Political Law - Judiciary 1

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owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, andthat their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared openfor disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang HomeownersAssociation, Inc., the present bona fide o ccupants thereof."

On September 14, 1973, a year almost to the day after the declaration of Martial Law, Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking hisemergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediateeffect. The Decree invalidated, inter alia, the title of the Tuasons' vendor,Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it hadsubsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public[(the Tuasonsbeing among the buyers]. The land bought by Carmel was part of the TalaEstate [one of the so-called "Friar Lands"]. Carmel had bought the land underAct No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Under these statutes:

[1] a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase [if he did not wish

to lease] the portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government,in cash or on installment; the interested buyer was given a certificate of sale,which was regarded as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price in theand at the interest specified, the acceptance of such certificate making theoccupant a debtor of the government;

[2] until the price was fully paid, however, title was reserved in theGovernment, and any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior tosuch full payment was explicitly declared to "be invalid as against theGovernment and, in all respects, subordinate to its prior claim;"

[3] in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchasemoney and interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands [nowDirector of Lands] had the duty at once to protect the Government from lossby bringing suit to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lienon the property and by selling it in the same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale being deemed to acquire a good andindefeasible title, and the proceeds of the sale being applied to the paymentof the costs of the court and all installments due or to become due; and

[4] in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred titleto the land to the purchaser "by proper instrument of conveyance", thecertificate of title over the land to issue and become effective in the mannerprovided by the Land Registration Act. [1 ]

Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding [2 ] that Carmel had failed tocomplete payment of the price. It adjudged that:

According to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the originalpurchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all
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installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by theCarmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said Association [3 ] stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with theGovernment and the land now occupied by the members of said Associationhas never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the

Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate itfrom the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being, therefore, nulland void ab initio a s against the law and public policy.

Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc.and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the membersof the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bonafide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open tothem for "disposition and sale pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, asamended." [4 ] It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention thathis Decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging, on theone hand, that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by thebuyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states onthe other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association,Inc. [are] the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots. The latteraverment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both aphysical and legal fallacy. Well-known is the rule of physics that two objectscannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the absurdity of thesubsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of land,who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants"thereof, much less "bona fide " occupants.

But this notwithstanding and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr.Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarlysituated as they, in the following imperious manner:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, byvirtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22,1972, do hereby order and decree that any and all sales contracts betweenthe government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those

between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfersthereafter, covering Lots 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226,1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 [LRC PSD-1730], all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City,are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against theGovernment; that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604, 62605,covering Lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc.,which are a consolidation and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbeforeenumerated, are declared invalid and considered cancelled as against the
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Government; and that said lots are declared open for disposition and sale tothe members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., thepresent bona fide occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32,as amended.

On the strength of this Presidential Decree, the Register of Deeds of CaloocanCity caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of thefollowing:

MEMORANDUM. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled asagainst the Government and the property described herein is declared openfor disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang HomeownersAssociation, Inc.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorariassailing the Marcos Decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of theconstitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain [5 ] but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrenstitles; [6 ] and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel thederogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in thealternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.

Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the Decree. In his Commenton the Petition, [7 ] he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorariresorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents

were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without orin excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opinedthat the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation, [8 ] they had never become ownersthereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and the Decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressinghousing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were lefthomeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Parkwhere they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, thatpetitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the AssuranceFund.

Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four [64] persons,members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by

Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of theirlands by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own, theallegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition.
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The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that theextraodinary writ of certiorari [9 ] may properly issue to nullify only judicial orquasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directedagainst acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,board, or person exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petitionwill be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawfulexercise of judicial power.

The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function.He made a determination of facts and applied the law to those facts,declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These actsessentially constitute a judicial function, [10 ] or an exercise of jurisdictionwhich is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine acause. [11 ] He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the originalpurchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of allinstallments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed byCarmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of the Association [of homeowners] stand." And applying the law to thatsituation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained withthe Government, and the land now occupied by the members of saidassociation has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that "any and all acts affecting said land and purportingto segregate it from the said property of the Republic were null and void ab

initio as against the law and public policy."

