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Ed Rooksby
Towards a Better Theory of the Capitalist State:
Combining Poulantzas’ and Block’s Approaches
In this paper1 I argue that much of Nicos Poulantzas’ theory of the capitalist state as
set out in his final work, State, Power, Socialism (SPS), may be fruitfully combined
with the ideas of Fred Block as put forward in two influential essays - ‘The Ruling
Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State’ and ‘Beyond Relative
Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects’. I summarise, first, the theory of
the capitalist state which Poulantzas advances in SPS. I argue that much of this theory
provides a strong and convincing basis for an understanding of the way in which the
capitalist state functions. However, I go on to argue that SPS is seriously flawed in
that Poulantzas cannot adequately specify the structural mechanisms which ensure
that the state tends to operate in favour of the long-term interests of capital in general.
I then summarise Block’s work and argue that it provides us with the resources to
improve Poulantzas’ theory. Poulantzas’ theory can be modified to incorporate
Block’s framework – and with this combination there emerges, I argue, a fuller and
more cogent theory of the capitalist state2.
1 This is a shortened and revised version of a longer piece of work (a PhD thesis chapter). An earlier version of this paper was published by York University in the York Working Papers series.2 The Poulantzas-Block hybrid approach that emerges towards the end of this paper can be termed a ‘general theory’ of the bourgeois democratic capitalist state (as such it is not in keeping with the approach of Jessop (1982: 211-213) for whom the formulation of such a general theory is not a legitimate endeavour). That is, it is intended to be broadly applicable to all democratic capitalist states (it does not apply so easily in the case of military dictatorships for example in which, for instance, the possibility of open working class struggle – which plays a large role in Block’s approach – may not exist). As such, it is necessarily presented at a certain level of abstraction. This paper seeks to identify the structural mechanisms that tend to ensure that capitalist states serve the long-term interests of capital. There is no way that a ‘general theory’ of this kind could include some comprehensive exposition of the exact institutional and procedural specificities through which and by means of which these structural mechanisms are concretely brought to bear in particular capitalist states. What is offered here is a broad account of the way in which capitalist states function. Concrete, empirical studies of particular states in particular conjunctures would be needed in order to ‘fill in the details’ in relation to the precise institutional forms and channels in and through which, for example, state managers operate.
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Poulantzas - State, Power, Socialism
Poulantzas is most famous for his early, heavily Althusserean account of the ‘relative
autonomy’ of the state3. As many critics have pointed out4, however, this early work is
highly flawed. Firstly, it is severely functionalist - Poulantzas does not specify exactly
how the state fulfils its pre-given role as the ‘factor of cohesion’5. Secondly, he tends
to present the economic and political ‘regions’ as actually (rather than simply
analytically) distinct. Thirdly, Poulantzas’ emphasis on the determining role of the
structural matrix of the capitalist mode of production (CMP) is impossible to combine
with the idea of contingent class struggle. His later work is far superior – SPS, in
particular, represents a major advance in Poulantzas’ thinking. In SPS, Poulantzas
rejects the Althusserean underpinnings of his previous work and in so doing manages
to overcome many of the central problems of his early theory. In SPS Poulantzas’
analytical starting point for the theorisation of the capitalist state shifts from the
assumption of a determinant structural matrix composed of relatively autonomous
regions to an examination of the nature of the relations of production and social
division of labour in the CMP. This shift allows Poulantzas to develop a vastly
improved theory of the state and its relationship with the economy.
The nature of the polity and economy is, in every mode of production, he argues,
governed by the particular organisation of the relations of production and social
division of labour - and indeed these relations determine whether or not the economy
and polity actually exist as distinct entities. The relative separation of the state and the
economy is, Poulantzas argues, ‘a peculiar feature of capitalism’ (Poulantzas, 2000:
18). It arises out of the social relations of production in the CMP in that it is the
complete separation of the direct producers from the object and means of their labour
under capitalism which removes the need for direct ‘extra-economic’ coercion in the
3 See, for example, Political Power and Social Classes.4 Poulantzas came to recognise the faults in his early work too.5 This is not to suggest that analysis of the capitalist state in terms of the functional requirements of capitalism must be rejected. The problem is that this approach in itself (i.e. functionalism) cannot provide an adequate account of state power for the simple reason that it does not necessarily follow that some structure or system must exist simply because it is functional for something else. In his early work, Poulantzas fails to identify the institutional, structural or procedural mechanisms or processes by means of which the capitalist state actually secures the functional requirements of capital.
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process of production and therefore, allows political power to be (as it were) expelled
from the economy and established in a separate, specialised, institutional apparatus.
The relative separation of the economy and the polity in the CMP, however, is
precisely a relative separation. That is, the two instances are separate in the CMP
relative to their condition in pre-capitalist modes of production - they are not wholly
distinct even under capitalism. There is, Poulantzas stresses, profound interpenetration
between political and economic (and ideological) elements in the CMP.
Poulantzas goes on to say that the relative separation of the state and economy in the
CMP is ‘nothing other than the capitalist form of the presence of the political in the
constitution and reproduction of the relations of production’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 19).
That is, the relative separation of the state from the economy in the CMP forms the
particular mode by which the state is present in the capitalist economy. The state is
present in the economy in that it is engaged in various functions which are central to
the reproduction, accumulation and valorisation of capital6. The state and the
economy, then, thoroughly interpenetrate. However these functions cannot be
provided by anything other than an apparatus which is organisationally independent of
any particular capital - an apparatus which, to some extent, stands above the
economy. It is the institutional relative separation of the state from the economy, then,
which allows the state to perform its functions which are essential for the economy
and, therefore, inherently economic themselves.
Having theorised the relationship between the state and the economy, and having
identified the ‘space’ of the state within the CMP, Poulantzas is then free to
investigate further what exactly the capitalist state is and what it does. In SPS
Poulantzas argues that the state is ‘the specific material condensation of a relationship
of forces among classes and class fractions’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 129). The state is, in
effect, the ever-changing material reflection or expression of the balance of class
forces - it is the institutional accretion of the effects of past class struggles. The state’s
structure and internal organisation, that is, is constantly modified and re-shaped by
struggles between classes and between class fractions. It follows that the state is not a
monolithic, unified bloc - it is a fractured apparatus, riven with contradictions. Neither
6 It is, for example, responsible for the reproduction of labour power, the provision of transport networks, and the regulation of markets. All these things go to the heart of the productive process since without them the capitalist economy would not exist.
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is it an apparatus which is entirely controlled by, or which exclusively represents the
interests of, the bourgeoisie. The struggles of the working class shape the state’s
structure and, therefore, working class power (to a certain extent) is manifested and
embedded within the state and their interests are reflected in various aspects of state
policy.
Though its structure is shaped by class struggle, the state, however, is not a passive
entity. The state itself has a positive role to play in the process of class struggle. The
structures of the state – what Poulantzas terms the state’s ‘institutional materiality’ –
feed back into the class struggle helping to mould and channel its outcome.
