Professor Temperley on the Origins of the War of 1914Source: Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1948), pp. 251-256Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020623 .

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2. PROFESSOR TEMPERLEY ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF I914

The following notes on the origins of the First World War may be of interest to readers for the light which they throw on Professor Temperley's views in 1927 when he was engaged with Dr G& P. Gooch upon the work of editing the British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. They have reference to a lecture by Professor Pearce Higgins on 'The Law of Nations and the War', delivered at the London School of Economics on 8 October 1914, printed as no. 24 of the Oxford Pamphlets 1914, and then submitted to Dr Temperley as pp. I24-48 of Studies in International Lazv and Relations, when that collection of papers (published in I928) was in proof. Professor Pearce Higgins appears to have taken some account of certain of these comments in a short supplementary note which is to be found on pp. 148-52 of the volume in question. Our thanks are due to Mr Carrington, of the Cambridge University Press, for communicating this manuscript, and to Mrs Temperley who has consented to its publication.

34 Lensfield Rd 30th December 1927.

My dear Higgins, I have read with lively interest your pages-and send you a few notes which, I hope,

may be of service to you. Would you, however, take special care not to mention my name in the preface etc., as I think I wish to avoid all responsibility on these critical matters until the last of our volumes is published.

Yours sincerely, sd. HAROLD TEMPERLEY.

Professor A. PEARCE HIGGINS, LL.D., C.B.E., etc. Willowbrook, Chaucer Rd.

One or two main comments strike me

pp. 125-7 It is, I think, a grave step to assume that the conclusions of either German writers or militarists (General Staff etc.) are identical with those of any German Government.

P. 127 Thus it is quite true that the German Emperor sanctioned the Schlieffen plan in I909. (I saw him walk over from his palace to the Crown prince's on New Year's day-to do it.j But he did this as Head of the Army not as Head of the State1 In the latter capacity he was notoriously timorous, and Bethmann Hollweg etc. were certainly not bellicose.

The strategic railways & plan argument could be used with even more effect against Russia, I, think. But the difference was this-the Russians would not be ready till 19I7 and therefore wished peace till then. The Germans, just because Russia's strength was increasing, were inclined to strike beforehand. Moltke certainly wished it-but I don't think it can be truly said that the militarists got control till about the 3oth July I914.

- It is the duty of soldiers to formulate the best military plans independently of ethics-and all general staffs do so. [H.T.]

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252 NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS I think the case against the civil government of Germany would have to

rest on other arguments-quite good in themselves but different: (a) Germany opposed disarmament or limited armaments consistently[.]

Russia was for it feebly in i898-We were for it navally in I 907, Germany never-and she expelled Norman Angell when he wanted to lecture. The Kaiser also strongly opposed the Arbn Court of I898-and only gave way at the last moment because Austria-Hungary abandoned him.

(b) Germany went on building her fleet This was legte in itself, but the avowed object was to keep us in a humble mood.

(c) The Bagdad railway. Apart from (a) wh. was open to question morally & (b) (c) wh. were

impolitic-I think the civil govt. was genY peaceful between-say I904 & I914. Bethmann certY was and recounts how he tried to stop or limit both (b) & (c). But there were discordant and foolish elements in the Civil

p. 134 Exve. The Emperor himself opposed his visit to Tangier and the F.O. were divided over Algeciras the peace party triumphed at Berlin & expelled Holstein, the Panther went to Agadir on the initiative of Kiderlen Waichter and apparently origY unknown to and later opposed by both Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser. In neither case did they, I think it is now certain, intend to provoke war or think it wd. do so. Whether they lowered international ethic is more disputable, but I think on the whole it was clumsiness not immorality. The standard of ethic of France both in I905 and still more between I908-Ii in Morocco was very questionable.

p. 134 [For Bismarck v. below.] The Bosnia imbroglio was not due to, nor desired by, Germany in any way, nor was the annexation known to her beforehand more than a day or two.

To sum up, Germany was a militarist state and thus a danger in herself, but her civil govt. were not militarist, though they found difficulties in opposing such tendencies. The Kaiser liked to 'rattle the sabre' but he shrank from using it, always until 19 I 4[.] German diplomacy was clumsy- rough-and under militarist intimidation at times-but it was not per- sistently unethical or bellicose or intentionally either. I fail to see any respect in which Russia was better than Germany-and in some respects she was worse. France, I think, always opposed limitn of armts & egged on Russian designs.

II p. 133 neutrality-andfaith of treaties-guarantees etc. p. 136 Guarantees were certainly not regarded in the XVIII century by anyone.

