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PRESIDENTIALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICA’S HYBRID
REGIMES
Paper for the Panel ‘Presidentialism in Developing Countries’
IPSA/ECPR Conference: Whatever Happened to North-South?
Sao Paulo, 16-19 February 2011
DRAFT, please do not cite without permission of the author
Oda van Cranenburgh
Leiden University
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Introduction
In comparing political systems, the institutional choice for a presidential or
parliamentary system of government has been a long standing issue. Debates on the
merits of each system were rekindled during the so-called Third Wave of
democratization, with the article by Juan Linz on ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’
published in 1990. While scholars had initially examined primarily European systems
and the United States, during the Third Wave they turned increasingly to Latin
America and Eastern Europe. The African and Asian regions were relatively under-
researched in terms of such institutional debates, with some notable (recent)
exceptions (Elgie & Moestrup 2007, Siaroff 2003). However, the institutional issues
are very relevant to assess whether democracy will be instituted and sustained in these
regions. The third wave of democratization brought multi-party elections and
consequently a degree of vertical accountability of the government to the electorate in
these regions. However, considering the prevalence of (varieties of) presidentialism
and semi-presidentialism in Africa, my interest is to examine whether these systems
also allow some form of horizontal accountability between the institutions of
government. Horizontal accountability is an essential addition to vertical
accountability, because it operates continuously, during the terms of government
(O’Donnel 1998). I take as a starting point the logical assumption that the creation of
horizontal accountability requires a degree of separation or balance of powers,
because where power is concentrated in a single entity, there are no entities with a
degree of independence or autonomy to hold the power center accountable. This is
why a study on separation of powers is both scientifically and politically relevant.
Several factors may explain the low profile of Africa in this institutional
debate. Primarily, the debate has been conducted in the context of (more or less
established) democratic systems. It needs no elaboration to point out that such systems
have been relatively rare in Africa until the early 1990s. Consequently, the choice of
democratic institutions and their consequences was low on the research agenda. Only
during the period of transfer of power from colonial rulers had such issues been
prominent: both the United Kingdom and France were busy during the 1950s and
1960s with an effort to ‘transplant’ their own systems of government to African and
Asian soils, and the effort was very much based on implicit assumptions about the
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inherent qualities of the political system of the ‘mother country’. As has been widely
discussed in the literature on African politics, the newly planted systems did not take
root very well and a process of institutional adaptation followed soon. Notably,
African leaders opted for unitary republics with an executive president, also in those
cases where a parliamentary system had been installed. In the name of national unity
for development, the executive president was granted a wide range of powers (at the
same time political opposition was curtailed). As many features of the planted system
were retained, the result has been the prevalence of hybrid systems of government.
This may constitute a second reason for the low profile of African countries in the
institutional debate: the hybrid nature of these regimes presents some inherent
difficulties in terms of classification and analysis. When Africa began to install
democratic reforms, beginning in Benin, a new round of institutional adaptation
followed. As noted by Conac (2007), Francophone countries reinstated forms of semi-
presidential government, making innovative adjustments in the model in terms of the
definition of powers for the president and the premier. The complex and hybrid nature
of African regimes continues to present obstacles for any systematic comparison.
This paper will examine these hybrid African systems of government in an
effort to compare the extent of separation of power between the executive and the
legislature. The more specific question pursued in this paper is whether the extent and
forms of separation of powers between the executive and legislature is clearly related
to regime type and colonial background. As elaborated below, both common sense
and the very definition of the presidential regime type suggests that separation of
power is present in these regimes, while in semi-presidential and parliamentary
regimes we would expect less separation between the branches of government.
However, earlier research has already suggested that Africa’s hybrid regimes defy
such expectations (van Cranenburgh 2008 and 2009).
The analysis builds on data gathered for previous research and is limited to 30
African countries, of which 15 are former British colonies ( I will use the term
Anglophone for this set) and 15 are former French colonies (the Francophone set).
