Post-Giri Recovery Action Plan for Shelter...

POST-GIRI RECOVERY STRATEGY

AND ACTION PLAN FOR SHELTER SECTOR

Shelter Working Group

February 2011 MYANMAR

The Post-Giri Recovery Strategy and Action Plan for Shelter Sector is prepared by Shelter Working Group chaired by UN-Habitat in collaboration with UNDP and DCGU, UNICEF, UN OCHA, UNHCR, IOM, New Generation, Swanyee, KMSS, Ar Yone Oo, CCF, MEET, NCV, MRCS, Save the Children, Solidarites International, Care, Danish Refugee Council, Action Aid, IFRC , ECHO and Malteser International.

The Comprehensive Joint Assessment of the Shelter Situation in Cyclone Giri Affected Area is done by UN-Habitat, Solidarites International, IOM, NCV, Save the Children and Swan Yee Development Foundation.

Printed and published with the support from Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

POST-GIRI RECOVERY STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN FOR SHELTER SECTOR

Shelter Working Group


Post – Gir i Recovery Strategy and Act ion Plan for Shel ter Sector

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 1

Table of Contents 2

1. Objectives of this Report

4

2. Background 4

2.1 Cyclone Giri 4

2.2 Emergency Response, Shelter Sector 5

2.3 Handover to Shelter Working Group 5

2.4 Comprehensive Joint Assessment 5

2.5 Workshop

6

3. Shelter Working Group Comprehensive Joint Assessment 6

3. 1 The Main Findings

6

4. Guiding Principles of the Shelter Recovery Strategy 9

4.1 Immediate Priorities/Targets 9

4.2 Sustainability 9

4.3 Support community and individual self-help processes 10

4.4 Reduce future risks

10

5. Issues of Concern/ for Clarification 10

5.1 Self-Recovery 10

5.2 Access Issues (transportation difficulties for people and supplies) 11

5.3 Short Time Frame

12

6. Agreed Strategies 12

6.1 Shelter Sector (please also see annexes 3,4 and 5) 12

6.2 Cross-Sector Interventions

13


3

7. Action Plan

14

8. Consequences of Inaction

15

9. The Information Sharing and Coordination Mechanisms

15

10. Contributors

15

11. Shelter Construction Guidelines and Manuals on DRR 15

Figures

Figure 1 Proportion of affected houses fully repaired in the worst hit areas, by township

7

Figure 2 Proportion of affected houses not yet repaired in the worst hit areas, by township

8

Figure 3 Top reason for the villagers’ inability to repair their houses, by township 8

Tables

Table 1 Level of house destruction and damage in the worst hit areas, by township 7

Annexes

Annex 1 Comprehensive Joint Assessment of The Shelter Situation in Cyclone Giri Affected Area

Annex 2 Abstract of Cost and BoQ for a Household Shelter (Location-Rakhine)

Annex 3 DDR Model House S01

Annex 4 DDR Model House S02


4

POST-GIRI RECOVERY STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN FOR SHELTER SECTOR

1. Objectives of this Report

his recovery strategy and action plan is intended as a guide for agencies involved in Shelter activities. It may also be a useful reference to donors who are funding or considering funding shelter sector activities in Cyclone Giri affected areas. This paper is

based primarily on the Comprehensive Assessment carried about by the Shelter Working Group between December 2010 and January 2011, and on the inputs received from the participating members of the Post-Giri Early Recovery Action Planning Workshop (for Shelter Sector) held on January 20th 2011 and hosted by UN-Habitat.

In addition, this report is informed by the many meetings of the Emergency Shelter Cluster and its Technical Working Group. With this report, UN-Habitat as a chair of Shelter Working Group wishes to provide donors and their respective agencies with the most important and relevant facts in order that they might more effectively focus their support and shelter recovery programming in the affected areas, while at the same time enabling the sector and the communities to better withstand future disasters.

2. Background

2.1 Cyclone Giri

Cyclone Giri, a category four cyclonic storm, made landfall in Rakhine State on 22 October 2010 close to Kyaukpyu town affecting 260,000 people, completely destroying over 20,830 homes and partially damaging 31,114 houses. The Townships of Kyaukpyu, Myebon, Myinbya and

T


5

Pauktaw were the most severely affected by the storm which caused severe damage to houses and infrastructure including roads and bridges in coastal areas1.

2.2 Emergency Response, Shelter Sector

The communities and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar are to be commended for Early Warning and planning in the lead up to impact of Cyclone Giri which fortunately led to minimal loss of life, particularly when compared to Cyclone Nargis. However the situation on the ground, especially in terms of shelter, has been devastating. The official estimate of homes damaged and destroyed by the Cyclone stands at 51,944 households2

The Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC) mobilized within weeks of the disaster, coordinating the sector’s response in Yangon, based on information and response received from the ground. The Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC) was led by IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross) and was comprised of 5 local NGOs, 12 International NGOs, 5 UN Agencies and 2 Donors. The Emergency Shelter response provided emergency shelter kits which includes 2 tarpaulins, a 30 meter rope and a hammer. Other items distributed included kitchen sets, mosquito nets and blankets.

Distribution of these items may continue in parallel with early recovery efforts so that villages that have not yet received early recovery assistance can still benefit from temporary emergency assistance until such time as full coverage by early recovery initiatives has been achieved.

2.3 Handover to Shelter Working Group

The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator (UN HC) informed the and humanitarian community that the emergency phase clusters system would end by late January 2011 to allow those clusters to be either integrated into existing sectoral working groups or to evolve into Early Recovery thematic working groups. Since the mandate of the IFRC precludes it from in engaging in post-emergency transitional housing and settlements solutions, the Emergency Shelter Cluster agreed that UN-Habitat should assume leadership of the sector, which it did in a handover from IFRC on 10 January 2011. From the initial days of the activation of the ESC, UN-Habitat had been working verily closely with IFRC. It was also co-chairing the ESC Technical Working Group (TWIG) along with Solidarites International. The TWIG prepared advocacy material and undertook a comprehensive assessment of shelter needs.

2.4 Comprehensive Joint Assessment

Because of the lack of access and paucity of concrete information and data coming in from the disaster areas, the Emergency Shelter Cluster ESC initiated a comprehensive joint shelter assessment led by key shelter agencies in collaboration with local partners. The main objectives of the assessment were to assess damage levels, collect data and plan for an effective transition from relief to early recovery and recovery, for the shelter sector.

