POST REVOLUTIONARY NICARAGUA AND CITIZEN ATTITUDES: A PROLEGOMENON

Samuel Freeman

METHODOLOGY

Unless toppled by outside intervention, the success of the Nicaraguan revolution will depend in (large part) on t h e willingness of the people to support the government and to respond to Sandinista initiatives to restructure and reform the socioecono- mic and political system. Consequently, it is impor- tant to gain an understanding of Nicaraguan attitudes toward the revolution and the government. The situation in Nicaragua makes some types of behav- ioral research extremely difficult. Statistical data considered routine in the United States either is not kept or is kept inadequate1y.l Survey research based on statistical probability sampling is not yet possible, necessitating utilization of other approaches. One approach common to anthropology and sociology2 is non-par ticipant observation.

Utilizing non-participant observation and in- depth interviews with approximately 30 Nicaraguans conducted between 9 and 1 6 August, 1983, t h i s paper synthesizes citizen attitudes with some of the post revolution writing on Nicaragua. Two interviews were conducted in Managua, all others were con- ducted in the northwestern departments of Metagal- pa, Jinotega, Esteli and Nueva S e g ~ v i a . ~ Questions were open ended and interviews lasted from 30 minutes to over an hour. Several questions, such as attitudes toward the Sandinistas and the United States were asked of everyone; but most questions centered on the specific knowledge and experiences of interviewees. As argued by Lane,4 such questions offer a dimension of understanding which cannot be

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captured by survey research type questions. Aithmgh there is no absolute agreement among scholars who have researched in post revolutionary Nicaragua,S observations presented herein are consistent with most scholarly information on the country.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

If you go to Nicaragua committed to the revolution, you will find plenty to strengthen your commitment. If you go opposed to the regime, you will find a satisfying amount to criticize. But if you go with an ambivalent attitude, you may return with ambivalence whose depth is

6 oceanic.

Nations experiencing revolution are likely to be viewed in idiosyncratic and mystical terms. Although all revolutions are in some ways unique, revolutions also share many common characteristics. Losing sight of this, or forcing events into a preconceived world view can lead to serious distortion and mis- understanding.

In The End and the Beginning, John Booth applies the literature of the life cycle of revolution to Nicaragua and finds close conformity between this revolution and other^.^ Given Booth's analysis, we might enhance our understanding of the Nicaraguan Revolution by referring to, for example, the Amer- ican revolution and that passage in the Declaration of Independence where Jefferson argues:

----

. . . all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.

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Nicaragua's history is one of political insta- bility and repeated interventions by the United States.* From its inception, the Somoza regime was repressive, brutal and corrupt. But with U.S. support and general reluctance by the people to arise en masse, the Somozas maintained control, serving as an instrument of U.S. policy.9

After the 1934 assassination of August0 San- dino, revolutionary opposition was sporadic until the 1961 founding of the FSLN. The Somozas, however, were repeatedly challenged, primarily by rival fac- tions of the oligarchy, the incipient middle class, organized labor and disgruntled military officers. Challenges were met in turn through alliances of convenience and marshalling various resources of the state, especially and increasingly its coercive powers. In addition, the U.S. responded with economic and military assistance when most needed.1°

Only after the earthquake of 1972 did the FSLN gain sufficient strength to threaten the Somozas. But six more years of increasing tyranny were required before sufficient support existed to topple the re- girne.ll As Jefferson had argued some two hundred years prior, the people had suffered injustice so long as it was sufferable.

Since 1979, there has been substantial political turmoil and uncertainty in Nicaragua, which is com- mon to all revolutions, including our own.12 Perhaps the surprise is that Nicaraguans have established and maintained as broad a consensus and as much stability as they have. Historically, a "reign of terror" is not uncommon.

There have been resignations from the govern- ment; but, with some exceptions, the groups repre- sented named replacements.13 From the original Council of State, all except COSEP14 maintained representation through 1983.15 Generally, resigna-

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tions have come from among groups slow to support the revolution. The obvious exception is Eden Pastora. Resignations have enabled the Sandinista leadership, some who always admitted to a Marxist philosophy, to consolidate power.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSPECTIVE

In 1983 President Reagan issued a bill of particulars against the Sandinista government which included the following: 1. Instead of freedom, they brought the people dictatorship. 2. They broke their promise to institute democracy and hold elections. 3. They broke the agreement negotiated by the OAS that led to Samoza's resignation. It called for representatives of all elements of Nicaraguan society in the government until elections could be held. But the Sandinistas seized power and "ousted their revo- lutionary comrades who had been fighting to establish a real democracy.'' 4. They abuse their neighbors in their desire to spread revolution and Soviet influence throughout Central America. 5. They engage in political repression of anyone who does not acquiesce to their wil l , including organized labor.16

In sum, Nicaragua is a willing agent of Soviet- Cuban- Mar xi s t-Lenini s t revolutionary subversion. Aided and abetted by Cubans and Soviets, Sandinistas are imposing totalitarianism, limiting freedom, sti- fling dissent, terrorizing Miskito Indians, attacking the Catholic Church, and supporting revolutionary efforts in El Salvador.

President Reagan: For almost two years, Nicaragua has served as a plat- form for covert military action. Through Nicaragua, arms are being smuggled to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatarnala. The Nicaraguan Government even admits the forced relocation of about 8,500

Miskito Indians.

The Nicaraguan junta cabled writ- ten assurances to the OAS in 1979 that it intended to respect human rights and hold free elections. Two years later, these commitments can be measured by the postponement of elections until 1985, by repression against free trade unions, against the media, minorities, and in defiance of all international civility, by the continued export of arms and sub- version to neighboring c o ~ n t r i e s . ~ ~

THE SANDINISTA PERSPECTIVE -- The Sandinistas respond that their opponents are

of two kinds - those who supported Somoza to the end, and the oligarchy which joined the rebellion in its final stage. Neither group, claim the Sandinistas, is in any way representative of the general popula- tion.

While admitting to Marxist influence, they contend it is only one of several philosophies guiding the revolution. "Liberation theology" also is strongly represented. As for becoming a Cuban-Soviet satel- lite, or regional provocateur, the Sandinistas argue that Nicaragua did not throw off U.S. domination to be dominated by Cuba, the Soviet Union or any other country, that their revolution follows no set ideology but seeks to discover what is best for Nicaraguans. Therefore, they say they are not exporting their revolution and that Nicaragua's solutions may be inappropriate for other nations. Regarding outside support and assistance, they point out that their nation, rendered destitute by exploitation and revolu- tion, needs and will accept assistance from any country. Furthermore, they are too busy trying to fulfill their revolution and rebuild their country to do more than offer moral and political support for

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struggles against oppressive governments.