The countries do not represent the entire ‘universe’ of Anglophone and Francophone
African countries, excluding countries where the constitution was suspended because
of war or state collapse at the time of the research (Chad, Ivory Coast and Sudan). The
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set analyzed the constitutions in force in 2007 including relevant constitutional
amendments.
The following section will illustrate the difficulties in classifying African
political systems and present a classification based on dispositional criteria, following
the work of Elgie. The next section will look specifically at the extent of institutional
separation (or non-separation) of power in these regimes. Institutional separation is
here defined as independence in terms of origin or survival for both the executive and
the legislature. Thereafter, a section will examine another form of separation, i.e. of
offices. Separation of office is here defined as incompatibility of office, i.e. one
person may not hold an executive office and a parliamentary office at the same time.
A next section will explore briefly the impact of party politics on the independence of
the branches of government. The concluding section will discuss the implications of
the patterns in separation of powers for the possibilities for horizontal accountability
and will argue that Anglophone countries most strongly represent a hybrid form of
regime which not only defies easy classification, but also expectations on the extent
and forms of separation of powers.
Classifying African regimes
Most African political systems represent a hybrid regime type, in the sense
that they combine elements of presidential and parliamentary systems of government.
In some cases the resulting system conforms to the semi-presidential regime type; in
other cases the resulting systems presents an institutional anomaly which some
authors will classify as a presidential and others as president-parliamentary. Before
elaborating on this I emphasize that the hybrid nature of the regimes does not imply
that they function or behave partly as parliamentary systems; quite to the contrary,
earlier research has shown that in most cases it makes them behave as
hyperpresidential systems (van Cranenburgh 2011).
In classifying systems I here follow the approach of Robert Elgie (1998 and
2007) which relies on dispositional rather than relational features. The reasons to
exclude the necessarily subjective assessment of power relations (between a president
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and a premier primarily) have been sufficient argued by this author. The important
variables concern the presence of a head of state (president) and a separate head of
government (premier) and – for each office – the question whether he/she is popularly
elected and whether the office has a fixed term (which implies there is independence
or separation from the other branch of government). In a parliamentary system all four
questions are answered with ‘No’. The head of government depends on the legislature
for its origin and survival and if there is a head of state, he is not popularly elected
(there may be a monarch or an indirectly elected ceremonial head of state). In a
presidential system, the head of state is also head of government and he is popularly
elected for a fixed term. Consequently, the two branches of government are
independent in the sense that the elected executive cannot be voted out of office by
the legislature; the population can only vote the executive out of office after
completion of the term (leaving aside the possibility of impeachment in
constitutionally prescribed and limited circumstances).
Most African systems combine these features of parliamentary and
presidential regimes, making them notoriously difficult to classify. There is a
popularly elected executive president with a fixed term and a cabinet, sometimes but
not always headed by a premier, that needs the confidence of the assembly and can be
dismissed by the latter. Part of the executive – the president - conforms to the
presidential model; another part – the cabinet - to the parliamentary model. In roughly
half the cases the cabinet is headed by a premier (predominantly in Francophone
countries), which results in the classification of these systems as semi-presidential in
Elgie’s system; in the other half cabinet lacks a premier (in the majority of
Anglophone countries), and consequently they are classified as presidential in Elgie’s
scheme. Note that Shugart and Carey (1992) classified the latter systems as
‘president-parliamentary’, which they also called the ‘confused’ system.
As noted by Elgie (2005), some authors object to the analytically clear and
objective classification system with the argument that many very disparate systems
end up in the same category; for example, in one semi-presidential system there may
be a balance of power between the president and the premier, while in others there is a
clear dominance of one or the other. Elgie excepts this and pointed to the necessity of
distinguishing subtypes for comparison. In a similar vein, Siaroff has compared levels
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of presidential power in various regimes type to show that such variation is hardly
related to the classical regime types. My work on 30 African systems similarly
showed wide ranges of presidential power for each regime type, granted that the
general African pattern showed a high level of presidetial power (van Cranenburgh
2008). In this contribution, I will also examine difference across and within regime
types, but the focus is not on levels of presidential power, but on the extent of
separation of powers in these regimes.