Poulantzas argues that ‘[t]he capitalist state… plays an organic role in political
domination and struggle, by constituting the bourgeoisie as the politically dominant
class’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 125-126). So, although Poulantzas is careful to stress that
that certain interests of the dominated classes are reflected in state policy, he is clear
that the dominant class (fractions) are structurally privileged within the state’s
‘institutional materiality’. The structures and practices of the state create, organise and
help to reproduce the domination of the bourgeoisie.
How is the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie inscribed in the state’s ‘institutional
materiality’? One major way in which the state establishes and reproduces the
conditions necessary for the domination of the bourgeoisie is through the
‘individualisation’ of dominated classes. Poulantzas argues that institutions of the
capitalist state7 constitute the public as atomised subjects. People are identified and
addressed by the capitalist state in terms of isolated individuals - the bearers of
abstract individual rights - and subjects engage with the state in such a way that
reinforces this social atomisation. This process serves capitalist interests not only in
that it fragments the popular masses, preventing their political organisation against the
bourgeoisie, but in other ways too. This particular, atomised form of individual
identity is also functional for capitalism. Individual juridical-political subjects in
capitalism, engage in the ‘public sphere’ as abstract subjects - as formally free and
equal ‘citizens’. They do not engage in politics in a form that takes account of the real
material inequalities between them. Political struggle takes place in a narrow sphere -
class inequalities are excluded from the frame of reference of bourgeois democracy
7 Especially institutions of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois law.
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and are, then, obscured and hidden. Poulantzas goes on to argue that individualised,
formally free and equal subjects, purged of their class identity, are then unified (in an
abstract sense) by the capitalist state in the form of the ‘people-nation’. The capitalist
state, that is, presents itself as the classless public unity of subjects within its area of
territorial jurisdiction. Poulantzas also argues that while it acts to atomise the
dominated classes, the state, simultaneously, functions to organise and unify the
bourgeoisie – cancelling out the effect of individualisation on this class8.
There is a further way in which the ‘institutional materiality’ of the capitalist state
establishes and reproduces bourgeois hegemony. Poulantzas claims that the state
‘incarnates intellectual labour as separated from manual labour’ (Poulantzas, 2000:
56) – it embodies, therefore, an important aspect of the capitalist division of labour.
State officials tend to specialise in intellectual work, as opposed to the manual labour
performed by the direct producers. Moreover, the intellectual labour carried out by
state officials centres, of course, on the administration of political power and is
conducted in a specialist bureaucratic and/or juridical discourse which non-specialists
would find difficult to follow. The working class is, as a whole, then, effectively
excluded from the discourses of state power and, therefore, prevented from
participating in the exercise of this power. For Poulantzas the state is, therefore, in a
sense, the material embodiment of the working class’s exclusion from power.
There is another important reason why the capitalist state, for Poulantzas, ensures the
domination of the bourgeoisie. We have seen that the state is not the exclusive
representative of bourgeois interests but also expresses working class interests.
However, Poulantzas is clear that the dominant class (fractions) are able to manoeuvre
much more effectively on the ‘strategic terrain’ of the state than are others. This is
because while different branches or sectors of the state act as ‘power centres’ for
different fractions of the ruling class, the working class does not directly control any
part of the state apparatus - they have only ‘centres of resistance’ which they
influence indirectly. Whereas the power of ruling class fractions is manifested directly
in various branches of the state apparatus, the working class have no immediate
access to the state apparatus. Instead working class interests are interpreted and
mediated by state employees (who are not working class themselves) in certain
branches of the state that, to some extent, embody working class interests. The state
8 I say more about this later.
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personnel, Poulantzas argues, operate on the grounds of a particular ideology in which
‘a neutral State appears as the representative of the general will and interest, and the
arbiter among struggling classes’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 156). State employees who act
on behalf of the working class interpret their demands through the distorting lens of
this ideology. There is an element of self-interest at play here too, in that state
employees have an interest in the maintenance of the separation between manual and
intellectual labour – since their role is rooted in this division. The state personnel will
act on working class interests only insofar as these can be combined with their
attachment to the division between political managers and the passive majority.
Furthermore, Poulantzas argues that the bourgeoisie is able to remould the circuits and
hierarchies of power within the state to maintain its dominance. If, for instance, the
Left establish a ‘centre of resistance’ at a strategic point in the state, the bourgeoisie
will simply re-shape the structure of power so that this ‘centre of resistance’ is
isolated and neutralised9. Even when a Left government controls state branches and
‘manages to gain control of the hitherto dominant apparatus, the state institutional
structure enables the bourgeoisie to transpose the role of dominance from one
apparatus to another’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 138)10.
We have seen, then, a number of ways in which the ‘institutional materiality’ of the
state engenders and reproduces the subordination of the dominated classes. It remains
to be shown, however, how Poulantzas conceives of the way in which the bourgeoisie
is unified and how coherent policy, which serves the interests of the dominant class
fractions, emerges from the fractured ‘strategic terrain’ of the state.
As in his earlier work, Poulantzas claims that the state organises a unified alliance of
dominant class fractions (the power bloc) under the leadership of a hegemonic
fraction. The wider bourgeoisie is then unified under the leadership of this hegemonic
fraction. State policy favours the central interests of this fraction and incorporates, as
9 This can be carried out through methods such as establishing ‘parallel power networks’, ‘short-circuiting’ decision-making made elsewhere in the system, through selective filtering of information and through a process in which policies which emanate from the Left-controlled apparatus are not acted on elsewhere in the state. 10 He provides a couple of examples here. He points to the role that the House of Lords played in blocking a British Labour government’s nationalisation bills and the role that the Chilean law courts played in obstructing the Allende administration’s policies. In both cases ‘institutions-apparatuses that normally… [had] an altogether secondary role, or a purely decorative function… suddenly… [took] on a decisive role’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 138).
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far as possible, the interests of other bourgeois fractions, inasmuch as they are
compatible with those of the hegemonic fraction. In his early work Poulantzas is
vague about how state policy that allows for this hierarchical, unifying arrangement
emerges. In SPS, however, Poulantzas offers an intricate account of this process.
Poulantzas appears to believe that the unification of the dominant class fractions
comes as a direct corollary of (and is therefore synonymous with) the development of
coherent state policy11. We have already seen that different state apparatuses act as
power centres for different fractions of the dominant class (or as centres of resistance
for dominated classes). Each of these class fractions have different interests and
therefore the policies – Poulantzas terms them ‘micro-policies’ - that each apparatus
attempts to put into effect are often mutually contradictory. The state is, thus, the site
of conflict and competition between the various micro-policies developed by these
different power centres (or centres of resistance). However, Poulantzas argues that
from this seeming chaos of conflicting micro-policies, a coherent policy line emerges
– state policy consists in the outcome of the collision of these micro-policies within
the structural framework of the state, which acts to shape this outcome in certain
ways. As Jessop puts it, this:
line emerges in a complex fashion from the institutional matrix of the state and the clash of specific strategies and tactics. It is not reducible solely to the effects of an institutional system of ‘structural selectivity’…. Nor is it reducible to the… successful application of a coherent, global strategy established at the apex of the entire state system. Only the interaction of matrix and strategies account for the general line. (Jessop, 1985: 127)
What Jessop refers to as the ‘structural selectivity’ of the state in Poulantzas’ schema
consists of:
a complex set of institutional mechanisms and political practices which serve to advance (or obstruct) particular fractional or class interests. Included here are: selective filtering of information, systematic lack of action on certain issues, definition of mutually contradictory priorities and counter-priorities, [and] the uneven implementation of measures originating elsewhere in the state system…. (Jessop, 1985: 127)
These mechanisms and practices, then, select certain micro-policies (while blocking
and cancelling out others) and moulds them into an overall policy line which serves
the interests of the dominant class fractions. Poulantzas is clear that the ‘structural
selectivity’ of the state is always geared in favour of the dominant class fractions. The
11 The overall unity of the state apparatus, too, Poulantzas suggests, emerges as an effect of the generation of a general policy line amongst the various apparatuses of the state.
