Preliminaries Case Outline - Election 2014

Election Laws: Prelimaries Cases (1.1-1.2) 2014

[G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]

ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited pleading in an election protest pending before the Regional Trial Court is the issue posed in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July 6, 1999

[1] dismissing Comelec

Case SPR No. 52-98.

The COMELEC’s challenged order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy thus:

1. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May 11, 1998 national and local election (sic). Petitioner is a re-electionist and a veteran politician;

2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998, and after the voting the ballot boxes were transmitted to the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol of Lanao del Sur at Marawi City where the automated counting of votes and canvass of election returns were centralized;

3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds were committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in that votes actually casted (sic)for the private respondent were not counted and credited in his favor thru (sic) the concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner;

4. In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and 11A about 115 official ballots were refused or rejected by the counting machine which the private respondent’s watchers or representatives have requested and insisted to be re-fed to the automated machine for the second and third times

pursuant to the provisions of Comelec Resolution No. 3030 but their requests were not heeded by the Election Officer and the Machine Operator, Solaiman Rasad, who is a close kin of the Petitioner, and instead considered the said ballots as finally rejected, while in Precincts Nos. 12A, 23A1 and 6A, around 56 ballots were found therein which were not drawn from the official ballots and were included in the counting of votes over the objection of the private respondent’s watchers or representatives;

5. Before the termination of the counting of votes and the consolidation of the results, the machine operator and the Election Officer carried away from the Kalimodan Hall the diskette and brought the same to the down town without the knowledge of the private respondent’s watchers or representatives;

6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes;

7. After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes were kept at the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol, Marawi City guarded and secured by military and PNP personnel together with the watchers/representatives of the petitioner and the private respondent and other candidates or political parties until they were transported and delivered to the respondent court at Malabang, Lanao del Sur sometime on August 13, 1998 by 1Lt. Napisa AG together with the duly authorized representatives of both parties.

xxx xxx xxx

1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/139357.html#_ftn1


Marogong, Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.[2]

2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, private respondent filed on May 25, 1998, an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil D. Dimaporo vs. Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest (Manual Judicial Recount, revision and reappreciation of ballots) docketed as Election Case No. 11-127.[3]

3. On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counter-protest in Election Case No. 11-127 special and affirmative defenses and counter-protest.[4] In his answer petitioner prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings since the protest is ad cautelam or subject to the petition filed before this Honorable Commission.

4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set for hearing by this Honorable Commission, the private respondent as petitioner therein, filed a motion to withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit said case was among those cases the proceedings of which were ordered to be continued beyond June 30, 1998, under Comelec Resolution No. 3049 promulgated on June 29, 1998.[5] xxx

5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this Honorable Commission, (First Division) granting the private respondent’s motion to withdraw petition in SPC No. 98-228 and considered the same withdrawn.[6] xxx.

6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17, 1998, private respondent filed an urgent motion before the respondent court on July 27, 1998, praying for the issuance of an order directing the proper officials/officers concerned to bring and produce before said court the ballot boxes subjects of the protest and counter-protest and to set the case for hearing as mandated by law.[7] xxx

7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the protest and counter-protest, the public respondent issued an order, dated August 17, 1998, setting Election Case No. 11-127 for hearing (a) for the creation of the Committee on Revision and appointment of the Chairman and Members thereof; (b) making of the cash deposit and payment of the revisor’s compensation; (c) partial determination of the case, etc. on September 1, 1998, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

[8]

8. When the case was called for hearing on September 2, 1998, a Revision Committee was created and its membership were duly appointed in open court which committee was directed by the respondent court to finish the revision of ballots, if possible, within 20 days from the commencement of the revision[9] xxx

9. After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to commence the revision of ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated; (2) Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3) Protestant is guilty of forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of the petitioner of the protest.

10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel, vigorously opposed the said oral motion to dismiss and orally argued that the motion is clearly dilatory having been made only after the Revision Committee has been ordered to commence the revision of ballots on September 1, 1998 and maintained that (1) The motion to dismiss is not allowed in an election protest; (2) The sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the protest and counter-protest have been preserved and never violated; (3) The automated counting of ballots does not preclude the filing of the election protest for the judicial recount and revision of ballots; and (4) The private respondent is not guilty of forum shopping because his petition of protest is clearly and explicitly a Protest Ad










Cautelam in view of the pendency of his petition before this Honorable Commission which was withdrawn by the private respondent before it could be set for hearing or acted upon by this Honorable Commission.

11. After the oral arguments of both parties, the petitioner’s counsel asked that he be given ample time to file a written Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and the respondent court thru then Acting Presiding Judge Rasad Balindong, issued an order dated September 2, 1998, giving ten (10) days to Atty. Tingcap T. Mortaba to file an Omnibus Motion in substantiation of all the oral motions he made, furnishing a copy thereof to the undersigned counsel for the private respondent who was likewise given an equal period of time to comment.[10]

12. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss[11] and on September 21, 1998, the private respondent filed a vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss.[12]

13. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto on September 21, 1998, the petitioner’s counsel requested for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss submitted by the private respondent which was granted by the court and on September 28, 1998, petitioner filed his rejoinder[13] and on October 5, 1998 private respondent filed his comment[14] thereto and thereafter all incidents were submitted for resolution of the court.

14. On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thru Honorable Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, issued the assailed order denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit and ordering the Revision Committee to report to the court on November 19, 1998, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning for their oath taking and to receive the instruction of the court in the revision of the ballots and other allied matters.

[15]

15. On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the

order dated November 10, 1998,[16]

and on November 23, 1998, private respondent filed a vigorous opposition [to motion] for reconsideration.[17]

16. Finding no compelling reason to disturb its order dated November 10, 1998, the respondent court issued the assailed order dated December 1, 1998 which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. In the same order, the respondent court reiterated its previous order to the members of the Revision Committee to take their oaths before Atty. Raqueza T. Umbaro or Atty. Khalil Laguindab and thereafter to convene and start the revision of ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, morning and afternoon.[18]

17. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case more specifically the revision of ballots, the petitioner filed on December 10, 1998, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and on December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent motion before the respondent court praying that further proceedings in Election Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestee’s petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Honorable Commission shall have been finally resolved, copy of which was served upon the undersigned counsel only on December 12, 1998, at 10:50 A.M.[19] xxx

18. That before the undersigned counsel could file his opposition to said urgent motion on December 14, 1998 and in the absence of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by (the COMELEC), the respondent judge already issued an order granting the same motion and ordering the Revision Committee to hold in abeyance the scheduled revision of ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, etc. until further order from the court xxx.

[20]

Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition the COMELEC acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in –













1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;

2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed;

3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal bases to dismiss Election Case No. 11-127.

In sum, petitioner insists that in refusing to pass upon the three (3) principal issues raised in COMELEC Case SPR No. 52-98, to wit:

1. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;

2. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in holding that a motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an election protest case in the Regional Trial court is not allowed; and

3. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in failing to resolve the relevant material and substantial issues raised in SPR No. 52-98.

the COMELEC "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the Constitution and the election laws." Such abdication of duty, according to petitioner, amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes on the conduct of elections –

…[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its

duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created – to promote free, orderly and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.

[21]

Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

In accordance with this intent, the Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the COMELEC’s powers in conducting elections. Sumulong v. COMELEC[22] aptly points out that –

Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions xxx. There are no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of election xxx we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.

[23] An election protest is imbued with public

interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative,[24] much more so in this case considering that a






mere twenty (20) votes separates the winner from the loser of the contested election results.

The primordial issue to be resolved herein is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing SPR No. 52-98.

In support of his cause, petitioner insists that there is "nothing irregular or anomalous in the filing of the motion to dismiss" after the filing of the answer because in effect he is merely insisting on a preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses. Thus, he claims that the summary dismissal of his motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

We disagree.