These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certioraribecause done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicialfunction, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was nevervested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested inthe Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law,[12 ] the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputablyperpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his officeas Chief Executive and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative

power that he had assumed as head of the Martial Law regime.

Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e., determined the relevantfacts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested partieswere accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for adetermination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the findingostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescindingfrom the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of
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these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable thatthe petitioner Tuasons [and the petitioners in intervention] were neverconfronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute theirtrustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fataldefect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due

process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr.Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power nevergranted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had, in addition, exercisedit unconstitutionally.

In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the Petition for Certiorarias one for Prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out acase for the latter. [13 ] Considered in this wise, it will also appear that anexecutive officer had acted without jurisdiction, exercised judicial power notgranted to him by the Constitution or the laws, and had, furthermore,performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the partiesthereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper andefficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in theprayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determinedafter all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties'pleadings. [14 ]

There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmelwas actually issued to it by the Government. This, of course, gives rise to thestrong presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, [15 ] thatofficial duty being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureauof Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for suchissuance, i.e ., the payment in full of the price, together with all accruedinterest. Against this presumption, there is no evidence. It must, hence, beaccorded full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having beenduly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner provided in Sectionone hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act." [16 ]

It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of theprice of the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant to theprovisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted.If this be the fact, the Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid

installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving theland subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against theland by selling the same in the manner provided by Act Numbered OneHundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of mortgages. [17 ] This it can do,despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription does not lieagainst the Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought andresults in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title byCarmel and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors
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from it of portions of the land covered by its original title must be respected.At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and cannot in anymanner affect this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of theunconstitutionality and invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 293, and theabsolute lack of any right to the land or any portion thereof on the part of the

members of the so-called "Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc." TheDecree was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justiceprinciples or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vilestratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous anddisdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was, in reality, a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever,from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance withand as explicitly guaranteed by law.

One last word respecting the petitioners in intervention. Their petition tointervene substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a classsuit [18 ] and was consequently given due course by the Court. They are,therefore, covered by this judgment.

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutionaland void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded tocancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners inintervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void anddeclaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition andsale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to dowhatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; andhenceforth, to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision orpart of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO,Petitioners,vs.SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 187910 June 16, 2009

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO,Petitioner,vs.SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives,Congress of the Philippines, Respondent.
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R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO,C.J.:

This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall not shirkits bounden duty to wield its judicial power to settle "actual controversies involving rights

which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there hasbeen a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." 1 Be that as it may, no amount of exigencycan make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper.

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizensand taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "AResolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciablecontroversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article

XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some may interpretpetitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by this Court beforeit will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.

It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. 2 The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the

judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutionalboundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its "solemn andsacred obligation" under the Constitution. 3 This Courts power of review may be awesome,but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legalclaims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further tothe constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. 4 The "case-or-controversy"requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingentquestions," 5 lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. 6 In the illuminating words of the learned Justice Laurel in Angara v.Electoral Commission 7 :

Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and tosterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the

judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Morethan that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, notonly because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the

judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive andlegislative departments of the government.

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In theUnited States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertaincontingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at
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funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Courtin cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or whenparamount public interest is involved. 16 While the Court recognizes the potential far-reachingimplications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 isyet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental

importance" doctrine.The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirementderived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice tosettle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable." As stated in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., 17 viz.:

x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are theyfree to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for thisconstitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure avigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the

judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of

government." It thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies.

x x x x

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire tolitigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severelylimited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffectivedispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.

Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locusstandi, evolving from the stringent requirements of "personal injury" to the broader "transcendental importance" doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an openinvitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebraldeficit.

In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at thebehest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concreteinjury. 18 When warranted by the presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review, thisCourt shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPEROC. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives

Facts:

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens
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and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A ResolutionCalling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals toAmend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitiveinterpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure foramending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutionalfor deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding theSenate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to theConstitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.

Issue:

Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.

