Date post: | 02-Jun-2018 |
Category: |
Documents |
Upload: | octavio-melchor-lucero |
View: | 216 times |
Download: | 0 times |
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 1/30
POLITICS, STRUCTURE, AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE CASE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Jill Nicholson-Crotty
and
Kenneth J. Meier
Dept. of Political Science
andGeorge Bush School of Government
Texas A&M University
4348 TAMUS
College Station, TX 77843-4348
979-845-4232979-847-8924
979-458-0104
Forthcoming Educational Policy
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 2/30
ABSTRACT
This study examines whether governance structures facilitate or impede political forces
by testing two competing hypotheses concerning the ability of bureaucratic structures to insulate
higher education policies from politics. Centralized structures both create autonomy and
facilitate access by environmental forces. This study examines the structures of higher education
boards to gain a better understanding of how they interact with politics to affect higher education
policy. To the extent that variation in governance structures is correlated with bureaucratic
autonomy, it should limit the ability of elected officials to influence education policies. The
transaction costs of individuals seeking to influence overall agency policy are lowered, however,
in more centralized organizations. Political actors can focus their attention on a single
geographic site rather than multiple sites that are adapting to different sets of institutional
arrangements and different local environments. These hypotheses are tested in a 47-state, eight-
year analysis.
Key words: higher education, politics, structure
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 3/30
1
POLITICS, STRUCTURE, AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE CASE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
The relationship between government structure and performance can be dated to both the
debates over the U.S. Constitution and the attempts by ancient philosophers such as Aristotle to
design the ideal polity. Unfortunately, until recently, systematic empirical attention to this issue
in higher education has not been a high priority (McLendon forthcoming). Using formal work
from the political control of bureaucracy literature (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Moe
1990) as its guide, political scientists (Lowry, 2001 and Knott and Payne, 2002) have started an
empirical investigation of the role that structure plays in determining higher education policy
outputs. A second branch of empirical work by education scholars grows out of organization
theory and a substantive interest in higher education (see Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn,
Griswold, and Marine 1996; McLendon, Heller and Young 2002; Volkwein 1986; 1989; Zumeta
1992, 1996).
The structure question in higher education links to an important theoretical literature in
political science. Structural questions are an essential part of the political control literature
because some advocates believe that structures are little more than hardwired political biases that
affect who benefits from administrative decisions (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987).
Structures, however, have a second function. They set the rules of game and, thus, advantage
some interests rather than others without actually hardwiring biases into the system. As an
illustration, providing for legislative oversight of administrative agencies advantages the
political interests who control the legislature but does not guarantee that the wishes of one
faction will forever triumph over another (Moe 1990). Lowry (2001), in his seminal study of
structures and higher education, demonstrated the first aspect of higher education structures; they
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 4/30
2
are associated with the distribution of policy benefits (in a different tradition see similar studies
by Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn, Griswold, and Marine 1996; McLendon, Heller and Young
2002; and Volkwein 1986; 1989). This paper examines the second dimension of higher
education structures; do some structures facilitate or impede the political forces regardless of
ideology?
Any assessment of higher education governance structures must recognize that the
agencies responsible for implementing postsecondary education policy differ markedly across
the nation. Three distinct structures are used to govern higher education at the state level--
consolidated governing boards, coordinating boards, and planning/service agencies. While the
number of consolidated governing boards approximately equals the number of coordinating
boards, only two states have planning/service agencies. Because of differences in the scope of
their activities and the control they have over important functions such as budgeting, these
boards differ both in autonomy and the degree of centralization. This paper uses structural
theories of politics to derive and test hypotheses about individual governing boards and their
ability to insulate policies from politics. In an important addition to previous studies, this
analysis also controls for the means by which agencies receive their power.
First, the theoretical relationship between structure and policy outcomes will be outlined.
Second, a description of the structures and powers of the three types of governing boards is
presented. Third, a short review of the literature that examines the effects of politics on
bureaucratic structure will provide a set of contrasting hypotheses. Finally, a preliminary test of
these hypotheses linking structure and politics will involve a quantitative analysis of how higher
education costs are distributed among tuition, state appropriations, and need-based aid.
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND THEORY
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 5/30
3
A number of structural dimensions must be addressed in order to comprehend fully how a
board’s structure affects the insulation of the costs of higher education from political forces. As
a first step this study will deal with two issues conceptually—autonomy and centralization.1 We
will do so using insights from both organizational theory and the literature on bureaucratic
politics.
Seidman (1970) argues that political structures determine power and that organizational
structures are an instrument of politics, position, and power. He contends that there are critical
differences between institutional types in terms of the composition of the directing authority
(single or multi-headed), qualifications for appointment, procedures for the appointment and
removal of principal officers, method of financing, budget and audit controls, personnel
regulations, and advisory councils and committees (Seidman 1970, 242; Meier 1980).