The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the revision ballots. These events, pointed out by private respondent[25] and borne by the record, show that –

1. It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation of the Revision Committee and the appointment of its Chairman and Members and after the said committee was ordered by the trial court to commence the revision and to render its report within 20 days that the petitioner orally moved for the dismissal of the case on the flimsy grounds that (1) the ballot boxes subject of the protest and counter – protest have been violated; (2) the automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of ballots; and (3) protestant is guilty of forum-shopping warranting summary dismissal of the protest;

2. After the oral arguments on the oral motion to dismiss the petitioner requested for ample time within which to file an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and over the vigorous opposition of the private respondent the same was granted by the court and the petitioner was given a period of ten (10) days to file the same and the private respondent was likewise given a period of ten (10) days to file his comment;

3. On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss[26] and during the hearing on the

said motion and the opposition[27]

thereto on September 21, 1998, the petitioner again asked for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss which was again granted by the court and it was only on September 28, 1998 that said rejoinder was filed;

4. After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November 10, 1998,

[28] the petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration on November 18, 1998;

[29]

5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on December 1, 1998,

[30] petitioner filed on December 18,

1998 before the Commission on Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and asked the trial court to defer the proceedings of Election Case No. 11-27 until after his petition shall have been finally resolved which was granted by the trial court. Hence, the scheduled revision of the ballots on December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was cancelled and the proceedings of the case held in abeyance;[31]

6. As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to petitioner’s prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court, upon motion of the private respondent, issued an order for the revision of ballots on February 8, 1999.[32] On said day, neither the petitioner’s counsel nor his designated revisors appeared, instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed men, numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places, prevented the court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not for the maximum tolerance exercised by the PNP personnel and the intervention of the local datus/leaders, there would have been bloodshed;

7. On February 9, 1999, the petitioner’s counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance with the attached letter-request of the petitioner asking for the deferment of the revision of ballots for at least two (2) weeks to enable him to engage the services of another counsel. Considering that the incident was designed to delay the further the early disposition of the case which










would frustrate the ends of justice, the court held in abeyance its ruling on the withdrawal of appearance of and directed petitioner’s counsel to handle the case after the appearance of a new counsel;[33]

8. To further delay the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed a petition for transfer of venue of the trial to from RTC, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur to Iligan City or in Metro Manila which the private respondent did not oppose so as not to delay the early resolution of this Honorable Supreme Court on the said petition;

9. Again, the proceedings of the case was held in abeyance in view of the pendency of the said petition for transfer of venue;

10. After the dismissal of the petition in Election Case No. 52-98, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before this Honorable Supreme Court with a prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order;

11. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed an urgent motion before this Honorable Supreme Court praying for the immediate issuance of a TRO directing the Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch III, Iligan City to cease, desist and refrain from conducting any further proceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until the instant case shall have been resolved. This Honorable Supreme Court, without granting the prayer for TRO, directed the RTC, Branch III, Iligan City not to promulgate any decision in the said election case until further order[s] from this most Honorable Court.

[34]

It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner within which petitioner virtually substituted his answer by belatedly filing a motion to dismiss three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of the electorate. As pointedly observed by the COMELEC in its challenged Resolution dated July 6, 1999,[35] petitioner only filed his motion to dismiss "when the results of the trial appear[ed] to be adverse to him’"[36] or right after the creation of the Revision Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner truly intended to move for the preliminary hearing of his special

and affirmative defenses as he claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer. Otherwise, he should have filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for but before filing the answer…" pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by petitioner can not be countenanced much more so in election cases where time is of the essence in the resolution thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no uncertain terms that –

SEC. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their respective cases, shall give preference to election contests over all other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without delay, hear and within thirty (30) days from the date of their submission for decision, but in every case within six (6) months after filing, decide the same. xxx[37] (emphasis and italics supplied)

Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity of the ballot boxes has been violated; b.] only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted are the proper subjects of an election protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, are enough grounds to dismiss the case.

We remain unconvinced.

As aptly observed by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution, these grounds are "evidentiary in nature and can be best ventilated during the trial of the case."[38] It needs be stressed in this regard that the purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.

[39] In an election contest where the correctness of

the number of votes is involved, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can not be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence.[40] In this case, the counted official ballots are available and there is no evidence, other than the bare allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the protest have been violated or the official ballots contained therein impaired. The best way, therefore, to test the truthfulness of petitioner’s claim is to open the ballot boxes in the protested precincts followed by the examination, revision, recounting and re-appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in accordance with law and pertinent rules on the matter. Needless to state this can only be done through a full-blown trial on the merits, not










a peremptory resolution of the motion to dismiss on the basis of the bare and one-sided averments made therein.

Petitioner’s reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868[41]

to support his restrictive claim that only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted in case of failure of the automated counting machines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is just as unpersuasive.

There is admittedly a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which prescribes the adoption of an automated election system. However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC,[42] that the Commission is nevertheless not precluded from conducting a manual count when the automated counting system fails, reasoning thus:

… In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections … In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes ... The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC…

… Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices, candidates do not follow the rules

of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.

Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy."[43]

Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioner’s counter-protest and private respondent’s protest already justified the determination of the issues through a judicial revision and recounting of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that –

Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest.- Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant or whenever in the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be examined and votes recounted. (Italics supplied)

So too must fall petitioner’s procedural objection that private respondent should be faulted for forum-shopping vis-à-vis this Court’s pronouncement in Samad v. COMELEC[44] which states in no uncertain terms that –

As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.






Conformably, we have ruled in a number of cases that after a proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable.

The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: (1) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (3) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was null and void.

Petitioner’s argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed with a regular court is not a prohibited pleading is well taken. As we pointed out in Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC: [45]

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a prohibited pleading under Section 1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because the said provision refers to proceedings filed before the COMELEC. The applicable provisions on the matter are found in Part VI of the Rules of Procedure titled "PROVISIONS GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL COURT" and as this Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v. Court of Appeals[46]

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of a certain pleading in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested in the Supreme Court.

[47]

The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his predicament because the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the other grounds relied therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the said motion is a prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challenged COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in dismissing the petition in this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence to resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy cannot be doubted. Indeed, as reasoned by the COMELEC, the –

… Commission assumes the competence of the trial court to handle electoral protest and cannot encroach on its original and exclusive jurisdiction on electoral protest cases involving the contested mayoralty seat. To our mind, the trial court should be allowed to resolve the case on the merits to be able to rule on the factual and legal grounds raised by the petitioner as his defenses in his Answer. Should the petitioner be dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in the lower court, he can still appeal, as his relief, to this Commission within the reglementary period provided by law.

Moreover –

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voter’s obvious choice. In applying elections laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.

[48]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melo, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.






Panganiban, J., in the result.

_______________

Rollo, pp. 45-47; Annex C, Petition, which provides, inter alia, that:

SEC. 2. Filing of Protest. – Any losing candidate, who registers his objections on the rejection of ballots, may file a protest with the Commission within ten (10) days from proclamation of the winning candidates in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Only rejected ballots and ballots manually counted shall be the subject of protest.

SEC. 3. Examination of rejected ballots. – In determining the intent of the voter in the case of rejected ballots, the rejection of which have been objected to and noted in the Minute of Counting, the Commission shall examine and appreciate the rejected ballots concerned applying the provision of Section 7 of Resolution No. 2862 (Rules and Regulations on the Manual Counting and Canvassing of Votes in Case of Failure of the Automated Counting System in the September 9, 1996 Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [ARMM], promulgated 14 August 1996).


[G.R. No. 123037. March 21, 1997]

TEODORO Q. PEÑA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND

ALFREDO E. ABUEG, JR., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR., J.:

Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution[1]

of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Peña in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of Palawan.

Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.

On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:

“7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner’s known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestant’s ballots and other irregularities.

8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained 52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of said document is attached hereto as Annex ‘B’.

9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities not been committed, the result of the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would have been different and the protestant would have garnered the highest number of votes for the Office Member of the House of Representatives in the

Second District of Palawan, which was the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.

10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the protestee was allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.”

[2]

Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and Counter-Protest[3] on June 5, 1995, to which Peña filed a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] the Petition on June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[5] on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary of Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election irregularities allegedly occurred.

In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal.

The HRET states pertinently:

“There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan which is comprised of Puerto Princesa City and the municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon, and Marcos (Ordinance appended to the 1973 Constitution). The Protestant failed to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included in his protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are located. Worse, the body of the Petition does not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of the issues which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be collected.