Table 1
Applying the regime typology to 30 Anglophone and Francophone Sub-
Saharan African political regimes results in the classification of 14 countries as
presidential, 13 as semi-presidential and three as parliamentary. The classification is
here presented in Table 1.
A confusing point is that in two of the parliamentary systems, i.e. South Africa
and Botswana, the head of state and government are one and the same office, and
while the office is essentially like that of a premier (no popular election and no fixed
term), the office is called ‘president’. In Elgie’s system, the two questions about the
Head of State are answered with No, while the questions on the Head of Government
are non applicable because there is no separate Head of Government (in Elgie’s
scheme, this represents a ‘Type 20’ out of his 24 possibilities). Another confusing
feature concerns the rule that cabinet needs the confidence of the assembly. As noted
above, this inherent feature of the parliamentary and semi-presidential system is often
present in presidential systems as well, creating what may be called an African
anomaly. In Anglophone African countries in particular which are classified as
presidential (popular election, fixed term and no separate head of government) cabinet
needs the confidence of the assembly. Another African anomaly can be found in the
systems classified as semi-presidential: the premier often has a dual accountability,
i.e. towards the assembly and towards the president. In many countries, the president
may dismiss a premier. Shugart and Carey classified the latter systems also as
president-parliamentary. When the premier can only be dismissed by the assembly,
Shugart and Carey distinguished a sub-type of semi-presidentialism: the premier-
presidential system.
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This classification shows that although the scheme is analytically and
empirically very clear in terms of the position on the president and the premier in
Africa’s regime types, it does not capture the specific feature we find in many African
regimes, i.e. that part of the executive – cabinet, often not headed by a premier – may
be accountable to the assembly. The next section will examine the extent of separation
of powers in these regimes.
Institutional separation of powers
Leaving aside the parliamentary systems, which inherently fuse the executive
and legislative powers - both the presidential and the semi-presidential African
systems are characterized by substantial fusion of powers between (part of) the
executive and the legislature, evident in the possibility of the legislature to censure
ministers or the entire cabinet and of the president to dissolve the legislature. At the
same time, all these systems are characterized by high levels of presidential power
(see van Cranenburgh 2008 and 2009). Such features led Elgie to classify many
African semi-presidential systems as ‘presidentialized’ rather than ‘dual executive’
systems. Shugart and Carey (1992) also examined levels of presidential power, which
they defined as presidential authority over cabinet, operationalized as the power to
appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers. While the focus of this paper is not on levels of
presidential power, I use the scheme of Shugart and Carey, later refined by Shugart
because it also assesses differences in the extent of separation of powers.
In this scheme the variables are: First, is the executive independent from the
assembly with respect to its survival? Second, is the assembly independent from the
executive with respect to its survival? Independence of survival is indicated by a fixed
term, in other words one branch of government cannot dismiss the other branch.
Shugart’s scoring system has been applied to the set of 30 Anglophone and
Francophone countries in Tables 2a and 2b. To visualize the combination of high
presidential power and partial or low separation of powers I reproduce here a figure
presented earlier (van Cranenburgh 2009). While all countries score on the upper side
of the figure for presidential authority over cabinet, the countries are scattered across
the entire spectrum for the extent of separation of power.
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Figure 1
Table 2
A first pattern which emerges is that a maximum score for separation of powers (8) is
present in seven cases, i.e. in three Anglophone countries and four Francophone
countries. Zambia is alone is scoring 7. All these countries with high separation of
powers are classified as presidential. These systems conform most closely to the ideal
typical presidential system based on separation of powers. The Cabinet consists of
Ministers who cannot be removed by the assembly; they are solely answerable to the
president.
Next, we can also discern a pattern of a polar opposite: regimes that score 0 or
1 for separation of powers, in other words countries in which the institutional
separation is very low or absent. This is the case in ten countries, which are all
classified as semi-presidential and they are all Francophone. This pattern conforms to
the expectation that separation of powers is less due to the accountability of the
premier to the assembly.