According to Seidman these provisions determine the degree of organizational and operating
autonomy as well as the relationship between an agency and its political environment (but see
Volkwein 1986).
The tension between autonomy and political control is obvious. Scholars argue that for a
bureaucracy to implement policy effectively it must have a certain level of autonomy and that
autonomy allows for insulation from politics (Meier 2000; Selznick 1948; Wilson 1989; Ingram
1990; West 1997). This autonomy and power then influences the ability of an agency to reshape
legislation in a way that more closely fits its mission. According to Rourke (1969, 43), agencies
that are highly professional in their orientation are allowed a degree of independence and
autonomy not afforded to all public agencies. The level of autonomy is important to this study,
as is the level of discretion that an agency has to choose the way that it will carry out its mission
(Meier 2000). Agency structure can have some role in determining the level of autonomy.
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 6/30
4
A combination of these theories leads us to the proposition that bureaucracies structured
to be insulated from politics have a greater degree of autonomy and greater control over policy
outcomes. If structures allow for influence from political changes, the likelihood of autonomy
for the organization decreases. This study examines the structures of higher education boards to
gain a better understanding of how they affect policies pertaining to higher education. To the
extent that variation in governance structures is correlated with bureaucratic autonomy, it should
correlate with differences in the ability of elected officials to influence policies pertaining to
education.
A second structural view of bureaucracy deals with the notion of centralization and
decentralization. To the degree that organizations are centralized, the transaction costs are lower
for individuals seeking to influence overall agency policy. Political actors focus their attention
on a single geographic site rather than multiple sites that might be adapting to different sets of
institutional arrangements and different local environments. Despite the conclusions of Seidman
that decentralized bureaucracy exists to match the structure of Congress (read the legislature),
any political institution seeking to control a bureaucracy has lower transactions costs in a
centralized bureaucracy, if all other things are equal. The perceived centralization benefit, in
fact, has specifically guided the design of higher education structures (see McGuinness 1999;
McLendon forthcoming and the citations therein).
HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Much of the literature concerning postsecondary education policy debates how much the
structure of higher education systems affects higher education policies. Studies focus on the
power of the governor, the character of the governing system, and the effects of the market.
Richardson et al. (1999) discuss the importance of political actors in the governance of higher
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 7/30
5
education as well as the increased interest of these parties in existing systems. With a seven
state comparative study, they examine the structures of state education boards and how state
governments influence education policies. Jones et al. (1998) provide a generalized overview of
higher education governance and attempt to set a research agenda for further examination in this
area. Zumeta (1992) provides a broad study of the effects of changes in state tuition and board
structures on scholarships for private universities. Hearn, Griswold and Marine (1996) show that
higher education structures are associated with changes in tuition costs and financial aid, but the
relationships are not always consistent across types of institution (e.g., four year versus two
year). Hearn and Griswold (1994) find these structures affect innovation rates among higher
education systems. McLendon, Heller and Young (2002) examine six policy innovations dealing
with finances and accountability; they find modest influences of structure. Volkwein (1986;
1989), in contrast, found no relationship between structural autonomy and the quality of
education offered.
The present study examines 47 states that have either a consolidated governing board or a
coordinating board. Because Michigan and Delaware do not have either type of board, they are
excluded from this study. Nebraska is excluded because its legislature is nonpartisan and
legislative partisanship is a key variable in our analysis. The starting point of our analysis is the
work of Lowry (2001), Hearn, Griswold and Marine (1996), and McLendon, Heller and Young
2002). Lowry is attempting to synthesize some of the literature and at the same time study
higher education structures in all fifty states. His work examines the effects of institutions on
policy implementation. Although he finds that universities whose trustees are selected by
nonacademic stakeholders charge prices that are significantly lower than states with
decentralized systems where trustees chosen by academic stakeholders (see also Hearn,
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 8/30
6
Griswold and Marine 1996), he also suggests that structures can enhance political control (see
also Knott and Payne 2002, 6). Lowry does not actually incorporate political factors in his
model, however, or interact those political forces with structures. McLendon, Heller, and Young
(2002) without using an interaction term find direct effects of political variables on the adoption
of education policy innovations; political factors, in fact, far outweigh structural ones in terms of
influence.
Both Lowry (2001) and Knott and Payne (2002) note the complex relationship between
structure and organizational outputs. Lowry (2001, 859) concludes that different structures
could lead to similar ends as demonstrated by his empirical results. Knott and Payne (2002)
show structures including some political aspects (number of gubernatorial appointments on
governing boards) affect decisions made by universities. Both of Hearn’s studies show that
structures are associated with different outcomes in different policy areas (but see McLendon,
Heller and Young 2002). In short, these studies find that different structures can produce similar
results and vice versa.
