450523 XXX10.1177/1368430212450523Montoya and PittinskyGroup Processes & Intergroup Relations
1University of Dayton, USA2Stony Brook University, USA
Corresponding author:R. Matthew Montoya, Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469, USAEmail: [email protected]
Researchers have long noted the tendency for group members to bias their behavior in favor of their fellow group members. For many, social norms lie at the heart of such outgroup bias (Pettigrew, 1991). Wildschut, Insko, and Gaert-ner (2002) have demonstrated the existence of a norm of group interest that dictates that “one should take into account the interest of one’s own group before taking into account the inter-ests of other groups” (2002, p. 977). The ability of a norm of group interest, or similar versions of this norm, to influence intergroup relations has been explored among group leaders (Pinter et al., 2007), among ad hoc groups (Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Wildschut & Insko, 2006), and cross-culturally (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006).
Much of the support for the role of the norm of group interest comes from laboratory studies that manipulated the norm’s salience. A question concerning the operation of the norm is whether some group members are more likely than others to express cooperative or discriminatory behavior due to their adherence to the norm of group interest. In other words, it is possible that not all group members adhere to the norm of group interest equally and that individual variability in
Individual variability in adherence to the norm of group interest predicts outgroup bias
R. Matthew Montoya1 and Todd L. Pittinsky2
AbstractThe norm of group interest dictates that group members should consider the interests of their group. We propose that individual variability in adherence to this norm accounts for intergroup attitudes and behavior. Study 1 developed a measure for the norm of group interest, and found that adherence to the norm predicted evaluations of the outgroup independent of group identification and collective self-esteem. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that the norm of group interest increased competitive behavior only when a competitive group norm was salient, but not when a cooperative norm was salient. These findings highlight the importance of both the norm of group interest and group norms to understanding attitudes and behavior in the intergroup context.
Keywordsnorm of group interest, intergroup competition
Paper received 25 June 2011; revised version accepted 11 May 2012.
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adherence may account for differing degrees of intergroup cooperation and competition. In the present research, we explored whether some indi-viduals are dispositionally more “there for their group” than others, and whether this variability accounted for cooperative or competitive behav-ior in the intergroup context. The goals of the current research were to (a) determine whether variability in adherence to this norm can explain individual differences in attitudes and behavior in the intergroup context, and (b) whether adher-ence to this norm is moderated by the ingroup’s specific group norms.
Norms of group interest and outgroup evaluationsTajfel (1970) was among the first to propose the existence of a norm to favor the interests of the ingroup. In an attempt to explain group members’ behavior in his early minimal-group experiments, Tajfel interpreted group members’ tendency to favor the ingroup as originating from a learned “generic norm” that dictated that they “act in a manner that discriminates against the outgroup and favors the ingroup” (1970, pp. 98–99). Similarly, Rabbie and Lodewijkx (1994) proposed that favoritism toward the ingroup is derived in part from a normative ingroup schema that con-sists of a learned belief that “more weight should be given to desires of ingroup members than of outgroup members” (1994, p. 146).
As noted previously, past research has demon-strated the influence of a norm of group interest by manipulating its salience. Wildschut et al. (2002), for instance, had participants play a single-trial prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG). The researchers manipulated whether participants believed that they would discuss their individual PDG votes with their fellow group members after they had made an individual decision (public condition) or would not do so (private condition). The norm of group interest would predict that people in the public condition should feel more accountable to their group members and more concerned with the effect of their decisions on
the ingroup. As expected, compared with the pri-vate condition, participants in the public condi-tion expressed more concern with maximizing outcomes for their group than did participants in the private condition and, as a result, competed more with the outgroup. Ben-Yoav and Pruitt (1984) similarly found that when individuals were accountable to their group members, group rep-resentatives were more cooperatively motivated when cooperation was seen as beneficial to the group and less so when it was not.
Individual variability in the norm of group interestNot everyone values the norm of group interest to the same degree, as studies have shown for other norms, ranging from littering norms (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993) to drinking norms (e.g., Baer, 1994). Indeed, Montoya and Pittinsky (2007) noted that, while almost 46% of people consider the norm of group interest “very important” to how they view their group, 29% consider it “not at all” important. Both differences in develop-mental experiences and differences in social forces may contribute to whether an individual adheres strongly to the norm of group interest.
From a developmental perspective, many peo-ple first learned values consistent with the norm of group interest from the first group to which they ever belonged—their own families. Families often place their own interests above those of any other group, from which children may acquire a stratified belief that groups to which they belong should come first (Anderson & Hargrave, 1990; Leibig & Green, 1999). As families differ in the degree to which they place their own interests above those of other groups, children will be dif-ferently socialized into the norm; different degrees of reinforcement or punishment associ-ated with behavior supportive of or detrimental to the familial ingroup will result in different degrees of adherence to the norm of group interest more generally. Alternatively, social forces can lead to individual differences in endorsement
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of the norm of group interest. Some social groups strongly endorse such a norm of group interest. The military, for example, places intense emphasis on duty to one’s fellow soldiers (“Call to Duty,” 2008). Participation in one of these social groups exposes individuals to social forces that may promote internalization of the norm of group interest.
Purpose of the studiesDifferent people experience and adhere to the norm of group interest to different degrees (as is the case with other norms; e.g., Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000; Schwartz, 1973). The purpose of this research was to directly examine the influ-ence of individual variability in the norm of group interest (NGI) on intergroup attitudes and behavior. To this end, we conducted four studies. In a pilot study, we selected items for a measure of the norm of group interest. Study 1 was designed to provide both construct validity and predictive validity for the NGI scale by investigat-ing the ability of NGI to predict attitudes in the intergroup context vis-à-vis established measures of group evaluation. In Studies 2 and 3 we used an experimental approach to test whether adher-ence to the norm of group interest moderates the effect of group norms on intergroup behavior. Study 2 investigated the influence of the NGI on intergroup behavior when either a cooperative or competitive group norm was salient. Study 3 investigated whether NGI adherence can predict future intergroup behavior.
