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INRETS DEST

Dakar experience in bus reform

A report prepared by Xavier Godard

For the World Bank Group

contract N° 7132248 to Inrets, stated 03 January 2005

April 2005

Inrets, 2 Av Gal Malleret Joinville, 94114 Arcueil Cedex France, tel 33 1 47 40 70 00


Report on Dakar experience in bus reform

This report has been prepared as a contribution to the project of toolkit prepared by the World Bank on bus reform.

A visit of one week in Dakar by X Godard has been organized from 25 January to 1 February 2005. It has been facilitated by C Diou and I Diouf (World Bank, Dakar) thanks to them.

This report is based on different sources: Documentation accumulated by X Godard since 1990. Reports transmitted by World Bank and by Cetud during the visit in Dakar Discussions with persons in charge of the urban transport in Dakar

Difficulties of availability and organization in Cetud have limited the information got from Cetud: actually only two reports have been transmitted by Cetud who was mobilized by the study called PDUD (Plan de Déplacements Urbains de Dakar).

This report is exactly structured according to the scheme presented in the Terms of Reference. When necessary some parts are referred to other parts covering the same theme. We have also developed some points which were not specifically mentioned in the TOR but seemed to be key elements in the lessons of Dakar experience in bus reform.

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Contents

I Political context p 5I-1- Institutional structure including allocation of powers between jurisdictionsI-2- Central government policy position on private supply in public transportI-3- Existence of a private sector in other public utility sectorsI-4- Local government policy stance and willingness to reform

II Economic conditions p 7II-1- National GDP per capitaII-2- Percentage of income spent on public transportII-3- Current public transport fares and costs, in current dollar equivalentsII-4- Other data

III Current public transport patronage, by mode p 10III-1- Passenger numbers by category: daily trips by modeIII-2- Ticket types III-3- Passenger load factors

IV Structure and organization of urban public passenger transport in city p 12IV-1- Organizational structure: the components of the urban transport in DakarIV-2- Legal basis for organization: CETUD as organizing authority; IV-3- Vehicle ownership and management; IV-4-Vehicle purchase, finance and insurance; IV-5- Legislative instruments; IV-6- Staffing and skills analysis; IV-7-Facilities and equipment;

V Service supply characteristics p 20V-1- Operational characteristicsV-2- Current bus routing and scheduling plan; V-3- Income and expenditure statements of main operators

VI Vehicle related data p 24VI-1- Nature of vehicle ownership VI-2- Operational constraints on supply of vehicles and financial arrangements VI-3- Financial arrangements in place for the operators to purchase buses; VI-4- Inventory of vehicle fleet, classified by age, type and maintenance status; VI-5- Nature of routine maintenance and capital rehabilitation VI-6- Vehicle operating costs per km in service

VII Existing regulatory arrangements and institutions p 27VII-1- Formal steps of the reformVII-2- Review of market conditions set up by various government agencies, VII-3- Fare and fare change mechanism; VII-4- Effects of unions and union regulations;VII-5-Taxation and other incentives/constraints.

VIII Perceived problems p 30VIII-1- Insufficient service;VIII-2- Poor quality of service;

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VIII-3- Poor vehicle maintenance;VIII-4- Inefficient operating procedures VIII-5- Antisocial or dangerous on-the-road behavior;VIII-6- Inappropriate vehicle type and size;VIII-7- Physical predation by the informal sector;VIII-8- Violence between operators;VIII-9- Maltreatment of customers;VIII-10- Corruption in administration.

IX Attributed causes p 34

X Drivers of the reform program and main lessons. p 35X-1 Key-drivers X-2 Objectives of the reform X-3 Obstacles and difficulties of the reformX-4 Main lessons

XI Spatial planning and sociological context for competitively tendered franchises p 38XI-1 Intended infrastructure development: busways XI-2 Sociological context for competitively tendered franchising

Annexes p 39

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I Political context

I-1-Institutional structure including allocation of powers between jurisdictions

Senegal is a democracy, with a real changeover of power in the Presidency: the President and the Parliament are elected. The last election for the President was held in 2000.

Many Ministries are concerned by the urban transport sector. The main of them are:- Ministry of Equipment and Transport- Ministry of Economy and Finance- Ministry of Trade- Ministry of Interior

The Governor of Dakar Region is involved in traffic management and enforcement. He is also in charge of stating the licenses for taxis.

Laws were stated in 1996 on the decentralization process, in particular the 96 – 06 and 96 – 07 laws dated March 22, 1996 – respectively called the Local Authorities Code and the Transfer of Jurisdiction to Regions, and to Local Councils and Rural Communities.

The local authorities were supposed to be in position to create and to implement development programs of regional, local or rural interest, in line with the general policy defined by the State. Nine areas of jurisdiction such as Territorial Development, Planning, Town Planning and Housing, were thus transferred by the State to the local authorities. But the transport sector was not included in the field of application of this decentralization. It is still under the responsibility of the State.

An Organizing Authority for urban transport in Dakar Region has been created in 1997: Conseil Exécutif des Transports Urbains de Dakar (CETUD) see below. Actually Cetud is also involved in other medium size cities in Senegal (Thies, Kaolack…)

I-2-Central government policy position on private supply in public transport

The official position of Government is to push towards privatization of public transport in Dakar.This orientation was stated in 1996 in the Statement of the urban transport policy, after discussions with the World Bank for launching the first project of urban transport in Senegal.

This first project included the so called privatization of Sotrac, the bus company operating since 1970. Actually Sotrac was not a State owned company but a mixed (public and private) enterprise: Société d’économie mixte, with a status of private enterprise.

The reality of the autobus company privatization has proved to be more complex than wanted (see IV-1).

Another attempt for privatization deals with the urban train operation, with many steps: the rail activity deserving Dakar and Bamako has been franchised to Transrail in October 2003. A new company (PTB SA) has been created in June 2003 to operate the urban line. It is a affiliate of the former public rail company SNCS. It is designed to be privatized when possible.

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I-3-Existence of a private sector in other public utility sectors

A privatization process has been introduced in various sectors:- Telecommunications : Sonatel (1997)- Electricity: Senelec (1998)- Water distribution : SDE (1996)- Market management: Kermel market in Dakar, an attempt

New projects have been launched by President Wade since 2000. A special Agency has been created for their development: Apix (Agence pour la promotion de l’investissement et des grands travaux). These projects are designed to be operated and if possible built by private operators. Particularly one can mention:

- New airport project located further outside Dakar in a new area of development;- Highway Dakar-Thies according to a BOT scheme.

But the implementation of this projects based on international private investors is very difficult and there is skepticism on their feasibility.

I-4-Local government policy stance and willingness to reform

Local governments (cities of Dakar, Guediawaye, Pikine, Rufisque, Bargny) are not usually involved in the urban transport sector as they consider it is the task of the State: it is consistent with the Law on decentralization which excludes the urban transport. The communes have been involved in the Board of the Organizing Authority Cetud which acts under the name of the State. Their role in Cetud seems rather weak, but this view is not shared by all.

In parallel some cities can try to develop some projects in urban transport as they think it is important to meet the travel needs of population. But they have no real means to develop these projects without agreement and funding by Cetud, at the exception of the commune of Dakar may be. For instance Dakar would like to develop a LRT project, but this idea is not yet connected to Cetud action.

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II Economic conditions

II-1-National GDP per capita

Data differ according to the sources.National GDP per capita was estimated around to 600 USD in 2000 according the Document of strategy for reduction of poverty (DSRP, 2002). This low level of resources justified the classification of Senegal in the Less Advanced Countries in 2001 According to Uemoa, the GDP of Senegal was 3511 Md Fcfa, or 5.1 Md USD in 2002 for a population estimated to 9.7 millions inhabitants. That corresponds to 526 USD per capita. Uemoa gives also another estimation of 480 USD per capita in 2001.

II-2-Percentage of income spent on public transport

The average share of household revenues spent on transport is 8.3 % in 2000, according Emtsu survey (Syscom 2001). The share of public transport expenses is 5.4% according the same survey.

One has reasons to think the expenses in public transport are underestimated in these surveys, but one cannot check if the share is really underestimated (Godard, 2002) as the households resources are also probably underestimated.

If one consider the distribution of revenues in households, this share of public transport expenses is lower for the quintil 1 (4.3%) and higher for the quintil 5 (5.6%). These differences are not so high. They are logically more important for individual modes expenses.

Table 1: Percentage of transport expenses according to the repartition of revenuesQuintil 1 Quintil 2 Quintil 3 Quintil 4 Quintil 5 All

Public transport 4.3 5.4 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.4Individual mode 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.3 5.3 2.9All transport 4.5 6.0 5.7 6.7 10.9 8.3Source Emtsu (Syscom, 2001)

This relatively low weight of transport expenses is due to the fact that many trips are made by walk (75%) and only a minority of them by motorized modes (25%).

