own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the

language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a

moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official

certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill

hisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security

of tenure provision to assure judicial independence.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO.

Facts:

A petition before the court requesting the members of the Supreme

Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain

transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the

MERALCO. MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act

No. 1446, section 11 which states: “Whenever any franchise or right of way

is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,

over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on

which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the

compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or

corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme

Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom

shall be final.”

The parties to an arbitration may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of

the matters submitted to arbitration. It has been held that a clause in a

contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be

referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and

cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the

terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in negative. The question in the instant

petition is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of

legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal

right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators

the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.

The issue would not fall within the jurisdiction granted in the SC if it

does, it would mean that the courts would be ousted of jurisdiction and

render the award a nullity. If this is the proper construction, we would then

have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court,

sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken wherefrom to the courts and

eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court

would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators, members of

the Supreme Court sitting as arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi

judicial functions.

The members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be

considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in

the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could

not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.

It is a judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the

Supreme Court. Supreme Court being the guardian of constitutional rights,

should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government.

Its power should be confined strictly within that granted by the Organic Act.

Exercise of jurisdiction by the SC cannot mean exercise of jurisdiction by the

members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators.

The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every

judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in

the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment

would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a

remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter,

and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress

should at some future time sanctions it, and passes a law authorizing the

court to carry its opinion into effect.

This is not the judicial power confided to the SC in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the Organic

Act and it would be illegal for the members of the SC to sit as arbitrators, the

decision of a majority to be final, to act on the petition of MERALCO.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

DAZA vs. SINGSON

Facts:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of

Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the

Commission on Appointments among the several political parties

represented in that chamber. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment

in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party

formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its

number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17

members. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives

revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by

withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-

formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of

representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and

including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from

the LDP.

The petitioner came to court contending he cannot be removed from

the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent

under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the

reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a

permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered

political party and has not yet attained political stability.

Respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is

political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also

maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent

being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the

Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he

stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party

be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission

on Appointments.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the matter

Whether or not change resulting from a political realignment validly

changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments

Ruling:

On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative for it has

the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is

before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may

not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here

is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the

petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

Tañada vs. Cuenco defined the term political question connotes, in

legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of

policy. In other words, it refers "to those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or

in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the

Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with

issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended

inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the

Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what

was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents

but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution.

The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the

discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable

and not a political question.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present

case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators

Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of

the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its

Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon

nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the

Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full

discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional

limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within

the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of

the proceeding in connection therewith.

It is, therefore, the court’s opinion that they have not only jurisdiction

but also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the

parties herein." Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was

made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the

organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or

discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court in the negative. As provided

in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments

consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of

Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of

proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily

connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the

requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate

measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also

subsequently thereto NOT the court.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.

GARCIA vs BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

Facts:

This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of

Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the

transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to

Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to

naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned

corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of

naphtha. Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan

Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a

new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as

the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project

was the use of “naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its

petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with

PNOC. However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East

Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade

Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January25, 1989 advising him of

BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by

changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced

for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the

presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned

by the Philippine Shell Corporation.

Issues:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance the instant

case

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in

approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to

Batangas

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the first issue as a justiciable controversy

because first, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to

which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation

bearing the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land

precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D.

No.1803. There is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in

the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long

before any covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is

not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not

shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or

unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas.

Certainly, these were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan

Petrochemical Corporation.

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant’s

remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to

Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not

only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for

reasons which remain murky to say the least. And this brings us to a prime

consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore. Section 1, Article XII of

the Constitution provides that: Xxx "The State shall promote industrialization

and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian

reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and

natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign

markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair

foreign competition and trade practices."The Court, therefore, holds and

finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the

transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing

the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the

main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to

the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has

been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy

of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run

its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.

On the second issue, the court holds and finds that the BOI committed

a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical

plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from

naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is

in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No

cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This

is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in

numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems

best for the national interest.

One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part

said he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than

one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign

government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what

we shall do with our heritage.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted.