Sandinistas see charges that they are imposing totalitarianism, stifling dissent and destroying private ownership as ridiculous fabrications. Press censorship and curtailed civil liberties are a result of efforts by Somocistas and the U.S. to subvert and destroy the revolution. They say the economy is over 60% privately owned. Only farms and businesses owned by the Somozas, or abandoned by oligarchs who left the country, or owned by those who disobeyed laws on wages and working conditions have been expropriated. (Since 1983, idle and underutilized lands also have been nationalized to redistribute land to refugee farmers from combat zones and to increase agricul- tural production.) They emphasize that much expro- priated farm land has been redistributed to private farmers or privately owned collectives.

They believe they demonstrate commitment to the people and the ideals of the revolution by abolishing capital punishment, increasing the literacy rate, and improving medical care and education. They could accomplish more if they did not have to divert scarce resources to the military to meet the challenge posed by U.S. supported contras and if the U.S. would cease its efforts to disrupt the economy.

To Sandinistas, problems with the Catholic Church hierarchy stem from traditional association of the Church with the oligarchy. Many ministers, priests and nuns working w i t h the people support the government. They admit they misunderstood and mishandled the situation with the Miskitos. Ad- mitting this, they claim to be approaching the problem more productively, and protecting Miskito rights and interests.

The Sandinistas admit having difficulty organ- izing the government, analyzing problems effectively, and developing and implementing successful policies.

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They say they assumed government under the worst of circumstances - in the aftermath of a revolution which left the nation prostrate - and that they are engaged in on the job training with no prior ex- perience to prepare them to run a government. They point to numerous local elections over the past five years and say they never promised national elections immediately after t h e revolution. Finally they point to turmoil in the United States after its own revolution noting it took Shay's Rebellion, two con- stitutions and seven years before national elections were held.

CITIZEN'S PERSPECTIVES

Do the Sandinistas have broad popular support? Have conditions improved? Is Nicaragua becoming a pluralist society? Are human rights protected? Is there a major Cuban presence? Is Nicaragua totali- tarian? Are civil liberties curtailed? These are some of the questions asked in interviewing Nicaraguans.

Nicaraguans are open, candid, hospitable, and graciously accept the presence of many foreigners from the world over. Though there was occasional hesitation, no one ever refused to talk or to answer any questions. Virtually everyone interviewed was very critical of U.S. policies in Nicaragua and Central America; yet no one ever generalized that to North Americans or personalized it to us. Most Nicaraguans distinguish between the government and the people of the United States. To illustrate, south of Jalapa we met a Nicaraguan militiaman wounded three weeks earlier. After introductions, he said: "You are North American. President Reagan is trying to do bad things to us. But you are here; and while you are here, you are our friend."

Those aware of U.S. hostility toward Nicaragua gave one or more of four reasons for it: 1. The U.S. misunderstood what was happening. 2. The U.S.

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- . . . . - .--

erroneously placed Nicaragua in an East-West dicho- tomy. 3. The U.S. wanted to continue its domination and exploitation of Nicaragua and Central America. 4. President Reagan was a bad person.19

Most interviewees opposed U.S. policies; few opposed the Sandinistas. Outside a farm cooperative near Metagalpa three persons agreed that life was better under Somoza than the Sandinistas. They objected to food and medical shortages, rationing and mili tarization.

Peasant woman: Before there used to be everything (i.e., no shortages and no rationing) . . . . I am not Somocista or Sandinista, but we were better off before . . . . We need medicine. If we go to the hospitals, they give us a couple of pills and let us go. If they give us a prescription, we take it to the pharmacy and there isn't any medicine. We also need sugar. A hotel owner, unsure of Sandinista intentions

regarding the private economy, was uneasy about the government. Furthermore, he held the Sandinistas responsible for contra attacks and general insecurity in the country. He noted that, before the Sandinistas came to power, there were no problems wi th the North Americans.

Only these four of over thirty people inter- viewed opposed the Sandinistas. At the farm cooper- ative where three persons criticized the Sandinistas, others argued the Sandinistas were not responsible for these problems. Food was scarce because of in- sufficient rain. Medicine and other things were in short supply because of the war and economic pressure by the United States. This debate was impressive because of its openness, its tone of disagreement without rancor, and its commonness. Such debates do not indicate repression.20

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While both critical and ambivalent attitudes were expressed, most interviewees expressed mild to passionate support for the government.

A farm worker near Metagalpa: The government is okay. (In an election,) I would vote Sandinista.

A refugee from the border area interviewed in Ocotal: I think this system of government is very good. We have freedom. We can move freely. We can work. Children can have an educa- tion. We have health.

A farmer in Jalapa: W e are grate- ful. We are satisfied. . . . I (want to) be organized in my community and work with the Sandinistas. I am 100% San- dinis ta.

A farm cooperative member near Metagalpa: We would vote for them (Sandinistas). If there were changes in the revolution, we would never stop defending the Sandinistas.

With the exception noted, everyone saw health care improvements as a major accomplishment of the revolution.21 Hospital care is free in public hos- pitals. Public pharmacies charge ten cordobas ($1.00 at the official exchange rate, $0.36 a t the "preferred" rate, about $0.17 at the black market rate) per visit regardless of the type, quantity or number of medi- cines prescribed.22 Establishment of health clinics, inoculation programs and regular visits by doctors where none of these had existed previously were cited repeatedly. Under Somoza only those who could travel to the doctors and could pay could get health care. Doctors, nurses, and paramedics now make regular visits to the workplace and workers are now covered by disability programs.23 A dental hygiene

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program now provides children monthly flouride treat m en ts.24

Other consistently praised achievements includ- ed the literacy and education campaigns. A refugee from contra attacks near Mosonte told how, before the revolution, he had managed with the assistance of an American priest to put his oldest son through school, but that he did not have the resources to provide more than a few years of school for his other children. H e said "(now) not only my sons, but all the poor people have a better opportunity to get an education."

In Metagalpa, four high school students dis- cussed differences in school since the revolution. Classes were larger (now about 50) because everyone could go now, not just those who could pay. Students were more serious. More courses and more sports activities were offered.