Pilot studyTo begin the process of scale development, an initial pool of 20 items were administered to 133 students at a large Midwestern university. Participants read the following instructions before answering the questions, “When answer-ing the following questions, think about some of the social groups of which you are a member (e.g., the university, fraternity or sorority, honor societies, athletic teams, house or dorm, etc.). For
the following questions, we would like you to think about how each statement generally applies to you across the groups.” Responses to all items were made on a 7-point rating scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). We retained the six items that pos-sessed strong distributional properties and high item–total correlations (all items correlated with the overall total at r = .50 or higher). A principal components analysis suggested a one-component solution. The items of the scale are presented in the Appendix. The psychometrics of the NGI scale indicates that the scale is normally distrib-uted: M = 3.98, Mdn = 4.16, mode = 4.00, SD = 0.91, skew = −0.31, kurtosis = 0.06. The scale was internally consistent, α = .78.
Study 1The purpose of Study 1 was twofold. The first purpose was to provide construct validity for the NGI scale by (a) determining its degree of overlap with existing group evaluation and trait scales, and (b) investigating NGI’s ability to predict attitudes vis-à-vis established group evaluation constructs. To address NGI’s overlap with other scales, we selected measures that covered two domains: (a) trait measures we expected to be unrelated to NGI (with some exceptions, see follows) that were chosen for discriminatory purposes, and (b) group evaluation measures that we expected to covary with NGI. The second purpose was to demonstrate the independence of the norm of group interest’s influence on intergroup attitudes from one’s evaluation of their group (i.e., group identification and the positivity of their evaluation of the group).
With respect to evaluating the construct valid-ity of NGI, we included measures of individual-ism and collectivism, guilt and shame, the Big Five personality dimensions, self-esteem, and the need to belong to social groups. Individualism, and its subscales, is of particular interest because it measures the tendency to eval-uate personal interests as more important than the interests of the group (Wagner, 1995). We included three dimensions of the individualism
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scale: (a) personal independence, (b) importance accorded to competitive success, and (c) norms about the subjugation of personal needs to group needs. We expected to find a nonsignificant cor-relation for (b), because we do not believe that NGI taps into a general competitive motivation. However, because individuals’ concern with max-imizing their own self-interest is a reason why group members do not support the group’s inter-ests (van Vugt & Hart, 2004), we expected a sig-nificant correlation with (c), because the norm of group interest should tap a similar tendency to highly value the interests of the group. We expected a similar pattern for aspects of a col-lectivistic orientation toward others (psychologi-cal collectivism; Jackson, Colquitt, Wesson, & Zapata-Phelan, 2006), such that the NGI should be correlated with prioritizing the interests of the ingroup (goal priority) and viewing the ingroup’s interests as important (norm acceptance).
We also included trait measures to rule out the possibility that individuals who scored high on NGI did so simply because of a basic motivation to be dominant relative to others (i.e., either a preference for a hierarchical view of the world or a preference for dominance in interpersonal rela-tions). To test this, we included a measure of social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), right-wing authoritari-anism (Altemeyer, 1988), and a measure that assessed a preference for dominance in interper-sonal domains (Wiggins, 1979).
A plausible alternative explanation for the effects of the NGI is one’s identification with one’s group. Whereas group identification has been linked to outgroup attitudes via a need to maintain self-esteem (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988), the NGI is linked to outgroup attitudes via the pressure individuals feel from the group to act in the group’s interests. As a result of the potential convolution of the effects of group identification and the NGI on outgroup antago-nism, we included group identification (as well as collective self-esteem, another related measure of orientation toward one’s group; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) in our analyses.
We conducted this study in the context of intercollegiate relations in which we asked partici-pants to think about their university and its rela-tion with its rival. In this case, as with most intercollegiate rivalries, the descriptive group norm suggests supremacy of the ingroup and derogation of the outgroup. This dynamic pro-vided the opportunity to evaluate the predictive validity of the NGI scale relative to established group evaluation measures (i.e., group identifica-tion and collective self-esteem [CSE]) in a com-petitive context.
HypothesesGiven a competitive intergroup context, we included several intergroup attitudes as depend-ent measures. Each of our measures assessed the desire to promote the absolute status of the group or to derogate the outgroup in relation to the ingroup. We expected group identification, collective self-esteem, and the NGI each to pre-dict such evaluations. However, because we hypothesized that the NGI operates separately from group identification, when measures related to group evaluation (i.e., group identification and collective self-esteem) are included in the model, we expected the NGI to continue to predict each measure significantly. We collected data from multiple universities to assess the robustness of our results.
MethodParticipants Participants were drawn from three large public universities, one in the Midwest (Sample 1) and two different universities in New England (Samples 2 and 3). Participants were recruited through advertisements placed on a popular collegiate online community and were paid $10.00 for their participation. Participants in Sample 1 were 113 students (36 men, 77 women) between the ages of 18 and 24 years (M = 19.79). Participants in Sample 2 were 96 students (36 men, 52 women, and eight who did not pro-vide gender data) between the ages 17 and 23
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(M = 19.75). Participants in Sample 3 were 150 students (76 men, 74 women) with an average age of 21.33 (SD = 2.08).
