Prelude to a Mission-War and Diplomacy, 1973-1979

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CHAPTER2

Prel ude t o aMssi on : War andDpl omacy, 1973-1979

I n the context of the peace t reaty between Egypt and I s rael , the

Uni ted States i s prepared t o provi de extraordi nary assi st ance i n order t ohel p I srael i n rel ocati on of Si nai m l i t a r y f ac i l i t i es to theNegev

Secretaryof DefenseHarol dBrown, 19March 1979 1

On6October 1973, the armd forces of Egypt andSyri a

l aunchedsurpri seattacks agai nst I srael . Careful l yt i medandcoordi -nated, the bl ows took pl ace onYomKi ppur, the hol i est day of the

J ewsh year . I n i t i a l l y , both offensi ves succeeded I n the north the

Syri ans sent the I sr ael i s reel i ng fromhe GolanHei ghts . I n thesouth the Egypti ans crossed the Suez Canal andpenetrateddeep

i nto the Si nai peni nsul a Wthi n twoweeks the I s rael i s , ai ded by

massi ve i nfusi ons of Amricansuppl i es andequi pment , turned the

ti deonboth fronts . Thecease- f i re agreements of 22October i n the

northand24October i n the south foundthe I srael Defense Force

shakenbut i n control andtheborders of 5October vi r t ual l y i ntact . 2The1973war broke the pol i t i cal andml i tary deadl ock i n the

Mddl eEast.Arabforces f ought far better than theyhad

i nanyear-

l i e r conf l i ct andshowedamastery of el ectroni c warfare that por

tendedheavy I srael i casual ti es i n any future conf l i ct . Thewarforced I srael to reassess Arabml i tary capabi l i t i es andto cal cul ate

anewthe costs of cont i nui ng the occupati on of the Si nai peni n-

sul a 3Bythe samtoken, theArabsuccesses di d agreat deal to i m

prove sel f -esteemamng I srael ' s enemes, parti cul arl y Egypt,

whosearmhaddoneextremel ywel l i n the f i r s t days of thewar 4

"There i s nodoubt, " I s rael i Presi dent andhi stori anChaimHerzog

concl uded, "that the i n i t i a l Arab success i n theYomKi ppur War

sat i sf i ed thei r feel i ngs of nati onal honour . " 5 I n addi t i on to al teri ng

theml i tarybal ance, thewar l ed to avast l y i ncreasedcommtmnt

by the Uni ted States t o peaceands t ab i l i t y i n theMddl e East . ThenewAmri can i nvol vement beganwth thewart i me ai r l i f t of m-

t er i el to I sr ael . TheAmricanpresence grewaf ter thewar, andthe



8 BULDNGAIRBASESI NTHENEGEV

ensui ng oi l embargoi mposedbyArabmembers of theOrgani za-

ti onof Petrol eumExporti ngNati ons (OPEC) showed thenewml -i t ar y andeconomc power of theArabnati ons . After 1973"tri angu-

l ar dipl omcy, " wth the Uni ted States as i ntermedi ary betweenI srael andtheArabnati ons-parti cul arl yEgypt-becameaf act of

regional negotiati ons.

I n theyears that fol l owed the war, theUni ted States pursued

several obj ecti ves i n theMddle East . Foremost was avoi dance ofwar, whi chhadthepotential to growi ntoamaj or regional conf l i ctand l ead to Soviet i nvolvement or even a confrontati on between

thesuperpowers OherUS . goal s i ncludedcontai nment of Soviet

influence, ;protectionof accessto

o i l ,andassuranceof I srael ' s sur-

vi val . To these concerns, al l of whi ch existed i n one formor an-

other prior to 1973, wasaddedan important newpurpose theim

provement of relati ons andeconomc t i es wth Arab states, most

notabl ySaudi Arabi aandEgypt . 'Egypt' s i nterests coi ncidedwth t hi s Ameri cangoal . Presi dent

Anwar Sadat was di ssat i sf i ed wth Soviet support duri ng theOcto-

ber war . Moreover, Egypt vi ewed i mproved relati ons wth the

Uni ted States as away

to pressure I srael whi le achievingamore

bal anced relati onshipwth the superpowers I n 1974 Sadat re-

storeddipl omti c relationswth theUni ted States, endi ngaseven-

year break Egypt al so accepted Ameri can i nvolvement i n disen-

gagement tal ks wth I srael . A though frustrated i n i t s efforts to

obtai nAmeri canarm, Egypt mintai nedgood relationswth the

Uni ted States throughout the presidencies of R chardNxonand

Geral dFord $

Ameri candi pl omacyi nthe

Mddl eEast duri ng thoseadmnis-

trati ons was marked by the "shuttle di pl omacy" of Secretary of

StateHenryKi ssinger Flying f romoneArab capi tal to another as

wel l as to I srael andhomefor consul tati ons, Ki ssinger sought away

to conveneageneral peaceconferencewhi l ecurbi ngSoviet i nf l u-

ence Hsefforts to createa basi s for agreement between theArab

states, I srael , andthePalestinians as wel l as thesuperpowersnever

reached frui tion 9 St i l l , hi s di pl omacyhad twomaj or long-lasting

resul ts . Hs overturesmarked thebegi nni ngof apersistent Ameri -

canquest for anArab-Israel i settl ement . I n time, even many I s-

rael i s came to appreciate t hi s commtment bytheUni ted States, es-

pecial ly the economc andmli tary hel p that camewth i t . I n

addi ti on, Ki ssinger convi nced twoArab nati ons-Egypt andJ or-

dan-to si t at the tablewth I srael . Thei r unprecedentedDecem

ber 1973meeti ng i n Geneva, Swtzerland, beganthe l ongprocess

leadingto a peacetreatybetweenEgypt and I srael . "