Table 2: Individual rate of mobility in Dakar (number of daily trips per person)poor Not poor allmen women men women

Not motorized 2.9 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.4Motorized 0.8 0.5 1.4 0.8 0.8All modes 3.7 2.9 3.6 2.9 3.2

Source Emtsu (Diaz Olvera, 2002)

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II-3-Current public transport fares and costs, in current dollar equivalents

The official fares for the minibuses are said not to be really applied.The average applied fares are the following (of course they depend on the length of trips, the time period etc):

Table 3: Fares applied by minibuses in 2004Vehicle type Peak average

fare (Fcfa)Off peak average fare Fcfa

Peak Average fare (US cents)

Off peak Average fare (US cents)

Standard deviation

SG2, 23 seats 87 83 16.5 15.5 37Mercedes, 35-40 seats

118 116 22.5 22 59

Source: Fideco, 2005

The extreme fares registered are 50 Fcfa as a minimum and 200 Fcfa as a maximum. There seems to be only a light difference between peak and off peak fares.

The fares applied by DDD vary from 150 to 225 Fcfa, or 28.5 to 43 US cents equivalent in January 2004.

Comment: The application of fares is bypassed by practices of cutting the lines in sub-lines (”sectionnement”), what obliges people to pay two or three times for only one trip. This practice is observed mainly in the peak period. For instance a typical trip from Dakar to Pikine the fare of which is officially 110 Fcfa costs often 200 Fcfa with a trip segmented in three travels in three different vehicles (Lombard, 2005). Many observers insist on this practice but its amplitude is not well estimated. Its influence was confirmed by the results of HH survey (Emtsu 2000) but in a proportion of around 30% to 40%. The reason given by operators to justify this practice of cutting the lines is the increased congestion which impedes them to implement the same number of travel than before and to get their “normal” revenue. In the opposite, in off peak period, there is some possibility for the passenger to bargain and to decrease the fare.

The average cost by trip for the user is given by the results from Emtsu survey in 2000 (Syscom 2001)

Table 4: Cost of a trip according to the main used means, Dakar 2000

Mode Cost Fcfa Cost US cents Mode Cost Fcfa Cost US centsAutobus 173 27 Metered taxi 663 102Car rapide SG2 100 15 Shared taxi 157 24Ndiaga Ndiaye 154 24 Clandestine taxi 203 31

Source: Emtsu (Syscom 2001)

II-4-Other data

The average rate of motorization in Dakar Region is estimated to 16.7 cars/1000 inhabitants in 2000 (Emtsu, Syscom 2001). It is a low rate. It is said to have increased in the recent period with new intensive imports of vehicles.

The poverty line can be appreciated by data from Emtsu 2000 (Diaz, 2002). Taking in account the threshold of one USD by person by day, Diaz has introduced an equivalent resource around

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21000 to 24000 Fcfa by month. That corresponds to the limit between the second and the third quintil of households so that the population considered as poor in Dakar is composed of the quintils 1 and 2. That represents 40% of the households in Dakar (but that is a higher proportion of the population as the poorest households have a higher size)

The declared access to urban services looks rather good, specialy for the schools, according to the results of Emtsu survey presented by Kane (2001). That comes probably from a good policy of settlements of these equipments (education, health) in the various areas of the city. It can explain also the low level of motorized mobility.

Table 5: Accessibility of some urban services in Dakar, 2000

Distance of access to the service (%) Time of access to the service (%)

Mode of transport (%)

Service - 100 m

100 to 500 m

500 m to 1km

1 to 5 km

+ 5 km

- 10 min.

10-30 min.

30-60 min.

+ 1h walk Motorized

Telecenter 67,4 27,6 1,7 2,7 0,2 94,9 3,6 1,1 0,1 98,1 1,5Coranic school 48,3 40,5 5,5 2 1,4 87 7,6 0,8 0 93,5 1,8Nursery school 23,2 47,8 14,5 10,4 3,3 74 16,8 4,3 0,4 86,4 9,2Primary school 20,8 56,8 16,2 4,6 1,1 71 25,9 2,1 0,4 93,9 5,4Market 23,7 38,1 19,3 17,7 1 66 30,4 2,6 0,6 85,4 14,2General care 11,4 40,5 25,2 19,4 3 58,5 37,6 2,9 0,5 75,3 24,2Secondary school 7,3 33,6 24,6 27,9 5,4 39,3 44,3 10,9 1,4 73,9 21,9Post office 3,6 13,8 15,7 48,4 16,9 41,3 49,3 6,6 0,6 46 51,8University 2,8 5,6 8,2 25,2 56 13,5 32,9 21,5 11,2 22 56,8Specialized care 2,8 6,5 10,3 31,9 44,4 23,2 35,9 22,9 2,9 21,9 63,1

Source: Kane, Godard (2001), based on EMTSU 2000

The unemployment rate is estimated to 11.7%. The informal employment share would be 76% according a recent survey (reported by Gmat, 2004). Many sources insist on the importance of the informal economy but of course data can be very different among the sources.

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III Current public transport patronage, by mode

III-1-Passenger numbers by category: daily trips by mode

The main data come from the Household survey (EMTSU 2000) made by Syscom under the responsibility of Cetud, with scientific advise by Inrets. They are adjusted and updated to 2003 for a better view, taking in account other partial data from operators or other surveys which are also used.

The public transport modes represent 85.7% of motorized trips in Dakar (EMTSU 2000).

Table 6: Daily trips by public transport mode, 2003

Mode Trips number % Mode Trips number %Autobus DDD 30 000 2.5% Metered taxi 112 000 10%Car rapide SG2 440 000 40% Shared taxi 77 000 7%Ndiaga Ndiaye 300 000 27% Clandestine taxi 88 000 8%Urban train 25 000 2% other 38 000 3.5%

Total public transport 1,1 M 100%Source: estimation by the author from data of Emtsu (Syscom 2001), Gmat,2004

These data of daily trips are different of data on patronage as many trips may combine two or three travels using a different mode. The rate of multimodal trips is estimated around 1.3. III-2-Ticket types

Ticket are used only by the bus company DDD or the train operator. That represents only a maximum of 5% of public transport trips in Dakar. There is a majority of single tickets. The season tickets seem to have been abandoned as the bus supply was too weak.

The maximum number of monthly tickets delivered by DDD was 6 022 in March 2002. It dropped down to 3 415 in December 2002, and to 4351 in April 2003. The repartition of monthly tickets is:

- 28.5% for scholars, - 45% for scholar children of civil servants, - 22.5% for civil servants.

The reform of minibuses plans to introduce ticketing: this measure should be apply in principle by GIE benefiting from the new Tata vehicles to be operated on franchised lines. But one can fear this reform is not yet matured neither really prepared. The necessity of ticketing has been evocated for many years without meaningful result.

III-3-Passenger load factors

No precise and recent information on bus operation is available from the bus operator which did not give recent data for 2004 according to the bad situation they have to cope with.

The buses load factor is probably very low as the bus operator cannot offer a sufficient service and frequency able to attract numerous passengers: the majority of buses is operated paradoxically with very few passengers inside. The data given in 2003 showed an average

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number of passengers/day/bus in operation inferior to 450: 441 exactly on the period from January to September 2003, it is less than in 2002.

Table 7: Data on daily passengers and operated buses in DDD (working day), May 2002

Passengers/day/bus 504 Direct Receipt/km 451 FcfaKm/day/bus 185 Total receipt/km 499 FcfaPassengers/day 62 933 Receipt/passenger (ticket) 165 FcfaBuses in operation 125Source: DDD

There is by definition no formal information from the paratransit sector. For the paratransit sector, the situation is dominated by:- the dissymmetry of passengers flows (trips from periphery to the center in the morning…). Load of 100% in one direction, very low in the other direction, so that some operators prefer to return empty to load again their vehicle as soon as possible in the peak direction.- the basic rule of operating paratransit is to start a vehicle when it is full or loaded enough. That explains the loading ratio is maximized at the detriment of quality of service.

Nevertheless surveys made in 2004 (Fideco, 2005) give an estimation of the following ratio: number of passengers/vehicle capacity for each vehicle travel (from one extremity to the other extremity of a route). It is a substitute of the load ratio stricto sensu: average number of passengers inside a vehicle; or passengers-kms/vehicles-kms ratio.

Table 8: Rate of passengers loading by minibus travel (in percentage of capacity)

Vehicle type Peak, favorable day

Off peak, favorable day

Peak, not favorable day

Off peak, not favorable day

SG2 25 seats 106 88 100 82Mercedes 35 seats 112 106 106 100Mercedes 40 seats 114 104 107 95Source: Fideco, 2005Note: the favorable days are the days after payment of the monthly wages. The not favorable days are in the middle and the end of the month when less money is available in the pockets of users.

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IV Structure and organization of urban public passenger transport in city

IV-1-Organizational structure: the components of the urban transport in Dakar

The public transport system in Dakar is composed of the following elements:

- Autobus operated by a company: Dakar Dem Dikk

The attempt at accelerated privatization of SOTRAC did not come off in the stipulated time period and the anticipated dissolution of the company in November 1998 led to serious malfunctioning in urban mobility;

International partners requested and potentially interested in the case were actually reluctant to participate, fearing strong and disloyal competition from local small-sized transporters, notwithstanding sanitization of the sector with which the whole procedure started.