THE STRUCTURE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION GOVERNANCE BOARDS
Although the structural governance of higher education varies from state to state,
postsecondary education structures generally consist of three types of boards that can be arrayed
on a continuum from more to less autonomy as well as on a continuum from more to less
centralized (Lowry 2001; Knott and Payne 2002, but see Volkwein 1986). Of the three boards,
consolidated governing boards appear to have the highest level of autonomy and are the most
centralized. Consolidated governing boards are assigned most, if not all, authority for
coordinating postsecondary education. The primary responsibility of these boards is to govern
the institutions under their jurisdiction. This responsibility, however, might be split between two
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 9/30
7
boards, one for four-year institutions and one for community colleges or technical institutions.
Responsibilities of consolidated governing boards include the governance of a single
corporate entity. The state of North Carolina, for example, has a consolidated governing board
system. It is responsible for all decisions concerning that system, and individual institutions do
not have separate governing entities. Within this structure the boards have all the rights and
responsibilities of that corporation as defined by state law. Individual institutions under the
board’s jurisdiction do not have separate corporate status. These boards also coordinate
functions, including planning, setting a public agenda, policy analysis, and problem resolution.
Governing boards are responsible for academic program review and approval, budget
development, and maintaining information and accountability. These boards participate in
developing and implementing policy as well as advocating the needs of the institutions within
the board’s jurisdiction to the legislature and governor. Other responsibilities include
establishing faculty personnel policies such as awarding tenure and serving as the final point of
appeal on faculty grievances. These boards also allocate and reallocate resources between the
institutions in the jurisdiction and establish policies for, at times even setting, tuition and fees
(ECS 1997; McLendon forthcoming). To perform these functions, governing boards have
professional staff, which contributes to greater autonomy (Lowry 2001, 848).
Coordinating boards, in contrast, merely provide an interface between the state
government and the governing boards of the state’s systems and individual colleges and
universities. Coordinating boards are less likely to have the power and autonomy necessary to
resist political influence. Some coordinating boards are responsible for approving academic
programs. Other advisory coordinating boards only have the power to review and make
recommendations to institutional governing boards regarding academic programs. Some carry
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 10/30
8
out only limited coordinating functions and primarily administer student financial aid or
licensure responsibilities (ECS 1997).
Coordinating boards differ from consolidated governing boards in that they do not govern
institutions, they do not appoint institutional chief executives or set faculty personnel policies.
They appoint, set compensations for, and evaluate only the board’s chief executive officer and
staff. The governor is sometimes actually responsible for appointing the agency executive but
usually on the recommendation of the coordinating board. Coordinating boards do not have
corporate status independent from the state government (ECS 1997). They focus on state and
system needs and priorities rather than advocating interests. They may or may not review and
make recommendations on budgets for the state’s system. The limited scope of these boards
means that they have less power.
Some coordinating agencies recommend consolidated budgets for the whole system
while others make recommendations to the governor or state legislature on individual or
segmental budgets. Most coordinating boards, however, have responsibility for implementing
budget policy only for funds appropriated specifically to the agency (as opposed to
appropriations to the individual campuses). Review or approval of academic programs and
authority to require institutions to review existing programs varies. In terms of faculty personnel
policy they are only responsible for carrying out legislative mandates for studies of issues such
as faculty workload and productivity or tenure policy (ECS 1997). Overall coordinating boards
clearly have less power and autonomy than governing boards; Lowry (2001, 847), in fact, treats
coordinating boards as merely extensions of the legislature or similar political principals.
The difference between consolidated governing boards and coordinating boards in terms
of autonomy is offset by their differences in centralization. Governing boards with their
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 11/30
9
autonomy and capacity are centralized, making the logistics of interacting with them relatively
easy. Coordinating boards do not centralize power but rather leave the actual power of the
institutions decentralized in the various institutions. All things being equal, the lower
transactions costs of the centralized governing boards means that political influence should be
easier (Lowry 2001, 848). Quite clearly all things are not equal since the centralized governing
boards also have greater expertise and autonomy. This combination sets up an interesting
empirical contrast between centralized structures with autonomy versus decentralized structures
with less autonomy.
POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
In addition to governing boards, other political institutions are also involved in the
governance of higher education within individual states. The governor and lieutenant governor
have some authority over higher education. Some governors and lieutenant governors exert
influence through formal powers such as appointment of board members or executives, while
others exert power through influence over the legislature. In addition to governors and
lieutenant governors, certain members of state legislatures also affect higher education policy.