PRELUDETOAMSSION 9

So, whenDemocr at i c Presi dent J i mmyCarter took o f f i c e i n J an-uary 1977, certai n breakt hr oughs hadal ready beenmade Some d i -rect t a l k s had t aken pl ace, and di sengagement agreements hadbeen r eached on

bothf ronts . The

Car t er admni st rat i on, wi t h asubst ant i al i nterest i n the M ddl e East rooted part l y i n the pr es i -dent ' s personal commtment, hada spr i ngboard f or f ur ther e f f o r t st oward peace . Carter ' s approach to t he Arab- I srael i c o n f l i c t , basedl argel yona Br ooki ngs I nsti tuti on report of 1975, di f f ered fromthatof Nxon and Ford Thenewpresi dent abandoned step-by- step s o -l uti ons through shutt l e di pl omacy . I nst ead, he sought away t o ne-goti ate a compr ehensi ve peace agreement . The Carter admni st ra-t i o n f e l t t hat a bi l ateral accord between Egypt and I srael that

i gnored Pal est i ni an aspi rat i ons woul d not be i n the best i nterest ofthe Uni t ed States . Sucha deal woul danger Saudi Arabi a and coul deven provoke anot her Arab oi l embargo Moreover , the Amer i canss t i l l consi dered a regi onal peace to be attai nabl e through a generalconf erence i n Geneva Carter sai d publ i cl y that such an agreementshoul d i ncl ude a Pal est i ni an " e n t i t y " on the West Bank of the J or-dan Ri v er , i n t he area I s r a e l cal l ed J udea and Samari a, seri ousl ydampeningany I s r a e l i ent husi asmf or such a conf erence . "

I n any c a s e , t he Uni t ed States was under consi derabl e pressureto reduce tensi ons and s t a b i l i z e condi t i ons i n t he Mddl e East .When the Shah' s r egi me i n I ran f e l l apart ear l y i n 1979 and gaveway to a f undamental i st Musl imgovernment , the Uni t ed States l o s t

amaj or a l l y. Moreover , t he Sovi et Uni onandCubaweremaki ng i n -

roads i n Af ri ca, notabl y i n Ethi opi a and t he former Portuguesecol oni es of Mozambi queandAngol a Thi s si tuati on demanded ac -

t i on that woul d end Egypt' s conf r ontat i on wi t h I s r a e l and enabl e

Egypt to deal wi t h the threat of Sovi et expansi on f romhe south. "Fromal most the o u t s e t , the Carter admni str at i on' s i nterest i n

the M ddl e East was marked by a deepmutual af f ecti on and r e -

spect between Carter and Sadat . They f i r s t met i n Wshington i n

Apri l 1977 Accordi ng to Sadat , Car t er was " amanwho under-stands what I want , aman i mpel l ed by the power of rel i gi ous f a i t h

and l o f t y val ues-a f armer l i k e me. " " Cart er too wrot e warmy of

thei r under st andi ng : " Ther e was an easy and natural f ri endshi p be-

t ween us f romthe f i r s t moment I knewAnwar Sadat . W trusted

each other . " "

Thi s harmony di d not keep Sadat f romsurpri si ng Car t er al ong

wi th the rest of t he worl dwhenhe of f ered to goto J er usal emThe

Egypt i an presi dent ' s announcement ast oni shed t he Peopl e' s As-

sembl y i n Cai r o on9November 1977 . El even days l a t e r he stood

bef ore Prime M ni ster MenachemBegi n and the I s r a e l i parl i a-

ment , cal l ed the Knesset, t e l l i ng I s r ae l and t he worl d he wanted




peace Sadat' s astoundi nggesture, whi chshi f ted thef ocus of nego-

t i at i ons froman overa l settl ement to bi l at er al t al ks betweenEgypt

andI srael , drewmxedresponses . Egypti ans andI srael i s al i ke we -

comedhi s dari ng act.TheWestern democraci es expressed p ea-

sureandopti msmregardi ng a settl ement . Sadat' s Arab al l i es, on

the other hand, were appal l ed Syri asevered re ati ons wth Egypt,

andl eaders i nmanycountri es of theMddl eEast ca l ed for Sadat' s

assassi nati on.Sadat sai d the t r ip , whi chCarter ca l ed "amongthe most dra-

mati c events of modern hi story, " emanatedfromthe need f or a

newapproach I mpati ent wt h protocol anddi p omacy, he sought

awayaround the forma i ti es andprocedural preoccupati ons that

fettered di pl omacyWenhe f i r s t consi deredJ erusal em he saw tas al ocati on for a meeti ng of potenti a parti ci pants i n aGeneva