Procedure Participants completed the survey online. They were instructed to complete the questionnaire in private, and were assured that their responses would remain completely anony-mous. The questionnaires of interest for this study were included among other questionnaires unrelated to it. When completing questions relat-ing to intergroup attitudes, participants were asked to think about their university when asked about their ingroup and were asked to think about their university’s primary rival when asked about the outgroup.
MeasuresGuilt and shame We used the Guilt and Shame subscales of the Dimensions of Consciousness Questionnaire (Johnson et al., 1987). The guilt subscale contains 13 items and the shame sub-scale contains 11 items. The reliability for each scale was acceptable, guilt α = .86 and shame α = .84.
Need to belong We used Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, and Schreindorfer’s (2007) Need to Belong Scale to assess participants’ desire to be associated with a group. The scale contains 10 items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The reliabil-ity for this scale was α = .80.
Dominance To measure participants’ perception of the importance of possessing dominance-related personality traits in interpersonal rela-tions, we used the Dominance subscale from the Interpersonal Adjective Scales (Wiggins, 1979). The reliability for this scale was α = .73.
Individualism Wagner (1995) defines individu-alism as giving greater importance to personal interests than to the needs of groups. We included three dimensions from Wagner’s Individualism Scale: importance accorded to competitive suc-cess, espousal of norms about the subordination
of personal needs to group interest, and impor-tance of personal independence. The reliability for each subscale was acceptable, ranging from α = .75 to α = .87.
Self-esteem To measure the degree of the positiv-ity or negativity of participants’ attitude toward themselves, we used Rosenberg’s (1965) 10-item measure of global self-esteem. The reliability was α = .89.
Social dominance orientation To measure desire for one’s social group to dominate and be superior to other groups, we used Pratto et al.’s (1994) 16-item social dominance orientation scale. The reliability was α = .91.
Right-wing authoritarianism To measure the degree to which participants endorse submitting to established authorities and adhering to social conventions, we used Altemeyer’s (1988) 22-item measure of right-wing authoritarianism. The reli-ability was sufficient, α = .75.
Big Five personality traits To measure the major components of personality, we used the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999). The BFI items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). The BFI measures conscientiousness (nine items), agreeableness (nine items), neuroti-cism (eight items), openness to experience (10 items), and extraversion (eight items). The alphas for each dimension ranged from .78 to .86.
Psychological collectivism To assess differences within a collectivistic orientation, we included Jackson et al.’s (2006) measure of psychological collectivism. The multifaceted measure assessed five dimensions: (a) using groups as the units of analysis; (b) emphasizing collective responsibil-ity; (c) feeling concern regarding ingroup mem-bers; (d) emphasizing the importance of group norms; and (e) prioritizing the goals of the ingroup. The alphas for each dimension ranged from .63 to .80.
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Individualism–collectivism To measure individual differences in an individualistic versus collectiv-istic orientation, we used Triandis et al.’s (1986) measure. The alphas for each dimension ranged from .76 to .81.
Group identification (Sample 1) The degree to which participants identified with their group was measured using Silver and Brewer’s (2012) eight-item measure of group identification. The reliability was α = .83.
Group identification (Sample 2) Group identifica-tion was assessed using the Affective, Cognitive, and Behavioral subscales of the Group Identifi-cation Inventory designed by Henry, Arrow, and Carini (1999). The questionnaire consisted of three subscales each with four items. The reli-ability for each subscale was appropriate, ranging from α = .75 to α = .87.
Collective self-esteem The Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) Scale, developed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), was used to measure the positivity of par-ticipants’ social identity. The 16-item scale con-tains four subscales: Membership (judgments of how worthy one is as a member of the group), Private (judgments of how good the group is), Public (judgments of how positively others evalu-ate the group), and Identity (importance of the social group to the participant’s self-concept). The reliability for each subscale was as follows: public α = .80, private α = .91, membership α = .76, and identity α = .77.
Outgroup liking The degree to which participants liked members of the other group was assessed using the Affective and Behavioral subscales of the Allophilia Scale developed by Pittinsky, Rosenthal, and Montoya (2011). Each subscale consisted of four items, and participants indi-cated their response on a 7-point scale. The Affective and Behavioral subscales were reliable; α = .95 and α = .92, respectively.
Outgroup evaluation Participants responded to a series of questions that assessed their attitudes
toward their rival school. They were asked to indicate their desire for their school to defeat its rival in an important contest (a football game; athletic superiority), to be better than their rival academically (academic superiority), and to be academically superior at the expense of their rival (relative superiority). In addition, we asked par-ticipants their willingness to donate money to the school after graduation (postgraduate giving). In Sample 2, we also asked participants the degree to which they liked members of the rival school (outgroup liking).
ResultsNGI Scale As with the pilot study, the psycho-metrics of the scale indicated that the scale was internally consistent and normally distributed: for Sample 1; α = .85, M = 4.30, Mdn = 4.50, SD = 1.03, skew = −0.42, kurtosis = −0.25; for Sample 2, α = .91, M = 4.75, Mdn = 4.80, SD = 1.25, skew = −0.48, kurtosis = −0.08; and for Sample 3, α = .83, M = 5.38, Mdn = 5.64, SD = 0.74, skew = −0.87, kurtosis = −0.64.
Construct validation The correlations between NGI and the trait and group evaluation measures are presented in Table 1 for each of the three samples. There are several important correlations to note. First, consistent with the norm of group interest’s supposition that individuals should con-sider the group’s interests, the Subordination of the Self to the Group subscale of the Individual-ism Scale was significantly correlated with NGI. The NGI also correlated with subscales of psy-chological collectivism, specifically, with those subscales that measured tendencies to value the goals and values of the ingroup. Also noteworthy was the negligible relation between NGI and guilt, indicating that NGI does not merely meas-ure a general susceptibility to adhere to group norms (Tangney, 2003). The nonsignificant cor-relations between NGI and social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and dominance are also consistent with the independ-ence of NGI in that they indicate that NGI does not merely measure a preference for a hierarchical
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view of the world or a preference for dominance relative to others.