The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et. al. (No. 46099, 66 Phil 148, 150, August 30, 1938) observed that, ‘[w]hile the

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/123037.htm#_edn1






election law does not say so directly, it is clearly inferred from its relevant provisions that where the grounds of contest are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes received, the motion of protest should state in what precincts such irregularities occurred. xxx The specification in the motion of protest of the election precinct or precincts where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required in order to apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to meet. xxx’

In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that the petition therein ‘could have been dismissed outright as deficient in form and substance, being couched in general terms only, without precise indication of thetime, place and manner of the commission of the alleged irregularities.’ xxx

Similarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest, observed that the protest, in general language, “impugns, contests and protests the illegal, improper and fraudulent electoral practices, acts and deeds” of the protestee and “impugns and contests all the election returns in the lone district of Catanduanes.” The tribunal held that this scattershot allegation is not allowed in election contests and that “it is necessary to make a precise indication of the precincts protested and a specification of the claimed offenses to have been committed by the parties.” (Alberto vs. Tapia, HRET Case No. 37, January 23, 1989)

While Protestant has attached as Annex “A” to his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on 10 July 1995, a Summary of contested Precincts, the defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as the Summary was submitted only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. The Opposition and the attached Summary do not amend the original Petition. There is not even a prayer in the Opposition suggesting such amendment.

Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995, the Commission on Elections en banc (COMELEC) dismissed herein Petitioner’s Petition (SPA Case No. 95-258) to declare a failure of elections in the second district of Palawan. Copy of said Resolution was sent to Petitioner Peña’s Petition Ad Cautelam was thus converted into a regular protest (not Ad Cautelam) effective upon the finality of the official COMELEC resolution, thereby providing him an opportunity to amend it to cure the defects cited above, Protestant took no positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.

Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has likewise failed to specify the 47 precincts he contests in his Counter-Protest. This omission merely renders Protestee’s Counter-Protest defective for insufficiency in form and substance and for failure to state a cause of action. It does not cure the fatal defects in Protestant’s Petition.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the petition (Protest) to state a cause of action because it is fatally insufficient in form and substance, the Tribunal Resolved to GRANT Protestee’s Motion to Dismiss and to DISMISS, as it hereby DISMISSES, the instant Petition of Protest. As a logical consequence thereof and also for the same reason, Protestee’s Counter-Protest is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”[6]

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal on November 14, 1995.

In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the respondent HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of petitioner considering that:

I

“THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT HRET.”

It is the Petitioner’s view that the instant election protest is sufficient in form and substance even while failing to specify the precincts where irregularities allegedly occurred. Nowhere is it provided that the specification of the precincts is a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order that an election protest can be entertained by the HRET. To support his submission, petitioner cites the cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter stating that:

“From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds, irregularities and violations of the law are alleged therein, which, if true, would undoubtedly change the result of the elections.

The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor of the protestant after the judicial counting is



not specified, does not affect the right of the protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defect of the protest, the same may be cured by a specification of the votes mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding new grounds for those already alleged by the protestant.”

Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant case, the defect in the petition should have been cured by the opposition to the private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.

Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead, required the private respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a prior determination that the petition is sufficient in form and substance.

We do not agree.

In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition, the HRET was not ruling on the formal and substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to require an answer is but a matter of course, as under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided that:

“RULE 22. Summons. - Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.”

As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the same.

A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.

Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious inadequacy than a mere failure to specify the number of votes which would inure to the protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of

some of the ballots cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases were decided in the 1920s. The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of “massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities”, without specification, and substantiation, of where and how these occurences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the water.

On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,

[7] that substantial amendments to the

protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after proclamation of the winner.

While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest.[8]

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step.[9] xxx This is as it should be, for the democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by a few.

In sum, this Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral tribunal’s judgment. There is such showing in the present petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the present petition for lack of merit. The resolution of the respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal dated October 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.





G.R. Nos. 111624-25 March 9, 1995

ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN, MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF

CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND EMILIANO MICU, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District.

Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.

During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent. 1 From the said ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208.

On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads:

Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en banc tabulated the votes obtained by candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by precinct submitted by the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination, the Commission rules, as follows:

1. That the actual number of votes obtained by

candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.

Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in favor of petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan.

2

Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation thereof.

In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was alleged to have become final, the PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said resolution and on the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes while the private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however, proclaimed winner because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC.

Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.

On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order

3 directing the PBC "to reconvene,

continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that date.

In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug and San Manuel filed by private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the corrected documents, the


Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate. 5

On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction alleging that the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92-384.

On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the issuance of an order directing the PBC to reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29, 1992 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent petition to cite Atty. Felimon Asperin and Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for Contempt with alternative prayer for proclamation as winner and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking a "definitive ruling and a clear directive or order as to who of the two (2) contending parties should be proclaimed" 6 averring that "there were corrections already made in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote. 7 On even date, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on canvassing and proclamation. 8

As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin dissenting, proclaimed candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul

Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:

1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not be declared in contempt of defying and disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated of Canvass of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;

2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;

3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate for the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside the foregoing resolution of the COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated without prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 106291.


On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc

10 granted the

petition ratiocinating that:

Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the petitioner's proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process. Moreover, there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant the annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.

1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent COMELEC which does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the only corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely directed it:

(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law,

the rules and guideline on canvassing and proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)

The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could only refer to the nine 99) COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was completed on 21 May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague and ambiguous.

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is notproperty under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]). Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate (Section 248, Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) andGallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a Special Case (SPC) because its ruling therein was made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. Special Cases under the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-proclamation controversies (Rule 27


in relation to Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We have categorically declared in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and companion cases, 6 August 1992) that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, . . . the commission en banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be referred to a division

Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul the proclamation; consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void. For this reason too, the COMELEC en banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-2()8 resolving the private respondent's appeal from the ruling of the PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is similarly void.

2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to such would be clearly unfounded. While it may be true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make the appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their corresponding COCs, none of said Boards convened to the members of actually implement the order. Such failure could have been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner to the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply chose not to act thereon. As already adverted to the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of sheets of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of private respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner) and San Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid corrections because the Election Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of the respective Board. Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)

provides that "[A] majority vote of all the members of the board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means at least two (2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the "municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman, and the most senior district school supervisor or in his absence a principal of the school district or the elementary school, as members"). As to why the Election Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were 7th only ones who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the other members of the Boards were no longer available. Since they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been easily summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect the corrections on the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass.

Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as the corrected SOVs and COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvass could only be accomplished either by inserting the authorized corrections into the SOV and COC which were originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by preparing a new SOV and COC incorporating therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolution of the COMELEC referring to "the Certificates of Canvass of the municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel" (Last clause, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion, Annex "A" of Petition: Rollo 15), is palpably unfounded. The Commission could have 7 been misled by Atty. Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already made in separate sheets of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan" (Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July 1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed. However, if it only took the trouble to carefully examine what was held out to be as the corrected documents,


respondent COMELEC should not have been misled.

Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient corrections, they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars prepared them — on 6 July 1992 — respondent COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPC No. 92-384) from the 24 June 1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections. Petitioner maintains that until now, his appeal has not been resolved. The public respondent, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had been:

. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed respondents (sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug and 2,179 in San Manuel (see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)

On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:

This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise deemed affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and Comelecen banc Resolution No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);

If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July 1992 that SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were still prematurely prepared. In any event, the COMELEC could not have validly ruled on such appeal in its 29 July 1992 Resolution because the same

was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For Contempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the private respondent. Furthermore, before the resolution of SPC No. 92-384 on the abovementioned date, no hearing was set or conducted to resolve the pending motion. Therefore, on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution, even if it was meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been issued in gross violation of the requirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and for having been resolved by the COMELEC en banc at the first instance. The case should have been referred first to a division pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections. Moreover, the COMELEC's claim that the questioned resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally baseless. The PBC did not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said MBCs did not convene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who signed the sheets of paper purporting to be corrections.

For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private respondent COMELEC private respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of votes, must necessarily fail.

The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August 1992 as


the second Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent Commission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending incidents conformably with the foregoing disquisitions and pronouncements.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC praying that the latter hear and resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court. Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384, both cases left unresolved by the COMELEC.

Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During the hearing, both Micu and Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin and to cite the Board for contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993.

Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No. 92-208 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the appeal. Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this Court's ruling nullifying the June 24, 1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel aside from being superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.

On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993 postulated that the petitions filed on June 11, 1992 for the correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, as well as the ruling of the PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so that the withdrawal of Bince's appeal in SPC No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the corrections.

On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division) holds that the petitioner Alfonso C. Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sixth District of Pangasinan.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan. 12

On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution.

On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for reconsideration in a resolution which dispositively reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano S. Micu is granted. The Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July 21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper notices, and to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to include the results in the said municipalities in its canvass.

The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED. 13

This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.

We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.


Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.

