Preserving the Identity of Small Settlements during Post-Disaster Reconstruction in Italy1 DAVID ALEXANDER The nature of small, historic settlements in Apennine Italy is described and options for reconstructing them are discussed. Villages and towns are disproportionately vulnerable to damage by even small earthquakes, which can cause substantial changes to their distinctive character. Responses to such events are outlined, including various strategies of evacuation and the process of developing standardized methods for post- disaster architectural suruey. Rationales for demolishing damaged buildings, and their role in causing decentralization of the settlements, are discussed. The effects of temporary shelter and contemporary reconstruction plans are evaluated in terms of their impact on the changing urban landscape of such towns. Finally, inconsistencies in government reconstruction funding are shown to be responsible for much of the variability of post-disaster recovery in Italy. Hence, existing theoretical models are of little use in predicting the course of reconstruction. INTRODUCTION In this review, I shall consider questions of vulnerabsty, evacuation, structural survey, demolition, decentralization,planning and reconstruction funding as they pertain to settlements of small size (less than 10,OOO people) in the Apennines of Italy. I will then relate these aspects to published theoretical studies of post-disaster reconstruction in order to qualify such models with relevant field experience. SMALL SETTLEMENTS IN THE NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN First, it is necessary to describe the settle- ments in question. The origins of many of them stretch back over at least 2,500 years, although the nucleus of urbanization may have shifted during the first thousand of these to a greater or lesser extent (Alexander, 1985). They tend to be highly nucleated, especially when situated on hilltops, and to consist of an organic archi- tecture that has undergone slow evolution over many centuries. The scale of building is small and the density of dwellings high: hence, the insula, bounded by narrow streets, is often a more clearly defined unit than the dwelling. Prior to the 1950s the predominant construction technique was low-strength, thick-walled masonry, using a random rubble of local stone, spaced with terracotta fragments and bonded with lime mortar (Hughes, 1981). Wooden, later steel, joists were employed for horizontal mem- bers, and roofs used terracotta pantiles. DISASTERS VOLUME 13 NUMBER 3
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Preserving the Identity of Small Settlements during Post-Disaster Reconstruction in Italy1
DAVID ALEXANDER
The nature of small, historic settlements in Apennine Italy is described and options for reconstructing them are discussed. Villages and towns are disproportionately vulnerable to damage by even small earthquakes, which can cause substantial changes to their distinctive character. Responses to such events are outlined, including various strategies of evacuation and the process of developing standardized methods for post- disaster architectural suruey. Rationales for demolishing damaged buildings, and their role in causing decentralization of the settlements, are discussed. The effects of temporary shelter and contemporary reconstruction plans are evaluated in terms of their impact on the changing urban landscape of such towns. Finally, inconsistencies in government reconstruction funding are shown to be responsible for much of the variability of post-disaster recovery in Italy. Hence, existing theoretical models are of little use in predicting the course of reconstruction.
INTRODUCTION
In this review, I shall consider questions of vulnerabsty, evacuation, structural survey, demolition, decentralization, planning and reconstruction funding as they pertain to settlements of small size (less than 10,OOO people) in the Apennines of Italy. I will then relate these aspects to published theoretical studies of post-disaster reconstruction in order to qualify such models with relevant field experience.
SMALL SETTLEMENTS IN THE NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN
First, it is necessary to describe the settle- ments in question. The origins of many of them stretch back over at least 2,500 years,
although the nucleus of urbanization may have shifted during the first thousand of these to a greater or lesser extent (Alexander, 1985). They tend to be highly nucleated, especially when situated on hilltops, and to consist of an organic archi- tecture that has undergone slow evolution over many centuries. The scale of building is small and the density of dwellings high: hence, the insula, bounded by narrow streets, is often a more clearly defined unit than the dwelling. Prior to the 1950s the predominant construction technique was low-strength, thick-walled masonry, using a random rubble of local stone, spaced with terracotta fragments and bonded with lime mortar (Hughes, 1981). Wooden, later steel, joists were employed for horizontal mem- bers, and roofs used terracotta pantiles.