PACU vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Facts:

This is a petition by the Colleges and Universities requesting that Act

No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be

declared unconstitutional, for they deprive owners of schools and colleges as

well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of

law, they deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their

children for civic efficiency; and that their provisions conferring on the

Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and

standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

Respondents on their answer submitted a mimeographed

memorandum contending that, the matter constitutes no justiciable

controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional

questions; petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said

acts; and the Acts are constitutionally valid.

In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of

a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and

any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such

person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint,

a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. The Solicitor

General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause

to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are

actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the

respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits.

They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law—and, naturally need no

relief in the form they now seek to obtain.

Respondent averred that it is an established principle that to entitle a

private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the

result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to

invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative

action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all

members of the public. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional

arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial

authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical

threat being insufficient. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education

might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not

constitute a justiciable controversy.

Issue:

Whether or not by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may

be declared unconstitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held in negative. In the first place, they believed

that the petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no

relief in the form they seek to obtain and that there is no justiciable

controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to

entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury

and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to

determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that

he has sustained common interest to all members of the public.

The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only

when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their

protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to

the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on

the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where

conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act

assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last

resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy

between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to

obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere

academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however,

finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the

petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law

because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with

the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the

unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court

conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even

if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the

Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official

documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain

nuisance.

Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby denied.

TAN vs. MACAPAGAL

Facts:

On October 6, 1971 petitioners Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and

Rogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City,

filed for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of

themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-

Leido Resolution, dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971

Constitutional Convention. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that

the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under

Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider,

discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution

through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now

outlined in the present Constitution merely empowered to propose

improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan

laid down therein."

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have locus standi on the case

Whether or not actual controversy is present in the instant case

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no legal standing to sue

obtained by the petitioners, in the categorical and succinct language of

Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the

validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case

such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement." 5 There has been a relaxation of this rule. As to the

requirement in making a taxpayers suit as a basis for legal standing, a

negative answers has been contemplated. The person who impugns validity

of a statue must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such

that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result to its

enforcement.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in accordance with the

controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until

after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of

certain proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the

matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep

its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other

departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The

legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to

what to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the

meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been

accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into

the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but

only "when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is

no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made

concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case

be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the

command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until

such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being

announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

Facts:

This pertains to the Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction

and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all

others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission

on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas

Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner, Patricio

Dumlao, a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, filed his certificate of

candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of

January 30, 1980. He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal

protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. He alleges that

the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the

classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,

therefore, class legislation.

His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two

however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of

a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term

of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision

barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the

filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would

already disqualify them from office.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case

or controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari

Whether or not the Batas Pambansa Blg.52 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the

determination of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails

the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause

guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC

from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely

affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's

disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that

constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review

on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue,

and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be

rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's

case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction. Courts are practically

unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid

unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It

is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one

who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable,

as in this case.

Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall

not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear

beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to

prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office

provided they are reasonable, as in this case. The constitutionality of

paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal

thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the

petitioner.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and

shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation,

according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The

challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence,

as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground

alone those charges have been filed against him before a civil or military

tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as

to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of

acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such

acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of

nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the

first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52

which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang

52 is hereby declared valid and that the second paragraph of section 4 of

Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the

commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after

preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is

hereby declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional

presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

SUPLICO vs. NEDA

Facts:

An agreement made by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and

Hu Jintao (Chinese President) held on October 2, 2007 regarding the ZTE

National Broadband Network Project. This case is a consolidation of cases

filed by the petitioner Rolex Suplico and the other petitioner questioning the

act of the Philippine Government in entering into such deal regarding the

ZTE Project. The respondents argues on the following grounds; that the court

can no longer take judicial review on the questioned act for there is no more

justiciable controversy to be resolved because the Philippine Government

decided not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project

making it moot and academic; that there is no perfected contract in this case

that would prejudice the government or public interest, stressing that it

remained in the negotiation stage; and that the matters raised concern

executive policy, a political question which the judiciary would generally pass

upon.

Issue:

Whether or not regardless of the its mootness the Court may take

cognizance

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that while there were occasions when the

Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those

petitions moot and academic, the istant case does not fall under the

exceptional cases. It is no doubt that the petitions became moot when

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the

meeting held on October 2, 2007 in China, informed China’s President Hu

Jintao that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the

ZTE-NBN Project due to several reasons and constraints.

