Political Law Part 5

8/13/2019 Political Law Part 5

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POLITICAL LAW PART V

ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congressof the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House ofRepresentatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by theprovision on initiative and referendum.

a. Define legislative power

Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:

1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws

2. principle of separation of powers

3. non-delegability of legislative powers

- reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablablelaws

- Separation of Powers

Read:

a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139

b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62

c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178

d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106

e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991

f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106

b. Nature of legislative power


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c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to thelegislature?

d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.

e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.

1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President incase of war or other national emergency, for a limited period andsubject to such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercisepowers necessary and proper to carry out a declared nationalpolicy. Unless sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such

powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize thePresident to fix within specified limits, and subject to suchlimitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, importand export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties orimposts within the framework of the national development programof the government.

Other exceptions: traditional

3. Delegation to local governments

The reason behind this delegation is because the local government isdeemed to know better the needs of the people therein.

a. See Section 5 of Article X

b. Read:

aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660

bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56

A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund thesalary of probation officers in their area is unconstitutional forviolation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where there is aprobation officer because the local government unit appropriated an


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amount for his salaries, convicts may avail of probation while in placeswhere no funds were set aside for probation officers, convicts thereincould not apply for probation.

a. Reason for the delegation

4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitutionand Section 32, Article VI The Congress shall, as early as possible,provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and theexceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and

enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereofpassed by the Congress of local legislative body after theregistration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of the totalnumber of registered voters, of which every legislative district mustbe represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.

f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.

1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?

Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the Presidentof the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of theRevised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor theirnames changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act ofCongress.

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come

under the provisions hereof.


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Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a newbarrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be changedby the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of thecouncil of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposedbarrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal councilshall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds ofthe entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That nonew barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundredpersons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 becameeffective, barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor

their names ch anged except by Act of Congress or of thecorresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of thevoters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the councilof the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio issituate d. Petitioner argues, accordingly: If the President, under thisnew law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipalitywhich is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units ofmunicipalities?

Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whichthe disputed executive orders are based, provides:

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executiveorder define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or otherpolitical subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised

therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces,separate any political division other than a province, into such portionsas may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions withanother, name any new subdivision so created, and may change theseat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as thepublic welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the(Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first beobtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to

be defined or any province is to be divided into one or moresubprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the


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Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of theterritory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or anyjudicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines,with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Departmenthaving executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory ofthe several officers affected and assign such officers to the newdistricts so formed.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to createmunicipalities under this section does not amount to an unduedelegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardonavs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, hassettled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not thecreation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory froman already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality(Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to saidtransfer (See Govt of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs.Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence ofthe fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the commonboundaries of two municipalities.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such commonboundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction betweenadjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrativenature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carryinto effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to createmunicipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of theGovernment the power to fill in the details in the execution,enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall aviolation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:

(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to beexecuted, carried out or implemented by the delegate and


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(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate ordeterminable to which the delegate must conform in the performanceof his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate wouldin effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of everylaw; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be nomeans to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegatehas acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he couldthereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law,but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measuresinconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system ofchecks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the veryfoundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet thesewell settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix thedetails in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy tobe carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a

standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referredto. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the lastclause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision tosuch place therein as the public welfare may require.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case atbar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the publicwelfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clausesthereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) andPeople vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "publicwelfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards fora valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, thedoctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements mustbe construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involvedtherein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and haveno binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case conferred


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upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretaryof Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules andregulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets.Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority ofthe Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancelcertificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both casesinvolved grants to administrative officers of powers related to theexercise of their administrative functions, calling for thedetermination of questions of fact.

