Political Law} Case Survey} 2000

8/13/2019 Political Law} Case Survey} 2000

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-law-case-survey-2000 1/45



POLITICAL L AW DIGESTS (2000-01) ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001

Louie, Carrie Bee, Evelyn, Thel, Gem, Ronald, Karen

2

execution proceedings and without need of a separate ejectment action, provided that theoccupants are afforded an opportunity to explain the nature of their possession, on which basisthe writ of possession will be denied or granted.

Gozun v. Llangco

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136 (August 30, 2000)FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution declaring the parcel of land occupied bycomplainant as the new site of the rural health center. Respondent issued a resolutiondeclaring that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is valid and enforceable and that the mayorcould order the police authorities to evict complainant.

HELD: Complainant was not made a party to the petition nor notified thereof. Respondentviolated the rights of the complainant to due process.

2. Absence of violation

Immam v . Comelec

322 SCRA 866FACTS: Petitioner claims that the questioned Comelec order was issued without any motion forits issuance and without notice and hearing. Thus, he claimed that his right to due process wasviolated.

HELD: The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The right to be heard doesnot only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party can be heard throughthe pleadings he submits. In this case, petitioner was heard through the memorandum hesubmitted.

Ocampo v. Off ice of the Ombudsman

322 SCRA 17FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for estafa and falsification. TheOmbudsman issued several orders to petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and controvertingevidence. Petitioner failed. The Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissingpetitioner from service. Petitioner claimed that he was denied due process because he was notgiven any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit.

HELD: The orders of the Ombudsman requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavitcontained a warning that if no counter-affidavit is filed within the given period, a waiver would beconsidered. Also, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard. A party who chooses not toavail of the opportunity cannot complain of denial of due process

National Police Comm ission v. Bernabe

G.R. No. 129914 (May 12, 2000)

FACTS: The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the National Police Commission on theground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of thecharges filed against him.

HELD: The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrativeproceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration ofthe action or ruling complained of. Due process does not always require a trial-type proceeding.In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints and anopportunity to answer. He even submitted an affidavit answering point by point the chargesagainst him.

3. Administrative Due Process

Pefianco v. Moral

322 SCRA 439FACTS: Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent fordishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitionerto furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. It was denied.







4

examine the witnesses. However, there should be a report and necessary documentssupporting the certification of the prosecutor. All these should be before the judge. (See also Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000 and Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 940547)

Tolentino v. Malangaon

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444 (August 3, 2000)FACTS: Respondent judge dismissed the case of child abuse filed by petitioner on the groundthat the prosecution failed to establish probable cause. Previously, the court ordered petitionerto show cause why the court should order the arrest of the accused. However, petitionerrefused to present additional affidavits on the ground that there was no need to prove the factualbasis of the information.

HELD: The judge must be satisfied with the existence of probable cause for the issuance of awarrant of arrest. The judge may require the prosecutor to present further evidence to provide afactual basis for the finding of probable cause.

2. Particularity of Description

Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 129651 (October 20, 2000)FACTS: Petitioners claim that the search warrant issued lacks particularity. The itemsdescribed in the warrant are as follows: multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals,columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional and official receipts,production record books, inventory lists, stock cards, unregistered delivery receipts,unregistered purchase and sales invoices; sales records, job orders, corporate financial records,bank statements, cancelled checks.

HELD: Most of the items listed lacked particularity. The judge could have formed a morespecific description of the documents, since the former employee of the petitioners furnishedphotocopies of the documents sought to be seized. With regard to the unregistered deliveryreceipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, they are specific. No more detaileddescription could have been given. Items not particularly described may be cut off, withoutrendering the entire warrant void.

3. Warrantless Searches and Seizurea. Incident of Arrest

People v. Elamparo

G.R. No. 121572 (March 31, 2000)HELD: Appellant’s subsequent arrest was lawful, coming as it is within the purview of ―inflagrante delicto‖ arrest. The warrantless search and seizure was also lawful since it was asearch incidental to a lawful arrest.

People v . Sevilla

G.R. No. 124077 (September 5, 2000)FACTS: A team of police officers went to the house of the accused to enforce a warrant ofarrest. Some members of the Narcotics Command joined the team to look for marijuana.

Accused was subsequently charged with illegal possession of marijuana.

HELD: The search is illegal. It is not a search incidental to a valid arrest since the NarcoticsCommand joined the team of police officers for the specific purpose of conducting a search.

People v. Figueroa

G.R. No. 134056 (July 6, 2000)

FACTS: Accused, together with NBI agents, went to the house of his co-accused and pointedto a pail in the kitchen containing prohibited drugs. NBI agents seized the item and arrested co-accused. Is the warrantless seizure valid?

HELD: No. The search is not incidental to a valid arrest. The arrest of the co-accused did notprecede the search.

People v. Che Chun Ting





5

G.R. No. 130568 (March 21, 2000)FACTS: Standing outside Unit 122, accused handled two transparent bags of drugs to MabelPo, in full view of NARCOM agents. Police officers arrested the surprised man and conducted asearch of Unit 122 where they found more bags of shabu.

HELD: The search of Unit 122 and the seizure of drugs found therein are illegal. A warrantlesssearch should be limited to the premises and surroundings that are under the immediate controlof the accused. Unit 122 is not even the house of the accused but that of his girlfriend.

b. Moving Vehicle

Peop le v. Escaño

323 SCRA 754FACTS: During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused. As a result,other passengers were searched and all firearms were seized. Are checkpoints illegal?

HELD: As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,and the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded asviolative of the right against unreasonable search.

c. Prohibited Article in Plain View / Custodial Investigation

People v . Valdez

G.R. No. 129296 (September 25, 2000)FACTS: Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the place of the accused wherethey found marijuana plants being cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from the house ofthe accused. They uprooted the plants and arrested the accused. They asked the accusedwho owned the plants and the accused admitted that they belonged to him. The prosecutionoffered the plants and the admission of the accused as evidence. The accused claimed that thewarrantless search was illegal while the police officers claimed that the plants were found inplain view.

HELD: The marijuana plants were not in plain view. For the plain view doctrine to apply, thefollowing must be present: (a) there was a valid prior intrusion based on a valid warrantlessarrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) theevidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they were;(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified seizure of theevidence without further search. In this case, the police officers located the plants before theyarrested the accused without a warrant. Also, they were dispatched precisely to look for themarijuana plants. The discovery was not inadvertent. The confession is also inadmissible. Intrying to elicit information from the accused, the police was investigating him as a suspect. Atthis point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel.

People v. Deang

G.R. No. 128045 (August 24, 2000)FACTS: The accused was arrested for kidnapping for ransom with homicide. He accompaniedthe police to his house to surrender his share of the ransom. Subsequently, the accused gotconvicted. He claimed that the warrantless seizure of the money was illegal.

HELD: The warrantless seizure of the money was legal because it was made with the consentof the accused.

4. Warrantless Arrestsa. Invalid Arrests

People v. Dela Cruz

G. R. No. 138516 (October 17, 2000)HELD: A warrantless arrest after the commission of a crime is illegal. The seizure of the itemshe stole is also illegal.

Posadas v. Ombu dsman

G.R. No. 131492 (September 29, 2000)







7

F. Eminent Domain

Santos v. Land Bank of th e Phil ippines

G.R. No. 137431 (September 7, 2000)HELD: Compensation for land expropriation for agrarian reform is valid, even if made notcompletely in cash.

G. Prohibition Against Impairment of Contracts

Harrison Motors Corp oration v. Navarro

G.R. No. 132269 (April 27, 2000)FACTS: Harrison Motors sold two trucks to Navarro. Subsequently, the Bureau of InternalRevenue (BIR), the Land Transportation Office and the Bureau of Customers (BOC) entered ina Memorandum of Agreement which provided that for purposes of registering vehicles, aCertificate of Payment should first be obtained from the BIR. Government agents seized anddetained the two trucks of Navarro after discovering that there were still unpaid taxes.

HELD: The Memorandum of Agreement does not impose any additional taxes which wouldunduly impair the contract of sale between petitioner and private respondent. Instead, theseadministrative orders were passed to enforce payment of existing BIR taxes and customs dutiesat the time of importation. What Sec. 10 Art. III of the Constitution prohibits is the passage of alaw which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the intention of the contracting parties.

H. Rights During Investigation1. Inapplicability

a. Administrative Investigation

Sebastian v. Garchit orena

G.R. No. 114028 (October 18, 2000)FACTS: Some employees of the post office were investigated by the chief postal service officerin connection with missing postage stamps. During interrogation, they submitted swornstatements. The prosecution presented the sworn statements as evidence. Accused claimedthat their sworn statements were not admissible in evidence since they were not assisted bycounsel.