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hegemonic fraction, he argues, is able to shape the structure of the state in its favour
because they can both establish the dominance of their power centre within the state
system and can transform any apparatus which is already dominant into a power
centre under their control. This dominant power centre will then, as Jessop
summarises ‘penetrate the personnel of other apparatuses, short-circuit decision-
making elsewhere in the state… and switch the relays and circuits of power’ (Jessop,
1985: 128) in order to structure the state in ways that privilege the interests of the
dominant fractions.
However, Poulantzas insists that the structural matrix of the state does not pre-
determine the content of the policy line that emerges at the end of the process of
policy formulation and neither do the micro-policies first generated by the hegemonic
class fraction’s power centre(s) always conquer those of other power centres in the
conflict of strategies within the state matrix. As Jessop points out, for Poulantzas, the
most appropriate strategy to ensure the hegemony of the dominant class fractions
‘often emerges only ex post through the collision among mutually contradictory
micro-policies and political projects formulated in different parts of the state system’
(Jessop, 1985: 128) and that ‘no individual, group, or class subject can be said to have
chosen or decided the final outcome of conflicting micro-power plays’ (Jessop, 1985:
129). The final outcome embodies a series of compromises between the interests of
different bourgeois fractions and incorporates some of the interests of the dominated
classes. The nature of this compromise has the effect of uniting the bourgeoisie, as a
whole, around a policy programme which favours the essential interests of the
hegemonic class fraction and which also secures the dominated classes’ consent to
their continued subordination.
Evaluation and Criticism of SPS
Many aspects of Poulantzas’ theory of the state in SPS are impressive and convincing.
His theory is, however, plagued by serious problems. I shall draw out the inadequate
aspects of the conceptualisation of state power in SPS further on. First, however, I
point out those parts of SPS that seem successful.
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Poulantzas’ argument that the relative separation of the state from the economy in the
CMP is simply ‘the capitalist form of the presence of the political in the constitution
and reproduction of the relations of production’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 19) is far superior
to his earlier theory. This approach allows him to account, convincingly, for the
specificity of the institutional concentration of political power, relatively separated
from the economy, under capitalism while, at the same time, permitting him to
conceive of the profound interpenetration of the political and the economic.
Poulantzas’ central analytical focus on social relationships, rather than structure,
enables him to see that the structure of the state is, itself, generated and reproduced by
social relations and practices. In SPS structure and class struggle are shown to be part
of the same process – class struggle constitutes and shapes the structure of the state
and, in turn, the structure of the state feeds back into class struggle, shaping its
development and outcomes. His theorisation of the state as ‘the specific materialised
condensation’ of the balance of class forces is a highly valuable one. Furthermore, his
account of the ways in which working class subordination is inscribed within the
state’s institutional materiality is, in the main, convincing.
In regard to the problem of how the state manages to organise the bourgeoisie and
formulate coherent policy in the long-term interests of capital in general12, his
suggested solutions are much less impressive. As we have seen, Poulantzas indicates
that the unification of the bourgeoisie comes as a corollary of the formulation of state
policy to ensure long-term bourgeois hegemony. In itself, this seems a reasonable
explanation of how the effect of individualisation is overcome in the case of the ruling
class – the trouble is that Poulantzas’ account of how the state formulates policy in the
interests of bourgeois hegemony is deeply flawed. In what follows, then, my
explanation of why Poulantzas’ account of the emergence of policy which favours the
long-term interests of capital in general is unsuccessful should, simultaneously,
explain why his account of the unification of the bourgeoisie is also unsuccessful –
since for Poulantzas the latter comes as a corollary of the former.
12 When I refer to the formulation of policy in the ‘long-term interests of capital in general’ I do not mean to suggest that there is only one possible such formulation. The ‘long-term interests of capital in general’ should be understood in terms of the reproduction over the long-term of social, political and economic conditions allowing for successful capital accumulation in the context of a competitive international capitalist system. These conditions may be secured in a variety of ways.
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In his criticism of Poulantzas’ theory of the emergence of coherent state policy
serving the interests of capital in general from the clash of micro-policies, Jessop
raises two major objections. He argues that Poulantzas’ account here has, firstly,
awkward ‘instrumentalist’ and, secondly, problematic teleological and determinist
implications (Jessop, 1985: 142-144). What Jessop terms the ‘instrumentalist’
approach to state power is one that is often associated with the State Monopoly
Capitalism approach of post-war Communist parties and also (rather unfairly) with the
work of theorists such as Miliband (1969) and Domhoff (1967 and 1970). According
to its critics the ‘instrumentalist’ approach posits that the state operates in favour of
the bourgeoisie because members of the ruling class staff key positions within the
state bureaucracy or that the state, in some other way, is directly manipulated and
wholly controlled by the bourgeoisie13. The major problem for any theory that
suggests that the state is an instrument under the direct control of the bourgeoisie is
that it cannot account for the state’s necessary degree of autonomy14. The state must
be capable of transcending the short-term interests of particular fractions of capital
and of the capitalist class as a whole if it is to act in the interests of capital in general
in the long-term. Indeed, it is clear that capitalist states sometimes implement reforms
that are fiercely opposed by large sections of capital (even if these reforms ultimately
serve to rationalise capitalism and therefore help to secure the bourgeoisie’s long-term
domination)15. The ‘instrumentalist’ approach, its critics point out, cannot adequately
explain this since, as it posits that bourgeois forces are in direct command of state
power, it does not allow for the institutional ‘distance’ between state and capital that
would enable the former to function with some degree of autonomy from the latter.
As Jessop suggests, Poulantzas seems to lapse into an awkward ‘instrumentalism’ in
his explanation of why the state’s ‘structural selectivity’ always favours the 13 I should point out that in fact, as Barrow (2008) shows, the ‘instrumentalism’ attributed to certain theorists (such as Miliband in particular) is often a caricature and misrepresentation of those theorists’ work. As Barrow argues, Miliband never embraced the simplistic positions that are often associated with his state theory and, indeed, it is arguable that the version of ‘instrumentalism’ often described by critics of this approach bears little relation to any actually existing work on the capitalist state. For a recent, rigorous restatement of the ‘instrumentalist’ approach freed from the distorted positions usually attributed to it see Wetherly (2008). I go on to criticise Poulantzas for falling into the trap of a crude form of ‘instrumentalism’ himself – he suggests that a hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie directly and wholly controls the essential sites of state power. This is to say, then, that Poulantzas incorporates into his own theory the crude kind of ‘instrumentalism’ often unfairly attributed to others. This is highly ironic given that Poulantzas’ contributions to the Poulantzas-Miliband debate of the 1970s made him perhaps the most famous critic of ‘instrumentalism’. 14 For such criticism of ‘instrumentalism’ – albeit criticism Barrow (2008) singles out for censure – see, for example, Block (1987a: 52-53).15 Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ is a prime example.