The remaining 12 countries all score between 2 and 6 for institutional
separation. The majority of Anglophone countries – 11 - show such a partial degree of
separation (scores between 2 and 6). Only one country in the set is Francophone, and
it is a presidential system (Guinea). Six countries with a medium score for separation
category are presidential regimes, three are semi-presidential and three are classified
as parliamentary regimes.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the extent of separation of powers for
three regime types and the Anglophone and Francophone African countries. Mean
scores suggest a relation between regime type and extent of separation: On average
the presidential regimes score 6.285, thus showing a tendency for presidential regimes
to have a higher degree of separation of powers. The semi-presidential regimes score
a mean of 1.384 and show least separation of all regime types. Besides the non-
separation inherent in cabinet subjection to assembly confidence, the president in
these regimes can dissolve parliament and thus jeopardize its independence. The
parliamentary regimes score a mean of 4. The higher degree of separation is the
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consequence of the lack of presidential power to dissolve the assembly without losing
office himself. However, statistical averages are misleading in the case of several
categories: the range in the presidential type is from 3-8, and in the semi-presidential
from 0-4. The three countries that are classified as parliamentary also show a
divergence of scores in the range of 2 to 6.
As for the classification by colonial background, the Francophone countries
show a lower average score for separation than the Anglophone groups; but the
Francophone group consists of ten countries with very low separation and four
countries with very high separation; there is only one country showing a score in
between. In the Anglophone set, a partial or median score for separation is more or
less the norm.
Table 3
The descriptive statistics for separation of powers illustrate the complexity and
hybrid nature of African regimes. The classification into regime types does not give
us clues as to the extent of separation of powers. The Anglophone set in particular is
most illustrative of the African hybrid system conforming neither to the ideal typical
presidential system with separation of powers, nor to the semi-presidential model with
very low or no separation of powers. At the same time, only the presidential regime
type shows the expected pattern of relatively high separation (with a high mean
score), but 6 presidential regimes do not conform to this pattern and have only a very
partial separation of powers. The semi-presidential and parliamentary regime types do
not show the extent of separation suggested by the very definition of the type: in
particular, semi-presidential regimes have lower separation than parliamentary
regimes.
Separation of Offices
Another indicator of separation between the executive and legislative branch of
government is whether offices are separated in the sense that one person cannot hold
offices in both branches. In particular, the question is whether cabinet ministers may
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also hold a seat in the representative assembly (legislative office). This issue has not
been subject of systematic comparative research in Africa, expect by Nijzink et al
(2006). Usually constitutions define explicitly whether or not there are
incompatibilities of office; in other cases it may be inferred from the clauses
regulating the appointment of ministers.
Table 4 reports on the presence or absence of fusion of offices. Here a
divergent pattern between Anglophone and Francophone countries is quite evident.
All Francophone countries separate offices, while the majority of Anglophone
countries allows the fusion of legislative and executive offices in one person. There
are variations in the constitutional requirements: in seven countries, ministers must be
MPs; in 4 countries ministers may be MPs; only three Anglophone countries separate
offices.
Tables 4 and 5
The pattern in Anglophone countries points to a particular way in which the
executive is fused with the assembly: the appointment to the cabinet creates a personal
union between the part of the executive and the legislature. The phenomenon can
reach quite high proportions: the average percentage of MPs holding a position in the
government is 30 for these countries, while in Namibia, 60% of MPs serve in some
capacity in the cabinet (van Cranenburgh 2009). This Anglophone feature is present in
all three regime types: in 5 out of the 14 presidential regimes, 3 out of the 13 semi-
presidential regimes and in all 3 parliamentary regimes (see table 5).
This feature has been noted in the context of the neo-patrimonial character of
African politics and represents in essence a cooptation of MPs into the government
(see for example van de Walle 2003). The result is, as Barkan noted, that ‘few MPs
pursued a legislative career with an eye on policy making for the good of the nation.
Rather, becoming a member of the legislature was seem as an avenue for lucrative
patronage jobs, a ministerial appointment being the most alluring among them’
(Barkan, 127-9). These features severely limit the possibility to ensure the
independence of parliament vis-à-vis the executive.