HELD: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because suchinquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinarymeasures against erring public officers.

b. Police Line-Up

People v . Partiare

G.R. No. 129970 (April 5, 2000)HELD: The accused-appellant’s defense that the identification made by the private complainantin the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the line-up without theassistance of counsel is inadmissible. The stage of an investigation wherein a person is askedto stand in a police line-up is outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel. (See also People v. Sirad, G.R. No. 130594, July 5, 2000)

c. Photograph

People v. Gallarde 325 SCRA 835

FACTS: Accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court convictedhim of murder only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of the accused immediatelyafter the incident on the ground that the same were taken when the accused was already underthe mercy of the police.

HELD: The taking of pictures of an accused, even without the assistance of counsel, beingpurely a mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination.





8

G. Applicability Gutan g v. People

G.R. No. 135406 (July 11, 2000)HELD: Receipt by the accused of prohibited drugs is inadmissible in evidence.

3. Custodial Investigation

People v. Bariquit

G.R. No. 122733 (October 2, 2000)HELD: Confession given by the accused without the assistance of counsel, while on the way tothe police station, is inadmissible in evidence.

People v . Valdez

G.R. No. 129296 (September 25, 2000)

FACTS: The accused was arrested for bank robbery. After four days, the police investigatortook down his extrajudicial confession and called a lawyer who conferred with the accused forten minutes and executed his confession.

HELD: The confession is inadmissible. The moment the accused was arrested and detained,he was already under custodial investigation. The lawyer was called only on the 4th day ofdetention when the accused was about to put down his confession in writing.

People v. Legaspi

G.R. No. 117802 (April 27, 2000)FACTS: Legaspi and Franco were charged and convicted of the special complex crime ofrobbery with homicide. They were identified as perpetrators of the crime by someone from agroup of eleven residents who were invited for questioning by the police. The accused nowclaims that their rights during custodial investigation were violated.

HELD: No rights were transgressed inasmuch as Legaspi and Franco were not yet singled outas perpetrators of the crime on November 29, 1992. Inviting certain individuals for questioningand asking them a single question as to their whereabouts on the day of the crime do notamount to custodial investigation. When certain persons are already singled out andpinpointed as authors of the crime, they are entitled to the rights of persons under custodialinvestigation.

4. Sufficiency of Warning

People v. Samol de

G.R. No. 128551 (July 31, 2000)FACTS: The accused was arrested for murder. Before he was interrogated, he was informed

of his right to remain silent, that any statement he might give could be used as evidence againsthim, and that he had the right to be assisted by counsel of his own choice. During trial, theprosecution offered his confession in evidence.

HELD: The confession is inadmissible. The accused was given only a perfunctory recitation ofhis rights. This is inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.

People v. Manriquez

G.R. No. 122510 (March 17, 2000 )

FACTS: Accused were found guilty of two counts of murder. They executed an extra-judicialconfession wherein they narrated their participation in the commission of the crime. They also

signed a waiver in the presence of a counsel which contained that they did not want theassistance of counsel.

HELD: Rights to remain silent and to counsel were violated. The lawyer’s explanation on theeffects of the waiver is unsatisfactory. Also, the extra-judicial confession is inadmissibleevidence. It is intrinsically flawed. It was merely attached as page 2 of the waiver. It was notprepared at the time the waiver was being prepared since another typewriter was used inpreparing the extra-judicial confession.





9

People v. Obrero

G.R. No. 122142 (May 17, 2000)FACTS: Appellant was charged with robbery with homicide. His extra-judicial confession waspresented as evidence.

HELD: Extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence because counsel for accused wasnot independent. At the time he assisted accused-appellant, he was the station commander ofthe WPD and a PC captain. As part of the police force, he could not be expected to haveeffectively assisted the accused during the investigation.

5. Independence of Counsel

People v. Base

G.R. No. 109773 (March 30, 2000)HELD: While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannotafford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused reallyhas the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. Alawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raisedany objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation. (See also People v. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 318)

6. Admissibility of Evidencea. Admissible Evidence

People v. Lumandong

327 SCRA 650HELD: The four fundamental requirements on the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessionare: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2 ) the confession must be made with the assistanceof competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) theconfession must be in writing. (See also People v. Daeng, G.R. No. 128045, August 24, 2000;People v. Llanes, G.R. No. 140268, September 18, 2000; and People v. Mameng, G.R. No.123147, October 13, 2000)

People v. Continente

G.R. No. 1000801 (August 25, 2000)FACTS: The trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the trial courtrelied upon were the confession of the accused. The accused argued that their confession wereinadmissible in evidence, since they were not informed of their constitutional right.

HELD: The written warning contained an explanation that the investigation dealt with theparticipation of the accused who chose not to give any statement to the investigator and a

warning that any statement obtained from the accused might be used against them in court.They contained an advice that the accused might engage the service of a lawyer of their ownchoice and that if they could not afford the service of a lawyer, they would be provided with onefor free. Despite the manifestation of the accused that they intended to give their statements,the investigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for the accused. The lawyersconferred with the accused before their investigation. The accused were informed of theirconstitutional rights in the presence of their counsel. The confession are admissible inevidence.

b. Inadmissible EvidencePeople v. Naag

322 SCRA 710

HELD: Circumstances show that the extrajudicial confession was signed without the assistanceof counsel. As such, it is inadmissible. The text of the confession is darker suggesting that adifferent typewriter was used from that used to type the name of the accused. (See also Peoplev. Paglinawan, 324 SCRA 97)

c. WaiverPeople v. Hermo so

G.R. No. 130590 (October 18, 2000)





10

HELD: When the confession of the accused was given without the assistance of counsel andthe accused did not object, he waives his right to object.

H. Right to BailLardes v. CA

324 SCRA 321FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for bail. The trial court granted it but imposed a condition thatthe approval of the bail bond would only be made after arraignment to make sure that theaccused could not delay his trial by absenting himself.

HELD: Bails should be granted before arraignment. Otherwise, the accused might beprecluded from filing a motion to quash.

I. Right to Counsel1. Absence of Violation

People v. Aquin o

G.R. No. 129288 (March 30, 2000)FACTS: Accused were charged with robbery with homicide. Accused claimed that he wasdenied of his constitutional right to counsel.

HELD: Accused should have informed the trial court if he had difficulties with his counsel. Hehad the opportunity to present his own version of the events but he just kept quiet. Besides,accused was convicted based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness ofthe defense.

Villanueva v. People

G.R. No. 135098 (April 12, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty of the Bouncing Check Law. He appealed to the Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration but the same was denied because it was filed out of time. Petitioner claimedthat he had a difficulty in finding a new lawyer and that when the CA denied his motion forreconsideration, he was denied of his right to counsel.

HELD: Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court, and also by acounsel de parte before the CA. There was no violation of his right to counsel when his newlawyer committed a procedural blunder.

2. Presence of Violation

People v. Nadera

324 SCRA 490

FACTS: The accused was charged for raping his two daughters. He pleaded guilty. Thelawyer of the accused did not cross-examine the first daughter because he was convinced thatshe was telling the truth. The cross examination of the second daughter centered on what shedid when she saw her sister being raped. The lawyer did not present any evidence, andexpressed his conformity for the admission of the evidence of the prosecution.

HELD: The case should be remanded because of the neglect of the lawyer of the accused inrepresenting his cause.

I. Right to be Informed1. Different Offense

People v. Paglinawan324 SCRA 97

FACTS: The accused was charged with murder. During trial, it was shown that the victims alsosuffered injuries.

HELD: A person cannot be convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged. Accusedcannot be held liable for the injuries.







12

HELD: The delay is not entirely attributable to the accused. The trial court should have grantedpostponement.

O. Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Dansal v. Fernand ez

327 SCRA 145FACTS: Petitioners, who were officers of the National Food Authority, were charged with estafathru falsification of a public document in the office of the Ombudsman. An additional charge forviolation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against the petitioners. More thanone year and four months after the cases were submitted for resolution, the Office of theOmbudsman issued a resolution recommending the filing of a case for estafa thru falsificationand a case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the petitioners.Petitioners argued that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violated theirright to a speedy disposition of their cases.

HELD: The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative and flexible concept. It isconsistent with reasonable delay. The protection under the speedy disposition of cases shouldnot operate as to deprive the government of the inherent prerogative to prosecute criminalcases or in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fair opportunity topresent their side. It cannot be said that petitioners found themselves in a situation oppressiveto their rights simply by reason of delay.