Various positions in the legislature are allowed to appoint members to the boards, some powers
delineated from the constitution are given to the legislature, and those boards whose power
resides in statute can experience loss or gain depending on the character of the state legislature.
In addition, a variety of committees in state legislatures exert power over policies pertaining to
higher education (ECS 1997).
Based on the education policy and bureaucratic literature, this study examines how well
governing boards are able to insulate higher education policies in individual states from politics.
This study differs from previous studies because it not only examines the structure but the means
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 12/30
10
by which these agencies receive the powers that they have and therefore what process would
have to be under-taken by political actors to influence these boards. In addition, we will
examine the importance of how the board executive came to power, how powers are delineated,
and the ability of the higher education boards to insulate the governance of institutions of higher
education from policies driven by political desires.
Hypothesis 1: Consolidated governing boards will provide more insulation for
policies from politics because of the structure and autonomy that they have and
that will result in less political influence on education policy.
Hypothesis 2: Consolidated governing boards will generate lower transactions
costs to political actors owing to their centralization and this will result in greater
political influence on education policy.
The two hypotheses are essentially contradictory predictions. The reason for this is that
the design of governing boards is influenced by two different organizational principles. This
inherent theoretical conflict, in fact, might be why McGuinness (1999) concludes that the
evidence is inconclusive on the benefits and costs of various structures. It also could explain the
varied findings of Lowry (2001), Hearn and Griswold (1994), Hearn, Griswold, and Marine
(1996) and Volkwein (1986; 1989).
METHODS
Our distinct theoretical contribution to the literature is to operationalize Lowry’s
hypothesis as an interaction between structure and politics. No prior test of this interaction
exists although most of the literature in the area has not precisely specified that an interaction
exists (see McLendon forthcoming). To test the hypotheses, we will code our structural variable
(S) as equal to 1 if the state has a coordinating board (rather than a consolidated governing
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 13/30
11
board). We will then define a vector of political variables (P) as well as a vector of control
variables (C). Whether or not structure facilitates or restricts the influence of political factors
then can be tested by interacting structure with politics and using a joint f-test for whether the
slopes of the interacted variables are different from zero (and thus different in states with
consolidated governing boards from those in states with coordinating boards). More formally,
O = 1S + 2P + 3SP +4C
Where O is some measure of output, and the key test is whether 3 is equal to zero.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Our concern is the costs of higher education and who incurs them. Four dependent
variables are used. The first is simply the total dollar cost per student of public higher education
in the state. Education, in an ideal world, has redistributive consequences; and to the extent that
the costs of education are low, these redistributive aspects can materialize. The other three
variables measure the distribution of costs; they are tuition per student, need-based scholarships
and financial aid per student, and state/local appropriations per student. The basic issue is who
pays for the costs of education. States that emphasize tuition place the burden on the individual
student; this burden is significantly higher if states do not provide much need-based aid. In
contrast states that fund more of higher education via appropriations take the burden of payment
off of students and use the general tax revenues.2 All data were taken from the Digest of
Educational Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics 1998). Because the distribution
of each of these variables is skewed, they will be subjected to a log transformation.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES–POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Three clusters of political forces will be examined in this research—partisanship,
ideology, and legislative characteristics. Politics in many cases means political parties. All
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 14/30
12
models will include both the political party of the governor (coded 1 if a Democrat and 0
otherwise) and the proportion of the legislature that are Democrats (Statistical Abstract, various
years). A priori one would expect that Democratic control would be more likely to decrease the
costs of education to students by increasing aid or by holding tuition down.
Although one can argue that the Democratic Party is always more liberal than the
Republican Party in a given state, party is only a rough surrogate for ideology. To more directly
capture the influence of ideology, we include Berry et al.’s (1996) measures of both government
and citizen ideology. Government ideology attempts to measure the political ideology of
government officials and thus fills in the gaps in the party measure. Citizen ideology is a
measure of mass preferences. Although the general public is unlikely to affect higher education
decisions directly, they could influence government officials to act on their behalf, that is to act
as delegates rather than trustees. Both measures are coded on a scale of 0 to 100 with 100 being
most liberal and 0 being most conservative.
The two remaining political variables are the professionalism of the state legislature and
a variable for conflict in the state legislature. The conditions that these variables represent are
likely to affect the policies and implementation in any state. Scholars have found that in times of
high conflict in a legislature, the interest and influence of members of Congress in policies also
increases (Bond and Fleisher 2000). More legislation is introduced, and more attempts to
oversee the implementation are made in an effort to claim responsibility for actions that might be
beneficial to one party or another. We expect that increased activity by a legislature could result
in the inability of boards to insulate the policy outputs from political influence. At the same time
greater legislative conflict could keep the legislature focused on internal battles and leave it little
time for overseeing the higher education system. Our indicator of legislative conflict is
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 15/30
13
measured by how closely the legislature is to a perfect fifty-fifty party split.
Legislative professionalism is an important variable because it provides the capacity to
interact with the bureaucracy on a more equal basis. Full time legislatures who are paid more
are able to commit more time and resources to actual legislation and conduct more oversight into
the actions of higher education governing boards. The greater resources that more
professionalized legislatures have at their discretion allows them to overcome problems of
information asymmetry. According to the literature, legislatures who spend more time
influencing policy are more likely to be concerned with equity, and this should result in
decisions that affect the distribution of costs for higher education (Lowry 2001). Although
multi-indicator measures of legislative professionalism exist, they do not exist on an annual
basis. Studies have found, however, that legislative salaries are good surrogates for legislative
professionalism and that measure will be used here (Fiorina 1994; 1999; source: Council of State
Governments various years).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES–CONTROLS
Besides political variables, the model includes additional structural variables that might
affect the implementation of policies. Several of these pertain to how a board receives its power.
First, we code whether the legal basis for board actions comes directly from the state constitution
or if the powers are statutory (coded 1 if statutory, a historical justification for this variable can
be found in McLendon forthcoming). Second, a dummy variable is included that measures
whether or not the chief executive of the board is a member of the governor’s cabinet; one might
hypothesize that a cabinet post would allow the governor to have greater influence on policy.
The final structural variable included is whether or not a board is elected or appointed. This is a
dummy variable coded 1 for the four states with elected boards and 0 otherwise. Appointments
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 16/30
14
can be done by a state legislature, the governor, or another high-ranking state governmental
official. States that are coded elected are popularly elected by the general population. All
structural variables are from the Educational Commission of the States (1997).
In addition to controlling for structural variables, the model also controls for two
economic/demographic variables as well. Per capita personal income should influence the need
that a state might have for either more need-based scholarships and grants or for a reduction in
tuition as well as the state’s ability to do so based on its income (Statistical Abstract, various
years). This ability might also affect the overall distribution of higher education costs. The total
fall undergraduate enrollment is included in all models in case economies of scale change the
cost factors (ECS 1997). All variables other than the dummy variables were logged and thus can
be interpreted as elasticities.
The analysis is a pooled time series of 47 states from 1989 to 1996. A few data points
are missing for a few states and thus the pool does not total exactly 376 cases. To control for
any time dominance in the pool, dummy variables for individual years are included in all
regressions.
FINDINGS
Given the initial exploratory nature of this research and the two contradictory hypotheses
about how structure might interact with political forces, the discussion of the findings will focus
on general patterns. The use of models with several interaction terms such as these are often
affected by collinearity and thus the individual regression coefficients might be unreliable.
Tables 1 through 4 present the results for the total higher education costs per student, tuition per
student, state appropriations per student, and need-based aid per student respectively.
[Tables 1-4 About Here]
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 17/30
15
Before progressing to the main set of hypotheses, the general impact of coordinating
boards versus consolidating governing boards should be noted. The first regression coefficient
in each table indicates how much impact a coordinating board has relative to a consolidated
governing board. Because the variable is a dummy variable, it can be converted to a percentage
change by using a binomial expansion (see Tufte 1974). All other things being equal, states with
coordinating boards have 40% lower total costs for higher education and their tuition costs per
student are 52% lower (both appropriations and scholarships appear unrelated to the distinction
between coordinating boards and governing boards). These are substantively large differences
that indicate coordinating boards are associated with providing relatively inexpensive education.
Whether this might be a preference for low cost methods of delivery of education (e.g.,
community colleges or four year schools versus comprehensive universities) is the subject of
future research.
The two key hypotheses are whether coordinating boards facilitate the ability of political
factors to influence higher education policy or not. Unfortunately, the pattern of coefficients
does not reveal a clear and consistent set of relationships. An optimal pattern might, for
example, show significant relationships for the coordinating board interactions and no
relationship for the noninteracted relationships (or vice versa). Instead we get a general pattern
where some of the coordinating board relationships are significant and some of the governing
board relationships are significant. What is clear from the tables is that higher education
structures do significantly affect the ability of political forces to influence higher education. In
all four cases the joint f-test shows that the sets of coefficients are significantly different from
each other. This concisely shows that how politics affect higher education in states with
consolidated governing boards is different from how politics affects higher education in states
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 18/30
16
with coordinating boards.
To illustrate the differences, the impact of legislative professionalism on tuition costs
will be used (see Table 2). In states with consolidated governing boards, a one percent increase
in legislative professionalism is associated with a .0437 percent decrease in tuition per student.