conf erence Ameeti ng there, he i ni t i al l y be i eved, coul d prepare

f or themoref ormal conf erence Suchagatheri ngcoul dal somake

cl ear t o I srael theprerequi si tes for anyseri ous negoti ati ons : wth-

drawal f romoccupi ed ter r i tor i es andacceptance o£a Pa esti ni an

state ThenSadat rej ected th i s approach i n f avor of the v i s i t that

start l ed theworl dand redi rected the f ocus of di scussi ons f roma

broadframework to b l atera tal ks . 16 Begi n' s bi ographer ca l ed

Sadat' sgrandgesture "a t ypi cal broaddramati c stroke. " 11

Several other factors underl ay Sadat' s deci si on Troub es at

home duri ng 1977, notab y theJ anuary ri ots after reducti on of

f ood pri cesubsi di es andthe rest i veness of f undamental i st Musl im

groups, mayhave convi ncedhimhat thesurvi va of hi s regi mewas

at stakeAeace agreement that returned theSinai t o Egypt and

brought newWstern i nvestment mght save the si tuati on AGenevaconf erence promsed to dragon for months wthout sub-stanti ve resul ts . Sadat' s pri maryconcerns i ncl uded mai ntai ni nghi s

presi dencyandpreservi ng Egypt' s soverei gntyandnati ona honor

Thecountryhadal readysp l l edmuchbloodandspent heavi l yon

thePa esti ni ancauseandwas at best ambi val ent toward conti nui ng

such outl ays . In t h i s framework the return of the Sinai took p r i -

macy Sadat waswl l i ng to r i s k ostraci smwthi n theArabcommu-

ni ty to attai n i t . "Ki ssi nger r cl ai med that i t wasArabnature "t o be i evethat some

epi c event or persona i ty w l l mracul ousl y t ranscend thehum

drummess that i s the usua human condi t i on. "" I f such a ten

dencyexi sted, Sadat' s bol dness andi mpati ence sure y ref l ected i t .

However, he thought careful l y about ther i sks bef oretakingacti on20

Accordi ng to Ki ssi nger, Sadat "understood that aheroi c gesture

can create a t newreal i t y . 1121 He hadacted i n agrandandunpre-

di ctab emanner i n thepast, expe l i ng thousands of Sovi et advi sers



PRELUDETOAMSSION

and t echni ci ans fromEgypt i n 1972 andr eopeni ng t he Suez Canalthree years l a t e r . 2 2 AsABCreport er Doreen Kays observed, Sadat"was an Arab l eader wi t h a hi story f or surpri ses . " 23 He al so knewf romexperi ence t he p o s s i b i l i t i e s of such a c t s . I n 1956, al t hough amember of t he Egypt i an Revol ut i onary Command Counci l , hewassurpr i sed by Presi dent Gamal Abdel Nasser' s nat i onal i zat i on of t heSuez Canal . Done i n r e t a l i a t i o n f or t he deni al of f i nanci al ai d f ort he great damat Aswan by t he Uni t ed States and t he I nt ernat i onalBank, t he sei zure e l e c t r i f i e d Egypt and st unned t he wor l d . Sadatnot ed adm ri ngl y i n hi s aut obi ography that t h i s grandand s t i r r i n gact made Nasser "an Egypt i an mythi cal hero . " 2 4

But there was more behi nd t he J erusal em t r i p . O al l t he Arab

nat i ons, Egypt hadby f ar t hemost i n common wi t h I s r a e l . The t wocount r i es shared a B r i t i s h col oni al background-Sadat and Begi nboth had been i nvol ved i n armed pl ot s agai nst Br i t i sh rul e-andhadmade hal t i ng andunsuccessf ul e f f o r t s at accommodati on .

25 Sostrong was t h i s commonal i ty that I s r a e l i Lt . Gen . Davi d El azar r e-

f lected i n 1972 that i t was unf or t unat e that I s r a e l and Egypt di dnot ex i s t i n i sol at i on . "Lef t t o our own devi ces, " El azar s ai d, "wewoul d have sol ved t he poi nt s of cont ent i on between us e a s i l y and

l ong ago. " 26J ust t wo months bef ore Sadat went t o J erusal em bot hnat i ons had secret l y probed t he ext ent of t h i s shared i nt erest . For-ei gn M ni st er MosheDayan hadmet wi t h an Egypt i an represent a-

t i v e , Dr . Hassan Tuham, i n Rabat , Morocco, and expl or ed t he pos-

s i b i l i t i e s f or a peace based on t he ret urn of t he Si nai t o Egypt .Oher i ssues rai sed at t hei r meeti ng i ncl uded Pal est i ni an ri ght s

and t he status of t e r r i t o r i e s occupi ed by I s r a e l after t he Si x- Day

Wr i n 1967 . 2 'Not onl y f or i t s grandeur di d Sadat ' s gest ure pl ease t he I s r a e l i s .

I s r a e l l acked ent husi asm f or mul t i nat i onal peace t a l k s , pref err i ng

separate di scussi ons wi t h each of i t s nei ghbor s . Egypt i an Forei gn

M ni st er I smai l Fahmy, who r esi gned i n prot est when Sadat an-

nounced hi s wi l l i ngness t o v i s i t J erusal em thought Begi n saw

Sadat ' s over t ure as a chance t o move away f roma general conf er -

ence and i nto t a l k s wi t h Egypt al one . Later, Cart er came t o a s i m -

l ar concl usi on . He thought I srael sought a separate peace wi t h

Egypt that assured ret ent i on of t he Wst Bank and Gaza whi l eavoi di ng t a l k s wi t h J ordan and t he Pal est i ni ans . Sadat ' s gest ure

al so s a t i s f i e d Begi n f or reasons qui t e unrel at ed t o I s r a e l i f orei gn