Domin go v. Sandiganbayan

322 SCRA 655FACTS: On May 26, 1987, a complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan against petitioner forviolation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July 30, 1992, a case was filed againstpetitioner with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that the inordinate delay in the preliminaryinvestigation violated right to speedy disposition of his case.

HELD: The delay was not undue since it was brought about by peculiar unforeseencircumstances. The SC nullified the authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor whichnecessitated the issuance of AO #1 by the Ombudsman authorizing the Special Prosecutor tocontinue with the preliminary investigation. The assigned prosecutor retired in 1989. After thereorganization by the Ombudsman of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the case wasassigned to a new prosecutor. The subpoena sent to petitioner was return unserved becausehe was no longer connected with his previous office. The prosecutor issued another subpoenato give petitioner chance to file counteraffidavits which he filed only on March 1992.

Castil lo v. Sandigan bayan

G.R. No. 109271 (March 14, 2000)FACTS: On August 25, 1986, a complaint was filed against petitioners with the Tanodbayan.

On Oct. 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan recommended filing a case for violation of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act. Petitioners filed motion for reinvestigation. The Ombudsman filed aninformation against petitioners on November 5, 1990 without first resolving the motion forreinvestigation. Petitioners argued that the case should be dismissed for unjustified delay in thefiling of the information.

HELD: There was no violation of right to speedy trial. The delay was not capricious noroppressive but was brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws in the initialstages of the case.

Raro v. Sandiganb ayan

G.R. No. 108431 (July 14, 2000)

FACTS: The complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was referred by the Deputy Ombudsman to the NBI for investigation. The NBIrecommended the prosecution of the petitioners. However, the petitioners argue that the four-year delay in the completion of the preliminary investigation violated right to speedy dispositionof cases.

HELD: It took the NBI 2 years to complete its report. The resolution recommending the filing ofthe case against petitioner has to be reviewed. The length of time it took before the conclusion





13

of the preliminary investigation may only be attributed to the adherence of the Ombudsman andNBI to the rudiments of fair play.

P. Prohibition Against Cruel Punishment

People v. Alic ante

G.R. No. 127026 (May 31, 2000)HELD: Death penalty is not cruel.

Q. Double Jeopardy

1. Termination

People v. Velasco

G.R. No. 127444 (September 13, 2000)FACTS: Trial court acquitted respondent from a case of murder; two cases of frustrated murderand a case for illegal possession of firearms outside of his residence. The prosecution filed apetition for certiorari on the ground that the trial court deliberately and wrongfully interpretedcertain facts and evidence.

HELD: On the ground of double jeopardy, an acquittal is final and unappealable. Prosecutioncannot accomplish through a writ of certiorari what it could not do so by appeal.

2. Different Offenses

People v. Ong

322 SCRA 38HELD: An illegal recruiter can be charged with estafa and illegal recruitment (See also Peoplev. Meris, G.R. No. 117145, March 28, 2000)

II. Citizenship

Valles v. Comelec

G.R. No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a Filipino father and an

Australian mother. She ran for governor. Petitioner, her opponent, filed a case fordisqualification on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen since she was issued an aliencertificate of registration; there was an application for an immigrant certificate of residence andshe was a holder of an Australian passport.

HELD: The respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino. Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective

renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. Atmost, she has dual citizenship.

Valles v. Comelec

G.R. No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother.

Australia follows jus soli . She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on theground of dual citizenship.

HELD: Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The factthat she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office.Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the

certificate, the candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support thePhilippine Constitution. Such declaration operates as an effective renunciation of foreigncitizenship.

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Party-List





14

Veteran Federation Party v. Comelec

G.R. No. 136781 (October 6, 2000)FACTS: The Comelec proclaimed 14 party list representatives from 13 parties which obtainedat least 2% of the total number of votes cast as member of the House of Rep. Upon petition byother party-list organization, it proclaimed another 38 additional party representatives althoutthey received less than 2% of the votes on the ground that under the Constitution it ismandatory that at least 20% of the members of House of Rep. must come from the party listsystem.

HELD: Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceilingfor party list seats in the House of Representatives. The Congress is vested with power todefine and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. In the exercise oftheir Constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary that parties participating in thesystem to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast to be entitled to a party-list seat. This is toensure that only parties with sufficient number of constituents are actually represented inCongress.

B. Attendance of Session

People v. Jalosjos

324 SCRA 689FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressmanwas confined at the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to his position, he argued thathe should be allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because hisconfinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress.

HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints ofgeneral law. Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep isprivileged from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment.Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years hasconstitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the accused wouldbe virtually made a free man. When he was elected into office, the voters were aware of hislimitations on his freedom of action. Congress can continue to function even without all itsmembers being present. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonableclassification in criminal law enforcement.

C. Electoral Tribunal

Guerrero v. Comelec

G.R. No. 137004 (July 26, 2000)FACTS: A petition to disqualify respondent as a candidate for Congressman was filed with theComelec on the ground that he was campaigning although he had not filed a certificate for

candidacy. Three days before the election, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy assubstitute for another candidate who withdrew. The petitioner argued that the substitution wasfatally defective since the replaced candidate was an independent and the respondent ran ascandidate for a political party. Respondent was proclaimed winner and assumed office.Comelec dismissed petition on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdictionof the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

HELD: Once a winning candidate has assumed office as a member of the House of Rep, the jurisdiction of Comelec over his qualification ends and jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal begins.The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not limited to constitutional qualifications only. The filing of acertificate of candidacy is a statutory qualification.

D. Title of the Law

De Guzman v. Comelec

G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shallhold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, theComelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners arguedthat the provision was not expressed in the title of the law, which is ―An Act Providing for a





15

General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing theProcedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof‖.

HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registrationas it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for theComelec to follow in the reassignment of election officers.

E. Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court

Villanert v. Desierto

326 SCRA 355HELD: The law making the decision of the Ombudsman appealable to the SC is invalid becausethe concurrence of the SC was not obtained. (See also Tirol v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.133594, August 3, 2000)

IV. Executive Department

A. Immunity from Suit

Glori a v. CA

G.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)FACTS: Upon recommendation by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, respondentwas reassigned as superintendent in another school. Respondent filed a petition for prohibitionagainst the Secretary on the ground that his indefinite reassignment violated his security oftenure. The Secretary argued that the filing of the case violated the immunity of the Presidentfrom suit.

HELD: The contention is untenable. The petition is not directed against the President.Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts.

B. Power of Control

Hutchiso n Ports Phil ippines, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Metropol i tan Auth ori ty

G.R. No. 131367 (August 31, 2000)FACTS: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority conducted a bidding for the development andoperation of a modern marine container terminal. It awarded the contract to petitioner. TheOffice of the President set aside the award and ordered a new bidding. Petitioner filed action forspecific performance.

HELD: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority is under the control of the Office of the President.Therefore the President may overturn any of awards granted by it for justifiable reasons.

C. Power to Call Out Armed Forces

IBP v. Zamora

G.R. No. 941284 (August 15, 2000)FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the Presidentordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention andsuppression. IBP questioned validity of the order on the ground that there is no factual basis forPresident to exercise his power to call out the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawlessviolence.

HELD: The IBP failed to support its assertion that the President acted without factual basis.The President has determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. He

asserted that violent crimes like bank and store robberies, holdups, kidnappings andcarnappings continue to occur. The court can take judicial notice of the recent bombingperpetrated by lawless elements in public places.

D. State of Rebellion

Lacso n v. Perez

G.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001)





16

FACTS:On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and

attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was astate of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress therebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders andpromoters of the ―rebellion‖ were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a ―state of rebellion,‖ whichallegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before theCourt assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and the warrantlessarrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.

1. On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a ―state of rebellion‖ inMetro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.

2. As to petitioners’ claim that the proclamation of a ―state of rebellion‖ is being used by theauthorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to lawenforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtainregular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary investigations will beconducted.

3. Moreover, petitioners’ contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrestedwithout warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus andprohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequateremedies in the ordinary course of law.

4. Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informations againstthe petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case.Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or chargeshave been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.

5. Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void sincepetitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in theirpetition.

6. Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of beingarrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since suchright to relief must be clear at the time of the award.

7. Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty (PMAP), argues thatthe declaration of a ―state of rebellion‖ is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers,

being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to interpret what took place on May 1.The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces ofthe Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

8. As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest.LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court.Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened bya warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and supporters are beingthreatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.

Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the SupremeCourt does not have jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.

PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required judicialwarrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege)

E. Legitimacy of the Arroyo Presidency

Estrada v. Desierto G. R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001





17

Estrada V. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any furtherproceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term ofpetitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warrantocase, praying for judgment ―confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of theRepublic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaringrespondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in anacting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.‖

HELD:FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisionsin the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and theallocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for aruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibrationof the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that ―it is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is . . .‖

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People PowerII. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the wholegovernment. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom ofassembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office ofthe President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government thatresulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional andthe resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice Presidentas President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA IIinvolves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

a. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate isan indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes,as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name."If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday."The President says. ―Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagodna ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’stoo painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.‖ The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent toresign is clear when he said ―x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.‖ ― Ayoko na‖ are wordsof resignation.

c. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. Theonly unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties duringand after transition period.

d. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press releasecontaining his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent asPresident of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized hewas leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order tobegin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to

any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disabilitydisappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people asPresident; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may comeahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challengeafter occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on hissupporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if







19

presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has notdischarged the burden.

V. Judicial Department

A. Judicial Review

Gon zales v. Narvasa

G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)FACTS: The president issued EO 43 creating the Preparatory Commission on ConstitutionalReform to recommend amendments to the Constitution. Petitioner, in his capacity as taxpayer,filed a petition assailing constitutionality of the Commission.

HELD: The Preparatory Commission was created by the President by virtue of EO 43. Anamount was set aside for its operation from the funds of the Office of the President. There wasno exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Petitioner cannot question theconstitutionality of the Commission in his capacity as taxpayer.

Gon zales v. Narvasa

G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition in his capacity as taxpayer questioning the constitutionality ofthe creation by the President of seventy positions for presidential advisers on the ground thatthe President did not have the power to create these positions.

HELD: Petitioner has not proven that he has sustained any injury as a result of the appointmentof presidential advisers.

Bayan v. Zamora

G.R. No. 138570 (Oct. 10, 2000)FACTS: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was entered into by the Philippines and UnitedStates to regulate conditions of presence of US military personnels in the Philippines. TheSenate concurred with the VFA. Petitioners who are taxpayers and members of Congressquestioned its validity.

HELD: Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining anydirect injury as a result of the enforcement of VFA. As taxpayers, they failed to show how theVFA will involve the exercise of Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Members ofCongress’ standing cannot be upheld absent a clear showing of any direct injury to their personor to the institution to which they belong. Further, IBP has no standing.

IBP v. Zamora

G.R. No. 141284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the Presidentordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention andsuppression. The IBP questioned validity of the order invoking its responsibility to uphold therule of law.

HELD: The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient toclothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by the wholecitizenry. The IBP has failed to show any specific injury it has suffered or may suffer by virtue ofthe questioned order. The presumed possible injury is highly speculative.

Militant e v. CA

GR. No. 107040 (April 12, 2000)

FACTS: Pres. Marcos issued PD 1315 in 1975 expropriating 40 hectares in Caloocan fordistribution to their occupants. The lots of petitioners were included in the coverage of thedecree. However, these lots were not among those acquired by government in 1978 and 1979.On May 14, 1980, Proclamation No. 1967 indentified 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as areasfor priority development and urban land reform zones. In 1981, the Human SettlementsRegulatory Commission (HSRC) declared the lots of petitioner to be outside the reform area.Because the National Housing Authority (NHA) failed to evict the squatters on his lots, petitionerquestioned the constitutionality of PD 1315.





20

HELD: The lots of petitioners are not in danger of expropriation. PD. 1315 was issued in 1975.It is doubtful that the government will still desire to expropriate the lots of petitioner. Moreover,the HSRC certified that the lots were outside the Urban Land Reform Zone. In 1987, petitionernegotiated with the NHA for the price of his lots therefore, he is estopped from asserting that PD1315 to be unconstitutional.

B. Form of Decision

1. Void DecisionPeople v. Nadera

324 SCRA 490FACTS: The accused was charged with rape. The trial court convicted him. The decisionmerely narrated the evidence of the prosecution and a republic act.

HELD: The trial court failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which it based theconviction of the accused. There is nothing to indicate the reason for the decision. No reasonis given why the trial court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible.

Madrid v. CA

GR No. 130683 (May 31, 2000)FACTS: The accused was convicted of homicide by the trial court. The decision summarizedthe testimonies of witnesses from both sides. It then stated that the testimonies of thewitnesses for the prosecution convinced the court. On the other hand, the demeanor of thedefense witnesses were not credible. The decision added that the aggravating circumstance ofevident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were present.

HELD: The decision does not indicate what the trial court found in the testimonies of theprosecution witnesses to consider them straightforward when they are in fact contradictory andconfused. Neither does the decision contain any justification for the appreciation of aggravatingcircumstances against the accused. The decision failed to comply with the constitutionalrequirement that a decision must expressly state the facts and the law on which it is based

Yao v. CA

GR. No. 132428 (October 24, 2000)FACTS: The MTC convicted petitioner of unfair competition. Petitioner appealed to RTC. TheRTC confirmed his conviction. In its decision, it stated that it found no cogent reason to disturbthe finding of fact of the MTC.

HELD: The decision of the RTC fell short of the constitutional requirement. Parties to a litigationshould be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasonsthat led to the conclusion of the court. The decision in question should be struck close as a

nullity.

People v. Dumaguing

G.R. No. 135516 (September 20, 2000)FACTS: The trial court convicted the accused of rape. The decision simply stated that theaccused was guilty of raping his own daughter and that the evidence of the prosecution was notcontroverted by the accused.

HELD: The trial court failed to comply with the requirement that it should state clearly anddistinctly the facts on which it is based.

2. Valid Decision

People v. OrdonezG.R. No. 129593 (July 10, 2000)

FACTS: The trial court convicted the accused of illegal recruitment and estafa. The accusedargued that the decision did not comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution, becauseit merely paraphrased the testimonies of the witnesses.

HELD: The trial court went over the testimonies of every witness of both parties. Aftersummarizing the testimonies, the trial court stated in its decision that it found that the accused





21

informed the complainants that they would be going to Korea to work when in fact they landed inKuala Lumpur instead; that one of the complainants had no job waiting, and the othercomplainant landed in jail at the time he arrived in Kuala Lumpur and had to be returned to thePhilippines. The decision complied with the requirement.

VI. Constitutional Commissions

A. Term of Commissioners

Gaminde v. Commiss ion on Audi t

G.R. No. 140335 (December 13, 2000)FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President appointed petitioner as Commissioner of the CSC fora term expiring on February 2, 1999. She took her oath of office on June 22, 1993 and wasconfirmed by the Commission on Appointments on September 7, 1993. The Commission on

Audit issued a decision that her term expired on Feb. 2, 1999.

HELD: The constitution adopted a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman andCommissioners of the Constitutional Commissions. The operation of the rotational plan requiresthat the terms of the first Commissioners should start on a common date and any vacancybefore the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.Consequently, the term of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the ConstitutionalCommissions must start on a common date, irrespective of variations in the dates ofappointments and qualifications of the appointees in order that the expiration of the first termsshould lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of theterms. February 2, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointeesto the Constitutional Commission, as the beginning of the term of office is understood tocoincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.

B. Civil Service Commission

1. Reassignment

Chato v. Zenarosa

GR No. 120539 (October 20, 2000)HELD: A government employee may be transferred.


G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shall holdoffice in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, theComelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners arguedthat the law violated their security of tenure.

HELD: What the guarantee of security of tenure seeks to prevent is the capricious exercise ofthe power to dismiss. Where it is the legislature which furnishes the ground for the transfer of aclass of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposedto cure a perceived evil is germane to the purpose of the law.

Gloria v. CA

G.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)FACTS: Respondent was appointed School Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools,Quezon City. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, thePresident reassigned him as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science andTechnology on the ground that he is an expert in vocational and technical education.

Respondent questioned the validity of his reassignment on the ground that it is indefinite and itviolated his security of tenure.

HELD: There is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary. Theevidence or intention to reassign respondent had no definite period. It is violative of his securityof tenure.

Padolin o v. Fernandez





22

G.R. No. 133511 (October 10, 2000)FACTS: Respondent was Finance and Management Division Chief. The petitioner, theSecretary of Science and Technology issued an order providing for the reassignment of branch,division and section chiefs. The order provided that their return would be the subject of aseparate order. Pursuant to the order, respondent was reassigned to the Office of the Directorof Finance and Management Service in Taguig. Respondent argued that this violated hersecurity of tenure.

HELD: The order violated the security of tenure of respondent and hence invalid. The ordercontains no definite duration of the reassignment. The reassignment of respondent reduced herto a mere subordinate without authority to supervise anyone.

2. ReorganizationCanonizado v. Ag uirre

323 SCRA 312FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission whenRepublic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of theincumbent commissioners were deemed expired. Petitioners claimed that this violated theirsecurity of tenure.

HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not expresslyabolish the positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National Police Commission wasunder the Department of Interior and Local Government, while under Republic Act. No. 8551 itis made an agency attached to the Department of Interior and Local Government. Theorganizational structure and the composition of the National Police Commission remainessentially the same except for the addition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member. Thepowers and duties of the National Police Commission remain basically unchanged. No bonafide reorganization of the NPC having been mandated by Congress and insofar as RA 8851declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting in their separation from office, it istantamount to removing civil service employees from office without legal cause therefore, it mustbe struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

3. Lack of EligibilityCuevas v. Bacal

G.R. No. 139382 (December 6, 2000)FACTS: Respondent passed the Career Executive Service Examination. She was appointedRegional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office. Later, she was designated as acting chiefPublic Attorney. Upon change of administration, respondent was appointed Regional Director.Respondent argued she was removed without cause.

HELD: The rank level of respondent is Rank level III. The position of Chief Public Attorney

required rank level I. As respondent does not have the required Rank, her appointment to thatposition cannot be considered permanent and she cannot claim the right to a security of tenure.

C. Commission on Elections

1. Power to Appoint Employees


G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shall holdoffice in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, theComelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioner argue

that the law undermined the constitutional authority of the Comelec to appoint its own officials.

HELD: The law merely provides the basis for the transfer of an election officers and does notdeprive the Comelec of its power to appoint its officials.

2. Judicial ReviewAmbil v. Comelec

G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)





23

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates for governor. Petitioner won.Respondent filed election protest with the Commission on Elections. A member of its firstdivision prepared the resolution but he retired before it could be promulgated. A new memberwas appointed to replace the retired commissioner. The first division issued a resolutiondeclaring the previously prepared resolution void, because it had not been promulgated.

HELD: Petition should be denied because the SC had no power to review interlocutory ordersor final resolutions of a division of Comelec. It must first be reviewed by the Comelec en banc before it can be brought to the SC.

ABS-CBN v. Comelec

323 SCRA 811FACTS: Comelec approved Resolution 98-1419 on April 21, 1998 which prohibited the conductof exit polls. Petitioners questioned the validity of the resolution by filing a petition for certiorariin the SC. Solicitor General argued that case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust allavailable remedies by failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the Comelec.

HELD: Considering that the resolution was issued only 20 days before the election and that thepetitioners got a copy of it only on May 4, 1998, there was hardly any opportunity to move forreconsideration and to obtain and swift resolution in time for the May 11 elections. The petitionalso involves transcendental constitutional issues therefore, direct resort to SC is justified.

Salva v. Makalintal

G.R. No. 132603 (September 8, 2000)

FACTS: The Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca Batangas approved an ordinance mergingBarangay San Rafael with another Barangay. The Sanggunian Panlalawigan passed aresolution instructing the Comelec to hold a plebiscite. The Comelec passed a resolution callingfor a plebiscite. The officials and residents of San Rafael filed a case in RTC to prohibit theplebiscite on the ground that the ordinance and the resolutions were invalid. The RTC ruled thatit had no jurisdiction over the case because only the Supreme Court can review the resolution ofthe Commission on Elections.

HELD: The issuance of the Resolution of the Comelec was a ministerial duty which may beenjoined by law and is part of its administrative functions. Any question pertaining to its validitymay be taken in an ordinary civil action before the RTC.

3. DecisionSoller v. Comelec

G.R. No. 139853 (Sept.5, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates for mayor. Petitioner wasproclaimed elected. Respondent filed with Comelec a petition for annulment of proclamation. A

week later, he filed an election protest in the RTC. Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, and failure to state a cause of action. TheRTC denied motion. Respondent also filed certiorari with Comelec en banc which was laterdenied.

HELD: The authority to resolve petitions for certiorari involving incidental issues of electionprotests falls within the jurisdiction of the Division of the Comelec and not with the Comelec enbanc . If the principal case is cognizable on appeal by a Division, there is no reason whypetitions for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be referred first to aDivision of the Comelec for resolution.

D. Commission on Audit

Laysa v. Commiss ion on Audi t

G.R. No. 12813 (October 18, 2000)FACTS: As a result of an audit of the Fishery Sector Program Fund of the Department of

Agriculture, Regional Office No. V was found to not have complied with the rules on bidding,submission of documents to support claim of disbursement. Petitioner, Director of the office,argued that since the Fishery Sector Program is a special program for research and







25

FACTS: The Deputy Ombudsman referred the complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to the NBI for investigation. The NBI recommended theprosecution of the case. Petitioner argued that by referring the complaint to the NBI, the officeof the Ombudsman abdicated its duty to conduct preliminary investigation.

HELD: The Office of the Ombudsman did not delegate the conduct of the preliminaryinvestigation to the NBI. What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory tothe preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman.

3. State immunity from SuitA. Applicability

Calub v. CA

G.R. No. 115634 (April 27, 2000)FACTS: Petitioners, who were officers of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources seized two motor vehicles for transporting illegally cut lumber. The owner and thedriver filed a case against them for the recovery of the possession of the motor vehicle.

HELD: The acts for which petitioners are being called to account were performed by them inthe discharge of their official duties. A suit against them is a suit against the state. It cannotprosper without the consent of the state.

B. Law Enforcement

Armed Forces

Integrated Bar Of The Phil ippines v. Zamora

G.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Policeand the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime,violated the prohibition on the appointment of the members of the Armed Forces who are inactive service to civilian positions.

HELD: The SC held that there was actually no appointment of the members of the ArmedForces to civilian positions. The members of the Philippine Marines were not integrated asmembers of the PNP. The participation of the Chief of Staff in civilian law enforcement does notmean that he was appointed to a civilian post, since the head of the PNP is the one actuallyvested with authority in these operations.

Philippine National Police

Integrated Bar Of The Phil ippines v. Zamora

G.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Policeand the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime,violated the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military and the civiliancharacter of the police force.

HELD: The participation of the Philippine Marines constitutes a permissible use of militaryassets for civilian law enforcement. The civilian character of the police force is also not affectedby this participation. The members of the PNP are the ones in charge of the operations. Theyare the ones who will direct and supervise the deployment of the Philippine Marines.

Visiting Forces Agreement

Bayan v. Zamora

G.R. NO. 138570 (October 10. 2000)

The Visiting Forces Agreement, for which Senate concurrence was sought and receivedon May 27, 1999, is the subject of a number of Constitutional challenges.





26

Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, orlegislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?

Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging theConstitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained oris in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and notmerely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that theyare in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise byCongress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the actcomplained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he hassufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that hewill sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. Itis not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in theabsence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegallyexpended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisitelocus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or tothe institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit inthe absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National Presidentto commence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significanceof the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance ofthe petitions.

Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of theConstitution?

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presenceof foreign military troops in the Philippines.

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate ontreaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: ―[n]o treaty or internationalagreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all theMembers of the Senate." Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:"[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the

Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of Americaconcerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in thePhilippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress sorequires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held forthat purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in whichcase, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required tomake the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general ruleon treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation orappellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties whichinvolve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under thisprovision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance withthe constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec25 further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in thePhilippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of thevotes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and

recognized as such by the other contracting state.On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting

the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, andfurther defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involvingforeign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent,





27

however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determiningthe number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.

It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transientagreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishmentof a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between "transient" and "permanent".We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to bestationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law; theCourt should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIIIis not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, areinvolved in the VFA. The proscription covers "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities." Stateddifferently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreignbases being established. The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops, orfacilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that threedifferent situations are contemplated — a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a)foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any of the three standing aloneplaces it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.

Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII’s requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in thecountry, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) thetreaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by amajority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treatyby the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisitesin the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is inaccordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means thatthe other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require theUS to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accordstrict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in theConstitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed,in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should beunderstood in the sense they have in common use.

The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has statedthat the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the USaccepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treatyobligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and theconcurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of ournation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligationsand responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is

proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty.In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonlybelieved, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholdingits consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part,under principles of international law ( pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of theagreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts thegenerally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres tothe policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

Sequestration

Republ ic v. Saludares327 SCRA 449

FACTS: The PCGG issued a writ of sequestration against the Lianga Bay Logging Company,which was later lifted by the Sandiganbayan. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but itwas denied. Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a complaint for collection of a sum ofmoney against the company with prayer for preliminary attachment where PCGG was notimpleaded as defendant nor was the sequestration made known to the RTC. The Court grantedthe preliminary attachment, and because of failure of company to answer complaint, it also





28

declared the company in default and ruled in favor of private respondent. Petitioner argues thatRTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the sequestered assets are under custodia legis ofthe PCGG.