In states with coordinating boards, however, this relationship changes dramatically; and a one
percent increase in legislative professionalism is associated with a .058 percent increase in
tuition costs per student (the impact in coordinating board states is the sum of the two
coefficients). Both coefficients are significantly different from zero and significantly different
from each other.
The widely varying pattern of coefficients as politics interacts with structure suggests
that the relationships are highly complex. Providing an explanation for the patterns and how
those patterns should appear will require additional theoretical work. One possibility is that the
relationships are even more complex than the current regressions reveal them to be. For
example, the direction of impact of legislative professionalism might be a function of both the
structure of higher education and the ideology or partisanship of the legislature. This notion
suggests a three way or perhaps even a four way interaction of these terms.
The other structural factors that are not part of the interactive hypothesis merit some
discussion. All other things being equal, elected boards are associated with 14 percent lower
tuition per student and 11 percent lower state appropriations. In other words, states with elected
boards favor lower educational costs. Cabinet rank also appears to matter. All other things
being equal, states that provide cabinet rank for the chief education officer are associated with a
3% higher total cost per student, 6% higher tuition charges, and 4% lower state appropriations.
In short, such states appear to impose more of the costs of higher education on the student.
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 19/30
17
Finally, states that provide the legal authority for their higher education board via statute are
associated with 8% greater total costs per student, 14% higher tuition, 6% lower state
appropriations, but compliment that with a 58% percent greater allocation of financial aid.
CONCLUSION
Structural questions are an essential part of the political control literature. Building from
the work of Lowry, Hearn, McLendon and colleagues, who first demonstrated that higher
education structures are associated with the distribution of policy benefits, this paper examined
whether structures facilitate or impede political influences. Unfortunately, the theoretical
literature does not suggest a clear directional hypothesis regarding the impact of structure. A
combination of the theories of political structures led us to two competing hypotheses regarding
structure and political influence. First, we posited that bureaucracies structured to be insulated
from politics might have a greater degree of autonomy and greater control over policy outcomes.
Alternatively, any political institution seeking to control a bureaucracy has lower transaction
costs in a centralized bureaucracy.
Our hypotheses concerning the ability of particular structures to insulate or facilitate
higher education from politics produced mixed findings. The pattern of coefficients does not
reveal a clear and consistent set of relationships in terms of direction and signs. What is clear
from this analysis is that higher education structures do significantly affect how political forces
influence higher education. In all four cases the joint f-test shows that the sets of coefficients
are significantly different from each other. This clearly demonstrates that political forces affect
higher education differently in states with coordinating boards than in states with consolidated
governing boards, even though the research does not provide an answer concerning exactly how
structure affects political influence.
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 20/30
18
Mixed findings such as these are obviously an invitation for further research, but they
also provide insights that should be incorporated into future studies of higher education. Our
findings suggest that structures affect how politics matters. Models of higher education policy
should include both structural variables and political factors. This insight should not be
surprising to students of public organizations, where findings consistently demonstrate that
bureaucratic structures influence outputs. It is nonetheless an element that can be explored in
more depth in future studies of state-run higher education systems. Even more work remains to
be done theoretically to develop a set of more precise hypotheses. We need to know what kinds
of political forces are mediated by the various structures, and how in combination these affect
higher education policy. Models will also need to reflect the possible complex patterns of
interactions among the various structures and the myriad political forces.
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 21/30
19
Table 1: Determinates of Logged Total Cost Per Student of Higher
Education in the American States, 1989-1996
Independent Variables Slope t-score
Consolidating Governing Board -.5201 3.42*
Political Variables
Citizen Ideology .1373 2.26*
Government Ideology -.0459 1.97*
Legislative Professionalism -.0493 5.06*
Democratic Governor .0394 3.18*
Democratic Legislature Percent .1142 2.05*
Legislative Conflict .1277 2.12*
Political Variables Interacted With Structure
Citizen Ideology .1023 1.37
Government Ideology .0199 .49
Legislative Professionalism .0895 6.52*
Democratic Governor -.0615 6.45*
Democratic Legislature Percent -.0326 .34
Legislative Conflict .0621 .56
Elected Board .0195 1.11
Cabinet Rank .0327 3.01*
Statutory Authority .0806 7.88*
Per capita Income .4592 6.19*
Student Enrollment (millions) -.0020 .14