Using assessment forms designed by the Technical Working Group of the Shelter Cluster (TWIG); the assessment was conducted in 112 sample villages in the worst hit areas during December 2010/January 2011 covering 39% of the affected families. The assessment, which can be viewed in Annex 1 of this report, was carried out with financial support from UN-Habitat and in- kind contributions from Solidarites International, IOM, NCV, Save the Children and Swan Yee Development Foundation. 1 OCHA Situation Report #11, 20 Dec. 2010 2 Official GoRUM figures for Shelter Cluster


6

2.5 Workshop

On the afternoon of January 20th, 2011, UN-Habitat as chair of the Shelter Working Group, hosted a workshop to share the Assessment results as a catalyst for discussion and brainstorming on the way forward into early recovery in the shelter sector. The inputs from the 23 agencies (UN organizations, INGOS, local NGOs and Donors) and their representatives who participated are well considered in this report.

3. Shelter Working Group Comprehensive Joint Assessment

3. 1The Main Findings

House destruction levels were quite high in the assessment areas, with over one third of the houses fully destroyed by the cyclone. Myebon was by far the most affected township with over half the houses in the assessment areas, completely destroyed.

Two months after the cyclone, half of the sampled villages indicate more than 91% of destroyed/damaged houses remain without rehabilitation of a stronger, more permanent nature - as appealed by the RC/HC to the international community on the briefing of 20th December 2010. In contrast, only partial repairs have been carried out using tarpaulins provided during the emergency phase. Again, Myebon had the highest proportion of houses not recovered at all.

In summary, the number of people who have not recovered their housing to pre-cyclone conditions is still dramatically high. As of January 2011 an estimated 104,000 people are homeless. For those households who have attempted to repair by themselves, the repair work is far below the minimum humanitarian standards (SPHERE) and does not meet any parameters of disaster resilience and will probably draw upon their scarce financial resources leaving them vulnerable and unable to meet basic food, water and subsistence needs.

The rate of self recovery for shelters was found to be as low as 9%, leaving entire villages without the means to rehabilitate their homes, recover their livelihoods and resume their lives. In the context of cash shortage and livelihoods disruption, leaving the homeless to self recover will most probably push many affected families into debt.

Should there be no external support, the majority of affected houses will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. The situation is particularly alarming in villages with high destruction levels, where most affected villagers will not be able to recover decent living conditions before the next rainy season. The lack of cash is by far the main constraint to shelter self recovery, and is compounded by the strong disruption to livelihoods. Basic technical skills and availability of manpower do not appear to be major constraints but rather represent assets for the recovery interventions to come.

Assessment Coverage: The assessment covered approximately 16% of the whole population of the four targeted townships. Considering that the total population affected by Cyclone Giri in the four townships was estimated at 260,000 people, the sample represents approximately 37% of the affected population.

Damage and Destruction Levels: Results indicate that in the worst hit areas, more than one third of the houses were fully destroyed by the cyclone, another third were partially damaged, and only 11% were not affected at all. As shown in table below, Myebon was by far the most affected township, with almost half of the houses destroyed in the assessed areas.


7

Table 1 Level of house destruction and damage in the worst hit areas, by township

Township Total No of houses in sample

Destruction Partial damage Small damage Total affected

No % No % No % No %

Kyaukpyu 4,314 467 11% 1,136 26% 1,645 38% 3,248 75%

Minbya 2,497 795 32% 803 32% 739 30% 2,337 94%

Myebon 7,034 3,427 49% 2,298 33% 1,128 16% 6,853 97%

Pauktaw 5,350 1,775 33% 1,943 36% 988 18% 4,706 88%

Total 19,195 6,464 34% 6,180 32% 4,500 23% 17,144 89%

Two months after the cyclone, half of the sample villages indicate more than 91% of destroyed/damaged houses remain without rehabilitation, and will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. In almost one third (32%) of the villages, villagers reported that there was not a single house fully repaired yet. Most of these villages were amongst the worst affected ones.

Disaggregated data by township show that recovery is slowest in Pauktaw (17% of affected houses already repaired fully); however the proportion of houses not repaired at all is much higher in Myebon (43%) than in the three other townships.

Figure 1 Proportion of affected houses fully repaired in the worst hit areas, by township

Houses that suffered small or partial damages during the cyclone were found to be the ones that people have already repaired partially or fully. They often used for this type of repair the materials they received during the emergency phase e.g. tarpaulins to cover part of the roof and

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Kyaukpyu Minbya Myebon Pauktaw Total

Proportion of affected houses fully repaired in the sample villages (as of 05 January 2011)


8

to replace a missing wall. In many cases however, self-repaired houses are not strong enough and do not have any disaster resilient features.


Approximately 20,000 fully destroyed houses have not been recovered yet, meaning that more than 104,000 people still remain homeless. Constraints Faced by Affected Households to Repair or Rebuild Their House: The lack of cash is cited as the main constraint mentioned for householders inability to repair/rebuild themselves with 88% of the sample villages, reporting this as the top constraint. This is particularly clear for Minbya where it was the main problem for all sample villages (see figure below).

Figure 3 Top reason for the villagers’ inability to repair their houses, by township

Top constraint for house self-recovery

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


% of sample villages lack of cash lack of materials No / loss of source of income

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%


Proportion of affected houses that have not been repaired at all in the sample villages (as of 05 January 2011)


9

The lack of construction materials and the lack of access to construction tools were also cited as key reasons impeding recovery; in addition to lack of time to rebuild particularly given the need to focus on addressing other basic needs such as food and water.

4. Guiding Principles of the Shelter Recovery Strategy

A number of principles were agreed to by the Shelter Working Group to guide the development of this strategy and to help judge the various options at hand for addressing the shelter recovery needs.

4.1 Immediate Priorities/Targets

The Shelter Working Group agreed that initial support should target primarily those communities most affected by the Cyclone and living with host families and with no or limited means for self-recovery

It was also agreed that priority should be given to the most vulnerable groups and the assistance package should cater to their specific needs (women-headed households, persons with disabilities, elderly, etc.), especially in the hardest hit townships of Myebon and Kyaukphyu.

4.2 Sustainability

Group members have also agreed to ensure the following:

� Recovery programmes are to be designed to maximize the positive impact on the local economy (using local resources, timber and nipa-palm leaves in a sustainable way)

Respect the primacy of the needs of the affected

families and communities Ensure security, protection,

and the right to a “place to live”


10

� Reduce individual dependency by using community-driven processes

� Ensure that the recovery investments remain within the community as much as possible

4.3 Support community and individual self-help processes

� Facilitate the community in their village planning and consultative actions (right package for right beneficiaries)

� Build on community knowledge while still providing technical insights for building safer houses

� Provide assistance packages to support people in rebuilding their own homes at least to the core level, which can then be expanded incrementally over time

4.4 Reduce future risks

� Considering the disaster-prone nature of Rakhine State, it was agreed that the recovery intervention can be perceived as an opportunity to improve the lives of the people and reduce their vulnerability to future disasters.

� Encouraging communities to build shelters that are resilient to cyclones and heavy wind speeds, and provide relevant technical guidance.