HELD: The SC ruled that the order of default of the RTC is affirmed but should be held inabeyance until the sequestration case is determined. However, the order of attachment wasdeclared null and void. The Court said that the disputed properties of the company were alreadyunder custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG when the

judge issued the writ of attachment. Since the writ of sequestration was already subsisting, itcould not be interfered with by the RTC because the PCGG is a coordinate and equal body.

Public Corporations

I. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

MMDA v. B el-Air Vil lage Ass ociat ion, Inc.

G.R. NO. 135962 (March 27, 2000)FACTS: Respondent filed a case against petitioner enjoining them from opening the NeptuneStreet and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of apreliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority toorder the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held thatthe authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Hence this petition.

HELD: The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Hence,its proposed opening of Neptune Street which was not mandated by the SangguniangPanlungsod of Makati City, is illegal.

II. Powers

A. Expropriation

Heirs Of Suguitan v. City Of Mandaluyong

G.R. NO. 139087 (March 14, 2000)FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizingMayor Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Suguitan. The city fileda complaint for expropriation when Suguitan refused to sell the property. The city later assumedpossession of the property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court. The courtlater issued an order of expropriation. Petitioners argue that the local government unit’sdelegated power of eminent domain must be exercised through the issuance of an ordinance,not by mere resolution.

HELD: The law may delegate the power of eminent domain to local government units that shall

exercise the same through an ordinance. The local government unit failed to comply with thisrequirement when they exercised their power of eminent domain through a resolution. TheLocal Government Code’s requirement of an ordinance prevails over the Implementing Rulesand Regulations requiring the issuance of a resolution.

B. Power To Sue And Be Sued

Mancenido v. CA

G.R. NO. 118605(April 12, 2000)FACTS: Petitioners, who are public school teachers, filed a case against the provincial officialsto compel them to pay their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition for review oncertiorari, they argue that the CA erred in recognizing the authority of the council of the

provincial officials to file a notice of appeal.

HELD: The SC held that in resolving whether a local government official may secure theservices of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of theaction and the relief sought are to be considered. In view of the damages sought in the case atbar which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to beimproperly represented by private counsel.





29

C. Registration Of Tricycle And Licensing Of Drivers

Land Transportat ion Off ice v. City Of Butuan

322 SCRA 805FACTS: The issue in this case is whether under the present set-up the power of the LTO toregister, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewisedevolved to local government units.

HELD: The SC ruled that the registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO whilefranchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB. Under the LocalGovernment Code, LGUs have the power to regulate the operation of tricycle for hire and togrant franchise for the operation thereof.

III. Qualification Of Local Elective Officials

Torayno v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on theground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro Citywhen he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ranfor mayor.

HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as amayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually residedthere before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

IV. LegislationMalonzo v. Zamora

323 SCRA 875FACTS: A supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon three readings held on thesame day. They were charged with misconduct.

HELD: There is no law prohibiting the holding of the three readings of a proposed ordinance inone session day.

V. RecallAfi ado v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 141787 (September 18, 2000)FACTS: This case involves a petition asking for the annulment of a resolution calling for therecall of the vice-mayor. The barangay officials in a preparatory recall assembly passed thisresolution. The proclaimed mayor at that time was the son of the previous mayor who had

already served for 3 consecutive terms. The father ran for a 4th term but withdrew, and wassubstituted by the son. The opponent filed a petition asking for the annulment of the substitution.When the SC ruled that the substitution was invalid, the vice-mayor became the mayor. Hencethis petition.

HELD: The specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to revive the vice-mayor.However, the resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor anymore, since she gave up the officeof vice-mayor when she assumed the position of mayor.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I. Regulations

A. Power

Phil ippine Registered Electr ical Practic ioners v. Francia

322 SCRA 587FACTS: Petitioner assails a resolution issued by the Board of Electrical Engineering whichprovided for a Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Program for electrical engineers whichrequired that they must earn credit units of CPE before their licenses could be renewed. Beforethese credit units could be earned, they must first apply for accreditation with the Institute of





30

Integrated Electrical Engineers of the Philippines. Petitioner argues that the resolution isviolative of the equal protection and due process clauses, prohibition against bills of attainderand ex post facto laws, and mandate for the protection of the rights of workers.

HELD: The SC denied the petition for being moot and academic. President Ramos had laterissued E.O. No. 266, which imposed upon registered professionals, the completion of the CPEas a pre-requisite for the renewal of their licenses.

SGMC Realty Corp oratio n v. Office Of The President

G.R. NO. 126999 (August 30, 2000)FACTS: On October 23, 1995, petitioner got a copy of the decision of the Board ofCommissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Petitioner filed an appeal to theOffice of the President on November 20, 1995, but this was denied for having been filed outsideof the required period. Petitioner argues that the period for appeal is actually 30 days pursuantto the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and AdministrativeOrder No. 18, Series of 1987.

HELD: The SC ruled that the 30-day period of appeal is subject to the qualification that thereare no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1344 provide that the decision of the Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from the date of its receipt. Theperiod of appeal of 30 days in the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use RegulatoryBoard is invalid for being in conflict with Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1344.

Zabat v. CA

G.R. NO. 122089 (August 23, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner filed this case questioning the award of a certain lot to the respondent by the Awards and Arbitration Committee of the National Housing Authority which declared petitionersas absentee owners. The National Housing Authority signed a contract to sell with respondent,and sent a notice of demolition to petitioner. Hence this petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that petitioner should have exhausted all applicable administrativeremedies. All decisions of the Awards and Arbitration Committee are subject to review by theGeneral Manager. Petitioner should have appealed the award of the lot and the execution of thecontract to sell to the Office of the President.

Province Of Zamb oanga Del Norte v. CA

G.R. NO. 109853 (October 11, 2000)

FACTS: Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperation increased the fuel compensation chargewithout the approval of the Energy Regulatory Board. As a result, petitioner filed a complaint

with the RTC.

HELD: The Energy Regulatory Board has jurisdiction over the fixing of power rates to becharged by electric cooperatives. Petitioner should have exhausted the available administrativeremedies before resorting to the court.

Pimentel v. Aguirre

G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local governmentunits to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-

personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, whichwithholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy doesnot rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order toensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 ismerely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervisionover local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power





31

of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities toundertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. Itdoes not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the nationalgovernment; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the correspondingrecommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and LocalGovernment, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in nocase be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal yearpreceding the current one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automaticrelease of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by theConstitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% ofthe LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.

Solar Entertainment and People of the Phil ippines v. Hon. How

G. R. No. 140863 (August 22, 2000)

FACTS: The question raised in this case is whether or not the trial court can indefinitelysuspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justicehas been resolved, without violating RA 8493, otherwise known as ―The Speedy Trial Act of1998‖.

HELD: The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates evenafter the information has already been filed in court is well-settled. Procedurally speaking, afterthe filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any dispositiontherein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend arraignment to await theresolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. Thus,public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it suspended arraignment toawait the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. The SC stressedthat the court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court ismandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree ordisagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after aninformation has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with theSpeedy Trial Act. Section 7 of the Act prescribing the 30-day period for the arraignment of theaccused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the law enumerates periods of delay that shall beexcluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. The exceptions provided in

the Act reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of ―speedy trial‖ is arelative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

Recently, the DOJ issued Memorandum Order No. 12 dated July 3, 2000 mandating that theperiod for the disposition of appeals/petition for review shall be 75 days. In view of thismemorandum, the indefinite suspension of proceedings in the trial court because of a pendingpetition for review with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely to happen.

Isagani Cruz and Europ a v. Secretary of Enviro nment and Natural Resourc es, et al

FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition andmandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA

8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and itsImplementing Rules and Regulations. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA ispartly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources toindigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. The Commission on HumanRights asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the Statehas the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a seriousdisadvantage like indigenous people. It prays that the petition be dismissed.





32

HELD: After due deliberation, 7 voted to dismiss the petition, while 7 other members of theCourt voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary majoritywas not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the votingremained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of CivilProcedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

PUBLIC OFFICERS I. Appointment

Marohom bsar v. CA

326 SCRA 62FACTS: Private respondent was first appointed as Technical Assistant. The position wassubsequently reclassified and retitled to Executive Assistant II. Since the private respondent didnot possess the appropriate civil service eligibility required of the position, she was extended atemporary appointment only. She was later extended a permanent appointment when sheacquired a Career Service Professional Eligibility. When petitioner became the President ofMSU, private respondent was later dismissed. Petitioner argues that the dismissal was legalsince the private respondent’s appointment lacks the requisite confirmation by the Board ofRegents.