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While Francophone countries do not constitutionally allow the fusion of
legislative and executive offices, the tendency to expand the size of cabinet by
appointing many ministers and deputy ministers is also evident. Conac (2007, 89)
reports that such measures, as taken in Gabon, serve to increase support for the
government. Comparing both groups, Anglophone and Francophone countries clearly
differ, with Anglophone fusing executive and legislative offices. This feature creates
more obstacles in ensuring independence of the legislature vis à vis the executive.
Party-politics and separation of powers
Constitutions may create separate institutions and offices, but how does party
politics impact on the extent of separation between the executive and legislative
branches of government? It is beyond the scope of this contribution to present
exhaustive data on party-politics in these 30 African countries. I will report briefly on
earlier research and argue that party politics affects separation of powers.
Most research on presidential systems has emphasized the importance of the
party system for the way presidential systems function. For Latin America, much
research examined the consequences of the combination of presidentialism with
proportional representation for legislative elections, in particular the extent of
fragmentation in the party system and the need for coalitions in these systems. Other
research has looked at the timing of elections for each branch of government. The
important variable in this regard is concurrent or honeymoon elections versus mid-
term elections for the assembly. Concurrent or honey moon elections – elections very
soon after the presidential election - increase the likelihood that the president’s party
will control a majority in the assembly and are therefore also known as a
presidentialist formula (Shugart and Carey 1992). The result may be that the two
branches of government, which may be institutionally separated, are controlled by the
same party.
Table 6 shows that the all Anglophone countries have concurrent or
honeymoon elections. Existing research on the composition of parliament in the
Anglophone countries shows that the president commands vast majorities in
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parliament and cabinets are one-party cabinets in the great majority of Anglophone
countries (van de Walle 2003, Bogaards 2004, Conac 2007, van Cranenburgh 2009).
So to the extent that power is institutionally separated (which is only partly the case in
Anglophone countries) the party-political situation limits the extent to which both
branches can function as independent entities because they are controlled by the same
(presidential) party. I therefore argue that in Anglophone countries obstacles to
independence for the assembly vis-à-vis the executive are particularly great.
In Francophone countries, elections are non-concurrent in 11 out of 15
countries; they are concurrent or honeymoon-style in only four countries. In this
group of countries, legislative majorities for the president’s party are much smaller,
and consequently, coalition cabinets occur more frequently (van Cranenburgh 2009).
The party system is more fragmented and consequently it is less easy for the executive
to control a legislative majority. In sum, the basic argument is that party politics
affects the separation of powers; institutional separation is jeopardized by the control
of both branches by the same (presidential) party. The highly majoritarian party
politics in Anglophone countries, which leads to unitary and single party government,
most strongly affects the possibility for the assembly to act independently of the
government,
Table 6 Implications for Horizontal Accountability
While African countries have strong executive presidents, this feature of the
executive is combined with very partial or no separation of powers. Institutional
separation is low or absent in the majority of regimes, while offices are not separated
in roughly half the regimes examined. What are the implications of the various ways
in which powers are not separated, or fused, for horizontal accountability in Africa?
Can the legislature, or better the assembly, effectively function as a counterweight to
the executive and exercise its function of oversight of the executive? This contribution
does not examine such questions empirically by looking at the functioning of
institutions in practice, but presents an argument based on these fundamental
characteristics of the constitutional design of these African regimes.
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The prevalence of the rule of cabinet needing the confidence of the assembly -
an inherent feature of the parliamentary and semi-presidential systems - in most
African regimes might at first sight appear to present opportunities for oversight of the
executive. This feature appears to express the constitutional and philosophical idea
that parliament is ‘sovereign’. Cabinet accountability to the legislature implies that the
freedom of presidents to appoint ministers is limited by the requirement of
confidence, but after the formation of the government it also creates a virtually
guaranteed support for the government in the assembly. As pointed out by Lijphart,
Budge and others, this aspect of the Westminster parliamentary system tends to create
executive dominance, especially when the cabinet is single party. In European
parliamentary systems such as the Dutch system, a similar pattern results from the
formation of coalition accords to ensure a parliamentary majority for the government.
