212
i
ii
Prof. Geoffrey Brennan University of North Carolina at Chapel Hilland Duke University, U.S.A.
Prof. Steven N.S. Cheung University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Prof. Issac Ehrlich University of Buffalo, SUNY, U.S.A.
Prof. Herbert Grubel Simon Fraser University, Canada
Prof. Y.C. Jao University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Prof. David Laidler University of Western Ontario, Canada
Prof. Patrick Minford Cardiff University, U.K.
Prof. Sir Alan Peacock David Hume Institute, U.K.
Dr. Alvin Rabushka Hoover Institution, Stanford University,U.S.A.
Prof. James Riedel Johns Hopkins University, U.S.A.
Prof. Pascal Salin Université de Paris-Dauphine, France
Prof. Peter Swan University of New South Wales, Australia
Prof. Gordon Tullock George Mason University, U.S.A.
Prof. Arthur Waldron University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Prof. Sir Alan Walters AIG Trading Group, U.S.A.
852-25478313 852-25486319
iii
iv
© 2007
ISBN 978-962-209-871-8
http://www.hkupress.org
v
vi
(Dr. Milton
Friedman) 1988 9 24
vii
xi
xvii
1
7
17
23
29
36
47
49
57
60
| 1 |
viii
67
78
87
97
99
105
106
113
115
116
124
129
141
147
148
152
155
160
165
167
168
169
172
177
187
ix
1 51
2 62
3 103
4 110
5 113
6 128
7 128
8 134
9 145
10 150
11 157
x
xi
1978
90
90
xii
90
(terms of trade)
90
xiii
1)
2)
1
3)
(critical mass)
4)
(marketplace for solutions)
(marketplace for institutional arrangements)
xiv
5)
6)
7)
(voucher market) (Friedman 1980)
8)
xv
9)
xvi
2007 4
21 17.10.05
xvii
(International Network for
Economic Method)
(Journal of Economic Methodology)
A Reconstruction of Education
1977 The Unseen Dimensions of Wealth
— Towards a Generalized Economic Theory
1984 What’s Wrong with Formalization in Economics
— An Epistemological Critique
1986) Effective Reform for China — An agenda
1991 Cognition, Value & Price —
A General Theory of Value
1992 The Making of a New Chinese Mind:
Intellectuality and the Future of China
1993 (Back to Power and Prosperity
China in the 21st Century, 1993) (The
West in Distress — Resurrecting Confucius’s Teachings for a
New Cultural Vision and Synthesis, 1995)
(The Reign of the Legal Person) (1998)
(Alone amidst Cold and Snow Fishing in the River)
(1999) (The Collected
Works of Henry K.H. Woo) (2001)
xviii
1
1978
1984 1
1990
2000
2000
| 1 |
2
85% 90%
1990 2000
120 340
2003
3
2003 1 8
2004 3 5
2004
1
26
4
(2004.7.26)
2005 5
5
30 3 5
1 2004
6
7
| 2 |
8
10%
1/3
1/3 666 0.8 463
0.5 1500
2005
2003
250
9
90%
10
5
1980
10
1997 2001 1000
2005
1985 2003 18
4.3%
8.7% 2004
3.2:1 6:1 2004
300
900
1992 2002
3600 1200 2005
2002
1991 10.3% 2002 7.7%
11
2001 3057
901
2 2002
1017
372
2005
2005
60%
7000 1.5
6% 2%
6% 1%
60%
21 2005.9.29
1994
12
2002 3000
2–3
6000–9000 700–1000
2005.1.17
2003 100
2004 100
12% 15%
13
5.