Under the Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory and the Court

has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the

President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our

government. It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court

shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of

evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-

Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2,

2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive

department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without

need of evidence. under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of

Court, the official duty of the executive officials of informing this Court of the

government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also

presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary.

Other than petitioner AHI’s unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court

finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the

present instance.

Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice

and legitimacy is the judiciary’s role of strengthening political stability

indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues

which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do

more harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial

discretion militates against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners

want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further

discussed, the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously

establishing the factual basis or antecedents.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of

mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the

Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no

more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render

any ruling or make any pronouncement.

The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny

them due course because of mootness and because their resolution requires

reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought

before the Supreme Court.

Wherefore, the petitions are dismissed.

NORTH COTABATO vs. REPUBLIC

Facts:

This pertains to the consolidated cases filed by the petitioners

enjoining the respondents from signing the agreement when the MILF had a

negotiation with the government of the Philippines through a Memorandum

of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that was scheduled to be

signed by the Philippines in Malaysia.

The court then issued an injunction pending the signing of the MOA-

AD. While pending, the government of the Philippines ordered the Peace

Panel on Ancestral Domain, represented by Sec. Rodolfo Garcia and others to

cancel the Memorandum of Agreement and then further argued that case is

already moot and academic, therefore, there is no actual controversy for the

court to take cognizance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court may take cognizance of this present case,

regardless of being moot and academic

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that regardless of its mootness, the Court will

take cognizance of the case for it may be capable of repetition yet evasive

for review. Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered

moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the

subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "no matter what

the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not sign the

MOA."

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic"

principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in

resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds

that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of

exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the

constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to

guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of

repetition yet evading review.

Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the

challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power

to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot

especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief

against the possible recurrence of the violation.

The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust

them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David

are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David,

but also in other cases where the Court similarly decided them on the merits,

supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot

notwithstanding.

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount

public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the

wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGU’s. The assertion that the

MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible

Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to

formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and,

in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.

Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. where the Court did not

"pontificate on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case

or controversy as this will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."

The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in

Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone

government procurement contract for a national broadband network

involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the

government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved

specific government procurement policies and standard principles on

contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein,

the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties

involved in the controversy.

In the case at bar, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of

agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD

which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the

third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the

Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and

Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive

Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General,

has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the

government will not sign the MOA-AD, "mootness will not set in light of the

terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001. Surely, the present MOA-AD can be

renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral

Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form,

which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court

notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is

committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and

equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be

assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present

petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the

public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF

regarding Ancestral Domain.

The present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again

apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number

of landmark cases. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners,

particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and

Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the

Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the

future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any

form.

Wherefore, respondents' motion to dismiss is denied. The main and

intervening petitions are given due course and is hereby granted. The

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF

Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the

Constitution.

IBP vs. ZAMORA

Facts:

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for

issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on the

constitutional grounds in the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada

commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine

National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter

of Instruction the "LOI" which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility

patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force

Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila

through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of

high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime

syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined

and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

Issue:

Whether or not the actions of the President was within the calling out

power of the president

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Martial law is not needed to be declared

so that President can call for help provided it is to suppress lawless violence.

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless

violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary

power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,

Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the

sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.

However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the

revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces.

The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the

power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have

simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and

review without any qualification.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the

Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of

Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not

constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the

Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law

enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility

patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. Moreover, the

deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian

character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged

with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.

LOZANO vs. NOGRALES

Facts:

This pertains to the filing of the petitioners of this case in their

capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers prayed for the nullification of

House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members

of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend

or Revise the Constitution, upon a Three-Fourths Vote of All the Members of

the Congress.

Both petitions seek to trigger a justifiable controversy that would

warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII,

which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.

The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from

the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the

Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing

amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and

consultations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance over

the instant case

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in negative. It is well settled that it is the

duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature,

scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of

the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the

allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy,

but to its mere fulfillment of its “solemn and sacred obligation” under the

Constitution. This Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited

to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal

claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and

limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota

presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from

deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give

opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.

Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal

questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its

function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of

wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord

the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only

because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but

also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and

controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed

through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of

the government.

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of

“ripeness.” the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness is that first, the

fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the

parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the

issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.

Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has

had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

In the case at bar, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of

judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not

sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained

of. Moreover, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of

Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing

amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet

transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More

importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of

power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House

Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain

contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may

not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would

warrant an intervention from this Court.

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a

constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the

Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable."

While the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule

of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury”

to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to

be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file

petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not

available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to

remedy a particular, concrete injury. When warranted by the presence of

indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty

to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.

Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.

KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA

Facts:

Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated is a non-stock domestic corporation

composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders

who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The

petitioner filed this case against the respondent seeking to prohibit or

restrain the implementation of the “Contract of Lease” executed by the

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming

Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery

system, also known as “lotto.” The respondent, however allege that the

petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the court’s

resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has decided to establish an

on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and

diversifying its sources of funds. Thus, PCSO conducted bidding for a possible

“partner” or lessee on the said venture of PCSO. The Philippine Gaming

Management Corporation (PGMC), owned by a Malaysian group of

companies. After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an

online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the

International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services

and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC

claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to

40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local

investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the

setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns,

however the project pushed through.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners has legal standing to file this case

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the preliminary issue on the locus standi

of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's

standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the

exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues

raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside

this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of

these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing

aside, if we must, and technicalities of procedure." Insofar as taxpayers' suits

are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as

to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open

discretion to entertain the same or not."

It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty of federal

jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less

determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set out

the divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases.

Other cases where they have followed a liberal policy regarding locus

standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing

the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No.

3452; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to

the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to

supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16

October 1976; (c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land

at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan; (d) the approval without hearing by

the Board of Investments of the amended application of the Bataan

Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to

Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from

naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas; (e) the decisions,

orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of

Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and

the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power

Corporation from indirect tax and duties; (f) the orders of the Energy

Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the hearings

conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the

petitioner substantial cross-examination; (g) Executive Order No. 478 which

levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported

crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products; (h) resolutions of the

Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the

number of elective members of Sanggunians; and (i) memorandum orders

issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City.

Supreme Court decided that the instant petition to be of

transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of

paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved

in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues

immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the

people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-

productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system

are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal

standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of

its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier

which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO

Facts:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease

Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and

accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or atleast

P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity.

Term of lease is for 8years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and

responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may

purchase the equipment for P25 million.

The petitioner, Kilosbayan, which is composed of a civic-spirited citizens,

pastors, priest, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of

truth, justice and national renewal. It seeks to declare the ELA invalid on the

ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease be nullified.

Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with the violative

of PCSO’s charter and the decision of the Supreme Court that violated the

law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the

1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not petitioners have legal standing in the case at bar

• Whether or not provisions of the Constitution are self-executing

RULING:

The Court ruled that petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that

these various litigants with the same holding grounds has. Petitioners asset

an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for

bring taxpayer’s suits. The standing of the petitioners is a departure from the

settled rulings on “real properties on interest” because no constitutional

issues were actually involved.

An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit

cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same

parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to

issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved.

Therefore, the petitioners do not have legal standing on the case because

they do not fall under any of the categories of taxpayer’s suits.

As to the provisions of the constitution that are invoked by the petitioners,

Section 5, 12, 13 and 17 in the Article II of the Philippine Constitution, are not

self-executing where they do not confer the rights which can be enforced in

the courts but only to provide guidelines for legislative or executive action.

By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect

determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the

Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That explains with what

the court had said, “the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.

Gambling is not illegal per se it is left to Congress to deal with the activity as

it sees fit”. Furthermore, the Supreme Court expounded the reason through

stating that the policies and principles invoked by the petitioners in this case

do not permit of such right of the people to a balanced and healthful

ecology, indeed, as already stated, petitioner’s opposition is not really to the

validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral. This is

not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and

Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.

Wherefore, the petition of as well as the motion for reconsideration is

Denied with finality.

JOYA vs. PCGG

Facts:

Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus

with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from auction sale

scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters

Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and

the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central

Bank, alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos,

his relatives and cronies.

The petitioners averred that they have the legal standing to file this

petition because they are Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply

concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic

wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents Executive

Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the

artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant

petition

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the altruistic and noble purpose of the

petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which must first

be resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites

for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or

validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court

unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,

namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there

must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at

the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional

or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, Supreme Court held that one having no right or

interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff

in an action. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the

case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the

constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will

sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being

challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and

to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the

question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

The interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based

on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related

party. Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and

in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private

persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of

Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations

established to promote non-Philippine arts.