This is often criticized for threatening institutional dualism and creating what is called
‘monism’ in the executive-legislative relationship. The parliamentary majority is
committed to the program of the government, limiting its possibility to control
government. It is rather paradoxical to note that in practice the confidence rule limits
the possibilities of the legislature to hold the executive accountable. However, one
could argue that the damage to the power balance between the institutions of
government is smaller in the context of established and consolidated liberal
democratic systems, where both political culture and a range of other institutions play
a role in ensuring horizontal accountability. In Africa the latter conditions generally
do not apply.
For African countries, the negative implications for horizontal accountability
are exacerbated by the party-political constellation. As noted above, in most African
countries the party of the president controls a large majority in the assembly leading
to unitary governments and one party cabinets. The political party landscape is highly
majoritarian. Thus, the lack of institutional separation is combined with a party-
political constellation making the legislature an extension of the executive. This
pattern is most strong in Anglophone countries which have majoritarian electoral
systems for the assembly (First past the Post). However, the pattern is also found in
the countries with proportional representation, such as South Africa and Namibia.
Besides the legacy of the role governing parties played as liberation movements, this
can be linked to the presence of concurrent elections for the president and the
legislature; only recently have some (high profile) cases shown an absence of a clear
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legislative majority for the president’s party (Kenya and Zimbabwe). In Francophone
countries, the party-political constellation is less majoritarian, which reflects the
prevalence of non-concurrent elections.
Besides the separation of institutions, this paper examined the separation of
offices. Anglophone countries stand out for the fusion of executive and legislative
offices, creating the strongest form of fusion between the branches, i.e. in one person.
This feature further strengthens executive dominance over the legislature. With many
MPs serving is some capacity on the government, they will not use their legislative
office to hold the government accountable.
Given the combination of executive dominance resulting from fusion of
powers between the legislature and the cabinet with a directly elected president with
substantial executive powers, my argument is that African presidential systems, and
most evidently Anglophone African systems, thus combine the power concentrating
features of the parliamentary and the presidential systems: parliamentary systems by
definition fuse power between the legislature and the executive and thus create a
degree of constitutional ‘monism’, and presidential systems are inherently
majoritarian in the sense that the single-person executive by definition gains power
through a majority vote of a winner take all type. Both systems, in their ideal typical,
but also in their empirical forms, also possess power sharing or power division
potential; parliamentary systems allow power sharing in a collective executive, and
presidential systems may divide and separate power between the branches of
government. In Africa’s hybrid systems, however, neither the power sharing nor the
power- dividing potential of the ‘pure’ types is reflected.
In the category of semi-presidential systems, in which (part of) the executive
and the legislature are inherently not institutionally separated, the African cases show
particularly high levels of presidential power. In Francophone countries, the great
majority being semi-presidential, levels of presidential power are highest and they
also show least separation of institutions. However, this group shows separation of
offices and the party-political context is less majoritarian than in the Anglophone
group. Granted the inherent institutional fusion in the semi-presidential systems, the
separation of offices and the party political context create some more possibilities for
parliament to hold the powerful executive accountable.
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In sum, the general picture shows that the balance of power between the
executive and the legislature is strongly in favor of the executive and the systemic
features lead to fusion rather than separation of power – although this is variably
manifested in low institutional separation, lack of separation of office or the
consequences of presidentialist electoral formulas. The introduction of multi-party
elections was not accompanied by a comprehensive reassessment of such systemic
features. The pattern of fusion and concentration of powers is strongest in the
Anglophone countries, which combine partial institutional separation, fusion of
offices and concurrent elections. The basic design of the executive-legislative
relationship inherently limits the independence of parliament vis-à-vis the executive
and limits the possibilities to play a significant role in legislation, policy development
and oversight of the executive.
The analysis showed that the hybridism of African regimes is particularly
evident looking at the extent to which powers are separated. The classification in
regime types does not give sufficient clues about the extent to which powers are
separated. This paper argued that an important prerequisite for the creation of
horizontal accountability – some degree of separation of powers - is absent or weak in
many African countries and most strongly in Anglophone countries and suggests that
these issues must be addressed in the effort to achieve democratic reforms.