pol i cy Af t er al most t h i r t y years i n opposi t i on, Begi n' s Herut party

cont rol l ed a gover ni ng coal i t i on . He had been i n of f i ce barel y a

year when Sadat arr i ved i n J erusal em The v i s i t great l y enhanced

t he Begi n government ' s publ i c accept ance and support . 2 8



1 2

Theonl y i mmedi atel y apparent concrete r esul t of Sadat ' s con-ci l i atoryj ourneywas a ser i es of m l i t ar y negoti ati ons t hat began i nCai ro i n J anuary 1978 The tal ks between the I srael i teaml ed byMni ster of Defense Ezer Wizmann and Egypti an GeneralMuhammadAbdal -Ghani al -Gamassi cl ar i f i ed I srael i concerns re-

gardi ng the Si nai . I srael had never gi venupan establ i shed set t l e-

mnt and i nsi sted on keepi ng the towns i n the northeastern cor-ner of the Si nai . I srael al so had a network of m l i t ar y bases on thepeni nsul a These provi ded a strong defense and al l owed di sper salof combat ai rc raf t over an area f ar l arger than what hi stori an

HowardSachar cal l ed "the narrow and vul nerabl e, wedge of i nt e-

gr al I srael . " 29 Egypt was j ust as adamant : the settl ements and bases

had t o go . For Sadat the i ssue was sover ei gnt y, andhe woul d acceptno I srael i presence i n the Si nai . The posi t i ons of both govern-

mentsmadea deadl ock seem nevi t abl e .

Negoti ati ons f oundered through the f i r s t hal f of 1978 Then

Carter asked Begi n and Sadat t o meet hi matCampDavi d Thi s i n-

vi t at i on ref l ec ted the strong Ameri can commtment t o a Mddl e

East sol ut i on but was not born of any opti msmon Car t er ' s part .He thought success unl i kel y, but he knewno better way t o restore

mmentumo the peace t al ks . Much t o the sur pr i se of nearl y al lobservers, Begi n and Sadat accepted the i nvi tat i on f or a meeti ng

i n ear l y September . "

At the pr esi dent i al retreat i n Maryl and' s Catocti n Mountai ns,

the i ssues spl i t i nto those pertai ni ng t o a general regi onal peace

and others rel at i ng t o a treaty between Egypt and I srael . Strenuous

and f rustrati ng negoti ati ons resol ved onl y the l at t er questi ons .Af ter a week of tal ks, the I srael i r ef usal t o remove the Si nai set t l e-

ments seemed t o create a deadl ock Begi n f i n a l l y yi el ded I n thef i nal anal ysi s, he l acked the emoti onal t i e t o the Si nai t hat woul d

makehi mresi st even consi derati on of gi vi ng up the ter r i tor i es t hat

he cal l ed J udea andSamari a TheSi nai was not part of Eretz Y i s r a e l ,

the t r adi t i onal l and of I srael . So he agreed t o l eave the peni nsul a,

convi nced par t l y by Car t er ' s warni ng t hat he woul d end the t al ks

and publ i c l y bl ame Begi n f or t hei r f ai l ure . Onthe other hand, Sec-

retary of Defense Harol d Brownof fered an i ncenti ve : hel p i n

bui l di ng l ar ge Negev ai r bases as repl acements f or the Si nai f i el ds .Heal so promsed t o have the newf aci l i t i es compl etedbefore I srael

f i ni shed i t s evacuati onof the Si nai .

The of f er t o hel pwth base constructi on was a strong i nduce-

mnt t omakean otherwse unpal atabl e concessi on I srael consi d-

ered the Si nai bases, whi ch were bui l t af t er the capture of the

peni nsul a duri ng the 1967war , very i mportant . The I srael i s r el i ed

heavi l y on ai r power, and the Si nai gave I srael str at egi c depth The

BULDNGAI RBASES I NTHENEGEV



PRELUDETOAMSSION 13

Egypt i an Ai r Force, whose pl anes had once been at El Ar i sh onl yseven mnutes fromTel Av i v , was nowmore t han t went y mnutesaway on t he west bank of t he Suez Canal . The I s r a e l i Ai r Force, ont he ot her hand, di sper sed i t s f a c i l i t i e s throughout t he r egi on,

whi ch was near l y three t i mes as l ar ge as I s r a e l pr oper . The Si naigave I s r a e l gr eat : f reedomof acti on and vast t r a c t s f o r t r ai ni ng andmaneuver . Al r eady consi der ed by many t he best a i r f or ce i n t hewor l d, t he I s r a e l i Ai r Force pr i zed t he w de open spaces of t heSi nai . "