5. Issues of Concern/ for Clarification

5.1 Self-Recovery

� Misperceptions about the meaning of “shelter kits” during Emergency Phase:

A misperception was created during the emergency phase from a statement (paraphrased) that “85% of shelter needs have been satisfied through distribution of


11

shelter kits”. This resulted in the widespread misperception that shelter needs had been largely satisfied even though a shelter kit is comprised only of 2 tarps, plastic sheet, nails and a hammer, materials sufficient for only the most temporary of shelter arrangements.

� Misperception that shelter “self-recovery” is a preferred option:

While some affected households have started to repair or rebuild their houses on their own, these are not often up to minimum humanitarian standards and certainly far from disaster resilience, and self-recovery inevitably has negative impacts on households’ financial situation. The Assessment clearly found that the overall self recovery rate is low, with lack of cash, time and materials being the main constraints.

� Lack of visual impact in the affected areas: damaged/destroyed houses are not visible on a drive-thru basis. The staff that conducted the Assessment noted that the damage level of a village could not be determined by casual observation, by driving through a village, for instance. This is because intact houses are readily visible whereas damaged or destroyed houses are generally obscured from view. In addition, most of the vulnerable families who were made homeless by the Cyclone are living with host families and only through interviewing the affected families is it possible to determine the abnormal nature of the living situation.

5.2 Access Issues (transportation difficulties for people and supplies)

� Access to many remote villages is possible only by boat, and the availability of boats is limited as many were damaged/destroyed in the Cyclone. Due to the scarcity of boats and the concurrent rise in demand for their hire by humanitarian agencies, the price of boat rental has risen considerably.

� Lack of Jetties: Only one village in Myebon had a jetty large enough to allow a medium- sized boat to dock and unload shelter materials. Where there is no jetty, supply boats


12

have to moor in harbors while smaller launches unload the materials and take them to shore piece by piece. This is a slow and expensive process. The lack of jetties will be especially problematic starting in March when the seas become progressively rougher. By the month of June, the increased waves and wind will deter many captains from delivering supplies.

� The suppliers in Sittwe and Myebon Town need up to one month’s time to from point of purchase order to complete delivery.

5.3 Short Time Frame

� There is a compressed time frame for securing funding and implementing shelter recovery projects as the rainy season will begin by June

6. Agreed Strategies

6.1 Shelter Sector (please also see annexes 2, 3 and 4)

6.1.1 Shelter should be the top priority during the early recovery phase, with focus on Myebon Township, to avert potential further tragedy and to allow livelihoods interventions to succeed over the long-term

6.1.2 Shelter recovery activities need to start urgently to make the most of the dry season and support the poorest households that will not be able to rebuild and will be forced to spend the coming rainy season(s) in dwellings far from minimum humanitarian standards.

6.1.3 Shelter standards should be appropriate to a disaster prone area with strong winds / rainfalls. The rainy season, which runs from June till October, is amongst the heaviest in the world (with an average annual rainfall of 5 meters)3. Several storms with winds of over 75 mph occur every year as well as regular cyclones from the Bay of Bengal. As a consequence, shelter standards in the area of intervention should be higher than in the Ayeyarwaddy delta and stakeholders involved in shelter recovery should aim for shelters with disaster resilient structure and features at a unit cost of at least USD 600 for a new shelter, and USD 175 for a ‘repair package’ (walling, roofing or flooring).

6.1.4 The initial target is to shelter those 15,000 households living with host families as dependants. The next priority group is the estimated 5,000 households whose homes were fully damaged and are now living in temporary erected shelters. The third priority group are those 14,500 households whose homes were damaged but not destroyed. For the remaining 17,444 households which homes were slighty damaged long term support will be provided which will enable them to self-repair their dwellings over time. This final group will receive long term support through the provision of livelihoods opportunities which will enable them to self-repair their dwellings over time.

6.1.5 The implementation approach should be Community-led, linking shelter to livelihood recovery interventions such as skills training in carpentry, masonry and cash-for-work projects

6.1.6 DRR knowledge should be a component of shelter reconstruction, and as a last resort, if no funding is made available for shelter, appropriate IEC materials should at least be shared with local communities for them to be able to build back better their houses if/when they accumulate enough resources.

3 Cyclone Giri Assessment Report – NCV / Solidarites International 7 Dec 2010 (Available at the www.themimu.info


13

6.2 Cross-Sector Interventions

6.2.1 Livelihoods: The members of the Shelter Working Group felt that in the Myanmar context, shelter provision is one of the most effective direct and indirect livelihoods generators and shelter provision should feature in donors’ livelihoods strategies. Beneficiary’s selection for livelihoods generators should prioritize those that have a damaged or destroyed house.

6.2.2 WASH

6.2.3 Ceramic water storage jars provided to each household

The initial assessments indicated that the most severe water situations exist in those villages which depended solely on manmade ponds for their entire water supply and/or those villages which supplemented their water supply from ponds, and where these ponds had become saline from sea water flooding following the cyclone.

While de-salinization of ponds and/or provision of alternative water sources will be coordinated by the WASH Working Group, members of the Shelter Working Group suggested that the shelter recovery strategy should include provision of ceramic water storage jars to each household in the communities in which they work, so that families can collect water from clean spring sources. While water collection from such sources may a require long haul on foot, the ceramic jars can serve as a temporary measure until such time as communities can restore normal water sources with the help of WASH implementing agencies as necessary.

6.2.4 Sanitation facilities provided only to those households that had them before Cyclone Giri:

The WASH cluster led by UNICEF has been advocating for a Community-Led Total Sanitation approach (CLTS) will be implemented as soon as resources become available. Hence it was agreed in WASH cluster meetings that where people had latrines before the cyclone, assistance should be provided to rebuild those that were lost.

It is counterproductive to the long-term process of hygiene behavior change to simply build latrines for people who do not know or want to use them. For households which did not have toilets before the cyclone the approach of community led total sanitation would be used to change social norms in communities, to convince communities not to defecate in the open.

6.2.5 Multipurpose Cyclone Shelter:

The Shelter Working Group also suggested that in the long term there is also a need for retrofitting the main public buildings (monasteries, schools, health centers, etc. ) to become multi-purpose centers where people can take refuge in case of a disaster.

6.2.6 DRR education/sensitization of communities: Building of one model house in each community to serve as an example of DRR construction so that people can have visual knowledge of safer shelter. The building of the model house would constitute the final installment of training of community carpenters in DRR construction techniques. Also important is the sensitization of communities through Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM).

6.2.7 Access Infrastructure (jetties, roads, small bridges) reconstruction to be undertaken as cash-for-work livelihoods opportunities.