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hegemonic class fraction. Poulantzas’s claim that the hegemonic class fraction can
shape the terrain of the state in its own favour implies that this fraction has direct
control of the state – or, at least, that it always controls the essential sites of power
within the state (which amounts, effectively, to command over the state as a whole).
Poulantzas’ theory, then, runs into the same difficulties commonly associated with the
‘instrumentalist’ approach. There is a similar problem in Poulantzas’ argument that
the dominant class fractions can re-shape the structure of state power to neutralise any
centres of resistance established at strategic points within the state.
Jessop detects an overarching functionalism-determinism too, in Poulantzas’ account
of the emergence of state policy. As we have seen, Poulantzas’ discussion of the play
of micro-policies within the state’s ‘institutional materiality’ suggests that the
formulation of state policy is a conjunctural, almost haphazard process. Yet, at the
same time, however, Poulantzas seems to insist that bourgeois hegemony must and
always does emerge out of the contingent interplay of micro-policies – as Jessop
remarks, Poulantzas ‘wanted to argue that the capitalist state can never in the long run
do anything but reproduce bourgeois class domination’ (Jessop, 1985: 134). There is,
then, a strong element of determinism here that makes the idea of contingency in the
generation of state policy rather redundant. Furthermore, as Jessop comments, in that
Poulantzas insisted ‘on the macro-necessity of class domination’, he ‘tended to see the
diversity of micro-policies as the cunning means whereby the predestined logic of this
domination is realised’ (Jessop, 1985: 144). That is, an underlying teleology seems to
guide and drive the process.
Why is it that Poulantzas, after having been at great pains to advance a theory based
on contingency – the unpredictable inter-play of micro-policies – lapses into
determinism and an ‘instrumentalism’ in which the hegemonic class fraction enjoys
complete control over the essential sites of state power? It seems to me that it was
only through incorporating a measure of such ‘instrumentalism’ and determinism that
Poulantzas could resolve the problem of how state policy in the long-term interests of
capital in general emerges out of the conflict of micro-policies – they constitute a kind
of deus ex machina which Poulantzas imports into his theory (by sleight of hand) in
order to get himself out of an impossible situation. It seems to me that Poulantzas’
theory of the play of micro-policies filtered through the institutional materiality of the
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state (itself the crystallisation of past struggles) could account for why it is that the
policies of the dominant fractions tend to emerge victorious from their clash with
those of other fractions, but it cannot account for the emergence of policy which
serves the long-term interest of capital in general. Some explanation is necessary
here. It seems possible to argue that the structure of the state gives dominant class
fractions an inherent advantage over other fractions and that this advantage is
constantly reproduced through the struggle of unequal class forces (unequal because
of the bias in structural selectivity). We could posit that, ever since the coming into
being of the capitalist state, dominant class fractions have enjoyed an inherent
advantage in the clash of micro-policies and that this advantage is continually
renewed, by the success of structurally advantaged micro-policies.
However, this structural tendency towards the reproduction of advantage for certain
class fractions cannot explain why certain interests of the dominated class fractions
are incorporated into state policy. Why is it that certain micro-policies (or elements
from them) emanating from centres of resistance are taken up by the state and
articulated with the central interests of the dominant fractions? It must be remembered
that, for Poulantzas, there are, effectively, no third parties involved in the process of
the formulation of state policy. There is no subject or apparatus which can stand apart
from the struggle between micro-policies and take account of the ‘bigger picture’, in
order to work out what political and economic strategies would best serve capital’s
long-term interests and to choose between the competing micro-policies accordingly.
State policy, as we have seen, must emerge organically from the contingent clash of
micro-policies. Poulantzas’ theory, however, does not provide us with any convincing
account of how this could possibly occur. It does not seem unreasonable to imagine
that Poulantzas was aware of this problem. He, perhaps, surreptitiously introduces
‘instrumentalist’ and determinist elements into his theory in order shore it up. The
‘instrumentalist’ elements suggest (without being explicit about it) that, perhaps, the
hegemonic fraction are fully cognisant of their long-term interests and those of the
wider bourgeoisie and act on this consciousness – pulling the strings of the state in
order to secure these interests. The determinist elements suggest that state policy in
the long-term interests of capital in general is an outcome pre-determined from the
start - somehow programmed into the process of the clash of micro-policies.
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Poulantzas’ theory, then, does not specify, convincingly, the mechanisms through
which the state ensures that policy is developed which favours the long-term interests
of capital. It seems to me that if we are to identify these mechanisms we must reject
much of what Poulantzas has to say and focus, instead, on the deliberate intervention
of human subjects (while avoiding the sort of class ‘instrumentalism’ that rests on the
idea that the bourgeoisie, or some fraction of it, are in direct command of the state). It
is my contention that Fred Block’s state theory can provide us with a convincing
account of the processes inherent within the functioning of the capitalist state which
ensure that it tends to operate in favour of the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie.
Furthermore, Block’s theory can be combined with those elements of Poulantzas’
theory which I have argued are most successful.
Fred Block’s Theory of the Capitalist State
Block starts from the assumption that capitalists are ‘conscious of their interests as
capitalists, but, [that] in general, they are not conscious of what is necessary to
reproduce the social order’ (Block, 1987a: 54). In order to illustrate this he points out
that the capitalist class often vehemently oppose state measures of reform, even
though these reforms may work in their long-term interests. Capitalism must rely,
then, for its long-term survival on an apparatus (relatively) independent of the
capitalist class and which is capable of identifying and safeguarding the long-term
interests of capital in general – this apparatus is the state. Unlike Poulantzas, however,
Block does not argue that this function emerges, somehow, unconsciously, through
the collision of various class (fraction) interests, filtered through the institutional
structures of the state. Instead, Block contends that this process occurs because of the
conscious and deliberate intervention of human beings within the state apparatus – the
state managers16. The structural position of state managers, Block argues, ‘forces
them to achieve some consciousness of what is necessary to maintain the viability of
the social order’ (Block, 1987a: 67) and forces them to act on this consciousness.
16 For Block ‘state managers’ are ‘those at the peak of the executive and legislative branches of the state apparatus’ (Block, 1987b: 201, fn.9) – this ‘includes the highest-ranking civil servants, as well as appointed and elected politicians’ (Block, 1987a: 197 fn.5). In the context of the British state, then, this term would cover, for example, the Prime Minister, senior and junior ministers, high-ranking civil service advisors and administrators in the various government departments and senior appointed political aides employed directly by the party in government.
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They are forced to ‘concern themselves… with the reproduction of the social order’
Block claims, ‘because their continued power rests on the maintenance of political
and economic order’ (Block, 1987a: 54).