2 TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)

1. US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, andspeculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinarycircumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, andauthorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council ofState, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and

making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions ofwhich are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, forany cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in theprice of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consentof the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures forcarrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in,palay, rice or corn.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing theprice at which rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang TangHo, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:


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The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive OrderNo. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st ofAugust, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 ofAct No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila,Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally andcriminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price ofeighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed byExecutive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines,dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of ActNo. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to fivemonths' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which heappealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in findingExecutive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, infinding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing thesentence.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on itsapproval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and thatthe law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that theproclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No.2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price atwhich rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes theGovernor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for anycause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice orcorn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergencymeasures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms,the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left tothe discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does notundertake to specify or define under what conditions or for whatreasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but saysthat it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to


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what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Actalso says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinaryrise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does notspecify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to thediscretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that theGovernor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," isauthorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergencymeasures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specifyor define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or howlong such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in forceand effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, theLegislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basisfor the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion ofthe Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and whatis or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as towhat is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying outthe purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is validand the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimumprice at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or withoutnotice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not havebeen any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, andthere may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-Generalfound the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and riceis sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of theUnited States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive andJudiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of theExecutive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law.The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, theExecutive has no authority to make or construe the law, and theJudiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to theConstitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its ownjurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of theLegislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, thatthe Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is tobe sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that


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power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Actdelegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the OrganicLaw, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the powerconferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated tothe Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannotdelegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a lawunto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than toauthorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carrythe law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. Thereis no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Actwithin itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and somelegislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, thedoing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is adelegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearlywhat the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in useas a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, withoutthe determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matersinvolving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not bedelegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in useas an act in conformity to which all fire insurance policies wererequired to be issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must becomplete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislativebranch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgementof the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so

that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti ,but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon theascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA208

5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757(Affecting National interest)


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6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may besustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is

provided and that the legislature in making the delegation hasprescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondentNTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribedby the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, thedelegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegationof rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature isrequired to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authorityis that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held thateven in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness,this standard may be implied.

It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the powerdelegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statutefor the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC isempowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinentto the operation of public service communications which necessarilyinclude the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connectiontherewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety,public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective

competition of private entities in communications and broadcastingfacilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for thecreation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications withcontrol and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically providedthat the national economic viability of the entire network orcomponents of the communications systems contemplated thereinshould be maintained at reasonable rates.

II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned orderviolates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio,


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submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making aprofit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied bypetitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the makerof said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contentsthereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refutethe conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, inmaking said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partakingof a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demandsprevious notice and hearing.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The CentralBank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:

It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of theadministrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required bydue process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R.185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrativeagency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice andhearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action whichaffects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved,

is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the caseof the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It issaid in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130,pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice andhearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character ofthe proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far asgeneralization is possible in view of the great variety of administrativeproceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing

are not essential to the validity of administrative action where theadministrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative,or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts ina judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular andimmediate rather than general and prospective, the person whoserights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to noticeand hearing.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubtcontains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is


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the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to noother. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patentlysuperficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the ratescharged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financialstatements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanationas to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statementswarranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization wasoffered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, whichprompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%)rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could bein a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of itsbusiness requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustiveand detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricaciesattendant to a public service undertaking of such nature andmagnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence topetitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rateswould adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service tothe public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects itstill has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably,petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine theinspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based itsquestioned order.

At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made byrespondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to itsquasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearingare not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to theentire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulateis bereft of merit.

g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrativebodies/agencies have the force of law? penal law? In order to beconsidered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, whatconditions must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION - a reviewer - Primer by FR.

JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 edition.

5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328


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6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327

7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270

h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII.

i. Classify the membership of the legislative department.Differentiate their qualifications, elections/selections and as to theparticipation of the Commission on Appointments in order to validatetheir membership.

j. Manner of election and selection

1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108

2. Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-fourSenators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of thePhilippines, as may be provided for by law.

3. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is anatural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the

election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, aregistered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than2 years immediately preceding the day of the election.

4. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be sixyears and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, atnoon on the 30 th day of June next following their election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntaryrenunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for thefull term for which he was elected.

Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of theHouse of Representatives.

2. Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be

composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed bylaw, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned


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among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area inaccordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and onthe basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, asprovided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system ofregistered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the totalnumber of representatives including those under the party-list. Forthree (3) consecutive terms after the ratification of thisConstitution, of the seats allocated to party-list representativesshall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from thelabor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,

women youth, and such other sectors, as may be provided by law,except the religious sector.