Post

– G

iri

Reco

very

Str

ate

gy

and

Act

ion

Pla

n fo

r Sh

elte

r Se

ctor

14

7. A

ctio

n Pl

an

The

obje

ctiv

e of

the

ear

ly r

ecov

ery

phas

e in

the

she

lter

sect

or is

to

supp

ort

the

com

mun

ities

aff

ecte

d by

Cyc

lone

Giri

to

re-e

stabl

ish t

heir

trad

ition

al

way

s of

bui

ldin

g th

eir

hous

e, b

ut w

ith im

prov

ed s

afet

y.

This

mus

t be

impl

emen

ted

with

str

ateg

ies

to r

educ

e vu

lner

abili

ties

in t

he m

ost

effe

ctiv

e an

d eq

uita

ble

man

ner

cons

ider

ing

the

scal

e of

nee

d, li

mite

d re

sour

ces

and

limite

d ac

cess

to th

e af

fect

ed r

egio

n.

Out

com

es

Inte

rven

tion

Tim

e Fr

ame

Tow

nshi

ps

Cos

t per

U

nit

Tota

l C

ost

Reha

bilit

atio

n an

d re

cons

truc

tion

of s

helte

r fo

r ho

mel

ess

popu

latio

n

Repl

acem

ent o

f 20

,000

ful

ly

dest

roye

d ho

mes

M

ost v

ulne

rabl

e by

Jul

y 20

11 a

nd 2

nd p

hase

be

fore

Jun

e 20

12 (o

nset

of

rai

ny s

easo

n)

Mye

bon,

K

yauk

phyu

, Pa

ukta

w, M

inby

a

USD

600

U

SD 1

2 m

illio

n

Reha

bilit

atio

n or

rep

air

of

affe

cted

hom

es

Repa

ir of

14,

500

dam

aged

hom

es

With

in 1

5 m

onth

s (b

efor

e st

art o

f 20

12

rain

y se

ason

)

Mye

bon,

K

yauk

phyu

, Pa

ukta

w, M

inby

a

USD

175

U

SD

2.54

m

illio

n

Incr

ease

d liv

elih

ood

oppo

rtun

ities

thro

ugh

enha

nced

ski

lls a

nd

empl

oym

ent

Prov

ision

of

livel

ihoo

ds o

ppor

tuni

ties

to 1

7,44

4 H

Hs

who

se h

omes

wer

e sli

ghtly

dam

aged

, thr

ough

ca

rpen

try

trai

ning

(inc

ludi

ng D

RR

cons

truc

tion

tech

niqu

es),

supp

lyin

g th

e re

leva

nt m

anua

ls, a

nd c

ash-

for -

wor

k ac

tiviti

es

Befo

re J

uly

2011

M

yebo

n,

Kya

ukph

yu,

Pauk

taw

, Min

bya

USD

10

0/ca

rpen

ter

(4-5

per

sons

per

vi

llage

)

Pote

ntia

l cos

t-sh

arin

g w

ith

othe

r W

Gs

USD

75

0.00

0

Enha

nced

cap

acity

of

com

mun

ity to

eff

ectiv

ely

prep

are

and

resp

ond

to

futu

re d

isast

ers

Cap

acity

bui

ldin

g in

em

erge

ncie

s an

d D

RR e

duca

tion

for

affe

cted

co

mm

uniti

es th

roug

h C

BDRM

Befo

re J

uly

2012

M

yebo

n, P

aukt

aw,

Min

bya,

Kya

ukph

u

To e

ncou

rage

D

RR-W

G

(DRR

-WG

)

Estim

ated

Tot

al S

helte

r Rec

over

y Co

st

*Thi

s ex

clud

es d

onor

con

trib

utio

ns (i

nclu

ding

CER

F) d

urin

g th

e re

lief

/em

erge

ncy

phas

e es

timat

ed a

t USD

1.8

mill

ion

dolla

rs o

f th

e to

tal

com

mitt

ed U

SD 2

2 m

illio

n fo

r G

iri r

elie

f an

d em

erge

ncy

USD

14.

54

mill

ion

*


15

8. Consequences of Inaction

Without external support, 57% of affected houses (29,000+ houses) will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. If the same area is hit with even a minor cyclone during the coming rainy season, a humanitarian crisis far worse than the one that occurred after Cyclone Giri can easily result as already weakened shelters are swept away.

On the other hand, if those villagers with inadequate shelter try to move inland to avoid the wind and rain of the season, this could be equally disastrous. They may seek drier/safer ground in large numbers, but they will not be able to bring their livelihoods with them. The inland areas of Rakhine State are mountainous; fishing cannot be practiced nor can rice be cultivated. Ultimately, their inability to re-establish their livelihoods in the inland areas of Rakhine State could trigger cross-border migration to other countries.

Another consequence of inaction is spiraling debt amongst households. It has already been mentioned in this report that self-recovery of shelter requires cash that most households do not have. Already, recent survey data provided by the Food Security Working Group indicates that 68% of the affected households don’t know when they will be able to repay their existing debt.

9. The Information Sharing and Coordination Mechanisms

Shelter Working Group chaired by UN-Habitat meets monthly and can be contacted by [email protected]. The Technical Working Group co-chaired by UN-Habitat and Solidarites International meets on a needs basis.

Inter-agency coordination meetings between local and international NGOs and UN agencies have been held regularly in Yangon and Sittwe. Bilateral meetings between local authorities and humanitarian partners take place regularly in Sittwe.

Donor Briefings chaired by the U.N. RC/HC are held in Yangon on a regular basis.

The MIMU has developed a webpage dedicated to the response to Cyclone Giri. Assessment data and 3W (Who-What-Where) information on the cyclone response are also compiled and posted to the website: http://www.themimu.info/

The webpage also lists those agencies/organizations working on shelter in Giri-affected areas.

10. Contributors

The following organizations and agencies, comprising the Shelter Working Group, participated in the Workshop that led to the formation of this document. From the United Nations, there was participation from:

� UN-HABITAT � UNDP and DCGU � UNICEF � UN OCHA � UNHCR � IOM

Local non-governmental organizations included:

� New Generation � Swanyee � KMSS � Ar Yone Oo


16

� CCF � MEET � NCV � MRCS

And finally, international NGOs and donors included:

� Save the Children � Solidarites International � Care � Danish Refugee Council � Action Aid � IFRC � ECHO � Malteser International

11. Shelter Construction Guidelines and Manuals on DRR

The following shelter construction guidelines and manuals on DRR developed by UN-Habitat are available upon request.