Whereas Poulantzas tends to regard state personnel simply as the direct
representatives or agents of class fractions,17 Block claims that they must be seen as a
social category which is, to some extent, independent of class forces. Block argues
that we must acknowledge ‘that state power is sui generis, not reducible to class
power’ (Block, 1987b: 84). It is this independence from class forces which allows
state managers to function with a kind of relative autonomy. State managers are not
subject to the direct control of capitalist class fractions and so can formulate policy
proposals with a measure of objectivity, in order to run the state in the long-term
interests of capital accumulation.
For Block, state managers have their own particular interests – he suggests that it is
useful to conceive of state managers, collectively, as ‘self-interested maximizers,
interested in maximizing their own power, prestige, and wealth’ (Block, 1987b: 84).
Crucially, however, state managers operate ‘within particular class contexts, which
shape and limit the exercise of… [their] power’ (Block, 1987b: 84) – that is, they can
only maximise their own interests within a set of political and economic constraints. It
is the nature of these constraints which tends to ensure that state managers act in the
long-term interests of capital. So what is this class context in which the state
personnel must operate? Block argues that the state personnel must respond to
pressures from two main directions. Firstly, they are subject to strong pressure from
the capitalist class to act in certain ways and, secondly, from a lesser, but still highly
significant, set of pressures from the working class. Let us look at both of these in
turn.
In relation to the power the capitalist class holds over the activity of the state
personnel, Block differentiates between what he calls the ‘subsidiary structural
mechanisms’ through which the bourgeoisie exert pressure and ‘major structural
mechanisms’. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to go into the subsidiary
mechanisms Block identifies and so I shall simply outline what he has to say about
17 With the partial exception of those state employees that re-interpret the interests of the working class in line with their own particular ideology.
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major structural mechanisms18. The major structural mechanism which tends to ensure
that state managers act in the interests of capitalists is rooted in the fact that state
managers are dependent on the existence of a healthy economy. This is true, Block
points out, for two reasons:
First, the capacity of the state to finance itself through taxation or borrowing depends on the state of the economy. If economic activity is in decline, the state will have difficulty maintaining its revenues at an adequate level. Second, public support for a regime will decline sharply if the regime presides over a serious drop in the level of economic activity, with a parallel rise in unemployment and shortages of key goods. Such a drop in support increases the likelihood that the state managers will be removed from power one way or another. And even if the drop is not that dramatic, it will increase the challenges to the regime and decrease the regime’s political ability to take effective actions. (Block, 1987a: 58)
Furthermore, as Block goes on to explain:
In a capitalist economy the level of economic activity is largely determined by the private investment decisions of capitalists. This means that capitalists, in their collective role as investors, have a veto over state policies in that their failure to invest at adequate levels can create major political problems for the state managers. This discourages state managers from taking actions that might seriously decrease the rate of investment. (Block, 1987a: 58)
Block is careful to point out, however, that although capitalists have a kind of
collective veto over state policy19, this does not necessarily mean that they hold or
exercise this power of veto as a class-conscious force. When capitalists respond to
state policy that they do not like by withholding investment or disinvesting, they do so
on the basis of a narrow self-interest in their own profits. Block calls the sum total of
all these evaluations by individual capitalists, the level of ‘business confidence’.
Capitalists, then, are able to exercise their veto over state policy ‘without any
members of the ruling class consciously deciding to act “politically” against the
regime in power’ (Block, 1987a: 62).
The fact that state managers are dependent on a healthy level of investment, however,
does not merely help to prevent state officials from enacting anti-capitalist policies. It
is also the key mechanism which helps to ensure that state managers tend to act in the
18 Block’s subsidiary mechanisms play only a very minor role in his theory – his theory of the state rests firmly upon the major mechanisms he identifies. It is not essential, therefore, that I cover them here. 19 Block argues that there have been certain ‘exceptional’ historical periods – periods of world war, depression and post-war reconstruction – that have allowed state managers more freedom of action in relation to capitalists than is normally the case (see Block, 1987b: 87-89 and Block, 1987a: 65-67). Since I am seeking to conceptualise capitalist state power under normal, rather than ‘exceptional’ (that is to say, very unusual) conditions, and since space is limited, I shall not cover this aspect of Block’s theory.
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long-term interests of capital in general. Block argues that the reliance of state
managers on a healthy capitalist economy means that they have a fundamental and
over-riding interest in making sure that the policies they formulate and put into
practice help to facilitate and encourage adequate levels of investment. ‘In doing so,’
Block writes, ‘the state managers address the problem of investment from a broader
perspective than that of the individual capitalist’ (Block, 1987a: 59). Their central
interest in maintaining healthy rates of capital accumulation means that state
managers are forced to concern themselves with the performance of the national
economy as a whole and to produce policy that serves the interests of capital
considered collectively. In other words state managers must act in the long-term
interests of capital in general.
This, however, is still only a partial account – Block’s analysis of the pressures that
emanate from the bourgeoisie does not fully explain why state managers tend to
introduce reforms that improve the rationality of capitalism. We must ask, in
particular, why they introduce changes which may induce a decrease in business
confidence in the short-term. To answer this question, Block suggests, we must turn to
the pressures exerted by the working class on state managers. Block argues that
working class struggle against social injustice forces state managers to reform
capitalism in order to improve workers’ living and working conditions20. State
managers must respond to workers’ struggle if they are to avoid social disorder and a
decline in the level of economic performance. Block also argues that the working
class’ interest in the amelioration of their living and working conditions through
increased state involvement in the economy dovetails with state managers’ self-
interest in expanding the powers of the state.
How, exactly, does the response of state managers to the pressures exerted on them by
working class struggle tend to contribute towards the rationalising of capitalism?
Block argues that ‘[o]nce working-class pressures succeed in extending the state’s
role, another dynamic begins to work’ (Block, 1987a: 64). As we saw above, state
managers have a fundamental interest in facilitating adequate rates of capitalist
investment. ‘There will’, then, Block argues, ‘be a tendency to use the state’s
20 In this respect Block’s views are similar to those expressed by Marx in Capital Volume 1, Chapter 10 (see Marx, 1961: 231-302) and by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto (see Marx and Engels, 1965: 22), in relation to the passing of the Ten Hours Act. The passing of this legislation is regarded in these texts as the result, largely, of working class struggle.
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extended role for the same ends’ (Block, 1987a: 64). State managers will attempt to
ensure that the reforms they provide are, at least, compatible with capital
accumulation or, better than that, that they improve conditions for accumulation.
Block suggests, for example, that state managers will, in response to working class
demands for better education, try to ensure that the content of expanded education
services is geared towards ‘the production of a docile work force at an appropriate
level of skill’ (Block, 1987a: 64). Block is clear that this process should not be
understood as one in which demands emanating from the working class are simply
and directly translated into state legislation – he points out that ‘working-class
demands are rarely granted in their original form’ (Block, 1987a: 65). Furthermore, he
is careful to point out, too, that the working class has not been the only force behind
the historical expansion of state provision of things like welfare and education.