(2004)
30%
1954 1958
14
2005
70% 8
1500 0.5
750 200
100 450
3600
5000 3000
66% 64%
(2005)
5000
15000
20
15
1995
15% 1999 22%
4000
2005
9
60%
2001 21%
70% 80%
64%
20 1982
9.5 45 5
300 2002 2004
50–80%
2004
2005
1999
16
11 3557 324
12.4 5155 467
2036 1021
10 758 747
60% 20%
7000
2000
6000
41%
2005
2004 11 5
60–80% 2003
2622.2 2236
(terms of trade)
17
2005
235
80%
18
8%
2003 6 9
5000 2005
10–50% 30% 3–9
3%
60%
19
2
16%
9%
70
1000
9%
1
20
3%
2610 668
5000
882
1/3 8517
1
2.5 900
1
10% 2006
2000
39.1%
65.4% 42.8% 15
8.3% 23.8% 4.0%
21
85% 80
10%
30%
1985
2002
65.72% 53.51%
64 60 1992
1:2.45 2004
1:4.39
22
23
| 3 |
24
2004
(I)
(II)
25
2004
26
30
27
(2004)
GDP
2%
GDP20%
2004
28
2004
2005
1% 1300
(2005)
1300 1500
29
30
(2004) (2002)
31
32
2004
33
2004
30% 50
200 2004
2004
(situational
logic)
34
(2005)
(a)
(b)
1840
35
20
2001 6 1 13
9
36
2004 1
1
2004
5
2004 120
1500
2003 300
1
2004
37
318
2003 72%
2005 26
2005 140
270
2004
2006 1
2006–2010
2004
2006 3 5
2006
3397 422
336
700
38
2006
150
180 140
2006
40% 2008
2007
39
2005
2006
2005
(2005)
40
100
2
1500 9%
1000
90
41
2006
2006
2005
1.5
600
2005 2004
5200 336
42
2006 39343
3397 10%
2005 813 2006 1150
2006
3,397 2005 422
14.2% 23,482 2005
3,222 15.9%
2007
3,917 2006 520
15.3% 26,871
2006 3,388.8 14.4%
2005 6.2%
9.6%
2006 10%
12%
2007
43
44
GDP15%–17%
GDP
7–8%
300–400
45
1. GDP 15%
17% GDP
GDP
2.
GDP
GDP
GDP
GDP
GDP
(2004 2005) 20
1
20
2030
46
16 50% 8
2006 3
20
3
8
47
60 13 2025
85 16
1
10% 1500
21
| 4 |
48
1.4 5.8
1/2 1/3
49
30
1996 2000 4.5
20 80
90 21
21
50
51
15
8
10%–20%
43
40%–60%
52
C
53
3S (GPS, GIS, RS) (ES)
50%
1
54
700
2 20
1998
21
3S (RS GIS
GPS)
55
(GPS)
2000
22
1000
80%
2004
3
56
57
21
BRIC BRIC
GDP 4%
10 8
58
2000
2000
59
20
4,000
15
60
37%
20 80
20 90
61
3S
2002
10 1/6
62
63
64
21 30
GIS GPS
2/3
65
66
67
| 5 |
68
69
70
600
500
71
72
73
764
40
74
160
6
75
a)
b)
c)
76
3 80
77
10 400
78
79
45%
20%
10
15% 50
12
2/3
105000
80
1970 6300 10000
3136
10 44 3
26
95%
40
49
81
2000
529 19.2%
36.7% 29.1% 42.5%
82
(GPS)
20 30
90
83
4
342
5000
25
60%
84
1979
90
20 50
50 40% 2.2%
10
15
60
1962
1990
1999
85
1.47
70% 1
2000 5
1.5
WTO
86
1
87
(New public management)
(Public choice theory)
(New institutional economics) (Theories of social change and
reform)
88
20 80
E (economy) (efficiency)
(effect)
(Buchanan)
89
90
(i)
(ii)
(Oliver E. Williamson)
(transaction cost)
(Coase) 1937
91
(property rights)
(North)
92
(von Hayek)
(evolutionary rationalism)
(constructive rationalism)
93
(unintended consequences of social actions)
(spontaneous order)
(road to serfdom)
94
(market instrumental-
ism)
(managerial reductionism)
(positivism)
95
96
97
(value-neutral)
(arch institution)
(basic human condition)
(explanatory schema)
(theory of ignorance)
(unintended
consequences)
98
( u n i f i e d
theoretical framework)
99
(procedural justice)
(re-dis-
tributive function)
(The Doctrine ofInterventionist Negativism)
100
2
(i)
(ii)
101
(institutional
risk management)
(closing of time window) (path-dependency)
a) (self-adjust-
ing and self-correctible)
b) ( h a z a r d
localization)
c) (checks and balances)
102
( p o w e r
asymmetry) (informational
asymmetry)
d) (risk affordability)
(worst possible scenario)
103
(1)
(2)
(3) (entropic factors)
(4)
(critical mass)
(5)
(6)
1
2 (operating cost)
104
105
| 6 |
106
107
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
108
(Non-recurrent revenue)
2004
20000 2485
7000
3000 2004
30 250 2000
2004 800
109
(Recurrent Revenue)
(1)
(a) GDP
(b)
(c)
2006 4 GDP
10%
14% 1
4
(2)
110
GDP
2004 136515 28469 2626
2005 147436 30746 2975 2
2006 159231 40213 3397 3
2007 178398 46515 3917
2008 196237 51167 4465
2009 215861 56283 5091
2010 237447 61911 5803
a)
0.3%
b)
c)
111
d) 500 1000
500
e)
f)
(3)
(4)
(5)
( ) ( )
112
51682 4
5000
1. 1500
2. 1000–1500 5
3. 2000
113
2007 3917 1500 1000–1500 2000–2500 8417–9417
2008 4465 1500 1000–1500 2000–2500 8965–9965
2009 5091 1500 1000–1500 2000–2500 09591–10591
2010 5803 1500 1000–1500 2000–2500 10303–11303
2004 2626 2010
11300 3
114
115
1.
