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T he Poomacha Fire started in the early hours of October 23 as a residential structure fire that spread to the wildland. Around noon that day, I received a call from CAL FIRE Battalion Chief Alan Knopp from the Lake-Napa-Sonoma Unit; the Communications Unit Leader (COML) on California Incident Management Team 4, which had been pre-staged in Southern California awaiting assign- ment and were now heading to San Diego County to support command of the Poomacha fire. He had no commu- nications support and was looking for personnel. I told him I was available and started packing. I hit the road and noti- fied my fire chief. I had met Alan a few years ago when I was the COML on CAL FIRE Incident Management Team 2. Alan had since stopped by the Cordelia Fire District Administrative Offices, where I am now working, a cou- ple of times and we had become reac- quainted. I had told him I was still certi- fied and qualified, and if he needed any- thing, to call. That's exactly what he did. I arrived at the Poomacha Base Camp about 2 AM on Wednesday morning and immediately found Alan. CAL FIRE's Mobile Communication Center MCC24 had arrived earlier from Redding, but none of his requested per- sonnel or other equipment, including radios, had shown up. As the morning continued to go by, much to our dismay, no other communications personnel showed up at the incident base. Because we still had outstanding orders for four Incident Dispatchers and two RADO (mnemonic for Radio Operators), and because of the vast number and size of the fires in Southern California, updates on pending orders were pretty much nonexistent. As the day wore on and no word of “fill infor- mation” came in on our personnel orders, Alan and I decided to use named requests; this meant sending out emails to a few different groups and seeing who was available and had agency approval, and then officially requesting that those qualified individuals to respond to our incident. Within an hour, I had heard back from three people who could respond immediately: an incident dis- patcher for the City of Napa Fire Department, Susan Dizmang; a City of Mountain View dispatcher, Jaymie Caioli; and an incident dispatcher from San Jose Fire - who just happened to be CALIFORNIA WILDFIRES Field Communications 24 9-1-1 Magazine I January/February 2008 Poomacha Fire Communications Management at the Fire Command Post BY DON STABLER What’s left of a neighborhood reduced to ash and carcasses of metal by the Poomacha Fire. Communications needs and topography challenged field comm managers and incident dispatch- ers, who responded from all over California to support the up to 3,000 firefighters assigned to this fire. RON EGGERS The
Transcript

The Poomacha Fire started inthe early hours of October 23as a residential structure firethat spread to the wildland.Around noon that day, I

received a call from CAL FIREBattalion Chief Alan Knopp from theLake-Napa-Sonoma Unit; theCommunications Unit Leader (COML)on California Incident ManagementTeam 4, which had been pre-staged inSouthern California awaiting assign-ment and were now heading to SanDiego County to support command ofthe Poomacha fire. He had no commu-nications support and was looking forpersonnel. I told him I was available andstarted packing. I hit the road and noti-fied my fire chief. I had met Alan a fewyears ago when I was the COML onCAL FIRE Incident ManagementTeam 2. Alan had since stopped by theCordelia Fire District AdministrativeOffices, where I am now working, a cou-

ple of times and we had become reac-quainted. I had told him I was still certi-fied and qualified, and if he needed any-thing, to call. That's exactly what he did.

I arrived at the Poomacha BaseCamp about 2 AM on Wednesdaymorning and immediately found Alan.CAL FIRE's Mobile CommunicationCenter MCC24 had arrived earlier fromRedding, but none of his requested per-sonnel or other equipment, includingradios, had shown up. As the morningcontinued to go by, much to our dismay,no other communications personnelshowed up at the incident base.

Because we still had outstandingorders for four Incident Dispatchers andtwo RADO (mnemonic for RadioOperators), and because of the vast

number and size of the fires in SouthernCalifornia, updates on pending orderswere pretty much nonexistent. As theday wore on and no word of “fill infor-mation” came in on our personnelorders, Alan and I decided to use namedrequests; this meant sending out emailsto a few different groups and seeing whowas available and had agency approval,and then officially requesting that thosequalified individuals to respond to ourincident. Within an hour, I had heardback from three people who couldrespond immediately: an incident dis-patcher for the City of Napa FireDepartment, Susan Dizmang; a City ofMountain View dispatcher, JaymieCaioli; and an incident dispatcher fromSan Jose Fire - who just happened to be

CALIFORNIA WILDFIRESField Communications

24 9-1-1 Magazine I January/February 2008

Poomacha FireCommunications Management at the Fire Command Post

B Y D O N S T A B L E R

What’s left of a neighborhood reduced to ash and carcasses of metal by the Poomacha Fire.Communications needs and topography challenged field comm managers and incident dispatch-ers, who responded from all over California to support the up to 3,000 firefighters assigned tothis fire.