[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with apopulation of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or each province,shall have at least one representative.

[4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, theCongress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts basedon standards provided in this section

Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House ofRepresentatives unless he is a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25 years ofage, able to read and write, and except the party-listrepresentatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shallbe elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than 1year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Read:

1. ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545

Rep. Act No. 2630


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Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Phil ippine Citizenship byrendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces ofthe United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of theUnited states, acquired US citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE PHILIPPINECITIZENSHIP BY TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE SAME WITH THE LOCAL CIVILREGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST RESIDED IN THEPHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciationof any other citizenship.

2. Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution

Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Philippinesfrom birth without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect theirPhilippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine Citizenship inaccordance with par. 3 * , Section 1 shall be deemed natural borncitizens.

OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO CRESPO,a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004

Who takes the place of the winning candidate as a Member of theHouse of Representatives who was disqualified after he wasproclaimed as such?

Facts:

The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for Congressman ofthe 6 th District of manila for the May 14, 2001 elections. Mark Jimenez

won over the petitioner with 32,097 vot es as against petitioners31,329 votes.

3. Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET basedon the following grounds: 1] misreading of ballots; 2] falsification ofelection returns; 3]substitution of election returns; 4] use of marked,spurious fake and stray ballots; and 5] presence of ballots written byone or two persons.


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4. On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the caseof ABANTE, ET AL. VS. MARI CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, etal., declaring Mark Jimenez ineligible for the Office ofRepresentative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in theDistrict. Mark Jimenez filed a Motion for Reconsideration which wasdenied.

As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner claimedthat all the votes cast for the former should not be counted and sincehe garnered the second highest number of votes, he should bedeclared winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and be proclaimed theduly elected Congressman of the 6 th District of manila.

Issues:

Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be counted?

Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed winnersince the winner was disqualified?

Held:

1. There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate inorder that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be consideredstray. This final judgment must be rendered BEFORE THE ELECTION.This was the ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA. Hence,when a candidate has not been disqualified by final judgment duringthe election day he was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot bedeclared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the

electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The reason behind this is thatthe people voted for him bona fide and in the honest belief that thecandidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they wouldentrust the exercise of the powers of government.

2. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtainedthe highest number of votes does not entitle the second placer to bedeclared the winner. The said principle was laid down as early as 1912

and reiterated in the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS.COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.


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Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall beelected for a term of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwiseprovided by law, at noon on the 30 th day of June next followingtheir election.

No member of the House of Representative shall serve for aperiod of more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation ofthe office for any length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of his service for the full term forwhich he was elected.

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of

the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shallbe held on the second Monday of May.

a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of Sectoralrepresentatives to the Hose of Representatives.

Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987

2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, September4, 1989

b. On gerrymandering

Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

4. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House ofRepresentatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancyin the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of theHouse of representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpiredterm.

Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337

COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislativedistricts whose Congressmen resigned or died while in office) without

a law passed by Congress appropriating funds for the said purpose.


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2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28,1987

5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in saidcompensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the fullterm of all the members of the Senate and the House ofrepresentatives approving such increase.

a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress?P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII ofthe Constitution. The Presidents salary is P300,000.00 per

annum, while the VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice isP240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the ConstitutionalCommissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members, P180,000.00 perannum.

b. Read:

1. Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President;P240,000.00 for VP, Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice;P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC;P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional Commissions)

2. PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;

3. LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823

6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives

shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 yearsimprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is insession. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any otherplace for any debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

a. Privilege from arrest

Read: Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22

b. Freedom of Speech and debate


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Read:

1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876

7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a fulldisclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notifythe House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that mayarise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they areauthors.

8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House ofRepresentatives may hold any other office or employment in thegovernment, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including government-owned and controlled corporations or theirsubsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neithershall he be appointed to any office which may have been created orthe emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he waselected.

Read:

1) ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431

After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa(Congress) , he is deemed to have resigned his position as Governor ofNegros Oriental because as a legislator, he is not allowed to hold any

other office in the government.

2) PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153

A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the BatasangPambansa as appointed member for be ing a member of the Cabinetis allowed to return to his former position as Governor if he resigns

from the Batasan. This is so because he was just an appointedmember as distinguished from the Adaza Case. (Note: It appears that


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an appointed member of the Batasan is placed in a better positionthan the elected members)

3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution

9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House ofRepresentatives may personally appear as counsel before any courtof justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodiesand other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly orindirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or anyfranchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or anysubdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any

government owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matterbefore any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit orwhere he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Read:

1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39

2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31

What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.So a member of Congress who is a stockholder of the corporationinvolved in a case is not allowed to appear under the guise that he isappearing as such, not as counsel for the corporation.

10. Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on

the 4 th Monday of July for its regular season, unless a different dateis fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such numberof days as it may determine until 30 days before the opening of itsnext regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legalholidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and theHouse of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all itsrespective members.


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Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deemnecessary.

[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day andmay compel the attendance of absent members in such manner, andunder such penalties, as such House may provide.

[3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with theconcurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a Member.A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty

days.

NOTE: In the cases of:

1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and

2. REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be

suspended by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA3019. This preventive suspension applies to all public officials,including members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will beconsidered class legislation if Senators and Congressmen who committhe same is exempt from the preventive suspension imposed therein.

Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended bythe Congress itself.

[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from timeto time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in itsjudgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays onany question shall, at the request of one fifth of the memberspresent, be entered in the journal.

Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.


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[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without theconsent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to anyplace than that which the 2 Houses shall be sitting.

Read:

1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion forreconsideration dated March 14, 1949

2) Disciplinary measures on erring members

Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal

4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive overthe other?

Read:

U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729

The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts ofnewspaper journalists and reporters as to what the proceedings allabout.

b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1

CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347

The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill providesthat it is urea formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not ureaand formaldehyde which appears in the journal which was reallyapproved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULDCHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.

d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131

e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714


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(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all mattersrequired to be entered in the journals, like yeas and nays on the finalreading of a bill or on any question at the request of 1/5 of themembers present. )

5) Differentiate a "regular" from a "special" session.

11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shalleach have an Electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of allelection contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications oftheir respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall becomposed of 9 members, 3 of whom shall be justices of the

Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief justice, and theremaining six shall be members of the Senate or House ofRepresentatives as the case may be, who shall be chosen on thebasis of proportional representation from the political parties andthe parties or organizations registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral tribunalshall be its Chairman.

See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII

Read:

1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988

2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATEELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,October 27, 1988

3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC & RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57

4. BONDOC VS. HRET, supra

11. Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of the Senate President, as ex-oficio chairman, 12senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives, as thecase may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportionalrepresentation from the political parties and the parties or


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organizations registered under the party-list system representedtherein. The chairman of the commission shall not vote, except incase of a tie. The commission shall act on all appointmentssubmitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from theirsubmission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of all themembers.

Read:

1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989

If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of

Congress is substantial so as to dramatically decrease the membershipof one party while reducing the other, the number of representativesof the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may alsobe changed in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: InCunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators was onlytemporary so as not to result in the change of membership in theCommission on Appointments)

2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992

Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, inaddition to the Senate President as the head thereof, every two (2)Senators are entitled to one (1) representative in the Commission.Parties, however, are not allowed to round off thei r members, I.e.,7 Senators are entitled to 3 representatives in the Commission on

Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5.

Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requiresthat there must be 24 members of the Commission. If thedifferent parties do not coalesce, then the possibility that the totalnumber of Senators in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality.(Example: Lakas---13 Senators; LDP---11 Senators. In this case, Lakas isentitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5members (11/2= 5.5)

3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision)


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To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.

12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission onAppointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate

and the House of Representatives shall have been organized withthe election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission onAppointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, atthe call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members, todischarge such powers and functions as are herein conferred uponit.

13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress

shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance withlaw, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Auditwhich shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to andexpenses incurred for each member.

14. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or anyof its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shallbe respected.

Read: 1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29

A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may bedetained during the term of the members imposing said penalty butthe detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right todue process of law.

Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation;question hour

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET

AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006

CARPIO MORALES, J .:


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The Facts:

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or

investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia , theattendance of officials and employees of the executive department,bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Ownedand Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a wholeissued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for

them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a publichearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporationwith the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafterNorth Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilegespeech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigatethe alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contractcovering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewiseissued invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following officialsof the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen.Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice AdmiralMateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFPRear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of theAFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of thePhilippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and

Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F.Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearingscheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) PrivilegeSpeech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005entitled Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can ofWorms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Electionof May 2005; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estradadelive red on July 26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the Wire -

Tapping Capital of the World; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator RodolfoBiazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled Clear and Present


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Danger; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria AnaConsuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on NationalDefense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, andin the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-calledGloriagate Scandal; and (5) Senate Resolu tion No. 295 filed bySenator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on NationalDefense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, onthe Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letterdated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement due to a

pressing operational situation that demands [his] utmost personalattention while some of the invited AFP officers are currentlyattending to other urgent operational matters.

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon receivedfrom Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter [1] datedSeptember 27, 2005 respectfully request[ing ] for the postponement ofthe hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials

of the Executive Department have been invited in order to affordsaid officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for thevarious issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committeeon its investigation.

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote [2] Executive Secretary Ermitathat the Senators are unable to accede to [his request] as it wassent belatedly and [a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as

notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week.

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 aletter from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation JoseL. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project bepostponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Centeron the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O.464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,


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Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for theRights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid ofLegislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Pur poses, which,pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salientprovisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress . In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and toimplement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powersbetween co-equal branches of the government, all heads ofdepartments of the Executive Branch of the government shall securethe consent of the President prior to appearing before either House ofCongress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires andthe President so states in writing, the appearance shall only beconducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.

(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on executiveprivilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted inthe separation of powers under the Constitution ( Almonte vs. Vasquez,G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or theCode of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials andEmployees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use ordivulge confidential or classified information officially known to themby reason of their office and not made available to the public toprejudice the public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified informationbetween the President and the public officers covered by thisexecutive order, including:

1. Conversations and correspondence between the President andthe public official covered by this executive order ( Almonte vs.Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates

Authority , G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);


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2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters whichin the interest of national security should not be divulged ( Almonte vs.Vasquez , G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PresidentialCommission on Good Government , G.R. No. 130716, 9 December1998).

3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to theconclusion of treaties and executive agreements ( Chavez v.Presidential Commission on Good Government , G.R. No. 130716, 9December 1998);

4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings ( Chavez v.

Presidential Commission on Good Government , G.R. No. 130716, 9December 1998);

5. Matters affecting national security and public order ( Chavezv. Public Estates Authority , G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executiveorder:

1. Senior officials of executive departments who in thejudgment of the department heads are covered by the executiveprivilege;

2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief ofStaff are covered by the executive privilege;

3. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chiefsuperintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgmentof the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

4. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of theNational Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

5. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.


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SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secureprior consent of the President prior to appearing before either Houseof Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation ofpowers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect forthe rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republicanstate. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it hasbeen recognized that the head of government may keep certaininformation confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explainingthe reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, adistinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said:Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterizethe proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than theproceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number isincreased, these qualities will be diminished.

Considering that no member of the executive department would want

to appear in the above Senate investigations in aid of legislation byvirtue of Proc. No. 464, the petitioners filed the present petitions todeclare the same unconstitutional because the President abused herpowers in issuing Executive Order No. 464.

I S S U E S:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested inCongress;

2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information onmatters of public concern; and

3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretionwhen they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in anewspaper of general circulation.

H E L D:


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Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O.464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise ofthe Courts power of judici al review are present is in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power ofjudicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be anactual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge thevalidity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must havea personal and substantial interest in the case such that he hassustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliestopportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case. [3]

Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin [4] and Valmonte v. Philippine CharitySweepstakes Office , [5] respondents assert that to be considered aproper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in thecase, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the

enforcement of E.O. 464. [6]

The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, theinterest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct andpersonal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives , [7] this Court heldthat when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, themere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal

interest.