Held:

No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some

Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 tothe Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint andConcurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners havenot sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. HouseResolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a futuretime for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actualconvention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposalhas yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yettaken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertaincontingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. TheHouse has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.

The petitions were dismissed.

G.R. No. 149719 June 21, 2007

MOLDEX REALTY, INC.,petitioner,vs.HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, OFFICE OF APPEALS,ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, EDITHA U. BARRAMEDA in her capacity asRegional Officer and METROGATE COMPLEX VILLAGE HOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION, INC.,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA,J. :

This is a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seekingthe nullification of Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, issued by the Housing and Urban


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Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), as well as the two issuances and the writ of mandatory injunction issued by public respondent Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB) in connection with the implementation of the assailed Resolution.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Moldex Realty, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate development.It is the owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, a subdivision situated inMeycauayan, Marilao, Bulacan. In 1988, the HLURB issued petitioner a License to Sell 696parcels of land within the subdivision. In 1993, a sufficient number of lot buyers andhomeowners in the subdivision formally organized to become the Metrogate Complex VillageHomeowners Association (respondent association).

Petitioner claims that since the completion of the subdivision, it had been subsidizing andadvancing the payment for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities including theoperation of streetlights and the payment of the corresponding electric bills. However, in2000, petitioner decided to stop paying the electric bills for the streetlights and advised

respondent association to assume this obligation. Respondent association objected topetitioners resolution and refused to pay the electric bills. Thus, Meralco discontinued itsservice, prompting respondent association to apply for a preliminary injunction andpreliminary mandatory injunction with the HLURB against petitioner.

On 5 April 2001, Editha U. Barrameda, in her capacity as Regional Officer of HLURBs Officeof Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs, issued a Resolution granting respondentassociations application for injunction. In support of the Resolution, Barrameda cited therelevant provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) Nos. 957 and 1216 and HUDCC ResolutionNo. R-562, series of 1994.

HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, particularly provides that "subdivisionowners/developers shall continue to maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwisestipulated in the contract, pay the bills for electric consumption of the subdivision street lightsuntil the facilities in the project are turned over to the local government until after completionof development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and their implementing rules andregulations." 1

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was rebuffed in an Order dated 28 May 2001. 2 After respondent association filed a bond, Barrameda issued a writ of preliminary mandatoryinjunction dated 28 June 2001 ordering petitioner to assume the obligation of paying the costof electricity of the streetlights starting from December 2000 until their turn over or donationto the Municipality of Meycauayan. 3

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Prohibition andCertiorari, praying not only for the reversal of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, aswell as the Resolution dated 5 April 2001 and the Order dated 28 May 2001, but also for thenullification of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, on the ground that it isunconstitutional.
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During the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals, the HUDCC approvedBoard Resolution No. R-699, series of 2001, entitled Amending the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree and Other Related Laws .4

On 27 August 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner should have raised the constitutionality of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994,directly to this Court. The appellate court likewise found that no proof was submitted to showMr. Juanito Maltos authority to execute the requisite verification and certification againstnon-forum shopping in behalf of petitioner. 5

Following the Court of Appeals pronouncement that constitutional issues should be raiseddirectly before this Court, petitioner instituted on 21 September 2001 an action for certiorariand prohibition. 6 The petition reiterated the prayer for the reversal of the writ of preliminarymandatory injunction, the Resolution dated 5 April 2001 and the Order dated 28 May 2001,all issued by the HLURB and for the setting aside of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994.

The instant petition is anchored on the following arguments:

1. Resolution No. 526 Series of 1994 issued by the HUDCC is unconstitutional for being avoid exercise of legislative power.

2. Public respondent gravely abused its direction in issuing the Mandatory Injunction on thebasis of a void regulation (HU[D]CC Resolution No. 526 Series of 1994).

3. Public respondent abused its discretion in not commanding that the obligation to maintainthe subdivision including the payment of the streetlight consumption belongs exclusively toprivate respondents. 7

In its Comment ,8 respondent association brought up the tardy filing of the instant petition. Itcontends that the instant petition, which assails the two HLURB issuances dated 5 April 2001and 28 May 2001, was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In its opinion, the prior filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals did not toll the running of the 60-day period.