Wei zmann, who was a f ormer a i r f o r ce pi l ot , r epeat edl ystressed t he i mpor t ance of t he bases t o I s r a e l i secur i t y Gener alMordechai Gur , chi ef of s t a f f of t he I s r a e l Def ense Force at t he

t i me of CampDavi d, agr eed w t hWi zmann, who sawgr eat r i s k s i nconcent r at i ng t he a i r f o r c e ' s pl anes i n f ewer bases . Wei zmannwasw l l i ng t o gi ve up Sharme l Shei kh, whi ch cont r ol l ed wat er bor neaccess t o t he I s r a e l i por t of E i l a t . He al so was w l l i ng t o gi ve upl ar ge chunks of t e r r i t o r y , but not t he a i r f i e l d s . 3 3 " I f we gi ve themup, " he commented hal f i n j e s t , " we s ha l l have t o buy an a i r c r a f t

car r i er . " "The I s r a e l i s were especi al l y concerned about t he t wo l ar gest

bases . Ei tami n t he northern Si nai pr ovi ded i n- dept h def enseagai nst an attack fromEgypt . Et zi on t o t he south protected navi gat i o n t hr ough t he S t r a i t s of Ti r an t o E i l a t and cover ed I s r a e l ' s sout h-er n f l ank agai nst attack f rombot h Egypt and Saudi Ar abi a . The

base may have had ot her uses as wel l : one newspaper cl ai med thatt he I s r a e l i pl anes that dest r oyed t he I r aqi nucl ear pl ant at Osi r aki nJ une 1981 came f romEt zi on . " Nei t her base was ever compl et ed,but some exper t s consi der ed Et zi on t o be "the f i nest t acti cal

f i ght er base i n t he wor l d .1136Wei zmann deci ded that I s r a e l woul d

have t o gi ve up t he bases t o get a peace agreement . At Camp Davi dhe asked Brown about Ameri can ai d i n bui l di ng r epl acement s,hopi ng t o commt t he Uni t ed States to const r uct i on pr i or t o wth-

dr awal and t her eby t o s h i f t t he cost of r el ocat i on f rom he over bur -dened I s r a e l i economy Brown r eadi l y agr eed t o t he p o s s i b i l i t y ,

prompti ngWei zmann t o concl ude that t he Ameri can had a n t i c i -

pat ed t he r equest . Ther eaf t er , Begi n saw t he choi ce as ei t her t he

a i r f i e l d s or peace . He opt ed f or t he l a t t e r.

Bef or e l eavi ng t he pr esi dent i al r e t r e a t , Begi n and Sadat si gnedt wo documents . The "Framework f or t he Concl usi on of a Peace

Treaty between Egypt and I s r a e l " of 17 September 1978 f ol l owed

t he concept examnedbyTuham andDayan i n Rabat . I t pr ovi ded

f or return of t he Si nai t o Egypt andw t hdr awal of al l I s r a e l i forces

and set t l ement s . I t l i m t e d Egypt i an use of abandoned I s r a e l i a i r -

f i e l d s t o c i v i l i a n pur poses and guar ant eed passage t o Ei l at and




CampDavi d accords . Pr esi dent Sadat , Presi dent C a r t e r , andPri meM ni s ter

Begi n si gni ng t he agr eement .

through the Suez Canal for I s r ael i sh ps . Thi s document became

the basi s for the t rea ty si gned i n Washi ngton on 26 March 1979Theother agreement concerned ageneral regi onal peace The

"Framework for Peace i n theMddl e East" expressed the i nt er es t s

of both nati ons i n "a j us t , comprehensi ve, anddurabl e settl ement

of the Mddl e East conf l i ct . " I t al so l e f t the i ssues of Palesti ni an

r i ght s and the I s r ael i occupati on of theWst Bank, Gaza, and the

Gol anHei ghts openfor negoti ati ons . " Wthnoneof thekey i ssues

regardi ng thePalesti ni ans and the t er r i t or i es deci ded, the overal l

agreement wasextremelyambi guous . So theCampDavi doutcome

amounted to aseparate peace between I s rael andEgypt, a resul t

that di d not get to thecrux of the regi onal problemandthat had

not been sought by theUni ted States or Egypt . 3 9

The f rameworks madeno reference t o Ameri can pl edges of

ai d to ei ther party I n fact , as Carter poi nted out , fewpromses of

anyki nd weremade Carter agreed only " t o v i s i t Egypt andto con

sul t wth I s rael onhowwe mght hel p wth moving the Si nai a i r -



PRELUDETOAMSSION 15

i mport ance of t he bases . Brown knewthat t he I s r a e l i s rel i ed heav-i l y on thei r a i r f orce f or def ense . I n a l e t t e r to Wei zmann l a t e r i nSeptember , he spel l ed out t heAmeri canunder st andi ng of the cru-c i a l i mportance of I s r a e l i a i r power and t he promse to di scuss

hel p wi t h rel ocat i on.

Brown understood "the speci al urgency andp r i o r i t y " I s r a e l at t ached to prepar i ng newbases " i n l i g h t of i t s con-vi cti on that i t cannot s a f e l y l eave the Si nai a i r bases u n t i l the newones are operat i onal . " He suggest ed t a l k s on thei r scope and costandonAmeri can ai d that mght f a c i l i t a t e const ructi on . The p r e s i -dent , Brownnoted, stood ready to seek congressi onal author i ty f orwhatever ai d the Uni t ed States mght of f er . "

CampDavi d evoked a vari ety of responses . I n the Uni t ed States

andWestern Europe, publ i c opi ni on general l y suppor t ed the a c -cords . Begi n and Sadat shared the Nobel Peace Pri ze . HowardSachar cal l ed the agreement "a goodarrangement f or both si des . "