As for the group evaluation measures, as expected, we found significant positive relations between the NGI and each of the CSE subscales, as well as between NGI and group identification.
NGI versus established measures We used linear regression analyses to examine whether
NGI and other established group evaluation measures—group identification and CSE—pre-dicted attitudes toward the outgroup. With respect to CSE, we focused our analyses on the Private subscale, which assessed the positivity of group members’ evaluation of their social group. CSE-private has been demonstrated to predict relative positive ingroup evaluations (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005) and ingroup favoritism
Table 1. Zero-order correlation of variables with NGI, Study 1
Note: N = 113 for Sample 1 and N = 94 for Sample 2. Step 1 reports the Pearson correlations between the independent variable and the measure of intergroup attitudes. Steps 2 and 3 report standardized beta weights for the variables included in a particular analysis. NGI = norm of group interest. CSE = collective self-esteem. Group ID = group identification.*p < .05. #p < .10.
(Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).1 We computed both zero-order correlations between NGI and attitudes and regressions in which NGI and established group measures were entered simultaneously.
The first column of Table 2 presents the bivariate correlations between the group meas-ures and the dependent variables for Samples 1 and 2. The first column (Step 1) indicates that NGI consistently predicted the attitudes; as NGI increased, participants were more interested in their school defeating its rival (sports superiority), being better academically than its rival (academic
superiority), and succeeding at the expense of its rival (relative superiority). They were also more willing to give money to their school after gradu-ation (postgraduate giving) and liked members of their rival school less (outgroup liking).
We next compared NGI’s effectiveness in explaining these attitudes to the effectiveness of other established group measures (Step 2). The second and third columns reveal that, across the different dependent variables, NGI accounted for unique variability when either CSE-private or group identification were included in the model.
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The fourth column indicates that when group identification, CSE-private, and NGI were included simultaneously in the model, NGI con-tinued to account for significant variability for six of the 10 measures, and no longer predicted post-graduate giving and outgroup liking-behavioral.
DiscussionStudy 1 provided evidence for the convergent, dis-criminant, and predictive validity of NGI, and sup-ports our contention that individual variability in adherence to the norm of group interest is a dis-tinct phenomenon important for understanding attitudes in the intergroup context. With respect to convergent and discriminant validity, we found that the NGI correlated with norms to subordi-nate the self to the group, the Norm Acceptance subscale of the Psychological Collectivism Scale, group identification, and CSE; but did not corre-late significantly with guilt, shame, dominance ori-entations, or beliefs in competitive success.
With respect to predictive validity, Study 1 provided initial correlational evidence that indi-vidual variability in adherence to the NGI is important for understanding intergroup atti-tudes. When CSE-private or group identification was included in the model with NGI, NGI con-tinued to predict participants’ attitudes in six of 10 instances (and marginally for two others), whereas group identification no longer predicted the outcome variable in seven of 10 analyses, and CSE stopped in five of eight analyses. These analyses indicate that attitudes in the intergroup context are not fully accounted for by group members’ evaluation of or identification with their group, but also need to be understood in the context of a norm to consider the interests of their group.
Second, our prediction that NGI correlates sig-nificantly with group identification was also sup-ported. One potential interpretation of this correlation is that a dispositional adherence to the norm of group interest precedes and predicts group identification. If so, it would indicate that any influence the norm of group interest had on attitudes toward other groups was driven primarily
via group identification (i.e., group identification mediates the norm’s influence on attitudes toward other groups). However, this does not appear to be the case. The regression coefficients in Table 2 demonstrate that NGI continued to predict atti-tudes in the intergroup context when group iden-tification was included in the model. This indicates that NGI accounts for variance inde-pendent of any indirect influence it has through group identification. It could be further noted that in some cases, the effect of group identifica-tion on the dependent measure disappeared when NGI was included in the model. This is consist-ent with our view that adherence to a norm to consider the interest of the ingroup contributes to understanding attitudes independent of group identification.2
Study 2Whereas Study 1 provided correlational evidence that NGI adherence predicts attitudes toward an outgroup, Study 2 experimentally investigated NGI’s influence on outgroup attitudes. And whereas Study 1 investigated the NGI in the con-text of a competitive group norm in which adher-ence to NGI increased the competitiveness of outgroup evaluations, we would not make the same prediction in the context of a cooperative group norm.
Group norms are often perceived to be func-tional and in the service of group interests (e.g., Allison, 1992; Campbell, 1975; Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005; Sherif, 1936; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and the NGI motivates individual group members to consider their group’s interests. We therefore expect NGI adherence to promote the expression of such group norms, whether they be cooperative or competitive.
Accordingly, in Study 2, we manipulated the group norm to be either cooperative or competi-tive. We expected that for high-NGI individuals, the salience of a competitive group norm would increase competitive behavior out of the belief that such competition was in the group’s interest. When a cooperative group norm was salient, par-ticipants should not see competition as being in
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the group’s interests and NGI adherence should not result in more competition.
We selected a nationally prestigious univer-sity in the southeastern United States that, depending on which aspect of their relationship was made salient, either shared a cooperative or competitive relationship with a nearby nation-ally prestigious university. On the one hand, the universities have a well-publicized academic, business, philanthropic, and entrepreneurial partnership, which has spawned joint academic programs (e.g., law, business, journalism) and mutually lucrative business ventures. This part-nership is evident in students’ everyday activi-ties: There are numerous joint-taught classes, discotheque nights, symposia, and social organ-izations, as well as a popular bus shuttle service connecting the two.