The modern doctrine was laid down by Canning-v. his despatch in my Foreign Policy p. 538 sq. a most masterly & classical exposition. But-we must remember-that we at one time rather hesitated about upholding the Belgian Treaty. Gladstone was very evasive in i870-and there were some curious negotiations or rumoured ones in I887 (v. Gooch Modern Europe, pp. 134-5) which imply that we might have acted then as is suggested- bottom of p. I37. We had lined up the straight ticket long before I9I4 because we felt ourselves committed to France and knew (privately) that she had no anti-Belgic intentions. But this only suggests that circs were favourable to our observation of the treaty at one time, and unfavourable at another.

p. I38 That is just the difficulty of the Balance of Power it is always shifting- p. I32 and who is to judge (when 'international law is destitute of a judiciary')

what action is right or to what group we or anyone shall belong? At the present moment p. I23-after Locarno we belong to both groups-the

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ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF I914 253

German and the French. We can press the balance down on one side or the other-but have we the right to judge?

I think the phrase Concert of Power expresses the ideal more correctly than Balance. After proclaiming the former in the League, the nations have settled down to a group and regional system in defiance of it. But it seems to me a Concert of Power is the true aim.

pp. I25, I48 Another general proposition[:] 'The German doctrine of necessity.' p. I26 'necessity of success'

I think most nations on the Continent before the war of I 9I4 would have held that war was wrong if unsuccessful, and right -if successful. J. A. Spender in his latest work-even says the Liberal Government thought so too in England between I906-and I914.

p. 124 [Here Professor Pearce Higgins had stated: 'We might, I think, add to the violation of treaties and of the common law of Nations the further acts of entering French territory with armed forces, and so commencing hostilities, without any previous ultimatum to France or without any previous declaration of war.']

Entering French territory with armed forces. It is a dangerous doctrine to press far.

Specific historical points pp. I29-30 The point about Canning is not, I think, quite correct. The criticism of

the time was based on the belief that Canning had not seen the secret articles-that they did not disclose a design against Denmark, and con- sequently that the aggression had no justification.

Modern research shows that, while Canning had not in fact seen them, he had good reason to know something of their contents.2 And his guess was in fact correct, as the publication of the secret articles revealed. In fact Canning was betting on a (i) heavy probability, and (ii) his bet was successful. Contemporary criticism did not believe (i) or (ii).

p. 125 ['There is this further point that immediately war was declared Germany proceeded to lay mines in the North Sea.']

German minelaying in the North Sea before the war-I believe this is doubted now-

p. I30 ['Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, at the very outset of the war, issued their respective cases to the world.']

Russia's pleadings-have been shown to be somewhat falsified and disguised from their originally published form in I914.

p. I3I I think the German argument wd have been that Russia meant to attack her, and France to support Russia. Hence France must be knocked out first-that Russia's aggression might be defeated. In other words- aggression in Belgium-was the defence against Russia.

pp. I3I-2 The German allegation about French & British marching into Belgium is-I think-quite untrue-though I cannot speak with certainty after I9I0.

p. I32 & Austria n'existe pas Austria-Hungary is, from the international point elsewhere of view, the only correct title. p. I43 Ferdinand was not Crown Prince but Arch Duke (I think not of Austria).

His title was Thron-folger3 which I cannot translate. p. I36 [Here Professor Pearce Higgins had written: ' "We cannot recognize

the right of any Power or State to alter an international treaty without the consent of the other parties to it", said Sir Edward Grey on October .-7th T(r-I '1 I I 7- -

i

2 Hall assumes that Canning knew the secret clauses. This is not correct. He may have seen some of them-but not all. [H.T.] 3 Successor? [H.T.]

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254 NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Grey's speech re Bosnia. Like much of his policy and utterances, espY in this part of the world, displayed astounding ignorance and naivete. There were, I think, already about twelve admitted breaches of the Berlin Treaty several of which, e.g. Bulgaria hd been sanctioned by the individual consent of the Great Powers-not by conference. Now in the case of Bosnia every Great Power had consented to annexn in principle exc. France (and France was carried by Russia) and Great Britain. Something like 20 years or so before-Russia-Italy-& Germany had all given written consent to annexation to A-Hungary. She could therefore argue that France's consent was foregone, and that England did not count alone. Further, conscription was introduced into Bosnia in I890-I think-a clear violn of the Treaty of Berlin and of the sovereign rights of the Sultan without, I believe, any protest being made. So in the case of Bosnia Grey's attitude was ill-informed. I think that Isvolsky objected because Aehren- thal did it before he expected it, and also because a half promise about opening the Straits was repudiated by Aehrenthal. But it is rather notice- able that neither France nor Russia played Grey's line about Conferences much. They rested the case on inopportuneness-inexpediency-rudeness rashness etc.