HELD: Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Boarddisapproves them. There is absolutely no showing that the Board of Regents disapprovedprivate respondent’s appointment. Since the private respondent holds an appointment underpermanent status, he enjoys security of tenure as guaranteed by law.

II. TerminationSalvador v. CA

G.R. NO. 127501 (May 5, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner had been a permanent employee of the DENR when it was reorganizedunder E.O. No. 192. This resulted in the conversion of the positions of several employees tocoterminous. The petitioner was one of the employees who were offered a coterminous position.Petitioner later filed a complaint along with other employees. The court decided in their favor,and ordered the reinstatement of the employees. DENR failed to comply with this order.Meanwhile, petitioner applied for a new opening in the company but was ignored.

HELD: Petitioner was covered by the decision of the court and thus entitled to reinstatement.His act of applying for a new position cannot be construed against him.

III. Administrative Case

Cons eñares v. A lmeid a

324 SCRA 388

HELD: A case against a public officer should not be dismissed even if the complainant haswithdrawn it. (See also Lapeña v. Pamarang 325 SCRA 440; and Farrales v. Camorista 327SCRA 84)

Secretary Of Education, Culture And Sports v. CA

G.R. NO. 128559 (October 4, 2000)

FACTS: The Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports filed charges against several publicschool teachers for refusing to obey his return-to-work order, thus incurring unauthorizedabsences for participating in a mass action.

HELD: The SC held that petitioners were liable for their participation in the mass actions which

actually amounted to a strike since they were involved in the concerted and unauthorizedstoppage of work.

IV. Rights, Privileges And Benefits

Secretary of Educ ation, Culture and Spo rts v. CA

G.R. No. 128559 (October 4, 2000)HELD: A public officer found guilty is not entitled to backwages.





33

ELECTION LAW

I. Certificate Of CandidacyA. Deficiency

Conq uilla v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 139801 (May 31, 2000)FACTS: Alarilla filed his Certificate of Candidacy without indicating the position he was aspiringfor. However, he attached a Certification which indicated that he was being nominated for theposition of municipal mayor. He was later proclaimed as the mayor-elect. Petitioner argues thatthe Certificate of Candidacy should be declared null and void for failing to specify the electiveposition that Alarilla was running for.

HELD: Alarilla’s failure to specify the public office he was seeking in his Certificate ofCandidacy was not a fatal defect. First, there was an attached certification which stated that hewas being nominated for the position of municipal mayor. Second, Alarilla had rectified thedeficiency by filing an Amended Certificate. Third, there was a Certified List of Candidates listing

Alarilla for the position of mayor. Finally, Alarilla was elected mayor. If substantial compliancewith the Election Law should give way to a mere technicality, the will of the electorate, as far as

Alarilla is concerned, would be frustrated.

B. Disqualification

II. Casting of Votes

A. Postponement of Election

Bash er v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 139028 (April 12, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for Punong Barangay. The electionwas declared a failure and a special one was scheduled. Again, the election failed and wasreset. However, the voting only started at 9PM because of the prevailing tension in the locality.Private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC todeclare the election as a failure alleging that no election was conducted in the place and at thetime prescribed by law. COMELEC dismissed the petition.

HELD: The SC ordered the conduct of a special election. The Court held that the peculiar set offacts in the present case show not merely a failure of election but the absence of a validelectoral exercise. The place where the voting was conducted was illegal. As to the time ofvoting, the law provides that the casting of votes shall start at 7 in the morning and end at 3 inthe afternoon. The election officer did not follow the procedure laid down by law for electionpostponement or suspension or the declaration of a failure of election. The electorate was also

not given ample notice of the exact schedule and venue of the election.

B. Failure of Election

Banaga v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 134696 (July 31, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner had filed a petition for declaration of failure of election on grounds of votebuying and glaring discrepancies in the election returns. The COMELEC dismissed the casedeclaring that the above grounds do not fall within the scope of failure of election.

HELD: To warrant a declaration of failure of election, the commission of fraud must be such thatit prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or fatally affected the preparation and

transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought to havebeen alleged clearly by petitioner, but he did not.

Benit o v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134913 (Jan 19, 2001)

FACTS: Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8 candidates vying for theposition of municipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. 5





34

precincts clustered in the Sultan Disimban Elementary School were met with violence whensome 30 armed men appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowedpanic among the voters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different directions. Ithappened before noon at the day of election. A spot report reported the incident.

Both parties are contending contrary facts. Petitioner alleged that the voting neverresumed even after the lawless elements left. On the other hand, private respondent allegedthat voting resumed when the armed men left around 1 pm in the afternoon. Petitioner is onlyasking, however, a declaration of failure of elections on the first three precincts, not with theentire five precincts. During the counting, the ballots from the three precincts were excluded.Nevertheless, the winner was the private respondent. And even if the votes from the threeexcluded precincts were added, private respondent still emerged as the winner.

Petitioner then filed a petition to declare failure of election and to call a special election.COMELEC however denied the petition and affirmed the proclamation.

HELD: Petition Dismissed.1. Two preconditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has

been held in any precinct due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes notcast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure mayarise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

2. Whether there was a resumption of voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are notproper subjects of inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

3. Voting in all five precincts resumed after peace and order was re-established in theDisimban Elementary School. There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the saidtwo precincts during the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selectiveobjection to the three precincts herein?

4. Petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis thenumber of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However, there can be a failureof election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot beascertained. But if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is noprovision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must casttheir votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality ofvalid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast.

5. The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care andonly under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of thelaw had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible todistinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain resultwhatsoever, or that the great body of voters have been prevented by violence, intimidationand threats from exercising their franchise.

C. Jurisdiction to declare a failure of elections

Carlos v. Ang eles

G.R. No. 142907 (Nov. 29, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of themunicipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998elections. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The privaterespondent filed an election protest with the RTC. The court came up with revision reportswhich also showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in itsdecision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of "significant

badges of fraud," which it attributed to the present petitioner. The court then declared privaterespondent as the winner. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition tothe SC questioning the decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdictionof the SC.

HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) inelection cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall





35

exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with theCOMELEC, the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule becauseunder the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law.

The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not todisenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drasticremedial measure. More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure ofelection. It is the COMELEC en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare afailure of election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election,the extent of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of specialelections. The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the courtcannot declare a winner.

III. Counting Of BallotsA. Counting of Votes

Villarosa v s. HRET

G.R. No. 143351, September 14, 2000

FACTS:Quintos contested the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa. Issue: whether ―JTV‖ votes should becounted in favor of Villarosa. ―JTV‖ is the nickname of Villarosa’s husband, who is theincumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro.

HELD:Villarosa’s use of ―JTV‖ as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the electionprocess. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for itsdetermination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor ofVILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.

Columbres vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 142038, September 18, 2000

Two issues: (1) Whether the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division, especially in matters ofappreciation of ballots, is absolute and cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsiderationbefore the COMELEC en banc;

(2) Whether in appreciation of ballots, when a ballot is found to be marked, absent anyevidence aliunde, there is the presumption that the markings were placed by a third person, andtherefore, should not invalidate the ballot.

HELD:

(1) No. What is being challenged is not the sufficiency of evidence but the appreciation thereofby the COMELEC Division. If the appreciation of the Division is erroneous, there is theimplication that such finding or ruling is contrary to law and thus, may be a proper subject of amotion for reconsideration.(2) No. There is no such presumption in law. Instead, the legal presumption is that the sanctityof the ballot has been protected and preserved.The case was remanded back to the COMELEC en banc.

B. Defects In Ballot

Pacris v. Pagalilawan

Adm. Matter No. RTJ-98-1403 (August 14, 2000)

FACTS: This case involves the election protest filed by the private respondent against thepetitioner who was declared as mayor. The case was decided in favor of the private respondent.Petitioner argues that the respondent invalidated several ballots cast in his favor due toundetached upper stubs.

HELD: The SC upheld the validity of the ballots. The Court declared that the voters must not bedisenfranchised because of the failure of the election officials to perform their duties, one of







37

copies of Election Returns which showed a tally of 92 votes for private respondent but indicateda corresponding total in words and figures of only 82 votes. There was also a copy whichshowed a tally of only 13 votes for private respondent but indicated a corresponding total inwords and figures of 18 votes. These copies were supported by affidavits from a poll clerk andthe chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors. COMELEC annulled the proclamation ofpetitioner. Hence this petition.

HELD: In accordance with the Court’s ruling in Castromayor v. COMELEC, the expedientaction to take is to direct the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice andhearing in accordance with Rule 27, § 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect thenecessary corrections, if any, in the election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim thewinning candidate/s.