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References Barkan, J. 2008. ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, no. 2, p. 124-137. Bogaards, M. 2003. ‘Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa,’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, No 2, p. 173-97. Budge, I. ‘Great Britain and Ireland’ in Political Institutions in Europe, J. Colomer, ed. (London and New Cork: Routledge), p. 18-62. Conac, F. 2007. ‘Semi-presidentialism in a francophone context’ in Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study, R. Elgie and S. Moestrup, eds (Oxon, UK: Routledge), p. 78-92. Cranenburgh, O. van. 2008. ‘Big Men Rule: presidential power, regime type and democracy in 30 African countries’. Democratization, Vol. 15, no 5, p. 952-974. Cranenburgh, O. van. 2009 ‘Restraining Executive power: horizontal accountability in Africa’s hybrid regimes’. South African Journal of international Affairs 16, 1, p. 49-69. Cranenburgh, O. van 2011 forthcoming. ‘Democracy Promotion in Africa: the institutional context,’ Democratization. Duverger, M. 1980. ‘A new political system model: semi-presidential government’, in: European Journal of Political Research Vol. 8, no. 2, p. 165–187. Elgie, R. 1998. ‘The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions,’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, p. 219-238. Elgie, R. 2005 ‘Variations on a Theme’ in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, no. 3, p. 98-113. Elgie, R. 2007, ‘What is Semi-presidentialism and where is it found?’, in R. Elgie and S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study (Oxon, UK: Routledge), p. 1-14. Frame, I. and Murison, K. eds. 2005, Africa South of the Sahara, 34th Edition (London: Europe Publications). Linz, J. 1990 ‘The Perils of Presidentialism,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 p. 51-71. Lijphart, A. 1991 ‘Constitutional Choices for New Democracies,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 72-85.
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Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale). Nijzink, L, Mozaffar, S and Azevedo, E. 2006. ‘Can Parliaments Enhance the Quality of Democracy on the African Continent? An Analysis of Institutional Capacity and Public Perceptions’, CSSR Working Paper no. 160, p. 1-27. O’Donnell, G. 1998. ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,’ Journal of Democracy, 9(3), p. 112-126. Shugart. M. and Carey, J. 1992, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Shugart, M. 1996. ‘Executive-Legislative Relations In Post-Communist Europe’, Transition. Vol. 2 (2) No. 24, p. 6-11. Shugart, M. 2005, ‘Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns’ in French Politics, 2005, No. 3, p. 323-351. Siaroff, A. 2003. ‘Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction,’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42, p. 287-312. Walle, N. van de 2003. ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging party Systems,’ Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 41, no. 2, p. 297-321.
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TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1. Classification of 30 African regimes as of 2007
* Based on constitutions in force in 2007. Botswana and South Africa are here classified as parliamentary; the difference with Mauritius is that there is no separate head of state; the head of government (no popular election and no fixed term) also serves as head of state. Table 2a. Scoring System Shugart 1996
‘presidential’ Head of state is directly elected and with fixed term; no separate head of government
‘parliamentary’: Neither the head of state nor the head of government is directly elected or with a fixed term
semi-presidential Head of state directly elected with fixed term; head of government not
Ghana Kenya (until 2007) The Gambia Zimbabwe Seychelles Sierra Leone Malawi Nigeria Zambia Benin Comoros Congo Brazzaville Djibouti Guinea
Botswana * Mauritius South Africa *
Namibia Tanzania Uganda Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Rep. Gabon Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo
Powers over cabinet Cabinet formation 4 President appoints ministers without need for assembly confirmation 3 President appoints ministers with consent of the Assembly ` 2 President appoints ministers, who need confidence of assembly
1 President nominates Prime Minister, who needs confidence of the Assembly; PM appoints other ministers, possibly with the consent of president
Cabinet dismissal
4 President dismisses ministers at will 3 President dismisses ministers with consent of the Assembly 1 President dismisses ministers, but only under certain restrictions 0 Ministers (or the whole cabinet) may be removed only by assembly on vote of censure Separation of survival in office (scored for both assembly and executive) 4 No provisions compromising separation of survival (such as fixed terms) 3 Survival can be attacked, but attacker must stand for re-election 2 Survival can be attacked only in situation of mutual jeopardy 1 Survival can be attacked at specified times 0 Survival can be attacked at any time (unrestricted censure or dissolution)
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Table 2b. Presidential Power and Separation (based on Shugart 2006)
Presidential Powers over Cabinet
Separation of Survival for…
Country
Cabinet Formation
Cabinet Dismissal
Total Assembly (dissolution)
Cabinet (fixed term)
Total
Botswana 2 4 6 3 3 6 The Gambia 2 4 6 4 0 4 Ghana 2 4 6 4 0 4 Kenya 2 4 6 3 3 6 Malawi 4 4 8 4 4 8 Mauritius 2 1 3 2 0 2 Namibia 2 4 6 3 0 3 Nigeria 3 4 7 4 4 8 Seychelles 3 4 7 0 3 3 Sierra Leone 4 4 8 4 4 8 South Africa 2 4 6 4 0 4 Tanzania 2 4 6 3 0 3 Uganda 2 4 6 4 0 4 Zambia 2 4 6 3 4 7 Zimbabwe 2 4 6 0 3 3
Presidential Powers over Cabinet
Separation of Survival for…
Country
Cabinet Formation
Cabinet Dismissal
Total Assembly (dissolution)
Cabinet (fixed term)
Total
Benin 4 4 8 4 4 8 Burkina Fase 2 4 6 0 0 0 Cameroon 2 4 6 0 0 0 C.African Rep 2 4 6 1 0 1 Comores 4 4 8 4 4 8 Congo Braz 4 4 8 4 4 8 Djibouti 4 4 8 4 4 8 Gabon 2 4 6 1 0 1 Guinea 4 4 8 1 4 5 Madagascar 2 4 6 1 0 1 Mali 2 4 6 1 0 1 Mauritania 2 4 6 1 0 1 Niger 2 4 6 1 0 1 Senegal 2 4 6 1 0 1 Togo 2 4 6 1 0 1
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Table 3. Extent of separation in three regime types and in Anglophone and Francophone African countries Regimes mean modus median Presidential (14) 6.285 8 7 Semi-presidential (13) 1.384 1 1 Parliamentary (3) 4.000 - 4 Anglophone (15) 4.866 3 of 4 4 Francophone (15) 3.000 1 1 Table 4. Fusion of Office
Ministers must be MPs Ministers may be MP’s Minister may not be MPs
Botswana Kenya* Mauritius Namibia* Tanzania* Zambia* Zimbabwe*
Ghana (50% + 1) Malawi South Africa** Uganda
The Gambia Nigeria Sierra Leone Benin Burkina Faso Comoros Congo Brazzaville Cameroon Central African Rep. Djibouti Gabon Guinea Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo
* In Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Presidents appoint ministers only from members of the Assembly. But, the President has the possibility to appoint twelve (Kenya) six (Namibia), ten (Tanzania), eight (Zambia) or twelve (Zimbabwe) members in the NA. Indirectly this means that the president may appoint these persons as ministers from outside the assembly. ** In South Africa, the President may select two ministers from outside the Assembly Source: The constitutions of all countries listed Table 5. Fusion of Office and Regime Type Regime type Fusion of Office Non-fusion Presidential (14) 5 9 Semi-presidential (13) 3 10 Parliamentary (3) 3 -
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Table 6 Concurrent or Honeymoon Elections * Concurrent or Honeymoon Elections Non-concurrent elections
Ghana Kenya Malawi Nigeria Namibia Sierra Leone Tanzania The Gambia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Central African Republic Mali Niger Senegal
Seychelles Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Comoros Congo Brazzaville Djibouti Gabon Guinea Madagascar Mauretania Togo
* Based on constitutions in force in 2007, including relevant constitutional amendments.
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Figure 1
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Former colony of
President-Parliamentary Presidential
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