Egypt obtai ned t he terri tory i t had l o s t i n 1967 ; I s r a e l won a r e a s -sur i ng tr ansi ti on per i od dur i ng whi ch i t coul d t e s t Egypt i an i nten-t i ons pri or t o wi t hdrawal as wel l as peace wi th i t s most f ormdabl eml i tary f oe . The Arab response di f f ered dramat i cal l y f romtheWestern reacti on . The anger t r i ggered by Sadat ' s t r i p to J er usal em

cont i nued unabated. Egypt under Nasser hadbeen l eader of the

Arab wor l d ; nowthe count ry was bei ng v i l i f i e d . At a h a s t i l y cal l edconf erence i n Baghdad, I r a q , l eaders of most Arab s t a t e s voi cedthei r outrage, whi l e the oi l exporters of the Persi an Gul f deci dedto cut of f thei r once subst ant i al f i nanci al ai d t o Egypt . Arab r e j e c -

ti on shocked andwoundedSadat . 4 2

The separat i on of Egypt fromtheArabmai nst reambecame anenduri ng f eature of regi onal l i f e . I n 1983, f our years af ter the

treaty was concl uded, I s r a e l ' s nei ghbor s remainedadamant . Arab

del egates at a conf erence of nonal i gned nat i ons i n I ndi a won ap-proval fromrepresentat i ves of 101 nat i ons f or a resol ut i on con-demni ng the Camp Davi d agreement . Nowhere i n theArabwor l d

was t he sense of betrayal and outrage greater than i n Syri a The

Syr i ans needed unremt t i ng Egypt i an pressure on I s r a e l , whi ch

had occupi ed the Gol an Hei ghts a f t e r t he 1967 war, endi ng 450years of Damascus - based control . They f eared that the endof Egyp-ti an h o s t i l i t y mght tempt I s r a e l to s o l i d i f y i t s hol d on t he Gol an

Hei ghts . Event s ul t i matel y j ust i f i ed t h i s concern I srael annexedt he hei ght s i n December 1981 . Thereaf ter, Syri an opposi t i on to

anyaccommodati onwi t h t he I s r a e l i s and t o theCampDavi d accordsonl y grewmore i nt ransi gent . 4 3

I n Egypt t he agreement wonwi de accl ai m a l be i t wi th s i g n i f i c a n t

except i ons . Some key o f f i c i a l s resi gned i n protest, among them

Fahmy' s successor i n t he f orei gn mni stry, I brahi mKam l . The ac -



16 BULDNGAIRBASESINTHENEGEV

cordwth I sr ael al so contri buted t o theal i enati onof fundamental i st

Musl i m, someof whomassassinatedSadat i nOctober 1981 44

The agreement even recei ved mxed revi ews i n I srael , whch

seemed to some the most obvious benefi ci ary After a l l , the ac-

cords brought thepromse of peacewth i t s most powerful nei gh

bor However, I srael ' s argumentati veandcontenti ous pol i t i cal cul -

turemadeunani mtyunl i kel y i n anycase . Opponents i ncl uded the

rel i g ous ri ghtjust as i t di d i n Egypt-and even members of

Pri meMni ster Beg n' s governi ng coal i ti on Publ i c rel ati ons ad-

vi ser Shmue Katz opposed even the imp i ci t recogni ti on of Pal es-

ti ni an pol i t i cal r i ght s i n the "Framework for Peace i n theMddl e

East" and theunprecedentedabandonment of the settl ements on

the Si nai coast . Forei gnMni ster Yi tzhak Shamr, DefenseMni sterAri el Sharon, andChai rmanMosheArens of theKnesset Commt-

teeonSecuri ty andForei gnRel ati ons al l opposedthe agreement,

parti cul arl y i f i t meant g vi ngupsettl ements. " Onl yi n the demo-

crati c Wst di d theaccordswnnearl yuni versal approval .

Theagreement set the stage for newdevel opments i n rel ati ons

between theUni ted States and I srael . After the si gni ng, hi gh- l evel

Ameri can o f f i c i a l s for the f i r s t ti me referred to I srael as an al l y .

Thi snewcloseness, whi chul timatel y l edto the1981memorandumon strateg c cooperati on, was underscored i n 1979 by the Si xth

Fl eet' s cal l at theport of Hai fa A so i n the sameyear cameanew

ki ndof Ameri canai d, theconstructi onof twonewai r bases for the

I srael i Ai r F' orce . 4s



PRELUDETOAMSSION 1 7

Notes

1 . L t r , Brown t o Mni ster of Defense EzerWei zmann, 19Mar 79, METGi l e s ,

OASD( I SA) .

2 For a conci se nar r at i ve of the October war , see Herzog, TheAr a b- I s r a el i War s,

pp 227-323 Someexcel l ent andmoredet ai l ed accounts of the war i nclude the

f ol l ow ng AvrahamAdan, On t he Banks of t he Suez : An I s r a e l i Gener al ' s Per sonal Ac

count of t he YomKi ppur War (SanRaf ael , Cal i f . : Pr es i di o Pr ess, 1980) ; Hanoch Bar -

t o v , Dado 48Year s and20Days, t r ans . I naFreedman (Tel Avi v : Ma' ar i vBook Gui l d,

1981) ; ChaimHerzog, The War of At onement , Oct ober 1973 (Boston, Mass . : L i t t l e,

Brown&Co , 1975) ; ; Edgar OBal l ance, No V i c t o r , No Vanqui shed: The YomKi ppur

War (San Raf ael , Cal i f . : Pr es i di o Pr ess, 1978) ; Saad el Shazl y, The Cr ossi ng of t he

Suez (SanFr anci sco, Cal i f . : Ameri canMdeast Research, 1980) .