At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it resolved the "pending incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v.COMELEC on February 9, 1993 Petitioner's contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless. In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid.

Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner and private respondent.

The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still, private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992, respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before proclamation of a winner, thus:

Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. — (a) Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a

certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may, motu propio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.

(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.

(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said order may appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation.

(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates, unless their votes are not affected by the appeal.

(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected thereby.

(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with a copy of the appeal, to the respondents.

(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.

(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).

The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be


countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC,

14 categorically

declared that:

. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes vs. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare that:

Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R. No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Emphasis ours)

In the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated and the Court went on to state that:

Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results, This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).

The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.

Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakesin mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.

In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.

In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes.


Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation.

As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the one at issue should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.


[G.R. No. 135716. September 23, 1999]

FERDINAND TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MANUEL C. SUNGA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari questions the June 22, 1998 Resolution

[1] of the Commission on Elections

(hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) in SPA No. 95-213, disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan, in the May 8, 1995 elections. It also questions the October 13, 1998 COMELEC Resolution[2] which not only denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, but also annulled his proclamation as elected Mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.

This case has been filed before this Court when the Petition for Disqualification of private respondent (SPA No. 95-213) was dismissed by the COMELEC. Acting on the Petition for Certiorari of private respondent, this court, in Sunga v. Commission on Elections,[3] ordered the COMELEC to reinstate SPA No. 95-213 and act thereon.

The facts of the case, as found in Sunga v. Commission on Elections, supra, are as follows:

“Petitioner (herein private respondent) Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent (herein petitioner) Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.

On 22 April 1995, Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Section 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.

On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand D. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor, and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations for various election offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.

On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, x x x.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification x x x.”

As we have mentioned, above, private respondent’s Petition with this Court was granted and COMELEC was ordered to reinstate SPA No. 95-213 and hear the same.

[4]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135716.htm#_edn1





Finally, on June 22, 1998, the COMELEC 1st Division

(former 2nd Division) promulgated the first questioned Resolution disqualifying petitioner as a candidate in the May 8, 1995 elections.

[5] Petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration,[6] claiming denial of due process. Private respondent filed his Opposition to the Motion,[7] at the same time moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s proclamation as elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and praying that he be proclaimed Mayor instead.

On October 13, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and also annulled his proclamation as duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections.[8] Private respondent’s motion to be declared Mayor was, however, denied. Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores rendered a dissenting opinion insofar as the Resolution annulled the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections, which she found to be “bereft of any legal basis.”

Petitioner alleges that the questioned Resolutions were promulgated without any hearing conducted and without his evidence having been considered by the COMELEC, in violation of his right to due process. He also contends that the portion of the October 13, 1998 Resolution annulling his proclamation as Mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections was rendered without prior notice and hearing and that he was once more effectively denied due process. Petitioner also adopts the stand of Commissioner Dy-Liacco Flores that his disqualification, if any, under SPA No. 95-213 cannot extend beyond the three-year term to which he was elected on May 8, 1995, in relation to which the corresponding Petition for his disqualification was lodged.

In his Comment,[9] private respondent assails the arguments raised in the Petition and prays that he be proclaimed as the elected Mayor in the 1998 elections. Petitioner filed a Reply

[10] to private respondent’s

Comment on February 24, 1999. Meanwhile, on February 25, 1999, the criminal cases filed against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan were dismissed.[11] On March 8, 1999, the Solicitor General filed a Comment for the COMELEC,

[12] reiterating the argument that

the COMELEC is empowered to disqualify petitioner from continuing to hold public office and at the same time, barring private respondent’s moves to be proclaimed elected in the 1998 elections. Respective Memoranda were filed by both parties.

The issues before us may be summarized as follows:

1. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 8, 1995 elections was concerned?

2. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 11, 1998 elections was concerned?

3. May petitioner’s proclamation as Mayor under the May 11, 1998 elections be cancelled on account of the disqualification case filed against him during the May 8, 1995 elections?

4. May private respondent, as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, be proclaimed as Mayor in the event of petitioner’s disqualification?

The Commission on Elections is the agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Unless the Commission is shown to have committed a grave abuse of discretion, its decision and rulings will not be interfered with by this Court.[13]

Guided by this doctrine, we find that no violation of due process has attached to the COMELEC’s June 22, 1998 Resolution.

Petitioner complains that while the COMELEC reinstated SPA No. 95-213, it conducted no hearing and private respondent presented no evidence.[14] Yet, this does not equate to a denial of due process. As explained in Paat v. Court of Appeals[15]--

“x x x. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard (Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995). One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings (Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995). In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense (Ibid.) Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration (Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995), as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco (G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995), we ruled that:

‘The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an













opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.’”

In the case at bar, petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss.

[16] He was also

able to submit his counter-affidavit and sworn statements of forty-eight (48) witnesses. While he complains that these were not considered by the Hearing Officer, he, himself, admits that the COMELEC did not rely on the findings of the Hearing Officer but referred the case to its Second Division. Thus, by the time the Second Division reviewed his case, petitioner’s evidence were already in place. Moreover, petitioner was also given a chance to explain his arguments further in the Motion for Reconsideration which he filed before the COMELEC. Clearly, in the light of the ruling in Paat, no deprivation of due process was committed. Considering that petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard, through his pleadings, there is really no denial of procedural due process.[17]

Being interrelated, we shall discuss the second and third issues together.

We note that petitioner’s term as Mayor under the May 8, 1995 elections expired on June 30, 1998.[18] Thus, when the first questioned Resolution was issued by COMELEC on June 22, 1998, petitioner was still serving his term. However, by the time the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was filed on July 3, 1998, the case had already become moot and academic as his term had already expired. So, too, the second questioned Resolution which was issued on October 13, 1998, came at a time when the issue of the case had already been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s challenged term of office.

In Malaluan v. Commission on Elections,[19] this Court clearly pronounced that expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding petition moot and academic. Thus:

“It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner’s right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality (Amatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 71003, April 28, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Artano v. Arcillas, G.R. No. 76823, April 26, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution) becauseexpiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic (Atienza v. Commission on Elections, 239 SCRA

298; Abeja v. Tanada, 236 SCRA 60; Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76).

When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election protest involving the office of the mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value (Yorac v. Magalona, supra). This rule we established in the case of Yorac v. Magalona which was dismissed because it had been mooted by the expiration of the term of office of the Municipal Mayor of Saravia, Negros Occidental. x x x.” (underscoring, ours)

With the complaint for disqualification of private respondent rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s term of office therein contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office in its second questioned Resolution on the ground that “it comes as a matter of course after his disqualification in SPA No. 95-213 promulgated after the 1998 election.” While it is true that the first questioned Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the term of petitioner as Mayor expired, said Resolution had not yet attained finality and could not effectively be held to have removed petitioner from his office.[20] Indeed, removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.[21]

In this regard, therefore, we agree with the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in the second questioned Resolution that petitioner’s disqualification under SPA No. 95-213 cannot extend beyond the term to which he was elected in 1995.[22]

Yet another ground to reverse the COMELEC’s annulment of petitioner’s proclamation under the 1998 elections is the undeniable fact that petitioner was not accorded due process insofar as this issue is concerned. To be sure, this was not part of the first questioned Resolution which only touched on the matter raised in the complaint – the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent merely prayed for the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation as winner in the 1998 elections in his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. It was with grave abuse of discretion, then, that the COMELEC went on to annul petitioner’s proclamation as winner of the 1998 elections without any prior notice or hearing on the matter.[23]

As per the Certificate of Canvass,[24] petitioner obtained 5,920 votes as against the 1,727 votes obtained by private respondent and 15 votes garnered by the third mayoral candidate, Johnny R. Banatao. This gives petitioner a high 77.26% of the votes cast. There is no doubt, therefore, that











petitioner received his municipality’s clear mandate. This, despite the disqualification case filed against him by private respondent.

This further lends support to our decision to bar his disqualification insofar as the May 11, 1998 elections is concerned. Indeed, in election cases, it is fundamental that the people’s will be at all times upheld. As eloquently stressed in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[25]--

“This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

‘x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Benito v. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 [August 17, 1994])’.”