In December 2000, the company Dakar Dem Dikk was thus created, in difficult conditions, by the State and the local actors, at the initiative of President Wade. It started its activity with a fleet of second hand vehicles with the hope of contracting for new buses purchase.

The capital stock is shared between the Senegalese State (76.6%) and private Senegalese investors. The State involvement was considered as provisory at the starting of DDD, but it could be not possible for the State to get a divestiture process from DDD. A business plan for the next five years has been established in 2003 and the concession agreement for the running of the bus network has been approved by CETUD’s Plenary Assembly. But the situation was deteriorating in 2003 then in 2004 so that very few vehicles were really operated every day: officially 45 vehicles for public transport and 15 vehicles for specialized transport (scholars…). The number of employees was 1043 in January 2005 and was planned to increase to around 1800 at the end of the year to operate new buses.

A new perspective is given in 2005 with the purchase of new buses for constituting a large fleet:- 60 Volvo buses built in Tunisia to be delivered in the period from February to June 2005- 350 Tata buses produced in India, a first delivery planned from March 2005

- Minibuses called Cars rapides The minibuses Cars rapides group two categories of vehicles : old Saviem SG2 or SG4 (25 seats ie 23 passengers official capacity) and Mercedes minibuses (35 and 40 seats i.e. 32 and 40 passengers capacity) called Ndiaga Ndiaye according to the name of the main operator who developed the use of these vehicles. Their fleet is estimated around 2500 to 4000 vehicles according to the sources. A third category of vehicles is planned to appear in 2005 thanks to the fleet renewal program funded by the WB: new Tata Minibus (option of 35 and 40 seats capacity)

- Shared taxis called taxis de banlieue or taxis clandos, operating in the suburbs or inside the cities of Guediawaye and Pikine. They were ancient clandestine taxis which were legalized in 1982. They seem to progressively return to illegality.

- Caleches (horse drawn vehicles) operated in Rufisque and some parts of Pikine, adapted to the sandy streets. Their number can be around 700 to 1000 vehicles (there is a seasonal aspect in the

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activity). Their role is quantitatively globally very low but they can have importance in some areas. They are used more for the transport of goods than for the transport of persons.

- Metered or individual taxis: The metered official taxis are numerous in Dakar (their number was estimated to 4000 in year 2000 but it has probably increased. Actually they are individual taxis but not really metered as the fare is classically bargained for each travel: there is a trend to the increase of fares thanks to the growing congestion in Dakar.

- Clandestine taxis: they are totally illegal taxis operating for many years at the favor of the public transport crisis. They could be around 1000 to 2 000 vehicles. These taxis operate mainly as shared taxis on specialized routes, with dedicated informal stations.

- Urban railway called PTB (Petit Train Bleu or Petit Train de Banlieue) linking the center of Dakar to Pikine and Rufisque (26,6 kms line)

Table 9: Public transport modes in Dakar

Nombre total Capacity (passengers) Status deserved area

Cars rapides 1400-2500 23 Private Dakar RegionNdiaga Ndiaye 1000-1500 35-40 Private Dakar RegionDakar Dem Dikk 107 100 Mixed Dakar RegionPetit Train Bleu 4 trains of 6 to 8

cars 1000 (120 to 150 passengers by car)

Public Plateau –Pikine- Rufisque

Taxis à Compteur 4000 4 Private Dakar RegionClandos 2500 5 Private Région sauf ville de DakarTaxis clandestins 1000 5 Private Dakar RegionCharrettes, calèches 700 3 Private Dakar Region, center excluded

Source: Kane, Godard, 2001

IV-2-Legal basis for organization: CETUD as organizing authority;

The institutional reform Cetud creating in 1997 (see the steps of the reform in VII) was fundamentally aimed at:

- resolving the problem of dispersion of jurisdiction between the various central and local institutions which encourages conservatism and means that no single authority takes ultimate responsibility of urban transport or public transport in Dakar;

- organizing a better coordination for definitions and decisions on urban transport policy, with the vital participation of the local authorities.

The choice of authorities, taking into account the need to develop the partnership for sustainable mobility, was based on the creation of a public organization of a professional nature, law No. 97 – 01 of March 10, 1997. The organization was named the Executive Council of Urban Transport in Dakar (CETUD).

According to the President Ousmane Thiam, CETUD’s role consists in organizing and regulating supply and demand of urban public transport in order to create a reassuring economic environment for the operators and to promote the emergence of a sound, durable competition: in accordance with the public transport policy defined by the State for the Dakar region. In order to do this, the organization carries out the responsibilities shown in Table below, on behalf of the

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State, the local authorities of the Dakar region, and the professionals of the sector. Furthermore, at the request of the State or the local authorities (other than those of the Dakar region), CETUD may intervene, to assist in the creation and implementation of projects of urban transport concerning the said authorities.

Table 10: CETUD’s Responsibilities

No. Responsibilities

Origin

State Local authorities

Operators

a/

Determine the routes to be served, the corresponding authorization quotas for public transport, and their technical operating terms

X

b/Put together the Call for Tender documents, sign agreements with the registered transporters, and control implementation of contracts X

c/Propose tariff policies to the appropriate authorities

X

d/Identify the constraints of the public service and determine the relative financial compensation. X X

e/Develop criteria for admission to the profession of public transporter X

f/Studies and initiatives for training, information, and promotion for urban public transport X X

g/Coordinate between the different types of public transport; and in particular, arbitrate the division of profits in the case of tariff integration.

X

h/Develop and support the creation of shares and investment programs to improve infrastructure, traffic, and road safety services.

X X

i/ Improve the condition and quality of the transport fleet to contribute to the fight against pollution generated by motorized transport.

X

Source: Thiam, 2003

Analyzing these responsibilities, it is apparent that CETUD is neither the transport network administrator, nor the traffic administrator. However, the task of assistance towards the administrators concerned is conferred to CETUD. The aim is to optimize the running of the road infrastructures in terms of freely moving traffic and traffic safety, essential for the development of public transport.

The organization is designed to be flexible for optimum efficiency. It comprises the two following bodies:

- The Plenary Assembly: body for negotiations and decisions, also acting as Board of Directors;

- The permanent Secretariat: executive body

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From 1997 to 2001, the Chairman represented the administrative and technical executive body for decision-making. He relied on a permanent Secretariat led by an executive secretary and comprising three experts (an engineer, an economist and a jurist) with twelve (12) agents. With the increased responsibilities of the Organisation, and given its status to implement programmes and projects relating to urban transport reform, the workforce of the permanent Secretariat has risen from twelve (12) to twenty-three (23) including 10 senior executives.

The members of the Plenary Assembly, as shown in following Table, decreased from twenty-seven (27) in April 1997, to nineteen (19) in July 2001. This change expresses the authorities’ desire, to render the structure and functioning of the aforementioned Assembly more flexible, and to restore balance to the partnership.

Table 11: Changes in the composition of the Plenary Assembly

Members Sept. 97 to July 01

From July 01

Chairman 1 1Person qualified in urban transport, chosen by the President of the Republic 0 1State Representatives 11 6Representatives from the Local Authorities, Dakar region 6 5Representatives from the private sector, operators and consumer associations

9 6

Total 27 19Source: Thiam, 2003

The participation of the private sector (in particular the operators) in the debate and decision-making body is an innovation. Urban transport organizational authorities are usually comprised of the State and the local authorities where the capital town is concerned, and only the local authorities where inland agglomerations are concerned, in developed countries where this form of organization exists.

The advantages of having the professionals of this sector participating in the area of debate are: firstly, decisions are made with a more thorough knowledge of the facts secondly, the implementation of these decisions is made easier with the

participation of the parties concerned

As far as possible, the Plenary Assembly’s decisions are made by common consensus. Failing this, they are made by simple majority of the voters representing a quorum equal to at least half the members of the assembly, the Chairman holding the casting vote.

Cetud has power of organization and proposal to the Government. But Cetud has not the formal power to set up the licenses of public transport. These licenses are seted up by:

- the communes for the shared taxis (taxis de banlieue);- the Dakar Region Governor for individual taxis (called also black and yellow according

their color)- the Ministry of Transport for minibuses,- the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Finance in principle for the bus company

with which a agreement has to be signed through Cetud

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IV-3-Vehicle ownership and management;

For the minibuses, the owners are not the real managers. The management rule is conducted by the basic commitment by which each driver has to give daily the owner a fixed amount of money. That amount depends on the state of the vehicle, it is usually in the margin of 15 000 Fcfa to 18 000 Fcfa, or 28 to 34 USD (Lombard, 2005).

The same rule is applied for individual taxis (required daily receipt of 8 000 to 10 000 Fcfa, or 15 to 20 USD) and for shared taxis (required daily receipt of 2 500 to 3 000 Fcfa or 5 to 6 USD).

