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Politics of Global Governance

Liliana B. AndonovaGraduate Institute-Geneva

October, 2009

Please do not distribute without permission; comments welcome to:Liliana.andonova@graduate.insitute.ch

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OutlineOutline

Globalization and governance challengesGlobalization and governance challenges International cooperation and institutionsInternational cooperation and institutions

• Intergovernmental institutionsIntergovernmental institutions• Pluralization of international politics Pluralization of international politics

New governance mechanismsNew governance mechanisms• Public-private partnershipsPublic-private partnerships

Case studiesCase studies

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Part I: Globalization and Governance Part I: Globalization and Governance ChallengesChallenges

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Globalization Globalization

A process of increased interconnectedness A process of increased interconnectedness across multi-continental distances and across multi-continental distances and across arenas of policy makingacross arenas of policy making

Dimensions of globalismDimensions of globalism• EconomicEconomic• EnvironmentalEnvironmental• MilitaryMilitary• SocialSocial• Cultural Cultural

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Challenges for Policy-MakingChallenges for Policy-Making

Transboundary spillover effects: rapid and Transboundary spillover effects: rapid and far reachingfar reaching

Issue complexityIssue complexity• Systems managementSystems management• Overlapping issuesOverlapping issues• Conflicting principles (equity, efficiency, Conflicting principles (equity, efficiency,

intrinsic rights)intrinsic rights)

Interdependence of responsesInterdependence of responses

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Transboundary Spillover: Transboundary Spillover: H1N1 Swine Flu OutbreakH1N1 Swine Flu Outbreak

http://healthmap.org/enhttp://healthmap.org/en

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Issue Complexity: Issue Complexity: Variation in the Variation in the Earth Surface TemperatureEarth Surface Temperature

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Climate System Complexity: Radiative ForcingClimate System Complexity: Radiative Forcing

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Climate projections by the IPCCClimate projections by the IPCC

Temp increase Temp increase 1.4-5.8C1.4-5.8C

Sea level rise Sea level rise of 0.09-0.88mof 0.09-0.88m

Variable Variable impacts across impacts across regions and regions and societiessocieties

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ComplexityComplexityGlobal Warming and Food SecurityGlobal Warming and Food Security

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Providing Global Public GoodProviding Global Public Good Public goods have Public goods have two main two main

characteristicscharacteristics::

• Non-rivalry: when the consumption of the good Non-rivalry: when the consumption of the good by one person does not detract from its by one person does not detract from its availability for othersavailability for others

• Non-excludability: additional users cannot be Non-excludability: additional users cannot be excluded from accessing or using the good. excluded from accessing or using the good.

• ““Pure” public goods rare (sunshine, moonlight, Pure” public goods rare (sunshine, moonlight, national security)national security)

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Examples of global public goodsExamples of global public goods

Climate stabilityClimate stability Global public health conditions/communicable Global public health conditions/communicable

disease controldisease control Financial stabilityFinancial stability International peace International peace Policy coordinationPolicy coordination The moonlightThe moonlight The warming rays of the sunThe warming rays of the sun

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Social construction of public goodsSocial construction of public goods

Notions of “publicness” and “privateness” Notions of “publicness” and “privateness” can change.can change.

Goods may be in the public domain , Goods may be in the public domain , because:because:• They are technically non-excludable (air)They are technically non-excludable (air)• They were made public by design (education, They were made public by design (education,

health)health)• They are being neglected or poorly understood They are being neglected or poorly understood

‘public bads’‘public bads’

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Challenge to Providing GPGsChallenge to Providing GPGs

Economic theory suggest that public Economic theory suggest that public goods will be underprovidedgoods will be underprovided

• For each user the marginal cost of For each user the marginal cost of contributing to the creation of GPGs is contributing to the creation of GPGs is larger than the marginal benefit larger than the marginal benefit

• Strong incentives to ‘free ride’ in the Strong incentives to ‘free ride’ in the

provision of public goodsprovision of public goods

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Providing public goods at the domestic levelProviding public goods at the domestic level

The nation state and the provision of PGsThe nation state and the provision of PGs• Political action to reveal preference for the Political action to reveal preference for the

types of goods that should be provided in the types of goods that should be provided in the public domainpublic domain

• Taxation Taxation • Financing of public goodsFinancing of public goods• Example: Example:

Keynesian welfare policies in industrialized countries Keynesian welfare policies in industrialized countries after WWIIafter WWII