The Solicitor General agrees, pointing out that the instant petition, captioned as Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari, does not assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals but the twinissuances and the writ of mandatory injunction issued by the HLURB and, therefore, shouldhave been filed within 60 days from petitioners receipt on 18 June 2001 of the HLURB Order dated 28 May 2001. It appears that when reckoned from 18 June 2001, the filing of theinstant petition would go beyond the 60-day reglementary period.

Petitioner maintains, on the contrary, that it filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period, but the same was dismissed by the appellate courtand "referred" to this Court, as it raised a constitutional issue.

When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a partymay raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being
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enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing theregulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliestopportunity. 9 This requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionalitymust be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That thequestion of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to

allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional,would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file acase to challenge the same. 10

In the instant case, petitioner has complied with the requirement that the issue of theconstitutionality of the subject HUDCC Resolution must be timely raised. Petitioner hadalready raised the question of constitutionality in its petition filed with the Court of Appeals.The alleged injury caused to petitioner as a result of the implementation of the HUDCCResolution is continuous in nature in that as long as the assailed resolution is effective,petitioner is obliged to pay for the electricity cost of the streetlights. For every occasion thatpetitioner is directed to comply with the assailed resolution, a new cause of action toquestion its validity accrues in favor of petitioner. Thus, the instant petition is not time-barred.

The Solicitor General also points out that it is the Regional Trial Court, and not this Court nor the Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of this original action for certiorari and prohibition, notwithstanding Section 4, Rule 65 11 of the Rules of Court.

It must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation. In Drilon v.Lim,12 it was clearly stated that the lower courts also have jurisdiction to resolve theconstitutionality at the first instance, thus:

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power todetermine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to thefundamental law. x x x Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in theSupreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in allcases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executiveagreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. 13

The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over casesinvolving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in circumstances wherethe Court believes that resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the firstinstance is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic and moralwell being of the people. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a question on theconstitutionality of a regulation may be brought only to this Court.

The instant petition does not allege circumstances and issues of transcendental importanceto the public requiring their prompt and definite resolution and the brushing aside of technicalities of procedure. Neither is the Court convinced that the issues presented in thispetition are of such nature that would nudge the lower courts to defer to the higher judgmentof this Court. The application of the assailed HUDCC resolution mainly affects the proprietary
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interests of the parties involved and can hardly be characterized as overriding to the generalwell-being of the people. Ultimately, the Court is called upon to resolve the question of whobears the obligation of paying electricity cost, a question that the lower courts undoubtedlyhave the competence to resolve.

However, it is also a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutionalquestion and decide a law, or an administrative regulation as in the instant case, to beunconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it israised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may raise its

judgment, that course will be adopted and the

constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will beunavoidable .14 In other words, the Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless itis the very lis mota of the case. 15

Apart from the non-observance of the hierarchy of courts principle, a subsequentdevelopment occurred which has not only rendered the question of constitutionality unpivotal

but made the resolution of the case itself a pure theoretical exercise. During the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals, Board Resolution No. 699, series of 2001,entitled Amending the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree and Other Related Laws , was passed by theHUDCC. The regulation amended certain design standards for subdivision projects, amongwhich is the proportionate obligation of subdivision homeowners in the payment of theelectricity cost of streetlights. 16 The amendatory provision has superseded the provision inHUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, directing subdivision developers to shoulder the electricity cost of streetlights. At the time of the filing of the instant petition, the newprovision was already in effect. That being the situation, the instant petition has becomemoot and academic.