3 HowardMSachar , AHi stor y of I s r a e l : Fromt he Ri se of Zi oni sm t o Our Ti me(NewYork AfredAKnopf, 1976), p 826 Herzog, The Ar a b- I s r a el i War s, p. 321 ; I s -

mai l Fahmy, Negot i at i ngf or Peace i n t he M ddl e East ( Bal t i mor e, Md: J ohns Hopki ns

Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1983) , p 34 Henry Ki ssi nger , Y e a r s of Upheaval (Boston Li t t l e,

Brown&Co, 1982) , pp 460-61, 476

4 Anwar el Sadat , I n Sear ch of I d e n t i t y : AnAut obi ogr aphy (NewYork : Harper and

Row 1977), pp 249, 270 I t i s di f f i cu l t t o overemphasi ze the importance of the

i ni t i al tri umphs t o Egypti annati onal pri de and sel f - est eem For some i dea of the

i nf l uenceof t hese vi ct or i es, see TheBook of t he I nt er nat i onal Symposi umon t he 1973

Oct ober War , Cai r o 28- - 31 Oct ober 1975 [Cai ro Mni stry ofWar, 1976] , pp 5, 10, 31,

41, 43, andpassim

5 . Herzog, TheAr a b- I s r a el i War s, p 323

6 Fahmy, Negot i at i ngf or Peace i n t h eM ddl eEast , p 34 Sachar, AHi st or y of I s r a e l ,

p 818 Ki ssi nger , Year s of Upheaval , pp 612-13

7 Pat r i ck Seal e, "The Egypt - I sr ael Treatyand I t s I mpl i cat i ons, " Wor l d Today 35

(May 1979) : 189 Paul J abber, "U S . I nt er es ts andRegional Secur i t y i n the Mddl e

East , " Daedal us 109 (Fal l 1980) : 69 ; Ki ssi nger , Y e a r s of Upheaval , pp 615-16, 644

8 Fahmy, Negot i at i ngf or Peace i n t heM ddl e East , pp 152, 155-57 Herzog, The

Ar ab- I srael i War s, p 321 ; Sadat , I n Sear ch of I d e n t i t y , pp 291-94 Ki ssi nger , Y e a r s of

Upheaval , pp 649, 747-48

9 . Ki ssi nger , Year s of Upheaval , pp 645-46 Sadat, I n Sear ch of I d e n t i t y , pp

294-96 Fahmy, Negot i at i ngf or Peace i n t he M ddl e E a s t , pp 3, 214 .

10 . Davi d Pol l ock, The P o l i t i c s of Pressur e Amer i canArmandI s r a e l i P o l i c y Si nce

t he Si x- Day War , Contri buti ons i n Pol i t i cal Sci ence, no 79 (Wstport, Conn :

Greenwood Pr ess, 1982), pp 166-67 Ki ssi nger , Y e a r s of Upheaval , pp 797-98 .

11 . TowardPeace i n t he M ddl e East : Repor t ofaSt udy Group (Washington, DC :

The Brooki ngs I nst i t ut i on, 1975), passimJ immCar t er , Keepi ngFai t h : Memoi r s of a

Pr esi dent (NewYork : BantamBooks, 1982) , pp 292-95 Fahmy, Negot i at i ngf or Peace

i n t he M ddl e F a s t , pp 189-90, 199 HowardMSachar , Egypt andI s r a e l (NewYork :

Ri chardMarek Publ i sher s , 1981) ,p 262 Mel vi nA Fr i edl ander , Sadat andBegi n:

TheDomest i c P o l i t i c s of Peacemaki ng (Boul der, Col o : Wstvi ewPr ess, 1983) , pp 51,

111 ; RobertOFreedman, "Moscow J erusal em andWashi ngton i n the Begi n

Er a, " i n Robert OFreedman, ed , I s r a e l i n t he Begi n Era (NewYork : Praeger Pub-

l i sher s , 1982), p 161 .

12 Seal e, "TheEgypt - I sr ael Tr eat y, " pp 190-91.

13 Sadat , I n Sear ch of I d e n t i t y , p 302

14 Car t er , Keepi ngFai t h, p 284



18 BULDNGAIRBASESINTHENEGEV

15 . Fahnny, Negot i ati ngf or Peace i n t heMddl e East, pp 243, 297 ; Sachar , Egyptand I s r a e l , pp 266- 67 ; C a r t e r , Keepi ngFai t h, p 309 .

16 . Carter, Keepi ngTai t h, p . 297 ; Sadat, I n Sear ch of I denti ty, pp 303- 04, 306- 07 .

17 . Er i c S i l v e r , Begi n : The Haunted Pr ophet (NewYor k : RandomHouse, 1984) ,

p 174 .18 . Fr i edl ander , Sadat and Begi n, pp 31 , 43-44, 70, 306 Doreen Kay s , Fr ogs

and Scor pi ons : Egypt , Sadat and t he Medi a (London Fr eder i ck Mul l er Li m ted,1984) , p 83 .

19 . Ki s s i nge r , Year s of Upheaval , p 61720 . Carter, Keepi ngFai th, p . 282 ; Fahmy, Negot i at i ngforPeace i n t heMddl eEast,

p 280 ; Mohamed Hei kal , Autumn of Fury The Assassi nat i on of Sadat (NewYor k :

RandomHouse, 1983) , p 64.

21 . Ki s s i nge r , Year s of Upheaval , p 647 .

22 . Sachar , I srael and Egypt , p . 263 .