Because television news has shown Nicaraguan students singing the FSLN song (often mistakenly reported in the U.S. as the Nicaraguan national anthem) condemning Yankee imperialists as "enemies of humanity," concern has been expressed in the U.S. about education in Nicaragua.25 Consequently we questioned a school teacher and the high school students a t length about the political content of instruction. The students said they studied "the dictator Somoza" and how he had people tortured and killed. They learned of U.S. support for Somoza, the oligarchy, the history of U.S. occupations of Nicara- gua and its support for the contras. Most information on the U.S. and Reagan was critical. They studied Western thinkers, including Marx and Lenin who were presented in positive terms. They knew about Cuban assistance - some of their teachers were Cuban - but not much about Cuba or Castro. They liked North Americans and baseball, but were not inter- ested in politics. They said "we are free and peaceful

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in Nicaragua."

The teacher taught 46 second grade students. She became a teacher because of her involvement in the literacy campaign after the revolution. She had relatives who supported the Sandinistas during the revolution. Although she did not participate in the revolution, she sympathized with the Sandinistas. She taught her students about the heroes and martyrs of the revolution and said there was some political content in instructional materials. This was appro- priate because of the realities of Nicaragua. She strongly denied that this constituted indoctrination and manipulation:

I don't think that there could be any manipulation here because, in spite of the young age of the children, they are living this reality. Especially now. I had the opportunity to see that when there was an attack (on a nearby village). One of my students was there. She was only eight years old and at this point, she was living this reality. Thus I don't consider this to be manipulation because I am teaching based on the reality of the circumstances. There are many children who have experienced this be- cause they and their parents have been taken by force. There are some times when we are teaching and not too far away from here we can hear the gunfire. This is why we are preparing them so that the classes won't be stopped. To m e this is not manipulation.

Economically, the Sandinistas have stressed land reform. After the revolution, the farms and estates of the Somoza family and oligarchs who fled the country were seized by the state. However, except as discussed above, land owners who remained in

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Nicaragua kept their lands. Most expropriated lands became worker owned collectives or state owned farms to be farmed collectively (primarily by pre- viously landless peasants). Some lands also were distributed to individual farmers. The goal is to distribute most state lands as worker owned coopera- tives.

Near Metagalpa a farm worker on a family farm was interviewed. Six hundred acres were being worked by the owner and three employees who were paid 240 cordobas for six days work (about $8.75 at the official preferred exchange rate). Satisfied with his job, h e had no plans to seek work elsewhere. His education, interest in and knowledge of politics were minimal. He was satisfied with the Sandinistas.

Workers on state farms and worker owned collectives were interviewed. All supported land reform and the Sandinistas. Surprisingly, when asked what they did during the revolution, none said they participated. One simply said "I worked."

A worker in Jinotega: No, the humble peasants have not been interested in wars. We have only been interested in working and providing 'a living.

A worker in Metagalpa: No, we were not involved, but now all of the members of the cooperative are militia. . . . We have to defend ourselves and we have arms. While most interviewees worked as hired hands

before the revolution, one in Jinotega owned a mountain farm near the Honduran border. When the government offered him membership in a worker owned cooperative, h e abandoned his farm because of contra activity and because it took' six days by boat to move his crops to market. His discussion on differences between private and collective ownership

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are indicative of other collective members' senti- ments:

We used to work in the mountains. We used to work intensely. We were a family. We used to have a lot of land. We would plant but it was hard to transport the crops down here - . We used to like to own our own land when we were in the mountains. We are used to working individually. But with the revo- lution, now the idea is to work collec- tively because it is more productive. By putting all the envy, egotism, and the ambition of wanting to have more aside, we have arrived at the idea of workirlg collectively. . . . (Almbition has made us want to have more than others. Working collectively makes us all equal with no one person having more than any other and helping each other out. Now we are getting used to it because we are be- coming conscientious. If you are always thinking you want to be better than other people, and work to have more, then you come to believe you are better than others. That is why the poor have always been below . . . . This is the idea of the revolution -- not to exploit each other.

Two interviewees in their middle twenties merit special attention. Both were from upper middle class families. Both attended universities in the U.S. during the revolution and returned home afterward. The man majored in agriculture, was self employed and supported the Sandinistas, as did his parents. The woman majored in political science and was a clerk in the government. She supported the Sandinistas strongly while her parents opposed them. Their perceptions are important because they viewed the revolution in broad perspective and they reflected

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some of the divergent attitudes of remaining mem- bers of the more affluent classes who supported t h e revolution, who have given the Sandinistas a chance, and who are concerned over its future and direction.

The man supported the Sandinista program, but wanted it enacted with moderation. H e believed there had been tremendous social and economic injustice in Nicaragua and held Somoza, the "oli- garchy" and the United States responsible. He supported land reform, nationalization of some busi- nesses (especially banks) and redistribution of wealth. His concern was that the revolution not become misdirected. While not a Marxist, he agreed with aspects of Marxist theory and "Liberation theology.ft However, he disliked Communism and Nicaragua becoming Communist. He disliked Cuba's government and did not care for Cubans; yet he insisted the Reagan Administration had greatly exaggerated the Cuban military presence. He saw Cubans (especially teachers and medical personnel) as providing in- valuable assistance, and said Cuba's relations with Nicaragua were proper. He saw Reagan's policies as wrong, injuring both Nicaragua and the U.S., and pushing Nicaragua toward Communism.

H e had mixed feelings about the U.S. He appreciated its positive qualities, and saw good relations between the two countries as essential. Yet he was painfully aware of a dark side to the U.S., especially its relations with other nations which he saw as imperialist, oppressive and exploitative. Furthermore, he saw no basis for Reagan's argument that Nicaragua is totalitarian. He insisted there was freedom, noting that people could go anywhere with impunity.

He was concerned about t h e inexperience of government officials and their consequent mistakes, and about increasing government bureaucratization. He feared this would stifle leadership, causing the

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revolution to stagnate. He said the Sandinistas could have tried harder to work with the private sector. But he held the propertied class which began taking money out of Nicaragua with the fall of Somoza more responsible. He resented and lamented their deser- tion of t h e country. Narrowing the social base was economically and politically injurious, and increased chances that Cuba would become the revolution's model.