One final note. In the main, petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, issued by the HUDCC. However, the HUDCC, although obviously anindispensable party, was not impleaded either in the instant petition or in the petition beforethe Court of Appeals. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no finaldetermination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority tohear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain realfinality. The absence of an indispensable parties renders all subsequent actions of the courtnull and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as tothose present .17 That is why the case is generally remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. In this case, however, remand is not feasible because the initial action has tobe discarded for failure to observe the hierarchy of courts principle.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 127022 June 28, 2000

FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SpousesCYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, Spouses CARMEN SOCO andLORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, Spouses SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA and LETICIANOCOM CHAN,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, ALICE E.SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL,NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC.,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI of Rizal) and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OFLAS PIAS, METRO MANILA, respondents, ALEJANDRO B. REY,petitioner-intervenor.

G.R. No. 127245 June 28, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDMANAGEMENT BUREAU,petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCNIO E. MARGOLLES, ALICEE. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA A. LAPERAL,NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI) of RIZAL, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OFLAS PIAS,respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PURISIMA,J .:

This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases,which the Third Division decided on September 2, 1999. The motions for reconsiderationseasonably filed by the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics,Inc., et al ., are pending.

Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by theResolution of November 18, 1993:

. . ., the following are considered en banc cases:

1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executiveagreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,ordinance, or regulation is in question;

2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;


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3. Cases raising novel questions of law;

4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;

5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;

7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may bemodified or reversed;

8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actualmembership of the court en banc ; and

9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.

The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around ninety-nine (99) hectarespresumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicatedto private individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the saiddecision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title issuedpursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it was soadjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order.

The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question, when theherein private respondents obtained their decree of registration thereover.

In Limketkai Sons Milling , Inc . vs . Court of Appeals , the Court conceded that it is notinfallible. Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error,and the parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded from seeking relief therefrom,by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more thananything else, is of paramount importance.

Here, there was submitted to the Court en consulta , petitioners' Motions to Refer to theCourt En Banc these consolidated cases for the consideration of the Court. A pleading,entitled "FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC , EN CONSULTA ," waspresented but when the same was first brought to its attention on March 7, 2000, the Court

opined that since the Third Division had not yet acted on subject motions to refer the casesto the Banc, it was then premature for the Court to resolve the consulta. However, the Courtsuccinctly cautioned that the action of the Third Division on the matter would just betentative.

On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion to transfer thesecases to the Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta andthereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that


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the cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its attention. Evidently, theaction of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUALPOWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of November 18,1993, which reads: " All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention ." (emphasis supplied)

Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the eight (8)Associate Justices who voted to treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have notgiven any cogent or compelling reason for such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of theResolution of this Court dated November 18, 1993, has been cited to support the majorityopinion, it is decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc andtherefore, the prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for theCourt en banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious.The aforesaid finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough towarrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide petitioners'motions for reconsideration. 1wphi1.nt

It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a casefor its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin isincapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means thatthe nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it beconcluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merelyguided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actualmembership that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the actionand decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of thishighest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting andapplying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court

to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be observed.

Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the Sumilao case is misplaced.The said case is not on all fours with these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was broughtto the Banc en consulta , the motion for reconsideration of the decision therein rendered hadbeen voted upon by the Second Division with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that thestalemate resulting from the said voting constituted a denial of the motion for reconsideration.

In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics,Inc., et al ., are pending and unresolved.

Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone theenormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there ismerit in the prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should beresolved by the Court En Banc .


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WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc cases; andpetitioners' motions for reconsideration are hereby set for oral argument on July 18, 2000, at11:00 a.m. Let corresponding notices issue.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr.JJ., concur.

Melo, J., I joined the dissents and in view of the close vote, urge that this actions be not repeated and that it be reviewed again.

Puno, J., please see separate opinion.

Vitug, J., I joined the dissenting justices.

Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., please see dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing and Pardo, JJ., I joined the dissent of J. Reyes.Separate Opinions

PUNO,J., separate opinion;

In the session last March 21, 2000, information was given that a majority of the members of the Third Division intends to hear the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic andthen report its result to the Court en banc . I sincerely believe that the result of the said oralarguments will be a vital factor to consider before the court en banc should finally decide toassume jurisdiction over the case at bar. The issue for resolution in the said Motion for Reconsideration concerns res judicata . This is an issue that does not strictly involve a

question of law for beyond doubt its resolution will rest on some amorphous questions of fact. Until and unless these questions of fact are sharpened and given shape in the intendedoral arguments, I am of the opinion and so vote that the Court en banc should defer its actionto assume jurisdiction over the case at bar.