On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the

foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has

been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when

they were placed on exhibit. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces

of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends

and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and

anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration

was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and

silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of

Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of

these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be

understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically

passed on the government without complying with constitutional and

statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these

properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or

statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be

raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to

recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by

statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal

owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly

owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to

question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus

is dismissed.

CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

Facts:

Respondent Public Estate Authority entered into a Joint Venture

Agreement (JVA) with AMARRI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom

islands. The agreement also requires the reclamation of an additional two

hundred fifty hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to

complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern

Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.

Petitioner Franklin I. Chavez filed this case as a taxpayer contending

that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by

respondent of the reclaimed lands to AMARRI. The petitioner wants that PEA

publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section

28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands

of the public domain to private corporations. And also, the petitioner further

asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of

the State that are of public dominion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing on the case

RULING:

Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner has standing to bring this

taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its

constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First

is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is

the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable

distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens.

The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information

on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which

the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the

second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of

alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,

compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

The petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public.

In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a

taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten

wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the

public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and

prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government

agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public

interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well

being of the people.'

The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal

interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such

as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set

aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case

involved public interest.

In Tañada v. Tuvera, in ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the

Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right

recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.' In Legaspi v.

Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that

'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the

requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner

is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the

right.' Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public

funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the

development, management and operation of the Manila International

Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the

important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of

the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We

concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the

Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the

petitioner's standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to

information and access to official records, documents and papers a right

guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a

former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of

the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's

legal standing, Supreme Court ruled that since the instant petition, brought

by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights to information

and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources, matters of transcendental

public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. The Public Estates Authority and

Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from

implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby

declared null and void ab initio.

DAVID vs. ARROYO

Facts:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and

prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and

General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of

National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry

out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by

invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5

were stated as follows, Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the

cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as

well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said

groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald

Llamas.

Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation

of news stories and various documents. Arrest of Congressman Crispin

Beltran by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and

attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al. The

petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987

Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant

case

Ruling:

Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice

on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-

parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be

prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”

Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be

benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the

avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own

right to the relief sought.

Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly

illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He

may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He

could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or

‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to

seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient

interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a

“citizen” or “taxpayer. This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our

jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the

validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the

case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David

and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R.

No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged

“direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”

committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor

General does not question their legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the

opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.

They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is

necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used.

Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be

represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court

the alleged violations of their basic rights, as applied in different cases, when

the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen

and has an interest in the execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s

assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly

may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be

granted standing to assert the rights of their members. We take judicial

notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies

and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP

1017 and G.O. No. 5. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are

national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have no legal

standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP

as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance

of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the

whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the

issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No.

171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant

petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds.

The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no

longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a

lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that

she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no

showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from

pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral

protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance.

She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or

result of her case.

To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits

with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The

petitions thus call for the application of the “transcendental importance”

doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the

“PP 1017 cases.”

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual

incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no

need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of

the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into

court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he

be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable

him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.

GONZALES vs. NARVASA

Facts:

On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was

filed assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory

Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of

presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the

Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and

the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays

that the Executive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish

the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officials

holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a

list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and

turned over to Malacañang.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a

citizen and as taxpayer

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to

bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized

interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the

requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not

present to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not

sustain or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a

result of its enforcement.

As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation

granted from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There

being exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner

cannot be allowed to question the PCCR’s creation. The petitioner has failed

to show that he is a real party in interest. In the petitioner’s request of

disclosure to public information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke

before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceeding

involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest

is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with the exception that

respondent Executive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the

information requested.

PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA

Facts:

President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting

secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.

Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad

interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to

which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

Senators being the petitioners, assailing the constitutionality of the

appointments, assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no

appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office

needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first

having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries maintain that the

President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department

secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even

while Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment.

Issue:

Whether or not the President can issue appointments in an acting

capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. The essence of an

appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap

measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a

permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied

by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department

secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice

as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could

assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while

Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the

President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the

President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a

department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a

person of her choice even while Congress is in session. Ad interim

appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance.