RON

EGG

ERS

The

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my wife, Lisa. I initiated the paperworkon the first two, and I had Alan handcarry the paperwork on Lisa to our Inci-dent Commander to make sure thateveryone was aware that a husband andwife were committed to the same com-munications unit as named requests.

As the dispatchers started to reportin many hours or a day later, our com-munications unit began to take shape,and we took responsibility for the inci-dent from the Forest Service dispatchers.I am sure the Cleveland National Forestwas happy to hear that, but because ofthe amount of frequencies in use on sur-rounding incidents, we kept our Com-mand Net on their dispatch frequency,which did have a preexisting repeaterthat worked well, until our fire morethan doubled in size.

I encountered a situation that wastenuous to say the least. A couple ofpeople in the comm unit who wereordered from out of state had problemswith work schedules and performanceand were released from the incident.This left us short; but in view of incidentand firefighter safety, I felt this was thecorrect move. At that time a named

Incident Dispatcher Perspective: Poomacha Fire CalloutB Y J A Y M I E C A O I L I , D I S P A T C H E R , C I T Y O F

M O U N T A I N V I E W ( C A )

O n October 25, 2007, 10:23 AM, I was noti-fied by Mountain View Fire Communica-

tions that I was approved to respond to thePoomacha fire in Southern California to fill aposition in the incident's communications unit.Within the hour, I was on my way to Valley Cen-ter. This would be my first deployment as anincident dispatcher on a mutual aid wildfireassignment.

At approximately 8:45 PM, I arrived at thecommand post. I checked in with Don Stabler,who was serving as deputy COML, and met thecommunications team already in place (whichincluded incident dispatchers, radio operators,and radio technicians). I completed my check-inprocess and received my first shift assignmentto begin the following day at 6 AM.

At the start of the shift, I was assigned toassist the radio techs with reprogramming theincident radios as the crews (firefighters/lead-ers) arrived. I was able assist and learn the pro-gramming process and technical needs of anincident of this nature. I also met personnelwho were assigned as unit leaders, frontlinefirefighters, and crewmen from several differentagencies. For my first time at an incident outsidemy city, as well as my first wildland experience, Ifound that working with so many different agen-cies was very beneficial to me. While the basicsof dispatching were the same, everyone's per-sonal experiences are what made up a great andsuccessful communications team.

This was day six of the fire, and the incidentstill had crews coming in and being dispatchedto the fire lines. The fire had grown very quicklyin the initial stages due to tough terrain and highwinds. The command staff thought this would bea fairly short incident; however, it turned out tobe a more difficult one to contain than anticipat-ed. The northeast end of the fire was the mostchallenging to tackle as many of the suggestedattack methods were attempted and brought toa halt due to winds. Most difficult was the terrain- crews were unable to get into many parts ofthis area.

While working the fire incident, we were alsoresponding units to incidents within the area thatwere not directly related to the fire. Not beingfrom the area made it a little difficult; but sincethere was such diversity in the comm unitstaffing, there were two dispatchers who hadgrown up in the area who could help guide us.One incident comes to mind that shows how

well the unit worked together: An inmate handcrew in the field called over the air to report aphysical fight between two crew members. Whilevery experienced dispatchers were present at thetime of this call, most were primarily fire or EMSdispatchers; having someone present whoworked police at their home agency helped rein-force the response and aid in resolving the inci-dent.

By the end of the incident, the fire hadburned approximately 49,410 acres. It alsodestroyed 138 homes and 78 outbuildings/com-mercial properties. In total, there were 379 fire-fighters assigned to the incident, of which 15were injured. The cost to fight the fire has beenestimated approximately $21 million. After inves-tigations, it has been determined that the inci-dent started with a structure fire on the La JollaIndian Reservation.

