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Leadership MessageMessage from Vice president

I am pleased to share the first issue of “Process Safety – from theoryto practice” under the theme of “Process Safety Awareness” with you. This initiative underscores our commitment and drive towards achieving excellence in Process Safety. We believe that effective leadership from the board room to the shop floor is essential for a successful process safety program. It is imperative that GASCO’s leadership set the process

safety “tone at the top” and establish appropriate expectations. We need to enhance our drive, raise our knowledge and awareness to

achieve excellence in Process safety, which is what I expect from this initiative.

We have everything thats required to achieve excellence in process safety. Be it a thorough HSE management system, a

hardworking team, or a strong leadership commitment.It’s there. All that is required now, is to synergize our

efforts towards achieving consistent complianceto all process safety components. Every one

of us has a role to play, in preventing serious incidents at site. I urge you all to understand

& commit to your respective roles in process safety. So that all the pieces of puzzle join

together to form our envisioned future – Being “most innovative and

respected supplier of gas and hydrocarbons in the United ArabEmirates”.

Yours sincerely,

Mahmoud Al MazmiVice President Ruwais Plant

safety program. It is imperative that GASCO’s leadership set the processsafety “tone at the top”“tone at the top”

We need to enhance our drive, raise our knowledge and awareness to achieve excellence in Process safety, which is what I expect from this

initiative.

We have everything thats required to achieve excellence in process safety. Be it a thorough HSE management system, a

hardworking team, or a strong leadership commitment.It’s there. All that is required now, is to synergize our

efforts towards achieving consistent complianceto all process safety components. Every one

of us has a role to play, in preventing serious incidents at site. I urge you all to understand

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It gives me great pleasure, to share this important milestone of Process Safety journey, the “Process Safety Bulletin”. It has been designed to decode relevant Process Safety knowledge in most simple & concise manner, thereby clarifying concepts & their evolution in becoming risk reduction strategiesof today. That is why we named it – Process Safety, from theory to practice!

This bulletin is intended to clarify misconceptions about process safety. Process Safety is simply about risk management & prioritizing

activities, which reduces residual risk to as low as reasonably practicable. It’s amazing to see that organizations, with the right

Process Safety culture, are exceptional in their safety records as well as business performance. It is only possible when every

worker & leader see himself and the things around him as “barriers”, designed to play their specific role of risk

reduction. A culture where people have little tolerance to risk & they continually question whether what

they do is enough to keep everyone safe? Weakest signals of potential failure are given due

importance & proactive interventions are encouraged at all levels. This is what

“Chronic Unease” is & that’s what best organizations are gradually shifting

towards, in order to achieve excellence!

I welcome you on this exciting journey and request to join hands with us, as we progress towards asafer tomorrow!

Yours sincerely,

Nabil Al NahariTechnical Services Department Head

Message from Technical Services Manager

4 SWISS CHEESE MODEL

Background

What

Process Safety is management of hazards that can give rise to major accidents involving release of potentially dangerous materials, release of energy such as fire and explosionor both. (Baker Panel report)

Why

Investigation of serious process safety incidents (Mocondo, BP Texas etc), highlighted the fact that these organizationswere doing quite well in terms of their Safety Lagging indicators (e.g. TRIR, LTI). Yet disasters happened, emphasizing the importance of a missing link – Process Safety.Professor James Reason presented his famous“Swiss Cheese accident causation theory”, which argued that although many layers of defense lie between hazards and accidents,there are flaws in each layer that, ifaligned, can allow the accident to occur.

From then on, Process Safety is being developed as a subject & discipline, used as a basis for emerging regulations & assisting organizations to achieve Operational & Business Excellence.(csb.gov)

Fig a) Different layers (shown by different colors) are designed to prevent Process Safety incident

Miti

gatio

n

Prev

entio

n

Process Value

Alarm

Trip

Loop

Incident

Emergency Response

Passive Protection(e.g. Bund/Dike)

(e.g. Relief Value / Rupture Disk))Active Protection

Safety Instrumented System

Operator Intervention

Process Control

Process Design

HAZARD

Ability to cause harm

When flaws in each layers ofdefense aligns, hazard

transforms to accident!