But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,

whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.

Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on

Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not

submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a

way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a

way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s

issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the

recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Wherefore, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby

dismissed.

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing

the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law

is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which

divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly

based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of

vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal

prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already

punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the

fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the

terms it uses. Particularly, in the terms; combination, series and

unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the

validity of the mentioned law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi in attacking

the validity of the law using the facial challenge

Ruling:

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not

constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair

warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be

plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under

the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what

conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that

specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by

a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not

invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.

Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the

statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be

made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible

chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal

law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial

challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount

successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances

exists.

With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who

application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the

statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to

other persons or other situations in which its application might be

unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them

down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before

the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that

the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.

Wherefore, Court holds that RA 7080, known as the Plunder Law, as

amended by RA 7659 the law constitutional and petition is dismissed for

lacking merit.

UMALI vs. GUINGONA

Facts:

Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the

Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. On August 1, 1994,

President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner

for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during

his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following

malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. Upon receipt of the said

confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an

Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately

referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on

Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.

Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was

directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and

Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. On October

6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President

Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the

service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

ISSUES:

Whether or not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's right to Security of

Tenure.

Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process of law.

Ruling:

The claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. Burden

of proof was on Umali, but he failed to adduce sufficient evidence. Petitioner

was not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show

petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged

violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he attended the

hearings before the investigatory body.

The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his

motion for reconsideration before the RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise

the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings.

Charges included in AO No. 152 were based on the results of investigation

conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the

Ombudsman.

The petition is dismissable; issues posited do not constitute a valid

legal basis for overturning decision arrived at by the CA. Taking into

consideration that the charges in the Ombudsman were dismissed, BIR and

Commissioner’s office were no longer interested in pursuing the case, and

due to the position taken by the Sol. Gen, The Court hereby GRANTS the

petition. AO No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to

retire with full benefits.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted

LAUREL vs. GARCIA

Facts:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents,

their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the

sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-

ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in

Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations

Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, and is part of the

indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and

their suffering during World War II. As intended, the subject property became

the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to

Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. Due to the failure of our government to provide

necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since

that time.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former

Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the

subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm where, at the end of the

lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the

Philippine government. On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a

committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government

properties in Tokyo and Kobe.

On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296

entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations’ capital goods

and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in

Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first

“Whereas” clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive

branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to

sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property

has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at $225 million.

Issue:

Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be

alienated by the Philippine Government.

Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the

authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. As property of public

dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be

alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and

enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides

in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical

person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare

and cannot be the object of appropriation. The Roppongi property is correctly

classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property

belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for

actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial

property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn

from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481

[1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available

for private appropriation or ownership “until there is a formal declaration on

the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.

Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public

service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil

Code must be definite. A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to

Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property’s original

purpose. Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an “authority to

sell”, does not have a provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of

the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. It merely

intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos

alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition.

Further, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation by the

investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at

the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the

Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law since the

President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already

convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no

longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the

respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court

sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by

petitioner Ojeda.

Wherefore, the petitions are granted.

DANTE LIBAN vs. GORDON

Facts:

Petitioner Dante V. Liban et al, filed a petition in Court to declare

Richard J. Gordon as “having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The petitioners

were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter,

while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)

board of Governors.

During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the

Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23,

2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners

alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a

member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution

Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional

provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled

corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did

not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer

service to which is neither an office nor an employment.

Issue:

Whether or not by accepting the PNRC position, did Gordon forfeit his

Senate Seat.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that accepting the PNRC position does not

forfeit Gordon his sit in the senate. The Philippine National Red Cross is a

private organization performing public functions. It does not have

government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the

Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from

private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation

campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must

not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and

independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their

fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence,

voluntary service, unity, and universality.

Wherefore, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Chairman of

the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a

government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition

in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

SERRANO de AGBAYANI vs. PNB

Facts:

A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if

any, to be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of

this appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de

Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her suit

against defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently

enjoining the other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from

proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to

plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer

enforceable, the prescriptive period having lapsed.

There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant

that if the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act

subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation,

then the right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting.

Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant

Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate

mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of

the province of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on

said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same

year, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office

of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance

of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both

defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage

sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed

from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a

writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff. Defendant

Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's

own theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period

from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26,

1948, when the subsequent legislative act extending the period of

moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation

of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the

loan.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling the case at bar

Ruling:

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus

manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when

extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the

time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was

tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No.

32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was

promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously

then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage

obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as

a defense.

Wherefore, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of

plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed.

HACIENDA LUISITA vs. PARC

Facts:

The Hacienda Luisita is a 6,443 hectare parcel of land originally owned

by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the

Spanish owners of Tabacalera decided to sell this land and its sugar mill,

Central Azucarera de Tarlac. Jose Cojuangco, Sr. took interest and requested

assistance from the Philippine government in raising the necessary funds

through: (a) the Central Bank, to obtain a dollar loan from the Manufacturer’s

Trust Company in New York for the purchase of the sugar mill; and (b) the

Government Service Insurance System, to obtain a peso loan for the

purchase of the Hacienda.

The Central Bank used a portion of the country’s dollar reserves as

security for Cojuangco’s loan with the MTC on the condition that Cojuangco

would acquire Hacienda Luisita for distribution to farmers within 10 years

from its acquisition. On May 7, 1980, the Marcos government filed a case

before the Manila Regional Trial Court to compel Tadeco to surrender

Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that the land could be

distributed to the farmers. On December 2, 1985, the Manila RTC ordered

Tadeco to surrender the land to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

When Corazon Aquino became President of the Philippines, President Aquino

issued Presidential Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, which

outlined her agrarian reform program. EO No. 229 included a provision for

the Stock Distribution Option, a mode of complying with the land reform law

that did not require actual transfer of the land to the tiller. On June 10, 1988,

President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 6657 or the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The CARL included a provision that

authorized stock distribution as a mode of compliance; the SDO allowed a

corporate landowner to give its farmers and farm workers shares of its stocks

in lieu of actually distributing the land to them.

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0)

to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS

the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and

placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The

Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court

noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which

the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation

of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to

the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries to choose

whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land

distribution.

Issues:

Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

Whether or not Republic Act No. 6657 known as CARL is

unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the instant case using the operative fact

doctrine. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is

applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the

doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies

to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have

the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said

decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be

respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be

applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of

the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.

The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact

doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the

FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and

homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also

given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as

stockholders of HLI or not.

On the second issue, Supreme Court held that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is

constitutional. The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule

on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not

raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis

mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and

academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA

9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling

in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless

that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may

justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby denied.

SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO

Facts:

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with

the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration charged petitioner

Hortencia Salazar with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand

Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA

regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that

petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent

Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205

to petitioner.

It was stated that there will a seizure of the documents and

paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing

illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has, No valid license or

authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and

deploy workers for overseas employment; Committed/are committing acts

prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of

the same code.

On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.

Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents as

members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No.

1205. The group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito

Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded

to the residence of the petitioner.

Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the

seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The

said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the

Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were

done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

can validly issue warrants of search and seizure or arrest under Article 38 of

the Labor Code.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Under the new Constitution, it is

only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one case, it

was declared that mayors may not exercise this power. Section 38,

paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an

amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late

President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise

of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges

of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. We reiterate that the Secretary

of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.

Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,

we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and

of no force and effect. The power of the President to order the arrest of

aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order

arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under

the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.”Furthermore, the search

and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that

the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things

to be seized.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

PEOPLE vs MATEO

Facts:

On October 30, 1996, one for each count of rape in ten information

filed, were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo

guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court

and recommends an acquittal of the appellant.

Issue:

Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme

Court by virtue of the express provision in the constitution

Ruling:

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate

review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses

committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that

gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,

reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds

justification in the 1987 Constitution

The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article

47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No.

7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section

10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules

of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is

not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in

the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or

review in favor of the accused. In passing, during the deliberations among

the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on

the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant.

Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to

convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the

Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical

dilemma.

Wherefore, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera

to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th

election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby dismissed.

In re: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA

Facts:

This is a Petition filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel

Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent

Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in

the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines Regional Governors elections.

Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while

petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent

President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.

Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern

Mindanao, have had two National Presidents each. Following the rotation

rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region

in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP

for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. Petitioners asseverate that it is in

this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from

the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa. The transfer of IBP

membership to Agusan del Sur, they add that he could have been disbarred

in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not

surrendered his California license to practice law.

Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position

of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on

May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws. The respondent

asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy,

contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the

determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the

organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-

Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. De Vera can still practice the profession in the

Philippines

Ruling:

This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature

for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from

being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region.

Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for

the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the

post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the

members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably

too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to

decline the nomination. We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring

member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he

cannot be barred.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De

Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final

judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of

the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he

suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to

pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the

absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a

fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not

shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral

fitness to run for governor.

On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed

the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their

support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to

substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,

unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of

Court.

SANGUNIANG BAYAN of TAGUIG vs. ESTRELLA

Facts:

The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then

mayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate

proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. In

his protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the

municipality.

On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in

the presence of a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion of the

order provided that so as to enable the court to get a complete overview of

the matter, it was better to have a handwriting expert examine the

questioned ballots to settle once and for all the questions and objections

relative to the ballots. Complainants claim that: respondent gave

unwarranted benefits to Papa and caused, on the other hand, undue injury to

Mayor Garcia as well as to the people of Taguig by depriving the latter of

their duly elected mayor, and giving Papa unwarranted benefits; the decision

and reports were prepared, issued, and executed with manifest partiality,

evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence; that respondent

conspired, confederated, and confabulated with the NBI officials concerned

and Papa to make the NBI Reports and the decision favorable to Papa; that

respondent did not bother to check the figures and to analyze the data

contained in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal of said reports

would have led to the discovery of flaws and mistakes; and that the hasty

transfer of ballot boxes from respondent's sala to that of Judge Vivencio

Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the

examination and appreciation of the ballots to be done by the judge himself

rather than mere reliance on the work of the Revision Committee.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Estrella acted in accordance with his duty

Ruling:

In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined xerox copies of

14,664 ballots from 713 precincts and without the guidance of objections

from revisors, the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative and

determination, sorted out as written by one person 12,274 ballots in six (6)

groups. This was done in a record time of less than two (2) months, from

March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.

To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number of

ballots, is almost impossible to accomplish. One would have to spread the

14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a floor or table space

bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands

of ballots, pick at random groups of ballots – six groups in all – and, by

examining them, reach a conclusion that the ballots in each of these groups

were written by one person.

It is no doubt that this is simply an impossible procedure. And we are

not convinced that through this method, the NBI could correctly and with

scientific precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.

Indubitably, the foregoing has raised the suspicion of partiality on the

part of respondent. Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent standards are

intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary

that is capable of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial.

Wherefore, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious

misconduct, partiality, and inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a

fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

SOLID HOMES Inc. vs. LACERNA

Facts:

On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe,

represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered

into a Contract to sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., a corporation

engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The

subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3,

Block I, Phase II, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600

square meters, more or less. The total contract price agreed upon by the

parties for the said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to be paid in the manner

stipulated.

The respondents made the down payment and several monthly

installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase

price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final

payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands

of the respondents.

The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint

for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28

June 1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In

their Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was

only P5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of

the Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of

the said amount.

The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, together with its Answer

dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of

action against it because the respondents failed to show that they had

complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the

respondents had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject

property. In view of the said non-payment, the petitioner considered the

Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in accordance

with the provisions of the same contract.

Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not reversing

the decision of the Office of the President.

Ruling:

The Petition is unmeritorious. The constitutional mandate that, “no

decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly

and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,” does not preclude

the validity of “memorandum decisions,” which adopt by reference the

findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior

tribunals.

This Court likewise declared that “memorandum decisions” comply

with the constitutional mandate. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII

of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in

administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to

decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled

“Judiciary,” and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect

to the judicial branch of government.

Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of

executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the

requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. Given the fact that the

respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject

property so they have yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of

the Deed of Sale and the TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB

Arbiter’s discretion to proceed hearing the respondents’ complaint in pursuit

of a judicious, speedy and inexpensive determination of the parties’ claims

and defenses. Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed

with the respondents by a notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both

parties must comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As ruled

by the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office of the

President and the Court of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the

balance of the purchase price of the subject property, after which, the

petitioner must execute and deliver the necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of

said property.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied.