POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 … · 2018-11-16 · POLITIKON: The IAPSS...

POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 (October 2016)

1


2

Volume 31: October 2016

ISSN 2414-6633

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.31

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief: Jaroslava Barbieri (Italy, Ukraine)

Luca Arfini (Italy)

Lorand Bodo (Germany)

Andrés Lopez Rivera (Ecuador)

Alice Martini (Italy)

Dorothea Tommasi (Italy)

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.31


3

Table of Contents

Editorial Note ........................................................................................................................... 4

Articles Parliamentary ombudsman (ouvidoria) and its democratic potential: The Brazilian case /

Thales Torres Quintão .................................................................................................................. 5

The impact of societal preferences on national monetary policy outcomes: A revival of

economic pluralism / Christoph Steinert ................................................................................ 26

Determinants of Re-Autocratization: An Empirical Analysis from 1996 to 2013 /

Kristin Eichhorn ........................................................................................................................ 53

Call for Papers ........................................................................................................................ 78

Instructions for Authors ....................................................................................................... 79


4

Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

Our Editorial Board is proud to present Volume 31 of Politikon, the flagship academic journal of the

International Association for Political Science Students.

The current issue will certainly prove a fascinating reading for this part of the year.

In this eclectic collection, you will be able to explore the institutional designs of the parliamentary

ombudsman in Brazil and the pattern of action that prevails from his/her relationship with the

public. You will have the chance to investigate how the size and strength of different economic

actors are the central determinants for monetary policy outcomes. Finally, you will have the

opportunity to read about re-autocratizations, namely the collapse of electoral democracies in the last

decade, with a specific emphasis on effects for economic growth rates and governance performance.

We hope you will enjoy the following highly dense 70 pages of valuable academic work from young

scholars across the globe.

While this volume has collected papers that use mainly quantitative analysis, we believe that with

such a varied yet fascinating range of topics each reader may find something that will catch their

interest. Hopefully, you will get inspired and submit your own article to one of our IAPSS academic

journals.

We are looking forward to reviewing your work!

Your Editors


5

Parliamentary ombudsman (ouvidoria) and its democratic potential: The

Brazilian case

Thales Torres Quintão

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.31.1

Thales Torres Quintão, 29, from Belo Horizonte (Brazil), is currently a PhD Candidate of Political Science at the

Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG). He graduated with a Bachelor’s in Social Sciences in 2009 (PUC –

Minas). He has a specialization degree in Management, 2012 (UFMT). In 2015, he earned a Master’s degree in

Political Science at UFMG. His research interests are: civil society, democratic theory, political participation,

democratic innovations, and participation and deliberation mechanisms of the legislative branch in Latin America.

Abstract

This research aims to map and analyze the institutional designs of the parliamentary ombudsman in Brazil and the

pattern of action that prevails from his/her relationship with the public. A qualitative approach was used for this case

study, focusing on document analysis of formal resolutions of state assemblies as well as the information provided on

their websites. A case study of the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais (ALMG) was also created in order to better

understand how the work of the ombudsman is structured and how the interactions of such with other officials may be

relevant to his/her performance. The case study determined that the parliamentary ombudsman is constituted as an

access mechanism for citizens, amplifying the opportunities for them to present their demands. However, the ombudsman

is neither a communication nor a participation channel.

Keywords

Accountability, Institutional Design, Parliamentary Ombudsman, Political Participation



6

Introduction

The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (also known as the Constitution of the Citizen) recognizes,

establishes, and formalizes the political participation of citizens in Brazil. In other words, democracy

and participation are perceived as mutually constituent phenomena. Based on institutionalized

participation in the state, the public ouvidoria1 (the office of the ombudsman) was formed, as a means

of citizen participation.2 In 1986, Curitiba was the first city to establish a public ouvidoria. However,

the Federal Constitution of 1988, which set out the principles of impartiality and publicity related to

government actions, indirectly spread public ouvidorias across the country in different branches and

government levels, each with a diverse structural configuration. An assessment made in August 2014

indicated that there were 1,123 public ouvidorias in Brazil (Ouvidoria Geral da União,3 2014). Although

this number is significant, it is important to bear in mind that they may include organizations that,

while referred to as ouvidorias, do not fully exercise their intended purposes.

In general, the public ouvidorias analyses prevail in the executive branch, but also have some in the

judicial branch. But even so, these studies are quite inexpressive. The studies done on the office of

the ombudsman concentrate on the analyses of formal resolutions and normative instruments of the

organization without collecting primary data as a methodology, which would enable the identification

of political forces and officials involved or even the flow of communication played by this

mechanism.

The goal of this research paper is to understand the scope and the purpose of this legislative

mechanism for the effectiveness of democratic participation, social inclusion, population control,

horizontal accountability, and public justification (Vera and Lavalle, 2012). For said purposes, we

utilize the institutional design framework. As a premise, the institutional design can influence the

distribution of power of the state legislature’s ouvidorias.

1 Ouvidorias are not exclusive in Brazil. There are ouvidorias in privates companies, whose concern is the quality of the product, the service offered, or customer loyalty (Lyra, 2014). 2 The public ouvidoria does not act in the judiciary field, neither does it possess coercive power nor a high functional status and is not part of the constitutional plan. The ombudsman is appointed to consolidate the external control from a power to another. However, the ouvidoria deals with the internal control of different public organizations (Gomes, 2000). Therefore, using the term ouvidoria in this paper. 3 The Ouvidoria Geral da União (Federal Ombudsman) is a part of the office formerly known as Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), which was terminated as a result of the ACA (Anti-Corruption Agency). Nowadays the Federal Ombudsman is linked to the Department of Transparency, Supervision, and Control.


7

1. Public Ouvidoria and Institutional Design

The public ouvidoria is an organization that aims to achieve the constitutional principles that control

public administration while also guiding the provisions of public services: legality, impersonality,

morality, publicity, and efficiency. Beyond that, there are the main attributions of a public ouvidoria,

which are change induction, damage repair, and promotion of democracy (Lyra, 2004, p. 144).

This mechanism should allow for the promotion of social and political inclusion,4 along with the

creation of a democracy between citizens and public administration (Antero, 2014; Lyra, 2011). The

ouvidoria serves as mediation between Brazil and the people, so as to resolve conflicts in a non-judicial

way and guarantee the rights of citizens, acting on recommendations given by the higher power; in

the public justification (Vera and Lavalle, 2012); and the exercise of power in transparent ways

(accountability as answerability) (Schedler, 1999).

The readings on public ouvidorias indicate that the institutional design can be more “modernizing”

(focusing on instrumental rationality) or more “democratic” (focusing on dialogic rationality), both

pursuing social justice while also stimulating public participation. The institutional design aims to

shape institutional structures and processes to achieve the desired results (Olsen, 1997) through

controlling landmarks, formal resolutions, organization charts, and procedures. As the designs are

not neutral and reflect the ideas and interests of the officials, their variations and changes will have a

direct impact on the end result of the organizations (Goodin, 1996).

Studies show the interrelation between the performance of democratic innovations and the design

adopted for the promotion of political participation (Avritzer, 2009; Smith, 2009). Fung (2003, 2006)

demonstrates the importance of the design for equality, social inclusion, participation, and

deliberation in “mini-publics.” For him, the design offers parameters and limits, defining rules and

procedures that directly affect the selection and recruitment of the participants, how public

deliberation will be made, where it will happen, the rate of participation, social accountability, etc.

The integration of the aforementioned and their respective designs shape what the author calls a

“democracy cube,” meaning that those elements are intertwined within each other, influencing the

political outcomes of those spheres.

4 The concept of social and political inclusion is the efficiency capacity of presentation demands and requirements to their needs (Miguel, 2013).


8

The institutional design is not the only factor influencing political participation. However, it should

be recognized as a fundamental vector to assert certain patterns of interference and engagement of

citizens as well as the typical obstacles of democracy, which are exemplified by cynicism, apathy, and

low political efficiency. These aspects are related to the political design organizations that make up

the country and their relationship with the public (Marques, 2010).

Considering the ouvidoria to be a kind of democratic innovation that involves a citizen-state

relationship (Isunza and Hevia, 2006), it is still considered to be quite fragile. The hegemonic model

of the ouvidoria is created top-down, with the norms established by the same organization of that

which will be supervised. The appointment of the ombudsman is of the supervised organization’s

own choosing; the selection is done in such a way as to promote efficiency and administrative

modernization, all while maintaining citizens’ rights. Those elements reveal the flaws of the ouvidorias’

public autonomy, forming a closer relationship between the government and society, which has a

more social and horizontal accountability. For Quintão (2014) three key factors contribute to the

optimization of the ouvidoria: public autonomy; cooperation between government bodies in order to

foster its recommendations; and performance capacity.

In order to be autonomous and democratic, ouvidorias need to have the following attributes: (1) the

ombudsman selection must be made through an independent third party; (2) an advisory council

chosen by the people, proposing procedures and supervising the work and actions of said

organization; (3) the duration of the term to allow for the possibility of renewing ideas and maintain

the status quo;5 (4) financial and administrative autonomy of the ouvidoria; (5) the obligation of a

quick response time from the leader, under legal penalty, setting priority and matter of urgency; (6)

the disclosure of their action and their analytical reports in the media, allowing extensive access to

the public; (7) confidentially of the person who looked for the ouvidoria, guaranteeing that he/she

does not suffer damages or sanctions (Cardoso, 2012; Lyra, 2011; Zaverucha, 2008).

Having an ombudsman is one of the crucial aspects of autonomy, and consequently, for the

efficiency of the public ouvidoria as well. Being a single-member position, the ombudsman focuses on

the management of this mechanism and its respective attributive functions (Silva, 2012). The role of

an ombudsman is essentially political and deals with the power relationship between the leader of the

5 The duration of the term of the ouvidor should not coincide with the political term. “The political calendar would be uncoupled from the administrative calendar with the objective of making it institutionally clear that the ouvidoria is much more an organization of the people than that of the government” (Zaverucha, 2008, p.226).


9

ouvidoria and the institution over which he/she resides. The idea is that ouvidorias cannot be organized

or controlled by the supervising institutions; otherwise, it would jeopardize their public purpose.

For a greater social and public legitimacy, the authors researched suggest the selection of the

ombudsman should be through an indirect election by an advisory council outside the political power

(Lyra, 2014). After being issued a ballot with three names, it would be sent to public authorities that

would then determine the ombudsman. 6 However, this model only accepts people with low

representation. Often the least voted in the ballot, drawn up by public authorities, is the chosen one.

In other words, the government-owned institution has the final say over the chosen ombudsman.7

Nonetheless, there is still a lack of information on how the ballot process is made. For instance: how

is the public deliberation in these forums and meetings conducted; which organizations have voices

and participate in this process, why do some participate and others do not; where does the

deliberation occur; how many representatives from each organization are there; how is the voting

done; what are the possible asymmetries of power in the decision-making process, etc. The

aforementioned are unanswered questions about the dynamics of the indirect election of the

ombudsman. Moreover, it is crucial to do a more systematic analysis for the ombudsman nomination

in order to better understand the distinct political projects (Dagnino, Olvera, Panfichi, 2006) marked

by the heterogeneity within society and the government itself, indicating that the relationship

between them is not stable but accented by multiplicity of conflicts, political will, and in certain

contexts, distinct projects.

2. Methodology

The research strategy of this paper consists of two steps. First, a comparative research was made

analyzing the design of all 13 state legislatures as well as the Federal District. We used the

documentary research technique, based on a qualitative approach, to examine the data collected on

the ouvidorias of the state assemblies. A content analysis was held on formal resolutions (creation

decrees, internal regulations, operating manuals, etc.) to measure how this mechanism operates. In

addition, a website of the assemblies was made in order to comprehend how the ouvidorias are

6 This format began with the Police Ombudsman in the state of São Paulo in 1995. 7 Therefore, when the IX National Conference on Human Rights occurred in 2004, a model was created where the most voted on the ballot would automatically be appointed as the ombudsman, if fifty percent of the votes came from public organizations.


10

included in these institutional organizations, with a look at accessibility and the information made

available (Raupp and Pinho, 2013).

Furthermore, the methodology of the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais (ALMG) case study was

adopted in order to understand the distribution of power and political officials involved directly or

indirectly in the performance of the parliamentary ouvidoria. Eight individual in-depth interviews were

held with ombudsmen and also with civil servants (four for each group). The selection of civil

servants to be interviewed was based on the snowball technique. The case study in ALMG is justified

because it was one of the first assemblies to establish an ouvidoria (in 2002), consequently encouraging

communication between state legislatures and the people.

According to Gerring (2007), said case study applies to a complete description and understanding of

the factors of each situation and context. This paper has the objective of developing studies and

further a theoretical development on a topic that, until now, was poorly investigated or relatively new

(Babbie, 1986).

3. Parliamentary Ouvidorias in Brazil

3.1. Concepts and communication methods

Parliamentary ouvidorias are a direct communication channel established between state legislatures and

the people, where the public can contribute to the improvement of services and functions. It allows

for the participation of any individual at various time periods as well as offer citizen protection and

control of public administration. Furthermore, these mechanisms have a purpose: to indicate paths,

alternatives, and suggestions directed to the Board of Directors, providing a mediation space not

only for the people but also for the government workers of the state legislatures (Federal Senate,

2013; Queiroz, 2012; Federal Chamber, 2010; Tromska, 2004). Being that the final recipient of the

aforementioned purposes is the Board of Directors, this shows that it is a crucial factor for providing

more effective ouvidorias.

In general, the ouvidorias can act in three different dimensions: as a house of information, where

citizens can acquire data about the legislative administration, with the implementation of the Law on

Access to Information (LAI)8 facilitating the process; as a communication platform, which involves

the principle of direct incidence of the flow of interaction between the government and the people;

8 The LAI was promulgated on November 18th of 2011 (Law n°12.527).


11

or as a diffuse control mechanism to develop accountability, either from an internal and horizontal

control or from an external and social control. They have the idea to establish a closer and more

horizontal relationship between the representatives and the represented, as well as the development

of the legislative proposals.

State legislature’s ouvidorias are established by ordinary laws, which differ from state to state. Hence, it

is important to analyse the different policies that contribute to their organization. As previously

mentioned, 14 assemblies have established an ouvidoria.9 The states with an ouvidoria are: Amazonas,

Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Paraíba, Piauí, Rio Grande do Sul,

Roraima, Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and Tocantins. The Federal District also has an ouvidoria. Almost

half of the states do not have this organization10 (Appendix 1). The first state that formed an

ouvidoria was Espirito Santo in 2001, and the last was Roraima in 200811 (Appendix 2). In just seven

states (Amazonas, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and

Tocantins), this organization is recognized in the Internal Regiment (RI) of the assembly, which

allows for more legal support, since it decreases political weakness (Appendix 3).

We can only measure the efficiency of a communication channel if the people know it exists. In

order to have a mechanism, such as the ombudsman, working and available, it is necessary to

disclose its existence through its own institutional media or by making appearances in different

communities. The set of existing communication channels in the state legislatures are shown in Chart

1 (absolute numbers).

Out of the 14 ombudsmen analyzed, the communication methods used mostly was the Internet (e-

mail and forms) (Appendix 4). The data above shows it is possible to group the ombudsmen based

on how well a certain communication method works. If we consider that each positive response to a

communication method receives a score equal to one and a state assembly uses all available means of

communication, it would achieve a score of seven.

9 Four independent variables were tested on the existence of the ouvidoria in state assemblies: region, state HDI, GDP per capita, and population of the state. We had hypothesized that states with a larger population, HDI, and GDP per capita would have greater financial, human, and technological resources to implement an ombudsman. Data for the last three variables were taken from estimates of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) for the year 2014. None of the four variables obtained statistical correlation (Pearson test) with the dependent variable (ouvidoria), which showed the difficulty of explaining the reason for implementing an ouvidoria and that it be related to a political order, not socioeconomic factors. 10 In total, Brazil has 26 states, not including the Federal District. 11 Nationally, the first parliamentary ouvidoria was created in the Chamber of Deputies in 2001. The Senate only installed this mechanism in 2011.


12

Chart 1 – Communication Methods of Parliamentary Ouvidorias

Source: Author’s elaboration. Estimate made in June 2015.

Only one state (Mato Grosso) provides every means of communication, in other words, it achieved a

score of seven, while Rio Grande do Sul reached a score of six (not available in person). Roraima has

the minimum score of one, offering only e-mail as a means of communication. Piaui, Santa Catarina,

Sergipe, and Tocantins all have a score of two (the most common), having only e-mail and contact

forms as a means of communication (Appendix 6).

The diversity of communication methods may mean expanding access for citizens, as well as a quick

response time, even with just the single-member official of the ouvidoria, which allows for individual

political participation. In states with a lower HDI and GDP, the free communications methods, such

as calling the Toll Free Number or having a meeting in person, could be strengthened and prioritized

so as to increase representation. Furthermore, the preference for using digital media can, in such

cases, mean exclusion and limit the scope of communication and citizen involvement, especially in

more remote areas with a lower quality Internet.

Given the importance of the information and communication technologies, especially the Internet, it

seemed relevant to see how ouvidorias are presented in the websites of the assemblies and also show

its potential for interaction with the people. The purpose of the study of these websites was to

examine two variables: placement and provision of information on the ouvidoria.

The first verified variable was where the ombudsman or the link to him/her is on the home page of

the website, as an indicator about how much thought went into facilitating the search of the

14

9 9

54 4

3

E-mail Form Phone In Person Toll FreeNumber

Fax Letter


13

ombudsman, in addition to demonstrating how strategic the ouvidoria is for the legislative

development.

Out of 14 ouvidorias, only three states (Mato Grosso, Piauí, and Sergipe) have their own access

button, placing it on the home page of the state legislature’s website. Two other states (Paraíba and

Roraima) provide the link with his/her name at the top of the home page. In nine other states, the

link to the ouvidoria is placed as an option on the home page. However, Internet users must use the

scroll bar to find the link, which can limit the amount of access per day. It also means Internet users

have more screens and clicks to reach the information or the contact forms to register their

complaint, making it more difficult to understand the portal and its navigation (Pinho, 2008). The

more clicks and screens Internet users have to go through, the more likely they are to give up

searching and move on.

It is expected that the websites of the assemblies make a wide range of information available to the

public. Some examples include: its features and objectives, a picture of the ouvidor, if there is a

mandate assignment as well as his/her term and the possibility of re-election, contact forms, the type

of messages to be sent to the ombudsman, legislation and normative acts, and performance rating of

the ombudsman. The aforementioned is the minimum amount of information that must be included

on the website.

The information is concise and refers to the concept, functions, objectives, and contact information.

None of the state assemblies has all the information listed above. Only five assemblies indicate who

the ombudsman is (Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Minas Gerais, and Paraíba) and only two state

assemblies depict the selection process of the ombudsman (Minas Gerais and Paraiba). Only one lists

each ombudsman and his/her occupation (Ceará). The disclosure of the ombudsman is considered

extremely important because of the single-member position, since only one person is responsible for

the duties of said occupation. Lastly, three state assemblies (Piauí, Sergipe, and Tocantins) do not

provide any information on the ombudsman and only offer a contact form.

None of the ouvidorias make their analytical reports containing the comments received and replies

public, as it happens in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate where it is possible to access

statistical reports about a certain person (state, age, gender, and education, message content, etc.). In

addition, in the assemblies’ websites there is no disclosure on the ombudsman activity, which is


14

consistent with low visibility of this organization among citizens and can damage the principle of

accountability and, the most worrying effect, can verify it is an inert medium.

Among the assemblies that have ouvidorias, there is still little exposure in their institutional websites,

materializing what could be classified as “under information: completely insufficient information that

discredits the news” (Sartori Apud Pinho and Winkler, 2007, p. 2), i.e., information is not relevant

from a political standpoint.

3.2. Designs of the Ouvidorias in State Assemblies

In this section we will see the different structures that contribute to the performance quality of the

ouvidoria. We will examine the following factors that contribute to the improvement of democratic

potential and autonomy in these ouvidorias: selection process of the ombudsman, period of mandate,

possibility of re-election and possibility of public hearings.

The majority of who is selected for the ombudsman position is a state legislator (deputy

ombudsman) (Chart 2). The Board of Directors of the assembly chooses the ombudsman, which is a

similar process to that of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Out of eight ouvidorias that have

this structure, three ouvidorias have determined the length of the term to be two years, two ouvidorias is

one year, and the rest did not make said information available. Re-election is possible in four cases;

however, in two states re-election is not allowed (Appendix 5).

The length of the term is important so as to provide employment security, preventing the

ombudsman from being fired by a higher power. Though the possibility of several re-elections of the

ombudsman can be damaging in the future, it can generate a dependency between the organization

and the ombudsman.

In two other assemblies, the Board of Directors appoints a government worker as the ombudsman

(civil servant ombudsperson) to re-enforce the political role of the Office of the Ombudsman. This

system takes place in two states: Mato Grosso and Santa Catarina.

Finally, there is the position denominated as societal ombudsperson. In this case, a third party

advisory council creates a ballot (three candidates only) and sends it to the president of the assembly.

Among these three candidates, the president nominates the ombudsman, to be discussed later. This

process only happens in Paraíba, where the ombudsman is a non-legislative member and has a two-


15

year term with the possibility of only one re-election. Yet studies show that the chosen ombudsman

is the one less voted on the ballot, has little exposure, and is not involved in politics (Lyra, 2008).

Chart 2 - Profile of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of state assemblies

Source: Author's elaboration. Estimate made in June 2015.

It may seem that the societal ombudsman is the one that provides more autonomy to the ouvidoria,

having a greater capacity to develop control over the public and make proposals. However, the

deputy ombudsman can be more popular with the other deputies, and could establish a better

dialogical relationship with them. This is so because the ombudsman has the same position and

social equality as his/her co-workers. We either improve communication internally (deputy

ombudsperson) or create a stricter control model (societal ombudsperson).

The crucial role of the ouvidoria is to integrate the relevant aspects of the individual demands as one,

that is, understanding the personal complaints as part of a collective structure that needs to be

discussed and re-thought (Trombka, 2004). It would be crucial for these organizations to require

public hearings, since they are one of the main instruments of participation. Public hearings could be

a social interface that enables communication with the people about the structure of the ouvidorias.

Eight parliamentary ouvidorias (Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Espiríto Santo, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Sul,

Roraima, and Tocatins) recognize the right of the ombudsman to request a public hearing (Chart 3).

In conclusion, legislative ouvidorias follow an institutional design that allows it to be: (1) a consultative

space for government workers and deputies, so as to publicly ratify the rulers actions previously

decided, (2) a mechanism to receive allegations, when the ombudsman role would only be to “pass

along” said allegations to other institutions, such as the Public Prosecution’s Office, to investigate the

problem.

8

21

3

DeputyOmbdusman

Civil ServantOmbudsman

SocietalOmbudsman

Noinformation


16

Chart 3 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and the Requirement of Public Hearings

Source: Author’s elaboration. Estimate made in June 2015.

3.3. The Case Study of the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais (ALMG)

The ALMG established an ouvidoria in 2002. The president, in agreement with other party leaders,

elected a state legislator as the ombudsman. Since its creation, five different ombudsmen have had

this position. However, one state legislator assumed the position three different times, in distinct

legislatures, which can be a problem as that leaves little room for improvement and new ideas.

In the case study, it is evident that the ouvidoria is a political mechanism and acts in favor of

parliamentary decorum. This mechanism is linked to the Ethics Committee of the House and the

ombudsman is more of an instrument of control and supervision for the legislators. Therefore, the

design attributed to the ouvidoria is to receive complaints and criticism about the misconduct of the

officials from any citizen, allowing each one to file a formal complaint against an official. The final

decision to continue or not with the complaint depends on the Board of Directors. As a result, the

ouvidoria is not a political participation mechanism but rather related to other social communication

methods of ALMG with the people.

Confusions between what would be the ouvidoria’s responsibility and that of the internal affairs

(individual interviews) can occur when focusing on parliamentary decorum. For example, a civil

servant said corregidor numerous times when he/she should have said ouvidor. Comparato (2012)

demonstrates that the concept of accountability involves three aspects: supervision, investigation,

and punishment. The first aspect is the only one that is of the ouvidoria’s responsibility, which often

happens upon demands. The other two is that of the internal affairs’ responsibility.

Through the case study it was possible to identify the variables that directly affect the work of the

ouvidoria. First, the nature of the ombudsman can affect his/her performance. Some critiques were

made about the political leadership of the deputy ombudsman.

8

4

2

Yes No No information


17

The chosen ombudsman is an unknown member. It is a political decision. Usually the ombudsman is

not an active legislator in the political party. The older the member, the more respected he/she is for

the position. (Civil Servant 3.)

The position of ombudsman is not attractive for legislators. The president of ALMG appoints a

legislator that was recommended to him/her and the legislator accepts the position. From the

political standpoint, being the ombudsman is not an important position, from the political

standpoint. An ombudsman in the past said, “Ouvidoria was always one of the last positions to be

filled.”

No one knew [who the ombudsman was]. It was not a known position. It had no visibility. Not even

the deputies knew who the ombudsman was. I went to a public hearing in Uberlândia. The deputy

asked me, “Is there an ombudsman at this hearing?” And I answered, “I am the ombudsman.”

(Deputy ombudsman 2.)

The second variable is the Board of Directors of the assembly, who has the power to decide future

actions. The Board has the power to archive or implement inquires made by the ombudsman.

Finally, there is a crucial component that limits its autonomy: the corporatism. As the ouvidoria takes

action based on suggestions and proposals, it interrelates with other political officials.

I had no autonomy. When it was related to a government complaint, the Board of Directors of the

assembly said, “This is not going forward.” If the governor is badly criticized, the Board will have

it removed. There was a conspiracy. There was some control over personal issues, i.e. harassment.

There is more control over these issues than that of government work. Corporatism is involved

when dealing with these matters. (Deputy Ombudsman 3.)

The ALMG office of the ombudsman does not have many responsibilities. Government workers are

satisfied with the model adopted, where the ouvidoria is not only a piece of the puzzle with the

objective to promote participation and social control, but also relates to the decorum of parliament.

On the other hand, the officials that accept the position desire a more independent and more

important role in the legislative process, so as to gain more political capital inside the assembly. In

other words, there is a conflict of interest between the attributions and the concepts of an ouvidoria.


18

4. Conclusions

If we consider the parliamentary ombudsman as a means of communication, as it is written in formal

decrees, it is expected to reinforce the bond between the government and the people, develop a

democratic stance in the legislative branch, and stimulate political and social inclusion. Those who

associate with an ouvidoria want to be connected with the organization, regardless if it is a complaint

or a suggestion.

From a performance and evolution standpoint, the ombudsman can be understood in three distinct

ways: (1) access: receiving demands, complaints, and criticism; (2) communication method: mutuality,

disclosure of actions, bilateral relations, and closer relationships with the people; (3) citizen

participation instrument: incorporation of citizens in a system of important matters and human

rights.

Nowadays, this instrument is inserted predominantly in the first step because the ouvidoria is a social

interface expanding the platforms that people have to express their demands and complaints, but it’s

unilateral and in favor of the government. The media does little to advertise the ouvidoria to the

public. One example is the difficulty to obtain certain information about the designs and the work of

the ouvidoria. It was not possible for us to get this data, even after sending several e-mails, making

numerous phone calls, and requesting data on the Law on Access to Information (LAI). For the

ouvidorias to have true transparency, the data must be made available to the public. There is little to no

exposure about the ouvidoria in the media.

Also, the people who seek the ombudsman are not included in the aftermath of their

complaint/suggestion. They are not a part of the deliberation process of these public policies, which

could stimulate new considerations on the public sphere and expand the political field, having greater

involvement of “ordinary citizens” and discursive accountability (Dryzek, 2000).

The motivation for the creation of theses mechanisms in the state legislature is to portray an image

that the organization has credibility. The ouvidoria is a symbol that shows the public the state cares

about their opinions. Nevertheless, the political involvement is quite unorganized and not well done.

It is a “trivial participation” (Fung, 2015), a kind of participation that is not relevant to the political

process and residuals.


19

Conclusively, it was evident that the role of the ouvidoria of the state legislature is not institutionalized

and still unfamiliar, especially if we compare them to the ouvidorias in the executive branch, which

increased the amount of public services. However, in order for the ouvidorias of the state legislatures

to undertake the concept of citizen participation, structural changes must be made so they can be

autonomous and democratic in the future. This organization can be classified as a “sleeper

institution” (Pereira, 2013), initially ineffective, but later strengthened, becoming more effective when

combining political will and commitment, pressure from society, institutional design, etc.

References ANTERO, Samuel A (2014). Evaluating the Participatory Potential of the Brazilian Active Model in

the Federal Executive Branch: an implementation perspective. Research Proposal. PHD in

Government: University of Canberra.

AVRITZER, Leonardo (2009). Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil. Johns Hopkins.

University Press, 205 p.

BABBIE, Earl (1986). The practice of social research. 4º Ed: Belmont, Wadsworth

BORGES, Doriam (ed.) (2012). Sumário Executivo: Pesquisa Diagnóstico das Ouvidorias do Poder

Executivo Federal. Brasília, 33 p.

CARDOSO, Antônio. S. R. (2010). Ouvidoria Pública como Instrumento de Mudança. Textos para

Discussão. IPEA, nº 1480, Brasília.

CARDOSO, Antônio S. R. Ouvidoria Pública e Democracia (2012). In: CARDOSO, Antônio. S. R;

LYRA. Rubens. P (orgs.). Modalidades de Ouvidoria Pública no Brasil: terceira coletânea. João

Pessoa: Editora Universitária da UFPB, p.83-102.

CARDOSO, Antônio. S. R; NETO, Fernando C. L.; ALCANTARA, Elton. L. da C (2013|).

Ouvidoria Pública e Governança Democrática. Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional, nº 03.

IPEA, p. 51-60.

COMPARATO, Bruno. K. (2012). As ouvidorias públicas como instrumento de democracia

participativa: o exemplo das ouvidorias da polícia. In: 8º Encontro Associação Brasileira de Ciência

Política (ABCP), Gramado.

CUNHA, Luciana. G. S. (2000). Ouvidoria: mecanismo de controle democrático. Grupo de Trabalho

Política e Economia. Anais do 24º Encontro Anual da Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação em

Ciências Sociais (ANPOCS).


20

DAGNINO, Evelina; OLVERA, Alberto J.; PANFICHI, Aldo (2006). Para uma outra leitura da

disputa pela construção democrática na América Latina. In: DAGNINO, Evelina; OLVERA,

Alberto J.; PAMFICHI, Aldo (orgs.). A disputa pela construção democrática na América Latina. São

Paulo. Editora: Paz e Terra, p. 13-92.

DRYZEK, John. S (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: liberals, critics, contestations. New

York: Oxford University Press.

FEDERAL CHAMBER (2009). 1º Encontro Nacional de Ouvidorias Parlamentares. Seminário da

Ouvidoria Parlamentar da Câmara dos Deputados: Centro de Documentação e Informação. Edições

Câmara. Brasília, 150 p.

FEDERAL CHAMBER (2010). Ouvidoria da Câmara dos Deputados – Ouvidoria Parlamentar: O

que é? Para que serve? Biblioteca Digital da Câmara dos Deputados: Edições Câmara. Brasília, 46 p.

FEDERAL SENATE (2013). Ouvidoria do Senado Federal – Sugira, Critique, Elogie: Saiba Como.

Brasília, 16 p.

FUNG, Archon (2003). Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their

Consequences. The Journal of Political Philosophy: volume 11, Number 3, p. 338-367.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00181

FUNG, Archon (2006). Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance. Public Administration

Review. Special Issue, December, p. 66-75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00667.x

FUNG, Archon (2015). Putting the Public Black into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen

Participation and Its Future. Public Administration Review 25, February, p. 1-10.

GERRING, John. (2007). The Case Study: What it is and what it does. In: The Oxford Handbook of

comparative politics. Oxford University Press; p.90-122.

GOMES, Manoel E. A. C. e (2000). O regime jurídico das Ouvidorias públicas brasileiras:

causalidade de sentido e adequação estruturo - funcional. Tese (Doutorado em Direito),

Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, 400 p.

IZUNZA, Ernesto V.; HEVIA, Felipe de la J. (2006). Relaciones Sociedad Civil – Estado en México:

un ensayo de interpretación. Xalapa: Ciesas – Cuadernos para la democratización, n. º 4.

LYRA, Rubens P. (2004). Autônomas x obedientes: a ouvidoria pública em debate. João Pessoa, Ed.

UFPB, 172 p.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00181

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00667.x


21

LYRA, Rubens P. (2008). Ouvidor: o defensor dos direitos humanos na administração pública

brasileira. In: LYRA, Rubens. P. (org.). Participação, democracia e segurança pública a experiência

brasileira. João Pessoa: Editora UFPB, p. 65-96.

LYRA, Rubens P. (2011). A ouvidoria pública brasileira e a questão da autonomia. Revista Prim@

Facie, v. 15, p. 9-23.

LYRA, Rubens P. (ed.) (2014). A Ouvidoria Pública no Brasil: modelos em disputa. João Pessoa.

Editora Universitária da UFPB, 350 p.

MIGUEL, Luiz F (2013). Democracia e Representação: territórios em disputa. São Paulo, Editora

Unesp.

PEREIRA, Anthony (2013). Police Ombudsman. Presentation for the International Seminars in

Political Science. Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG).

PINHO, José A. G. de (2008). Investigando portais de governo eletrônico dos estados do Brasil:

muita tecnologia, pouca democracia. Revista de Administração Pública. Rio de Janeiro, vol. 42, nº 03,

p. 471-493.

PINHO, José A. G. de; WINKLER, Ingrid (2007). Dabliu, Dabliu, Dabliu: Sociedade da

Informação. Que informação? Anais do XXXI Encontro da ANPAD. Rio de Janeiro.

PIRES, Roberto; VAZ, Alexander (2012). Participação Social como Método de Governo? Um

mapeamento das “Interfaces Socioestatais” nos Programas Federais. Texto para Discussão, nº 1707,

IPEA.

QUINTÃO, Thales. T (2014). Ouvidoria Pública e Instituições Participativas: um desenho para

ampliar o “Cânone Democrático”. In: CUNHA, Eleonora. S M.; THEODORO, Hildelano. D

(orgs.). Desenho Institucional, Democracia e Participação: conexões teóricas e possibilidades

analíticas. Belo Horizonte. Editora D’Plácido, p. 313-329.

RAUPP, Fabiano M.; PINHO, José A. G. de (2013). Accountability em câmaras municipais: uma

investigação em portais eletrônicos. Revista Administração. São Paulo, vol. 48, nº04, p. 770-782.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5700/rausp1120

SCHEDLER, Andreas (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. In: SCHEDLER, Andreas;

DIAMOND, Larry; PLATTNER; Marc (Org.). The Self-Restraining State: power and accountability

in new democracies. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 13-28.

SILVA, Adriana. C. et al (2012). Por um sistema nacional de ouvidorias públicas. Série Pensando o

Direito, vol. 42. Ministério da Justiça, Brasília.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5700/rausp1120


22

SMITH, Graham (2009). Democratic Innovations: designing institutions for citizens. Cambridge

University Press, 220 p. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609848

TROMBKA, Ilana (2004). Ouvidoria Parlamentar: uma proposta para o Senado Federal. Revista de

Informação Legislativa. Senado Federal. Brasília, v. 42, nº 166, abr./ jun. p. 151-162.

VERA, Ernesto I.; LAVALLE, Adrian G (2012). Arquitetura da participação e controles

democráticos no Brasil e no México. Novos Estudos, n. 92, p.105-121.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-33002012000100007

ZAVERUCHA, Jorge (2008). O papel da ouvidoria de polícia. Revista Sociologias, Porto Alegre, ano

10, nº 20, jun/dez; p. 224-235. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s1517-45222008000200010

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Relation of the Parliamentary Ouvidorias

Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Ouvidoria

1 Amazonas Ouvidoria-Internal Affairs

2 Bahia Ouvidoria

3 Ceará Ouvidoria

4 Espírito Santo Ouvidoria

5 Minas Gerais Ouvidoria

6 Mato Grosso Ouvidoria

7 Paraíba Ouvidoria

8 Piauí Ouvidoria

9 Rio Grande do Sul Ouvidoria

10 Roraima Ouvidoria

11 Santa Catarina Ouvidoria

12 Sergipe Ouvidoria

13 Tocantins Ouvidoria

14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) Ouvidoria

15 Pernambuco Institutional email

16 Rondônia Institutional email

17 Acre System Contact Us

18 Amapá System Contact Us

19 Goiás System Contact Us

20 Maranhão System Contact Us

21 Pará System Contact Us

22 Rio Grande do Norte System Contact Us

23 Alagoas System Contact Us

24 Paraná System talk to the Legislative

25 Mato Grosso do Sul System talk to the Assembly

26 São Paulo Contact Center

27 Rio de Janeiro Hello - Assembly of Rio de Janeiro

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609848

http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-33002012000100007

http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s1517-45222008000200010


23

Chamber of Deputies Ouvidoria

Federal Senate Ouvidoria

Appendix 2 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and Year of Creation

Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Year of Creation

1 Amazonas No information

2 Bahia 2007

3 Ceará 2007

4 Espírito Santo 2001

5 Minas Gerais 2002

6 Mato Grosso 2002 - Law in the approval

stage

7 Paraíba 2002

8 Piauí No information

9 Rio Grande do Sul 2001

10 Roraima 2008

11 Santa Catarina 2003 - Law in the approval

stage

12 Sergipe No information

13 Tocantins No information

14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) 2002 * Unregulated

Chamber of Deputies 2001

Federal Senate 2011

Appendix 3 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and Internal Regiment

Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies In the Internal Regiment

1 Amazonas Yes

2 Bahia No

3 Ceará Yes

4 Espírito Santo Yes

5 Minas Gerais Yes

6 Mato Grosso No

7 Paraíba No

8 Piauí No

9 Rio Grande do Sul Yes

10 Roraima No

11 Santa Catarina Yes

12 Sergipe No

13 Tocantins Yes

14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) No

Chamber of Deputies Yes

Federal Senate No


24

Appendix 4 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and Ways of Contact

Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Contact Toll Free Number

1 Amazonas E-mail (form Internet)/Phone/Letter Yes

2 Bahia E-mail/Phone/Letter No

3 Ceará E-mail (form Internet)/Phone/Fax No

4 Espírito Santo E-mail/Phone/In person No

5 Minas Gerais E-mail (form Internet)/Phone Yes

6 Mato Grosso E-mail (form Internet)/Phone/In

person/Fax/Letter Yes

7 Paraíba E-mail/Phone/In person No

8 Piauí E-mail (form Internet) No

9 Rio Grande do Sul E-mail (Internet)/Phone/Fax/Letter Yes

10 Roraima E-mail No

11 Santa Catarina E-mail (Internet) No

12 Sergipe E-mail (Internet) No

13 Tocantins E-mail (Internet) No

14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) E-mail/Phone/In person/Fax Yes

Chamber of Deputies E-mail/Phone/Fax/Letter Yes

Federal Senate E-mail/Phone/Letter Yes

Appendix 5 – Profile of the Parliamentary Ombudsman

Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Profile of the Ombudsman

1 Amazonas Deputy ombudsman

2 Bahia Deputy ombudsman

3 Ceará Deputy ombudsman

4 Espírito Santo Deputy ombudsman

5 Minas Gerais Deputy ombudsman

6 Mato Grosso Civil servant ombudsman

7 Paraíba Societal ombudsman

8 Piauí No information

9 Rio Grande do Sul Deputy ombudsman

10 Roraima Deputy ombudsman

11 Santa Catarina Civil servant ombudsman

12 Sergipe No information

13 Tocantins No information

14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) Deputy ombudsman

Chamber of Deputies Deputy ombudsman

Federal Senate Deputy ombudsman


25

Appendix 6 - States by Media Communication

States

Scale Media Communication

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Roraima Piauí/Santa

Catarina/Sergipe/Tocantins Bahia/Espírito Santo/Paraíba

Amazonas/Ceará/Minas Gerais

Federal District

Rio Grande do Sul

Mato Grosso


26

The impact of societal preferences on national monetary policy outcomes: A revival of economic pluralism

Christoph Steinert


Christoph Steinert, 24, from Ravensburg has graduated in Political Science and Public Law at the University of

Mannheim. He is going to start his Master in International Relations at the University of Oxford in October 2016.

His main areas of interest are the fields of conflict research and international political economy. He has professional

experience in the State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, the Human Rights Centre of the University of Potsdam

and in the German Institute of Global Area Studies in Hamburg. Furthermore, he was working for three years at the

chair of International Relations in a project on pro-government militias. During his undergraduate studies he has

published two papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.

Abstract

This study investigates how societal preferences impact policy choices in the trade-off between exchange rate stability and

monetary policy autonomy. Building on the theoretical approach of economic pluralism, it is argued that the size and

strength of different economic actors are the central determinants for monetary policy outcomes. Times-series cross-

sectional regression analysis and a fixed effect model are used to analyse the predictors for domestic monetary policy

outcomes in a timespan from 1960 up to 2010 (N=467). The results suggest that the size of the export sector, the

banking sector and the share of workers to gross capital formation are the central determinants for monetary policy

outcomes. Being in line with economic pluralism, the finding stands in contrast to the previous assumption that the

partisan character of governments plays the decisive role. This implies a dominance of lobby groups over government

discretion in monetary policy choices.

Keywords

Economic pluralism; exchange rate stability; government discretion; government ideology; monetary

policy; monetary policy autonomy; Mundell-Fleming trilemma



27

Introduction

The question of who holds the reins in a country and determines the direction of public policy has

always fascinated academic scholars and political theorists (e.g. already Aristotle 4th-centruy BC;

Machiavelli 1532). In democracies, the basic principle of rule of the people entails that the will of the

population has to be translated in some way into policy outcomes. However, it is debatable how

these translation processes occur and which channels between the people and the state are the main

platforms of policy-creation.

Some scholars have argued that governments have a significant degree of discretion in policy-

creation and that their ideological orientation is the central determinant for policy outcomes (e.g.

Bearce 2003; Bjørnskov 2008; Potrafke 2009). They assume that governments are mainly motivated

by policy-seeking goals and always try to implement their favored policies. Other scholars doubt the

discretionary power of politicians and emphasize the crucial impact of powerful interest groups (e.g.

Berger 1983; Lijphart 1975; Pizzorno 1981). In this vein, Becker has once compared the role of

politicians with managers of firms. He argued that politicians are hired to further the collective

interests of pressure groups, who could fire or repudiate them with the next elections in case they

deviate from their interests (Becker 1983, 396). According to this logic, politicians are reduced to

mere puppets which have to serve the interests of powerful groups in the society.

The question who determines the direction of a country is in particular relevant with regard to highly

controversial topics where conflicting interests are competing with each other. One of those topics is

the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability which each state faces in

an environment of international capital mobility (Mundell 1964). While it is beneficial for some

groups in society to pursue an autonomous monetary policy, others held a distinct preference for

stable exchange rates. This paper aims to shed light on the translation of societal preferences into

policy outcomes with focus on exactly this dilemma of monetary policy. Consequently, this analysis

aims to answer the following research question:

“How do societal preferences shape policy outcomes in the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange-

rate stability?”

Hereby, this paper will built on an analysis by David Bearce in 2003 entitled “Societal Preferences,

Partisan Agents and Monetary Policy Outcomes” (Bearce 2003). Bearce argues in his influential paper that

the ideology of government parties is the central determinant for the decision in the trade-off


28

between monetary policy autonomy and exchange-rate stability. Based on a principal-agent model he

suggests that leftist parties are the agents of all societal groups which prefer monetary policy

autonomy and that rightist parties are the agents of all societal groups with a preference for

exchange-rate stability. Thus, he concludes that the partisan character of a government determines

the monetary policy of a country whereas he regards the size and strength of different societal groups

as irrelevant. He underpins this assumption with empirical evidence of twenty-two OECD countries

in the period between 1975 and 1992 and he supplies his findings with further evidence from a

historical case study about lobbying for monetary policy in the US. His quantitative evidence

illustrates that the ideology of government parties is indeed the central determinant for a country’s

monetary policy and that the strength of different societal groups emphasized by the economic

pluralism is of minor importance. However, his analysis is based on several theoretical and

methodological flaws which will be elucidated in the following. In particular, a re-analysis of his study

with a newer dataset and a more sophisticated measure of the central explanatory variable will

demonstrate that the power and willingness of government parties to shape the monetary policy of a

country is actually smaller than previously thought.

This paper will proceed in the following way. First, the Mundell-Fleming model - which represents

the foundation of this study - will be introduced. Secondly, I will demonstrate with several theories

about preference formation why different actors in the society have different priorities regarding

monetary policies. In a next step, the two central theories for the translation of societal preferences

into policy outcomes will be contrasted with each other. Hereby, I will critically discuss Bearce’s

party-as-agent model and its implications. Afterwards, I will explain in the methods section the

databases and the statistical model used for this re-analysis. Hereby, I will supply a times-series cross-

sectional OLS regression analysis with a fixed effects model which accounts for several problems of

pooled data. Finally, I will summarize the findings and explain why economic pluralism is still the

dominant theory for the translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes.

1.) The implications of the Mundell-Fleming trilemma for monetary policy

The Mundell-Fleming model of international macroeconomics was developed by Robert A. Mundell

(Mundell 1960/ 1961a/ 1961b/ 1963/ 1964) and Marcus Fleming (1962). Its central contribution

was the systematic analysis of the impact of international capital mobility on determining the

effectiveness of macroeconomic policies under different exchange rate regimes (Frenkel and Razin

1987, 567). The core of the Mundell-Fleming model is the so-called “impossible trilemma”


29

(Aizenman 2011) which posits that economies cannot simultaneously maintain free capital

movement, a fixed exchange rate, and an independent monetary policy.

Marcus Fleming argued in his seminal study on international macroeconomics that the stimulus to

employment, income, and output resulting from a given increase in public expenditure will be larger

with a floating exchange rate than with a fixed one (Fleming 1962, 372). Underpinning this

assumption, Robert Mundell demonstrated that under a floating exchange rate monetary expansion

puts downward pressure on the interest rate and induces capital outflow, further depreciating the

exchange rate and creating an export surplus, which in turn increases, via the multiplier effect,

income and employment (Mundell 1963). Hence, Mundell showed that monetary policy becomes a

powerful tool of stabilization policy under flexible exchange rates when the condition of capital

mobility is given (Mundell 1963). The same impact cannot be achieved under a fixed exchange rate

since the maintenance of the exchange rate thwarts the effect triggered by a depreciation of the

currency. The contemporary international economy is characterized by a great mobility of capital

across national borders (Frieden 1991), i.e. the condition of capital mobility is fulfilled for almost all

developed economies. Thus, the choice of any exchange-rate system in each country is based on the

trade-off between domestic economic independence on the one hand and exchange-rate stability on

the other (Oatley 2012, 205).

The question arises which of those two conflicting monetary policy goals is more desirable for states.

It can be assumed that in democratic states the choice for one of those monetary policy goals is

determined by societal preferences since the people should be the sovereign of the country.

Therefore, I will discuss in the next section how societal preferences towards the trade-off between

monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability emerge and which opposing interests are

competing.

2.) Societal preferences for monetary policy outcomes

To understand how societal preferences for monetary policy outcomes emerge, it is necessary to

identify different societal actors which are affected in distinct ways by the degree of realization of the

conflicting monetary policy goals. Since the impact on societal actors is of economic nature, it makes

sense to differentiate them according to their economic activities. I follow hereby the classification

scheme from Bearce by identifying different economic actors under the frameworks of economic

sectors and production factors.


30

The idea of production factors is based on the influential Heckscher-Ohlin model. This model

assumes that all factors of production within countries are mobile across sectors, that there are

constant returns to scale in production and that markets are perfectly competitive (Mansfield and

Mutz 2009, 427). Based on those assumptions, the Heckscher-Ohlin model distinguishes in its basic

form between two main production factors, namely capital and labor. While the model was originally

developed to explain trade policy preferences (Oatley 2012, 70f.), diverging preferences of capital and

labor can be also identified with regards to other national economic policies. In this vein, it has been

argued that the production factor labor is more tied to the local economy than capital and that it

therefore prefers domestic monetary autonomy (Kapstein 1996). This can be explained by the fact

that domestic actors can benefit from currency depreciations processes induced by monetary

policies. And because of its prevailing domestic economic activity, the production factor labor is less

affected by varying exchange rates. In the contrary, the production factor capital has a highly mobile

nature. Therefore, it relies more on stable exchange rates and less on an autonomous monetary

policy by national states which shapes its preference the other way around. Taken together, the

framework of production factors predicts that capital has a preference for exchange rate stability

whereas labor holds a preference for domestic monetary policy autonomy.

In a second step, I will consider the differentiation of economic sectors emphasized by the Ricardo-

Viner model. The Ricardo-Viner model assumes, in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, that

factor specificity is very high, i.e. that some factors cannot move at all among industries (Alt et al.

1996, 690). Consequently, we except coalitions to form not along the lines of factors but along the

lines of export- versus import-competing industries or sectors (Alt et al. 1996, 692). Labor and

capital interests within a sector can be expected to unite since these factors are specific to the

respective sector (Bearce 2003, 367). The advantages of a fixed exchange rate are that cross-border

trade, payments and investments become more predictable (Hefeker 1998, 6). This is in particular

advantageous to the export sector which therefore holds a strong preference for exchange rate

stability. If companies rely on the export of their goods, they prefer a certain degree of reliability of

currency movements to anticipate their future revenues. The same applies to international investors

and the banking sector which also depend on transactions across currencies. The downside of

exchange rate stability is that the currency cannot be depreciated to make domestic goods more

competitive (Hefeker 1998, 6). Consequently, companies operating in the import-competing sector

desire a certain degree of monetary autonomy. They are not affected by the uncertainty associated


31

with varying exchange rates and therefore have no fundamental interest in stable currencies. This

applies also to producers of non-tradable services who do not operate in an international context.

In summary, it can be stated that all internationally oriented actors prefer currency stability, while

domestically oriented actors accept the costs of greater currency instability and prefer monetary

autonomy (Frieden 1991, 446). Considering the predictions made by the production factor and the

economic sector model, several different groups with preferences for either monetary autonomy or

for exchange rate stability can be identified. Namely, the production factor labor, the import-

competing sector, and the non-tradable services sector have a preference for monetary autonomy,

whereas the production factor capital, the export-competing sector, the banking sector, and

international investors prefer exchange rate stability.

3.) Translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes

After the identification of different preferences for either monetary autonomy or exchange rate

stability, it is necessary to scrutinize in a second step how those preferences are translated into

monetary policy outcomes. There are two main theoretical frameworks for those translation

processes which will be introduced and contrasted below.

3.1) Economic pluralism

The theory of economic pluralism argues that policy outcomes are a function of the political

competition between different societal actors which is determined by their relative power and their

propensity for collective action (Garrett and Lange 1995, 628). Rooted in a liberal theory of

international politics (Moravcsik 1997), pluralism assumes that the dominant groups in a society will

finally implement their favored policies. Therefore, Dahl has connected the emergence of pluralism

to a particular kind of regime termed ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl 1978, 191). While hegemonic regimes thwart

the development of pluralism, polyarchies are more open to organised opposition and thereby induce

the formation of a pluralistic order.12 In such political systems, political institutions regard interest

groups as partners rather than as opponents. They try to establish cooperation with each other,

relying on mutual acquiescence and approval (Hill and Varone 2014, 27). Pluralism assumes that

various interest groups have open and equal access to policy-making and shape the policy process

according to their respective aims (Chari and Kritzinger 2006, 44). As a consequence, pluralism leads

to a balance of interests as it satisfies each tendency in the society in proportion to its relative

12 Democractic states come most close to the polyarchic ideal and are therefore most suitable for pluralism.


32

representation in the population (Pizzorno 1981, 259). Following the logic of pluralism, government

institutions just provide the arena for group competition and do not exert a significant impact on

policy decisions themselves (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988, 7). Therefore, politicians have

not an autonomous role of policy shaping but instead they follow the will of the powerful actors in a

country which emerge as dominant pressure groups (Becker 1983, 396).

Applied to the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability, the pluralist

theory suggests that a state will either strive for monetary policy autonomy in case that groups with

such a preference predominate in a society or pursue exchange rate stability in case that groups with

the opposite preference are superior. Thus, the distribution of the size and strength of different

societal groups will shape monetary policy outcomes. Connecting this rationale to the preference

patterns discussed above, it can be assumed that the respective size of those economic actors shapes

the monetary policy choice. More specifically, according to the pluralist logic it is expected that the

size of the export-competing sector, the import-competing sector, the banking sector as well as the

size of unionized workforce influence the choice between monetary autonomy and exchange rate

stability. Based on this assumption, I will examine the following hypotheses to test the theory of

economic pluralism:

H1: Countries with higher percentages of exports to total GDP have higher degrees of exchange rate

stability.

H2: Countries with higher percentages of imports to total GDP have a higher degree of monetary

autonomy.

H3: Countries with a higher percentage of unionized workforce to total salary earners have a higher

degree of monetary autonomy.

H4: Countries with a larger banking sector have a higher degree of exchange rate stability.

H5: Countries with a higher percentage of workers to gross capital formation have a higher degree of

monetary autonomy.


33

3.2) The ‘party-as-agent model’ from David Bearce

David Bearce provides in his paper an alternative theory for the translation of societal preferences

into monetary policy outcomes. Building on a principal-agent approach, he emphasizes the crucial

role of the partisan character of governments for the choice of monetary policies.

His point of departure is the fact that leftist parties are traditionally the protectors of labor interests

and that rightist parties often form close alliances with capital owners. By focusing on the US

context, Bearce argues that less-skilled manual workers in the import-competing manufacturing

sector and white-collar workers in the service sector are a solid leftist constituency. In contrast,

skilled-manual workers which often work in export-oriented industries, capital-intensive industries

and investment banks are closely aligned with the political right. Considering the different preference

patterns elucidated above, Bearce infers that leftist political parties advocate the interests of societal

groups with preferences for monetary autonomy and that rightist political parties represent the

interests of societal actors with preferences for exchange rate stability. He assumes that a delegation

process from actors with particular monetary policy preferences to political parties takes place,

whereby he regards the societal groups as principals and political parties as agents. In the desire to

fulfil the policy preferences of their respective principals, leftist governments pursue an autonomous

monetary policy and rightist governments implement stable exchange rates. Thus, the central

indicator of a country's monetary policy is the partisan character of its respective government.

Since this theory is grounded on the rather utopian assumption that governments are solely

interested in the preferences of their voters, Bearce also introduces a variation of his theory. This

variation accounts for the fact that vote-seeking governments care also about the interests of

powerful actors within a society. In the framework of the principal-agent-model, governments are

perceived as ‘shirking’ when they act against the preferences of their principals. Terming his variation

approach as party-as-agent model with significant shirking, he tries to make sense out of the fact that

governments pursue also strategic vote-seeking goals and that they are not pure policy-seekers. While

the party-as-agent model with significant shirking assumes an interplay between economic pluralism

and discretion of government parties, I will focus here on testing the party-as-agent model in its pure

form. If there is cumulative evidence for economic pluralism and the party-as-agent model, then the

party-as-agent model with significant shirking would be the theoretical framework which the

strongest predictive power. But a necessary condition therefor is that I find in a first step evidence


34

for an impact of government ideologies on monetary policy outcomes. Thus, I examine the party-as-

agent model in its pure form by testing the following hypotheses:

H6: Countries with more leftist governments have higher degrees of monetary autonomy.

H7: Countries with more rightist governments have higher degrees of exchange rate stability.

3.3) Critical discussion of David Bearce’s ‘party-as-agent model’

Several points of criticism should be considered with regard to the party-as-agent model. First, the

party-as-agent model makes very optimistic assumptions about the ability and willingness of

government parties to pursue the favored policies of their voters. It assumes that a government is

determined to implement the preferred policies of its voters irrespective of opposition from various

powerful actors in the society. Previous research has demonstrated that governments are not

immune against pressures from interest groups and especially not against pressure from powerful

business entrepreneurs (Golden 1998; Klüver 2009; Yackee and Yackee 2006). A remarkable

example for the significant influence of interest groups on policy outcomes is the lobbying of the

National Rifle Association in the US against gun control which is successful against the majority’s

preference for a more restricted gun control (Dearden 2015). Ignoring such impacts, the party-as-

agent model treats government parties as pure policy-seeking actors which try to implement the

policies they promised to their voters. In contrast to this assumption, a multitude of studies showed

that governments are also motivated by vote-seeking goals and that they often act strategically to

reassure their re-election (Crisp et al. 2004; Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer 2007).

Secondly, it is not entirely clear why leftist parties should always support monetary autonomy and

rightist parties categorically prefer exchange-rate stability. Bearce’s theory is rooted in the US-context

where skilled manual workers are often found in the export-oriented industries whereas less-skilled

manual workers are generally trapped in the import-competing manufacturing sector (Bearce 2003,

381). However, in several other OECD countries this generalization does not hold. For example in

Norway many low-skilled manual workers work in the export-oriented crude oil industry

representing typical clients for left-wing parties. It seems to be an oversimplification to regard leftist

parties categorically as agents of actors with preferences for monetary autonomy and rightist parties

always as agents of actors who prefer exchange-rate stability.


35

Thirdly, Bearce employs a one-dimensional left-right heuristic of party ideologies which is a strong

simplification of reality. This might work for the American context with only two parties to be

classified but the party structure in other OECD countries is often far more complex. Taking into

account this polymorphic character of ideology, it has become a standard to differentiate between

the economic and sociopolitical dimension when classifying party ideologies (Bräuninger and Debus

2011). Bearce fails to acknowledge those different dimensions and treats party ideologies as one-

dimensional categorizing them on a scale ranging from 1 up to 5. This problem will be encountered

with a more fine-grained measure of party ideology which will be elaborated in the methodological

section below.

4.) Methods

The methodological section is divided into three parts. First, I will critically evaluate the measures

used by Bearce. Afterwards, I describe my own variables and their operationalizations and

subsequently I introduce my statistical model.

4.1) Critique of David Bearce’s methods

The central weakness of Bearce’s study is the fact that he measures his central theoretical innovation,

namely the party-as-agent model, with a rather superficial and crude proxy variable. The ideological

complexion of the respective government in power is captured with a five-point scale where lower

values indicate more right-wing ideologies (Bearce 2003, 386). This variable is taken from the Party

Government Data Set established by the University of Amsterdam (Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge

2000). They categorize the ideology of parties in a highly simplistic way as either left, central, or right.

In a second step, they account for the relative strength of parties in government by transforming the

proportional shares of right, center and left parties into scores ranging from 1 till 5 representing the

degree of representation of the different ideologies. The grounding of Bearce’s study on such a crude

variable, based on a breakdown of the complex issue of ideology to a three categories indicator,

raises severe doubts to the validity of his results. Additionally, the operationalization of his central

dependent variable, namely monetary autonomy, seems to be prone to measurement errors. Bearce

measures monetary autonomy with the differential between a country’s domestic interest rate and the

prevailing world interest rate (Bearce 2003, 385). Hereby, the prevailing world interest rate is

operationalized with the average interest rate of the US, Japan, Germany, Britain and France. Bearce

does not provide a theoretical justification for choosing those countries and in an increasingly

globalized world, it seems questionable whether the monetary policy of countries like Britain and


36

France is as influential as the monetary policy of raising economic players such as China, India or

Brazil. The recent inclusion of the Chinese Yuan to the SDR basket of reserve-currencies by the IMF

(Mathew 2015) illustrates the growing importance of other currencies and shows that they also

significantly impact the prevailing world interest rate. Acknowledging the difficulties of capturing

such latent concepts as monetary policy autonomy and government ideology, this analysis aims to

improve their measurement by using more sophisticated and fine-grained measures that have been

developed by other scholars.

4.2) Variables and Data Sources

For the purpose of my re-analysis, I use the same variables as Bearce, but the variables originate from

other sources with different operationalizations.13

The main dependent variable ‘monetary autonomy’ will be operationalized with the so-called

monetary independence index taken from Aizenman’s open economy trilemma dataset (Aizenman,

Chinn, and Ito 2008). Aizenman has developed a remarkable dataset which quantifies the degree of

achievement along the three dimensions of monetary independence, exchange-rate stability and

financial openness. He standardizes the extent of realization of the three conflicting monetary policy

goals with three indices ranging from 0 to 1 whereby higher values indicate higher achievement of

the respective policy goals.14 By comparing a country’s monetary policy to a respective base country,

he is able to detect autonomous policy choices along these three dimensions. The choice of the

respective base country builds on a study by Shambaugh who classifies countries’ currencies as

pegged or nonpegged and identifies to which country the monetary policy is most closely linked to

(Shambaugh 2004). The application of Aizenman’s monetary independence index has two significant

advantages. First, it does not rely on an arbitrary choice of the prevailing world interest rate but

compares closely connected currencies. Secondly, the standardization between 0 and 1 facilitates the

interpretation of the achievement along the three dimensions of the impossible trilemma.

The proxy variable for the party-as-agent model tries to overcome the weaknesses of Bearce’s

simplistic measure of government ideology discussed above. In contrast to Bearce, I use a very

sophisticated and fine-grained indicator developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to

13 In distinction from Bearce, I do not control for central bank independence, the size of the non-tradable service sector and outward foreign direct investments since the amount of missing cases for those variables decrease the number of observations used for the analysis in an inadequate way. 14 Further information about the operationalizations of the three dimension of the impossible trilemma is illustrated in the appendix.


37

measure the ideological orientation of a country’s government (Lehmann et al. 2015). The CMP

provides a left-right indicator for parties’ ideological orientations based on content analysis of their

manifestoes. The variable ranges from -100 to +100 whereby lower values indicate a more leftist

ideological orientation. The information is derived from coding of quasi-sentences in party

manifestoes and their categorization according to pre-defined rules into a left-right dichotomy.15 To

account for the fact that many governments consist of more than one party, I weigh the respective

CMP-scores of government parties with their seat shares in parliament following the procedure

proposed by Williams (Williams 2012). It is advantageous to use the CMP data compared to Beace’s

left-right indicator since the classification of political parties’ ideology is grounded in an extensive

analysis of party’s manifestoes with various different nuances and not on a rough classification

without predefined rules.

The central explanatory variables for the theory of economic pluralism are the ratio of the working

population to gross capital formation, the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union

members to the total number of wage and salary earners, the percentage of exports and imports of a

country’s total GDP, and the size of the financial service sector as a percentage of total GDP. The

data for the ratio of the working population to gross capital formation is based on Graham’s

international political economy data resource (Graham 2015). The trade union density

operationalized by the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members divided by the

total number of wage and salary earners is derived from the OECD (The Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development 2015b). Data for the percentage of exports of goods and services of a

country’s total GDP is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (The World Bank 2015).

Data on the percentage of imports of total GDP is used from the OECD (The Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development 2015a). The financial system deposits as percentage of

GDP are operationalized with data taken from the World Bank (The World Bank 2015).

In line with Bearce, I include control variables for GDP growth, inflation rate, capital openness,

government fractionalization and a dummy variable for proportional representation systems. The

annual percentage of GDP growth and the annual inflation rate are taken from the World Bank

Development Indicators (The World Bank 2015). Capital openness is measured with the Financial

Openness Index based on Aizenman’s quantifications of the three dimensions of the impossible

15 For additional information on the coding process of the CMP consult “Party Policy and Government Coalitions” by

Laver and Budge (1992).


38

trinity (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008). The degree of fractionalization is operationalized with the

probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of

different parties and the information is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al.

2001). Finally, the proportional representation dummy originates from a publication by Strøm et al.

about arrangements of powersharing (Strøm et al. 2013).

5.) Statistical model

In line with Bearce, I analyze the total of OECD countries since for those countries a sufficient data

basis exists. However, I will not only use data for the timeframe between 1975 and 1992, but also

cover the whole period between 1960 and 2010.16

The use of OLS regression with time-series cross-sectional data has some difficulties which have to

be reflected in the analysis. Data which varies also in the time-dimension is more problematic for

OLS than pure cross-sectional data since observations are usually not independent (Plümper,

Troeger, and Manow 2005, 329). This leads to four common violations of OLS assumptions with

panel data, namely (a) serial correlation of errors, (b) heteroscedasticity of errors, (c) correlated errors

across units due to common exogenous shocks and (d) non-spherical errors in both the cross-

sectional and the serial dimension (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 329). These violations cause

estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients to understate their actual variability (Beck and

Katz 1995, 634). To encounter those difficulties, I use panel-corrected standard errors, which have

been shown to be very accurate estimates of sampling variability (Beck and Katz 1995). I hereby

follow the mainstream approach in the political science literature since 66% of the regression

analyses published between 2009 and 2012 in the American Political Science Review apply robust

standard errors to encounter model misspecifications (King and Roberts 2014, 1). I do not include a

lagged dependent variable because there is no plausible logical explanation why the value of the

dependent variable 'monetary policy independence' in year t+1 should be always influenced by the

value of this variable in year t. Since a new government could pursue a completely different monetary

policy to its predecessors the monetary policy in one year is not necessarily affected by the monetary

policy in the previous one. If there is no theoretical explanation for the inclusion of a lagged

16 I exclude all countries of the European Monetary Union from 2000 onwards since the introduction of the EURO has

finished monetary autonomy of the member states. Thus, the theoretical assumptions of the party-as-agent model and

economic pluralism do not hold anymore for those countries.


39

dependent variable, there is the risk that the lagged dependent variable dramatically affects other

coefficients in the model and in the meanwhile exaggerates the model fit (Achen 2000, 3).

In a second step, I cross-check the results of OLS regression with a fixed effects model. In so doing,

I deviate from Bearce’s analysis which is only based on the results of his OLS regression analysis. But

using OLS is generally problematic with pooled data since it ignores the panel structure of the data

(Schmidheiny 2005, 5). It simply lumps all the observations together and treats them as one cross-

section. To overcome this problematic simplification, I run a model which accounts as well for the

time-variation of the data. In a first step, I decide whether a random or a fixed effects model is

suitable. The main distinction between fixed and random effects models is based on “whether the

unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model”

(Greene 2008, 183). By applying the Hausman test, I check whether those unique errors are

correlated with the explanatory variables (Torres-Reyna 2007, 29). The significant test result suggests

that a fixed effects model is suitable for this analysis. Fixed effects models are designed to analyze the

causes of changes within an entity (Kohler and Kreuter 2009, 245). Thus, the fixed effects model is

here exploring the relationship between the predictors and the outcome variable within countries and

shows how intra-country variations of the strength of economic actors and governments’ ideologies

affect the level of monetary autonomy. The central assumption of fixed effects models is that

something within the individual may bias the independent or dependent variables and that we need

to control for this bias (Torres-Reyna 2007, 9). The results of both analyses – the OLS regression

with robust standard errors and the fixed effects model – will be displayed in the next section. Below

I illustrate the equation on which the OLS regression analysis is based.

Monetary.Independence.Indexit = β0 + β1 × GDP.Growth + β2 × Capital.Mobility + β3 ×

Government.Fractionalization + β 4 × Central.Bank.Independence + β 5 × Inflation + β 6 ×

Proportional.Representation + β7 × Government.Ideology + β8 × Capital.Worker.Ratio + β9 ×

Import + β 10 × Export + β 11 × Unionized + β 12 × Banking + + ∑(α × Countryjit) +

∑(α × Yearjit)


40

6.) Results

At first, I run the OLS regression model with robust standard errors. However, testing the basic

regression assumptions demonstrates that there is an unacceptable problem of multicollinearity

within the model. The pairwise correlation between the two explanatory variables import and export

is 0.95. The Variance Inflation Factor which indicates the degree of multicollinearity has a value of

20.20 for those two variables. Acceptable Variance Inflation Factors are only values up to 10. The

high correlation between the import- and the export-variables is not surprising since they are both

proxies for the same theory, namely economic pluralism. Also previous research has demonstrated

that there is a high correlation between the percentage of imports to GDP and the percentage of

exports to GDP (Bebczuk 2008). Thus, I re-run the OLS regression in two models with the export-

variable and the import-variable separately. The results are displayed in table 1.

Table 1: Results of the OLS regression model with robust standard errors

(1) (2) Mon.Indep. Mon.Indep.

GDP.Growth 0.00687* 0.00691* (2.24) (2.30) Inflation 0.00144 0.000950 (1.58) (1.03) Cap.Mobility -0.120** -0.135*** (-3.03) (-3.54) Unionized 0.000682 0.000640 (1.61) (1.51) Cap.Worker. 0.0158 0.0278 Ratio (logged) (0.63) (1.10) Banking 0.000150 0.000135 (0.61) (0.56) Government. -0.000156 -0.000154 ideology (-0.34) (-0.34) Government. -0.0455 -0.0469 Fractionalizat. (-1.40) (-1.46) Proportional. 0.0279 0.0307 Representation (1.61) (1.76)


41

Export -0.00300*** (-4.66) Import -0.00352*** (-5.20) _cons 0.593** 0.729*** (2.84) (3.43)

N 467 467 adj. R2 0.198 0.204 t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Graph 1: Results of the OLS regression model (model with export-variable)

The central finding is the non-significance of the variable which indicates the government ideology.

At odds with the party-as-agent theory, both models indicate no significant influence of the

ideological orientation of the government on monetary independence. Underlining the explanatory

power of economic pluralism, two proxies capturing the size and strength of different societal groups

are statistically significant. A one percentage increase of the size of the export sector is associated

with a 0.003 decrease on the monetary independence index, supporting the assumption posited in

hypothesis 1. The variable capturing the size of the import sector has also a statistically significant

GDP Growth

Inflation

Capital Mobility

Capital Worker Ratio

Unionized

Export

Banking

Government Ideology

Government Fraction.

PR

-.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05


42

effect on monetary independence.17 The model indicates as well significant effects of two control

variables: Higher degrees of capital mobility are associated with reduced monetary independence,

while the existence of higher rates of GDP growth is associated with higher monetary independence.

The model fit is fairly good for both models with adjusted R2-values of roughly 0.2.

In a second step, I control the results of the OLS regression analysis with a fixed effects model. The

results are depicted in table 2. Supporting the results from the OLS regression analysis, the fixed

effects model shows also no significant impact of the government ideology variable. In line with the

assumptions of economic pluralism, the fixed effects model indicates significant effects of the

import-, export- and banking-variables. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis four, larger banking

sectors in a country are associated with less monetary independence. A one percentage increase of

financial deposits related to the GDP is associated with a -0.002 decrease on the monetary

independence index. Confirming hypothesis one, a one percentage increase of the export sector

related to total GDP decreases the values on the monetary independence index by 0.007 points.

Also, the import-variable shows again a statistically significant effect. Additionally, the control

variable capturing capital mobility indicates a statistically significant negative effect on monetary

independence. The model fit is satisfactory with adjusted R2-values of 0.17 and 0.18.

Table 2: Results of the fixed effect model

(1) (2) Mon.Indep. Mon.Indep.

GDP.Growth 0.00165 0.00249 (0.49) (0.75) Inflation 0.00104 0.00134 (1.17) (1.44) Cap.Mobility -0.161** -0.110 (-2.88) (-1.78) Cap.Worker. 0.0410 0.0539 Ratio (logged) (0.51) (0.73) Banking -0.00167* -0.00140 (-2.23) (-2.01)

17 The sign is in the opposite direction as predicted by hypothesis two. The same applies for Bearce’s study where the import- and export-variables have also signs in the same directions in two models at odds with his hypotheses. This is due to the fact that imports as percent of total GDP is not exactly measuring the potential political strength of the import-competing sector. A better measure would have been to subtract exports from total manufacturers. However, for the purpose of the re-analysis, I decided to follow the measure used by Bearce.


43

Unionized -0.00225 -0.00197 (-1.21) (-1.06) Government. -0.000414 -0.000262 ideology (-0.84) (-0.51) Government. -0.0389 -0.0304 Fractionaliza. (-0.67) (-0.53) Proportional. -0.0521 -0.0518 Representation (-0.90) (-0.93) Import -0.00672* (-2.39) Export -0.00687** (-3.30) _cons 1.286 1.342* (1.93) (2.12)


Graph 2: Results of the fixed effect model (model with export-variable)

GDP Growth

Inflation

Capital Mobility


Export

Banking

Unionized

Government Ideology


PR

-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2


44

Finally, as a further robustness check, I control the results by replacing the dependent variable

monetary autonomy in the fixed effect model with a variable capturing exchange rate stability18. The

results are displayed in table 3. Both variables represent opposing poles, the effects should be the

same just in the inverse direction. And indeed, the robustness check confirms the absence of a

significant effect of government ideology on the trade-off between exchange rate stability and

monetary autonomy. Further underlying the meaningfulness of economic pluralism, the capital to

labor ratio has here a statistically significant impact on the exchange rate stability. Countries with

higher shares of workers to gross capital formation have lower degrees of exchange rate stability.

This confirms the assumption of hypothesis 5.

Table 3: Robustness-Check with the dependent variable exchange rate stability

(1) (2) Ex.rate.stability Ex.rate.stability

GDP.Growth 0.00635 0.00600 (1.25) (1.17) Inflation 0.00100 0.000811 (0.69) (0.57) Cap.Mobility 0.0835 0.0540 (1.44) (0.95) Cap.Worker. -0.224* -0.235* Ratio (logged) (-2.29) (-2.40) Banking -0.00123 -0.00136 (-1.30) (-1.38) Unionized 0.00317 0.00297 (1.09) (1.04) Government. 0.000109 0.0000295 ideology (0.19) (0.05) Government. -0.00905 -0.0142 Fractionaliza. (-0.12) (-0.20) Proportional. -0.0146 -0.0174 Representation (-0.17) (-0.20) Import 0.00425 (1.46)

18 The operationalization is also based on Aizenman’s quantifications of the impossible trinity (Aizenman 2011).


45

Export 0.00388 (1.40) _cons -1.783 -1.828 (-1.98) (-2.01)


Graph 3: Robustness-Check with exchange rate stability (model with export-variable)

Conclusion

This paper set out to re-analyze the findings of the study “Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents and

Monetary Policy Outcomes” (2003) by David Bearce who argued that the ideology of government parties

is the central determinant of monetary policy outcomes. By using a more up-to-date dataset

comprising all OECD countries between 1960 and 2010 and by applying more sophisticated and up-

to-date measures for the central variables, this analysis demonstrated that the ideological orientation

of governments has no significant influence on monetary policy outcomes. In contrast to Bearce’s

findings, this analysis revealed robust evidence for the theory of economic pluralism. In particular,

evidence was found for the hypotheses one, four and five which are all grounded in the theoretical

GDP Growth

Inflation

Capital Mobility


Banking

Unionized

Government ideology


PR

Export

-.4 -.2 0 .2


46

framework of economic pluralism. In line with hypothesis one, bigger export sectors in a country are

associated with more exchange rate stability. The same applies for larger banking sectors which are

associated with less monetary policy autonomy as predicted in hypothesis four. Finally, higher shares

of workers to gross capital formation are associated with higher degrees of monetary autonomy

confirming hypothesis five. Derived from this evidence, it can be concluded that the size and

strength of different societal groups are indeed the central determinants of domestic monetary policy

outcomes. Thus, this study can be interpreted as a revival of the liberal theory of economic pluralism

which is superior to the party-as-agent model in predicting translation processes of societal

preferences into monetary policy outcomes.

Several limitations have to be considered when drawing inferences from the results. First, even

though the applied measures strive to be more sophisticated than the ones used by Bearce, it is still

questionable whether they are able to capture the latent concepts of monetary autonomy and

government ideology in an adequate way. Secondly, this analysis cannot overcome the problems

associated with a one-dimensional measure of government ideology. The measure based on CMP is

also ignoring the differentiation between the economic and the sociopolitical dimension of party

ideologies. Thirdly, an extended analysis including the non-OECD countries would enhance the

generalizability of the results but could not be realized due to data limitations. Fourthly, the analysis

is based on the assumption that every citizen has at least any preference towards the trade-off

between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability. This is highly questionable since

some basic economic knowledge is essential to understand the implications of the trade-off predicted

by the Mundell-Fleming model. Furthermore, even if societal groups held preferences for one or

another goal, it is doubtful whether they are able to organize themselves to promote their interest.

Especially large groups face always a collective action problem (Olson 1965) and often fail to

organize lobbying. Therefore, it would be necessary to buttress the evidence for economic pluralism

with qualitative evidence of lobbying by different societal actors towards the achievement of

monetary policy goals.19

Being aware of those limitations, this study claims nevertheless to make a modest contribution to the

understanding of the translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes.

19 Bearce claims that such lobbying was historically often non-existent but he infers this assumption by considering only the US-context.


47

References

Achen, Christopher H. 2000. "Why lagged dependent variables can suppress the explanatory power

of other independent variables." Ann Arbor 1001.

Aizenman, Joshua. 2011. The impossible trinity-from the policy trilemma to the policy quadrilemma

Working Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department.

Aizenman, Joshua, Menzie D. Chinn, and Hiro Ito. 2008. Assessing the emerging global financial

architecture: measuring the trilemma's configurations over time. National Bureau of Economic

Research.

Alt, James E., Jeffry Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. "The

political economy of international trade enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry." Comparative

Political Studies 29 (6): 689–717.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414096029006004

Aristotle. 4th-centruy BC. Polítcia. Athens.

Bearce, David H. 2003. "Societal preferences, partisan agents, and monetary policy outcomes."

International Organization 57 (02): 373–410.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818303572058

Bebczuk, Ricardo. 2008. Imports-Exports correlation: A new puzzle? Central Bank of Argentina,

Economic Research Department.

Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-

section data." American Political Science Review 89 (03): 634–47.

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082979

Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New tools

in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." The World Bank

Economic Review 15 (1): 165–76.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wber/15.1.165

Becker, Gary S. 1983. "A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence." The

Quarterly Journal of Economics: 371–400.

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1886017

Berger, Suzanne. 1983. Organizing interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, corporatism, and the

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414096029006004

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818303572058

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082979

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wber/15.1.165

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1886017


48

transformation of politics. CUP Archive.

Bjørnskov, Christian. 2008. "The growth–inequality association: government ideology matters."

Journal of Development Economics 87 (2): 300–308.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.04.002

Bräuninger, Thomas, and Marc Debus. 2011. Parteienwettbewerb in den deutschen Bundesländern.

Wiesbaden: Springer-Verlag.

Chari, Raj S., and Sylvia Kritzinger. 2006. Understanding EU Policy Making. London: Pluto Press.

Crisp, Brian F., Maria C. Escobar‐Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones, and Michelle M.

Taylor‐Robinson. 2004. "Vote‐Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential

Democracies." Journal of Politics 66 (3): 823–46.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00278.x

Crisp, Brian F., Kathryn M. Jensen, and Yael Shomer. 2007. "Magnitude and vote seeking." Electoral

Studies 26 (4): 727–34.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2007.08.001

Dahl, Robert A. 1978. "Pluralism Revisited." Comparative Politics 10 (2): 191–203.

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421645

Dearden, Lizzie. 2015. "Why does nothing get done about gun control? The reasons Obama cannot

change US infatuation with firearms: Barack Obama said thoughts and prayers were 'not enough'

after the latest massacre but his attempts at reforming gun laws have failed." The Independent.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/why-does-nothing-get-done-about-gun-

control-the-reasons-obama-cannot-change-us-infatuation-with-a6676876.html#gallery (December

19, 2015).

Fleming, J. M. 1962. "Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange Rates

(Politiques finacierieures interieures avec un systeme de taux de change fixe et avec un systeme de

taux de change fluctuant)(Politica financiera interna bajo sistemas de tipos de cambio fijos o de tipos

de cambio fluctuantes)." Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund: 369–80.

Frenkel, Jacob A., and Assaf Razin. 1987. "The Mundell-Fleming model a quarter century later: a

unified exposition." Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund: 567–620.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.04.002

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00278.x

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2007.08.001

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421645


49

global finance." International Organization 45 (04): 425–51.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033178

Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. 1995. "Internationalization, institutions, and political change."


http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028460

Golden, Marissa M. 1998. "Interest groups in the rule-making process: Who participates? Whose

voices get heard?" Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8 (2): 245–70.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024380

Graham, Benjamin A. T. 2015. "The International Political Economy Data Resource." January 26.

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2534067 (December 21,

2015).

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2534067

Greene, William. 2008. Econometric Analysis. 6th ed. New York: Prentice Hall.

Hefeker, Carsten. 1998. Interest groups and monetary integration: The political economy of

exchange regime choice. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hill, Michael, and Frederic Varone. 2014. The Public Policy Process. London: Routledge.

Ikenberry, G. J., David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno. 1988. "Introduction: approaches to

explaining American foreign economic policy." International Organization 42 (01): 1–14.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300007116

Kapstein, Ethan B. 1996. "Workers and the world economy: Breaking the postwar bargain." Foreign

Affairs 75 (3): 16–37.

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20047578

King, Gary, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2014. "How robust standard errors expose methodological

problems they do not fix, and what to do about it." Political Analysis: 1–21.

Klüver, Heike. 2009. "Measuring interest group influence using quantitative text analysis." European

Union Politics 10 (4): 535–49.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116509346782

Kohler, Ulrich, and Frauke Kreuter. 2009. Data analysis using Stata. 2nd ed. Lakeway Drive: Stata

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033178

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028460

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024380

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2534067

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300007116

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20047578

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116509346782


50

Press.

Lehmann, Pola, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, and Annika Werner. 2015. "Manifesto

Corpus." Version: 2015-11. Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science Center (December 23, 2015).

Lijphart, Arend. 1975. The politics of accommodation: Pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands

University of California Press.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1532. The Prince. Florence.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. "Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic

politics, and out-group anxiety." International Organization 63 (03): 425–57.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090158

Mathew, Jerin. 2015. "Yuan's inclusion in SDR basket no big deal for global economy say

economists." http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/yuans-inclusion-sdr-basket-no-big-deal-global-economy-

1516428 (December 22, 2015).

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics."


http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081897550447

Mundell, Robert A. 1960. "The monetary dynamics of international adjustment under fixed and

flexible exchange rates." The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 227–57.

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884252

———. 1961a. "Flexible exchange rates and employment policy." Canadian Journal of Economics

and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique 27 (04): 509–17.

———. 1961b. "The international disequilibrium system." [Kyklos 14 (2): 153–72.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1961.tb02451.x

———. 1963. "Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates."

Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science

politique 29 (04): 475–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/139336

———. 1964. "A reply: capital mobility and size." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political

Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique 30 (03): 421–31.

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/139708

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090158

http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081897550447

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884252

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1961.tb02451.x

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/139336

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/139708


51

Oatley, Thomas. 2012. International Political Economy. Amsterdam: Addison-Wesley Longman.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Pizzorno, Alessandro. 1981. "Interests and Parties in Pluralism." In Organizing Interests in Western

Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics, eds. Suzanne Berger and

Charles Maier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plümper, Thomas, Vera E. Troeger, and Philip Manow. 2005. "Panel data analysis in comparative

politics: Linking method to theory." European Journal of Political Research 44 (2): 327–54.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00230.x

Potrafke, Niklas. 2009. "Does government ideology influence political alignment with the US? An

empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly." The Review of International

Organizations 4 (3): 245–68.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9066-5

Schmidheiny, Kurt. 2005. "Panel Data: Fixed and Random Effects: Short Guide to

Macroeconometrics." Universität Basel. http://www.schmidheiny.name/teaching/panel2up.pdf

(December 18, 2015).

Shambaugh, Jay C. 2004. "The effect of fixed exchange rates on monetary policy." The Quarterly

Journal of Economics: 301–52.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839605

Strøm, Kaare W., Scott Gates, Benjamin A. T. Graham, and Håvard Strand. 2013. "Inclusion,

Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World's States, 1975–2010." British Journal of

Political Science: 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000174

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2015a. "OECD Data."

https://data.oecd.org/trade/trade-in-goods.htm#indicator-chart (December 21, 2015).

———. 2015b. "OECD Labour Force Statistics." http://www.oecd-

ilibrary.org/employment/data/trade-unions/trade-union-density_data-00371-

en?isPartOf=%2Fcontent%2Fdatacollection%2Flfs-data-en (December 21, 2015).

The World Bank. 2015. "World Development Indicators." http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi

(December 21, 2015).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00230.x

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9066-5

http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839605

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000174


52

Torres-Reyna, Oscar. 2007. "Panel Data Analysis Fixed and Random Effects using Stata." Princeton

University. http://dss.princeton.edu/training/ (Accessed December 18, 2015).

Williams, Laron K. 2012. "Data: Create Government Partisanship." University of Missouri.

http://web.missouri.edu/~williamslaro/data.html (December 24, 2015).

Woldendorp, J., H. Keman, and I. Budge. 2000. "Party government in 48 democracies. Composition

– duration – personel. http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/departments/political-

science/staff/woldendorp/party-government-data-set/index.aspx (December 22, 2015).

Yackee, Jason W., and Susan W. Yackee. 2006. "A bias towards business? Assessing interest group

influence on the US bureaucracy." Journal of Politics 68 (1): 128–39.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00375.x

Appendix

The in index for the degree of monetary independence is defined as:

IMI = 1- 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝑖

𝑖,𝑖𝑗)−(−1)

1−(−1)

In the equation i refers to home countries and j refers to the base country. The maximal possible

value is 1 and the minimal possible value is 0. Higher values indicate more monetary independence

(Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008).

ERS = 0.01

0.01+𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(∆(log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒))

For the measurement of exchange-rate stability, annual standard deviations of the monthly exchange

rate between the home country and the base country are included in the formula above to

standardize the index between 0 and 1. Higher values of the index represent more stable movement

of the exchange-rate against the currency of the base country (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00375.x


53

Determinants of Re-Autocratization: An Empirical Analysis from

1996 to 2013

Kristin Eichhorn


Kristin Eichhorn, 28, from Chemnitz (Germany), received her Master’s degree in East European Studies at Free

University in Berlin in July 2015. She wrote her Master’s thesis on re-autocratizations. Currently she works as a

research assistant at the Institute for Political Sciences at the Technical University of Chemnitz. Her interests include

political systems, transformations, electoral systems, and political parties.

Abstract

During the 1990s, research in the political sciences within the framework of the transition paradigm focused mainly on

democratization and consolidation. However, in recent years a growing debate concerning the decline of democratic

quality and breakdown of democracies has emerged. In this paper, the collapse of electoral democracies (referred to as re-

autocratizations) will be operationalized using a minimalistic conception of democracy and analyzed globally in the

timeframe from 1996 to 2013 using logistic regression. Significant effects for economic growth rates and governance

performance are found.

Keywords

Breakdown of democracy, re-autocratization, regime change, transformations, transitions, logistic

regression analysis



54

Introduction20

The third wave of democratization resulted in a worldwide increase of the number and quality of

democracies. Especially the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union led to optimistic expectations

concerning the trajectories of those transformations. The transition paradigm assumes that all countries

of the third wave moving away from autocracy are on the way to become a democracy (e.g.

Carothers 2002: 6; Levitsky and Way 2015: 49). Consequently, academia focused mainly on the

determinants of democratizations and democratic consolidations (Ambrosio 2010: 375f.; Erdmann

2011: 7).

Since the mid-2000s, the transition paradigm has been increasingly challenged. As early as the mid-

1990s –at the peak of democracy optimism– Huntington proclaimed that third wave democracies

might face a reverse wave as well: “History unfolds in a dialectic fashion. Any substantial movement

in one direction tends eventually to lose its momentum and to generate countervailing forces” (1996:

5). Whether we are currently facing a reverse wave is much debated. On the one hand it is argued

that the empiric data is not yet sufficient support for assumption of an arising reverse wave21. On the

other hand, increasing numbers of hybridizations and losses of democratic quality are identified and

interpreted as a sign for a possibly upcoming reverse wave22.

This debate gave an impetus to the research on autocracies (Thiery 2015: 419). Furthermore, the

research on autocracies was invigorated by the fact that not all countries that previously were

considered in transition actually ever reached full democracy. Many introduced democratic institutions,

but reasonable doubts concerning the democratic quality remain (Schmotz 2015: 561). Gero

Erdmann (2011: 28ff.) makes a strong plea for the study of reverse transitions and broadly traces the

contours of a potential future research agenda.

This paper examines why some democracies endure, while in other cases autocracies or hybrid

regimes are re-established, henceforward called re-autocratizations. The applied conceptualizations of

re-autocratization rests on a minimalistic institutional definition of democracies. After terminological

20 This paper is a shortened and revised version of my master thesis. The original thesis was published in German language and can be accessed here: http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/politik/publikationen/AP81.pdf. I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Dr. Klaus Segbers and Cosima Glahn for their valuable inputs and support. 21 Schmitter (2015) argues that there is a crisis of democracy due to dissatisfaction with its way of functioning despite a general desire for democracy. Levitsky and Way (2015) argue that new democracies are strikingly robust. Currently we do not face a reverse wave, but a saturation. 22 Based upon the Freedom in the World Index, Puddington (2008) views the developments as a setback for democracy. Diamond (2015) claims that if the current democratic recession eventuates in “swing states” such as India it might be the forerunner of a reverse wave.


55

preliminary considerations and a review of available literature, the mainly endogenous determinants

of re-autocratizations are analyzed in a logistic regression for 1382 country years (102 countries in

between 1996 and 2013), of which 32 are considered re-autocratizations.

Literature Review

Köllner and Kailitz (2013: 2) decompose the research on autocracy and autocratizations in two

phases. The first phase emerged after the Second World War and focused on totalitarian regimes and

classifications (Hartmann 2015: 100ff). Nevertheless, the three volume work The Breakdown of

Democratic Regimes by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1978) can be considered a cornerstone of the

research on re-autocratizations. With increasing democracy optimism however, the academic interest

in autocracies wore off until the late 1990s. At the latest since the color revolutions, the field of

research experienced renewed interest. In this new phase, the emphasis is placed on autocratic

stability (e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 2006), instability or the breakdown of authoritarian and hybrid

regimes (e.g. Geddes et al. 2014; Brownlee 2009), or classification of autocratic systems (e.g. Cheibub

et al. 2010). Furthermore, conceptual and empiric research on re-autocratizations was performed.

Ulfelder and Lustik (2007) operationalize autocracy and democracy as a dichotomy using selected

variables of the 21-point Polity Index (PI). For a country year to be considered democratic, the score

of the variable Executive recruitment needs to be six or above, and Competitiveness of Political Participation

needs to score above three. In an event-history model they find that wealthy democracies are less

prone to regime changes in support of assumptions of modernization theory. However, they do not

find a significant correlation between presidentialism and the chance of re-autocratization and

therefore challenge previous structural assumptions.

Kapstein and Converse (2008a) analyze failed democratizations between 1960 and 2004. Referring to

open questions and contradictions regarding the application of modernization theory to young

democracies, they argue that the main focus should be placed on political institutions. They find that

reversals are more likely in parliamentary democracies. Due to the weak status of parliaments in

young democracies, they cannot live up to their intended role and put constraints on the executive

power. Kapstein and Converse chose a dichotomous differentiation between democratizations and

their reverse based on the PI. A democratization is measured when the PI increases within three

years by six points. Conversly, an autocratization is measured when PI decreases by six points within

three years. Kapstein and Converse find 123 democratizations, of which 56 were reversed. However,


56

of the 123 measured democratizations 40 did not reach the level of a full democracy, but remained

partially democratic (Kapstein and Converse 2008b: 2f.). In theory, cases where a six-point decrease

results in a anocratic regime are possible. Those would be placed in the same category as six-point

decreases, which result in (full) autocracies.The authors acknowledge this problem, but do not

further investigate it, for the lack of empiric cases (Kapstein and Converse 2008b: 2f.). However, it

needs to be questioned whether autocratizations where the outcome is anocratic (i.e. a score of -1)

are subject to the same mechanisms as autocratizations, where a fully-fledged autocracy (i.e. a score

of -6 or below) is the result. The same applies on the democratic end of the scale. Therefore, using

intervals seems to be more suited to measure the loss of democratic quality rather than regime

changes. Furthermore, Vreeland (2003: 7) finds that the PI is not a continuous measure and claims

that it can be considered ordinal at most. Therefore, the assumption of equidistant values cannot be

made. Ordinal scales can be subject to a ranking, but are not suitable for addition or subtraction.23

Ko Maeda (2010) differentiates between endogenous and exogenous breakdowns of democracy.

Endogenous breakdowns originate from within the government, exogenous breakdowns from

without (Ibid.: 1130). A breakdown of democracy is measured when the PI falls below the threshold

value of six points. With a survival analysis between 1950 and 2004, Maeda finds that endogenous

breakdowns are not correlated with the macroeconomic situation, while exogenous breakdowns are

less frequent the better the economic situation (Ibid.: 1141ff.).

These studies use a continuous measure of regime type which is based on a broad conception of

democracy. However, for the empirical analysis, they define thresholds or intervals that allow a

recoding as a nominal variable (measuring whether the regime change occurred or not). Both Maeda

and Kapstein & Converse use the same data set but define different thresholds for the measurement

of the breakdown of a regime.

In contrast to these studies, Milan Svolik (2008) chooses a minimalist conception of democracy and

focuses on the length of democratic spells. He splits his data in failed democracies and currently

existing democracies and performs a survival analysis. He finds that the chance for survival increases

with the age of a democracy. The hazard rate for re-autocratization is among others increased by

poor economic development, presidentialism, and a military authoritarian legacy. This however only

applies to transitional (young) democracies. Therefore, Svolik advocates to distinguish between

23 Same criticism applies to the level of measurement of the Freedom in the World Index (Vreeland 2003: 5).


57

factors that increase the hazard rate for autocratizations and factors that support consolidation

(Svolik 2008: 166)

Gero Erdmann (2011) also examines whether the conditions which make democratization possible

differ from those for the decline of democracy. He analyzes changes in the Freedom in the World Score

in between 1974 and 2008. Changes with the result “not free” are operationalized as collapse of

democracy, and changes with the result “partly free” as hybridizations. He finds 52 cases of

democratic decline, of which only four lead to a breakdown of democracy. Bringing those categories

to a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), he finds that younger democracies are more likely to

experience decline of democracy. Furthermore, correlations with the macro-economic development

and economic performance are confirmed. Erdmann concludes that the loss of democratic quality

does not necessarily lead to hybridizations or collapse of democracy (Erdmann 2011: 17).

Besides the empirical studies, there is also a conceptual debate on the hypothesis, whether re-

autocratizations are facilitated by mechanism of diffusion. Lucan Way argues that there is an

increased “authoritarian aggressiveness” (Way 2016: 74). Autocrats attack democracy promotion by

offering autocratic alternatives. However, these tactics are still ineffective and in some cases

unintendedly lead to democratization (Ibid.: 71ff.). Especially Russia and China are identified as main

players in this field and much attention is paid to the increasingly difficult circumstances of non-

governmental organizations (Ambrosio 2010; Cooley 2015).

The concept of re-autocratizations

Transformations from democracy to autocracy can be as diverse as their democratic counterpart.

Recently, Nancy Bermeo has described this diversity as follows:

Backsliding can take us to different endpoints at different speeds […] Democratic

backsliding can thus constitute democratic breakdown or simply the serious weakening

of existing democratic institutions for undefined ends. When backsliding yields

situations that are fluid and ill-defined, taking action to defend democracy becomes

particularly difficult." (Bermeo 2016: 6)

The terminology applied to those different types of transformations is still under construction.

Firstly, the loss of democratic quality has been inter alia named democratic backsliding (Aleman and


58

Yang 2011)24, hybridization (Erdmann 2011) or democratic erosion (Bermeo 2016). The outcome of

those processes remains undefined. Especially the term hybridization refers to diminished subtypes

of democracy as an outcome. Secondly, complete regime changes have been called collapse of

democracy (Diskin et al. 2005), breakdown of democracy (Maeda 2010) or (re-)autocratization

(Merkel 2010). The former two terms are ambiguous: The collapse of a regime does not

automatically lead to the introduction of an opposite regime. As noted above, not all transformations

of the third wave of democracy did in fact lead to the consolidation of democratic institutions and

norms. The same applies to regime changes in the opposite direction: breakdown of democracy does

not necessarily imply that the initial democracy won’t be followed by another democratic regime. The

term re-autocratizations shall bypass this ambiguity.

From Electoral Democracy to Re-Autocratization

Re-autocratizations are considered regime changes which replace a democracy with an autocracy.

The liberal qualities of the initial regime are not taken into consideration. Regimes are socially

constructed (Albrecht and Frankenberger 2010: 49). For the purpose of measurement they need to

be attributed to observational concepts. The accentuation or disregard of characteristic indicators is

dependent on the conceptualization of the regime type in question. There are countless

conceptualizations and operationalizations of democracy. Autocracy however, is in most cases

conceptualized as the residual category of democracy: anything non-democratic is considered

autocratic (Ibid.: 38). This democracy bias is also reflected in the available data sets. Whereas their

objective is to measure all regime types, they are more or less a measurement of the degree of

democracy (Hartmann 2015: 149).

I conceptualize re-autocratizations on the basis of a minimalistic democracy concept focusing on the

institution of elections. For elections to qualify as democratic, certain standards summarized under

the concept of contestation need to be met: “1) ex ante uncertainty, 2) ex post irreversibility, and 3)

repeatability” (Cheibub et al. 1996: 49). The focus on the institution of elections is based on a

Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy as a method:

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political

decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive

struggle for the people’s vote.” (Schumpeter 1950: 269)

24 However, the term backsliding has also been applied on complete regime collapses, e.g. by Ulfelder and Lustik (2007).


59

Whereas this operationalization draws a clear line between democracies and autocracies, doubts on

the democratic qualities of electoral democracies are reasonable. Given the emergence of hybrid

regimes and especially competitive authoritarianism, this dichotomous approach might be outdated.

Therefore, the conceptualization of re-autocratization on the basis of electoral democracies bears the

risk of oversimplification.

The alternative approach would be the usage of a broad democracy concept including political

freedom or the regimes responsiveness to the preferences of the people (Schmidt 2010: 212f.).

However, these broad concepts make it difficult to define a line between autocracy and democracy.

Therefore, these conceptualizations prove very useful when analyzing the loss of democratic quality,

but have weaknesses when looking specifically at the breakdown of democracies and the

introduction of autocratic ruling.

Operationalization of Re-Autocratizations

As the conceptualization of re-autocratizations is based on a minimal concept of democracy, a

nominal indicator differentiating between autocracy and democracy is sufficient. For the

measurement, the list of electoral democracies provided by Freedom House is used. The list of

electoral democracies indicates whether a country is considered an electoral democracy. This

classification is based on the evaluation of the electoral process in the Freedom in the World data set.

The data is available annually from 1989. To represent re-autocratizations the data set will be recoded

as follows.

0 = no Re-Autocratization

1 = Re-Autocratization

As re-autocratizations only occur in electoral democracies, only years marked as such are coded 0. All

autocratic country years are coded missing values. The first year of an autocratic spell is coded 1.

Furthermore, generally instable states which oscillate between electoral democracy and autocracy on

a regular basis could degrade the validity of the data. Therefore, a temporal minimal requirement is

introduced. Electoral democracies must have existed for three years prior to a regime change for this

regime change to qualify as a re-autocratization. Any earlier regime changes are considered indicators

of general instability of the regime in question. The duration of three years has not been chosen

arbitrarily. This minimal temporal requirement encompasses that at least half of the first legislative


60

period was an electoral democracy.25 Therefore, cases in which an autocrat used democratic elections

to rise to power to then introduce autocratic ruling are censored out. Three years exceeds the

criterion introduced by Brownlee (2009: 528) whereby three out of four years need to be democratic

to be considered a democratization and exceeds Erdmanns (2011: 11) criterion of two years.

Operationalization of Explanatory Variables

Different theoretic approaches allow the analysis and explanation of re-autocratizations. The basis of

the research on regime changes are the transformation theories, focusing on the functional

differentiation of the system, structural properties, culture and the choices of political elites.

It is assumed that regime changes are a complex phenomenon. Therefore mono-causal explanations

are insufficient (e.g. Erdmann 2011: 18; Merkel and Thiery 2007: 192). In this paper, assumptions of

modernization theory and structuralist assumptions are combined. The explanatory variables are

grouped in two dimensions: a socio-economic dimension and a politico-institutional dimension.

Socio-Economic Dimension

Building on modernization theory, the socio-economic dimension includes the effect of the degree

of modernization, GDP growth rates and the income distribution.

The Degree of Modernization (IV1) is operationalized using the Human Development Index (HDI),

which includes the components life expectancy, educational level and GDP. It is hypothesized that

the higher the human development, the lower the chances for re-autocratization.

The effect of economic growth rates is puzzling. The theoretic assumptions and empirical findings

on their correlation with democratic stability are conflicting. Even though high growth rates are

associated with improvements of the living standard, they might challenge democracy due to a

sudden crash of traditional values. Lipset hypothesized a functional interdependence between

different factors of modernization, such as income, education or democratic values. Unbalanced

development in these factors might challenge democracy:

We know that development efforts, projects that interrupt the life styles and the social

relationships of people and change level of expectation, as a result, may make people

25 I am not aware of a global analysis of the length of legislative periods. The argument is based on a study of the length of legislative periods in six consolidated democracies between 1960 and 2005. The average length of legislative periods was 3.5 years. The maximum constitutionally legal legislative period was 5 years (Markwardt 2008: 93).