Investment in education and human capital by the Investment in education and human capital by the East Asian tigersEast Asian tigers

In many domestic contexts, however, public goods In many domestic contexts, however, public goods still under-provided: weak institutions, lack of still under-provided: weak institutions, lack of resources, globalization provide additional strain resources, globalization provide additional strain

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Global Governance ParadoxGlobal Governance Paradox

The world need more coordination and The world need more coordination and governance to address challenges of globalization governance to address challenges of globalization

Existing policies often underperform:Existing policies often underperform:• Financial crisesFinancial crises• Malaria; HIV/AIDS, other diseases persistMalaria; HIV/AIDS, other diseases persist• Access to clean water inadequateAccess to clean water inadequate• Climate change and vulnerability unaddressed Climate change and vulnerability unaddressed

Yet states and publics fear and resist the Yet states and publics fear and resist the delegation of more authority to international delegation of more authority to international institutions institutions

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Possible Solution?Possible Solution?

Strengthen intergovernmental Strengthen intergovernmental institutions?institutions?

Establish new and diverse Establish new and diverse mechanisms of governance?mechanisms of governance?

Greater focus by multiple actors on Greater focus by multiple actors on the provision of Global Public Goods?the provision of Global Public Goods?

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Part II. The Politics of International Part II. The Politics of International Cooperation and Institutions Cooperation and Institutions

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Theories of International Theories of International CooperationCooperation

Realism: focus on power and interestRealism: focus on power and interest• Cooperation transientCooperation transient• Institutions reflect the constellation of Institutions reflect the constellation of

power -> epiphenomenalpower -> epiphenomenal• Hegemonic stability theoryHegemonic stability theory

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Theories of International Theories of International CooperationCooperation

Institutionalism: Institutionalism: • Power & interests matterPower & interests matter

• Institutional regimes play a key role in Institutional regimes play a key role in facilitating cooperation facilitating cooperation

• International regimes: “…implicit or explicit International regimes: “…implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international converge in a given area of international relations.” (Krasner: 1983)relations.” (Krasner: 1983)

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Institutional Theories of CooperationInstitutional Theories of Cooperation

Build on insights of new economics of Build on insights of new economics of organization (Coase 1988; Williamson 1985; organization (Coase 1988; Williamson 1985; North 1990)North 1990)

Emphasis on the role of institutions in facilitating Emphasis on the role of institutions in facilitating political cooperation (Keohane 1984; Ostrom political cooperation (Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1990)1990)• Reduce transaction costReduce transaction cost• Facilitate information exchange/credibilityFacilitate information exchange/credibility• Credible commitmentsCredible commitments• Issue linkagesIssue linkages• ReciprocityReciprocity• Facilitate monitoringFacilitate monitoring• Common norms, social capitalCommon norms, social capital

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The Prisoners’ DilemmaThe Prisoners’ Dilemma

Cooperate DefectCooperate 3,3 1,4Defect 4,1 2,2

Player 2

Player 1

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Theories of International Theories of International CooperationCooperation

Constructivism:Constructivism:• Global system as a community of statesGlobal system as a community of states• The role of norm, ideas, and discourse The role of norm, ideas, and discourse

in constructing state identity and in constructing state identity and behaviourbehaviour

• The role of epistemic communities and The role of epistemic communities and advocacy organizations in diffusing advocacy organizations in diffusing knowledge and normsknowledge and norms

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Pluralization of World PoliticsPluralization of World Politics

New actors: growth in NGOs, transnational corporations and New actors: growth in NGOs, transnational corporations and chains, private foundations, transnational networkschains, private foundations, transnational networks

International Organizations – actors in their own right, with a International Organizations – actors in their own right, with a degree of autonomydegree of autonomy

Diversification of cooperation mechanisms and policy instrumentsDiversification of cooperation mechanisms and policy instruments• Greater use of market mechanismsGreater use of market mechanisms• Network-based transnational governanceNetwork-based transnational governance• Private authorityPrivate authority• Public-private partnershipsPublic-private partnerships

Greater focus on results:Greater focus on results:• Rise in monitoring, including rating of government performanceRise in monitoring, including rating of government performance• Greater use of targeting (see MDGs)Greater use of targeting (see MDGs)• Focus on specific GPGs by multilateral organizations such as the WB, Focus on specific GPGs by multilateral organizations such as the WB,

UNDP, WHO, etc.UNDP, WHO, etc.