2.
116
(marketplace for solutions)
(waste management) (abuse management)
(worst
scenario prediction) (lowest risk-bearing
capability)
117
(catalysts of change)
2005
2005
1947
118
90% 79% 78%
69% 80% 70%
2005
80%
85% 42% 100
1995 71%
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
60%
52%
119
82% 70% 95%
63% 100%
90%
8 5
20 60 70
1971
1/3 5%
120
121
122
(agro-manager) (agro-management team)
123
124
11
125
(demonstration effect)
(market creation)
(virtuous circle)
(snowball effect)
(convergent
interactionist voucher model)
126
(voucher system)
(Milton Friedman 1980)
(input-output system)
(demand creation) (targeted)
127
(voucher market)
(goal-oriented)
6
7
128
▲
t
TV
0
1.
10.
11.
▲
▲
▲▲
129
90
130
1994
1995
19
2004
131
1.5–3.5
100%
20%–30% 40%–50%
25%–30% 5%–
10%
30
2005
1990 2002
4736 440
1.4
13 6630
2005
2005 6 11
132
2005
133
134
(unified vertical
management)
➡➡
135
(co-ordinate management)
136
1978
137
2003
138
(i)
(ii)
139
(iii)
(iv)
(quasi-
market)
140
141
142
4000
3.5 20%–
30% 60
80–90
6.9% 80 80
90
1997
21
5
200
143
50
10
10–
30% 5–15% 30%
144
1998
6336 351
40% 70%
145
146
147
148
2006
1030 780
149
(I)
(II)
(III)
a)
b)
c)
150
1998
④➀
➂
➁
151
1998 5
7400 46436 4
152
1994
1998 1999 2001
37 491 508 2004
80 98%
10%
2001 78%
153
1979
2000
10334 8722 1612
50% 65%
154
2006 12 20
2007
10%
155
20
156
2006
70 592
1700
1700
2007
157
158
(i) (ii) (iii)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
a)
b)
c)
d)
a)
159
b)
c)
d)
e)
a)
b)
19
160
161
2000
60% 90% 1990–
2000 60%–70% 32%–
33% 2000 188.6
710.2 1/4
32.72%
27.6%
1991–2000
690
15.9% 1991–2000
506.71
63.08 12.4% 2000
191
4
85%
80
162
10%
2005
5 200
2006
40%
20 40
42 2008
163
164
a)
b)
c)
165
(i) (ii) (iii)
(iv)
166
167
A)
168
B)
(zero-
based budgeting)
169
1994 (Brown)
170
1990 2030
2.07 3.69
2 1–2
(1)
8.3
500
16.6
(2) 2030
7.02
6.9
(1) 2.2 2.3
45%
10%
2004
(2) 2004
2004
171
1/10
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
172
(International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC))
2050
1–3ºC 3ºC
173
174
1 27 1978 2004
9.28
%
1978 150.66 13.43
1979 174.33 13.60
1980 149.95 12.20
1981 110.21 9.68
1982 120.49 9.80
1983 132.87 9.43
1984 141.29 8.31
1985 153.62 7.66
1986 184.20 8.35
1987 195.72 8.65
1988 214.07 8.59
1989 265.94 9.42
1990 307.84 9.98
1991 347.57 10.26
1992 376.02 10.05
1993 440.45 9.49
1994 532.98 9.20
1995 574.93 8.43
1996 700.43 8.82
1997 766.39 8.30
1998 1154.76 10.69
1999 1085.86 8.23
2000 1231.54 7.75