On the other hand, these two universities engage in a perpetual rivalry over which is better academically (both rank nationally among the top 30 universities; “The 2012 Edition of America’s Best Colleges,” 2012) and athletically (both athletic programs rank nationally among the top 15 uni-versities; National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics, 2011), a debate renewed whenever they meet on the football field, soccer pitch, and basketball court. Awareness of the competition is unavoidable: Athletic competi-tions receive regional (and often national) atten-tion, student rallies usually precede the most important games, and students on campus often wear t-shirts that vilify the rival university’s stu-dents, players, and coaches.
For Study 2, we used a money allocation task to assess ingroup bias. Participants were told that a local philanthropic organization had donated $100 million to fund development of the scholas-tic partnership. We expected the NGI to predict participants’ allocation strategy, such that those who scored high on the NGI in the competitive condition would be more competitively oriented with their allocations while those who scored high on the NGI in the cooperative condition would not be more competitively oriented but would be more cooperatively oriented with their allocations.
MethodParticipants Participants were 135 students between the ages of 17 and 24 (M = 19.40) at a large Southeastern private university. Participants were 76 women and 59 men. They were recruited through advertisements placed on a popular col-legiate online community and paid $10.00 for their participation.
Procedure Participants completed the survey online. The questionnaires of interest for this study were included among other questionnaires unrelated to them.
After completing the survey’s first portion, which contained the NGI scale, half of the par-ticipants were asked to think about a cooperative relationship with the rival school and the other half were asked to think about a competitive rela-tionship with the rival. In the cooperative condi-tion, participants were instructed to think about and then write a short description of how the average student at their school treats (or would like to treat) students from the rival school during a cooperative joint school program such as an exchange program or a joint class. In the com-petitive condition, participants were instructed to think and write about how the average student at their school treats students from the rival school during a competitive event (either scholastic or athletic) such as a basketball game or a knowledge bowl.
Next, participants were told that a local phil-anthropic organization had donated $100 million to an intercollegiate collaboration fund to further sponsor development of the two schools’ scho-lastic partnership. Participants were told that, of the two schools, their rival had a greater need for such funding. Participants were asked to indicate the percent of money that should be given to their own university and to its rival.
ResultsBecause of the leptokurtotic nature of participants’ giving to the two schools (many participants gave an equal amount to both schools), we
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trichotomized the participants’ responses into those who allocated more to the outgroup (out-group favoritism), the same to both groups (equality), or more to the ingroup (ingroup favor-itism) and analyzed the data using ordinal regression.3
We entered the trichotomous variable into an NGI × Norm ordinal regression with allocation (ingroup favoritism, equal allocation, outgroup favoritism) as the dependent variable and treated NGI as a continuous predictor. The allocations are presented in Table 3 with NGI divided using a median-split for descriptive purposes. The main effect for NGI was significant, χ2(1, N = 135) = 18.06, p < .05, as was the main effect for the norm, χ2(1, N = 135) = 20.45, p < .05. There was a significant NGI × Norm interaction, χ2(1, N = 135) = 4.88, p < .05. Inspection of the interaction indicates that, in the cooperative condition, NGI did not produce a significant influence on alloca-tion. In the competitive condition, however, as NGI increased, participants were less likely to express outgroup favoritism (b = −1.70, SE = .36, p < .05) and more likely to express ingroup favoritism (b = 1.89, SE = .34, p < .05).4
DiscussionThe outcome of Study 2 provided further evi-dence for the ability of individual variability in NGI adherence to predict behavior in the inter-group context. Consistent with expectations, we found a significant NGI × Norm interaction, such that higher levels of NGI led to increased competition only when a competitive group
norm was salient: NGI moderated the competi-tive or cooperative motivation of group mem-bers, such that high-NGI participants were only more competitively oriented in the competitive condition.
Study 3A more stringent test of the norm of group interest would be to examine its influence in a minimal group context. A limitation of Study 2 was that it was correlational and did not allow for an examination of the influence of the NGI independent of preexisting group identification or collective self-esteem. To address this concern, we explored the influence of adherence to the NGI in a minimal group paradigm.
Accordingly, we administered the NGI scale to participants at the beginning of a semester. Later in the semester, participants took part in the following laboratory study: After being ran-domly assigned to groups, participants were informed that each of their fellow group mem-bers had chosen to act either cooperatively or competitively with another group in an inter-group allocation task (thus establishing either a cooperative or competitive group norm). We expected that adherence to the norm of group interest would predict participants’ allocation strategy and motivation, such that those who scored high on the NGI scale in the competitive condition would be more competitively oriented while those who scored high on the NGI scale in the cooperative condition would not be competi-tively oriented.
Table 3. Participants’ selection of allocation by group norm and NGI, Study 2
MethodParticipants One hundred and twelve students, 64 men and 48 women, at a large university in the Northeast participated in this study. Participants received course credit for their participation.
Procedure Before the semester, as part of a course requirement, participants completed a bat-tery of questionnaires comprised of attitude and personality trait measures, including the NGI scale (α = .90). Later in the semester, participants took part in the laboratory portion of the study.
Participants were assigned to groups of three or four. Each participant was seated in a room with a personal computer. Participants were led to believe that this was a large, cross-campus study of group problem solving.