GONZAGA-REYES,J., dissenting opinion;

With due respect, I am constrained to dissent from the acceptance by the Court en banc of the referral of the motions for reconsideration in the cases at bar. The justification for thereferral is stated thus:

These cases involve a vast tract of land around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptivelybelonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to privateindividuals under a decision allegedly rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Since thevalidity of the said decision and of the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificatesof title issued pursuant thereto is contingent on the character or classification of subject areaat the time it was so adjudicated to private persons, the determination of the same isessential. The decision sought to be reconsidered does not clearly reflect or indicate the


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the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc , including those involving theconstitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the caseand voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the caseand voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of suchMembers. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided enbanc ; Provided , that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decisionrendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting enbanc .

It is implicit in the paragraph immediately preceding that decisions or resolutions of a divisionof the court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in thedeliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or resolution of the

Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis avis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of theCourt is considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc , and sits veritably as theCourt en banc itself. The only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down bythe Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by theCourt sitting en banc .

(3) Circular No. 2-89 of the Court en banc laid down the following Guidelines and Rules onthe referral to the Court en banc of cases assigned to a Division:

1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in Divisions of three, five or seven Members(Sec. 4[1]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At present the Court has three Divisions of fiveMembers each.

2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of itsMembers who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and votedthereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is adecision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).

3. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Divisionmay be appealed.

4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or

resolution therein rendered becomes final and executory, the Division may refer the case enconsulta to the Court en banc which, after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such referral, may return the case to the Division or accept the case for decision or resolution.

4a. Paragraph [f] of the Resolution of this Court of 23 February 1984 in Bar Matter No. 205(formerly item 6, en banc Resolution dated 29 September 1977), enumerating the casesconsidered as en banc cases, states:


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f. Cases assigned to a division including motions for reconsideration which in the opinion of at least three (3) members merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable by amajority vote of the actual members of the Court en banc .

5. A resolution of the Division denying a party 's motion for referral to the Court en banc of anyDivision case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc .

6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court en banc , the latter may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take cognizance of thesame, in which case, the decision or resolution shall be returned to the referring Division.

7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to takecognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained.

8. This Circular shall take effect on March 1, 1989.

In the Resolution of the Court en banc dated November 18, 1993, the following wereenumerated as the cases to be considered as " en banc cases":

1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executiveagreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,ordinance, or regulation is in question;

2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;

3. Cases raising novel questions of law;

4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;

5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,

Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.000 or both;

7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may bemodified or reversed.

8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actualmembership of the court en banc ; and

9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.

Notably, the rule that "cases assigned to a division which is the opinion of at least three (3)members thereof merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the Court en banc " has been reiterated.

However, a new paragraph was added in the 1993 Resolution, as follows:


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9. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.

The immediately foregoing paragraph may lend itself to an interpretation that any case whichthe Court en banc by majority vote of its members "may deem of sufficient importance tomerit its attention" is an en banc case.

This interpretation is of doubtful validity and soundness.

To begin with, Resolution dated November 18, 1993 is essentially an amendment toSections 15 and 16, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which deals with the form ("unglazedpaper," margins, number of copies, etc.) of unprinted and printed papers to be filed with thisCourt. This Resolution was clearly not intended to lay down new guidelines or rules for referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a Division. Thus, the principle that thecourt en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may beappealed could not have been intended to be abrogated. Article VIII, Section 4 of theConstitution, earlier quoted, expressly provides that "when the required number (the

concurrence of at least three members of the division) is not obtained, the case shall bedecided en banc ." The obvious contemplation is that when the required vote of at least threemembers is obtained, the banc's participation is not called for.