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Rise of NGOs and moral authorityRise of NGOs and moral authority

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Rise NGO Led GovernanceRise NGO Led Governance

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Rise of corporate actors, self-regulation and CSRRise of corporate actors, self-regulation and CSR

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Global GovernanceGlobal Governance

Governance “occurs on a global scale through Governance “occurs on a global scale through both the co-ordination of states and the activities both the co-ordination of states and the activities of a vast array of rule systems that exercise of a vast array of rule systems that exercise authority in the pursuit of goals and that function authority in the pursuit of goals and that function outside normal national jurisdictions.” (Rosenau outside normal national jurisdictions.” (Rosenau 2000, 167)2000, 167)

Mechanisms of global governance:Mechanisms of global governance:• Intergovernmental treaties, laws, organizationsIntergovernmental treaties, laws, organizations• Transnational network governance: “when networks Transnational network governance: “when networks

operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals” (Andonova, steer constituents towards public goals” (Andonova, Betsill, Bulkeley 2009, 56)Betsill, Bulkeley 2009, 56)

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Climate Governance: Historical TrendsClimate Governance: Historical Trends

Year Intergovernmental Transgovernmental Hybrid Private

1970-79 World Climate Conference (1979)

1980-89 IPCC (1988) Villach Conferences (1980, 83, 95,87)

World Climate Conference 2 (1988)DOE Efficiency Centers Program

UNFCCC (1992) US DOE Country Studies Program1990-1996 GEF Cities for Climate Protection GEF Small Grants Program

Activities Implemented JointlyClimate Technology Initiative

WB NSS Studies (1997) Prototype Carbon Fund (1999) REC/WRI capacity CPCF Assist USAID EcoLinks (1998) WRI GPMDG

Post 1997 Kyoto Protocol (1997) Renewable Energy Coalition Carboncredits Netherlands The Gold StandardUSAID Municipal Energy Efficiency Chicago Climate Exchange WWF Climate Savers

RGGI REEP

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Public-Private Partnerships in the Public-Private Partnerships in the Multilateral SystemMultilateral System

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Partnerships as Institutional Partnerships as Institutional InnovationsInnovations

Old multilateralismOld multilateralism• ““Multilateralism can be defined as the practice Multilateralism can be defined as the practice

of coordinating of coordinating national policiesnational policies in groups of in groups of three or more three or more statesstates, through ad hoc , through ad hoc arrangements of by means of institutions” arrangements of by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990)(Keohane, 1990)

New multilateralismNew multilateralism• Public-private partnerships can be defined as Public-private partnerships can be defined as

coordination of practices and agreements coordination of practices and agreements between between state state and and non-state actorsnon-state actors that that establish a set of norms, rules, practices, or establish a set of norms, rules, practices, or implementation procedures that apply to implementation procedures that apply to multiple levels of governancemultiple levels of governance

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IOsIOs PPPsPPPs

HierarchyHierarchy Network (typically)Network (typically)

Rules and standard Rules and standard operating proceduresoperating procedures

FlexibilityFlexibility

ContinuityContinuity FlexibilityFlexibility

Sphere of competenceSphere of competence Pooling of competencesPooling of competences

Legal-rational authorityLegal-rational authority Pooling sources of Pooling sources of authorityauthority

Tendency for inclusive Tendency for inclusive membershipmembership

Selectivity, non-Selectivity, non-inclusivenessinclusiveness

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Triangle of Partnership Triangle of Partnership EntrepreneurshipEntrepreneurship

External Pressure(NGO, public, political)

External Opportunities(Business, NGO, experts, funding)

Agency Entrepreneurship

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Political factors facilitating PPPsPolitical factors facilitating PPPs

Pressures : NGOs, public opinion, budgetary Pressures : NGOs, public opinion, budgetary crises, political principalscrises, political principals

IOs more vulnerable to public opinion pressure IOs more vulnerable to public opinion pressure than governmentsthan governments

Opportunities: new sources of financing, Opportunities: new sources of financing, expertise, management, lower cost of expertise, management, lower cost of communication, organizations communication, organizations

IOs attractive counterparts for institutional IOs attractive counterparts for institutional experimentation because of perceived moral experimentation because of perceived moral authority, legitimacy, neutralityauthority, legitimacy, neutrality