Finally, we see no error in the COMELEC’s rejection of private respondent’s move to be declared as Mayor on account of petitioner’s disqualification. To begin with, the issue had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s challenged term of office. Second, even in law and jurisprudence, private respondent cannot claim any right to the office. As held by the COMELEC, the succession to the office of the mayor shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code which, in turn, provides that the vice mayor concerned shall become the mayor.[26] Also, in Nolasco v. Commission on Elections,

[27]citing Reyes v. Commission on Elections,

[28] we

already rejected, once and for all, the position that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed the winner in the event of disqualification or failure of the candidate with the highest number of votes to hold office. This court ratiocinated thus –

“That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]; Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 [1991]; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 [1992]; Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436 [1994]). The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings (Compare Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912] with Ticson v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 687 [1981]; Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985] with Santos v. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 740 [1985]) has since been removed. In

the latest ruling (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995) on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.”

Private respondent claims that there are compelling reasons to depart from this doctrine. He argues that since the disqualification case filed against the petitioner for the 1995 elections has been rendered moot and academic, it is with the 1998 elections that its impact must be felt. He also claims that justice should be given him as victim of petitioner’s dilatory tactics.

We are not persuaded. On the other hand, the fact that despite the disqualification case filed against petitioner relating to the 1995 elections, he still won the mandate of the people for the 1998 elections, leads us to believe that the electorate truly chose petitioner and repudiated private respondent. To allow private respondent, a defeated and repudiated candidate, to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their choice.[29]

Therefore, the Resolution of the COMELEC dated October 13, 1998 which annulled petitioner’s proclamation as Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections should be set aside. On the other hand, the petition filed before the COMELEC against petitioner for election offenses committed during the May 1995 elections should be dismissed for being moot and academic, the term of office to which petitioner was elected having already expired.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC, dated October 13, 1998 is SET ASIDE insofar as it annuls the proclamation of petitioner as winner in the May 11, 1998 elections. Insofar as the May 8, 1995 elections is concerned, we find the issues related thereto rendered moot and academic by expiration of the term of office challenged and, accordingly, DISMISS the petition lodged in connection therewith. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., no part.







SYNOPSIS

This is a petition for certiorari questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections disqualifying petitioner as a mayoralty candidate in the May 1995 elections. Likewise, it seeks the review of a subsequent resolution annulling petitioner’s proclamation as elected mayor in the May 1998 elections.

Petitioner’s term as mayor under the May 8, 1995 elections expired on June 30, 1998. Thus, when the first questioned Resolution was issued by the COMELEC on June 22, 1998, petitioner was still serving his term. However, by the time the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was filed on July 3, 1998, the case had already become moot and academic as his term had already expired. So, too, the second questioned Resolution issued on October 13, 1998, came at a time when the issue of the case had already been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s challenged term of office. With the complaint for disqualification of private respondent rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s term of office therein contested, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; DECISIONS AND RULING THEREOF, GENERALLY NOT INTERFERED WITH BY SUPREME COURT.- The Commission on Elections is the agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Unless the Commission is shown to have committed a grave abuse of discretion, its decision and rulings will not be interfered with by this Court.

2. ID.; DUE PROCESS; CONSTRUED.- As explained in Paat v. Court of Appeals - xxx ‘The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain

their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

3. ID.; ID.; NOT DENIED WHERE PARTY AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THRU PLEADINGS.- Petitioner complains that while the COMELEC reinstated SPA No. 95-213, it conducted no hearing and private respondent presented no evidence. Yet, this does not equate to a denial of due process. In the case at bar, petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss. He was also able to submit his counter-affidavit and sworn statements of forty-eight (48) witnesses. While he complains that these were not considered by the Hearing Officer, he, himself, admits that the COMELEC did not rely on the findings of the Hearing Officer but referred the case to its Second Division. Thus, by the time the Second Division reviewed his case, petitioner’s evidence were already in place. Moreover, petitioner was also given a chance to explain his arguments further in the Motion for Reconsideration which he filed before the COMELEC. Clearly, in the light of the ruling in Paat, no deprivation of due process was committed. Considering that petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard, through his pleadings, there is really no denial of procedural due process.

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DISQUALIFICATION; RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE.- We note that petitioner’s term as Mayor under the May 8, 1995 elections expired on June 30, 1998. Thus, when the first questioned Resolution was issued by COMELEC on June 22, 1998, petitioner was still serving his term. However, by the time the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was filed on July 3, 1998, the case had already become moot and academic as his term had already expired. So, too, the second questioned Resolution which was issued on October 13, 1998, came at a time when the issue of the case had already been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioners challenged term of office. In Malaluan v. Commission on Elections, this Court clearly pronounced that expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding petition moot and academic.

5. ID.; ID.; REMOVAL; CANNOT EXTEND BEYOND TERM DURING WHICH ALLEGED MISCONDUCT WAS COMMITTED.- With the complaint for disqualification of private respondent rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s term of office therein contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office in its second questioned Resolution on the ground that “it comes as a matter of course after his disqualification in SPA No. 95-213


promulgated after the 1998 election.” While it is true that the first questioned Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the term of petitioner as Mayor expired, said Resolution had not yet attained finality and could not effectively be held to have removed petitioner from his office. Indeed, removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; DENIAL THEREOF BY ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION WITHOUT ANY PRIOR NOTICE OR HEARING.- Yet another ground to reverse the COMELEC’s annulment of petitioners proclamation under the 1998 elections is the undeniable fact that petitioner was not accorded due process insofar as this issue is concerned. To be sure, this was not part of the first questioned Resolution which only touched on the matter raised in the complaint - the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent merely prayed for the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation as winner in the 1998 elections in his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. It was with grave abuse of discretion, then, that the COMELEC went on to annul petitioner’s proclamation as winner of the 1998 elections without any prior notice or hearing on the matter.

7. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; PEOPLE’S WILL AT ALL TIMES UPHELD.- It is fundamental that the people’s will be at all times upheld. As eloquently stressed in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections - “This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held: ‘x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Benito v. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 [August 17, 1994]).”

8. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION CASES; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED IN EVENT WINNER DISQUALIFIED.- Finally, we see no error in the COMELEC’s rejection of private respondent’s move to be declared as Mayor on account of petitioner’s disqualification. To begin with, the issue had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s challenged term of office. Second. even in law and jurisprudence, private respondent cannot claim any right to the office. As held by the COMELEC, the

succession to the office of the mayor shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code which, in turn, provides that the vice mayor concerned shall become the mayor. Also, in Nolasco v. Commission on Elections, citing Reyes v. Commission on Elections, we already rejected, once and for all, the position that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed the winner in the event of disqualification or failure of the candidate with the highest number of votes to hold office.


[G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998]

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D.

MENESES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 127900. April 27, 1998]

FERDINAND D. MENESES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO M.

PUNZALAN, respondents.

[G.R. No. 128800. April 27, 1998]



[G.R. No. 132435. April 27, 1998]



D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections.

On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas’ 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan’s 8,612 votes.

On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-005-95 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in the municipality’s forty-seven (47) precincts.[1] In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21) precincts[2] of the 47 protested by Manalastas.

On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-006-95, also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts.

[3] Meneses, on his part, filed an answer with

counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts[4]

of the 157 protested by Punzalan.

Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were ordered consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.

Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the election of Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and other illegal electoral practices during the registration and the voting as well as during the counting of votes such as:

a. the registration of flying voters;

b. the preparation of ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;

c. the use of electoral fraudulent practice such as the ‘lansadera;’

d. false reading of votes for the petitioner/protestant;

e. the counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes as votes for the respondent/protestee;

f. switching of ballots in favor of respondent/protestee;

g. tampering with the ballots for the petitioner/protestant after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for respondent/protestee;

h. the adding of more votes to those actually counted for the respondent/protestee and the reducing of the votes actually counted for the petitioner/protestant in the preparation of the corresponding election return;

i. groups of two or more ballots for the respondent/protestee were written each group, by only one (1) person;

j. one (1) ballot for the respondent/protestee written by two or more persons.

[5]

By way of counter-protest to the two (2) election protests, Meneses alleged that he, too, was a victim of massive fraud and illegal electoral practices such as:

a. The preparation of the ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/apr1998/126669.htm#_edn1






b. The use of electoral fraudulent practice known as the ‘lansadera;’

c. False reading of votes for the protestee;

d. The counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes for the protestant;

e. Switching of ballots in favor of of protestant;

f. Tampering with the ballots for the Protestee after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for the protestant;

g. The adding of more votes to those actually counted for the protestant and the reducing of the votes actually counted for the protestee in the preparation of the corresponding election returns;

h. Group of two (2) or more ballots for protestant were written, each group, by only one (1) person;

i. One (1) ballot for the protestant written by two (2) or more persons.[6]

Finding the protests and counter-protests sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered a revision of the ballots. The result of said physical count coincided with the figures reflected in the election returns, thus: Meneses - 10,301 votes; Manalastas - 9,317 votes; and Punzalan - 8,612 votes.