(4) It is true that the Constitution itself recognizes the power of the Supreme Court to requireother cases to be heard en banc (Article VIII, Sec. 4(2)). As pointed out, the November 18,1993 Resolution quoted earlier, could not, by reading the issuance in proper context, havebeen intended to expand the enumeration of en banc cases. A reasonable interpretation isthat paragraph 9 refers to cases accepted by the banc pursuant to existing rules, foremost of which is that the referral requires the concurrence of at least three of the members of thedivision. If the provision "all other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actualmembership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention" was intended to givethe court en banc a general residual power and prerogative to cause the elevation of anycase assigned to a division, without a consulta from the division itself, this intent should beineluctably expressed, having in mind the essential and traditional role of a division of thecourt sitting veritably as the court en banc itself.

The court en banc should be shielded from the importunings of litigants who perceivethemselves aggrieved by a decision of a division of the court and resort to the convenienceof an appeal to the court en banc on the plea that its case is "of sufficient importance to meritits attention." In the Sumilao case, the majority of the banc's members refused to take thecase where there was a two-two tie vote in the division for the elevation of the motion for reconsideration to the court en banc . In an earlier precedent involving the conviction of Imelda Marcos' by the Sandiganbayan, the case was considered as deserving of a full courttreatment, despite the fact that the motion for reconsideration did not garner a majority votein the division. The Court Should establish a consistent policy on these referrals for thestability of its policies and procedures.

The prerogative to take out a case from the division without the concurrence of a majority of its members, should, if at all, be used only for clearly compelling reasons; otherwise thedecision of the Court en banc to take cognizance of the matter itself would be suspect of


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irregularity and the precedent would be difficult to justify before litigants who may be similarlysituated.

I vote to deny the motions to refer the motions for reconsideration to the Court en banc .

PANGANIBAN,J., dissenting opinion;

With due respect, I dissent from the majority's Resolution.

Very briefly, these are the relevant antecedents. On September 2, 1999, the Court throughthe Third Division unanimously promulgated its Decision denying the Petitions in thesecases. Thereafter, both the government and private petitioners filed separate (1) Motions for Reconsideration and (2) Motions to Refer the Cases to the Court en banc .

By vote of 4-1, 1 the Third Division rejected the Motions to Refer the Cases to the full Courtbecause the movants had utterly failed to adduce any legal reason for such referral.

Subsequently, Justice Fidel P. Purisima, the lone dissenter, asked the Court en banc to yankthe case out of and against the will of the said Division, and to empower the banc to resolvethe pending Motions for Reconsideration. By the instant Resolution, the majority has agreedwith Justice Purisima.

With due respect, I say that the majority has not given any cogent or compelling reason for this unprecedented action. Its Resolution, penned by Justice Purisima, simply pontificatesthat "these consolidated cases are of sufficient importance to merit the attention anddisposition of the entire Court," without stating why. The majority simply used its sheer votingstrength to bulldoze the earlier 4-1 action of the Third Division. If at all, the lame excusegiven that the "subject Decision [promulgated by the Third Division] does not clearly indicate

the classification of said land" is merely an argument why the pending Motions for Reconsideration should be granted, not why the banc should take over this case.

I fully agree with the well-reasoned Dissent of Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes,the ponente of the Third Division's unanimous Decision. I write, however, to stress one point.In the celebrated Sumilao farmers' case, 2 a similar motion to refer to the full Court was turneddown by the Second Division by a vote of 3-1. Arguing that the Division's earlier vote of 2-2on the Motion for Reconsideration was not decisive, Justice Jose A. R. Melo (who was thena member of the Second Division) subsequently asked the banc to take over the case.Justice Melo argued that under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, "[c]ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and votedthereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such members." Sincethe Motion for Reconsideration did not obtain the required three votes in the Division, headded that the banc should thus take over and resolve the impasse. In other words, JusticeMelo presented a genuine "question of sufficient importance" which the Second Divisionwas not in a position to resolve to justify a take-over by the banc. Yet, the full Court turneddown his proposal. Only Justice Vitug and I supported Justice Melo.
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I therefore cannot understand why the banc is now taking over this case against the wishesof the Third Division. It turned down the poor farmers' plea and the Melo proposal. Why thenshould the banc grant the not-so-poor private petitioners' prayer here? Why then should itapprove the groundless Purisima proposal? At the very least, if it should take over this case,then it should likewise assume jurisdiction over the farmer's suit. After all, the vote in the

Motion for Reconsideration in that case was two in favor and two against, while in thepresent case, the Third Division has not even voted on the plea for reconsideration. In other words, there was sufficient reason for the banc to take over the Sumilao problem because of the 2-2 vote of the Division. Here, no cogent reason whatsoever other than themotherhood peroration that the case was "of sufficient importance" is given by themajority.