In sum, the Sandinistas should be less bureau- cratic, more reasonable with the private sector, less reliant on Cuba as a model, and less strict with the press. The private sector should stop exporting capital and return 'that already exported. The affluent should stop deserting the country, be more willing to work with the Sandinistas, and stop sup- porting the contras. The U.S. should stop supporting the contras, reinstate the loans and assistance pro- grams which Reagan stopped, remove all military personnel from Honduras, stop exploiting Central America, and t ry to establish a partnership with the Sandinistas based on equality.

Though more committed to the Sandinistas, the woman also believed government was too bureau- cratic and that this could threaten the revolution. She recognized Sandinista mistakes, especially with the Miskitos but attributed them to inexperience and the comprehensive nature of the problems. It was important to her that the government had recognized, admitted to and apologized for mistakes, and had changed policies. As a Marxist, she was not worried about Cuba as a model for Nicaragua. She saw the propertied class as the people's enemy, bitterly resented their looting the nation's wealth, and bid them good riddance. She believed capitalism was a repressive, exploitative, and inherently unjust eco- nomic system which had destroyed democracy in the U.S. Reagan was inherently evil, a puppet of the capitalist class.

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If the U.S. government had any human decency or meant its rhetoric on freedom, justice, and democracy, she felt it would adopt policies like those of most nations by sending agricultural equipment, medical personnel and supplies, and teachers instead of guns, ammunition, military personnel and sabo- teurs. Then Nicaragua could concentrate on re- building the nation and would not need a large army. However, given contra attacks and U.S. aggression, Nicaragua must arm itself.

A s for the contras, interviewees variously de- scribed them as bandits, murderers, rapists, thieves, kidnappers and traitors. No one was sympathetic. While increasing militarization and the draft law were unpopular, most interviewees saw them as necessary given the threat of U.S. supported contras.26 Some interviewees were in the militia and one was in a Sandinista Defense Committee (CDS).

Virtually everyone interviewed saw the only alternative to the Sandinistas as a return of the Somocistas which they strongly opposed, saying they would fight anyone to preserve the revolution. But all also said they only wanted to live in peace and that they would like to have.better relations with the United States. Several expressed fear that the U.S. would invade, doubt whether Nicaragua could repel such an invasion, and resolve to try. A man interviewed in Jalapa shared these views, concluding with stark eloquence: "If the North Americans attack us, we will do as Sandino. With our machetes, we will chop off their heads and hang them from trees."

DISC US SION

Nicaragua is a nation a t war. Drawing experiences in Viet Nam, I evaluated the situation

on in

a broader context than might have been possible otherwise. Armed military personnel were every- where. To those inexperienced in such situations, this

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could be disconcerting, leading to an unwarranted conclusion that Nicaragua is a police state. While security was tight throughout Viet Nam, security in Nicaragua was limited. This was especially notice- able at the airport where defenses consisted of about 24 World War I1 vintage anti-aircraft guns.27 Few security personnel were visible in the terminal. Customs inspection was perfunctory at most.28 While government buildings in Managua were guarded, entry was not difficult, eliciting no more than a quick search if that. Conversely, it was very difficult to gain access to the U.S. Embassy, even for U.S. citizens.29

A marked difference existed in interaction between military personnel and civilians in Nicaragua and Viet Nam. Beyond official contacts, there was little interaction between the two in Viet Nam. Soldiers and citizens mingled easily in Nicaragua; and while citizens occasionally regarded police with a p prehension and suspicion, interaction generally was relaxed and cordial. In Viet Nam soldiers and police routinely stopped citizens to check papers, question and search them. I saw absolutely none of that anywhere in Nicaragua.

Foreigners did not have to register or have their itinerary approved, but security personnel in Managua observed their movements in the city,30 especially those carrying cameras. Pictures of government buildings and anything military were prohibited. Film would be confiscated. If security personnel suspected that someone might have, or might be about to take such pictures, they would make quiet, professional and firm inquiries, explaining what was and was not permitted. There was no harassment, nor undue or prolonged questioning.

Although an uneasy city, there was no curfew in Managua and streets were safe at all hours. Nor were there travel restrictions in Nicaragua, even in the

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combat zones.31 Official authorization was needed only to interview regular army personnel which is common to any military and was not rigidly enforced. Permission was easily obtained from civilian (not military) personnel at the Managua press office. Regular a r m y officers and enlisted personnel were well disciplined. While friendly and willing to engage in casual conversation, only authorized personnel would discuss military questions.

Army personnel were patient and responsive to all appropriate questions. A s in any army, they would not discuss questions on troop strength or movement, armaments beyond small arms, or tactics. Regular army soldiers generally had complete uniforms in good condition. Beyond a weapon and helmet, equipment such as packs and web gear were possessed unevenly. Most soldiers had AK-47's of good con- dition, with a variety of other weapons, especially M - 1 6 ' ~ ~ in evidence.32

The much larger militia was doing most of t h e fighting. This was without doubt a rag tag army, ill clothed and ill equipped. Complete uniforms were nonexistent. Many militiamen had no boots; some were barefoot. Helmets were rare. They were as likely to be armed with an M-16, a FAL (Belgian assault rifle), shotgun or machete as an AK-47. Though more common, the AKs clearly were hand- me-downs, probably from the Cubans, as the stocks uniformly showed considerable wear. Militiamen were cooperative in interviews and permission for interviews was not needed. They knew the situation in their area, but poor communications limited their knowledge of events elsewhere. Except for army bases, there were almost no restrictions on taking pictures outside Managua.

Considerable Soviet block assistance was ob- vious, but it appeared primarily to have been uni- forms and small arms. This had been insufficient to equip both the army and the militia.33 There were

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many Soviet trucks, but Toyotas were the most common military vehicles. Militiamen commonly hitched rides on civilian transportation and drivers appeared very willing to pick up soldiers even in combat zones where their presence made vehicles automatic targets for the contra^.^^ Aside from about 18 aircraft at the Managua airport, no military aircraft were seen on the ground or in the air during the entire week.35

Freedom of movement was amazing.36 As is common to nations at war, towns had guard posts at the outskirts and machine gun positions at street corners in towns in the combat zones; but they were manned only at night. Their mostly symbolic nature was striking. Ease of entry to, movement in, and exit from towns in war zones even at night, the per- functory nature of security checks, the lack of a cur- few in war zones were startling.37 I t seemed they were determined to take no more precautions than the minimum necessary and to permit security mat- ters to interfere with normal routine only as ab- solutely necessar In fact the Sandinistas have said essentially that. 3%

As noted, there have been shortages in the countryside; but it seems the Sandinistas have favored the countryside over Managua.3g While soap was rationed in Managua, a store in Jalapa had a t least 30 bars. Nor was soap hard to find in other towns. Fresh vegetables and dairy products appeared to be adequate, as were clothing and shoes.40

Posters and billboards abounded with patriotic sayings, likenesses of revolutionary heroes41 and exhortations to defend and build the nation. "No pasaran'l (they will not pass) was a national watch- word. A billboard in Managua proclaimed that a nation's military does not kill its own people - perhaps not in Nicaragua anyway. "All arms to the people" was another common expression. The perva-

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siveness of weapons among the people calls into question 'mguments that the Sandinistas are coercing the people and defying popular will. Disarming the people generally is a primary objective of dictators.