_______________________________________________________________________
R-Squared = .67 Standard Error = .0654 N = 372 F = 28.73
Joint f-test for political variables (6, 346) = 10.15 p = .0000
Coefficients for dummy variables not reported
*significant p < .05
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 22/30
20
Table 2: Determinates of Logged Total Tuition per Student of Higher
Education in the American States, 1989-1996
Independent Variables Slope t-score
Consolidating Governing Board -.7262 3.37*
Political Variables
Citizen Ideology .0208 .24
Government Ideology -.0078 .23
Legislative Professionalism -.0438 3.12*
Democratic Governor .0061 .34
Democratic Legislature Percent .0549 .68
Legislative Conflict .1893 2.23*
Political Variables Interacted With Structure
Citizen Ideology .2490 2.31*
Government Ideology -.0415 .70
Legislative Professionalism .1018 5.15*
Democratic Governor -.0312 1.20
Democratic Legislature Percent .1259 .91
Legislative Conflict .0832 .52
Elected Board -.1358 5.30*
Cabinet Rank .0575 3.63*
Statutory Authority .1332 9.08*
Per capita Income .5304 4.94*
Student Enrollment (millions) -.0185 .90
______________________________________________________________________
R-Squared = .65 Standard Error = .0953 N = 375 F = 26.13
Joint f-test for political variables (6, 349) = 6.13 p = .0000
Coefficients for dummy variables not reported
*significant p < .05
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 23/30
21
Table 3: Determinates of Logged Total Appropriations Per Student of
Higher Education in the American States, 1989-1996
Independent Variables Slope t-score
Consolidating Governing Board .2012 .94
Political Variables
Citizen Ideology -.2682 3.10*
Government Ideology .1142 3.38*
Legislative Professionalism .0903 6.47*
Democratic Governor -.0143 .81
Democratic Legislature Percent .1399 1.74
Legislative Conflict -.0403 .48
Political Variables Interacted With Structure
Citizen Ideology .2861 2.67*
Government Ideology -.1454 2.48*
Legislative Professionalism -.1215 6.18*
Democratic Governor .0354 1.38
Democratic Legislature Percent -.0323 .24
Legislative Conflict -.0517 .36
Elected Board -.1082 4.32*
Cabinet Rank -.0349 2.23*
Statutory Authority -.0542 3.71*
Per capita Income .0986 .92
Student Enrollment -.0314 1.53
_______________________________________________________________________
R-Squared = .33 Standard Error = .0950 N = 376 F = 6.91
Joint f-test for political variables (6, 350) = 8.72 p = .0000
Coefficients for dummy variables not reported
*significant p < .05
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 24/30
22
Table 4: Determinates of Logged Scholarships/Aid Per Student of Higher
Education in the American States, 1989-1996
Independent Variables Slope t-score
Consolidating Governing Board -.5304 .66
Political Variables
Citizen Ideology 1.2168 3.74*
Government Ideology .5044 3.98*
Legislative Professionalism .0089 .17
Democratic Governor -.1299 1.95
Democratic Legislature Percent -.5834 1.93
Legislative Conflict .5052 1.59
Political Variables Interacted With Structure
Citizen Ideology .0680 .17
Government Ideology -.1001 .45
Legislative Professionalism .2839 3.85*
Democratic Governor .0496 .51
Democratic Legislature Percent .7125 1.38
Legislative Conflict .8384 1.40
Elected Board -.1485 1.58
Cabinet Rank .1085 1.84
Statutory Authority .4585 8.36*
Per capita Income .1913 .48
Student Enrollment .4178 5.42*
_______________________________________________________________________
R-Squared = .64 Standard Error = .3565 N = 376 F = 25.21
Joint f-test for political variables (6, 350) = 2.95 p = .0088
Coefficients for dummy variables not reported
*significant p < .05
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 25/30
23
REFERENCES
Bernstein, M. (1955). Regulating business by independent commission. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Bond, J.R. and R. Fleisher. (2000). Polarized politics: Congress and the president in a
partisan era. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Council of State Governments. (various years). The book of the states. Lexington: KY:
author.
Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown.
Fiorina, M.P. (1994). Divided government in the United States: A byproduct of
legislative professionalism? American Political Science Review 88, 304-316.
Fiorina, M.P. (1999). Further evidence of the partisan consequences of legislative
professionalism. American Journal of Political Science 43, 974-977.
Education Commission of the States. (1997). 1997 state postsecondary education
structures sourcebook: State coordinating and governing boards. Denver, CO: Education
Commission of the States.
Gittell, M. (2000). Higher education—Politics, access, and economic development.
American Behavioral Scientist 43, 1053-1057.
Hearn, J.C. and Griswold, C.P. (1994). State-level centralization and policy innovation
in U.S. postsecondary education. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 16, 161-190.
Hearn, J.C., Griswold, C.P., and Marine, G.M. (1996). Region, resources, and reason: A
contextual analysis of state tuition and student aid policies. Research in Higher Education 37,
241-278.
Ingram, H. 1990. Implementation: A review and suggested framework. In Public
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 26/30
24
administration: The state of the discipline, N. Lynn and A. Wildavsky, eds. Chatham, N.J.:
Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
Jones, D., Ewell, P., and McGuinness, A.C. (1998). The challenges and opportunities
facing higher education: An agenda for policy research. Washington: The National Center for
Public Policy and Higher Education working paper.