I was lucky to have had the opportunity to bea part of this incident and have gained tremen-dous experience that will benefit my career as adispatcher and an incident dispatcher. I workedwith amazing individuals and saw the day-to-dayworkings of a wildland incident. I look forward tobeing a part of future incidents. But most of all, Iwas able to be a part of helping the residents ofsouthern California during the wildfires.

9-1-1 Magazine I January/February 2008 25

Communications personnel erect a portableantenna and repeater to enhance fire commu-nications during the Poomacha Fire in SanDiego County.

LISA

STA

BLER

A lone helicopter carries a bucket of water todrop onto Poomacha flames near the PalomarObservatory in northern San Diego County.

LISA

STA

BLER

0801 911-2.qxd 2/16/08 9:00 AM Page 25

request was issued for Michael Dicker-son from Ventura County Fire. Aftermany hours and a couple of attempts toget him ordered through the system,Michael reported for duty. This was agodsend, to say the least. Michael hadspent many years with the fire depart-ment located right next door to basecamp. While I knew that this was a win-win for everyone, I did not realize howsoon it was going to pay off.

A few hours after his arrival and atshift change, we received a garbled radiomessage that sounded something like,“Emergency Traffic ... (location) ... alter-cation ... golf.” We figured out that wehad a fight involving a hand crew(“Golf ” is the mutual aid designation fora Type 1 hand crew). Because he wasfamiliar with the area, Michael was ableto pinpoint the location on the map anddirect local law enforcement to the siteand handle the dispute. Having greatdispatchers at the consoles paid off and

our named requests had earned theirweight in gold.

The radio techs assigned to CALFIRE Communications Unit workedvery well with the dispatchers. In firstfive or six mornings, we had to repro-

gram every portable radio as the com-munications plan and assignments keptchanging. Lisa had her own program-ming cube (like a thumb drive that candownload the frequency program intothe Bendix King radios), so she assisted

26 9-1-1 Magazine I January/February 2008

Communications on Location: The Poomacha FireB Y L I S A S T A B L E R , S E N I O R D I S P A T C H E R , S A N J O S E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T

O n October 25, I was deployed as an IncidentDispatcher to the Poomacha fire in San

Diego County. At 10:45 AM, I was on the road. Idecided to travel in my uniform as I thought itwould help me get past any road blocks that werein place. As I got closer to the San Bernardinoarea, if I hadn't known better, I would havethought it was late evening as the sky appearedto be dusky; but it was only 4 PM. As I got off I-15, I encountered a few roadblocks, and the uni-form did help. It was such an eerie feeling to seethe fire on the mountainside, to be the only caron the road and driving toward the fire.

I arrived at Base Camp at approximately 7:30PM. After checking in, I reported to the communi-cations unit where I was immediately put to work.I was assigned to day shift, and for the first fourdays I worked 15-hour shifts. Radio communica-tions were a daily challenge. Each morning, wereceived a new Incident Action Plan, which pro-vided the radio channels for the operational peri-od along with a packet of updated maps for eachbranch. This meant all the radios had to be repro-grammed daily.

For sleeping accommodations, we were sentto a casino inside the evacuation area. The roomswere comfortable, but the smoke was every-where; it hung in the air, so the hotel set up blow-ers in the hallways. Besides fire personnel, evac-

uees were also staying at the hotel. This caused afew interesting situations, such as the kids playingfetch with the family dog in the hallway of thehotel, and the hotel using the in-house PA systemtwice a day to announce the arrival of the meals.The latter made it hard for the folks assigned tothe night shift to get a good day's rest.

As we all settled into our routines, the sched-ule settled into 12-hour shifts. As I had lived in thearea previously, and as we tired of bag lunches, Istarted going into town to share my favorite localcuisines with my coworkers. The comm techsoffered to take us out onto the fire ground asthey attempted to fix radio issues. I learned a lotabout fire behavior from one of these field trips.At that time, the majority of fire equipmentassigned to the incident were bulldozers, air oper-ations, and a few Type 3 wildland engine striketeams.

ResponsibilitiesShortly after my arrival, I assisted other com-

munications personnel through the check-inprocess and acted as a runner when needed.