Poster: Building Back Safer (E-M)

Poster: We protect our shelter from rains, storms & floods (E-M)

Guidelines Village Shelter Committee (E-M) Poster: Building Back Safer Shelter (E-M)


17

Manual: A Guide for Village Carpenters on How to Build a Safer Shelter (E-M)

Manual: How to Build a Safer Shelter(E-M)

Guidelines on Retrofitting of Rural Houses in Myanmar (E-M)

1 Comprehensive Joint Assessment of the Shelter Situation in Cyclone Giri Affected Area

The Comprehensive Joint Assessment of the Shelter Situation in Cyclone Giri Affected Area has been conducted by the Shelter Working Group with funding and in kind contribution from:

COMPREHENSIVE JOINT ASSESSMENT OF THE SHELTER SITUATION IN

CYCLONE GIRI AFFECTED AREA

SHELTER WORKING GROUP


2

Comprehensive Joint Assessment of the Shelter Situation in Cyclone Giri Affected Area

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

3

1. Assessment Rationale and Objectives 5

1.1 Context and Rationale for the Joint Assessment 5

1.2 Objectives of the Joint Assessment

6

2. Assessment Methodology 6

2.1 Data Collection Tools And Methods 6

2.2 Data Collection Teams 7

2.3 Village Sampling 7

2.4 Data Entry, Data Analysis and Reporting

8

3. Assessment Findings 8

3.1 Assessment Coverage and Demographic Data 8

3.2 Destruction Level 9

3.3 Self-Recovery Rate and Estimated Level Of Needs 12

3.3.1 Current Level of Self-Recovery 12

3.3.2 Estimated Level of Shelter Repair Needs 14

3.4 Main Constraints Faced by Affected Households to Repair or Rebuild Their House

18

4. Conclusion and Recommendations 19

2


Executive Summary

yebon, Pauktaw, Kyaukpyu and Minbya were four of the most-severely affected townships following the impact of Cyclone Giri, which made landfall in Rakhine State on 22 October 2010. The shelter and infrastructure sectors were in particular severely

damaged (OCHA situation report #11, 20th December 2010).

Given lack of access and availability of concrete information and data coming in from the disaster areas, the Emergency Shelter Cluster ESC initiated a comprehensive joint shelter assessment led by key shelter agencies in collaboration with local partners. The main objectives of the assessment were to assess damage levels, collect data and plan for an effective transition from relief to early recovery and development, for the shelter sector. Using a one page assessment form designed by the Technical Working Group of the Shelter Cluster (TWIG) co-led by UN-Habitat and Solidarités International, the assessment team conducted group discussions at community level in 112 sample villages in the worst hit areas during December 2010/January 2011.

The Main Findings

House destruction levels were quite high in the assessment areas, with over one third of the houses fully destroyed by the cyclone. Myebon was by far the most affected township with nearly half the houses in the assessment areas, completely destroyed.

Two months after the cyclone, half of the sampled villages indicate more than 91% of destroyed/damaged houses remain without rehabilitation of a stronger, more permanent nature - as appealed by the RC/HC to the international community on the briefing of 20th December 2010. In contrast, only partial repairs have been carried out using tarpaulins provided during the emergency phase. Again, Myebon had the highest proportion of houses not recovered at all.

In summary, the number of people who have not recovered their housing to pre-cyclone conditions is still dramatically high. As of January 2011 an estimated 104,000 people are homeless. For those households who have attempted to repair by themselves, the repair work is far below the minimum standards for disaster resilience and will probably draw upon their scarce financial resources leaving them vulnerable and unable to meet basic food, water and subsistence needs.

The rate of self recovery for shelters was found to be low, leaving entire villages without the means to rehabilitate their homes, recover their livelihoods and resume their lives. In the context of cash shortage and livelihoods disruption, leaving the homeless to self recover will most probably push many affected families into debt. Should there be no external support, the majority of affected houses will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. The situation is particularly alarming in villages with high destruction levels, where most affected villagers will not be able to recover decent living conditions before the next rainy season. The lack of cash is by far the main constraint to shelter self recovery, and is compounded by the strong disruption to livelihoods. Basic technical skills and availability of manpower do not appear to be major constraints but rather represent assets for the recovery interventions to come.

Key Recommendations

� Shelter should be considered as a top priority during the early recovery phase, with a specific focus on Myebon Township.

M

4


� Shelter recovery activities need to start urgently to make the most of the dry season and support the poorest households that will not be able to rebuild and will be forced to spend the coming rainy season(s) in dwellings far from minimum humanitarian standards.

� Shelter standards and costs should be defined considering that the area is highly prone to disasters and has very strong wind and rainfalls.

� DRR knowledge must be improved and spread within the communities as a component of shelter construction.

� Shelter reconstruction should be community-led, with an emphasis on supporting and encouraging revitalization of the links between shelter and livelihood recovery interventions.


Comprehensive Joint Assessment of the

Shelter Situation in Cyclone Giri Affected Area

1. Assessment Rationale and Objectives

1.1 Context and rationale for the joint assessment Cyclone Giri made landfall in Rakhine State on 22 October 2010 affecting 260,000 people, completely destroying over 20,380 homes and thus making approximately 102,000 people homeless1. The townships of Myebon, Pauktaw, Kyaukpyu and Minbya were the most affected. A number of ad-hoc agency assessments were carried out in the affected areas in the weeks following the cyclone. In particular UNDP conducted a multi-sectorial assessment in November that includes some shelter issues i.e. the proportion of households who had their house collapsed and data on the current settlement of affected people. Initial findings indicated that a significant proportion of households were still staying with family / friends or in tents or temporary shelters while some also built or repaired a shelter by themselves.

The Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC) has been coordinating the sector response at Yangon level based on information received from the ground. Following the review of existing assessments, the Technical Working Group (TWIG) of the ESC, co-led by International UN-Habitat and Solidarités, decided to implement a comprehensive joint assessment for the following reasons:

� Although most of the emergency needs were covered through the distribution of emergency shelter kits, there are still tremendous gaps in terms of resilient shelter recovery, which need to be properly assessed;

� There are still significant data missing from the assessments done so far in particular to measure the self-recovery rate of affected communities;

� There is a need to prepare a common strategy for the transition from Emergency to Early Recovery that takes into account the lessons learned from Nargis and the good practices for a quality recovery response (e.g. local capacity building, use of local materials).

Previous assessments provided useful information on the level of damages and the current situation on the ground, showing that shelter is amongst the top priority needs. This joint assessment is to help plan a community-driven and coordinated early recovery intervention.

1 As per Situation Report #11, OCHA, 20 December 2010.

6


1. 2 Objectives of the Joint Assessment The main objectives of this joint assessment were to assess the extent of the damage, the shelter self-recovery rate of local communities in the 4 most affected townships and to collect key data essential for planning early recovery for the shelter sector. By ‘planning’ reference is made in particular to appropriate timing as well as adequate means and methods which need to be defined and agreed upon by the various stakeholders involved in the shelter sector.

2. Assessment Methodology

2.1 Data Collection Tools and Methods To ensure consistency and easy data collection members of the TWIG designed a one page assessment form2 that addresses the following expected results:

� Result 1: The actual level of destruction in the most affected areas is documented and quantified.