Nevertheless, the major impetus behind the extension of such reforms, he argues, has
come from the working class and the way in which this working class pressure has
intersected with the fundamental concern of state managers – the safeguarding,
encouragement and expansion of capital accumulation.
Block does not offer many specific examples of the sort of reforms he discusses21.
Nevertheless, his arguments here are quite compatible with that of another theorist
who does specify particular historical reforms that should be regarded as the result (at
least in great part) of ‘pressure from below’ on the part of the working class. Gough
(1979) argues, along lines very similar to Block’s approach, that the development of
the welfare state in Britain and elsewhere came about as a result of the interplay of
certain pressures impinging upon the state - ‘pressure from below’ on the part of the
working class and other allied subordinate groups on the one hand, and pressure to
provide for the requirements of capital accumulation on the other. Gough identifies
several specific welfare measures that came about as a response to pressure from the
working class and allied groups – Bismarck’s social insurance scheme of the 1880s,
Lloyd George’s unemployment insurance scheme of 1911, the NHS, and the
introduction of comprehensive education in Britain for example (see Gough, 1979:
58)22. Gough’s specification of particular welfare measures in the genesis of which 21 He mentions the expansion of education provision as noted above and also ‘welfare’ (in very broad terms), state legislation to end child labour and to improve standards of public health and housing, and measures to produce higher levels of employment. However these are all mentioned rather fleetingly and discussed at a very general and abstract level.22 Similar arguments are advanced by Piven and Cloward (1972 and 1979) who point to the key role that the struggle of the working class and other dominated groups played in the introduction of specific
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working class struggle has played a key role seems wholly compatible with Block’s
approach.
Furthermore, Gough makes clear something which I think is implicit in Block’s
argument and which should be mentioned here in order to help clarify the latter’s
approach. Gough points out that ‘the modes through which class pressure generates
welfare reforms are many and various’ (Gough, 1979: 58) – class pressure might be
exerted directly, for example through extra-parliamentary mass action, or,
alternatively, reforms might be devised by state personnel in order to ‘forestall the
dangerous growth of an independent class movement, and may even be opposed by
the subordinate classes’ (Gough, 1979: 59). Even in the latter case, however, where
welfare reforms are imposed against the wishes of the working class, these reforms
can still be regarded as, in large part, responses to pressures emanating from the
working class and impinging on the capitalist state. This, of course, would help us to
account for historical occasions on which particular welfare reforms have met with
working class opposition.
It seems to me that what Gough articulates here is also implicit in Block’s argument.
As we have seen, Block does not argue that state reforms should be regarded as the
direct translation of working class demands into state policy. Rather, these reforms
represent the response to pressures emanating from the working class of state
managers operating within certain constraints that force them to focus on the
provision of an economic and political environment conducive to healthy levels of
investment. Implied within Block’s approach is the idea that these ‘pressures from
below’ may or may not take the form of direct working class demands on the state for
particular reforms, but may also, for example, manifest themselves in terms of the
danger of social unrest (both actual social disorder and the threat of future social
disorder) or in terms of the danger that capital may not be supplied with a sufficient
quantity or quality of workers as a result of ill-health or inadequate education. As the
guardians of capitalism, forced to achieve some consciousness of what is needed to
maintain the viability of the social order, state managers must try to head-off and
neutralise such dangers and this might involve the implementation of reforms
designed to dampen down class struggle or improve healthcare and education
welfare reforms in the US. See also Ginsburgh (1979) and Manley (2008) for similar analyses.
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provision, even if these particular reforms have not specifically been demanded by the
working class23. In this way, then, Block’s approach certainly allows for the
introduction by the state of measures such as welfare reforms which have not been
called for by the working class and which might even go against their wishes24.
Block is clear that the process of reform does not occur smoothly or without the
possibility of the implementation of reforms which cannot easily be integrated into the
capital accumulation process. He argues that sometimes politically conscious
elements of the working class exert strong pressure on the state for reforms that are
not wholly compatible with the expanded reproduction of capitalism. Sometimes,
also, there is a ‘serious time lag between granting concessions to the working class
and discovering ways that the extension of the state’s power can be used to aid the
accumulation process’ (Block, 1987a: 65). Block goes on to say that:
some concessions to working-class pressure might have no potential benefits for accumulation and might simply place strains on the private economy…. If the strains occur over the long term, then capitalism faces severe problems because it becomes increasingly difficult to roll back concessions that have stood for some time. (Block, 1987a: 65)
However, despite the ‘friction’ and ‘continuous possibility of other outcomes’ (Block,
1987a: 65) inherent in the process of state reform, Block asserts that it has a very
strong tendency to work in favour of the interests of capital. This is because, as we
have seen, it is fundamentally in the interests of those who formulate and execute
these reforms that they ultimately guarantee the smooth operation of the accumulation
process.
It should be pointed out that – although he does not make this aspect of his theory
very explicit - Block’s theory allows for multiplicity in terms of the particular policy
strategies that may be chosen by state managers in order to secure capital’s long-term
interests. That is, state managers in Block’s schema may seek to secure bourgeois
hegemony in many different ways. The political and ideological disposition of
23 This is most strongly suggested in Block (1987b: 85-86) although he does not make the point directly.24 I should point out, too, that Block’s approach is quite compatible with the empirical observation that it is often the middle class that particularly benefits from the welfare state (on this see, for example, Ginsburgh, 1992: 4). The fact that the middle class is often the main beneficiary of welfare provisions does not in itself invalidate Block’s argument that the working class has been the major driving force behind the introduction of such measures. Furthermore, it should not come as any surprise that the relatively privileged sections of society are often the most proficient in making sure that they benefit from welfare provision.
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particular state managers, of course, will often have some effect on the specific policy
choices they make (clearly, different policy choices will be made by different parties
in government)25. Some policy strategies, furthermore, may be more successful than
others. It is not just that, as we have seen, state managers may enact policies that
badly impair capital accumulation – Block’s approach also suggests that some
strategies formulated by state managers may not encourage as much capital
accumulation as other possible strategies (without necessarily inducing a serious
deterioration in ‘business confidence’).
It is also worth making clear that Block’s theory is not incompatible with the view
that it is not only state managers who engage in day-to-day ‘big picture’ strategic
thinking about the long-term requirements of the capitalist economy. Block does not
incorporate such an idea into his theory26, but it seems obvious that other groups and
individuals such as ‘think-tanks’, business journalists and academics engage in serious
and well-informed strategic political-economic thinking too. Nevertheless, it is quite
easy to adapt Block’s approach slightly in this regard. These intellectuals, we may
say, formulate a number of different and competing ‘accumulation strategies’27 for
capital upon which state managers may draw for ideas – they may adopt one of these
accumulation strategies more or less in its entirety or they may selectively pick and
choose between them. However, it is always the state managers who are ‘at the sharp
end’ of the process of economic management. They will usually have more to lose
than business journalists or ‘think-tanks’ from the implementation of policies that do
not adequately serve capital’s long-term interests and will also feel the pressures that
build up from a decline in ‘business confidence’ more directly and more sharply than
those intellectuals. For these reasons, then, state managers will tend to have a clearer
view of what is necessary for the reproduction of bourgeois hegemony than any other
social group, even though they are not the only people who engage in strategic
thinking about the requirements of capital accumulation.
