Presented to: International Civil Aviation Organization By: Jeffrey Loague, Acting Director, Runway...

Presented to: International Civil Aviation Organization

By: Jeffrey Loague, Acting Director, Runway Safety & Operational Services

Date: September 2005

Federal AviationAdministration

U.S. National Airspace System:Runway Safety

U. S. National Airspace System: Runway Safety2Federal Aviation

AdministrationSeptember 2005

US Safety Management System Overview

• Goal of the Safety Management System (SMS) implementation is to enhance the safety of the provision of air traffic services:– Provides common framework for identifying, assessing,

mitigating, and tracking safety risk of National Airspace System (NAS) changes

– Includes safety assurance (e.g., evaluations and data analyses)

– Promotes and strengthens safety culture within FAA through training, dissemination of lessons learned, and sharing of safety data

• FAA SMS as documented in FAA SMS Manual will meet ICAO requirements



Safety Risk Management

• Safety Risk Management (SRM) is a component of the SMS

• Formalized proactive approach to the safe provision of air traffic service– Safety-related changes are documented

• Systems• Procedures• Maintenance• Airspace

– Risk is assessed and analyzed– Unacceptable risk is mitigated– Hazards are identified and tracked to resolution– Effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies are assessed– Performance of change is monitored throughout lifecycle



The Runway Incursion Challenge• There are millions of aircraft operations

• Human error is a certainty

• Technology has limitations

• Potentially catastrophic events occur infrequently

• Causes - Consequences are global in nature

• Global proactive risk management is needed



Types of Runway Incursions The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the

occurrence to one or more of the following error types:

• An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:

• An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:

• Less than the required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an aircraft and obstacles (obstacles include vehicles, equipment, and personnel on runways).

• An aircraft landing or departing on a runway closed to aircraft.

Operational Errors

• A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate.

• A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate.

Pilot Deviations

• A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (V/PD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.

• A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (V/PD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.

Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations



Distribution by Type of Runway Incursions

FY 2005 YTD (08/31/05)

PD49%

V/PD 17%

OE/D 34%

Data are preliminary and subject to change



Current FAA Runway Incursion Severity CategoriesOperational dimensions affecting runway incursion severity:

EnvironmentalConditions

Speed ofAircraft and/or

Vehicle

Proximity ofAircraft and/or

Vehicle

Increasing Severity

Category D

Little or no chance of

collision, but meets

the definition of a

runway incursion.

AvailableReaction

Time

Evasive orCorrective

Action

Category C

Separation decreases, but there is ample time and distance to avoid a potential collision.

Category B

Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision.

Category A

Separation decreases

and participants take

extreme action to

narrowly avoid a

collision, or the event

results in a collision.



Severity Distribution of Runway Incursions

FY 2005 YTD (08/31/05)

A 4%

B 5%

C 29%D

62%

Data are preliminary and subject to change



Category A Incursion - Boston



Category D Incursion

The potential for a collision is low, but by definition, a Runway Incursion has taken place.



Runway Incursions 2002-2004(Preliminary Data)• Entering runway safety area in front of an

aircraft landing – 45% of all runway incursions– 69% of landing aircraft went around

• Entering runway safety area in front of an aircraft taking off – 32% of all runway incursions– 38% of aircraft aborted– 45% rotated before reaching the intersection– 17% rotated after reaching the intersection



Common ATC Errors inRunway Incursions• Forget (about a closed runway, a

clearance that they issued, an aircraft waiting to take off or cleared to land)

– “Prospective memory” – Remembering to do something later is the weakest function of human memory

• Distractions, interruptions – Number one enemy of memory

• Unusual or temporary occurrences (such as vehicle on the runway, wrong altitude for direction) are easy to forget about



Operational Errors Involving TIPHTime Between Isssuance of TIPH and Resulting

Event

0123456

CCR-T-98-

01

CRG-T-98-01

MDW-T-98-002

LGA-T-98-03

SJC-T-00-

02

MDW-T-00-

02

MDW-T-00-

01

FLL-T-01-01

FFZ-T-01-

01

SRQ-T-03-001

Operational Error

Tim

e (i

n m

inu

tes)



Common ATC Errors inRunway Incursions (continued)

• Lack of (or inadequate) coordination between controllers– Most often ground and local on a crossing

• Misidentify aircraft

• Readback/Hearback errors



Results of Common ATC Errors

• Most (54%) controller errors that result in runway incursions involve pilots completely crossing the runway in front of a takeoff or landing

• 27% involve pilots entering the runway (includes crossing the runway edge and lining up and waiting for takeoff)

• 19% resulted in pilots crossing the hold short lines, but not crossing the runway edge.