� Result 2: The proportion of houses rebuilt by the end of December 2010 is estimated.

� Result 3: The proportion of houses that will not be rebuilt, if further assistance is not provided before the next rainy season, is estimated.

� Result 4: The main constraints3 on affected households for repairing or rebuilding their house are identified.

Three levels of damage were defined for the purpose of this survey:

� “Destruction”: means that the house completely collapsed and that only the core structure remained in the best case scenario (though it is often leaning).

� “Partial damage”: means that the core structure remained without major damage but the house sustained significant damages to the roof, walls and/or floor, or that at least one of these was missing.

� “Small damage”: means that the house was still fit to live in but had some missing elements pertaining to the roof, walls or floor.

Figure 1 The three levels of house damage used during the joint assessment

Destruction Partial damage Small damage

2 See Annex. A draft version of this questionnaire was tested in the field in Myebon by Solidarités International in November. Following this test, the questionnaire was adjusted and also the Myanmar translation was improved. 3 This includes financial constraints but also the local capacity for retrofitting or building resilient shelters (number of skilled carpenters and masons) and the availability of local construction materials.


This assessment form was designed for a discussion at community level, with the village leader and a group of 5 to 20 villagers depending on the size of the village. In order to have a more realistic picture of the needs, specific attention was paid to the difference between houses and households. The group discussion was completed by direct observations and pictures to illustrate the housing conditions in the sample villages.

2.2 Data collection teams The assessment was carried out in the field by Solidarités International (SOL) in collaboration with Noble Compassionate Volunteers (NCV), Swan Yee Development Foundation (SYDF), Save the Children (SC), IOM, and with the financial cooperation from UN-Habitat.

Solidarités International organized three training sessions for the field assessment teams (enumerators and/or supervisors) according to the following schedule:

Table 1 Training sessions for data collection teams

Location Date Number of participants SOL NCV SC SC SYDF

Yangon 23 Dec. 6

Sittwe 27 Dec. 1 9 2

Myebon 29 Dec. 5 12 2 4

During these training sessions, participants were carefully explained the objectives of the joint assessment, the content of the questionnaire and the data collection method, through focus group discussions. A specific attention was paid to clarify the different levels of destruction and the meaning of shelter self-recovery. It was also an opportunity to remind all participant agencies to carry out a field test of the questionnaire with their teams before collecting the data. They were also requested to include MIMU P-codes in all the filled questionnaires for improved information coordination and mapping.

2.3 Village Sampling Considering the primary objective of this assessment (to estimate the shelter self-recovery rate), the sample was purposely focused on areas / Village Tracts (VT) where the percentage of collapsed houses is higher. The decision to select more villages in Myebon than in the three other main affected townships was based on UNDP assessment findings for house damage: 96% of households affected in Myebon in comparison to 53% to 56% in the three other townships, and 40% of houses collapsed in Myebon in comparison to 11% to 21% in the three other townships4.

After a review of the data available from UNDP, 120 sample villages

4 Calculated from UNDP Rapid Assessment – Myebon, Minbya, Pauktaw and Kyaukphyu townships

Training of enumerators in Myebon

Group discussion

8


were randomly selected in the most affected VT of Myebon, Pauktaw, Minbya and Kyaukpyu townships. Each partner agency was assigned one or several areas or townships. The main constraint faced during the field assessment was the inaccuracy of some of the villages’ name and/or their location. Although they have P-codes and are recorded in MIMU database, some sample villages were actually found to be sub-villages of the same single village, and others had been merged more than 25 years ago. Finally data was obtained on 112 villages in 50 VT with the following breakdown:

Table 2 Breakdown of sample villages, by township and agency

Township Agency

Total % IOM SC SYDF SOL/NCV

Kyaukpyu 24 24 21,4%

Minbya 10 11 21 18,8%

Myebon 9 33 42 37,5%

Pauktaw 17 8 25 22,3%

Total 17 41 10 44 112 100%

2.4 Data Entry, Data Analysis and Reporting Solidarités International compiled and analyzed the data collected by the different partners and drafted the present report. UN-Habitat reviewed and validated this report and ensured its publication and dissemination amongst shelter stakeholders.

3. Assessment Findings

3.1 Assessment Coverage and Demographic Data The assessment covered approximately 16% of the whole population of the four targeted townships:

Table 3 Population covered by the joint assessment, by township

Township Total Pop. in sample

Total Pop. in Township5 Coverage

Kyaukpyu 20, 091 148, 162 14%

Minbya 12, 888 184, 199 7%

Myebon 34, 696 118, 662 29%

Pauktaw 28, 441 167, 292 17%

Total 96, 116 618, 315 16%

5 Source: MIMU, 29 November 2010 (as per September 2010 figures from Government).

Direct observation of current living


Considering that the total population affected by Cyclone Giri in the four townships was estimated at 260,000 people, the sample represents approximately 37% of the affected population.

The average household size in the 112 sample villages is 4.5 persons. The ratio of the number of households to the number of houses is 1.1 on average, and does not vary much from one township to another.

Table 4 Total number of households and houses in the sample villages, and average village size, by township

Township Total No of HHs

Total No of houses

Average village size

HHs Pop. Kyaukpyu 4,747 4,314 198 837

Minbya 2,823 2,497 134 614

Myebon 7,846 7,034 187 826

Pauktaw 5,928 5,350 237 1,138

Total 21,344 19,195 191 858

3.2 Destruction Level Results indicate that in the worst hit areas, more than one third of the houses were fully destroyed by the cyclone, another third were partially damaged, and only 11% were not affected at all. As shown in table below, Myebon was by far the most affected township, with almost half of the houses destroyed in the assessed areas. In contrast, the majority of affected houses in Kyaukpyu only sustained partial or small damages.

Table 5 Level of house destruction and damage in the worst hit areas, by township

Township Total No of houses in sample

Destruction Partial damage Small damage Total affected

No % No % No % No %

Kyaukpyu 4,314 467 11% 1,136 26% 1,645 38% 3,248 75%

Minbya 2,497 795 32% 803 32% 739 30% 2,337 94%

Myebon 7,034 3,427 49% 2,298 33% 1,128 16% 6,853 97%

Pauktaw 5,350 1,775 33% 1,943 36% 988 18% 4,706 88%

Total 19,195 6,464 34% 6,180 32% 4,500 23% 17,144 89%

The above figures can be usefully compared with figures obtained by other agencies. Save the Children selected and assessed 18 villages of Kyaukpyu regardless of the extent of shelter damage in the area: less than 11% of the houses in these villages were found to be fully destroyed. In the same way, ACF collected the same data in 9 villages of Minbya (also selected regardless of extent of shelter damage), where they observed a level of destruction of only 12%. Both figures tend to show that the joint assessment sampling was quite right as regards the house destruction levels.