The junta's apparent trust of the people goes beyond arming them. Junta members hold weekly equivalents of town meetings where residents ques- tion them on various topics. Sandinista supporters and critics are present and debate is lively. Junta members have been lightly guarded at these meetings. Though government officials are now heavily guarded, as recently as January, 1984 some junta members moved among the public virtually unguarded.42 They have stated they do not want security concerns to burden the revolution and interfere with its progress and that they must trust the people if the people are to trust them.43

Trust does not extend to all sectors for, without question, the socioeconomic and political base of the revolution has narrowed. Dissatisfaction of the affluent has been widely reported in the United States,44 and sometimes distorted to imply a level of discontent which is not evidenced by interviews with the general population. While some affluent citizens not only support but serve in the government,45 affluent support for the Sandinistas is limited and has deteriorated steadily. At times there has been m u t u a l antagonism (which often has been fueled by the United States, as in the recent election^.)^^

Harassment of dissidents appears to have been relatively low keyed, but also appears to have increased, at least through the fall of 1983. Fur- thermore, erosion of human rights protection oc- curred in 1982 and 1983.47 In late 1983, however, the Sandinistas attempted to improve relations with virtually all dissident groups. Results have not been impressive. While most parties participated in the 1984 elections, debate over election procedures was a major point of contention.

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There still appears to be appreciable room for dissent. -- La Prensa manages to publish opposition v i e w ~ . ~ ~ Advertisments for La Prensa dot Managua and it is available outside the city. Opposition parties openly maintain offices; we had (and noticed) no problems in entering them. We saw opposition literature being freely distributed in Massaya and listened to regular radio broadcasts of excerpts of addresses by the Pope.49 Billboards with messages on the Pope's visit were evidenced throughout Mana- gua and the countryside.

--

People spoke candidly without knowing anything about us except our nationalities. Suspicions were expressed twice when companions of an interviewee suggested we might be spies (for whom?). That did not seem to inhibit persons buying corn at a coopera- tive near Metagalpa in criticizing the Sandinistas. At Jalapa an interviewee continued expressing support for the government and criticisms of the contras and the United States. None of this indicates a repressive society.

While the Reagan Administration has tried hard to discredit the elections, most reports indicate an open contest. Sandinistas worked to accommodate objections to election procedures. Most irregularities were minor and the vote appears to have been free and fair. The Sandinista vote was smaller than predicted and the number of parties participating as well as their proportion of the vote indicate a viable opposition.50

The Sandinistas are using the schools to social- ize students into "Nicaragua Libre." This can be seen as propaganda and brainwashing. But this must be placed in perspective. After any revolution the social fabric must be restructured, requiring, in part, legiti- mizing and glorifying the revolution and the new regime. Acculturation and political socialization are

23

major functions of all educational systems. We create and teach myths about our nation.51 The history taught in our schools often is a history of c ~ n v e n i e n c e ~ ~ whereby unflattering actions such as incarcerating Japanese-Americans during W WII is ig- nored or soft peddled. Unquestionably there is a point beyond which such socialization/indoctrination becomes excessive. However, in my opinion, it is inaccurate to claim excess by the Sandinistas.

Some argue the revolution was instigated by Marxist forces outside the country. Nicaraguan history indicates the causes were domestic;53 but political leaders in t h e U.S., directly or indirectly, give credence to the "external subversion" thesis which is then repeated, if not accepted by t h e media and opinion leaders as legitimate. This obfuscates meaningful understanding and inhibits formulation of viable policy based on recognition of both the positive and t h e negative aspects of the revolution. While there is ample room for concern over the course of the revolution, it is difficult to substantiate argw ments by the Reagan administration, especially that the country is, or is becoming totalitarian. Even former Ambassador Quainton privately admitted that,54 as does a current Embassy spokesman.55 Limitations on press freedoms and restrictions on opposition parties are common to nations at war. Still, they are vexing and generally unjustifiably severe. Such is the case in Nicaragua. A major Sandinista failure has been in relations with the Miskito Indians; but they readily admit these mistakes and recent policies appear to have improved rela- tions.56

Efforts to destabilize Nicaragua appear to have backfired. Indeed news reports indicate the CIA never expected the contras to threaten the Sandinista regime ~ ign i f i can t ly .~~ However, the contras have inflicted economic damage and probably have made i t more difficult for the Sandinistas to deal more

24

effectively with dissent, which appears to be greatest in Managua.58 There are tensions in the countryside as well, but of an entirely different sort - t h e kind reflected by bunkers in a church schoolyard in Ocotal. Although they can infiltrate the country to launch raids on towns and villages, the contras appear to have almost no popular support. Regarding contras and Somocistas, those interviewed responded with a tenor in the voice which said more than the words spoken. The same holds for questions on an invasion by the United States. Responses from the heart and the gut displayed firm determination. Regardless of their criticisms of Sandinista failures and short- comings, the people appear to stand with them on this issue.

President Reagan's policies appear to have solidified Sandinista support, giving them an effective excuse for anything and everything that goes wrong - "Were i t not for contras and North American imperialists. . . ." There may be some truth to that. Surely there are more constructive things to be done than digging bunkers in Ocotal.

In many ways the Nicaraguan revolution has been remarkable. There have been major improve ments in health care and education. Land reform is being implemented with apparent success. Although young and inexperienced, the police and military were well disciplined, professional and seemed to have generally good rapport with t h e people. This has been done in four years in the face of counter revolu- tionary warfare being waged on both borders. The United States has restricted virtually all U.S. assis- tance, has made i t very difficult for Nicaragua to get international loans and has encouraged decapitaliza- tion. Furthermore, it has provided $100 million59 to the contras and has engaged directly in military operations against Nicaragua.