The owner has to manage the administrative obligations and also the maintenance or repair of the vehicle. The driver has in charge to operate the vehicle with the help of a controller he usually chooses (but sometimes the owner can impose a controller)

The driver is responsible for the operation of the vehicle, which can be affiliated to a route and a terminal managed by drivers unions.

The controller is responsible of the receipt and he can suggest to the driver what is the best route depending to the state of the demand and to the period in the day. That is why one can sometimes wonder if the real manager is not actually the controller.

The driver is supposed to give the daily receipt to the owner but actually he keeps and shares with the controller the surplus of receipt when this sort of allowance to the owner is paid.

For a part of vehicles there can be a second driver (with a second controller) who is committed by the main driver. This second driver is called siroumane. The financial arrangement is on the same scheme. This practice seems to involve SG2 cars rapides but not Mercedes ones. It is due to long daily periods of operation necessary to insure the daily receipt. It is supposed to increase the dysfunctionning of the system as these drivers are less skilled and less controlled.

The new scheme of GIEs (Grouping of owners in large management units) introduced formally in 2001 does not seem to have introduced really new rules of management, neither common structures of management or accountability between the members: every owner continues his own direct relationship with the driver(s) who is autonomous.

IV-4-Vehicle purchase, finance and insurance;

IV-4-1 Present practices

The present practices of vehicle purchase are the following:

Buses for DDD: At the start of its activity, buses have been purchased by an intermediate and then funded by the Senegalese State. There has been a confused period on this point before its formalization. DDD attempts to purchase new buses were conditioned to the increase in the social asset of the company but no private investor has yet been convinced to be involved in this company.

Minibuses for paratransit operators: There is practically no practice of loans by the formal Banks in Dakar to the transport operators because they cannot present formalized accounts for their activity. Also the operators find that the conditions of credit are not good for them and the procedure is too complicated. Every operator

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gets money from his personal informal network. He has also his informal network for buying and importing a vehicle from Europe. One can distinguish two cases of second hand purchase:

- a second hand vehicle imported from Europe or - a old vehicle eventually imported which is restored in workshops in Dakar thanks to a set

of second hand spare parts. A completely new vehicle can be built in Dakar with various recycled spare parts including a motor, and an old chassis.

IV-4-2- A new scheme applied in 2005

Two different mechanisms of funding the purchase of vehicles are implemented in 2005. There seems to have been no real link stated between these two parallel initiatives.

Buses for DDD: New Volvo and Tata buses are purchased by the Senegalese State according to interstate agreements with Sweden and India. Very favorable conditions of credit are applied and there is a part of donation in Volvo case. The buses will be submitted to a leasing contract linking the State and DDD. The company will have to pay three-monthly fees based on the amortization of the real price of vehicles. At the end of the contractual period, vehicles will be officially owned by the company. That means that in principle the donation part will benefit to the State and not directly to the operator.

Minibuses for paratransit operators: The fleet renewal programme is funded by IDA. The new scheme was in preparation for many years, since the creation of Cetud in 1997 and it was even discussed before. Its application begins to be implemented in 2005 as the WB has confirmed in January 2005its no objection agreement to fund the purchase of a first set of 105 vehicles.

The scheme is a purchase of vehicles by leasing. The main elements and conditions are summarized below.

- Grouping of operators in GIEs: 14 GIEs (12 of minibuses) have been created, with a total fleet of around 1400 vehicles

- Creation of a Funding association grouping all GIEs: the Association de Financement which will manage the credit and its reimbursement has been created in 2001.

- Personal supply of 25% of the vehicle value by the operator who wants to purchase a new vehicle (value of the new Tata minibus: 21 M Fcfa, or 40 000 USD). The operators have been reluctant to this contribution they refused to bring.

- Supply of the old vehicle compensated by an allowance the value of which is estimated by a Technical Commission (in the range of 1.5 to 2,5 M Fcfa or 2850 to 4750 USD). These allowances have to be financed on the budget of the State. The vehicle has to be withdrawn from the traffic to be dismantled (last discussions between Cetud and operators seem to accept a period of 3 months for implementing this measure, the time necessary to get the new vehicle…)

- Participation to a training course of operators registered through a certificate of aptitude to management

- Commitment of a credit for 75% of vehicle value, at favorable conditions: rate of interest of 8%, period of credit of 5 years.

- Assignment of vehicles to authorized routes according to a scheme of franchise: real conditions are not yet very clear.

But the ancient scheme will of course continue to work also, difficult to say in what proportion. The difficulties of launching this new scheme of funding make many people skeptical about the

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success of this program. According the supervision missions in January 2004 then in September 2005 the WB considers this leasing component of Pamu as risky, despite of many advises on the difficulties to be solved. The risk concerns both the probability of a fair reimbursement by the operators, and the magnitude of the renewed fleet through this program: if the volume of credit is too low the Association de Financement (AF) will not cover its fixed charges of management and it is submitted therefore to a real risk of deficit…

IV-5- Legislative instruments;

No specific instrument out Cetud

IV-6-staffing and skills analysis;

For the bus company, one has contrasted appraisals of staff and skills:- Probably good skill of the majority of employees in DDD, as there has been a selection

from the previous employees who worked in Sotrac- Insufficient school level which makes some employees illiterate: this problem was very

present in the ancient bus company Sotrac and seems present again in DDD: employees can be skilled but they have difficulties to insert in formal management procedures which impose to read and to write forms.

- Fear on the unavoidable bad habits taken by the employees with the operation of a limited fleet of old vehicles. The drivers could be involved in too many accidents.

- Structure of Direction which is criticized by some ones: the Direction staff seems not very developed, very dependant from the General Director. This situation can be justified by the limited size of the fleet but it will need to evolve with the new buses (see below).

In the minibuses sector the employees are usually criticized for their low level of instruction and training. The majority of them are illiterate among the crews but also among the owners. This does not impede some owners to have apparently an efficient and successful management.

Training programs have been implemented by specialized consultants under the responsibility of Cetud. It is necessary to distinguish programs dedicated to the owners and programs for the employees (drivers and controllers):

There has been a first step of training for drivers in 1999-2000. The training program involved 6 000 drivers. It was judged as successful but had to cope with difficulties with Unions, particularly with a Union leader who wanted to be associated and paid for his contribution

Furthermore, a second step of training is planned to increase the professionalism of these “cars rapides” minibus operators, with a training program of the managers in 2004-2005, after the merge into Groups of Economic Interest GIE (446 transporters in 12 federated GIEs in the Association for Financing the Professionals of Urban Transport, created in April 2001).

IV-7-Facilities and equipment;

The bus company DDD has two depots where vehicles are parked during the night and they are maintained in specialized workshops. Nevertheless only one depot seems to be usable. The company looks for two other depots to manage the new buses got in 2005.

The lines operated by DDD have terminals which are simple areas permitting the buses making their about-turn.

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The bus stops are equipped in majority with shelters for waiting passengers.

The main paratransit operators having more than 20 vehicles have their own workshop where they can maintain their vehicles. Even in this case vehicles can sometimes be repaired on street. For the large majority of small operators, they have no equipment to maintain or to park vehicles so that these vehicles are continuously on street.

Concerning the stations and terminals, there are few main bus terminals? They are an important cause of congestion in the area around. The main of them are:

- Petersen : new big terminal in the core center, managed by a private firm, SAGES- Lat Dior: in the core center, also managed by a private firm, SAGES- Pompier: in the center, interurban terminal, submitted to restructuring projects- Colobane: in the pericenter of Dakar along the highway- Thiaroye: old station in Pikine- Baux Maraichers: new big terminal in Pikine designed to manage the interchange

between urban and interurban services.- …

There are also many more informal stations not organized by the Authorities. All the stations are under the responsibility of the communes (see V-1).

IV-8-financial environment

No comment. See above IV-4.

IV-9-role of the informal sector

The so called informal sector corresponds mainly at what is usually called paratransit or in French artisanat transport. This form of transport is very important in Dakar as it insured 90% of public transport in 2000 and probably more in 2004. The components of this sector are listed above.

There are complementary informal activities which are linked to the transport operation:

- Coxeurs: they are beaters. Either they organize the movement of vehicles in stations, or they attract passengers to load a vehicle before its departure, or they try to get money in doing anything useful (or not?)

- Changeurs : people who make the change when the controller needs low value coins necessary to get the right fare from the passenger

- Maintenance and repair of vehicles: activity concentrated mainly around the stations, on street. But this activity can be dispersed in many areas of the city;

- Rebuilding of new vehicles with various sets of spare parts and elements.

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V Service supply characteristics

V-1-Operational characteristics

V-1-1- Routes operated,

There are officially 23 lines operated by DDD, according to the agreement of franchising signed by Cetud and DDD. Actually in 2002 and 2003 only 17 lines were operated which are very similar to the lines operated by the former Sotrac. The other lines not yet operated are new lines.