25 It is surprising that Block has little to say about the specific effects of party politics on state policy (he tends to treat state managers as an undifferentiated mass), but - as I hope I have shown – it is quite possible to integrate into Block’s overall approach some recognition of the fact that different state managers may have different political views and that these will have some effect on their activities as state managers.26 Although his discussion of Marx’s distinction in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte between the ‘political and literary representatives’ (Marx, in Block, 1987a: 55) of capital on the one hand, and capitalists themselves, on the other, implies something like this (see Block, 1987a: 54-56).27 I am borrowing Jessop’s term here. See, for example, Jessop (2002 and 2008) for his use of the term.
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Combining Block and Poulantzas
Block provides a convincing account of the structural mechanisms which ensure that
the state tends to act in the long-term interests of capital in general - those structural
mechanisms which Poulantzas fails to identify. For Block, state managers are,
effectively, the custodians of the interests of capital in general – their structural
position forces them to seek to identify the long-term interests of capital and it is
through their agency that these interests tend to be provided for. This is vastly
superior to Poulantzas’ incoherent account of how state policy is formulated in
capital’s long-term interests. In addition, Block’s theory is free of those
‘instrumentalist’ and functionalist-determinist problems that were identified above in
Poulantzas’ approach. Unlike Poulantzas, who, as we saw, seems to fall back on the
problematic idea that a hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie enjoys direct control
over the essential sites of state power, Block is careful to resist the temptation to
attribute to the bourgeoisie any direct control over the state. Neither does Block’s
theory, unlike Poulantzas’, suggest that the state must inevitably function in the
interests of capital in general. As we have seen, state managers may sometimes
introduce policy which is disadvantageous or damaging for capital28. His theory, then,
provides us with the resources to explain how crises of bourgeois hegemony may
sometimes emerge. The tendency for the state to act in the interests of capital in
general is, precisely, a tendency – and no more than that.
It is my contention that Block’s ideas can be combined with the best elements of
Poulantzas’ theory. If we reject Poulantzas’ theory of the emergence of state policy
from the clash of micro-policies and replace this with Block’s account of the
constrained autonomy of state managers, we arrive at a full and convincing theory of
the capitalist state. It appears to me that, after we have rejected the micro-policies
theory, the remaining central ideas of SPS are thoroughly compatible with Block’s
theory. Let us now look at these remaining ideas in SPS, and understand how they are
compatible with those of Block.
28 They may do this under pressure from a strong working class, or, alternatively, they may simply fail to identify policies adequate to the task of securing capital’s long-term interests – that is, they may badly misjudge the particular needs of the capitalist class as a whole.
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Nothing about Block’s theory seems incompatible with what Poulantzas has to say
about the fundamental interpenetration of the polity and the economy. Neither does
there seem to be any difficulty in reconciling the notion that the capitalist state is
founded on capitalist social relations of production with Block’s framework. There
seems to me little problem in combining the idea of individualisation with Block’s
theory. Block’s framework allows for the idea that state institutions tend to atomise
and fragment the working class. With our adoption of Block’s framework the
individualisation process becomes, perhaps, less central to our schema than it is for
Poulantzas, but we can certainly say that it plays an important role in helping to
support the process through which capitalism is reproduced. An individualised
working class are less likely to organise politically to make radical demands on the
state which managers will find difficult to reconcile with capital accumulation and are
more likely to regard the state as class-neutral and to accept the concessions that state
managers provide for them. Poulantzas’ idea of the state as the institutional
embodiment of intellectual labour as separated from manual labour also seems
compatible with Block.
What about Poulantzas’ ideas about the state’s organisation of bourgeois unity – and,
in particular, its organisation under the domination of a power bloc? As pointed out
above, Poulantzas’ account of this process is highly problematic. He appears to argue
that bourgeois unification occurs as a corollary of the process of the state’s
organisation of policy in the long-term interests of capital in general. However, the
process by which the state organises this policy in capital’s long-term interest is
precisely what Poulantzas fails to account for. Block however, as I have argued, does
manage to explain this process – and there is no reason why we cannot, then, take up
Poulantzas’ suggestion that the class organisation of the bourgeoisie stems from the
successful formulation of policy in the interests of capital in general. The idea of a
power bloc and hegemonic fraction capture something about the nature of capitalist
class organisation – that the bourgeoisie is not a homogenous bloc and that certain
fractions tend to be dominant over others29 – and I argue these should and can be
incorporated into our hybrid Poulantzas-Block theory of the capitalist state. How do 29 For example, it is often argued that financial fractions of the British bourgeoisie have, historically, been dominant over industrial fractions and that this domination has been reflected in preferential treatment for the City of London rather than for, say, manufacturing interests, on the part of successive government administrations. For arguments of this type see Hobsbawm (1990), Nairn (1979) and Anderson (1987). For broadly similar arguments from non-Marxist perspectives see Pollard (1982) and Hutton (1995).
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we square the idea of a hegemonic class fraction and a power bloc with Block’s
schema? We can say that when state managers formulate policy in order to safeguard
and reproduce healthy levels of economic activity, they tend to organise it in line with
the central interests of those bourgeois fractions which seem to state managers the
most crucial to the national economy. Therefore, state policy will tend to privilege the
interests of certain fractions – it is a small step from here to call these privileged
fractions a ‘power bloc’ and to consider that state policy unfolds under the hegemony
of particular fractions.
It is also possible to integrate Block’s framework with the central idea of SPS – that
the state is a social relation between classes. Like Poulantzas, Block argues that the
particular balance of class forces has an effect on the content of state policy – a strong
working class will force the state to act on some (or all) of their demands, for
example, and they must also respond to the needs of various capitalist fractions in
order to reproduce the conditions for adequate levels of economic activity. Like
Poulantzas, also, Block claims that the state is not a passive entity which simply
responds to the particular class pressures it is subjected to. The interests of dominant
class fractions are structurally advantaged and privileged within the state apparatus,
for Block as for Poulantzas, and, therefore, the state tends, systematically, to
reproduce the class domination of the bourgeoisie. For both theorists, though the state
is the concentrated site of class struggle, the dominant class fractions are accorded an
inherent structural advantage in this conflict. Furthermore, for both Block and
Poulantzas, the state apparatus organises the general interests of the bourgeoisie and,
in so doing, unifies the class – it does not simply reinforce some pre-existing
domination of the ruling class, but actually establishes its ascendancy.
However, while there seems to be clear compatibility in general terms between the
two theorists’ frameworks, Poulantzas’ account of the state as a social relation
between classes must be modified slightly to incorporate Block’s insistence on the
central importance of state managers. Poulantzas suggests that dominant class forces
are manifested directly in various ‘power centres’ within the state’s institutional
materiality and that their physical presence within the state helps to determine the
content of state policy. Except for Poulantzas’ discussion of the role the state
personnel play in (mis)representing the interests of the working class, state managers
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do not seem to be very important in Poulantzas’ schema. However, for Block, of
course, an awareness of the actions and decisions of state managers is crucial to an
understanding of the way in which the capitalist state functions. If we are to
incorporate Block’s ideas into Poulantzas’ general framework we must abandon
Poulantzas’ suggestion that class forces are manifested directly within the state
apparatus – we must acknowledge that the balance of class forces is reflected in the
processes and policy of the state only indirectly, through the mediation of state
managers. The balance of class forces is not, somehow, directly inscribed into the
structures of the state and the specific content of state policy is not determined by the
relative weight of class fraction interests actually existing within the state. Instead the
structure of the state, and the content of policy, is generated (in effect) in relation to
state managers’ interpretation of the balance of class forces and the relative
importance to national economic success of the needs and interests of each class
fraction.