It should not be necessary for each generation to rediscover principles of process safety, which the generation before discovered. We must learn from the experience of others rather than learn the

hardway. We must pass on to the next generation a record of what we have learned.

Jesse C. Ducommun(VP, Manufacturing, American Oil)

1974-1976 1984-1986 1988-2000 2001-2011 2013 2014

ADNOC COPVI-09

GASCO - HSE &

AI Policies

PSM Application

Manual

Flixborough, UKSeveso, Italy

HAZOPMOC

Reactivity hazardsInherent SafetySafety Culture

Bhopal, IndiaChernobyl, Russia

Piper Alpha, North SeaPasadena, USA

BP Texas, USABuncefield, UKDeepwater horizonFukoshima, Japan

West Fertilizer, USAYPF Refinery,Argentina

ManagementSystems, Procedures,Human error

Facility Siting, VCE,Risk mgmt, SMS,Procedures

Fire protection,Natural hazards

Incident(s)

Learnings(s)

How

Unfortunately, whatever we know about process safety, originated from our learning as a result of global disasters. As a philosopheronce said, “Past failures are future wisdom”. Focus of global industry at large today is not only upon learning from past mistakes, but developing proactive approaches, thus maximizing profits without the cost of human, environment or reputation impact. Brief history of disasters that occurred & their corresponding lesson leant has been illustrated in figure below.

In March 2005, the BP Texas City refineryexperienced an explosion that killed 15 and injured 170 employees. Anecdotal evidencesuggests that the BP Baker report has awakened the industry to the importance of differentiating between personal and processsafety. Prof. Hopkins noted personal safetyrefers to safety hazards that affect the individual but are not necessarily affectedby the activities of the plant, whereas process safety is defined as hazards that arise directly from processing activity at a plant. In high reliability organizations, such as Oil & Gas, chemical & nuclear power plants, theimportance of understanding and monitoring process safety indicators is very high, as failures of the process can be catastrophic.

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Importance

What’s for me?

Process safety is all about preventing large scale loss of lives, harm to environment, asset &reputation. It’s a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems andprocesses that handle hazardous substances. Thus it relies on good design, engineering, operating & maintenance practices, to prevent us & our businesses from harm.

It is important to understand what led us to Process Safety. Industry realized in the wake of industrial disasters, that the reasonswhy these incidents continue to occur are;

Lack of Process Safety awareness at senior level

Devaluation of sound engineering practices

Increased divestment/ Use of contract manpower

Failure to recognize importance of asset integrity & maintenance

Only easy to measure items, were being measured under umbrella of safety

Loss of corporate memory due to attrition etc.

Fragmentation of functions

Inadequate hazard identification, risk management & mitigation measures

Lack of Emergency response mechanism

As a result, Systems & standards emerged, which focused on following behaviors;

Safety in design requires follow-up with safety in operation & Skill in dealing with unusual situations

Process safety is never fixed – it requires constant attention

Process automation and management systems can create a false sense of security

What and why of design considerations and HSE critical features must be known by relevant people. Changes to design should be reviewed thoroughly

Meaningful assurance system is mandatory, which warrant proactive solutions for keeping materials in their primary containments

Take decisions that do not compromise longer term integrity for the sake of the short term benefits

“Bad news” should be considered as an opportunity for improvement

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Relevance

My Role

Key Terminologies

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Lesson Learnt

Key Lesson learnt:

Hazard Evaluation & Management: Communication system between Maintenance & Operations completely failed. Lock out tag out system was not followed.

Plant integrity: The firewalls on platform could have prevented the spread of initial fire. However, they were not built to withstand explosion. Effective containment in any process facility is central to gaining rapid control and prevention of escalation.

Major Accident Potential: Primary risk on platform was the gas risers, but they were not protected adequately. This was also a recommendation of earlier audit, which recommended installation of a specific deluge system along with an automatic valve that

would seal the risers in an abnormal situation. None of these measures had been implemented.

Protective Systems: Automatic fire water deluge system was put on manual due to a job that occurred earlier that day. After completion of job, system was not taken back in service, which resulted in absence of an important mitigation system.