Paratransit operators of minibus tend to operate routes from a variable and flexible way so that there is no available record of the real operated routes. On the basis of the existent routes Cetud has identified and planned in 2002 26 routes to be proposed in franchise to the minibus operators at the condition they are grouped in GIE. This scheme has to start its implementation in 2005 with 6 routes linked to the purchase of new Tata vehicles by GIEs. The identified routes link the center of Plateau to urban suburbs of Dakar but not to the other communes of Pikine or Guediawaye as the lines are considered as suburban and more difficult to manage. These 6 routes could be the following (not yet confirmed by Cetud):

- Line 1: Lat Dior Terminal to Niary Tally- Line 2: Lat Dior terminal to Castor Grand Yoff- Line 3: Lat Dior Terminal to Gueule Tapée- Line 4: Lat Dior Terminal to Yoff Village- Line 5: Lat Dior to Grand Yoff- Line 6: Petersen to Dieuppeul

V-1-2- Scheduled timetables

There is no timetable applied by the paratransit operators, by definition.

Actually the timetables of DDD are not applied at all by the bus company submitted to too many difficulties (they have never been applied)

V-1-3- Details of vehicle kilometers run,

Precise data for buses are available for the bus company.

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Table 12: Data on Dakar Dem Dikk operation in 2003

Mois Kilometers PassengersReceipts (M FCFA)

Receipts/Km (Fcfa)

Receipts/Bus (Fcfa) Km/Bus

January 637 625 1 382 266 225.5 354 73 998 209February 525 480 1 138 179 184.9 352 72 744 207march 573 986 1 222 303 197.3 344 71 538 208April 544 930 1 172 683 189.7 348 72 272 208May 541 767 1 116 811 180.9 334 72 276 216June 527 710 1 045 762 169.3 321 67 841 211July 507 237 1 032 203 168.4 332 72 220 218August 464 505 861 322 141.0 304 68 492 226September 371 161 731 616 119.6 322 74 569 231October 388 589 770 974 125.6 323 75 662 234 Total 5 082 989 10 474 119 1 702.6 335 72 052 215

Source : Kane from Dakar Dem Dikk December 2003

There are no available data on vehicle-kilometers run by minibuses, but some estimations in various studies. In average one estimates the operated length to around

- 200 kms, daily- 5 200 kms monthly- 50 000 kms to 60 000 kms yearly

These estimations are similar to bus estimations, which are in the margin 200 to 230 daily kms by bus.

V-1-4- driver training and control,

See IV-6

V-1-5- Vehicle maintenance practices, service standards,

There are very few precise information on the maintenance practice, see IV-7.

V-1-6- Service monitoring

There is no monitoring for paratransit service.

Apparently no monitoring of bus services was offered by DDD in 2004. Probably there is an internal monitoring inside the company, not available as it has no meaning because the situation seems too deteriorated. Precise data were produced in 2002 with a daily monitoring of the activity.

V-1-7- Bus terminal management system;

The minibus terminals are operated by drivers unions at the exception of two important terminals in the center which are operated by a private firm, SAGES, which is also franchised to manage parking in the center of Dakar.

The unions apply the turn rule to organize the departure of vehicles: vehicles start in the order of their arrival registration. Each movement involves a payment for the vehicle on departure.

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The terminals are officially franchised by the communes to the unions. The reality is the drivers identify themselves the location where to operate a terminal: the informal terminal is then negotiated with the commune where it is located.

There is a potential conflict between the cities council and the districts inside because the districts claim for getting the revenues of fees paid by terminals operators.

A policy of franchising terminal management to companies in a formal management scheme has been attempted but appeared more difficult than wanted: the private management which should get benefits risks actually to cumulate a deficit (experience in Pompier).

V-2-Current bus routing and scheduling plan;

New tools for bus routing and scheduling are planned to be applied by DDD when the new fleet will be available.

V-3-Income and expenditure statements of main operators, in aggregate and by operator.

The statements of income and expenditures can be summarized for each type of operator:

For DDD, the bus operator, available data in 2001 are thrown from the report to the Board, (September 2002). Table 13: Receipts and expenditures of DDD, 2001

Md Fcfa M USDReceipts 2.8 3.8Expenditures 5.3 7.2Deficit 2.1 2.9Note: Some expenditures are accounted as fixed assets

Rate of change Fcfa/USD: 736

The deficit represents 75% of the receipts. The receipts cover 53% of the expenditures. These data which are bad are caused by the cost of starting the activity of such an enterprise after the collapse of the former Sotrac.

For the minibuses data in 2004 are thrown from Fideco (2005)

Table 14: Annual receipt and expenditures for minibus operation, 2004SG2, 23 seats Mercedes 35 seatsM Fcfa USD Fcfa USD

Receipts 11.7 22 285 14.4 27 430Expenditures 8.9 16 950 10 19 045Surplus 2.8 5 335 4.4 8 385Source FidecoNote: Surplus has to cover the amortization of the vehicle and the income for the owner.Rate of change Fcfa/USD, January 2004: 525

In aggregate one can propose estimation from the following way:

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According to EMTSU 2000 (Syscom 2001) the yearly expense in public transport is estimated to 36 Mds Fcfa. But this estimation is underestimated as it is suggested by other estimations (Godard 2002), (France Consultants, 2001) of annual receipts by type of transport operator in 2000:

bus company Sotrac (1999) : 1.3 Md FcfaMetered Taxis: 12.5 Md Fcfa Minibuses operators: 36 Md Fcfa PTB : 0.4 Md Fcfa

One has to add other types of vehicles:Shared Taxis: 2000 vehicles, 5000 Fcfa/day, 300 days : 3 Md FcfaClandestine Taxis : 1000 vehicles, 7000 Fcfa/day, 200 days : 1.4 Md FcfaCarts, caleches : 1000 vehicles, 5000 Fcfa/day, 200 days : 1 Md Fcfa

The total expense in public transport is therefore estimated to 55.6 Md Fcfa in 2000, or 85 M USD

This estimation has to be increased in 2004, with a total receipt of around 42 Md Fcfa for the minibuses: the total could be in the margin of 60 to 65 Md Fcfa, or 114 to 124 M USD.

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VI Vehicle related data

Data should be provided which gives a picture of the current fleet of vehicles and its condition in operation, including:

VI-1-Nature of vehicle ownership

The minibuses ownership is presently only individual. A leasing scheme will be applied in 2005 at the occasion of the fleet renewal program.

VI-2-Operational constraints on supply of vehicles and financial arrangements

No specific information

VI-3-Financial arrangements in place for the operators to purchase buses;

See above IV-4-2

VI-4-Inventory of vehicle fleet, classified by age, type and maintenance status;

The minibus fleet is difficult to know precisely. It is supposed to be around 2000 to 3000 vehicles called car rapide. The same number is given in many reports for ten years. That means there is no progress in the knowledge of this fleet and no real mastering by the Authorities despite of the programme of renewal of this fleet, included in Pamu and funded by IDA. Nevertheless one can give some useful data about it:

The official number of permits given by the Ministry of Transport was 2424 in June 2004.

Table 15: Repartition of minibuses according to their capacity, Dakar 2004

Capacity (seats) Number of vehicles % of vehicles Total capacity % of capacity25 1399 57.8% 32 177 49.4%30-32 298 12.3% 8 344 12.8%35 530 21.9% 17 490 26.8%40-45 175 7.2% 6 650 10.2%other 22 0.8% 500 0.8%Total 2424 100% 65 161 100%Source: Data calculated from DTT fileNote: the real capacity of each vehicle is diminished of 2 seats for the driver and the controller

The 25 seats vehicles are Renault SG2 or Saviem SG4 vehicles.The 30 to 45 seats vehicles are mainly Mercedes vehicles.

Table 16: Repartition of minibuses according to the number of vehicles by owner, Dakar 2004

Number of vehicles by owner

Number of owners Total of vehicles % of fleet

1-5 Na (around 1000) 1603 66.1%6-10 30 228 9.4%11-20 9 115 4.7%

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21-50 5 162 6.7%51 and more 2 316 13%total 2424 100%Source: Data calculated from DTT file

The average age of vehicles can be estimated from a recent survey in 2004 (Fideco study)

Table 17: Estimation of average age by type of vehicle, Dakar 2004

Vehicle type Average age Standard deviationSG2 21,7 4,1SG4 16 12,3Mercedes 14 6,6Source: Fideco

Comments: The bad knowledge of the minibuses fleet in operation in Dakar is surprising when one refers to the high number of studies implemented since 1997 and to the announced program of reform of the urban transport sector in Dakar, funded by the World Bank.

The fleet of DDD was 187 vehicles in January 2003, and only 102 in September 2003. The decrease of this operating fleet has continued in 2004 as there were around 60 buses operated in January 2005.

Table 18:Evolution of operating fleet of DDD, 2001-2004

period January 2001

November 2001

2002 January 2003

September 2003

December 2004

Autobuses number 64 143 na 187 102 60

VI-5-Nature of routine maintenance and capital rehabilitation

No available information.