Participants first completed a computerized perceptual judgment test that provided a plausi-ble basis for categorizing them into groups. This procedure has been used frequently in minimal-group research (e.g., Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001). The perceptual task required participants to estimate the number of times a target symbol appeared on the computer screen. After 12 estimations, participants received ran-domly assigned feedback classifying them as either overestimators or underestimators (osten-sibly on the basis of their estimation patterns).
Next, participants were told that a second, unrelated problem-solving task would follow. Participants were told that the purpose of this task was to investigate whether overestimators and underestimators used different strategies to divide resources (i.e., money).
Participants were led to believe that they were one of seven group members interacting with another group of seven. Participants received false feedback via a scripted computer program. The false feedback informed them about how fel-low group members allocated money. Participants were informed that they had been randomly assigned to be the sixth to vote for their group’s allocation. They were told that the amount of money allocated to their group and the other group would be the average of their group’s
allocation choices, in combination with the alloca-tion choices made by the other group. Participants were told that the money allocated to their group (about $1.00 per group member) would be distrib-uted equally among the seven members.
Participants were presented with an inter-group allocation task (Multiple Alternative Matrices [MAMs]; Bornstein et al., 1983) to assess their intergroup bias. The MAMs present simulta-neously seven unconfounded options for distrib-uting resources between ingroup and outgroup members. Each option represents a distinct allo-cation strategy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). One ori-entation, min dif, represents a concern for minimizing the differences between groups. Three orientations favor the ingroup: (a) max rel represents a concern for maximizing the ingroup’s relative gain over the outgroup, (b) max own rep-resents a concern for maximizing the ingroup’s absolute gain, and (c) max joint represents a con-cern for maximizing the joint earnings of both groups while providing an advantage to the ingroup. The remaining three orientations are symmetrical to the ingroup-favoring orientations, but favor the outgroup: max rel other, max other, and max joint other.
Participants in the competitive condition learned that four fellow group members had selected an ingroup-biased option (max rel) and one had selected the min diff option. Participants in the cooperative condition learned that four fel-low group members had selected the min diff option and one had selected the max rel option.
After learning how five of the other group members had voted, participants were instructed to select the orientation that best reflected how they would like the resources to be allocated. Participants believed that their individual choice would be seen by their fellow group members but not by the outgroup. After selecting an allocation option, participants completed the questionnaire packet, which included a questionnaire that assessed their motivations during the allocation task (see Dependent Variables section). After completing the questionnaires, participants were thanked, debriefed, and compensated.
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Dependent variablesAllocation motivations Ten questions assessed participants’ motives during the allocation task. Participants used a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) to rate each item. The items measured the degree to which participants were influenced by five potential motivations: maximize their group outcomes (max own), maximize the dif-ference between groups (max rel), minimize the difference between groups (min diff), maximize the joint outcomes (max joint), and fear. The Spearman–Brown corrected reliabilities for these pairs were: .75 for max own, .82 for max joint, .72 for min diff, .86 for max rel, and .78 for fear.
ResultsAllocation choice Since all participants chose either max own, max rel, min diff, or max joint, the other three allocation choices were dropped from further analyses. The allocation choices for participants in the cooperative and competitive conditions are presented in Table 4 with NGI divided using a median-split. Each allocation choice was entered separately into a Group Norm × NGI logistic regression with the allocation choice as the dependent variable and NGI treated as a continuous predictor.
Max rel There was a significant main effect for group norm, χ2(1, N = 98) = 4.96, p < .05, such that participants in the competitive condition,
compared to the cooperative condition, were more likely to select max rel. Neither the main effect for NGI, χ2(1, N = 98) = 0.05, p = .80, nor the Group Norm × NGI interaction was signifi-cant, χ2(1, N = 98) = 0.53, p = .46.
Max own Neither the main effect for group norm, χ2(1, N = 98) = 1.21, p = .27, nor the main effect for NGI, χ2(1, N = 98) = 0.73, p = .39, was significant. Importantly, the Group Norm × NGI interaction was significant, χ2(1, N = 98) = 4.63, p < .05, indicating that in the competitive condition, high-NGI participants selected max own more frequently than low-NGI participants.
Max joint There was not a significant main effect for group norm, χ2(1, N = 98) = 2.39, p = .12, or for NGI, χ2(1, N = 98) = 1.88, p = .17. The Group Norm × NGI interaction was signifi-cant, χ2(1, N = 98) = 4.32, p < .05, indicating that for high-NGI participants, the cooperative group norm led to more max joint selections than did the competitive norm condition.
Min dif There was not a significant main effect for group norm, χ2(1, N = 98) = 1.95, p = .05, but the main effect was significant for NGI, χ2(1, N = 98) = 6.89, p < .05. The NGI main effect indicates that high-NGI participants, compared to low-NGI participants, were less likely to select min dif. Importantly, the Group Norm × NGI interaction was also significant, χ2(1, N = 98) = 4.79, p = .05, indicating that high-NGI participants selected min dif more frequently in the cooperative condi-tion than in the cooperative condition.5
Allocation motivationMax own The main effect for group norm was not significant, b = 0.35, t(110) = 1.24, p = .21. The expected Group Norm × NGI interaction was sig-nificant, b = 0.73, t(110) = 2.53, p < .05. Inspection of the simple slopes revealed that the more group members adhered to the NGI, the more they were motivated by max own in the competitive condi-tion, b = 0.43, t(110) = 5.64, p < .05, and less so in the cooperative condition, b = −0.26, t(110) = 2.15, p < .05.
Table 4. Participants’ selection of orientation as a function of group norm and NGI, Study 3
Note: A max rel selection was consistent with the competitive group norm and a min dif selection was consistent with the cooperative group norm.