61

vulnerable to recruitment by extremist movements, religious or secular.” (Lipset 1994:

17)

In contrast, Przeworski and Limongi (1997: 167f.) find that growth generally correlates positively

with democratic survival and that bad economic performance is rather a thread to democratic

survival.

In this paper both extreme growth and economic crisis are hypothesized to be destabilizing factors

for democracy and therefore increase the chance for re-autocratization. In order to test this u-shaped

correlation, a transformed version of the annual per-capita GDP is included. Based on the per-capita

GDP for each country year, the relative change of the GDP over the 5 past years is calculated. Crisis

does not necessarily mean negative growth. Growth that is below the average can be experienced by

the poulation or instrumentalized by non-democratic forces as a crisis. Therefore, the growth rates

for each country year will be centered on the median26 of the growth rates in this country during the

period under research. As it is hypothesized that both crisis and excessive growth are destabilizing,

the absolute values of the centered growth rates are used. This variable then indicates the strength of

the deviation of the relative growth of the per-capita GDP over the past five years from the average

growth, irrespective whether it is positive or negative. The variable is named Growth (IV2). The higher

the Growth (meaning the higher the positive or negative deviation from average growth rates) is the

higher is the chance for re-autocratization.

The assumption of power dispersion, as a structuralist enhancement of modernization theory, is that

power resources need to be distributed equitably for democracy to be stable.

Democracy […] is a delicate political arrangement that comes into place under a very

special set of circumstances. Have too much inequality and asset specificity and a

country is almost certain to be perennially under dictatorship. If by chance democracy is

introduce in a country whose levels of inequality and/or asset specificity exceed a

certain threshold, the country is likely to experience political unrest and revert back to

authoritarianism.” (Aleman and Yang 2011: 6)

A widely available measure of distribution of resources is the Distribution of Income (IV3). Even though

this relates only to one specific power resource, it still might bring interesting results. The

26 The centering is conducted on the median in order to minimize the impact of outliers.


62

distribution of the income is included using the GINI-Index. It is hypothesized that the more

dispersed the income the lower the chances of re-autocratization.

Politico-Institutional Dimension

Within the structuralist approaches to democratic (in)-stability and transformations, the focus is put

on institutions and structure of power (Merkel and Thiery 2007: 192). The constitutional design of a

democracy is a central factor. One prominent assumption advocated by Juan Linz (Linz 1990: 51) is

that parliamentary democracies are more stable than presidential democracies. The dual power

legitimation and the winner takes all elections are assumed to have destabilizing potential. However, as

seen in the literature review, the empirical results are contradictory. I follow Linz’ argumentation and

hypothesize that in presidential and semi-presidential democracies the chance for re-autocratization

is higher than in parliamentary democracies. For the variable System of Government (IV4) presidentialism

and semi-presidentialism will be included as dummy variables.

Furthermore it is assumed that inefficient and ineffective governance lead to general dissatisfaction

with the political system and thus instability. Only good governance allows the effects of

modernization and economic growth to have a stabilizing effect on a democracy:

Without significant improvements in governance, economic growth will not take off or

be sustainable. Without legal and political institutions to control corruption, punish

cheating, and ensure a level economic and political playing field, pro-growth policies will

be ineffective and their economic benefits will be overshadowed or erased.” (Diamond

2008: 42)

If politics for example are shaped by corruption or the general perception of ineffectiveness and

inefficiency, the political system will be instable. The World Governance Indicator (WGI) measures

perceived governance in six components. However, on the basis of conceptual doubts27 only three of

those components are included: Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption. All

three components capture the citizens perception of the issue (Kraay et al. 2010: 3). As the

components are highly correlated, for the statistical analysis they will be combined to the variable

27 The component Voice and Accountability inter alia includes whether citizen can select the government. Political

Stability and Absence of Violence measures the likelihood that a government will be overthrown violently. Both are

directly related to the concept of re-autocratization. Rule of Law is not directly related to the concept of electoral

democracy, however, I assume that rule of law is an integral part of contestation. To avoid circular argumentation, all

three are omitted.


63

Perceived Governance Performance (IV5). Even though this is a subjective measure, it is assumed that the

perception on these issues might be determining actions. It is hypothesized that high Perceived

Governance Performance (IV5) decreases the chances for re-autocratization.

Method

To test the determinants of re-autocratizations, a stepwise binary logistic regression is performed.

This method allows the estimation of the (logarithmized) chance for binary dependent variables on

the basis of the influence of independent variables. As re-autocratizations are rare events, logistic

regression analysis is useful: non-linear relationships between dependent variables and independent

variables are allowed (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007: 437).

Due to restrictions on the availability of data the analysis will be performed for the years 1996 to

2013. All countries with at least 1 000 000 inhabitants that experienced a democratic spell of three

years or longer during the research period are included in the analysis. 28 In total 102 countries

summing up to 1382 country years are analyzed.29

Appendix 4 provides an overview of the tested independent variables. As some of the indicators for

the independent variables are not available annually, trends were calculated in order to avoid

excessive occurrence of missing values. However, the use of these trends might lead to data

smoothing and ignore possible volatility. This is especially the case for the variable Income Distribution.

In the data set 32 cases of re-autocratization occur. This rarity requires specific consideration in the

construction of the regression model. Firstly, regression models applied to rare data tend to

underestimate the chance of the event (King and Zeng 2001: 138).30 Secondly, as a rule of thumb

there should be 10 cases in the smaller category of the dependent variable per included independent

variable. Otherwise the model might suffer from overfitting, meaning that with each additional

variable the measures of goodness increase while the variables remain insignificant (Tabachnick and

Fidell 2007: 442). Applied to the analyzed data, this means that in each model not more than three

28 Due to restrictions in the data availability (especially the World Governance Indicator and the GINI-Index) micro states cannot be included in the analysis. Appendix 1 provides an overview of all excluded states. 29 The number of country year does not equal 102 countries * 17 years. Firstly some countries were democratizes during the research period. They are only included in the analyses, after the minimal temporal requirement has been met (see Appendix 2). Furthermore in some countries data is missing, therefore those years cannot be included in the regression analysis. 30 To avoid this effect, King and Zeng (2001) propose to over- or undersample the data for the DV in order to improve the estimations. Despite conceptual doubts, both approaches were tested. The results were not much improved in comparison to the classical regression model used here.


64

variables should be included. Therefore, the regression is performed stepwise for each dimension.

Firstly, the all the variables of one dimension are added to the model. Then insignificant variables are

dropped. A final model will combine the best variables from both dimensions.

Analysis and findings

To avoid multicollinearity the variables should not be correlated. Appendix 5 shows the correlation

coefficients in a cross table. Most of the correlations are on a low to moderate level and therefore

acceptable. However, IV1 Degree of Modernization and IV5 Perceived Governance Performance are strikingly

high correlated (0.81). for the stepwise regression models in the dimension this is no problem, as IV1

and IV5 are in different dimensions. However, in a final model these variables should not be

combined.

Table 1 summarizes the results of the logistic regression model. In the socio-economic dimension,

IV1 Degree of Modernization has a significant negative effect and IV3 Growth shows a significant positive

effect on the chance of re-autocratization. The variable IV2 Income Distribution is not significant.

Dropping it in Model II has only a marginal effect on the measures of goodness. In the politico-

Table 1: Determinants of Re-Autocratizations 1996-2013

Socio-Economic

Dimension

Politico-Institutional

Dimension

Final

Model

Model I Model II Model III Model IV

Degree of

Modernization

-0.0724**

(-6.477)

-0.0715***

(-6.382)

Growth 0.0141***

(3.667)

0.0144***

(3.743)

0.0085

(2.178)*

Income Distribution -0.0125

(-0.598)

Presidentialism

(Dummy)

-0.4784

(-0.911)

Semi-presidentialism

(Dummy)

0.2198

(0.414)

Perceived governance

Performance

-2.6466***

(-5.864)

-2.6240***

(-5.944)

-2.6091***

(-5.859)

Constant -1.4193*

(-2.401)

-1.6992***

(-4.583)

-4.3964***

(-9.350)

-4.5361***

(-12.925)

-4.8956***

(-12.055)

R² (Nagelkerke) 0.1927 0.1914 0.2440 0.2337 0.2478

Likelihood-Ratio Test 53.658*** 53.291*** 68.279*** 65.347*** 69.384***

N=1382

Binary logistic regression analysis. Dependent Variable: re-autocratization.

Shown are the coefficients and in parentheses the z-values.

Significance levels: *p<=0.05; **p<= 0.01; ***p<= 0.001, insignificant effects in grey

Source: Author (data: see Table 1)


65

institutional dimension only IV5 Perceived Governance Performance is significant and shows a negative

effect on the chance of re-autocratization.

The dummy variables for the System of Government Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism are not

significant. This might stem from the small number of events for each of the dummy variables and

the reference category. For example only 6 cases of re-autocratization occurred in parliamentary

democracies. The same problem occurs when including other classifications that split the data set,

such as region or classification of income distribution. As these rarely create significant effects,

preliminary conclusions on possible correlations can only be drawn from the comparison of

frequencies (Appendix 6).

Final Model

Due to the high degree of correlation between IV1 and IV5 only one of them shall be included in the

final model. As the degree of modernization shows a lower level of significance than perceived

governance performance, this variable is dropped. In comparison to Model II the final model shows

an increase in the measures of goodness. For the case of an average growth 31 and a Perceived

Governance Performance of 032 the model estimates a chance for re-autocratization of 0.007533. If

governance performance is perceived good, the chance decreases. Increasing deviation of the growth

rates from the average deceases this chance.

For the final model, outliers and influential cases were investigated (Appendix 7). Influential cases

have a disproportional high effect on the estimation of parameters in the regression model. Cases

which experienced re-autocratizations despite a relatively low predicted chance yield high residuals.

Cases without re-autocratizations despite a high predicted chance show high leverage. High leverage

and residuals combined identify influential cases.

Four cases are identified as influential, all of which are re-autocratization. The data on outliers and

influential cases encompasses important information. Firstly, e.g. the case of Liberia in the year 2000

shows high leverage. However, in the following year a re-autocratization occurred, which meets the

criteria for an influential case. Therefore, the approach might be improved by a refinement of the

time steps: Yearly observations do not distinguish between re-autocratizations at the beginning of the

year or at the end. However, a re-autocratization in the first half of a year might be provoked by the

31 Meaning that the deviation from the average Growth over 5 years in the country is 0. 32 Slightly under average (See Appendix 4) 33 Odds (ea)


66

IVs in the previous year. Furthermore, it might be necessary to not only look at yearly developments,

but also include the effect of mid- and long-term developments on the chance of re-autocratization.

Repeated Re-Autocratizations

Despite the minimal temporal requirement, we can find countries in the data set that experienced

two re-autocratizations in the period of research. Affected are Georgia (2003 and 2008), Guinea

Bissau (200334 and 2010), Niger (1996 and 2009), Central African Republic (2001 and 2008), and

Haiti (2000 and 2010). Due to the low number of cases, a split population analysis would not

produce reliable results. However, comparing the mean values of the independent variables for the

countries that did not experience a re-autocratization with those that experience re-autocratization

once or twice, tendencies are revealed. The degree of modernization in countries that experienced re-

autocratization twice is considerably lower than in countries with one re-autocratization. If the

median is taken into consideration the distribution is obviously skewed to the left. Georgia has a

relatively high degree of modernization and therefore increases the mean of the whole group.

The variables Growth and Perceived Governance Performance also confirm the hypothesized correlations.

The perceived governance performance is lowest in countries with two re-autocratizations.

Furthermore, the deviation of growth rates from the average growth rates are more erratic than in

countries without or with single re-autocratizations.

Table 1: Single and Repeated Re-Autocratizations in Comparison

No Re-Autocratization Re-Autocratization (AV=1)

74 countries

1150 country years

once

23 countries

202 country years

twice

5 countries

30 country years

Degree of Modernization 74.80

(76.85)

52.92

(54.15)

41.94

(37.05)

Growth 32.64 %

(23.37 %)

33.08 %

(23.24 %)

39.64 %

(37.21 %)

Perceived Governance

Performance

0.57

(0.54)

-0.51

(-0.51)

-0.90

(-1.07)

Displayed are the mean and in parentheses the median.

Source: Author

34 This re-autocratization not in the regression model, due to missing values for the independent variables.


67

Conclusions

Re-Autocratizations are more likely in countries with relatively low human development and the

perception of bad governance (high corruption, low government effectiveness and regulatory

qualities). Furthermore, excessive deviations from the average growth in a country, be it economic

crisis or excessive economic growth, increase the chance for re-autocratization.

As discussed above, the low number of 32 re-autocratizations in the analysis is a challenge. An

expansion of the data set or application of other methods such as QcA could improve the

estimations. The results presented here only give a rough impression, as the level of abstraction

especially in case of the dependent variable is very high, and seems not suitable when taking hybrid

regimes and electoral authoritarianism into consideration. Furthermore, whether the identified

explanatory variables are genuinely determining democratic instability and re-autocratization, or if the

same variables are applicable on authoritarian breakdowns and subsequent democratizations requires

further investigation. Countries that experienced re-autocratization twice are assumed to not only

have instable democracies, but also to not be able to stabilize autocratically.

The minimal temporal criterion was only applied to the democratic spell. Of the 28 countries that

experienced one or more re-autocratizations during the research period 14 were again considered an

electoral democracy in 2013. Some were re-autocratizations that were followed shortly by electoral

democracies. Georgia (2003) and Bangladesh (2007) did not experience an autocratic spell after the

re-autocratization. How do those cases differ from countries that took much longer until the next

democratization or were not yet democratized again? What implications does the length of an

autocratic spell following a re-autocratization have for the following democratic regimes and vice

versa?

Looking at the regional distribution of re-autocratizations, more occurrences in Asia and Africa.

However, these categories were not included as variables due to the small number of cases in each

class. It might be interesting to investigate, whether there are specific mechanisms of diffusion in

place in this region.

The absolute values for the centered growth rates did result in a significant effect. However, looking

at the distribution of the growth rates, we find that the variable is not normally distributed: over

average economic performance is more common than economic crisis. Furthermore the variable


68

ignores globalization. Looking at the annual trends globally (see Appendix 8), variance in the

distribution is obvious and needs further investigation.


69

Bibliography

Albrecht, Holger, and Rolf Frankenberger (2010). ‘Autoritarismus Reloaded: Konzeptionelle

Anmerkungen zur Vergleichenden Analyse politischer Systeme’, in Holger Albrecht and Rolf

Frankenberger (eds.), Autoritarismus Reloaded: Neuere Ansätze und Erkenntnisse der Autokratieforschung,

37–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/9783845225470

Aleman, Jose, and David D Yang (2011). ‘A Duration Analysis of Democratic Transitions and

Authoritarian Backslides’, Comparative Political Studies, 44, 1123–1151.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414011405460

Ambrosio, Thomas (2010). ‘Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts,

Dynamics, and Future Research’, International Studies Perspectives, 11:4, 375–392.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00411.x

Bermeo, Nancy (2016). ‘On Democratic Backsliding’, Journal of Democracy, 27:1, 5–19.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012

Brownlee, Jason (2009). ‘Portents of pluralism: How hybrid regimes affect democratic transitions’,

American Journal of Political Science, 53:3, 515–532. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-

5907.2009.00384.x

Carothers, Thomas (2002). ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13:1, 5–21.


Cheibub, Jose Anonio, Michael M Alvarez, Adam Przeworski, and Fernando Pappaterra Limongi

Neto (1996). ‘What makes Democracies endure?’, Journal of Democracy, 7, 39–55.


Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland (2010). ‘Democracy and

dictatorship revisited’, Public Choice, 143, 67–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2

Cooley, Alexander (2015). ‘Countering Democratic Norms’, Journal of Democracy, 26:3, 49–63.


Diamond, Larry (2008). ‘The Democratic Rollback The Resurgence of the Predatory State states’,

Foreign Affairs, 87:2, 36–48.

Diamond, Larry (2015). ‘Facing Up to the Democratic Recession’, Journal of Democracy, 26:1, 141–155.


http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/9783845225470

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414011405460

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00411.x


http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00384.x

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00384.x



http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2




70

Diskin, Abraham, Hana Diskin, and Reuven Y Hazan (2005). ‘Why Democracies Collapse: The

Reasons for Democratic Failure and Success’, International Political Science Review, 26:3, 291–309.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512105053787

Erdmann, Gero (2011). ‘Transition from Democracy. Loss of Quality , Hybridisation and

Breakdown of Democracy’, GIGA Research Programme,. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2134854

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (2014). ‘Autocratic Breakdown and Regime

Transitions: A New Data Set’, Perspectives on Politics, 12:02, 313–331.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592714000851

Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell (2006). ‘Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways to

democracy, 1972-2003’, The Kellog Institute,November, 1–35.