I

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any ofits respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in

accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of


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persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall berespected. (Underscoring supplied)

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless,

in Arnault v. Nazareno , [8] a case decided in 1950 under thatConstitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry isinherent in the power to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalouspurchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the RuralProgress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leadingwitness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the

Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of thesenators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate,detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to punishArnault for contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investingeither House of Congress with power to make investigations and exacttestimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions

advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to thelegislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power ofinquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriateauxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislatewisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting theconditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; andwhere the legislative body does not itself possess the requisiteinformation which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to

others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests forsuch information are often unavailing, and also that information whichis volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means ofcompulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. [9] . . . (Emphasisand underscoring supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of theexecutive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power ofinquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power tolegislate. [10] The matters which may be a proper subject of


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legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigationare one. It follows that the operation of government, being alegitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of theexecutive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power ofinquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the mostfamiliar with and informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforceit, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislativeprocess. If the information possessed by executive officials on the

operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on thatsubject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to thatinformation and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, [11] the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thusbeyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could notusurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for

Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate inits invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person forthat matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need forthe inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with theusual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative toand in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculationon the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid oflegislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards thatproscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires thatthe inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses dulypublished rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutionalinfirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules ofprocedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of personsappearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an impositionthat obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill ofRights.


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A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation andthe question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary inthe question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related andcomplementary to each other, should not be considered as pertainingto the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the powerto conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicitinformation that may be used for legislation, while the other pertainsto the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is toobtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department headsare implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to suchinformation is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, asChief Executive, such department heads must give a report of theirperformance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, inkeeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may onlyrequest their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in whichCongress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under

Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons statedin Arnault . [12]

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated bycompulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit oflegislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from thedeliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance ofexecutive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While theexecutive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannotfrustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply withits demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way fordepartment heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claimof privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are


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department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted fromthis power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,beyond the reach of Congress except through the power ofimpeachment.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI ofthe Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid oflegislation, must be construed as limited in its application toappearances of department heads in the question hour is thereforeCONSTITUTIONAL.

It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned. Section 3 of

E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) tosecure the consent of the President prior to appearing before eitherhouse of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all seniorofficials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of theheads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. departmentheads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the NationalSecurity Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege.

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may bedetermined by the President. Given the title of Section 2 Nature,Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege , it is evident that underthe rule of ejusdem generis , the determination by the President underthis provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverageunder executive privilege.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue ofwhether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it isgathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possessionof the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even againstCongress. Thus, the case holds:

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioneris privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. Theinformation does not cover Presidential conversations,correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings


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which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and othercollegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress,are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot bepried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange ofexploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity andpressure by interested parties, is essential to protect theindependence of decision-making of those tasked to exercisePresidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situationin the instant case. [13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section2(b) is thus invalid per se . It is not asserted. It is merelyimplied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for theclaim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement thatthe President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient forCongress to determine whether the withholding of information isjustified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustratesthe power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

2

E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right toinformation on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctionsbetween the right of Congress to information which underlies thepower of inquiry and the right of the people to information on mattersof public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the productionof documents pursuant to his right to information does not have thesame obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued byCongress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen thepower to exact testimony from government officials. These powersbelong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generallyconducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending tounduly limit disclosures of information in such investigationsnecessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed


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to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of publicconcern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information whichthey can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter beforeCongress opinions which they can then communicate to theirrepresentatives and other government officials through the variouslegal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holdsValmonte v. Belmonte

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free politicaldiscussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceiveand be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can beeffective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thusable to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants inthe discussion are aware of the issues and have access to informationrelating thereto can such bear fruit. [14] (Emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as aconsequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above,just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.

3

The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in theOfficial Gazette as illegal. Due process thus requires that the peopleshould have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.This is clear from the doctrine laid down in the case of TANADA VS.TUVERA.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b)and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), EnsuringObservance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to theRule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of PublicOfficials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Underthe Constitution, and For Other Purposes, are declared VOID .

Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991


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This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of atemporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin therespondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring thepetitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into thealleged sale of the e quity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the LopaGroup in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contendthat (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has no validlegislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the saleor disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a purely privatetransaction which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right todue process.