186 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 16(2)
Min dif The main effect for group norm was significant, b = −0.86, t(110) = −2.61, p < .05, indicating that participants endorsed a min dif motivation more in the cooperative condition than in the competitive condition. This main effect was qualified by a Group Norm × NGI interaction, b = −0.74, t(110) = −2.15, p < .05. Inspection of the simple slopes demonstrated that increased NGI in a competitive condition was associ-ated with significantly less min dif, b = −0.83, t(109) = −3.88, p < .05, whereas NGI in the coop-erative condition did not result in more min dif motivation, b = 0.09, t(109) = 0.36, p = .72.
Max joint The main effect for group norm was not significant, b = −0.64, t(110) = −1.70, p = .09. The expected Group Norm × NGI interac-tion was significant, b = −1.04, t(110) = −2.51, p < .05. Inspection of the simple slopes dem-onstrated that in the competitive condition, the more group members endorsed the NGI, the less they were motivated by max joint, b = −0.99, t(110) = −3.28, p < .05, whereas in the coop-erative condition, more NGI adherence was not associated with more max joint, b = 0.05, t(110) = 0.21, p = .82.
Max rel and fear The Group Norm × NGI interaction was not significant for either max rel, b = 0.55, t(110) = 1.33, p = .18, or fear, b = 0.24, t(110) = 0.81, p = .41.
DiscussionThe results of Study 3 were consistent with those of Study 2. NGI moderated the group norm, such that high-NGI participants were more com-petitively oriented in the competitive condition. Importantly, high-NGI participants did select more min dif and max joint selections in the cooperative condition than in the competitive condition, a finding supportive of the notion that NGI does not simply lead to more competition with outgroups. In the cooperative condition, high-NGI participants became more descrip-tively cooperative in their allocations. Moreover, what is particularly important about the finding
of Study 3 is that participants’ beliefs in the NGI at the beginning of the semester predicted their response to group norms in a novel group in a laboratory setting weeks later. This bolsters our contention that NGI is a dispositional belief that exists independent of group identification or evaluations of the group and exerts influence on intergroup behavior.
As with Study 2, participants’ motivations dur-ing the allocation task indicated that the effect of NGI on allocation behavior was greater in the competitive condition than in the cooperative condition. One reason for this may be that we operationalized cooperation as “min dif ” rather than “max other.” “Max other” would have more clearly defined the group norm as cooperative (or altruistic), which may have then facilitated more cooperative behavior from the group members. We choose not to do this to avoid triggering per-ceptions of unjustified altruism; unjustified altru-ism is seen as improbable in a minimal-group context because individuals expect other group members to have a competitively self-interested orientation (Baron, 2001; Gaertner & Insko, 2001). Recognizing the relative weakness of “min dif ” as a cooperation manipulation (weak relative to a stronger cooperation manipulation of “max other”), we still found that our manipulation affected their allocation choice and there was a positive trend for several of the allocation moti-vations; that is, tendencies for more cooperative and less competitive orientations in the coopera-tive condition as NGI increased.
General discussionThree laboratory studies were conducted to dem-onstrate that a dispositional belief in a norm to consider the interests of the ingroup is important to predicting intergroup attitudes and behavior. We found evidence that this norm affects inter-group attitudes and behavior and that it operates independent of group identification or collective self-esteem. Study 1 demonstrated NGI’s ability to predict attitudes in the context of a competi-tive group norm independent of group identifi-cation and collective self-esteem. Studies 2 and 3
Montoya and Pittinsky 187
demonstrated that the NGI moderated existing group norms: With a competitive group norm, high-NGI group members were more competi-tive, whereas with a cooperative norm, high-NGI group members were not more competitive, but were more cooperative (in Study 3). Further, additional analyses indicated that NGI affected intergroup attitudes and behavior independent of the influences of group identification or collec-tive self-esteem, providing compelling evidence for the uniqueness of this phenomenon.
This research adopts a novel perspective on the influence of norms on intergroup bias. Past research has emphasized the situational influ-ences of norms; that is, their ability to influence group members’ behavior in certain situations. Ingroup bias, for example, has been demon-strated to result from a group-level norm to dis-criminate against the outgroup (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996a; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001) or favor the ingroup (Muñoz-Rojas, Falomir Pichastor, Invernizzi Gamba, & Leuenberger, 2000). However, the current research demon-strated that dispositional adherence to a norm moderates the extant group norm. In other words, we demonstrated that those individuals who endorse the NGI are more likely to adhere to a group-level norm to express bias (or coop-eration) toward an outgroup.
Does the norm of group interest always predict competition?Studies 2 and 3 revealed that NGI predicted com-petitive behavior in competitive conditions but had an inconsistent effect oriented toward more cooperative behavior in the cooperative condi-tions. Several models of intergroup behavior, such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906), and social dominance (Pratto et al., 1994), might hypothe-size that individuals high in NGI should be moti-vated to make their group better than other groups. However, the evidence from Studies 2 and 3 indicates that this was not the case. Only when in a competitive condition did high-NGI participants compete more with the outgroup,
indicating that NGI adherence does not necessar-ily promote dominance over or competition with other groups. There was, further, a tendency across different dependent measures for those who adhere to the NGI to become more coop-erative when in the cooperative condition. That we did not find consistent evidence across Studies 2 and 3 for the cooperative norm is consistent with other research, which has also found nonsig-nificant increases in cooperative behavior in cooperative contexts (e.g., Jetten et al., 1996a, 1996b).