10


Examples of house destruction and damage:

Destroyed house Destroyed house

Partially damaged house House with small damage

As shown in the map and table below, the levels of destruction and damage vary quite a lot across the sample and within each township. Table below indicates most affected Village Tracts within the 4 townships, for prioritization. For example, in Kyaukpyu, villages located in Gone Chein VT had a much higher level of destruction (48% on average) than other villages.

Table 6 Variation of house destruction and damage levels across the four affected townships

Township Destruction range, by village

“Total affected” range, by village Most affected sample VT

Kyaukpyu 0-76% 8-100% Gone Chein

Minbya 14-66% 56-100% Yin Chaung, La Har Kyay, Thar Yar Kone

Myebon 12-99% 64-100%

Moe Thee Nat Taung, Ah Ngu, Ohn Chaung, Laung Da Reik, Yoe Sa Nwin,

Nga Shwe Pyin, Taung Shey, Kyun Thar Yar, Sat Tet, Pyayt Chaung, Sin

Kyat, Yae Shin

Pauktaw 4-94% 55-100% Byaing Thit, Tha Yet Chaung, Pon Nar Gyi, Sin Paik


Map 1 Level of house destruction in the worst hit areas of the four affected townships

12


3.3 Self-recovery Rate and Estimated Level of Needs

3.3.1 Current level of self-recovery At the beginning of January 2011 i.e. more than 2 months after the cyclone, half of the sample villages indicate more than 91% of destroyed/damaged houses remain without rehabilitation, and will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. In almost one third (32%) of the villages, villagers reported that there was not a single house fully repaired yet. Most of these villages were amongst the worst affected ones (mean destruction level of 54% and above, and mean proportion of affected houses reaching 98%).

Disaggregated data by township show that self recovery is slowest in Pauktaw (only 17% of affected houses already repaired fully); however the proportion of houses not repaired at all is much higher in Myebon (43%) than in the three other townships (see figures and map below).

Figure 2 Current level of shelter self recovery in the worst hit areas, by township

Examples of house repair::

Fully repaired house Partially repaired house Partially repaired houses using materials received during emergency

distribution

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


Proportion of affected houses fully repaired in the sample villages (as of 05 January 2011)


Map 2 Level of shelter self recovery in the worst hit areas of the four affected townships

Houses that suffered small or partial damages during the cyclone were found to be the ones that people have already repaired partially or fully. They often used for this type of repair the materials they received during the emergency phase e.g. tarpaulins to cover part of the roof and to replace a missing wall. In many cases however, self-repaired houses are not strong enough and do not have any disaster resilience features.

14



Approximately 20,000 fully destroyed houses have not been recovered yet (15,000 households are living with host families and another 5,000 are living in temporary makeshift shelters), meaning that more than 104,000 people still remain homeless or without adequate basic shelter.

Based on the assumption that the majority of houses that are still not repaired are the ones that were fully destroyed, the number of houses not repaired represents almost three quarters (74%) of the number of houses destroyed by the cyclone, in the assessed area. If this ratio is extrapolated to the estimated number of houses destroyed in the whole Giri affected area (20,000+), it can be estimated that approximately 15,000 fully destroyed houses are still in the same condition as right after the cyclone. For the 5,000+ destroyed houses where people started to repair, field observations made during the assessment indicate that the level of repair does not ensure proper living conditions. We can therefore conclude that approximately 20,000 fully destroyed houses have not been recovered yet, meaning that more than 104,000 people still remain homeless or without adequate basic shelter.

3.3.2 Estimated level of shelter repair and reconstruction needs

As part of the assessment, villagers were asked to estimate the number of houses that will not be rebuilt or repaired before the next rainy season. In the 112 sample villages, this figure was estimated as over 9,600 houses; meaning that approximately 48,000 persons will not be able to recover housing conditions to pre-cyclone level. The proportion of houses that are not expected to be rebuilt or repaired is particularly high in Pauktaw and Myebon, representing over two thirds of affected houses.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%


Proportion of affected houses that have not been repaired at all in the sample villages (as of 05 January 2011)


Table 7 Proportion of affected houses that will not be repaired by next monsoon, by township

Township

Total No of

affected houses

Houses that will not be repaired before next rainy season

No %

Kyaukpyu 3 248 841 26%

Minbya 2 337 610 26%

Myebon 6 853 4 546 66%

Pauktaw 4 706 3 694 78%

Total 17 144 9 691 57%

16


Map 3 Expected level of shelter repair needs before next monsoon in the worst hit areas of the four affected townships


If this figure of 9,691 houses in sample area is then extrapolated to the whole Giri affected area, where a total of 51,944 houses were collapsed or damaged according to latest Government figures6, at least 29,500 affected houses may not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. In addition, the 22,000+ houses that have been or might be self-repaired are very unlikely to meet minimum standards for disaster resilience as was observed during this field assessment. In a context of cash shortage and livelihoods disruption at community and household levels, self recovery will most probably push many affected families into debt.

The following chart sums up the destruction levels and estimated needs for the whole Giri affected areas:

It is also worth looking at the self-recovery rate, village wise. For as many as 35% of the sample villages, it is expected that over 90% of affected houses will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. These villages have an average level of house destruction well above the sample mean (55% as against 38%). The assessment indicates that there are very few villages where houses were fully recovered. Indeed, only 3 sample villages out of the 112 (2.7%) will not have any houses left to be repaired or rebuilt by the monsoon according to the group discussions7.

3.3.3 Main Constraints Faced by Affected Households to Repair or Rebuild Their House

The lack of cash is cited as the main constraint mentioned for householders inability to repair/rebuild themselves with 88% of the sample villages, reporting this as the top constraint. This is particularly clear for Minbya where it was the main problem for all sample villages (see figure below).

6 Source: Emergency Shelter Cluster, 10 November 2010. 7 One of these villages had actually no house destroyed by the cyclone. Another one (Nga Pa Thon) is one of the biggest villages in Myebon affected area, which suffered 30% destruction but where the needs were somewhat played down due to external pressure in the village during assessment.

52,000 affected houses

Fully destroyed: 20,000

Damaged: 32,000

= 29,500 without any kind of recovery by next monsoon

15,000 14,500

18


Figure 4 Top reason for the villagers’ inability to repair their houses, by township

The lack of construction materials was the first concern in a few villages (4% of sample) and to a higher degree in Pauktaw Township (12%). However, if we look at the whole constraints mentioned whatever their ranking, it seems the lack of materials might be an issue in a number of villages (more than two thirds of the sample). Construction material availability at village level is relatively limited according to observations in the sample villages. In some villages, people usually collect wood and bamboo for their own needs from the nearby hills, although this is considered illegal. However, nearly all big timbers have been cut in the 1990s when logging companies used to operate in the area. Thatch roof materials such as nipa palm leaves are sometimes available in Minbya villages but relatively rare in Myebon and Kyaukpyu affected villages. Other construction materials such as zinc roof, nails are not available in the villages but can be found in shops in the main towns. However, most affected households will probably not be able to afford such materials. Construction tools were said to be missing.