Competence: Lack of training in PTW & Emergency response procedure resulted in escalation of impacts.

What history taught us!

PIPER ALPHA PLATFORM, UK, NORTH SEA. Owned by Occidental PetroleumOccurred: 2200hrs on July 6,1988

Consequences: Explosion, Fire, total destruction of Offshore Platform Impact: Fatalities: 167, Financial: £1.7 billion

Disaster initiated from a Hydrocarbon leak thru pipe work connected to a condensate pump. A safety valve had been removed from this pipe work for overhaul and maintenance. The pump itself was undergoing maintenance work. When the pipe work from which the safety valve had been removed was pressurized at start-up, the leak occurred from removed PSV flange.

Major outcomes of the The Cullen Inquiry for this disaster were; o Initiation of Formal Safety Assessments o Improvements to the “permit to work” management systems o Relocation of pipeline emergency shutdown valves o Control of bypassing of safety critical equipment & systems o Improvements to evacuation and escape systems o Installation of sub sea pipeline isolation systems

Absence of the evidence of risk is not evidence of the absence of risk.

(UK Health and Safety Executive)

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Sulphur Dust Explosion

A sulphur dust explosion occurs when fine sulphur dust in suspension in air is ignited, resulting in a very rapid burning, and the release of large quantities of gaseous products. This in turn creates a subsequent pressure rise of explosive force capable of damaging plant and buildingsand injuring people.

Difference between Fire triangle & Dust explosion pentagon

Dust explosion phenomenon is different from a fire triangle, since it requires dispersion of dust & confinement in addition to usual air/fuel and ignition source. It also differs in the aspect that first explosion results in suspension of additional dust, which results in secondary explosions.

a) Dust explosion in controlled environment b) Primary explosion triggers nearby dust to explode

Dust explosion was studied in a controlled laboratory environment. Pictures below, show the propagation of primary explosion in figure a. This resulted in dispersion of nearby dust with asubsequent secondary explosion (fig b).

Lesson Learnt (Continued)

Factors affecting Sulphur dust explosion

Particle Size As size of the dust decreases, the available surface area increases, making it much easier for the dust to burn rapidly (explode) & vice versa

Moisture Content results in difficulty for dust particles in exploding. However, moisture has to be very high (making it non market able in some cases) to completely prevent explosion

Inerting results in reduction of explosivity. Inerting can be achieved by reducing O2 level with inerts such as N2, CO2 etc. An atmosphere containing O2

<= 8% will not support explosion

Avoid sulphur dust suspension Remove all sources of ignition Effective House keeping Training

Containment of shock wave in a properly designed vessel etc Venting the vessel using PRV, PSV Facility siting, isolating hazardous process from other operations

Sulphur dust explosion prevention

Sulphur dust explosion protection

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Gasco’s Methodology

How are we doing it?!

GASCO Process Safety Management Applicationmanual was published in April 2013.

This manual outlines the basis to establish sufficient assurance of Process Safety at all GASCO facilities.

It introduces the 22 requirements of ProcessSafety and aims to provide Asset managers with simple, clear and concise guidance on whatshould be verified to provide assurance of the Asset.

The requirements in this document have been formulated with the aim to set a minimum level of acceptable Process Safety requirements related to an asset which is part of the operations domain.

By fulfilling these requirements, GASCO leadership team has the confidence that risk controls have been reduced to ALARP, and that a minimum required level of Process Safety is provided and maintained in Operations.

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The requirements are distributed over the following four topics describing the GASCOmanagement processes, with the details being shown in the figure below:

1. Risk Management 2. Management of Change (design and construction) 3. Operation, Inspection and Maintenance 4. Process Safety Culture

Gasco’s Methodology (Continued)

1. Identify and document hazards (RAM red & yellow) for existing and new Assets.1. Identify and document hazards (RAM red & yellow) for existing and new Assets.2. Manage risks to ALARP3. Manage competence of employees in HSE critical positions3. Manage competence of employees in HSE critical positions4. Manage Fitness to work of employees5. Manage Contractor HSE requirements6. Provide supervision of HSE critical activities7. Develop statement of fitness for Asset

8. Establish Technical Integrity in design and construction8. Establish Technical Integrity in design and construction9. Design and construct new Assets and modify existing Assets as per Design 9. Design and construct new Assets and modify existing Assets as per Design General Specifications (DGS).10. Meet the process safety basic requirements as specified by GASCO MAPP 10. Meet the process safety basic requirements as specified by GASCO MAPP (Rev. 2 06/2010)11. Create, make available and maintain the documentation for HSECES11. Create, make available and maintain the documentation for HSECES12. Perform process safety reviews for new & existing.