VI-6-Vehicle operating costs per km in service

The minibus operating costs are estimated by a recent study (Fideco, 2005)

Table 19: Minibuses operating costs per km, 2004

SG2 (50 000 km/year) Mercedes 35 seats (60 000km/year)

M FCfa US D % Fcfa USD %Gazoline 2.8 5 333 30 3.6 6 857 34Current provisions, maintenance

1.2 2 286 12 1.8 3 428 17

Salaries, allowances 2.7 5 143 29 2.4 4 571 23External charges 2.6 4 952 27 2.7 5 143 26Total operating cost 9.3 17 714 100 10.5 20 000 100

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Operating cost/km (Fcfa, Us cents)

186 35,5 175 33,5

Note: data are thrown from Fideco (2005) and are used on the basis of simplified hypotheses which should be discussed but cannot be in this report.The total operating cost is estimated before vehicle amortization and revenue for the ownerThe external charges group many payments to the police, to the coxeurs (beaters), to the union etc, but also the various official taxesRate of change Fcfa/USD: 525

Table 20: DDD buses operating costs per km, January to May 2002

Planned expenses (M Fcfa)

Registered expenses (M Fcfa)

Registered expenses M USD

%

gazoline 859 616 0.83 29%Current provision 535 391 0.52 18,5%Salaries 997 960 1.29 45,5%Other charges 225 152 0.20 7%Total operating cost

2 617 2 119 2.84 100%

Bus-kms millions 4.4 6Operating cost/km 595 Fcfa 353 Fcfa 0.47 centsNote: data thrown from DDD for the period January 2002 to May 2002The considered period is limited so that data are not completely meaningful: some expenses of current provision for maintenance have probably been postponed.The gasoline expenses are lower than planned although the consumption has been higher as the bus-kms were higher than planned. The average consumption is high: 51liters/100 kms, due to the old age of vehicles.Applied rate of change Fcfa/USD, January 2002: 745

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VII Existing regulatory arrangements and institutions

VII-1 Formal steps of the reform

The reform of public transport organization in Dakar is a process under implementation on a period of more than a decade. The main steps were the following:

- Seminar in Saly Portudal, May 1992: discussion and orientation of a new urban transport policy, Dakar is pilot town for urban transport inside SSATP that means donors commit to fund measures necessary to the reform.

- Statement of a Monitoring committee, May 1993 which a structure of dialogue between stakeholders to orientate decisions on urban transport

- Preparation of various issues of Urban transport policy orientation- Decisional seminar, September 1995- Statement by the Government of the letter of urban transport in Senegal, 25 September

1996- Creation of CETUD, Law 10 March 1997- Decree on organization of Cetud, 8 April 1997- Decree modifying the organization of Cetud, 19 July 2001- Statement of the Charter of urban mobility, 6 June 2003- Creation of FDTU (Fund for development of urban transport) Law 23 July 2003

The most recent regulation call for some comments:

*Law for orientation and organization of land transportA new law has been voted in May 2003: Law for orientation and organization of land transport. It is not focused on urban transport but it deals with the whole land transport activity in Senegal. It only confirms the role of Cetud for Dakar.

*Creation of CetudOne of the most important achievements of the current reform is the partnership established between the State, the local authorities and the private sector. This partnership has been extended to the NGOs with the intervention of the consumer associations which have got a seat in CETUD’s Plenary Assembly since July 2001.

The development of such a procedure demands constant effort on the part of the different members. With this in mind, the charter of urban mobility was signed on June 6, 2003 by the members concerned, and also, during the session of July 4, 2003, the National Assembly passed a law establishing the rules for the organization and running of the Urban Transport Development Fund (law No. 2003 – 20 of July 23, 2003).

*Charter of urban mobilityThe Charter of urban mobility which was signed in June 2003 states the commitments of each stakeholder concerned by the urban mobility in Dakar. “With this charter, the participants in urban mobility, in particular the local authorities, committed themselves to developing cooperation in the creation, implementation and follow-up of actions needed for a sustainable improvement in travel conditions in the Dakar region. This cooperation must be encouraged and emphasized between the main interlocutors, but also, within each body concerned. The utmost importance is given to communication at every level of participation for durable improvements in urban mobility” (Thiam, 2003). But this charter is purely declarative and does not guarantee any action for application.

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*FDTUFor the Urban Transport Development Fund (FDTU), the State, as a reliable partner, conscious of the limited financial means of the local authorities, will take a graduated responsibility for some of the costs of the said authorities over a period of four years, at the end of which parity will be restored. Once again, this is an obvious sign for the need for solidarity between the different partners in urban mobility.

The fund is designed to be fed by contributions from the State, the local authorities of the Dakar region, and from the private sector, in particular the direct and indirect beneficiaries of investments and shares emanating from resources. Actually the contributions of local authorities and of the private sector seem to be difficult to apply so that one can be skeptical on this reform based finally on the State contribution.

VII-2-Review of market conditions set up by various government agencies,

Minibuses licenses for urban activity are stated by the Minister of Transport and by delegation by the Director of Land Transport. A license can be given to a vehicle if :

- the vehicle is correct according to the technical control center (actually this control is known to not be efficient)

- the owner is registered as a transporter: this registration is dependant of checking the professional capacity of the owner. For many years the practice seemed dominated by a sort of clientelism.

In the recent years the policy was to stop the statement of licenses, with few exceptions managed for political arrangements.

In the new scheme which will be stated through the reform, Cetud will define the number of wanted licenses and the routes dedicated to transporters, and it would also prepare the forms of license so that the DTT will have only to countersign the decision.

Taxis licenses are stated by the Governor of Dakar Region.

The driver licenses are stated by the Ministry of Transport.

In the new scheme which was attempted in 1999 a public transport driver has to participate in a training session confirmed by a certificate. This training program will be pursued at the occasion of the minibus renewal program. This certificate is (will be) required for each driver engaged in the operation of the new minibuses.

VII-3- Fare and fare change mechanism;

The official fares seem not well applied by the paratransit sector but they play a role of reference.

After the increase of gasoline price in 2004 the transporters have pushed to increase their fares. This requirement is now examined both by Cetud and by the Ministry of Transport (Direction of Land Transport, DTT) before making proposals to be examined by the Ministry of Finance and decision by decree.

The Ministry of Transport (DTT) would want to have a sound study to know the reality of operating costs at the aim to manage better the requirements about fare changes. According the

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Director one estimates the transporters probably overestimate the influence of price increase of gasoline in their operating costs.

The fares by the company are submitted to a procedure of revision which involves the Cetud, according to the contract of franchising approved in 2003. The company can request an increase in fares when an increase of one standardized indicator of cost is registered. Cetud analyses the situation and makes a proposal to the Ministries. If the fare increase is refused, the company has to get a compensation from the Ministry offsetting the lost of receipt.

VII-4- Effects of unions and union regulations;

One has to distinguish in principle the unions of transporters and the unions of drivers (two main unions)

There is a tradition of dialogue between the Authorities and the unions. The unions of transporters and also of drivers were invited to participate in the Seminar for urban transport policy held in Saly in 1992. They have been associated to the Comité de suivi then to the Cetud General Assembly. They were involved in the discussions on the renewal of fleet of minibuses.

But there are limits in this dialogue: the commitments are very hard to get from the unions; if an agreement is found, the unions refuse to be really committed, or they are criticized by other groups so that no application can be found.

A main difficulty is the degree of representativeness of each union which seems flexible according to their action. Some ones wonder if the representatives of unions who participate in meetings with Cetud have a real good contact with the people they represent. Actually everything seems to be submitted to a constant bargaining and discussion.

The political power of unions is considered as very high as it was demonstrated during a recent strike in January 2005. This strike which was organized by one of the two unions of drivers has involved all the minibuses. It was said to have blocked Dakar during the whole day. The origin of the conflict was the new legislation of driving behavior (code de la route). Actually the public transport drivers seemed to fear about the sanctions of infractions and especially they feared about the amount of the informal payments they have to make to the policemen (or policewomen) who are supposed to enforce the law. (see below: corruption)

The power of the unions is periodically demonstrated. It is one reason why the Authorities are reluctant to make or to apply strong decisions of organization of urban transport in Dakar.

VII-5-Taxation and other incentives/constraints

No specific items.

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VIII Perceived problems

VIII-1-Insufficient service;

The offered service of public transport is insufficient and deteriorating from year to year, according to all observers and decisionmakers. It is very difficult to move in Dakar by public transport as well as by private car because of the congestion encountered on the main roads, especially in the central city area. The travel times of the main trips from periphery to the center (Plateau area where are the main administrations and shopping facilities) have become very long: they can be around one or two hours according to many observers who mention a deterioration of performances since 2000 when the HH survey was made.

As the majority of minibuses are concentrated on the routes from periphery to Dakar center, the supply is insufficient on the other routes. This supply is judged also insufficient in off peak periods.