After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1996 with the following findings, viz: that massive fraud, illegal electoral practices and serious anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that ballots, election returns and tally sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53, 68, 68-A and 70 “disappeared under mysterious circumstances;” and that filled-up ballots with undetached lower stubs and groups of ballots with stubs cut out with scissors were found inside ballot boxes. Because of these irregularities, the trial court was constrained to examine the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon and came up with the declaration that Punzalan was the winner in the elections. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In EPC No. E-005-95 – declaring Ferdinand D. Meneses as having garnered 7,719 votes or 33 votes more than the 7,686 votes received by Danilo D. Manalastas and dismissing the instant protest.

2. In EPC No. E-006-95 – declaring Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Protestee Ferdinand D. Meneses is hereby ordered to vacate his position and to cease and desist from further discharging the duties and functions officially vested in the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga which now and henceforth, unless otherwise disqualified by law, are conferred unto and in favor of Ernesto M. Punzalan, who is hereby ordered to act, perform and discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities and all incidents appertaining to and in connection with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, immediately and after he shall have taken his oath of office as such.

3. The counterclaims interposed by Ferdinand D. Meneses in both cases are hereby dismissed.

The authorities concerned are hereby ordered to enforce, implement and assist in the enforcement and implementation of this Decision immediately after Ernesto M. Punzalan shall have had taken his oath of office.

As soon as this Decision becomes final, let notice thereof be sent to the Commission on Elections, Department of Interior and Local Governments and Commission on Audit.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Immediately thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. The case was docketed as EAC No. 48-96 by the COMELEC. Manalastas did not appeal from the said decision.

On October 1, 1996, Punzalan filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga. On the same day, the COMELEC issued an order directing the RTC to elevate the entire records of the case.

On October 10, 1996, the RTC issued an order which granted Punzalan’s motion for execution pending appeal. On the same date, Meneses filed before the COMELEC a petition forcertiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction, docketed as SPR No. 47-96, seeking the nullification of the RTC’s order of execution pending appeal.

On October 11, 1996, the COMELEC issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its Order dated October 10, 1996.

On October 22, 1996, Meneses filed with the COMELEC a motion for contempt against Punzalan, alleging that the




latter was holding the office of mayor of Mexico, Pampanga in violation of the TRO issued by the COMELEC.

On October 28, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. 126669, to set aside the COMELEC’s TRO issued on October 11, 1996.

On November 7, 1996, the COMELEC issued two (2) orders, one which submitted for resolution Meneses’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for contempt and another which granted a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the RTC’s order of execution dated October 10, 1996.

On November 12, 1996, this Court issued a TRO directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing the TRO it issued on October 11, 1996 in SPR No. 47-96.

On November 21, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a supplement to the petition seeking to declare as void the COMELEC’s preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and to declare Meneses in contempt of court.

On January 9, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order which dispositively read as follows:

Considering that the 7 November 1996 preliminary injunction of the Commission was pursuant to its 11 October 1996 temporary restraining order, which was specifically covered by the Supreme Court’s temporary restraining order, the Commission will respect and abide by the order of the Supreme Court. Considering, however, that the temporary restraining order of the Supreme Court relates only to the implementation of the order of execution of judgment pending appeal of the Regional Trial Court, the Commission finds no legal impediment to proceed with the resolution of the main action for certiorari pending before it and shall act accordingly.

On January 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order stating that: 1) it need not act on Meneses’ motion reiterating the prayer to suspend pendente lite the implementation of the Order dated January 9, 1997, and 2) the Order dated January 9, 1997 shall take effect thirty (30) days from notice thereof to the parties.

On February 10, 1997, Meneses filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 127900, which sought to set aside the COMELEC Orders dated January 9 and 30, 1997.

On April 24, 1997, the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition of Meneses to set aside the RTC’s order of execution pending appeal and allowing Meneses to continue to discharge the duties and functions of municipal

mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, without prejudice to the resolution of his pending appeal from the RTC’s decision.

On April 28, 1997, Punzalan filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 128000, which sought to nullify the COMELEC’s Resolution dated April 24, 1997.

On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution in EAC No. 48-96 setting aside the trial court’s decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo in Election Protest Case No. E-006-95 declaring protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Mexico, Pampanga in the May 8, 1995 local elections is hereby ANNULLED and SET-ASIDE.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission [First Division] hereby AFFIRMS the proclamation of protestee-appellant Ferdinand D. Meneses by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga but with the modification that protestee-appellant received only 9,864 votes, or a deduction of 437 votes from his original 10,301 votes. Further, this Commission [First Division] hereby COMMANDS protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan to RELINQUISH his post in favor of protestee-appellant Ferdinand Meneses immediately upon finality of this Resolution.[8]

Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. In its Resolution dated February 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied said motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, filed on February 16, 1998 and docketed as G.R. No. 132435, to set aside the COMELEC’s resolutions of December 8, 1997 and February 13, 1998. Thus, petitioner alleges:

1. that the decision (resolution) in question is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

2. that it was rendered in disregard of law and the evidence;

3. that the decision (resolution) in question is a ‘prejudged decision;’ and

4. that the decision (resolution) in question is the culmination of a series of acts of the public respondent favoring the private respondent.[9]

First. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots




credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Castro[10] wherein it was held that the absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.

This contention is not meritorious.

While Section 24[11]

of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as “An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms,” requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people.[12]

In the recent case of Marcelino C. Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose T. Ramirez,[13] this Court affirmed the ruling of the Tribunal in Libanan v. Ramirez[14]to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. The Court explained in this wise:

What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the “Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines” provides that in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.

Second. Punzalan contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring valid (a) the ballots wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen were different from their respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC documents, (b) those group of ballots allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a number of single ballots written by two (2) persons. He argues that the trial court’s findings on the authenticity of said handwritings must prevail over the findings of the COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was based first on the findings of the revisors with the assistance of an expert witness in the person of Atty. Desiderio Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding where both parties were represented by their lawyers and the expert witness was cross-examined; and (3) on the other hand, the findings of the public respondent were made unilaterally, without any hearing. and without the presence of the lawyers of the parties and of the parties themselves.[15]

These arguments fail to persuade us.

The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. It is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court.[16]

Anent Punzalan’s assertion that the trial court’s finding which was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding wherein an expert witness testified and was cross-examined, should not be interfered with by the COMELEC whose finding was arrived at without the benefit of a hearing or the aid of an expert, it is axiomatic that the COMELEC need not conduct an adversarial proceeding or a hearing to determine the authenticity of ballots or the handwriting found thereon. Neither does it need to solicit the help of handwriting experts in examining or comparing the handwriting.[17] In fact, even evidence aliunde is not necessary to enable the Commission to determine the authenticity of the ballots and the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as an examination of the ballots themselves is already sufficient.[18]

In Erni v. COMELEC,[19]

we held that:

x x x. With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should have been ordered to determine whether they had been written by two or more












persons, or in groups written by only one hand, we hold that the Commission en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner-protestee’s request. The rule is settled that the Commission itself can make the determination without the need of calling handwriting experts.

Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves being sufficient. x x. x..

[20]

In Bocobo v. COMELEC,[21] we likewise ruled that:

x x x. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao, 52 Phil. 718). x x x.[22]

In the case at bar, the opinion of Atty. Pagui, who was claimed to be a handwriting expert, was not binding upon the COMELEC especially so where the question involved the mere similarity or dissimilarity of handwritings which could be determined by a comparison of existing signatures or handwriting.[23] Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”

In Lorenzo v. Diaz,[24] this Court enumerated the tools to aid one in the examination of handwriting, thus:

The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm , presence of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examination of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, played an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent evidence of the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to

characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between the questioned handwriting and an authentic one.[25]

Indeed, the haste and pressure, the rush and excitement permeating the surroundings of polling places could certainly affect the handwriting of both the voters and the election officers manning the said precincts. The volume of work to be done and the numerous documents to be filled up and signed must likewise be considered. Verily, minor and insignificant variations in handwriting must be perceived as indicia of genuineness rather than of falsity.