13. Establish and maintain procedures for access, use of equipment and performing 13. Establish and maintain procedures for access, use of equipment and performing work in classified areas14. Establish and maintain procedures to operate HSECES within operational limits.14. Establish and maintain procedures to operate HSECES within operational limits.15. Establish and maintain the procedures to inspect the technical integrity of HSECES15. Establish and maintain the procedures to inspect the technical integrity of HSECES16. Establish and maintain procedures to maintain HSECES 16. Establish and maintain procedures to maintain HSECES 17. Control hazards during inspection and maintenance activities using procedures 17. Control hazards during inspection and maintenance activities using procedures specified in permit to work.

Process Safety Culture

18. Appoint an asset Manager for each phase of asset life cycle with single point 18. Appoint an asset Manager for each phase of asset life cycle with single point accountability for PSM of the Asset.19. Review the process safety risks to the business at least annually in line with 19. Review the process safety risks to the business at least annually in line with management review.20. Review the process safety risks to the asset annually, in line with Management20. Review the process safety risks to the asset annually, in line with Management Review.21. Know the asset hazards with RAM red and yellow 5A process safety risks, and know21. Know the asset hazards with RAM red and yellow 5A process safety risks, and know how these risks are managed to ALARP.22. Demonstrate leadership in process safety through measureable and visible actions22. Demonstrate leadership in process safety through measureable and visible actions

Commitment

GASCO’s leadership is committed to achieve excellence in process safety & recognizes that it requires a lot of hard work & perseverance. But so does everything in this world, worth having!We recognize that, excellence is never an accident. It is the result of high intention, sincere effort, intelligent direction, skillful execution and the vision to see obstacles as opportunities.

This is the confidence that our teamwork has given us, as this is the fuel which drives

common people to attain uncommon results...

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Customer’s Feedback

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Disappointing Exceptional

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Thanks, for providing your valuable feedback.

Khairy Hassan & Aamish J. Khan, CSP

Integrity Assurance Team

GASCO Ruwais

Exceptional

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Help us improve, by providing feedback

Vision behind the bulletin is to “Promote Process Safety knowledge at all levels of organization”. We intend to do this by clarifying concepts, emphasizing its importance, publicizing roles and responsibilities expected - in an easy to understand way.

Please fill out this questionnaire and send it to us, sowe can improve this experience for you & ourcommunity at large. Thank you.

The contents of the publication has been able to achieve the vision behind Process Safety Bulletin (mentioned above)?

Selection of content/topics has covered the theme “process safety awareness” properly

Which of the current chapters you like to see in next issue…

Customer’s Profile;

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E-mail

Discipline

Sector

Leadership messages

Background

Importance

Relevance

Lesson learnt

GASCO’s methodology

Leadership commitment

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PetrochemicalOps/HSEW/Maint/etc.

Oil & Gas

OthersOthers, please define:

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Suggest areas of improvement for our next issue

What themes do you suggest for our next issues.

Design

Chronic UneaseProcedures

Process Safety Culture Alarm ManagementFacility Siting

Risk Assessment MOCOperating & Maintenacne

Content Theme Language

How would you rate your Process Safety Knowledge currently

This bulletin has been able to improve my knowledgeon the subject

From inside UAE; Please detach paper, fold & send it to our mail.From outside UAE, please scan feedback page and send it to:aakhan@gasco.ae

Khairy Hasan & Aamish Khan, CSPIntegrity Assurance TeamRuwais Plant DivisionP.O.Box 665Abu Dhabi Gas Industries Ltd (GASCO)Abu Dhabi, UAE