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Collective action advantages of PPPsCollective action advantages of PPPs

• Small groups of actorsSmall groups of actors• Common values more likelyCommon values more likely• Social incentives and pressure more Social incentives and pressure more

likely to influence behaviour (free-riding likely to influence behaviour (free-riding less likely)less likely)

• Fragmentation of complex issuesFragmentation of complex issues• Greater overlap between public and Greater overlap between public and

private benefitsprivate benefits• Lower costs of entry in and exit from Lower costs of entry in and exit from

collective agreementcollective agreement

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Implication for Partnership PatternsImplication for Partnership Patterns

Uneven distribution across issue domains, within Uneven distribution across issue domains, within organizations, and across timeorganizations, and across time• Technical, expertise-dependent, pluralistic issue domains more Technical, expertise-dependent, pluralistic issue domains more

likely to open for partnershipslikely to open for partnerships

• Technical units within organizations most likely to seek Technical units within organizations most likely to seek innovation through partnershipsinnovation through partnerships

• Organizational resistance to mainstreamingOrganizational resistance to mainstreaming

• Critical juncture events (summits, leadership change, new IOs): Critical juncture events (summits, leadership change, new IOs): can increase pressures and opportunities for partnershipscan increase pressures and opportunities for partnerships

• Mimicking and diffusion across organizations likelyMimicking and diffusion across organizations likely

• ““Niches” of partnerships governanceNiches” of partnerships governance

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Case StudiesCase Studies

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Case 1: United Nations Fund for Case 1: United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP)International Partnerships (UNFIP)

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UNFIP HistoryUNFIP History

UN budgetary crisis 1997UN budgetary crisis 1997 Ted Turner pledge a $1 billion gift to Ted Turner pledge a $1 billion gift to

support UN causes support UN causes UN Foundation set up to administer the UN Foundation set up to administer the

gift gift Former Secretary-General K. Annan Former Secretary-General K. Annan

established UNFIP to facilitate partnerships established UNFIP to facilitate partnerships between UN agencies and non-state between UN agencies and non-state actors, supported by the UN Foundation actors, supported by the UN Foundation

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UNFIP Partnerships Across UN AgenciesUNFIP Partnerships Across UN Agencies

Source: Source: www.un.org/unfip/www.un.org/unfip/ , accessed , accessed December 2005 December 2005

19%

6%

8%

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UNEP

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UNFIP PartnersUNFIP Partners

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UN Agencies Industry NGOs Foundations Goverments

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UNFIP partnership patterns by policy arenasUNFIP partnership patterns by policy arenas

Other $15,391,656

Children's Health $255,391,380

Peace, Security & Human Rights $47,279,484

Women & Population

$126,167,440

Environment $150,075,033

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Clustering of environmental PPPsClustering of environmental PPPs

UNFIP PPPs for the environment

biodiversity

climate

energy

forest

other

water

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The San Cristobal Wind Power The San Cristobal Wind Power ProjectProject

Facilitated through UNFIPFacilitated through UNFIP PartnersPartners

• Eolica San Cristobal S.A. – EOLICSAEolica San Cristobal S.A. – EOLICSA• American Electric PowerAmerican Electric Power• RWERWE• E8E8• UN FoundationUN Foundation• UNDPUNDP• Government of EquadorGovernment of Equador• The Galapagos National Park ServiceThe Galapagos National Park Service• May of San CristobalMay of San Cristobal

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San Cristobal Partnership ObjectivesSan Cristobal Partnership Objectives

Replace San Cristobal’s diesel generation system Replace San Cristobal’s diesel generation system with a renewable energywith a renewable energy

Reduce dependency on diesel fuelReduce dependency on diesel fuel

Reduce oil spills, local air emissionsReduce oil spills, local air emissions

Contribute to protection of biodiversityContribute to protection of biodiversity

Diffusion of Diffusion of operational, technical, environmental operational, technical, environmental and financial knowledge necessary to operate a and financial knowledge necessary to operate a fleet of wind turbines on a sustained basisfleet of wind turbines on a sustained basis

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ImplementationImplementation

Project completed in 2008Project completed in 2008 Total budget of US$ 6300000Total budget of US$ 6300000 2.4 MW wind farm, can account for up to 2.4 MW wind farm, can account for up to