In Go Fay v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,[26] this Court held that carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation, and speed in signing are evidence of genuineness. In U.S. v. Kosel,[27] it was ruled that dissimilarity in certain letters in a handwriting may be attributed to the mental and physical condition of the signer and his position when he signed. Grief, anger, vexation, stimulant, pressure and weather have some influence in one’s writing. Because of these, it is an accepted fact that it is very rare that two (2) specimens of a person’s signature are exactly alike.

On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert witness, were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents concerned.[28] This fact raised a cloud of doubt and made the findings suspect. Consequently, the examination of the ballots themselves by the COMELEC should not be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court (the COMELEC in this case) to make itself the comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the evidence is offered.”

Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in character; the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.

[29]

In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by the COMELEC by personally and actually examining the ballots themselves. We find no compelling reasons to disturb its findings.

In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.

[30] An election protest is

imbued with public interest so much so that the need to













dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.

Prescinding from the foregoing, we find that respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in G.R. No. 132435. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot by the preceding disquisition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 132435 is hereby DISMISSED. The status quo order issued by this Court on February 24, 1998 is LIFTED. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot and academic by the foregoing disquisition.

Further, this decision is immediately executory in view of the shortness of time between now and the next elections and to prevent the case from becoming moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. L-61260 February 17, 1992

SERGIO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs.

HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IX (Quezon City), COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

RIZAL, and ROBERTO MIGUEL, respondents.

R.C. Domingo, Jr. & Associates for petitioner.

Cenon C. Sorreta for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City rendered in an appealed election case and which decision proclaimed herein private respondent Roberto Miguel as the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, in the Barangay Elections held on May 17, 1982, with a plurality of twenty-four (24) votes over herein petitioner Sergio Bautista.

Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for the office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of two (2) votes.

On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City, (docketed as Election Case No. 82-408) on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest.

It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City were contested. A revision and recounting of the ballots was conducted which resulted in a tie. The votes obtained by both of the protagonists were as follows:

1. In Voting Center. No. 519:

MIGUEL = 126 votes

BAUTISTA = 180 votes

Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the

following ballots: Exhs. a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, and o.

Protestee-appellee contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

2. In Voting Center No. 520:

MIGUEL = 152 votes


Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. P, Q and R.


MIGUEL = 150 votes


Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 6 and 7.


MIGUEL = 222 votes


Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. AA, BB, BB-1, BB-2 and CC.

Protestee-appellee contented the ruling of the lower court on the following ballots: Exhs. 8, 9, 9-a 10, 10-a, 11, 11-a, 12, 12-a, 13, 14, 14-a, 15, 15-a, 16 and 16-a.

5. Total Votes in all Voting Centers Nos. 519, 520, 521 and 522:


MIGUEL = 650

BAUTISTA = 650 (pp. 11-12, Rollo)

The trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, Roberto Miguel is hereby declared to have received the same number of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City. (p. 12, Rollo)

From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. * On July 29, 1982, judgment was rendered on the appeal which, as stated in the first portion of this decision, declared protestant Roberto Miguel the duly elected Barangay Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee Sergio Bautista. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring and proclaiming protestant-appellant ROBERTO MIGUEL as the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, in the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of twenty-four (24) votes over and above his protagonist protestee-appellee SERGIO BAUTISTA; setting aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee-appellee as the elected Barangay Captain made by the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982; sentencing protestee-appellee to pay protestant-appellant the costs and expenses that the latter has incurred in this protest, in accordance with Sec. 7, of COMELEC Resolution no. 1568, to wit:

P 25.00 for filing and research fee for petition of protest

2,500.00 for cash deposit for expenses for revision of ballots;

25.00 for appellant docket and research fee;

50.00 for appeal bond deposit;

P 2,600.00 Total

The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish 4 copies of this Decision to the Commission on Elections, the Ministry of Local Governments, the Commission on Audit, and the Secretaries of the Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Barangay, in accordance with Sec. 15 of Comelec Resolution No. 1566.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 87-88, Rollo)

Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review by certiorari on August 13, 1982 on the following questions of law:

1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private respondent but who was never presented as a witness, is competent and admissible evidence to support the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen (18) votes cast in favor of your petitioner were written by one and the same person.

2) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be considered a valid ballot.

3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested ballots (Exhibits "Z", "Z-I", "S", "5", "6", "7").

Considering that the term for the contested office had expired on June 7, 1988, 1 this petition has become moot and academic. However, this case had already been submitted for decision as early as December 19, 1984, prior to the expiration of the contested office. Hence, We deem it proper to resolve this case on the merits and determine the true winner of that elections.

Anent the first question, petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court on the opinion of oneDesiderio A. Pagui, who was never presented and qualified as an expert witness. The report of Pagui allegedly appeared only in the records of the case on file with the CFI which was attached in the Memorandum for Protestant Miguel.

The ballots involved in this objection of petitioner are exhibits "B" to "O" which all pertained to voting center No. 519 and Exhibits "T", "T-l", "U", "U-l", "V" and "V-1" from voting center No. 521. Respondent court ruled:

b) Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N and O were counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA, over the objection of protestant-appellant that these ballots were written by a single hand. These ballots and the writings therein contained were the subject of QUESTIONED HANDWRITINGS EXAMINATIONS and


PDIL REPORT NO. 09-682 of Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, Examiner of Questioned Documents (Ret. Chief Document Examiner, NBI), who was allowed by the lower court to assist it in the appreciation of ballots contested by either party as having been written by a single hand and to take photographs of the questioned ballots, his report and photographs having been submitted by protestant-appellant to this Court accompanying his memorandum. The pertinent portions of the FINDINGS in the said report read as follows:

Comparative examinations between and among the various letter designs, their structural constructions and other characteristics appearing in Exhibits "B" to "O" inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U", "U-I", "V" and "V-l", reveal the existence of significant identifying handwriting characteristics, more particularly in —

l. general style of writings;

2. size and propertion (sic) of letter designs; base and height alignments; and relationship between adjacent letters;

3. lateral spacing; and initial and terminal strokes;

4. structural constructions and more perplexed elements embedded in the structures of letter forms; and such characteristics are exemplified in the following words/ names: . . .; and the

scientific evaluation of the aforementioned writing characteristics includes the consideration of the idiosyncrasies of natural variation as shown in the numerous similar letter forms, although at some instances, the writer succeeded in having changed the entire letter designs of certain letters (at different style), but somehow certain significant writing characteristics reappeared in the various letters during the process of writing, thus be able to connect one writing from the others as having emanated from one source."

The probative value of the above-mentioned writing characteristics are further augmented by the presence of unusual structural construction of letter forms and/or in combinations with adjacent-letters, thus . . .

The CONCLUSION of the said report states:

The questioned handwritings appearing in Exhs. "B" to "O", inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U", "V" and "V-l", were WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.


Notwithstanding this report, this Court has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings, and compare the same with each other in order to determine whether or not they were indeed written by a single hand, and this Court is convinced beyond doubt that Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, N and O, were written by a single hand, considering the remarkable similarity if not almost identity of the writings on these ballots. The lower Court's ruling on these twelve (12) ballots is hereby reversed, and the twelve (12) votes for protestee-appellee based thereon should be deducted from him.

With respect to Exhs. I and J, this Court entertains some doubt on their having been written by a single hand, and therefore resolves the doubt in favor of the validity of these two (2) ballots, as votes for protestee-appellee. Therefore, the ruling of the lower Court counting Exhs. I and J for protestee-appellee stands. (pp. 78-80, Rollo)

The contention of petitioner that respondent court relied on the report of an alleged handwriting expert is misplaced. It should be noted that while respondent court considered the report of Atty. Pagui, it did not rely solely on the said report. In the words of respondent court, "(I)t has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings and compare the same with each other . . ." In fact, in its effort to determine the true value of the contested ballots and in order not to disenfranchise bona fide voters, it counted certain ballots in favor of petitioner which the alleged handwriting expert found as written by only one person. It contradicted said report as regards Exhibits "I", "J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court was circumspect in relying on its own findings on whether or not these contested ballots were prepared by one person. The ballots are the best evidence of the objections raised. Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting, this can be done by the COMELEC (in this case, the court taking cognizance of the appeal in this election protest) itself (Bocobo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94173, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA 576).

Petitioner also argues that respondent court misinterpreted and misapplied Section 36(f) of Comelec Resolution No. 1539. It allegedly failed to take into consideration the other provisions of said Section 36 of the Resolution.