Those concerned about the Nicaraguan revolu-

25

tion should go see for themselves, travel about and talk to the peo le. While there are grounds for opposing views, 6 f even staunch anti-communist, anti- Sandinista visitors must be struck by the disparity between President Reagan's description of Nicaragua and what one actually sees and experiences there.62 But the President is partially correct; we should compare Nicaragua with other revolutions, especially our own. Despite numerous problems, Nicaragua remains remarkably open and the revolution shows considerable evidence of striving to fulfill its ideals. This is being done in the face of determined opposi- tion from the world's most powerful nation. There has been no reign of terror as in France, no purges as in the Soviet Union, no isolation as in China, no mass slaughter as in Cambodia, no personality cult as in Iran. One must ask why this revolution so alarms the United States government.

AFTERWORD

The ability to do rigorous research is increasing. Investigation is needed on the electoral process, establishment of the National Assembly and repre- sentation within it, the relationship between the National Assembly and the President, and the drafting of the Constitution. Furthermore, given arguments raised by President Reagan, Dr. K i r k p a t r i ~ k , ~ ~ and others, it is imperative that a focus of investigation be citizen attitudes. In planning such studies, researchers should establish as many contacts as possible before traveling to Nicaragua and to expect numerous delays once there.

Most research has been conducted in the cities. A truer understanding of Nicaraguan attitudes neces- sitates much more research being done in the coun- tryside. Non-participant observation with indepth interviews will remain an appropriate methodology even after survey research studies with probability sampling become possible. Sensitivity to the socio-

26

economic, geographic, e th ic and religious mix of the nation can enable an appropriate sample. Larger, more representative sarn?les than was possible for this study are needed.

lFor example, the Latin American Studies As- sociation reported in "LASA-NICA Scholars News" that the Centro de Investigaciones d e la Costa Atlantica is beginning to develop a demographic data base for Zelaya Department (April, 19851, v. 1, no. 2 , p. 4. However, the government is collecting and organizing more data regularly and has been willing, even eager, to make information available to re- searchers. Consequently substantial amounts of scholarly research are now being done on post revolu- tion Nicaragua as is evidenced by papers presented at tne April 1985 meeting of LASA in Alburqueque, New Mexico.

2A classic example is Elliot Liebow's, Tally's Corner (Boston:

3I traveled to Nicaragua wi th two other pro- fessors from Pan American University, a fellow political scientist and a sociologist. We wanted to make contacts and gain an initial understanding of the country in order to return and conduct more rigorous research. In the paper, I occasionally say "we". There are two different groups of rrwe'l being discussed. When discussing events upon arrival in country or in Managua, the I'we" being referred to are m y colleagues from Pan American and myself. When discussing travel in the countryside, the rrwe'' being referred to are myself and three free lance jour- nalists with whom I traveled (two Britons and a Spaniard).

Little, Brown & Co., 1967).

4Robert Lane, Political Ideology: Why the Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: The Glencoe Free Press, 1962).

27

5For a critical appraisal see Robert Leiken's "Nicaragua: The Untoid Story," N e w Republic (8 October 19841, v. 191, pp. 16-22.

6Peter Davis, "Mirror of Our Midlife Crisis," The Nation, v. 238 (28 January 19841, p. 77.

7John Booth, The End and t h e Beginning Westview Press, 19821, pp. 215- (Boulder, Colorado:

227.

81bid., pp. 11-50.

gIbid., pp. 51-95.

OIbid., passim.

llIbid.

12Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionarv America (Princeton: Princeton Uni- I

versity Press, 1965); Gary Nash, Red, White and Black: The People's of Early America (Englewood Cliffs. New Jersev: Prentice Hall, 1974); Gordon Wood,' The Creati& of the American Republic: 1776- 1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

13John Booth, The End and t h e Beginning, pp. 184-186.

14Superior Council of Private Enterprise. This is a coalition of chambers of commerce and industry which never gave more than lukewarm support to t h e revolution.

15John Booth, "Nicaragua: The Enigma," - San

Isweekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- ments Washington: D. C.: Office of t h e Federal

Antonio Light (9 October 19831, pp. lH , 4H.

28

Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration), v. 1 9 (18 J u l y 1983), pp. 1011-1012.

17Ibid., v. 1 8 (24 February 19821, p. 221.

18Bruce Marcus, ed. Sandinistas Speak (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982); Humberto Ortega Saavedra, et. al., La revolucion a traves de nuestra Direccion Nacional (Managua: Secretaria Nacional de Propaganda y Educacion Politica-FSLN, 1980); Ernesto Cardenal, "Cultura revolucionaria, popular, nacionalista, antimperialists," Nicarauac 1 (May/June 1980); Ernesto Cardenal, "A Priest in the Ministry," interview in Sojournes (March, 19831, pp. 14-18; Tomas Borge, "Revolutions are not Exported,'' inter- view in Newsweek, international edition (24 Septem- ber 1979'); Tomas Borge, Ernesto Cardenal and Ra- mirez Mercado, "The Sandinistas," interview in Playboy (September, 1983); and Daniel Ortega, inter- view in Playboy (September, 1983).

1 9 0 n l y two peasants interviewed (both refugees from very remote mountainous areas where there had been contra activity) had such limited education and led such isolated lives that they were totally unaware of the United States' attitude toward the Sandinista government. Their knowledge of anything outside their immediate environment was very limited and their opinions of the Sandinista government were ambivalent.

Regarding the reasons for the U.S. posture toward Nicaragua, the limited number of interviews obviously does not permit any speculation as to which of these explanations is the more prevalent. The significant point is the extent of awareness of U.S. policy among an essentially rural and not well educated population and the virtual unanimous oppo- sition to it.

29

20For additional evidence of this see t h e "Re- port of t h e Latin American Studies Association." LASA Forum (November, 1984).

21See John Donahue, "The Polit ics of Heal th C a r e in Nicaragua Before and Af ter t h e Revolution," Human Organization, v. 42 (Fall, 19831, pp. 264-272.

22Interview with a n Argentine doctor in Jino-

23Ibid., and interview with factory worker in

241nterviews with school teacher in Ocotal and

t ega.

J ino tega.

with four high school s tudents in Metagalpa.

25For fur ther clarification of this see Thomas Walker, "The Nicaraguan-U.S. Friction: The First Four Years (1979-1983)," paper presented at t h e XI International Congress of t h e Latin American Studies Association in Mexico Ci ty , 1 October 1983, p. 27.