50% of annual electricity consumption50% of annual electricity consumption Hybrid wind-diesel systems developedHybrid wind-diesel systems developed Technical support by e7 Technical support by e7 Conservation programs, local capacityConservation programs, local capacity Government target for fossil fuel free Government target for fossil fuel free

Galapagos by 2017/Galapagos by 2017/

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PPP Case 2: Amazon Regional PPP Case 2: Amazon Regional Protected AreasProtected Areas

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Amazon Regional Protected Areas Amazon Regional Protected Areas (ARPA)(ARPA)

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's: President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's: 1998 pledge to protect at least 10% of 1998 pledge to protect at least 10% of Brazil's Amazon forestsBrazil's Amazon forests

ARPA: Launched at Johannesburg Summit ARPA: Launched at Johannesburg Summit 20022002

Brazil-World Bank agreement signed April Brazil-World Bank agreement signed April 20032003

Partners:Partners:• Brazilian government: US$18.1m. Brazilian government: US$18.1m. • WWF-Brazil: US$11.5m WWF-Brazil: US$11.5m • WB and GEF: US$30m. Over 4 yearsWB and GEF: US$30m. Over 4 years

GETncm/justsaycust-recrate-itemcommunittg/stores/dtg/stores/d-favorite-listruejust-say-no

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ARPA ScopeARPA Scope

Triple the amount of Amazon forest Triple the amount of Amazon forest under protection to 500,000 sq. km. under protection to 500,000 sq. km. Equivalent of 12% of total forest Equivalent of 12% of total forest

Includes sample of all 23 Amazonian Includes sample of all 23 Amazonian eco-regionseco-regions

Will include both ecological reserves Will include both ecological reserves and extractive reservesand extractive reserves

Design management plans, Design management plans, surveillance, researchsurveillance, research

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ARPA ImplementationARPA Implementation Objectives for Phase I (2002-2008) for the Objectives for Phase I (2002-2008) for the

creation of strict nature reserves, new creation of strict nature reserves, new sustainable use reserves, and sustainable use reserves, and consolidation of neglected ‘paper parks’ consolidation of neglected ‘paper parks’ exceededexceeded

Expansion of protected areas in the Expansion of protected areas in the Amazon and creation of buffer zones to Amazon and creation of buffer zones to sustain gainssustain gains

Focus on sustained financing of the projectFocus on sustained financing of the project

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Public-Private Partnerships as a Public-Private Partnerships as a Mode of Global GovernanceMode of Global Governance

Uneven distribution across issue domains, Uneven distribution across issue domains, within organizations, and across timewithin organizations, and across time• Technical, expertise-dependent issue domains Technical, expertise-dependent issue domains

more likely to attract partnershipsmore likely to attract partnerships

• ““Niches” of partnerships governance likely to Niches” of partnerships governance likely to emerge: energy, water, biodiversityemerge: energy, water, biodiversity

• Unlikely to provide comprehensive solutions to Unlikely to provide comprehensive solutions to policy problemspolicy problems

• Contribute to GPGs through incremental Contribute to GPGs through incremental collective action and diffusion of best practicecollective action and diffusion of best practice

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Effectiveness?Effectiveness? Types of PPP effectsTypes of PPP effects

• Provision of specific collective goods: relatively high effectiveness Provision of specific collective goods: relatively high effectiveness

• Global problem solving: contribution is long-term, cumulative, indirect, Global problem solving: contribution is long-term, cumulative, indirect, and highly conditional and highly conditional

Structural conditions for effectivenessStructural conditions for effectiveness• Clear focus and definition of collective goods objectives and expected Clear focus and definition of collective goods objectives and expected

outputoutput

• Alignment of actors’ interests and values necessaryAlignment of actors’ interests and values necessary

• Small partnerships (or programs made of a number of small Small partnerships (or programs made of a number of small partnerships)partnerships)

• Institutional structure: transparency and accountability critical but Institutional structure: transparency and accountability critical but often problematicoften problematic

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The Challenges Ahead:The Challenges Ahead:

Awareness of the multi-layered governance structures Awareness of the multi-layered governance structures

Linking layers of governance: scaling up and downLinking layers of governance: scaling up and down• The role of information, capacity, agency, power, and interestsThe role of information, capacity, agency, power, and interests

Financing multi-layered governanceFinancing multi-layered governance• Are transnational networks and their impact durable?Are transnational networks and their impact durable?

Legitimacy and accountability of the new generation Legitimacy and accountability of the new generation governance institutions governance institutions