Hartmann, Jürgen (2015). Demokratie und Autokratie in der vergleichenden Demokratieforschung. Wiesbaden:

Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07479-1

Huntington, Samuel P (1996). ‘Democracy for the Long Haul’, Journal of Democracy, 7:2, 3–13.


Kapstein, Ethan B, and Nathan Converse (2008a). ‘Why Democracies Fail’, Journal of Democracy, 19:4,

57–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0031

Kapstein, Ethan B, and Nathan Converse (2008b). ‘Codebook: Kapstein and Converse Dataset of

Young Democracies, 1960-2004’, http://www.ethankapstein.com/data-sets/Codebook.doc

(Accessed February 29, 2016).

King, Gary, and Langche Zeng (2001). ‘Logistic regression in rare events data’, International

Organization, 55:3, 693–715. http://dx.doi.org/10.18637/jss.v008.i02

Köllner, Patrick, and Steffen Kailitz (2013). ‘Comparing autocracies: theoretical issues and empirical

analyses’, Democratization, 20:1, 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738859

Kraay, Aart, Daniel Kaufmann, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). ‘The worldwide governance

indicators : methodology and analytical issues’, Policy Research Working Papers.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5430

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A Way (2015). ‘The Myth of Democratic Recession’, Journal of Democracy,

26:1, 45–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0007

Linz, Juan J (1990). ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy, 1:1, 51–69.

Lipset, Seymour Martin (1994). ‘The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential

Address’, American Sociological Review, 59:1, 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2096130

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512105053787

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592714000851

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07479-1



http://dx.doi.org/10.18637/jss.v008.i02

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738859

http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5430


http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2096130


71

Maeda, Ko (2010). ‘Two Modes of Democratic Breakdown: A Competing Risks Analysis of

Democratic Durability’, The Journal of Politics, 72:04, 1129–1143.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022381610000575

Markwardt, Gunther (2008). Wahlen und Konjunkturzyklen. 1. Aufl. Wiesbaden: Gabler.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9976-4

Merkel, Wolfgang (2010). ‘Are dictatorships returning? Revisiting the “democratic rollback”

hypothesis’, Contemporary Politics, 16:1, 17–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569771003593839

Merkel, Wolfgang, and Peter Thiery (2007). ‘Systemwechsel’, in Hans-Joachim Lauth (ed.),

Vergleichende Regierungslehre. Eine Einführung., vol. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 186–

212.

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi (1997). ‘Modernization. Theory and Facts’, World Politics,

49:2, 155–183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.1997.0004

Puddington, Arch (2008). ‘Freedom in retreat: Is the tide turning? Findings of Freedon in the World

2008’, Journal of Democracy, 19:2, 61–73.

Schmidt, Manfred G (2010). Demokratietheorien: eine Einführung. 5. Auflage, Lizenzausgabe. Bonn:

Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung.

Schmitter, Philippe C (2015). ‘Crisis and transition, but not decline’, Journal of Democracy, 26:1, 32–44.


Schmotz, Alexander (2015). ‘Hybride Regime’, in Raj Kollmorgen,Wolfgang Merkel,and Hans-Jürgen

Wagener (eds.), Handbuch Transformationsforschung, Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 561–

567. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-05348-2_44

Schumpeter, Joseph A (1950). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers

Publishers.

Svolik, Milan (2008). ‘Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation’, American Political Science

Review, 102:2, 153–168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055408080143

Tabachnick, Barbara G, and Linda S Fidell (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics. 5th ed. Boston:

Pearson.

Thiery, Peter (2015). ‘Demokratische Transitionen im späten 20. Jahrhundert’, in Raj

Kollmorgen,Wolfgang Merkel,and Hans-Jürgen Wagener (eds.), Handbuch Transformationsforschung, vol.

Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 405–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-

05348-2_30

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022381610000575

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9976-4

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569771003593839

http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.1997.0004


http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-05348-2_44

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055408080143

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-05348-2_30

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-05348-2_30


72

Ulfelder, Jay, and Michael Lustik (2007). ‘Modelling Transitions To and From Democracy’,

Democratization, 14:2, 351–387. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340701303196

Vreeland, James Raymond (2003). ‘A continuous Schumpeterian conception of democracy’,

Philadelphia.

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Excluded Countries

Countries that did not experience a democratic spell of at least three years during the research period: Afghanistan,

Algeria. Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burma, Cambodia,

Cameroon, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea,

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya,

Malaysia, Mauretania, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,

Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, The Gambia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates,

Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Counties with a population below 1 000 000: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,

Bhutan, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti , Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Liechtenstein,

Luxemburg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Montenegro, Nauru, Monaco, Palau,

Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Gren., Suriname, Tonga,

Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Appendix 2: Countries in the Population without Re-Autocratization

Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil. Bulgaria, Canada,

Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic (from

1999), East Timor (from 2005), Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana

(from 1999), Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,

Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi (from 1997), Mauritius, Mexico (from 2003), Moldova (from 1998),

Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New

Guinea, Paraguay, Peru (from 2004), Tanzania (from 2013), Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom,

United States of America, Uruguay.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340701303196


73

Appendix 3: Overview of Countries that Experienced Re-Autocratizations

Country

Co

de

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Armenia ARM Bangladesh BGD

Bosnia u. Herzegovina BIH Burundi BDI

Central African Republic CAF Georgia GEO

Guinea-Bissau GNB

Haiti HTI

Honduras HND Kenya KEN

Kyrgyzstan KGZ Lesotho LSO

Liberia LBR Madagascar MDG

Mali MLI Mozambique MOZ

Nepal NPL Nicaragua NIC

Niger NER Nigeria NGA

Pakistan PAK Philippines PHL

Republic Congo COG Russia RUS

Sri Lanka LKA Thailand THA

Venezuela VEN Zambia ZMB

Explanatory Note Democratic year (dependent variable = 0) Minimal temporal requirement. (dependent variable = missing value) Year of re-autocratization (dependent variable = 1) Missing value on the side of the independent variables. Country year cannot be included in the

regression analysis.

Autocratic year (dependent variable: missing value).

Source: Author (Data: Freedom House 2015b)


74

Appendix 4: Independent Variables

Variable Indicator (Source)

Information Hypothesized correlation

Socio-economic dimension

IV1 Degree of Modernization

HDI (UNDP 2014)

possible domain {0,100} 0 – no human development 100 – highest human development realized domain {0,70.1}i

mean 46.46 median 48.7

Negative

IV2 Growth (absolute value centered)

Centered absolute value of the relative growth rates over 5 years of the GDP per capita in a country (World Bank 2014a, own calculations)

domain{0; 251.2} 0 – average growth rate 251.2 – largest deviation from average growth rate mean 32.92 median 23.80

Positive

IV3 Income Distribution

GINI (Worldbank 2013)

possible domain{0,100} 0 – maximum diffusion of income 100 – maximum concentration of income realized domain {0,46.70}i

mean 16.64 median 13.9

Positive

Politico-institutional dimension

IV4 System of Government

Presidentialism [Dummy] Semi-Presidentialism [Dummy] (Cheibub et al. 2010)

0 – no presidentialism 1 – presidentialism 0 – no semi-presidentialism 1 – semi-presidentialism Reference category: parliamentary system

Positive

IV5 Perceived Governance Performance

Index of three components of WGI -Control of Corruption -Government Effectiveness -Regulatory Quality (Worldbank 2014b)

Possible domain {-2.5,2.5} realized domain {-1,66,2.27} mean 0.38 median 0.20

negative

i For the purpose of the logistic regression the lowest value of the original distribution of the variable was set 0, in order to ease the interpretation of the regression constant. It then indicates the additive effect unit for each unit above the lowest value in the dataset. The empirical distributions are IV1 {24.30,94.40} and IV3 {23.1,69.8}. Source: Author


75

Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix for the Variables

DV IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5

Presidential Semi-

Presidential

DV

1.00 -0.19*** 0.07** 0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.18***

IV1

1.00 0.02 -0.46*** -0.24*** -0.07*** 0.81***

IV2

1.00 -0.06** -0.02 0.02 -0.03

IV3

1.00 0.53*** -0.26*** -0.46

IV4

Presidential 1.00 -0.43*** -0.30***

Semi- Presidential

1.00 -0.09**

IV5

1.00

Pearsons correlation coefficient. Significance levels: *p<=0,05; **p<= 0,01; ***p<= 0,001, insignificant correlation coefficients in grey. Source: Author (Data: see Table 1)

Appendix 6: Group Differences in the Frequency of Re-Autocratizations

Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Type of Government

Parliamentary

Systems Semi-Presidential

Systems Presidential

Systems Total

n=536 n=317 n=326 N=1382

no Re-Autocratization (AV=0)

533 98.89 %

304 95.90 %

513 97.54 %

1350 97.68 %

Re-Autocratization (AV=1)

6 1.11 %

13 4.10 %

13 2.46 %

32 2.32 %

Depicted is the number of country years and the column percentage. Source: Author

Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Region

Africa Asia

Latin America Caribbean

Eastern Europe

W. Europe N. America

Total

n=157 n=224 n=319 n=279 n=403 N=1382

no Re-Autocratization (DV=0)

151 96.18 %

209 93.30 %

314 98.43 %

273 97.84 %

403 100.00 %

1350 97.68 %

Re-Autocratization (DV=1)

6 3.82 %

15 6.70 %

5 1.57 %

6 2.15 %

0 0.00 %

32 2.32 %



76

Point of Time of First Democratization

Before 1974 After 1974 Total

n=582 n=800 N=1382


579 99.48 %

771 96.36 %

1350 97.68 %


3 0.51 %

29 3,63 %

32 2.32 %


Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Grouped Income Diffusion

high

diffusion n=346

medium diffusion

n=346

medium concentration

n=344

High concentration

n=346

total

N=1 382


342 98.84 %

340 98.26 %

330 95.38 %

338 97.69 %

1350 97.68 %


4 1.16 %

6 1.73 %

14 4.05 %

8 2.31 %

32 2.32 %

The grouping is conducted on the basis of the quartiles: 1st quartile 31.67, median 37.00, 3rd quartile 47.17. Depicted are the country years per category and column percentage. Source: Author

Appendix 7: Residuals and Leverage for Outlier Cases

Case

nu

mb

er

Resi

du

als

Leve

rag

e

Country

Year

Re-Autocratization

Growthi Perceived Governance Performance

High Residuals

1.256 16.18 0.00 Thailand 2005 Yes -1.83 0.43

38 8.63 0.00 Armenia 2003 Yes -4.48 -0.26

1060 7.58 0.00 Philippines 2007 Yes 25.84 0.08

743 7.54 0.00 Lesotho 1998 Yes -29.02 -0.13

High Leverage

1304 -0.59 0.12 Ukraine 2008 No 245,22 -0.71

1188 -0.43 0.09 Serbia 2005 No 251.19 -0.31

1303 -0.49 0.08 Ukraine 2007 No 223.03 -0.67

718 -1.19 0.07 Liberia 2000 No 105.96 -1.84


77

Case

nu

mb

er

Resi

du

als

Leve

rag

e

Country

Year

Re-Autocratization

Growthi Perceived Governance Performance

Influential Cases

471 7.26 0,01 Georgia 2008 Yes 167.33 0,30

139 2.42 0,03 Bosnia and Herzegovina

1999 Yes 173.91 -0.93

1.358 1.03 0.12 Venezuela 2008 Yes 204.61 -1.11

719 1.17 0.16 Liberia 2001 Yes 60.47 -1.68

i In this table the centered growth rates are depicted. The signs are included for reference. Source: Author

Appendix 8: Annual Distribution of the Country Centered Growth Rates

Source: Author.


78

Call for Papers Politikon

Politikon is the flagship publication of the International Association for

Political Science Students. It publishes papers submitted in particular by

students of all levels and young researchers with the frequency of four

issues per year.

Politikon is accepting papers for publication on a continual basis.

All articles should respect the formal structure and all requirements stated

below in “Instructions for Authors”.

The Editorial Board will contact the authors in order to communicate results

of each evaluation (1st Editorial Board Evaluation, 2nd Peer Review),

proposed changes and the planned date of publication.

The Editorial Board will not evaluate articles by authors who already (co-

)authored other articles currently under evaluation.

All interested authors should submit their articles to

[email protected].

mailto:[email protected]


79

Instructions for Authors

Recommended Academic Paper Structure

Cover Page

Title and sub-title(s) of your paper. Your Personal data incl. your full name, your institutional

affilitation (university) and study degree, your e-mail address and postal address.

Abstract

No more than 150 words. Research question, original parts of research, overview on used

methodology, conclusion(s).

Keywords

5 to 10 keywords, general and specific, in alphabetical order.

Introduction

What is the research question and why should academics research it, scientific and societal

relevance.

Literature review

What has been written on the topic previously, what conclusions did others reach.

(Model construction) and theoretical framework

What theoretical framework and approach is used and why. If applicable, causal model may be

shown at this point, or later, after data investigation.

Conceptualization and operationalization

Definition of basic terms and their indicators, choice of variables and their validity testing.

Formulation of hypotheses (explicit or implicit) based on the theory/theories. Elaboration of

specific claim(s) in the investigated theory/theories. If applicable, description of the causal

mechanism, i.e. the chain of events purported to link your explanatory variables to the specific

outcome.

Methodology

Description of the specific research method used (i.e., process-tracing, discursive analysis, MLA,

etc.), its advantages and weaknesses and why it is chosen.


80

Data

Description of the data used, number of cases, method of case-selection, source of data, method

of data collection, sampling method.

Analysis and findings

What the data show in detail, general tendencies and interesting particularities.

(Model construction) and Conclusions

Causal models may be formulated and general conclusions reached. Conclusions may or may

not specifically challenge or support findings in existing literature.

Future research

Possibilities of future research for the researcher or other scholars, promising directions,

requirements for future research.

List of References (Bibliography)

In text : (Author YEAR: page ; Co-author and Co-author YEAR: page ; Co-author et al. YEAR: page)

Bibliography Examples

1. Surname, First Name (YEAR): Title of the Book. City: Publisher. [If available] DOI:

2. Surname, First Name and First Name Surname (eds.) (YEAR): Title of the Book. City:

Publisher. [If available] DOI:

3. Surname, First Name (YEAR): ‘Title of the Journal Article’, Journal Name Nr. (Issue Nr.):

pp. XX. [If available] DOI:

4. Surname, First Name (YEAR): ‘Title of the Chapter’, in First Name Surname and First

Name Surname (eds.) Title of the Book. City: Publisher. pp. XX. [If available] DOI:

5. Surname, First Name (YEAR): ‘Title of the Thesis or the Conference Paper’, XX thesis,

University of XX, City / XX conference paper, City, Date. Website Owner / News site /

Project Leader (YEAR): Name of the Database / Title of the News Reports. Accessible at

WWW : http XXXXXX (date when last accessed). [If available] DOI:

Appendices

Every piece of data used shown so as to facilitate potential replications. If possible, data shared

publicly and/or presented together with the manuscript.

Paper Format

Contents: Cover page, abstract, keywords, main body of the paper, references, appendices, name

and short presentation of the author.


81

Font: Garamond 12, spacing 1.5;

Abstract: Garamond 12, spacing 1.15, italic; Main Title (Heading): Garamond 16, bold;

Subtitles (Section Headings): Garamond 14, bold;

Sub-Subtitles (Sub-section Headings): Garamond 12, bold, italic;

Footnotes: Garamond 10, spacing 1.15;

Presentation: Garamond 12, spacing 1.15, italic.

Paragraphs: first line indentation 1.25 cm, no spaces between paragraphs

Borders: top and bottom 2,5 cm, left and right 3,00cm (default)

Quotes: sectioned off in more than two sentences; Garamond 11, indented 1.25 cm

References and Appendices on separate pages

Tables and Charts are continuously numbered, each fits on one page at maximum, and all are

sourced (if original, use ”Source: Author.”)

Title of the submission file: LASTNAME_Initial_Title_mm_yyyy_POLITIKON/ELA.doc(x)

A good academic paper features:

Academic style of writing and structure (see section “Recommended Academic Paper

Structure”);

Grammatically correct language;

Between 4,000 and 6,000 words, without bibliography and appendices.

Presentation of the author:

Please, include a short presentation of yourself (approx. 100 – 150 words) in the following style

(3rd person singular): Name, age, hometown (country), university, degree(s), focus of your

studies/specialisation(s), Master or Bachelor Thesis, current employment or study interests, e.g.:

“Françoise Deutsch, 27, from Hammerfest (Norway), is a graduate who received her Bachelor’s

degree in “European Studies” at the University of Shire in 2008. In 2009, she obtained an

LL.M/M.Sc./MA in International Relations at the University of Stadt. She wrote her Master’s

Thesis on xxx, and currently interns/works/studies at the yyy. Her interests include security

studies, human rights, democratic transition, development studies, political philosophy, conflict

resolution, etc.”

ISSN 2414-6633

© 2016

Date post:	25-May-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	3 times
Download:	0 times

POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 … · 2018-11-16 · POLITIKON: The IAPSS...

Documents