What Controllers Can Do

• Recognize limitations of human memory and attention (protect against)– Don’t clear an aircraft to “Line Up and Wait” if you plan on it

being there for more than a minute

• Optimize teamwork

• Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check– Recall number one pilot error follows a correct readback

• Good communication techniques– Always inform pilots of similar call signs



Common Pilot Errors

• Most common pilot error in runway incursions is reading back the air traffic instruction (for example, to “hold short”) correctly and then doing something else

• Most common reason for the error is that pilots lose track of where they are (misidentifying their location)

• Most common factor cited for losing track of location is that one pilot is “heads down” programming FMC or conducting checklists



What other reasons cause air carrier pilots to cross the hold short lines without authorization?

•Frequency congestion & blocked transmissions

• Complex airport geometry

• Signs and markings confusion

• Hold short lines in an unexpected location



Results of Common Pilot Errors

• Only 23% of pilot deviations that result in runway incursions involve pilots completely crossing the runway (in front of a takeoff or landing)

• 40% involve pilots crossing the hold short lines, but not crossing the runway edge

• 37% result in pilots entering the runway (includes partially crossing the runway edge and lining up and waiting for takeoff



What Pilots Can Do

• Minimize “heads down” activity while taxiing– Is there a runway between you and your departure

runway or between you and the gate?

• “Out and In Use” of airport diagram

• Both pilots should LISTEN UP for clearances to land, taxi, takeoff, and for all clearances involving your runway– Is there an aircraft on final?– This method worked for USAir altitude busts



What Pilots Can Do (continued)

• LOOK OUT for conflicting traffic

• When is doubt about your position or your clearance, ASK.

• (For Air Carriers) Turn landing lights on when takeoff clearance is received (this is a signal that aircraft is moving)



What Is Being Done?

• Enhanced markings to alert pilots and vehicle drivers that they are approaching hold-short lines are being implemented

• Advisory Circulars have been published to encourage pilots to:– Reserve use of landing lights for takeoff– Know the the airport layout – Listen for all clearances involving “their” runway– Avoid performing heads-down tasks until clear of all runways



Description of the Enhanced Taxiway Centerline:

• Dashed yellow lines are placed on both sides of the taxiway centerline

• The modified centerline will be implemented approximately 150 feet prior to the runway holding position marking (if sufficient space is available)

• The enhanced centerline may or may not be supplemented by surface painted holding position signs



Enhanced Taxiway Centerline

9-27

9-27

8’ (2.44 m) 150’ (45.72 m)

2’-4’ (0.67-1.34 m)

3’ (0.91 m)

Drawing not to scale

Optional

Adopted



Key Revisions to Advisory Circular 120-74A

• Turn on landing lights when cleared for takeoff as a signal that the aircraft is moving

• Suggestion to contact ATC if a takeoff clearance is not received within expected time when on the runway

• More comprehensive use of clearance “Read Back” technique by pilots regarding use of runways



Landing Lights

• Two competing priorities

– Rear-aspect visibility & Landover risk• Can you see an aircraft on the runway from final approach?

– Visibility to aircraft crossing the runway downfield• Can the crossing aircraft sense when TIPH aircraft is

accelerating for takeoff?



Runway Incursions at 35 U.S. Towered Airports

• From 2000-2002, 47% of serious runway incursions involved aircraft crossing in front of a takeoff

• AFTER publication of Advisory Circular 120-74A in 2004, 26% of serious runway incursions involved aircraft crossing in front of a takeoff



Safe Surface Operations for Commercial Pilots

Reduce the Risk



Looking Ahead

• Improve safety data reporting

• Improve replay and simulation capabilities

• Automate incident reporting process



www.ato.faa.gov

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