Kaufman, H. (1969). Administrative decentralization and political power. Public
Administration Review 29, 3-15.
Knott, J.H. and Payne, A.A. (2002). The impact of state governance structures on higher
education resources and research activities. Paper presented at the Texas A&M conference on
public management, February.
Lowry, R.C. (2001). Governmental structure, trustee selection, and public university
prices and spending: Multiple means to similar ends. American Journal of Political Science 45,
845-61.
McCubbins, M.D., Noll, R.G., and Weingast, B.R. (1989). Structure and process, politics
and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. Virginia Law
Review 75, 431-48.
McGuinness, A.C. (1999). The states and higher education. In American higher
education in the twenty-first century, P. Altback, ed. American Society of Higher Education.
McLendon, M.K. (forthcoming). State governance reform of higher education: Patterns,
trends, and theories of the policy process. In J. Smart, Higher education: Handbook of theory
and research. Vol. XVIII. New York: Agathon Press.
McLendon, M.K., Heller, D.E., and Young, S.P. (2002). State postsecondary policy
innovation: Politics, competition, and the interstate migration of policy ideas. Paper presented at
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 27/30
25
the Midwest Political Science Association meetings, Chicago.
Meier, K.J. (1980). The impact of regulatory organization structure: IRCs or DRAs.
Southern Review of Public Administration 3, 427-443
Meier, K.J. (2000). Politics and the bureaucracy: Policymaking in the fourth branch of
government. Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers.
Moe, T.M. (1985). Control and feedback in economic regulation: The case of the NLRB.
American Political Science Review 79, 1094-1116.
Moe, T.M. (1990). The politics of bureaucratic structure. In Can government govern?
J.E. Chubb and P.E. Peterson, eds. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
National Center for Education Statistics. (1998). Digest of education statistics.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Richardson, R.C., Bracco, K.R., Callan, P.M., and Finney, J.E. (1999). Designing state
higher education systems for a new century. Phoenix: American Council on Education and Oryx
Press.
Rourke, F.E. (1969). Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company.
Seidman, H. (1980). Politics, position, and power: The dynamics of federal organization.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Selnick, P. (1948). Foundation of the theory of organization. American Sociological
Review 13, 25-35.
Statistical abstract of the United States. (various years). Washington: Bureau of the
Census.
Thompson, J.D. (1967). Organizations in action. New York: McGraw-Hill.
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 28/30
26
Tufte, E.R. (1974). Data analysis for politics and policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Volkwein, J.F. (1986). Campus autonomy and its relationship to measures of university
quality. Journal of Higher Education 57, 510-28.
Volkwein, J.F. (1989). Changes in quality among public universities. Journal of Higher
Education 60, 136-151.
West, W.F. (1997). Searching for a theory of bureaucratic structure. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 4, 591-613.
Wilson, J.Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it.
New York: Basic Books.
Wood, B.D. and Waterman, R.W. (1991). The dynamics of political control of the
bureaucracy. American Political Science Review 85, 801-828.
Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial organization. London: Oxford University Press.
Zumeta, W. (1996). Meeting the demand for higher education without breaking the
bank. Journal of Higher Education 67, 367-425.
Zumeta, W. (1992). State policies and higher education: Policies, correlates, and
linkages. Journal of Higher Education 63, 363-417.
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 29/30
27
Biographical Statements
Kenneth J. Meier is the Charles Puryear Professor of Liberal Arts in the Department of Political
Science and holds the Sara Lindsey Chair in the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M
University. His work on education policy generally combines the themes of politics, equity, and
representation. His research agenda in education includes a new national study of race, ethnicity
and education in 1800 school districts and an on-going project on how school systems can be
managed effectively.
Jill Nicholson-Crotty is a PhD candidate in political science at Texas A&M University and
research director of the Texas Educational Excellence Project. Her research interests are public
administration and public policy with a special emphasis on gender, representation, and
management. She is currently working on projects involving gender and the management of
school districts, police and the enforcement of sexual assault laws, and the politics of public
health policy.
8/10/2019 Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/politics-structure-and-public-policy-nicholson-meyer 30/30
28
1.There are a wide variety of other structural issues such as whether the board has
statutory or constitutional powers, whether it is part of the governor's cabinet, and the
degree of control vested in the governor versus other elected officials. On the last issue
see Knott and Payne (2002). Whether or not structure actually translates into autonomy
is an open question. A series of studies by Volkwein (1986; 1989, and references
therein) seek to measure autonomy and find it is not closely linked to structural form.
2.The other major sources of funds for higher education are research grants and private
contributions.
ENDNOTES