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Barrel, sail, lunette and pavilion vaults were commonly constructed, using stone or brick until in the nineteenth century terracotta hollow-brick was employed.
Such architecture tended to respond closely to the contours of the land and to adapt easily to gradients in excess of ten percent, while at the same time it provided protection against the ravages of summer heat and winter cold. It did not, however, protect against natural calamity such as earthquake or landslide (Alexander and Rendell, 1986).2 Indeed, such factors must be added to less precipitous socio-economic causes of mutation in the urban fabric. Hence, although the present appearance of the best preserved historic settlements seems mediaeval, often it is not. Earth- quakes and inattention to basic structural maintenance may have removed many of the architectural details that formerly embellished the residences of the well-to- do: loggias, towers, balconies, stucco and carvings have often been shorn off. Further- more, in the mediaeval period buildings tended to cluster in densely-settled neigh- bourhoods separated by wide spaces and broad thoroughfares. In the last 100-150 years these latter have had drains installed in them, have been paved and have had new buildings constructed along their sides, thus making them much narrower. By the 18OOs, walls built in the Dark Ages or Mediaeval period had been demolished or had long ceased to act as barriers to development. Castles, cathedrals and noble palaces had ceased to be centres of nuclea- tion, while monastic foundations located within the urban centre had been dissolved and the buildings converted into residences. Fountains, on the other hand, acted as centralizing influences until much more recently.
Such settlements, although striking, convey their identity more by a sense of continuity of development than by any claim to uniqueness. Many have success- fully absorbed small disaster impacts from
previous epochs, including landslides, minor earthquake damage, urban karstic subsidence, or the depredations of gully erosion at their peripheries.
QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE RESTORATION OF DAMAGED SETTLEMENTS
That it is valuable and necessary to restore historic settlements after disaster is no more than an opinion, one that rests on the value judgements of decision-makers or those who influence such people. It is something that was not always done in the past: for example, the ancient town of Noto Antica was transferred 16 km to Noto Barocca after the 1692 eastern Sicily earthquake (Tobriner, 1981); and the Spanish viceroys achieved similar relocations among settlements damaged by the 1688 earthquake in the Sannio of Benevento (central-southem Italy), Campomaggiore in the Province of Potenza (Basilicata Region, southern Italy), whose Roman foundations underwent landsliding in 1885, was transferred several kilometres to a hilltop site that unfortu- nately proved to be almost as unstable as its predecessor. Likewise, inhabitants of Craco in the Province of Matera (Basilicata Region), which was destroyed by rotational slumping in December 1963, were trans- ferred to a valley location that has since been plagued by problems of erosion and sedimentation. History thus teaches us that transferring a settlement to a new site will not necessarily make it invulnerable to natural catastrophe, especially in highly tectonized terrains such as those of the Apennines, in which stable land is at a premium (Alexander, 1988).
Not all such transfers have occurred as a result of a conscious plan. For instance, Senerchia in the Province of Avellino (central-southem Italy) has experienced eleven damaging earthquakes (MCS inten- sity rVIII) since 1450. The locus of settle- ment has migrated gradually from a limestone mountain-front (subject to
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amplification of seismic waves), across an active normal fault (subject to ground rupture), to a partially dismantled alluvial fan (subject to mass movement and subsi- dence). Adjustments in the form and loca- tion of the human settlement after each disaster have not reduced its vulnerability to the next one (Alexander and Coppola, 1989).
Over historical time it has been more normal to find settlements reconstructed in situ than transferred to a virgin site. Yet the rationale for such a strategy was seldom likely to have been moral or aesthetic. Instead, there are four possible reasons:
- In situ reconstruction may have been the easiest and cheapest option, given the survival after the disaster of roads and foundations.
- Such an option may have been facilitated by the availability of appropriate materials and skills.
- The productive system usually needed to be reactivated too rapidly to permit extensive p~anning.~
- In situ reconstruction would have tended to reinforce the local power structure and the existing, ingrained social relations (6. Placanica, 1985).
These observations are, however, diffi- cult to support with widely applicable general examples and, moreover, they point to a series of important questions that have yet to be answered satisfactorily:
- To what extent do traditional settlements absorb disaster impacts as a dynamic historical process in their continued evolution?
-Assuming that the modem need to preserve and restore historic settlements is accepted by scientists, technicians, politicians and residents, to what extent can traditional buildings, streets and insulae be given modem functionality and made to respect modern safety
norms without unacceptable loss of identity?
- To what extent is the social cohesion of a settlement promoted by its architectural distinctiveness?
- To what extent does the physical nature of a settlement (its appeal as a living space) determine the social fabric and ties of its population? For example, does the emigrant who returns feel attracted back by the aesthetic appeal of his village or merely by family ties there?
-What do the terms identity and dis- tinctiveness mean when applied to small settlements in the northern Mediterranean?
Hence, the preservation of small historic settlements after disaster is fraught with uncertainty, as it is by no means easy to restore devastated urban fabric in such a way that it conserves its historic elements, while simultaneously being functional in a modern sense and protecting residents against further disasters. The specific problems involved in tackling this dilemma will now be reviewed.
EARTHQUAKE SIZE AND THE VULNERABILITY OF SETTLEMENTS
Earthquakes at Assisi in October 1982, Gubbio in April 1984 and the Sulmona-Sora area of Abruzzo in May 1984 illustrate the extreme vulnerability to damage of historic settlements in places like central Italy (Alexander, 1986). In no case did the Richter magnitude of these tremors exceed 5.5 (which is at the lower end of the"moderate" category of seismic energy release), and fatalities were largely absent. But 500 residents were evacuated at Assisi, 6,800 at Gubbio and 38,OOO in Abruzzo (falling to a residual figure of 11,500). While acknow- ledging that many of these evacuations were precautionary, mass homelessness is a salient - if more or less transient - feature of Apennine earthquakes. More- over, it is extremely difficult to define a
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Post-Disaster Reconstruction in Italy 231
relationship between the physical size of the event (Richter magnitude, maximum Mercalli intensity, area affected in km’, etc.) and the level of human impact. There are several reasons for this. The first is that attitudes to the evacuation of damaged settlements may be complex (see Alexander, 1987a).
EVACUATION
In Italy, post-disaster evacuation may be a legally enforceable process, if backed by a mayoral or prefectural order (Pastorelli, 1986). In the interests of public safety, residents may be evacuated from any build- ings that are damaged or susceptible to further impacts in the immediate future, until the danger has passed or the damage has been repaired.
There are, however, two approaches to evacuation. To the local administrator it may make sense either to minimize the number of evacuees or to maximize it; and frequently a disaster area may show evi- dence of both tendencies. Hence, after the Abruzzo earthquakes of 7 and 11 May 1984, evacuation from the centre of Barrea (Aquila Province) was total. The site was cordoned off and an 8 p.m. curfew was imposed, while nearby at Pescasseroli only those residents whose homes were significantly damaged received evacuation orders, which thus were not sent out to more than ten percent of the population. Apart from any differences in the vulnerability and damage levels of building stock in the two settle- ments, the discrepancy can be explained with reference to their differing functional roles. Barrea is a relatively poor agricultural settlement, while Pescasseroli is a rather richer tourist resort. Hence, it was in the interests of the mayor of Barrea to magxufy the impact of the earthquake on his village in order to draw the attention of central government to it, agricultural activity being relatively unaffected by the evacuations and closure of the town centre. In contrast, the
mayor of Pescasseroli would not have wished to discourage tourist presence by cordoning off sectors of his town.
These situations can be propounded as a more general model in which the propor- tion of the populations of settlements who are evacuated is simultaneously (a) high (80 percent or more) and relatively insensi- tive to distance from the epicentre or other surrogate for the level of physical impact; and (b) declines exponentially from near total at the epicentre to very low at the periphery of the affected area (Alexander, 1986, 1987a).
STRUCTURAL SURVEY OF BUILDINGS
Evacuation and reconstruction are critically affected by the process of structural survey (Alexander, 1982). As the Italian State seeks to indemnify its citizens against losses caused by disaster impacts, surveys have the legal role of determining eligibility for reconstruction funds and entitlement to temporary or permanent resettlement (Consiglio Regionale della Basilicata, 1982; Geologia Tecnica, 1983; Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, passim).
Since the 1976 Friuli earthquake, survey techniques have evolved in Italy on an ad hoc basis, with norms being established by researchers connected with the National Research Council ”Geodynamics” Project and first being seriously applied in a minor earthquake at Parma in 1983 (C.N.R., 1983- 4). It is as well to remember that structural survey, unless it is done haphazardly, is a slow and laborious process. For instance, in the first five months after the 23 November 1980 Irpinian earthquake, 7,000 technicians in Basilicata examined 73,000 buildings comprising 228,OOO apartments and 523,000 rooms (Alexander, 1982). Such endeavours can lead to substantial changes in the locus and magnitude of homelessness, as resi- dents are either rehoused or permitted to return home, depending on the outcome of the surveys. From this we conclude that the
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magnitude of damage to an individual settlement should be considered as a dynamic quantity during the early months of the aftermath, not merely because of the probability of repeated impacts, but also because the assessment of damage is itself subject to flux.
DEMOLITION
Damaged buildings should be demolished if they cannot be restored economically and if their continued presence poses an unavoidable threat to public safety. Despite the simplicity of this axiom, demolition has been greatly misused in Italian disaster aftermaths. It is, in fact, a costly and often unnecessarily destructive technique.
In both the north and the south of Italy, certain settlements have suffered the depre- dations of so-called "carpet demolitions", regardless of the needs of public safety, planning and reconstruction. There are several explanations of this phenomenon:
- Psychological theorists describe an innate desire among survivors to "wipe the slate clean" prior to reconstruction, or to "attack the stones that caused the hurt" (Binaghi-Olivieri, 1980).
- Political theorists describe the desire on the part of local administrators to drama- tize the damage by exacerbating it, in order to obtain a greater share of recon- struction funds (F.G.C.I., 1981).
- Criminologists refer to the use of demoli- tion by corrupt construction firms as a means of obtaining control over materials, plans or reconstruction con- tracts. In this, the Mafia, 'Ndrangheta or Camorra (criminal organizations of Sicily, Calabria and Naples, respectively) may be implicated (Russo and Stajano, 1981).
Indiscriminate demolition reduces the stocks of both repairable vernacular housing and historic buildings, reduces supplies of reusable architectural elements and dressed
stone, and may destroy the underlying utilities network. It may also promote decentralization of the settlement.
DECENTRALIZATION
Since 1945 centrifugal tendencies have replaced the centripetal ones that originally created the highly nucleated settlements of the Apennines, as people demand more living space and modem construction methods permit urbanization of steeper or less accessible sites. Hence the buildings at the centre of villages tend to be the oldest, least anti-seismic and most vulnerable to damage.
Devastation may lead to an inversion of the clustering that normally characterizes such settlements. At Lioni, San Gregorio Magno and Sant'Angelo dei Lombardi in the Province of Avellino (central-southem Italy), and at Santa Ninfa and Santa Margherita del Belice in western Sicily, redevelopment began on the periphery of the devastated area (in which the process of planning was much more protracted and slow than beyond its margins). At Castel- nuovo di Coma, Coma di Campania and Laviano in Irpinia (central-southem Italy), and at Calatafimi and Sambuca di Sicilia in the Belice Valley (western Sicily), it took place at a kilometre or more from the ruins. And at Gibellina in western Sicily the population was transferred en bloc to a new site more than 16 km from the devastated one. As the original density of population and dwellings will usually never be reached again in the reconstructed central zones, such processes indicate a permanent departure from the concept of in situ reconstruction (Alexander, 1984).
ARCHITECTURAL PROBLEMS
The most momentous change experienced by small settlements in modem Italy is probably the transition from low-strength
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masonry to reinforced concrete construc- tion. This has simultaneously opened up new possibilities in terms of the scope, range and speed of building and imposed an unprecedented uniformity upon archi- tectural style (Latina, 1982). However, to a greater or lesser extent, reinforced concrete buildings (which if properly constructed are capable of providing maximum protection against natural hazards) have been assimi- lated into the urban landscape. The same cannot be said of temporary prefabricated buildings (36,250 of which were used in southern Italy after the 1980 earthquake there).* Styles of wooden, steel or resin- framed light-walled prefabs included nordic, colonial, alpine, geodesic, Swiss chalet, rustic log cabin, igloo and “Disney- land” cottage. The bucolic vied with the nautical; fairytale images were pitted against space-age ones in a drastic modifica- tion of the urban landscape that threatened to be at least semi-permanent and devoid of all reference to any long-standing func- tional traditions of the local area (Ventura, 1982).
Temporary buildings with a design life of 5-50 years will presumably be removed eventually and so perhaps they need not be assimilated. But the same cannot be said of the urbanization facilities that go with them. Few cases have emerged of plans to reutilize access roads, utility conduits, parapets, plinths, and so on, after the displaced populations have been transferred out of the prefabs into permanently reconstructed homes.
One ad hoc solution to these problems is to reuse the prefabs. Cases of the exces- sive longevity of temporary dwellings are not hard to find: the 1783 Calabrian and 1883 Casmicciola (Naples) earthquakes both spawned prefabs that lasted very many decades (Canosa, 1981; Solbiati and Marcellini, 1983), while in 1988 families still occupy temporary dwellings at Santa Margherita del Belice (struck by earthquake in 1968) and Pisciotta in Calabria (damaged
by landslide in the 1960s). In western Sicily and on the fringes of Naples, however, prefabs no longer occupied by families evacuated after disaster may have been ceded to North African migrant workers, who represent the lowest point on the local social scale. Thus the problem of reusing the site is postponed, but not solved.
RECONSTRUCTION
Delays in the process of reconstructing small settlements are inevitable and not necessarily the result of chronic inability to act. At Sant’Angelo dei Lombardi (Avellino Province, central-southern Italy), for instance, four years were needed to refor- mulate the urban master plan (“Piano Regolatore Generale”), and public consulta- tion led to 44 objections being raised to its particular details. Demolition did not resume for 42 months after it was halted in February 1981 in an attempt to prevent the indiscriminate destruction of repairable buildings (!kirb, 1984). At Lioni, nearby, the urban plan was reformulated without the full geological basis required by regional laws, the investigations for which were slowed down greatly by complications in the substrate.
On the other hand, the “organic” nature of traditional architecture causes substantial problems in both formulating a plan and obtaining sufficient consensus to put it into operation (Ventura, 1984). Where the insula is the fundamental unit to be repaired, a detailed plan (”piano particola- reggiato”) may be required, especially if the damage is complicated (and frequently it may be mixed with pre-existing dilapidation or structural weaknesses). Unless all owners and occupiers are in agreement, it may prove very difficult to make workable plans, obtain the requisite government funds, and contract a building firm to work on the property. Owners may possibly come from differing socio-economic backgrounds and have divergent expectations about the
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repair work. Some of them may be absentee residents or landlords and, if they do not use the damaged property as a primary residence, may have differing eligibility for government funding and differing aspirations for its future uses.
As an example of this problem, consider Tricarico in the Province of Matera (central- southern Italy; Rendell, 1985). According to structural surveys, 26 percent of buildings in the historic centre of this town (whose oldest foundations date from 79 B.C.; Rendell and Alexander, 1985) were damaged in the November 1980 earthquake. The historic core occupies an area only 900 by 250 m in size, in which 1,310 properties are grouped into 197 insulae, with a mean of 6.65 properties per insula. The nominal density of population there is 5,530 persons/ km2, more than ten times that of the municipality as a whole (which contains 8,500 residents at an average of 53/km2), although very many owners of property in the centre do not actually live there. It is not sufficient to have a broad plan for such an area. If the urban landscape is to be restored to functionality, the broad plan must co- ordinate a series of particular plans relating to insulae and individual buildings.
