Pragmatic conditionals

7/30/2019 Pragmatic conditionals

1/15

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics

pragmatic conditionals

conditional pragmatics

jean-franois bonnefoncnrs and universit de toulouse

guy politzercnrs and institut jean nicod

august , nd london reasoning workshop
http://find/


2/15


overview

the paradox of the pragmatic component

Whatever the future grand theory of conditional reasoningwill be, it will require a pragmatic component.

content and context effects on interpretation andinference are consensually important, and are expected toexplain an awful lot. . .

and yet the pragmatic component is often the leastdeveloped in current theories.

Maybe because pragmatics is all too often used to explainstuff away. Maybe because we cast too wide a net.
http://find/


3/15


overview

the boundaries of the pragmatic component

suggestion (constrain the explananda)

That the component must explain the pragmatic dimension ofconditional reasoning does not mean it has to explain everythingpragmatic that can happen when reasoning conditionally.

We offer a rule of thumb to determine what the componentshould explain and what is off its explanatory limits.

Should handle broad sets of results:

inferences from exotic pragmatic conditionals inferences derived from classic conditional pragmatics.

Should certainly handle the intersection of these sets.

Might safely ignore (for now) the exclusion of these sets.
http://find/


4/15



preliminary characterization

What is the purpose of an ifp then q conditional?

Often to inform of a (causal, temporal. . . ) relation

between p and q:(1) a. If Elizabeth dies then Charles will become King;

b. If thats the Brussels plane the next one is to Berlin.

Some conditionals have another illocutionary force;

Often involve considerations of decision-theoretic utility;

Invite conclusions without a minor premise.

/
http://find/


5/15



consequential conditionals

consequential conditionals

Illocutionary force is still to inform (suggest?), but goesbeyond the causal relation.

a definitional framework for other utilityconditionals.

definition (consequential conditionals)

p is an action under the control of an agent who is neitherthe speaker nor the listener.

q is a valued (desirable or undesirable) consequence of

taking action p; q is known by the agent to be a consequence of p.

(2) a. If the ceo admits the fraud, hell serve time in jail;b. If Sophie takes this drug, shell make a good recovery.

/
http://find/http://goback/


6/15



conditional inducements

conditional inducements

Intention not merely to inform, but to induce ordiscourage a behavior through commitment to someconsequences.

definition (promises/threats)

p is an action under the control of the listener. q is an action under the control of the speaker. q is either desirable or undesirable to the listener.

p has same valence to speaker as q to listener.

(3) a. If you buy this computer, Ill throw in a box of free CDs;b. If you throw a tantrum, Ill ground you.

/
http://find/


7/15



other utility conditionals

other utility conditionals

tips/warnings are very similar to promises/threats, butspeaker neither controls q nor has stake in p.

(4) If you throw a tantrum, your mom will ground you.

persuasion conditionals implicate that their speaker believestheir antecedent should (not) be undertaken.

(5) If the Kyoto accord is ratified, greenhouse gasemissions will be reduced.

directives and more generally deontics give indication aboutthe preferences of individuals who established oraccepted them.

(6) If I clean the house then I may have a drink.

http://find/


8/15



non-utility pragmatic conditionals

non-utility pragmatic conditionals

biscuit conditionals do not conditionalize their consequenton their antecedent, but rather the conversationalrelevance of asserting their consequent. Theirobverse is an endless source of fun.

(7) a. If you need help, my name is Pam;b. and whats your name when I dont need help?

preconditionals aka anankastic conditionals use a necessary

condition as the antecedent, and suggest that thisantecedent is far from being guaranteed.

(8) If I have some money left on Monday Ill invite youto lunch.



9/15



the invited inferences

the invited inferences

Conditionals routinely invite their obverse:

(9) a. If Guy gets a raise then hell buy a car;b. If Guy doesnt get a raise then he wont buy a car.

Linguists approach this phenomenon within the frameworkof conditional perfection. Psychologists mostly wantto explain the fallacies.

Recent psychological accounts depart from conditional

perfection in several critical assumptions: Invited inferences can occur outside conditional perfection; Conditionals may also invite their converse ; The two invitations need not occur together.

http://find/


10/15



the conditional field

the conditional field

There is much more to a conditional than just twopropositions. Statement IfA, then really refers to:

(AA1 A)(BB1 B) (NN1 N)

where each ofA,B, . . . ,N would warrant the inference to, as long as complementary necessary conditionsAis, Bjs, etc. are satisfied.

All disjuncts other than As are ruled out by the invitedinference to the obverse;

The a-conjuncts are implicitly true as per expectationsof cooperativeness and relevance.

http://find/


11/15


intersection

obversion of pragmatic conditionals

obversion of pragmatic conditionals

Geis & Zwicky actually made their point using a promise:

(10) a. If you mow the lawn, Ill give you dollars;b. If you dont mow the lawn, I wont give you dollars.

We dont infer (10b) for scalar reasons, but rather not todefeat the whole illocutionary point of (10a).

Threats also invite their obverse, for slightly morecomplicated reasons:

(11)a. If youre home later than , Ill take away your car;b. If youre home before , I wont take away your car.

Not meaning (11b) would again make (11a) inefficient.In addition, the parent asserting (11a) has a moralobligation to mean (11b).



12/15

/

intersection

suppression effects

suppression effects

Conditionals come with the assumption that their cncsare satisfied;

Pragmatic conditionals invite inferences of their

ownpossibly about the cncs of other conditionals. Thus the well-known suppression effects

(12) a. If we go to room , well have free wine;b. If Mike got funding, well have free wine;c. We go to room .

(13) a. If Emma goes to the party then she buys a new dress;b. If Emma buys a new dress, she cant pay the rent;c. Emma goes to the party.

http://find/


13/15

/

exclusion

exclusion

Say a research appeals to pragmatic notions and predictsconditional reasoning phenomena. . .

. . . whilst not dealing with either pragmatic conditionalnor conditional pragmatics.

modus tollens, modus shmollens

(14) Carol and Didier are eating a soup;

a. If it tastes like garlic, there is garlic in the soup;b. Carol tells Didier: there is no garlic in this soup;

c. Therefore, the soup tastes like garlic.

This result constrains theories of reasoning, but notnecessarily the pragmatic component of conditionalreasoning.

http://find/


14/15

conclusion

conclusion

To accelerate theoretical development, we need to be clearabout the role we give to the pragmatic component.

We suggest that the prime explanatory targets are twobroad sets of results, pragmatic conditionals andconditional pragmatics.

The intersection of the sets is especially relevant

(obversion of pragmatic conditionals, suppression effects). We suggest to ignore for now the exclusion of these sets.

http://find/


15/15

question time



jean-franois bonnefoncnrs and universit de toulouse

guy politzercnrs and institut jean nicod

august , nd london reasoning workshop
http://find/

Date post:	04-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	adnan-bujak
View:	260 times
Download:	0 times

Pragmatic conditionals

Documents