We do not agree. Section 36 in its entirety provides:

Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. (a) Identification of votes. — The chairman shall check in the certified list of voters the name of the person offering to vote. He shall then announce the voter's name distinctly in a loud tone. If there is no challenge, or if having been challenged and the question is decided in his favor, the voter shall be allowed to vote and he shall affix his signature on the proper space of the Voting Record (Comelec Form No. 5).

(b) Delivery of ballot. — Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the Chairman shall, in the presence of the voter, the other members of the board and the watchers present, affix his signature at the back thereof and write the serial number of the ballot in the space provided in the ballot, beginning with No. "1" for the first ballot issued, and so on consecutively for the succeeding ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the corresponding space of the voting record. He shall then fold the ballot once, and without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter together with a ball pen.

(c) Instructions to the voter. — If a voter so requests, the poll clerk shall instruct him on how to fill the ballot.The voter shall be reminded that he should fill the ballot secretly and return it folded so as not to show the names of the candidates he voted for. He shall also be warned not to use any other ballot; not to show the content of his ballot; not to put any mark thereon; not to erase, deface or tear the same; and not to remove the detachable coupon.

(d) Preparing the ballot. — Upon receiving the ballot, the voter shall fill the ballot secretly.

(e) Returning the ballot. — (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the voter shall affix his right hand thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable coupon; and shall give the folded ballot to the chairman; (2) The chairman shall without unfolding the ballot or looking at its contents, and in the presence of the voter and all the members of the Board, verify if it bears his signature and the same serial number recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be authentic, the voter shall then be required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space in the voting record. (4) The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the folded ballot in the compartment for the valid ballot and the coupon in the compartment for spoiled ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave the voting center.


(f) When ballot may be considered spoiled. — Any ballot returned to the chairman with its coupon already detached, or which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any ballot with a serial number that does not tally with the serial number of the ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in the voting record, shall be considered as spoiled and shall be marked and signed by the members of the board and shall not be counted.

The ballots concerned were marked Exhibits "BB", "BB-1" and "BB-2" from voting center No. 522. The respondent court ruled that:

b) Exhs. BB, BB-l and BB-2 were counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the objection of protestant-appellant that these ballots are not duly authenticated by the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers at the back thereof. An examination of the back portion of these ballots reveals that it is completely blank of any signature or initial. The mandatory requirement of authentication of ballots is found in Sec. 14 of B.P. 222 and in Sec. 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, and the legal consequence for the absence of such authentication is stated precisely in Sec. 36, sub-par. (f), and generally in Sec. 152 of the 1978 Election Code, . . . (p. 84, Rollo)

The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.

As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court which ruled that these were not marked ballots and hence, were valid votes for petitioner BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court, respondent court ruled that the presence of an arrow with the words "and party," was meant for no other purpose than to Identify the voter.

We agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general rule, a voter must write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the offices appearing thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the Revised Election Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the ballot (par. 5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation of affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not

used as a means to identify the voter. Even under a liberal view, the words written on the ballots under consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the rule. Consequently, they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots. (Lloren v. CA, et al., No. L-25907, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence, respondent court excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l".

Exhibit "S" (Voting Center No. 521) was excluded by respondent court as a vote for petitioner. It held:

a) Exh. S was counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the objection of protestant-appellant that this ballot was found in the small compartment of the ballot box for spoiled ballots and the said ballots appear to be in excess of the number of ballots actually used. The records show that as reflected in the MINUTES OF VOTING AND COUNTING OF VOTES found inside the ballot box, (1) there were 311 voters who cast their votes, and the ballots actually used bear Serial Nos. 1-311, (2) 1 voter did not return his/her ballot, 8 ballots were spoiled ballots and 302 ballots appreciated by the Board of Election Tellers. The questioned ballot, Exh. S, together with blank questioned ballot, was found by the Committee in the small compartment for spoiled ballots. It does clearly appear that these two (2) ballots, one of which is Exh. S, are in excess of the 311 ballots actually used and must be considered as "EXCESS BALLOTS" under Sec. 151 of the 1978 Election Code and "shall not be read in the counting of votes." In view of the foregoing considerations, the ruling of the lower court on Exh. S is hereby reversed, and this ballot shall not be counted as a vote of protestee-appellee and therefore deducted from him. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)

We affirm.

Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY" was written in the spare for Barangay Captain. "BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. Section 155 (11) of the 1978 Election Code provides:

11. The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when they were used as a means to identify the voter, in which case the whole ballot is invalid: Provided, That if the nickname used is unaccompanied by the name or surname of a candidate and it is the one by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality and stated in his


certificate of candidacy, the same shall be counted in favor of said candidate, if there is no other candidate for the same office with the same nickname.

While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was no doubt that the voter intended to vote for "BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner was popularly known and which nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence, the respondent court's decision as regards Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote is counted for petitioner.

Exhibit "6" was invalidated by both respondent court and the city court as stray vote on the ground that petitioner's name, written as "Bo. Barangay Bautista" was placed on the first line intended for councilmen. In the case of Farin v. Gonzales and CA, G.R. No. L-36893, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 237, cited by petitioner, it was ruled that where the name of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for such candidate. Such rule stems from the fact that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. In this case, while the name of petitioner was written in the space for barangay councilman, his name was preceded by the name of the office for which he is being elected, that as Punong Barangay or Barangay Captain (See Exh. "6"). The respondent court ruled that what was placed before the name BAUTISTA was Bo. Barangay and not Po. Barangay for Punong Barangay (or Barangay Captain). We believe however that the voter's intention to vote for BAUTISTA as Barangay Captain was present and said vote should be counted in favor of petitioner.

Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot cannot be considered as a vote for petitioner whose name was written seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing of a name more than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no other purpose than to identify the ballot (Katigbak v. Mendoza, L-24477, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 543).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5" and "6". Private respondent Roberto Miguel in declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of twenty-two (22) votes. The temporary restraining order issued Court on December 2, 1982 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* This was the correct procedure under BP 222, as allowed by the 1973 Constitution. Art. IX, Sec. 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution now requires the appeal to be made directly to the Commission on Elections (see Flores v. Commission on Elections, 184 SCRA 484).

1 Under BP. 222, Sec. 3, the term of office of the barangay officials elected under this Act shall be six years, which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have been elected and shall have qualified. This term however was cut short by Proclamation No. 3 of the President dated March 25, 1986 particularly Sec. 2 of Art. 111 thereof, which provides:

Sec. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

Under the present administration, the first barangay election was conducted on March 28, 1989 by virtue of R.A. 6679 which provides in Section 1 thereof:

Sec. 1. The elections of barangay officials set on the second Monday of November 1988 by Republic Act No. 6653 are hereby postponed and reset to March 28, 1989. They shall serve a term which shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994.


REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6466

AN ACT CREATING A BRANCH OFFICE OF THE REGISTER

OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEZON, WITH

PERMANENT STATION AT THE MUNICIPALITY OF

GUMACA, SAME PROVINCE AND AUTHORIZING THE

APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE

Section 1. There is hereby created a branch office of the

Register of Deeds of the Province of Quezon, with

permanent station at the Municipality of Gumaca, same

province, which shall perform all the duties and

functions of the register of deeds for the entire second

congressional district of the said province which

comprises the Municipalities of Agdangan, Alabat,

Atimonan, Buenavista, Calauag, Catanauan, General

Luna, Guinayangan, Gumaca, Lopez, Macalelon,

Mulanay, Padre Burgos, Perez, Pitogo, Plaridel, Quezon,

San Andres, San Francisco, San Narciso, Tagkawayan

and Unisan.

Section 2. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there

is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of any

funds in the National Treasury not otherwise

appropriated, the sum of thirty-eight thousand seventy-

pesos which shall be spent for the following:

(a) One deputy register of deeds P6,798.00

(b) One supervising clerk I4,544.00

(c) Two clerks at P2,424.004,848.00

(d) One cash clerk 2,560.00

(e) One janitor-messenger 2,160.00

(f) One laborer 2,160.00

(g) Sundry expenses 15,000.00

Total 38,070.00

=======

Such sum as may be necessary for the same purpose in

the subsequent years shall be included in the annual

General Appropriations Act.

Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 17, 1972.

Date post:	19-Jan-2016
Category:	Documents
Upload:	algene-cutamora
View:	16 times
Download:	1 times