The lack of time was also reported as an important constraint in approximately two thirds of the sample villages. This is likely to be related to other reasons mentioned, in particular the fact that affected people are now still focusing on their more immediate needs (food and to a lesser extent water).

Except in a few villages, technical skills and manpower availability do not seem to be major constraints. For instance, local people usually know how to make bamboo mats for flooring or partition walls. This finding is also related to the relatively high number of skilled carpenters and masons in the affected area. In the 112 sample villages, they are no less than 597 carpenters and 133 masons, which means 6 to 7 skilled construction workers per village on average. Less than 15% of sample villages have no skilled carpenter at all.

Top constraint for house self-recovery

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


% of sample villages lack of cash lack of materials No / loss of source of income


Figure 5 Reasons mentioned by villagers to explain their inability to repair their houses

Other reasons for not being able to repair damage houses are much related to the lack of cash: in 32% of sample villages, people mentioned the loss of their income source or the current lack of job opportunities. Other main reasons also include poor transport conditions or means (for 7% of the sample, with a particularly higher level in Pauktaw – 20% of sample villages), the fact that people are currently busy with fulfilling other basic needs (6% of sample, but only mentioned in Kyaukpyu villages), and their higher concern for food availability (3% of sample).

4. Conclusion and recommendations

� House destruction levels were very high. In the worst hit areas, more than one third of the houses were fully destroyed by the cyclone. The joint assessment confirmed that Myebon was by far the most affected township.

� Although affected people have started to repair their house with salvaged materials and the emergency kits they received (e.g. tarpaulins), shelter self recovery is slow and leaves entire villages neglected without support. As of the beginning of January 2011, half of the sampled villages indicate more than 91% of destroyed/damaged houses remain without rehabilitation,. The proportion of houses not repaired at all is much higher in Myebon (43%) than in the three other townships.

� The number of people who have not recovered their pre-cyclone housing conditions is still dramatically high. Based on extrapolation from assessment figures, an estimated 20,000 houses that fully collapsed during Giri have not been recovered yet, meaning that more than 104,000 people are still without adequate basic shelters as of January 2011. Some affected households have started to repair or rebuild their houses. However, these are often not up to minimum standards for disaster resilience, and self recovery will inevitably have negative impacts on households’ financial situation.

� Shelter still needs to be considered as a top priority that requires external assistance during the early recovery phase.

Main reasons for the inability to repair (all answers mentioned, without ranking)

0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

Lack of cash Lack of

materials Lack of technical

skills

Lack of time Lack of manpower Other

constraint

% of sample villages

Kyaukpyu

Minbya Myebon Pauktaw Total

20


� Shelter recovery efforts should target first Myebon Township, where destruction levels were higher and full recovery is slower.

� Further assessment should be conducted to look at and quantify the actual impacts of shelter self recovery on household financial resources and debt levels.

� A large proportion of affected houses will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season should there be no external support. Based on communities’ forecast, it is expected that 57% of affected houses in the worst hit areas will not be repaired before the next monsoon. In Pauktaw and Myebon townships, over two thirds of affected houses are likely to remain unrepaired.

� In villages where destruction levels were high, villagers will not be able to recover decent living conditions before the next rainy season. For as many as 35% of the sample villages, it is expected that over 90% of affected houses will not be repaired or rebuilt before the next rainy season. The average level of house destruction of this category of villages is particularly high.

� Considering that the poorest households (i.e. small scale farmers or fishermen, and casual workers) used to have the weakest shelters amongst the community prior to Giri, and now account for the majority of households whose house was totally destroyed, support is required for those households that will not be able to rebuild and will be forced spend the coming rainy season(s) in dwellings far below minimum humanitarian standards.

� Considering only 3-4 months now remain before the next rainy season, shelter recovery activities need to start urgently to make the most of the dry season.

� The rainy season runs from June till October and is amongst the heaviest in the world (with an average annual rainfall of 5 meters). Several storms with winds of over 75 mph occur every year as well as regular cyclones from the Bay of Bengal (in 2004, Mala in 2006 and Giri in 2010). As a consequence, shelter standards in the area of intervention should be higher than in the Ayeyarwaddy delta and stakeholders involved in shelter recovery should aim for shelters with disaster resilient structure and features at a unit cost of at least USD 600 for a new shelter, and USD 175 for a ‘repair package’ (walling, roofing or flooring).

� The replacement value for 20,000 fully destroyed houses which are not likely to be rebuilt without external assistance is USD 12 million. Another 14,500 damaged houses are expected to remain unrepaired until the next rainy season, and the total repair value would then amount to USD 2.54 million. The total shelter recovery

Current living conditions for the poorest households

Koke Ko village, Myebon Tsp

Ngan Taung village, Myebon Tsp

Pyin Wan village, Myebon Tsp

Pyin Wan village, Myebon Tsp


cost can therefore be estimated at USD 14.54 million.

� DRR knowledge must be improved and spread within the communities as a component of shelter construction. In case no funding is made available for shelter, appropriate IEC materials should at least be shared with local communities for them to be able to build back better their houses.

� The lack of cash is by far the main constraint to shelter self recovery, and is compounded by the strong disruption of livelihoods, which is likely to continue in the coming months.

� The lack of construction materials is also perceived as a barrier, probably because many materials are sourced out of the affected areas and people cannot afford to buy them anymore.

� Technical skills and manpower availability do not seem to be major constraints. Local capacities for retrofitting or building shelters are one the affected communities’ assets early recovery interventions will have to integrate.

� These results indicate that shelter reconstruction should be community-led, and they also advocate for a stronger link between shelter and livelihood recovery intervention, also considering that shelter provision is one of the most effective direct and indirect livelihood generators. If no funds are directly allocated to the shelter sector, at least some should be to recovery interventions that procure cash or incomes to affected people to support them in rehabilitating their homes without entering debt spirals.

� The number of people who have not recovered their pre-cyclone housing conditions is still dramatically high. Based on extrapolation from assessment figures, an estimated 15,000 houses that fully collapsed during Giri have not been recovered yet. Some affected households have started to repair or rebuild their houses. However, these are often not up to minimum standards for disaster resilience, and self recovery will inevitably have negative impacts on households’ financial situation. Overall, it was estimated that more than 104,000 people are still without adequate basic shelters as of January 2011.

Date post:	26-Jul-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	0 times
Download:	0 times

Post-Giri Recovery Action Plan for Shelter...

Documents