Our main duties were monitoring the radio,which consisted of mostly taking supply requests,relaying messages from various units and person-nel, dispatching reports of flare-ups, and the doc-umenting all of this on the radio log. Having

excellent documenting skills is always an asset: onthis fire, there was an investigation regarding aradio transmission I received; our documentationwas precise as to who said/requested what, andwhat subsequently occurred. The federal officialswho came in to review it later were impressed bythe quality of our documentation.

The radios in the CAL FIRE Mobile CommUnit were quite different from what I was used toin our dispatch center. The radio consoles are oldradios that had programmable tones. Radioreception and repeaters are important at a cam-paign fire. Since we don't have built-in repeaterswe are forced to set up mobile repeaters inappropriate locations, which was a big issue forour fire. We didn't have a support channel tocoordinate our logistics; we had only the threechannels being used for the branches and divi-sions. Due to the mountainous terrain, radiocommunications were really bad. The air attackspotter plane and the local area dispatch centerbecame my relay partners. We eventually put ahuman repeater (our runner Raul) at the top ofPalomar Mountain. This worked extremely well.

When we had to dispatch and assist some-one, instead of having a run card showing aresponse order like we do in our normal dispatchcenter, we had to make a decision based on themap at the given time and decide which division

Poomacha Staging: As fire crews and strike teams requested through the state mutual aid sys-tem they would assemble at the incidents’ staging area and await assignment. Discipline, coordi-nation and standard communications through the Incident Command System drove incident man-agement on all of the fires.

LISA

STA

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in this while Sue Dizmang issued radiosto the crews who needed them - by the

9-1-1 Magazine I January/February 2008 27

or branch it would be. Sometimes we had tocall a unit two or three times before theywould hear us, just due to the kind of workthey were doing. Initially this was a stressor,but it eventually became routine.

Since this was a unified command and thefire was deemed to be 70% contained, therewas talk of releasing the communications per-sonnel, since the federal team was coming into take over on November 4. I was releasedon the 2nd, followed a few days later by ourCommunications Unit MCC 24. A couple ofincident dispatchers were left for anotherweek to monitor the radios; then the ForestService assumed control over the incident andhandled their own communications.

On field assignment, we need to expect towork long hours and to be able to think onour feet. The CAL FIRE team assigned to thisincident was relatively newly formed and stillworking out how to work together as a team. Ispent time with the COML Chief Knopp fromthe CAL FIRE's Lake/Napa unit and educatedhim about the abilities of dispatchers and thedifferences between radio operators and inci-dent dispatchers, who are more roundedcommunications specialists fluent in docu-mentation and resource accountability as wellas communications. I believe he saw howprofessional dispatchers (versus someonewho has taken a radio class and been signedoff but doesn't do that job on a daily basis)can help make his job easier. 9-1-1

This CALFIRE mobile communications centerserved as the Poomacha’s communicationshub, interfacing between command and tacti-cal staff, and programming and issuing hun-dreds of portable radios and thousands ofbatteries.

VIA

LISA

STA

BLER

(continued on page 56)

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impossible, for any agencies to have per-formed better.

“When the true elapsed time periodsare understood,” noted Archangel ’sSenior Consultant John Giduck, in aninitial assessment report, “from first 9-1-1 call, to emergency radio contact toSWAT, to response, movement to theattack site, organization and coordina-tion of tactical teams, breaching of thebuilding, and speed of movementthrough the building to the shooter - itwill be universally recognized that itwould be almost impossible for any unitto have handled the operation withgreater speed or professionalism.”

Few reports have examined the chal-lenge of the Virginia Tech shootingsfrom the perspective of the dispatch cen-ter, but our discussion with VTPD’scommunications professionals reinforcedthat the communications and resourcemanagement support given this incidentby the dispatchers at Virginia Tech andtheir colleagues at Blacksburg, Mont-gomery County, and elsewhere in theregion was as proficient, professional,and effective as that of their counter-parts in the field.

“This was and is biggest challengemany of us will ever face,” concludeddispatch supervisor Denise Linkenhoker.“I am not sure you can ever truly beready for something like this to happen,although you train and know it can.

“I would like to thank all of the com-munication centers, law enforcementagencies, and citizens around the coun-try that sent cards, letters, care packages,food, etc., to show their care and con-cern for our department,” addedLinkenhoker. "Words cannot expresshow touched we all are to know so manypeople were thinking about us duringthis tragedy.”