26The d r a f t l aw has become increasingly (even highly) unpopular and was a n issue in the elect ion campaign. Interview with John Booth, 8 January 1985. Professor Booth was a member of t h e LASA delegation observing t h e Nicaraguan elections.

27These were the defensive positions visible from t h e landing and takeoff approaches a t Managua airport and from t h e apron at t h e terminal building. I t is possible t h e r e were o t h e r defenses beyond t h e airport . This is questionable, however, given t h e bombing raid on t h e airport in September , 1983.

Since t h a t ra id , Nicaragua has pursued t h e development o f mili tary air fields in various par t s of t h e country, has s t rengthened its a i r defenses, and has substantially increased t h e number of i t s mil i tary

30

aircraft, primarily helicopters. Because fighter air- craft typically require relatively short runways for takeoff and landings, virtually any paved runway in Nicaragua can accommodate fighter aircraft. De- spite continued insistence by the Reagan administra- tion that the Soviet Union/Cuba/Nicaragua plan to introduce MIG aircraft to Nicaragua (for example, immediately after the U.S. presidential elections in 1984) all three countries adamantly deny that any such plans exist. To date MIGs have not been introduced and there is no known evidence of any such plans. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out, especially if the contras continue to rely on air resupply for units operating in country.

28Airport security now is much tighter and baggage inspection for departing flights is rigorous in order to prevent bombs from being placed on board. Interview with John Booth.

29Entry to the U.S. Embassy by U.S. citizens without an appointment is virtually impossible. Ap- pointments can be difficult to obtain. It took us almost three days and many phone calls. Such highly controlled access is not the result of disturbances at the Embassy. Although American citizens opposed to U.S. policies who live in Nicaragua picket weekly a t the Embassy, there have been no threatening dis- turbances. It is generally recognized that the Ambassador to Nicaragua is one of the few U.S. Ambassadors to Latin America who can travel freely in his host country without much precaution.

30By th i s I do not mean that foreigners are followed or kept under surveillance. I am confident that I was not followed, nor has any U.S. citizen with whom I have talked indicated a suspicion that they were at any time followed. However, security and police do not take notice as they see foreigners moving about Managua.

31

31Apparently travel to the Atlantic coast com- bat zones is now restricted. "Report of the Latin A m er ican Studies Association.

32For additional discussion of the types and amounts of arms possessed by the Nicaraguans, see Thomas Walker, "The Nicaraguan-U.S. Friction," pp. 9-11.

33Since I did not tour military bases, I cannot attest to heavier weapons such as tanks and artillery. I can only say that I saw none (although they obviously possess them) and that tanks would be of very limited value in the northern border area because of the rugged terrain.

News reports in the United States throughout the Fall of 1984 indicate that Nicaragua has in- creased its acquisition of heavy weapons and Soviet tanks have been in evidence in Managua. Thus one should conclude that there are substantially more such weapons in Nicaragua now than when I was there. Whether these weapons have been acquired as a consequence of aggressive intent by the Sandinistas or as a consequence of the hostility of the United States is open to debate although i t would appear that a stronger case can be made for the latter explana- tion.

34For example, on 9 August 1983 a civilian pickup truck carrying 18 people, one of whom was a Sandinista militiaman, was struck by a rocket pro- pelled grenade (RPG). There were three survivors including an 18 month old infant whose mot,her perished.

35These aircraft consisted of six or seven helicopters, five or six "piper cub" type observation aircraft, three small transports and two Korean war vintage U.S. fighter jets. In fact, except for some of the helicopters, all of the aircraft were of U.S.

32

manufacture. It is possible, of course, that other military aircraft were based at other airfields (and there is no question of that being so now).

One additional point merits discussion. When a U.S. helicopter was shot down along the Hondu- ran/Nicaraguan border in early 1984, video tapes of the helicopter at the crash cite showed an aircraft without any markings. U.S. officials have said the aircraft was marked, but that the markings may have been obscure. When the helicopter was removed from the crash site and placed on display one week later, U.S. markings were clearly visible. I have no explanation for the initial absence and then presence of markings, but I have the video tapes to support m y assert ion.

360ne of the journalists (Robert Anderson) whom I accompanied to the northern departments had been in the Soviet Union the previous year. H e talked at length about the differences in freedom of movement in the Soviet Union and Nicaragua as well as the differences in surveillance and the ability to interact freely with the people. He stated that he had had reservations about going to Nicaragua be- cause he thought he might encounter surveillance and restrictions similar to those experienced in the Soviet Union. He said quite simply that the difference between t h e two countries on these points was "the difference between daylight and dark."

37T0 illustrate, going into Metagalpa after dark, we were stopped at a guard post manned by one person. He asked for our destination, but not for any identification, and then waved us on without further question or inspection of our vehicle. Later we walked the streets of Metagalpa until after midnight. We approached four high school students talking on a street corner and talked with them for over half an hour. Numerous other people were out and a police car passed by once. No one seemed to pay any

33

attention to the seven of us. The next night we attended a carnival in Ocotal, again moving about the town late at night without incident. Contra attacks in the Ocotal area were common at that time, including an attack the night we were there. Re- turning to Managua the following night, we were stopped once at a guard post manned by two armed guards. One shone a flashlight around in our vehicle while the other asked our destination. They did not ask for identification.

381nterview with Reverend J i m McLeod, a Pres- byterian minister, historian and an organizer of "Witness of Peace" who participated in negotiations with the Nicaraguan government to place U.S. citi- zens in the combat zones for extended periods of times h e . weeks to months).

39By the summer of 1984 a common saying was "Todo para 10s frentes de guerra!! (everything for the war front).

40Apparently there now are shortages of dairy Interview wi th John Booth. products also.

41The Sandinistas have made a calculated effort to avoid the creation of a cult of personality. They do not want their revolution to become identified with any one person. Consequently, all but one of the "heroes" depicted on billboards died during the revo- lution. The lone exception is Tornas Borge who is the sole surviving founder of the FSLN. While the portrait of Sandino and other "heroes" of the revolu- tion may appear alone, Borge's is always displayed in the company of others.

421nterview with Scott Lind (January, 19841, reporter for .the McAllen, Texas Monitor, who spent a week in Nicaragua over New Year, 1984.

431nterview with Rev. J i m McLeod.