23 . Kay s , Fr ogs and Scor pi ons, p 1024 Sadat, I nSearch of I dent i t y , pp 142-43 .

25 . Sachar , Egypt and I s r a e l , pp 3, 35- 36, 40- 41, 78- 79 ; Fel i pe Fer nandez-Ar mest o, Sadat andHs Statecraft (London: The Kensal P r e s s , 1982) , p . 150 ; Don-al d Nef f , War r i or s f or J er usal em The Si x Days That Changed t he Mddl e East (NewYor k : Li nden Pr ess / Si mon and Schust er , 1984) , pp 338-39 .

26 . Bar tov, Dado, p . 155 .

27 . Moshe Dayan, Br eakt hr ough : APer sonal Account of t he Egypt - I sr ael Peace Negoti -

ati ons (NewYor k : Al f r edAKnopf , 1981) , pp . 42-54 .

28 . Fahmy, Negot i ati ngf or Peace i n t heMddl e East, p 251 ; C a r t e r , Keepi ngFai th,

p . 409 ; Ef ramTor govni k, "Li kud 1977- 1981 : The Consol i dati on of Power , " i nFr eedman, I sr ael i n t he Begi n Era, pp 20-21 .

29 . Sachar , Egypt and I s r a e l , pp 272- 73 .

30 . I b i d . , pp 276- 77 ; Carter, Keepi ngFai th, p 316 ; S ea l e , "The Egy pt - I s r a el

T r e a t y , " pp 189- 90 .

31 . C a r t e r , Keepi ngFai th, pp 394- 96 ; Sachar , Egypt and I s r a e l , p . 281 . For i n-

s i ght f u l commnts on t he I s r a e l i negot i ati ng s t y l e , see Ki s s i nger , Year s of Upheaval ,

p 539 ; S i l v e r , Begi n, p . 161 .

32 . Sachar , AHi st or y of I s r a e l , p 639 ; TRM l ton, "M deast Sur vey : Pr obl emsand Pr ospects , " Ar For ce Magazi ne 63 ( August 1980) : 71 ; Randol ph S . Chur chi l l

andWnston S . Chur chi l l , The Si x- Day War (Boston : HoughtonMi f f l i n, 1967) , pp89, 194 ; EdwardN Luttwak and Dani el Hor owi t z, The I s r ael i Army 1948-1973

( Cambr i dge, Mass . : Abt Books, 1983) , p 221 ; I nter v ( t el ephone) , aut hor wi t h ColHaywood S . Hansel l I I I , J un 79, Washi ngt on, D C .

33 . Ezer Wei zmann, The Batt l ef or Peace (NewYor k : BantamBooks, 1981) , pp90 , 96, 101, 104, 107, 139, 1 44, 1 70 , 175, 181, 183, 322 .

34 . I b i d . , p 175 .

35 . Wshi ngtonPost, 10J un 81 .

36 Ti me, 30 Mar 81 .

37 . Wei zmann, Batt l e f or Peace, pp . 371- 72 .

38 . Fr i edl ander , Sadat and Begi n, p . 311 ; Sachar , Egypt and I s r a e l , p 282 . Forcopi es of t he f r amewor ks, see Dayan, Br eakthr ough, pp 321-26 .

39 . Pol l ock, Pol i t i cs of Pr essur e, p 226 .

40 . C a r t e r , Keepi ngFai t h, p 402 .

41 . L t r , Brown t o Wei zmann, 28 Sep 78, METG i l e s , OASD ( I SA) ; Ha r t s e l l

i nter vi ew42 . Sachar , Egypt and I s r a e l , pp 282, 291 ; Fr i edl ander , Sadat and Begi n, p 231 ;

Freedman, "Moscow, J er usal em and Washi ngt on, " pp . 173- 76 ; Fer nandez-



PRELUDETOAMSSION 19

Armesto, Sadat andHs Statecraft , pp 134-35, 158-59 Hei kal , Autum of Tury, p

174

43 TheMddl eEast , no 102 ( Apr i l 1983) : 14 Seal e, "The Egypt - I sr ael Tr eat y, "

p 194 Fahmy, Negoti ati ngfor Peace i n t he Mddl e East , p 111 Wash ngton Post , 14

Dec 81 and 11 Dec 83 Stanl eyReed, "Syr i a' s Assad Hs Power andHs Pl an, " New

York TimesMagazi ne, 11 9 Feb 84, pp 59, 64 Newsvi ew4(8November 1983) : 16

44 Sachar, Egypt and I srael , p 290 Hei kal , Autum of Tury, pp 169, 210

Fahmy, Negoti ati ngfor Peace i n t heMddl eEast , p291

45 Freedman, "Moscow J erusal em andWash ngton, " p 175 Shmuel Kat z,

TheHol l owPeace (J erusal emDvi r and theJ erusal emPost , 1981), pp 270, 280, 284

Bernard Avi shai , "The Vi ctory of theNewsrael , " NewYork Revi ewof Books28 (13

August 1981) : 49 ; Internati onal Heral d Tri bune, 3Sep 80 Newsweek, 16Nov 81;

Roger Rosenbl att, "Fromthe Bat t l ef i el d of Bel i ef s, " NewYork Ti mesBookRevi ew88

(6November 1983) : 1 .

46 Pol l ock, Po l i t i c s of Pressure, pp 284-85 .

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Prelude to a Mission-War and Diplomacy, 1973-1979

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