LEGISLATION AND FUNDING
Until the creation in 1982 of a Ministry for Civil Protection, and in 1983 of a national "reservoir" of reconstruction funds, post- disaster recovery was achieved in Italy by passing individual laws to regulate the eligibility for, and magnitude of, disburse- ments after each event. This, in fact, is still partly the case. Hence, as in other countries, legislation follows the disaster rather than preceding it in a preventative role. Public opinion, as much as the physical exigencies of the situation, stimulates the government to act. The public is sensitized by personal experience of disasters or by the impact of reporting in the news media. The media are selective in their emphases and hence there
are fashions in what is reported and how it is presented to the public.
This leads to substantial discrepancies in the level of funding of reconstruction, which are extremely hard to predict and categorize. For example, the city of Ancona (easterntentral Italy) initially obtained from central government only 16 percent of the cost of its landslide damage (785 homes damaged in December 1982). On the other hand, Marsico Nuovo in Basilicata (central- southern Italy; 50 homes damaged by land- slide in 1983) initially obtained almost nothing and later obtained at least 100 per- cent of its requirements. Also in Basilicata, Senise (nine buildings destroyed by land- slide in 1986) stimulated the Italian govern- ment to spend 64 times the cost of the damage on consolidation and development works in the local area (Alexander, 198%).
Discrepancies also occur in the timing of subventions. For instance, relatively little was accomplished in the first 15 years after the 1968 Belice Valley earthquakes in western Sicily, yet after the 1983 volcanic emergency at Pozzuoli (Naples), more than 50,000 people were permanently rehoused in a few tens of months. Unevenness in government policy can be traced to the flux of national interest in disaster impacts, and more surely to the success or failure of local politicians of greater or lesser eminence to influence the national cabinet.
ARE THEORETICAL MODELS OF RECONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE IN ITALY?
Several theoretical models have been for- mulated for the purposes of codifying the stages of reconstruction. Quarantelli (1982), for example, divided the process into emer- gency sheltering, temporary sheltering, temporary housing and permanent hous- ing. Kates and Pijawka (1977) defined an emergency period (of 1-8 weeks), a restora- tion period (lasting from 8 weeks to 9 months), a replacement-reconstruction period (of perhaps three years) and a
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developmental reconstruction period (that might occupy more than a decade). Hogg (1980) applied the latter model to recon- struction after the 1976 Friuli (northern Italy) earthquakes, but found it unable to cope with questions of bureaucratic delay, the role of damaging aftershocks, and the uneven distribution of resources among settlements.
Field experience suggests that the reconstruction of Apennine villages after disaster has struck tends to confound theoretical models. The categories of schemes like those listed above tend to overlap or blur, and momentous changes seem to reflect the whims of government decision-making in a more haphazard than rational manner, that is frequently charac- terized by unpredictability, unevenness and inconsistency. The identity of small settle- ments is a function of temporal continuity in their evolution, which presents a visual and functional record of their history. Disasters break into this evolution and interrupt the continuity. Yet in a sense all reconstruction must be developmental: the world has changed too much to allow the damage merely to be replaced. New safety standards and criteria are in force, new materials and construction techniques are in use, and survivors have expectations that would not have been entertained in previous epochs of history. Perhaps the apposite watchwords are “Uniformity in all safety standards, variety in matters cultural.”
Notes
1.
2.
Paper read at the Italian-German Conference on Earthquakes and Regional Identity, Villa Vigoni, Menaggio, Como (Italy), 25-28 October 1988. Traditional Apennine buildings that have not been retrofitted tend to respond to seismic shaking with too much stiffness and inertia, coupled with poor structural unity among both horizontal and vertical members. For instance, floor joists that are poorly tied to
~
3.
4.
walls may come loose and wedge the walls apart as the building sways and distorts. Studies in Middle Eastern war zones suggest that replacement housing is still vital to resumption of economic activity (Crouch, 1979). The earthquake of 23 November 1980 in Campania and Basilicata Regions, southern Italy, killed 2,735 and injured 8,842 people. Homelessness amounted to somewhere between 280,000 and 471,000 people. Some 686 municipalities were affected over an area of 23,000 km2, and 506 of these reported significant damage. According to a Prime Ministerial Decree of 22 May 1981, 295 settle- ments were severely damaged and 36 devastated (Alexander, 1982).
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