This formulation still preserves the idea that structure and struggle are not distinct, but
part of the same process. The structure of the state becomes, perhaps, rather more
solid with our incorporation of Block’s ideas, but Poulantzas’ idea of a dialectical
interaction between two not wholly distinct entities (class struggle and state structure),
I think, remains intact – class struggle shapes the institutional structure of the state
and guides policy via state managers and, in turn, the structure of the state and state
policy via state managers, feeds back into the class struggle.
To some extent the Poulantzas-Block hybrid theory of the state must abandon
Poulantzas’ notion of ‘power centres’ – we have seen that Block’s ideas are not
consistent with the idea that class forces physically manifest themselves within the
institutional materiality of the state. However, we need not reject the idea that certain
state apparatuses may tend to represent the interests of certain class fractions. It is
clear that the state apparatus is not a homogenous bloc and that state managers do not
always act in unison. The state is not fractured into ‘power centres’ because
competing class fractions actually penetrate into certain apparatuses, but because state
managers in different branches of the state may, for various reasons, tend to favour
the interests of certain class fractions. For example, certain apparatuses may tend to
favour the interests of particular fractions because of the occupational background of
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key state managers within those apparatuses, or because of historical links between
those apparatuses and specific class fractions which tend to be reproduced, or because
the nature of the remit of a particular branch tends to bring it into contact with
members of a particular class fraction30.
The idea of a ‘centre of resistance’ also retains some force. Just as there are state
apparatuses that will tend to favour the interests of particular dominant class fractions,
certain apparatuses may tend to take particular account of the interests of the
dominated classes. Some state employees in areas such as social security or
healthcare, for example, may be particularly sympathetic to working class needs and
demands. However, as Poulantzas points out, those state employees who sympathise
with the working class interpret their demands and interests in terms of a particular
ideology – that of the ‘neutral state’. They act on working class demands only insofar
as these are compatible with their view of the state’s neutrality and in as far as they
are compatible with the continued division between state employees and the mass of
people. This seems compatible with Block’s view of state managers. For Block, like
Poulantzas, state managers’ self-interest in the maintenance of their own power is an
important factor in their behaviour. Also, for Block as for Poulantzas, state managers
will tend to act on working class demands only insofar as they are compatible with the
reproduction of the capitalist order.
There is a difference of emphasis in that while Poulantzas suggests that state
employees in certain apparatuses may consciously sympathise with the working class,
Block seems to indicate that state managers will act on working class demands only
because they feel it is necessary in order to safeguard capitalism. However, this is not
a major problem. We could say that the vast majority of state managers will act in the
way that Block describes and that only a minority will actively sympathise with the
working class – and that this minority will tend to be concentrated in certain areas of
the state such as those administering welfare. This minority can easily be sidelined by
the majority and, in addition, the pro-working class minority will, as discussed above,
30 For an interesting account of how relationships between various ‘interest groups’ (i.e. class fractions) and state apparatuses tend to be reproduced and reinforced over time, though with room for constant, dynamic alteration see Marsh and Smith (2000). Marsh and Smith focus on the ‘policy network’ surrounding the British Ministry of Agriculture in the post-war period, but, as they point out, the findings of this case study can be extended more widely. Furthermore, this essay emphasises a dialectical inter-relationship between members of a ‘policy network’ (including state managers) and between state policy and ‘policy network’. It seems broadly compatible with the theory I set out here.
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(mis)interpret working class interests via a particular ideology which will tend to
‘filter out’ the most radical of working class demands. We should also, here,
differentiate between state managers and state employees. Those most ready to listen
to the demands of the working class will tend to be those lower in the state hierarchy
and state managers (i.e. those with real influence and decision-making power) will
tend to behave in accordance with Block’s account, since radicals are unlikely to be
promoted to positions of influence.
It is important to retain Poulantzas’ idea that should a left-wing government be elected
(and therefore penetrate key state apparatuses) the circuits of power within the state
are likely to be remoulded so that these centres of resistance are neutralised. I
indicated in my criticism of Poulantzas that his description of this process has
problematic implications. However, though we should reject the idea that the
bourgeoisie remould the structure of the state in such circumstances, we could still
argue (drawing on Block’s schema) that the circuits of power are reordered by state
managers31. It is likely that should a radical government be elected, state managers’
self-interest would drive them to seek to ‘limit the damage’ that it could do32. Block,
then, provides us with the resources to explain how the circuits of state power can be
deliberately transformed to neutralise the threat from internal socialist forces – a
reality Poulantzas correctly identifies, but fails to account for convincingly.
Block’s schema is highly compatible with many of the central arguments of
Poulantzas in SPS once we have rejected the latter’s theory of micro-policies. Block’s
ideas, then, allow us to correct the major flaw in SPS. With the combination of the
two theories, I argue, we produce a cogent, detailed and coherent theory of the
capitalist state.
31 Of course, in Block’s terms, radical government ministers would, themselves, be state managers. However, in the event of the election of a left-wing government these ministers would find themselves outnumbered by other more experienced state managers in the civil service, for example, who would tend to oppose radical policies. It should be pointed, too, that radical government ministers would find the economic and political constraints presented by the level of ‘business confidence’ amongst the bourgeoisie just as constraining as any other group of state managers – it is likely, then, that radical government ministers would soon abandon radical policies. The political trajectory of the left-wing French government under Mitterrand’s presidency from 1981 exemplifies this process.32 Coates details some of the complaints of relatively radical Labour ministers, such as Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman about the opposition or ‘administrative inertia’ they faced when dealing with the civil service (see Coates, 1975: 148-151) – providing us with examples of civil service obstruction and a glimpse of what is likely to happen should a left-wing government come to power.
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Ed Rooksby
Conclusion
I have argued that much of Poulantzas’ theory of the state in SPS is highly
convincing. It sets out an extraordinarily rich and sophisticated account of the
capitalist state – its origins, its foundations, its dialectical relationship with class
forces and its role in the establishment and reproduction of bourgeois domination and
in the reproduction of the CMP. SPS, however, does not provide an adequate account
of the way in which the structures and workings of the state tend to ensure that the
state operates in the long-term interests of capital in general. I have argued that for
such an account we should turn to the work of Block. I argued that Block’s theory of
the way in which the structural position of state managers forces them to develop an
understanding of what is necessary to safeguard the social order and to act on this
understanding is very convincing. Furthermore, I argued, Block’s schema can be
incorporated into Poulantzas’ theory – and with the amalgamation of these two
theories there emerges a more thorough and persuasive theory of the capitalist state.
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