However, cooperative norm adherence in a cooperative context has been demonstrated else-where (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989). The studies that do find effects in a cooperative context tend to be field studies in which the link between norm adherence and group interest is clearest. Among nurses (Oaker & Brown, 1986) and forest rangers (Hall, Schneider, & Nygren, 1970), for example, increased adherence to a cooperative group norm is seen as aligned with group interests and increased adherence to the norm of group interest was found to increase (a) adherence to the cooperative group norm and (b) cooperation with outgroup members. Accordingly, the most likely explanation for the lack of additional cooperation in the coop-erative condition in Studies 2 and 3 was that group members may not have understood how coopera-tive behavior would facilitate the interests of the ingroup. Competitive behavior is generally more likely than cooperative behavior to be perceived as linked to the group’s interests (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003).
In this research, we explored variability in adherence to the norm of group interest in the context of groups in which group members’ identification with the group was salient (in Studies 1 and 2) or in the context of a laboratory study with minimal groups (Study 3). But would we expect similar findings in the context of other groups, including those based on national, ethnic, or religious divisions? As these groups are respon-sible for considerable intergroup conflict and warfare (Kelman, 1999), it is reasonable to con-sider whether we would expect the norm of group interest to play a role in these contexts.
188 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 16(2)
Indeed, as noted with the effects in Study 3 using minimal groups, we would posit that the key ele-ments for ensuring that the norm of group inter-est operates in a group context is to (a) make the group identity salient, and (b) ensure awareness of the relevant ingroup norms. As demonstrated in Studies 1 and 2 (and even in the minimal-group context in Study 3), strong group identification or high collective self-esteem is not necessary for the NGI to exert influence in the intergroup con-text. As long as group membership is salient and group members know how they are to act to facil-itate the interest of the group, the norm of group interest has the ability to operate.
ConclusionDespite the powerful role that social norms play in intergroup relations, norms have received less than their share of empirical attention (Pettigrew, 1991). The current research indicates that indi-vidual differences in endorsement of a disposi-tional norm, which dictates that group members ought to consider the interests of their fellow group members, plays an important role in inter-group relations. We have demonstrated that indi-vidual adherence to this norm, in combination with specific group norms, is important for under-standing intergroup attitudes and behavior. We have also demonstrated that such a norm influ-ences intergroup behavior independent of the degree to which an individual identifies with his or her group or feels about that group. We hope that this research will help further clarify the unique and distinct role norms play in determining both competitive and cooperative intergroup behavior.
Notes1. We also compared the influences of NGI on
intergroup behaviors using CSE-public, CSE-membership, and CSE-identity. In almost all cases, CSE-identity produced results similar to those of group identification (although slightly weaker) while CSE-membership and CSE-public pro-duced markedly lower regression coefficients compared with CSE-private.
2. The astute reader will note that it is also plausible to view NGI as a moderator of group identification
(or vice versa), such that NGI accentuates the effects of group identification on intergroup attitudes. To test this possibility, we conducted regressions predicting intergroup attitudes with NGI, group identification, and an NGI × Group Identification interaction term. For the Sample 1 data, the interaction was not signifi-cant for any of the measures of intergroup atti-tudes: sports supremacy, b = −.12, t(112) = −0.98, p = .32; academic superiority, b = −.03, t(112) = −0.29, p = .76; relative supremacy, b = −.01, t(112) = −0.08, p = .93; and postgraduate giving, b = −.15, t(112) = −1.36, p = .17. The Sample 2 data similarly did not reveal significant NGI × Group Identification interactions. Alter-natively, one might argue that the NGI precedes and predicts group identification. If so, it would indicate that any NGI influence on attitudes toward other groups is driven primarily by group identification; that is, group identification mediates the norm’s influence on attitudes toward other groups. However, this does not appear to be the case. The regression coeffi-cients in Table 1 demonstrate that NGI contin-ued to predict attitudes in the intergroup context when group identification was included in the model. This indicates that NGI accounts for variance independent of any indirect influence it has through group identification. It could also be noted that, in some cases, the effect of group identification on the dependent measure disap-peared when NGI was included in the model. This is consistent with our view that the influ-ence of NGI adherence on attitudes is inde-pendent of group identification.
3. We reported the results of an ordinal regression because the dependent variable was not normally distributed. Additional tests treating money allo-cated to the outgroup as a continuous variable did not change the key findings.
4. We tested additional models that included group identification (Henry et al., 1999) and CSE-private as a covariate and moderator. In all cases, (a) nei-ther covariate was significant (for CSE-private, χ2 = 0.13, p = .71, for group identification, χ2 = 1.03, p = .31), (b) the Moderator x Norm interac-tion was not significant (for the CSE-Private × Norm interaction, χ2 = 0.52, p = .46, for the Group Identification × Norm interaction, χ2 = 0.81, p = .36), and (c) the NGI × Norm interac-tion remained unchanged.
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5. To evaluate the influence of group evaluations on intergroup behavior, we tested models that included CSE-private (assessed at Time 2) as a covariate and as a moderator. For all allocation choices, (a) it was not significant as a covariate, (b) the CSE-Private × Norm interaction was not sig-nificant (e.g., for max own interaction, χ2 = 0.08, p = .77; for max rel, χ2 = 0.32, p = .57; for max joint, χ2 = 1.16, p = .28; for min dif, χ2 = 0.12, p = .72), and (c) the NGI × Norm interaction remained unchanged.
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AppendixNorm of Group Interest Scale
1. I feel that my fellow group members want me to do everything I can to support my group.
2. I feel that other group members expect me to look out for them.
3. It is important that we all do what we can to support our group.
4. I feel that my group members expect me to privilege the interests of my group over other groups.
5. Group members should “pull strings” to help out fellow group members.
6. Whatever the mission of my group, I feel that all group members are expected to help out.