34

44Ricardo Lizano, "A Revolution of Disillusion," World Press Review v. 30 (June, 19831, pp. 37-38; Car l Miodail, "In Nicaragua, A Revolution Gone Sour," U.S. News and World Repor t , v. 63 (October 18 , 19821, pp. 41,44; Ralph K. Bennett , "Nightmare in Nicaragua," Reader 's Digest v. 120 (May, 19821, pp. 47-48, 50-51, 54; ?!Nicaragua: W i l l Freedom Fighters ' Help or Hurt?" Business Week (May 23, 19831, pp. 62, 67, 70; Beth Nissen, "The Betrayal of a Revolution," Newsweek, v. 101 (June 6, 19831, pp. 26, 31-32; Margot Dougherty, "Living on t h e Edge," Life Maga- zine (September, 19831, pp. 24-30.

45For example J u a n Tijerino, who owns 3,000 acres of farmland, was elected to t h e National Assembly under the FSLN label. Although not a member of the FSLN party, h e recent ly toured several states in t h e U.S. expressing his s t rong support for the revolution and t h e Sandinistas.

46"Report of the Latin American Studies Asso-

-

cia t i on.

47John Booth, "Nicaragua: The Enigma," p. 4H.

48Six points need mentioning here. First , La Prensa is censored, sometimes without apparent r e z son. In a PBS documentary, Pedro Chomorro com- plained tha t censorship had extended to prohibiting publication of some passages from t h e Bible. ("Nica- ragua: Inside Story," PBS, 13 October 1983).

Second, La Prensa frequently is irresponsible by United S ta tes ' s tandards of journalism. When a group of U.S. clergy went to Nicaragua in June, 1983, La Prensa reported t h a t t h e t r ip was arranged by B i a n z Jaggar who had nothing to d o with it. When t h e delegation traveled to Jalapa, scene of heavy fighting with the contras, to hold a prayer vigil on t h e Honduran border, La Prensa s ta ted t h a t they had gone there to c a m p o u T ( I n t e r v i e w with Scot t Lind, 4

35

August 1983).

Third, passionate opposition to t h e Sandinistas is "Report of the Latin evident even after censorship.

American Studies Association."

Fourth, the Chomorro family is an old aristo- cratic Nicaraguan family which has dominated the Nicaraguan press for many years. It is deeply split over the revolution and the nature of the Sandinista regime. The opposition La Prensa, the independent but pro-Sandinista N u e v r D m and the FSLN Barricada are all edited by members of the Chomorro family. ("Nicaragua: Inside Story").

-~

Fifth, La Prensa sometimes censors itself by shutting down production on its own. ("Nicaragua: Inside Story" and "Report of the Latin American Studies Association").

--

Sixth, pro-Sandinista and Sandinista publications also are censored. (John Booth, "Nicaragua: The Enigma").

49Like the press, radio broadcasts are subject to prior clearance by the Sandinistas. Thus all broad- casts are tape delayed. While restrictions and censorship of the print and broadcast media are common to nations at war, and while even the U.S. has had press restrictions during war (most recently in Grenada), the degree of press regulation in Nica- ragua seems clearly excessive and indefensible.

5011Report of the Latin American Studies As- sociation." Also see Abraham Brumberg, "'Sham ' and 'Farce' in Nicaragua?" Dissent (Spring, 19851, v. 32 , no. 2 , pp. 226-236. For an opposing evaluation of the elections, see Arturo Cruz and Arturo Cruz, Jr., "A Peace Plan for Nicaragua," New Republic (18 March 19851, V. 192 , pp. 17-18.

36

51See Dan Nimmo and J a m e s Combs, Subliminal Politics (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., =Patrick Gers te r and Nicholas Cords, Myth in

(Enci, California: Glencoe Press, and John Shelton Lawrence, - The

American Monomyth (Garden City, -New Jersey: Doubleday, 1977).

52See Francis FitzGerald, America Revised (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); and William Griffen and John Maricano, Teaching the Viet Nam War (Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1979).

531n addition to Booth, see RalDh Woodward, Central America: A Nation Dividei (New York: Oxfo-merican - Com- mission on Human Rights, Report on the Condition of Human Rights in Nicaragua: Findings of t h e "On Cite" Observation in t h e Republic of Nicaragua, October 3-12, 1978 (Washington, D.C.: The Organi- zation of American Sta tes , 1978); Thomas Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981).

41n ter vie w with Am bassad or Quain ton con- ducted by Dr. Gary Mounce, Pan American Univer- sity, 1 2 August 1983.

551fReport of the Latin American Studies Asso- ciation."

561nterview with Dr. John Booth, 1 3 February 1985.

57Patrick E. Tyler, "CIA Says Nicaraguan Reb- els Can' t Overthrow Sandinistas," The Washin ton Post National Weekly (12 December + 1 9 8 3 , p. 15.

58Thomas Walker, "The Nicaraguan-U.S. Fric- tion," pp. 15-18.

37

59United Press International, 8 January 1985.

60Among o ther news services , CBS News re- ported t h a t CIA personnel planned and part ic ipated in t h e a t t a c k s on t h e port of Corinto which damaged t h e oil terminal there. Also see Thomas Walker, "The N icaraguan-U.S. Friction."

61For contrast ing viewpoints see George Russell "Nothing Will S top This Revolution," Time (17 Octo- ber 19831, pp. 34-40; Michael Kramer, "The Not Quite War," New York (12 September 19831, pp. 32-43; Gunter Grass, "Superpower Backyard: Solidarity With t h e Sandinistas," The Nation (12 March 19831, pp. 300-303; and David Russell, "Revolutionarv Baseball." Working Papers (January/February 1983): pp. 8-11; John Vinocur, frNicaragua: A Correspondent 's Por- trait ," The New York Times (16 August'1983), pp. 1,4; T.D. Allman, Unmanifest Destiny (New York: Dial Press, 1984); Michael Massing, "No Time for Ortho- doxy: Hard Questions on Nicaragua," The Nation (6 April 19851, v. 240, no. 1 3 , pp. 395-398; Richard Barnet, et. al., "Responses to Michael Massing: The U.S. L e f r a n F N i c a r a g u a l f 7 The Nation (20 April 19851, v. 240, no. 15, pp. 456-463.

62For example, even t h e relatively conservative Freedom House l is ts Nicaragua as a nation in which t h e people are at least partially free.

63Scott Lind, I'Ex-U.N. Envoy Kirkpatrick Visits in Honduras Briefly," The Monitor, McAllen, Texas, 1 2 April 1985, p. 1A.

38