B. Defective Returns

1. Formal DefectsOcampo v. COMELEC

326 SCRA 636HELD: Formal defects are not grounds for excluding an election return.

2. Statistically Improbable Returns

Velayo v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 135613 (March 9, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Private respondent filedseveral cases with the COMELEC. Petitioner was proclaimed as mayor. COMELEC en banc issued a resolution annulling the proclamation and declaring private respondent as the winner.Hence this petition.

HELD: Standing alone and without more, the bare fact that a candidate for public officereceived zero votes in one or two precincts cannot adequately support a finding that the subjectelection returns are statistically improbable. The doctrine on statistical improbability must beviewed restrictively, the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing the fraudulent and corruptpractices, innocent voters become disenfranchised. Moreover, the doctrine involves a questionof fact and a more prudential approach prohibits its determination ex parte.

Ocampo v. COMELEC

325 SCRA 636HELD: If only one candidate obtained all the votes in some precincts, this is not sufficient tomake the election returns statistically improbable.

3. DuressSebastian v. COMELEC

327 SCRA 406HELD: Duress cannot be raised as an issue in a pre-proclamation case.

VI. Election ContestsA. Payment of Docket Fee

Enojas v. Gacott

322 SCRA 272HELD: An election protest should not be dismissed despite a deficiency in the docket fee,because it involves public interest.

Soller v. COMELECG.R. No. 139853 (September 5, 2000)

HELD: An election protest should be dismissed if the correct docket fee is not paid.

B. Verification

Soller v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 139853 (September 5, 2000)







39

FACTS: Petitioner filed an election protest against respondent who was proclaimed as mayor.The RTC decided in favor of petitioner, but the decision was reversed by the 2 nd Division of theCOMELEC in an appeal filed by respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsiderationquestioning the decision of the division to validate the marked ballots cast in favor of therespondent. The MR was denied by the COMELEC en banc which declared that findings of factcannot be a subject of an MR. Hence this petition.

HELD: Any question on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed ruling of aDivision is also a proper subject for a motion for reconsideration.

G. Execution Pending Appeal

Fermo v . COMELEC

G.R. NO. 140179 (March 13, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for Punong Barangay. The latterwas proclaimed as the winner. Petitioner filed an election protest. The court ruled in favor ofpetitioner. Private respondent appealed this decision to COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion forexecution pending appeal which was granted by the court. The private respondent appealed thisdecision to the COMELEC, which the latter reversed. Hence this petition.

HELD: COMELEC did not err in reversing the decision. Only one ground was used bypetitioner to support his petition i.e. ―shortness of term‖, which the SC considered as insufficient.The order of COMELEC for the petitioner to relinquish his post to the private respondentpending final resolution of the appeal is a logical and necessary consequence of the denial ofexecution pending appeal.

VII. Election Offenses

A. JurisdictionJuan v. People

322 SCRA 125HELD: It is the RTC which has jurisdiction over election offenses.

B. Procedure

Laurel v. Presiding J udg e, RTC Of Manila

G.R. NO. 131778 (January 28, 2000)

C. Offenses1. Transfer Of Government Employee

Regalado v. CA

325 SCRA 516

FACTS: Mayor Navarro appointed Barba as a nursing attendant. When he ran for mayor, thepetitioner was appointed as OIC-mayor. Petitioner issued a memorandum informing Barba thatshe would be reassigned. This transfer was made without prior approval of COMELEC. Barbafiled a complaint against petitioner for violation of § 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.Petitioner was later charged and convicted of the offense.

HELD: Indeed, appointing authorities can transfer or detail personnel, as the exigencies ofpublic service require. However, during election period, as such personnel movement could beused for electioneering or even to harass subordinates who are of different political persuasion,§ 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, prohibits the same unless approved bythe COMELEC.

2. Carrying Firearm

Caña v . Gebu si on

A.M. NO. P-98-1284 (March 30, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner (judge) filed a complaint against private respondent (Sheriff IV in the samecourt as petitioner) for violation of the Civil Service Law, the Firearms Law, and the Omnibus





40

Election Code. In addition, respondent was also accused of carrying a revolver without a licenseand of threatening to kill complainant for having filed the above charges. An investigation wasconducted, and the respondent was found guilty of several of the charges.

HELD: The SC ruled that respondent should be dismissed from service. One of the reasons isthat by possessing a firearm without the necessary license, he committed a serious misconduct.

VIII. Party-List System

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 1136781 (October 6, 2000)

FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneouslywith the national elections. One hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitionsparticipated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-listrepresentatives from twelve parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percentof the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.

Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC,pleading for their own proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38parties. Such move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved, theproclaimed parties asked the SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaimadditional seats, so that each of them would have three party-list reps.

HELD:1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? SC:

The 20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory.

2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA7941 constitutional? SC: Yes. Congress was vested with the broad power to define andprescribe the mechanics of the party-list system.

3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? SC: As to themethod of allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating partiesaccording to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes asagainst the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All thosethat garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteedseat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those garnering more than two percent ofthe votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Theformula for additional seats of other qualified parties is: no.of votes of concerned partydivided by no.of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the first

party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. ( 5% = 2 seats )

IX. Right of Suffrage - Special Registration before the General Elections

Akbayan vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066 (March 26,2001)

Betito vs. Benipayo G.R. No. 147179 (March 26,2001)

FACTS:Consolidated cases regarding the Right to Suffrage. Petitioners are asking the COMELEC tohold a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Election. After hearings, meetingsand consultations, the COMELEC denied the request for special registration on the grounds (1)

it is against the law, and (2) impossibility. The case was elevated to SC.

HELD:

1. The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. It is subject to existing substantive and proceduralrequirements. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarilyconditioned upon the process of registration. The act of registration is an indispensableprecondition to the right of suffrage. The State, undoubtedly then, in the exercise of its







42

The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various reasons. First,one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution ispromulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the 1st Division denied the release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the 1 st Division even later said that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yetpromulgated. Lastly, Commissioner Z could not have affixed her signature on the resolution,since on the same date an order was issued where she said that she still wanted to see bothpositions before making her decision.

Soller v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 139853 (September 5, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of themunicipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner wasproclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petitionwith the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later, private respondent filed an electionprotest against petitioner with the RTC. The COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation casefiled by private respondent, while the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitionermoved for reconsideration but said motion was denied.

Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending thatrespondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion innot dismissing private respondent's election protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissedpetitioner's suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the COMELEC en banc.

HELD: The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not havethe requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamationcontroversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Anydecision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instanceis null and void. In the SC’s view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involvingincidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within thedivision of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.

Salva v. Makalintal

G.R. NO. 132603 (September 18, 2000)

FACTS: The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for annulmentof Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.

Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay

Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC toconduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05,thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 wasvetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown thatthe essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several governmentagencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for therules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger withbarangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.

The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act, resolutionor decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The petitioners

contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of theOmnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when theCOMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the RegionalTrial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial oradministrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.





43

HELD: The SC ruled that ―…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings anddecisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by laware those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of bythe said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governingthe conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicialfunctions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct ofplebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorariby this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in anordinary civil action before the trial courts.

XI. Recall Election

Afiado vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 141787 (September 18, 2000)

FACTS: The Preparatory Recall Assembly passed Resolution No. 1 for the recall of Vice-Mayor Amelita Navarro. The issue is whether an elective official who became City Mayor by legalsuccession can be the subject of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall AssemblyResolution that was passed when said elective official was still the Vice-Mayor.

HELD: The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago Cityis a supervening event that rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic. Aperusal of the said Resolution reveals that the person subject of the recall process is a specificelective official in relation to her specific office.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Extradition

Secretary of Ju stice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jim enez

G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000overturn ing 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)

By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requestedfor the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pendingevaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested forcopies of the US' extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE:During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to thetwo basic due process rights of notice and hearing?

HELD:Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage

of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminalproceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill ofRights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocenceof an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will beextradited.

Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may beprovisionally arrested pending the submission of the request. Because of this possibleconsequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an

investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basicdue process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable.

Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutionalright to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflictbetween international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.

B. Conflicts between international law and Philippine law







Convention provides that "the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in thepresent Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings whichmay be given to them in the internal law of the State."

Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executiveagreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiatingfunctionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to make nodistinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligationsupon nations.

In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements evenwithout the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. EasternSea Trading , we said:". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without thenecessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From theearliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjectsas commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark andcopyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. Thevalidity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.‖

Date post:	04-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	bubblingbrook
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times

Political Law} Case Survey} 2000

Documents