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both housesof Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 1Thus, Section21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordancewith its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of personsappearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise iscircumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus,as provided therein, the investigation must be in aid of legislation inaccordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that therights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall berespected. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill ofRights must be respected, including the right to due process and theright not to be compelled to testify against ones self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specificallyprovided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to theimplementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any


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proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They mayalso extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution inCongress and/or in the Seante alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, tobe within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must bematerial or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by theConstitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to anycommittee or committees any speech or resolution filed by anySenator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of

legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature ofan inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under whichsuch an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (SenatorEnrile) made a statement which was published in various newspaperson 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo Baby Lopa of havingtaken over the FMMC Group of Companies. As a consequence thereof,

Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988categorically denying that he had taken over the FMMC Group ofCompanies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himselfcategorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran onChannel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him(Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a takeover on his(Lopas) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of theSenate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so thathe could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate hisreputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, consideringthe claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enriles) charges that he (Lopa) hadtaken over the FMMC Group of Co mpanies are baseless andmalicious. Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others,as follows:


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It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondentCommittee is not really in aid of legislation because it is not relatedto a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of theinvestigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of thePresident or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears morewithin the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa diedduring the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States,20 it was held :

The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the

legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiriesconcerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, orpossibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress toremedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the FederalGovernment to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no generalauthority to expose the private affairs of individuals withoutjustification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freelyconceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is theCongress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of theexecutive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is anend in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimatetask of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personalaggrandizement of the investigators or to punish those investigatedare indefensible. (emphasis supplied)

Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Sincecongress may only investigate into those areas in which it maypotentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matterswhich are within the exclusive province of one of the otherbranches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given tothe Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively theconcern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in

what exclusively belongs to the Executive.


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Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents inadministrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of acriminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galmanvs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs.Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invokethe right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings butalso in all other types of suit

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule thatpetitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee toappear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because wehold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, ifpursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powersbetween the legislative and the judicial departments of government,ordained by the Constitution.

Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive Privilege

ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OFPUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON

TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONALDEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)

THE FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation andCommunication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing

Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment andservices for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in theamount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). TheProject was to be financed b y the Peoples Republic of China. Inconnection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introducedin the Senat

At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the

consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate.


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Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sendinginvitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involvedin the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He wassummoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 andOctober 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates.

In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia IIItestified that several high executive officials and power brokers wereusing their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by theNEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDAacquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, tobe financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondentCommittees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commissionon Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He furthernarrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt

and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, whenprobed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. Inparticular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or notPresident Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, [15][6] (b) whether or notshe directed him to prioritize it, [16][7] and (c) whether or not shedirected him to approve. [17][8]

Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena AdTestificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testifyon November 20, 2007.

However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive SecretaryEduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense withpetitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Thepertinent portion of the letter reads:


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With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to SecretaryRomulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 beforethe Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri hadalready testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project,including his conversation with the President thereon last 26September 2007.

Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec.Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with the rulingof the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita , 488 SCRA 1 (2006).

Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of

executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:

a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?

b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?

c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve theproject after being told about the alleged bribe?

Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita , the foregoing questions fallunder conversations and correspondence between the President andpublic officials which are considered executive privilege ( Almonte v.Vasquez , G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA , G.R. 133250, July 9,2002).

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that theinformation sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well

as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invokethe settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.Ermita , and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.

On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondentCommittees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the showcause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited incontempt. The Letter reads:


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Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees onAccountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon),Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security require you toshow cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6,Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon).

The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.

On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees,manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearingand that he thought the only remaining questions were those he

claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus:

It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I havecooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid oflegislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the hearing on26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questionsthat were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered byexecutive privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive

Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after thatexhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only thethree questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executiveprivilege. Hence, his request that my presence be dispensed with.

In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel,Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his(petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and(2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate andsensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to theimpact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials andthe possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in thePhilippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioners requestthat he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarifyso that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.


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On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the presentpetition for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November22, 2007.

Respondent Committees found petitioners explanationsunsatisfactory. Without responding to hi

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