The supply offered by the bus company (called DDD) is very low as very few vehicles are operated daily. That involves very low and random frequencies so that users are obliged to wait for a bus during one hour or more: therefore they use to get another mode more accessible.

VIII-2-Poor quality of service;

The quality of service is judged bad by many observers and responsibles who have a negative view on the minibus cars rapides. (But these persons do not really use public transport modes as they are car users) Present minibuses are accused of many shortcomings:

- old vehicles;- bad maintenance;- polluting vehicles- involvement of minibuses in many accidents: many examples given in the newspapers- incorrect behavior of the controllers, who are young boys considered as rough;- practice of cutting the lines obliging the users to pay two or three times the fare for one

trip;- bad information on the route and the final destination as a vehicle can decide to not go to

the terminal initially planned;- risk of robbery inside the vehicles

The majority of these shortcomings are also expressed by the urban population, according to the qualitative surveys conducted in 1999 (Bipe study on the effects of the urban transport crisis on mobility…). The situation has worsened since then.

Nevertheless one has to moderate these judgments on some points:- The users can travel seated in minibuses: it is more comfortable than in a crowded bus- It is rather easy to find a vehicle on the main axes- Some mentioned shortcomings can be found also in the bus sector, for instance the risk of

robbery or the bad information on buses frequency

VIII-3-Poor vehicle maintenance;

The maintenance is clearly poor. Many vehicles can be found stopped on the roads or on the highway after a breakdown. There is no preventive maintenance practice but only curative maintenance when a problem appears.

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The state of many vehicles is not very attractive for the users.

VIII-4-Inefficient operating procedures

Among the bad practices of Cars rapides from the point of view of the user or of the community one has to mention:

- Cutting the lines, what obliges the users to pay twice or more the normal fare of a travel.- Stopping everywhere on street for picking up new passengers (practice of SG2): it is a

factor of congestion as the vehicles behind are obliged to wait.- The rule of departure in terminal which gives an equal chance to each vehicle without

consideration of its state (tour de role).- Rule of vehicle departure in a terminal only when the vehicle is full or loaded enough:

passengers are obliged to wait for a very long time

Among the inefficient practices of DDD, one has to mention the acceptation of so many lines for the limited available fleet of buses: that means the company is able to distribute only very few vehicles to each line. The consequence is the very low frequency of buses conducting to the paradox of vehicles which have few passengers inside as the potential passengers cannot wait for an hypothetical bus and prefer to take a minibus.

VIII-5-Antisocial or dangerous on-the-road behavior;

The unsafety of cars rapides is very famous in Dakar even if a progress may have been registered during the last years. The statistics of road accidents in 2003 (standardization through the procedure BAAC) confirm the involvement of the minibuses in accidents but not in the proportion one could suppose: the minibus share is low. At the contrary the urban taxis and the buses are highly involved in accidents.

Detailed statistics and analyses are missing about Dakar Region and the nature and responsibilities of these accidents.

Table 21: Statistics of accident in Senegal, 2003

Total vehicles Urban taxis Urban minibuses Urban autobusvehicles 5119 (Dakar: 3386) 142 (3%) 126 (2%) 708 (14%)Killed 411 (DK: 120) 21 5%) 3 (1%) 37 (9%)Highly injured 2471 (DK: 1068) 156 6%) 85 (3%) 323 (13%)Lightly injured 2471 (DK: 1042) 209 (5%) 88 (2%) 613 (16%)Source: DTT

Dakar Region represents 70% of accidents in Senegal, and a higher proportion for the involvement of public transportThe official statistics are underestimated, one does not know in what proportion.

Some years ago in 90s the accidents caused by minibuses were the cause of violence from population to the cars rapides drivers: after an accident the driver was threatened to be lynched. But the accidents seem to have decreased and this violence seems less reported. Nevertheless it was recently reported at the end of 2004 that the school girls of Lycée Kennedy have attacked cars rapides after an accident where a car rapide killed one scholar girl.

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VIII-6-Inappropriate vehicle type and size;

The vehicles presently in operation have been criticized on some points by the Authorities when they have decided the specifications for the fleet renewal. Independently of the old age and the bad state of vehicles the main characteristics mentioned as inappropriate were:

- Boarding of passengers by the door at the back of the vehicle: it has to be replaced by a boarding by a lateral door.

- The controller who is standing at the back of vehicle, often out the vehicle with the open door: he will have to get a seat inside the vehicle.

- The low size of SG2 (25 seats capacity) is criticized to contribute to the congestion. That is why the Authorities will impose minibuses having a higher capacity of 35 seats at minimum. This argument does not seem totally correct in its generalization without any precise analysis: I personally do think small size vehicles can have an important role to play in a global system.

VIII-7-Physical predation by the informal sector;

The maintenance practice of minibuses is unfair for the environment: for instance problem of used oil in the ground.

The broken vehicles stay parked in the public space.

The pollution by the sector can be also considered as a physical predation. According to a study funded and approved by the WB in 1998 the transport pollution in Dakar would represent a cost of 63 Md Fcfa every year. It was an argument to eliminate the lead in gasoline and also an argument to replace the minibuses fleet. Unfortunately the data and the method used to make this appraisal are not correct1 and this estimation appears much overestimated: even if the pollution is a concern the Authorities have to cope with consistent data and to be careful about them.

VIII-8-Violence between operators;

There does not seem to have real violence between operators, ie between the drivers in competition to get passengers. One only registers unfair practices of random stopping on street to board new passengers, which limits the speed of other vehicles behind.

At the contrary one can observe a friendly complicity between drivers.

The violence seems nevertheless present in the competition between the unions.

VIII-9-Maltreatment of customers;

The passengers are not well considered by the controllers, there are often some conflicts on the payment of the fare. The controllers are known to be rough, being young people coming from the rural areas.

At the contrary passengers can sometimes bargain the fare and get a reduction. There are cases of complicity of people who know the controller and can travel without having to pay.

1 See my criticism in Godard 2001 or in the chapter Environment of the book under my direction: Godard X 2002, Les transports et la ville en Afrique au sud du Sahara, Karthala-Inrets ed.

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VIII-10-Corruption in administration.

The word corruption can be ambiguous and it does not cover the same reality according to the level of responsibility of persons involved in.

The problem of the so called corruption is present on the field. There seems to be two aspects to be distinguished: - usual corruption on the field where drivers have to pay a low sum of money under any pretext

or a real infraction by the driver: difficult to distinguish- payment to the police to get a provisory agreement to operate a vehicle without the official

license: that is called “basang”.

The question of payments to the police by the drivers is very important and it was the main cause of a recent strike (two days) of drivers in Dakar in January 2005 caused officially by the reform of Road regulation.(code de la route). Actually the drivers fear about the cost of informal fines they will have to pay after the reform as the official penalties are increased in case of infraction.

The practice of basang (provisory agreement to operate given by the police) is never evocated officially in reports but it is important enough to explain the impossibility to know precisely the number of minibuses operated in Dakar.

The cost of the payments to the Police is estimated in the recent study on the profitability of the CR activity in Dakar (Fideco, 2005). These payments represent an estimated operating cost of 450 000 Fcfa by year, or 5% of the total operating cost. But it is difficult to check the amounts which are declared by the drivers in this type of survey.

Some observers can speak about corruption at high level, but it is politically incorrect to comment on this without very precise elements. To avoid recent files, one can express previous files in Sotrac where the director was supposed to get money at the occasion of a command of buses on the budget of spare parts. Or another director was known to benefit from a huge number of vouchers for gasoline (bons d’essence) which are known as a complement of income in the Administration or in companies.

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IX Attributed causesThere are many causes which are listed below:

*Insufficient political willingness to implement really the decided measures of organization of the sector.

*Problem of communication and dialogue between actors. The structures exist for such a dialogue but there is a difficulty to have representatives : question concerning the transport unions in a sector very dispersed : owners, drivers and controllers, coxeurs.

*(Un) Employment context which makes policymakers hesitating to exclude really from the system many persons who live thanks the activity.

*Inappropriate control by the police: they do not really fight the bad driving practices (not enough) but they are too much involved on getting money from the transport sector.

*Inappropriate design of the reform based on a dichotomy:- between wonderful projects and a bad reality, it is more and more difficult to move in Dakar:

the game seems to be maintaining illusions…- between a modern institutional scheme of reference which brings rigidity and the informality

of dominant practices, and their flexible character which can have positive effects despite of disorder effects…

That means the formal and rigid scheme is designed and planned to be applied to informal and flexible practices though one needs probably an intermediate approach which could be implemented strongly.

Partial responsibility of the WB in the situation is engaged as it imposed or accepted (guaranteed) surveys and organizational schemes elements of which can be criticized.

The level of expertise is improving but it is still insufficient to manage the system and to give it a good orientation. There is no tradition of scientific and contradictory debate on data, conclusions of surveys, feasibility of projects, time mastering to implement projects etc…

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X Drivers of the reform program and main lessons.