This report is based on interviews with andinput received with thanks from VirginiaTech PD Lt. Debbi Morgan, dispatcherApril Blankenship, and dispatch supervisorDenise Linkenhoker. Input and assistancefrom Steve Souder, Montgomery County 9-1-1, is also acknowledged with apprecia-tion. The Report of the Review Panel toVirginia Governor Timothy M. Kaineabout the shootings was also instrumentalin building the timeline of events. (The247-page report can be downloaded fromwww.governor.virginia.gov.)

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56 9-1-1 Magazine I January/February 2008

dozens for the first few days. Jaymieprovided traffic control for the crewswaiting to for radios; that kept the con-fusion and time lost to a minimum. Thetechs took turns taking the dispatchersout on to the line to see the devastationwhen they needed to go out to set up orcheck a remote repeater site. Lessonlearned by all? California oranges areflammable.

As the fire moved, we found a deadarea not covered by repeaters that wassensitive during the day time, so wedeployed one of the RADOs, Raul Gar-cia from the Tahoe National Forest, intothe field as our “human relay.” Raul wasset up remotely on top of Mount Palo-mar between the Palomar Observatoryand a fire lookout tower, where he pro-vided an essential verbal communica-tions link, the old-fashioned way, for atleast five days. He was never lonely -he'd be visited on occasion by crews andchiefs stopping by, who provided someattention to him, and he also was visitedby a number of displaced wildlife. Hehad breakfast in camp, grabbed a lunchas he headed up the mountain, and cameback in the evening to have dinner.

As the Poomacha fire started to winddown and some resources were deployedto new and more active fires, we receivedword that a Forest Service Type 2 Teamwould transition in. At that time, I start-ed to demobilize some of the communi-cations personnel, and shortly foundmyself released from the incident.

As I drove home, I thought about thecommunications personnel who wereassigned to this incident. They wentbeyond dispatchers - we had a few radiotechnicians from the Department ofGeneral Services and support personnelin the way of private vendors. There wasalso the support of the frequency coordi-nators, Hampton Stewart in particular.It seemed that at every turn of events, Iknew someone somewhere to give megood advice: Chris Hinshaw and DonRoot at the San Diego County EOCand, on adjacent fires, Geoff Pemberton,Kody Kerwin, Rick Smith, and a fewothers.

The incident dispatchers whoresponded once again proved and vali-dated the training they received in theCalifornia Fire Chiefs Association Inci-

dent Dispatcher Program. This programhas been endorsed by the FIRESCOPECommunications Specialists Group, theOperations Section Group, and also theBoard of Directors of the California FireChiefs Association. As a trainer of over600 incident dispatchers over the pastdozen or so years, to be at an incidentand see a few of my students in actionwas heartwarming. As I explained to atraining chief a few years ago, when theytrain firefighters, they see the results oftheir efforts almost immediately. For me,I have only had this pleasurable experi-ence a few times; but I learned early onthat I did not need to spend much timelooking over shoulders. A good teamgoes a long way.

Don Stabler has been in the public safetyarena since 1970. In 2006, he “retired ”from Contra Costa County Fire in Califor-nia as a senior dispatcher, and he went backto the same agency the next day as the OESRegion 2 Transition project coordinator. Henow is the communications officer for theCordelia Fire District in Solano County.He has served in all positions on the Cali-fornia Fire Chiefs Comm. Section Execu-tive Board, he currently sits onFIRESCOPE Communications SpecialistsGroup, and he continues to train dispatch-ers. He and his wife, San Jose Fire seniordispatcher Lisa Stabler, make their home inManteca (CA).

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P O O M A C H AContinued from page 27

Allegations that earlier warningabout the first shooting might havehelped secure Norris Hall from theseverity of the second attack were alsodiscounted. There was no hard evidencethat the WAJ shootings were the firstwave in a spree that would commencehours later across campus. In an inde-pendent review, Archangel Group - anonprofit organization providingantiterrorism training, consulting, andsecurity assessment that spent a weekstudying the VTPD response - foundthat, from the perspectives of prepara-tion and training, joint operations abilityand experience, not only did the two ini-tially responding agencies not fail in anyway, but it would be difficult, if not

V I R G I N I A T E C HContinued from page 41

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