Parenthetically, I should add that the Third Division is not averse to hearing the petitioners'Motions for Reconsideration. As a matter of fact, if the banc did not take over this case, itwould have scheduled the said Motions for oral argument. Simply stated, the Third Divisionis not incapable of rendering objective and fair justice in this case and to rule on the issue of "classification of said land."

Having taken over this case, the banc in the name of equal justice should also takeover the Sumilao farmers' Petition. But having rejected their case, then it should also turndown this one. Sauce for the poor goose should be the same sauce for the rich gander. Thatis simple, equal justice for all. 1wphi1.nt

G.R. No. 176951 December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP NationalPresident JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OFSURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERNSAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,Respondents.CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OFLEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OFSILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITYOF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SANFERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OFURDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITYOF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,Petitioners-In-Intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


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G.R. No. 177499 December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP NationalPresident JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOSNORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; andMUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,Respondents.CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OFLEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OFSILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITYOF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SANFERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OFURDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITYOF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,Petitioners-In-Intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178056 December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP NationalPresident JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,vs.PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OFCEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION ONELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,Respondents.CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OFLEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OFSILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITYOF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SANFERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OFURDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITYOF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,Petitioners-In-Intervention.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR.J.:

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be readaccording to its spirit or intent ,1 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
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not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within thestatute. 2 Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much withinthe statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not withinthe statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 3 Withal, courts ought not to interpretand should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its

legislators.4

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: thepresumption of constitutionality of statutes .5 This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partitesystem of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three greatdepartments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and notto interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end,courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is theproduct of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. 6 Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocalbreach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentativeone, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. 7

BACKGROUND

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of thePhilippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas 8 assail theconstitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, 9 each converting the municipality covered therebyinto a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.

By Decision 10 dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted thepetitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution,specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause.

Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising,as one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of theparties, let alone established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration. 11 By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its"Resolution" dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents"Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering thatnew and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents "Motion for Reconsideration"dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" datedDecember 9, 2008 and dismiss the "Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case.
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Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion asfollows:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 isDENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted tooverturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition inIntervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x

On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28,2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolutionof March 31, 2009" and "Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and toConduct Further Proceedings Thereon ."

Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009 , the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted toas expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-DeCastro, however, taking common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, statedthe observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act onthe aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of theApril 28, 2009 Resolution." 12

Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2,2009 to which some of the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respectivecomments. The Court will now rule on this incident. But first, we set and underscore somebasic premises:

(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-DeCastro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of thecorrectness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6vote on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which deniedthe motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have already been passed upon"reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsiderationof the said decision;

(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 wasprecipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. ThisMay 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a lawunconstitutional remains unresolved; and

(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionalityof a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority
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of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case andvoted thereon.

The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolutionboils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII islimited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motionfor reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionalityof a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing,on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated groundthat the "basic issueshave already been passed" suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for adeclaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?

The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied theinitial motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon"betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters

and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And beit remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolutionwas the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution.Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should bedeliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of thelaws in question is, on the merits, secured.

It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members"contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that:

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc , x x x shall be decided withthe concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations onthe issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis added.)

Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total." 13 In plain language, thismeans 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections , Justice, now Chief Justice,Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the view that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not amajority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value." 14

As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote inthe determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishingwhether such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for

reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J.Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on theconcurrence of the majority was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same isinconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration." 15

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:
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