X-1Key-driversThe reform has been introduced by a dynamic of exchange involving some international agencies (French cooperation then World Bank) and the Senegalese authorities. One has reasons to think the real drivers were mainly the international agencies, this may be the reason why the reform is so difficult to implement with efficiency.

Before the WB involvement the French cooperation had been active in attempts of reform of the urban transport sector in Dakar:- Funding by CCCE (previous structure before AFD) of buses in Sotrac and pressure towards a

better management of the company.- Support to the urban train project, conditioned by the existence of an organizing authority and

an autonomous unit of management of this train- Support to the Authorities to get the expertise capacity necessary to the future Authority

The reform program has been formally pushed by the World Bank through two urban transport programs it funded:- Institutional reform 1997-2000: creation of Cetud, statement of the organization and funding

of the sector, privatization of the bus company Sotrac, preparatory studies, training. The privatization process was unsuccessful and the organization of minibuses postponed to the following program.

- Urban Mobility Improvement Program (PAMU) 2001-2005 (first step to be continued by a second step if minimum objectives are achieved, it is not yet evident): infrastructures improvement, minibus fleet renewal, implementation of the new scheme of organization, urban train progressive investment, measures for a better quality of air, facilitation for pedestrians, study of a transport and mobility plan (PDUD). The implementation of this program has revealed to be very late (rate of financial implementation of only 4.5% observed in mid-term mission in January 2004) and has been limited by many difficulties.

The Senegalese drivers of the reform have concerned mainly three bodies:- Cetud, which is the organism in charge of the reform, after having been the first element of

the reform: - Ministry of Transport (and Equipment): the Minister is involving in the reform, but probably

his mastering of the sector is limited: he is obliged to use Cetud skills and proposals at this aim, and he is also constrained by the initiatives of the President

- President of Republic: he is very active on strategic questions, particularly the creation of DDD, the international cooperation for buses purchase, the creation of a bus industry in Thies for feeding the minibus renewal program, pressure on Cetud (he had the project to suppress Cetud when he starts his responsibility of President in 2000.

As already mentioned the communes could not be much involved in this reform which is the matter of the State: they have few financial and technical means available for that. Some ones disagree with this appraisal arguing that the communes were involved in Cetud Board and they are planned to fund the sector through their contribution to FDTU.

X-2 Objectives of the reform

Dakar was chosen as a pilot-town for the creation and implementation of key reforms, as part of the Sub-Saharan African Transport Policy Program (SSATP), coordinated by the World Bank.

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In May 1992 in Saly Portudal, within the context of the SSATP, Senegal hosted a seminar for the first time, grouping all the public and private members of the sector, supported by the World Bank and by French cooperation. This was an important time for the sub-sector of urban transport. It revealed the need for a concerted course of action, not only to carry out a thorough diagnosis of the sector, but also to set out a policy aimed at sustainable urban mobility.

The main aim of the reform was to design and to apply a policy orientation which is defined by the Senegalese concerned stakeholders and not imposed by the international donors.

The objectives of the reform stated in 1996 on which was based the first project funded by the WB is to improve the urban transport organization in Dakar through various measures:- Institutional reform with the creation of the organizing authority, Cetud- Financial facilities with the creation of a Funding structure for public transport (FDTU)- Reorganization of public transport- Human resources development with training actions

The expression of these objectives is very general.

X-3 Obstacles and difficulties of the reform

As it has been observed by the IDA missions in January and in September 2004, the urban mobility situation has deteriorated in the period covered by the programs, since 1997. Of course this is not due to the reform, but to the non achievement of the objectives and to the postponement of many decisions and actions, which is responsible for this deterioration.

It is not our concern to make here an appraisal of the efficiency of the WB action for the urban transport reform in Dakar. We have to note only some points:- The responsibilities are shared at evidence between WB and Senegalese Authorities;- Steps of the studies conducted by Cetud under the control of the WB look to have been

irrational- Difficulties of the reform have been underestimated- One of the objective which was the reinforcement of expertise seems to have been managed

too lightly- Cetud has been criticized through many right arguments for many years, but if it did not exist

one would need to create something like it: the institutional reform was a necessity but it has to be improved

X-4 Main lessons

Finally some main lessons can be proposed, they are summarized below:

The first lesson is that a long time is necessary to achieve a reform. According to the President of Cetud, “With regard to defining objectives and performance indicators, the urgency attached to urban transport reform must not detract from real concerns regarding the complexity or the sensitivity of the sector.

This is the lesson to be learned from the preparatory reform procedure, taking into account the fact that the main members lacked experience in terms of dialogue concerning definition of policies and strategies in this sector. A certain amount of time was needed in order to finalize the sectoral policy document by common consensus” (Thiam, 2003)

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The second lesson is: one needs a clear and strong political willingness for reform, but also a clear direction of reform on the key factors.

The third lesson is: the insistence on formal goals like privatization imposed by the WB can produce finally inefficiency.

The fourth lesson is: if the reform is too much instrumentalized through formal procedures without development of a real expertise, it does not work.

The last lesson is: if the endeavor made for the reform reveals to have failed it might not to be lost at the condition to integrate really the accumulated experience and to improve on this basis the real implementation of the reform.

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XI Spatial planning and sociological context for competitively tendered franchises

XI-1 Intended infrastructure development: busways

A BRT project is proposed by the NGO Itdp. This option is planned to be considered in the PDUD study (Transport and mobility plan for Dakar) in 2005. At the evidence such an option will oblige to franchise the operation.

An important project is considered for franchising: the highway project from Dakar to Thies, supported by the President Wade. This project is designed by the special Agency APIX. It is benefiting from some funding by the WB for specific studies.

XI-2 Sociological context for competitively tendered franchising

The context is rather negative because people are not familiar with formal procedures of tendering. There have been some attempts in the past when Cetud tried to make a franchise to the suburban lines in 1999: minibuses operators were solicited, and also workers groups of the former Sotrac. But theses groups were not familiar with the statement of provisional activity and accounts and could not integrate this procedure. One can fear the same with the present GIEs involved for the fleet renewal and supposed to integrate the scheme of tendered or negotiated franchising.

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Annex 1: Main sources used for this report

Catram, Etude des conditions et modalités d’adaptation du nouveau cadre réglementaire des transports en commun, rapport pour le Cetud, 1999

Diouf I, Financement public, exploitation privée, l’exemple des gares routières de Petersen et Lat Dior, communication Sitrass 6, Bamako, 2001

Fideco, Etude sur la viabilité financière des services de transport en commun de personnes par autocar à Dakar, Rapport final, janvier 2005

France Consultants, Ressources du Cetud-Fdtu, simulations et adaptation du dispositif institutionnel, Rapport pour Cetud, janvier 2001

Godard X Difficultés d’adaptation des approches du transport urbain pour les villes en développement, Analyse critique d’études des bureaux internationaux à Dakar, article Cahier scientifique du transport, 2001

Godard X (ed) Les transports et la ville en Afrique au sud du Sahara, Karthala-Inrets, 2002

GMAT, Etude d’élaboration d’un plan de déplacements urbains pour l’Agglomération de Dakar (PDUD), Diagnostic global, décembre 2004, Cetud/Pamu

GMAT, Rapport de vérification des indicateurs de performance du Pamu, août 2004, Cetud/Pamu

ITDP, Dakar Busway Prefeasability Study, January 2004

Kane C, Godard X, Performances des modes de transport et satisfaction des besoins des pauvres, cas de Dakar, communication Séminaire Sitrass 6, Bamako, 2001

Lombard J, Sakho P, et al, Les rues de Dakar, espaces de négociation et d’appropriation des transports collectifs, article Revue Autrepart, Ird Armand Colin ed, Paris, mars 2005

République du Sénégal, Document de Stratégie de Réduction de la pauvreté, août 2002

Syscom, Enquête sur la mobilité le transport et les services urbains à Dakar (Emtsu), Rapport final, Cetud, janvier 2001

Thiam Ousmane, Organizational and/or regulatory authorities for urban transport: the example of Cetud, in Codatu/Sitrass Workshop on Urban mobility, Africities Summit, Yaoundé, December 2003

World Bank, Aide Mémoire, PAMU, Mission de supervision de l’IDA, Revue à mi-parcours du Projet, 19-29 janvier 2004

World Bank, Aide Mémoire, PAMU, Mission de supervision de l’IDA, 13-17 septembre 2004

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Annex 2: List of the main persons met during the mission in Dakar (25 January-1 February 2005)

K Diako, Cetud

M Diop, Itdp Sénégal

C Diou, World Bank

I Diouf, World Bank

L Ndiaye, DG Cetud

D Sagna, Cetud

C Salvy, DG Dakar Dem Dikk

B Seck, Directeur DTT

O Sy, Cetud

O Thiam, President Cetud

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Annex 3: Maps of Dakar and its transport system

Figure: Organisation de l’espace dakarois

Source Kane 1999

Figure: dynamique urbaine et pôles générateurs de mobilité à Dakar (Source : Kane)

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Source : Kane 1999

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