2001 1456.73 7.71
2002 1580.76 7.17
2003 1754.45 7.12
2004 2357.89 8.27
175
2
2005 2006
3 2006 3 5
4
1) 1953–1978 9500 1979–2004
1000 x 15 15000 24000
2) 20000
3) 10%
1191
4) 2003 647
10 6470
5)
2005 2975
1)–4)
24000 20000 1991 649 51682 10
5168
2.25 8300 36888
3.40 3643 10714
1.30 3287 25285
8 2358 00295
2004
115 3.9%662 22.3%
813 27.3%189 6.4%
432 14.5%
130 4.4%
99 3.3%
535 17.9%
176
5
1. 5
2. (2)
a) 2004 49415
46595 96100 0.3%
288
b) 2004 10375 2585
10849 244 24389
1% 244
c) 2004 9,500
5339 2425
1% 172
d) 2004 500 89935
0.5% 450
e) 2004 1737 2 35
f) (3)(4)(5) 1189
1000–1500
2007 3917 1000–1500 4917–5417
2008 4465 1000–1500 5465–5965
2009 5091 1000–1500 6091–6591
2010 5803 1000–1500 6803–7303
177
Q.
A. 70
(theory-
ladenness)
(necessary
and sufficient condition) (Karl Popper)
(World 3)
| 7 |
178
Q.
A.
Q. (critical mass
effect)
A.
GDP
179
Q.
A.
Q.
180
A.
181
Q.
A.
182
Q.
A.
Q.
183
A.
Q.
A.
(1).
(2).
(3).
(4).
Q.
WTO
A.
184
WTO
WTO
Q.
A.
(1).
(2).
(3).
(4).
(5).
(6).
Q.
A.
185
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
186
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
187
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2002.8.1
21 2004.8.16
21 2004.
8.23
21 2004.
8.25
21
2004.8.31
2004.3
2004.03.04
2005.03.31
2005.7.19
2005
2005.1.7
2004
2005.4.18
2005
21
2004
2005
2003.3
2002
2004
2004
2004
2004.6.1
2005
2005
2005
190
2005
2005
2005.3.
29
2005.5.9
2005.5.12
21
2005
2005
2005.4.22
2005.4.19
2005.6.20
2005.7.4
1984
2005
2004
2005 21
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005.5.9
2005
1993
1998
2004
2004.11
2005.4.26
2005
21
2005
191
21
2005
2000
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005.
04.04
2001
2002.12.2
2005.4.19
2004
2005
2005
2004
2005
2005.3.9
2005.
6.6
2005.6.14
2005.6
2005.8.21
2003.6.
17
2005.4.22
2002.2.21
2003.8.15
2004.5.2
2004.8.26
2005.3.16
2005.4.25
192
2005.4.26
2006.03.05
2005.4.18
2005.1
2005.2.1
2005.3.2
2005.8.19
2002.9
2004.9.3
2004.5
2003
2004.9.6
2004.11
500
2004.10.14
2004.12.26
2005.4.
29
2005.4.6
6.2%
2006.02.26
2004.10.19
2004.11.1
2005.8.1
2005.4.26
2005.1.11
2005.4.
28
2004.5.9
2004.
5.10
2004.5.12
2005
2005.1.4
193
2005.2
2005.3
2005.7.15
2005.8.7
2004.11
2005.4.6
2005.4.20
2005.4.30
2004
2000
2004.8.10
2006.1.12
2005.3.17
2005.4.21
2005.6.17
2005
2004.11.3
2005-9-17
16 21
2004.9.5
2001.9.20
2005.4.19
2005-9-15
2001.6.1
29 21
2004
2005.4.19
2005.4.22
2005.4.22
2006–03–22
194
21
2005.5
2005
2006.1.21
2006 3 5
2006.3.15