I think Grey was, before the War, a believer in Conferences which most English statesmen of the time e.g. King Edward-Sir E. Crowe & Lord Sanderson were not. By the way Germany was not, in any true sense, privy to the annexation of B-Herzegovina beforehand.

pp. I43-4 I shall not be suspected of undue prejudice agst Servia-but the Austro- Hungarian position is difficult to put correctly. The Ballplatz-at any rate after Aehrenthal-was stupid & clumsy to an incredible degree, but they acted in a spirit of deadly fear.

The circs were these. The annexation really arose out of a Danube railway project of I907, furthered by Servia & Russia. To this Aehrenthal replied early in I908 by the Novibazar railway scheme. This greatly increased the agitation of Serbo-Croats inside A-Hry, and of Serbs of Serbia outside. I think there can be no doubt this was stimulated by the Servian government. Aehrenthal tried to stop this by annexation.

In March I909 the Servian Government came to an agreement with A-Hungary by which they agreed to discountenance all such agitations in future. I do not think that they kept this agreement, though it might be difficult to adduce proofs.

But the real cause of the ultimatum was not F. Ferdinand's assassination, though this accelerated matters. It was (a) the constantly increasing agitation among Croato-Serbs in Austria-HY-Croatia-Dalmatia-Bosnia, combined with (b) a similar agitation from Serbs inside Servia.

The A-Hns thought (b) was the cause of (a). It would be more true to say that (a) was the cause of (b). But the two were inseparable in fact. The complicity of the Servian Govt in the actual assassination, as apart from stimulating propaganda, would be difficult to prove. Your statement here p. I43 is just about right.

The A-H Govt incurred very grave responsibility for delivering an ultimatum with the allegation of the Serbian Govt's complicity in the assassination, when in point of fact they had just received a report from their chief expert declaring the S. Govnt's complicity 'definitely improbable' and in no way proved. This report they withheld from the German Govt. When you speak somewhere of the ultm being delivered 'with the con- nivance' of the latter you speak correctly and precisely the fact. But it omits to consider that A.HY in effect deceived Germany on the facts of the

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ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF I914 255

case, alleging that they had proofs of governmental complicity in the plot when they in fact had not, and did not believe that they existed.

The German Govt. apparently took the decision to support them partly on this ground.

They were also influenced by the argument-very specially taken by the Kaiser-that no crowned head was safe unless this nest of murderers was rooted out. If the government was really behind this nest of murderers, there was something to be said for this view. But this was believed by the A H. Govt to be untrue.

But what was really at the back of both A-Hn & German Govtal minds was this. It is expressed by the dictum of Conrad von Hoetzendorf Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. He said that in I908 war with Servia would have been successful, that in I9 I 2 or I9 I 3 it was even chances, but that in 1914 it must be undertaken because there was no alternative.

The profound underlying cause-was not the Servian way of treating a crowned head-but the Serbo-Croat agitation inside Austria Hungary and the corresponding Serb agitation-by individuals at any rate-if not by government-inside Servia. This ultimately involved the fate of Austria- Hungary-after I9I2-every town council in Bosnia-& Dalmatia-was suspended-and the Constitution in Croatia was suspended-though every single member of the Parliament was anti-government. This was because government except by martial law in these areas was impossible- and the longer this went on-the greater the danger from the other dis- ruptive elements of the Dual Monarchy-'Russians in Transylvania- Italians-Slovenes-Czechs & Slovaks. Germany found her ally being weakened by what she regarded as an insidious external propaganda and supported her. Austria-Hungary, I feel sure; acted from fear and a sense of insecurity. the longer the agitation went on-the more certain her ultimate dissolution. Unless she acted, her existence was endangered. And it was on the law of self preservation that she acted. She had deter- mined so to act in the near future-and drawn up a memo-which she had already decided to 'forward to Germany asking for support before the assassination. So the latter was the occasion-not the cause-of the ultimatum.

One last word I think p. I43. the statement that Servia accepted the demands of A-Hungary in all except two points is not quite accurate. There are some very clever and careful qualifications revealed by a close study of it, which somewhat modify this.

On two other points you can feel sure (i) A-Hungary-sent the ultm without believing in the guilt of the

Serbian Government. (2) The ultimatum was not meant to be accepted-and the A.H. minr

actually left Belgrade in half an hour without waiting for an answer.

I note a point p. 123 [in a further paper by Professor Pearce Higgins on 'The Locarno Treaties'] about Locarno-though it is not really in my province.

I should go further than you do at the end of par. i The whole coinci- dence of the signing of various engagements on the eastern frontier between Poland-CzechoSlovakia & France etc with the Locarno signature was plainly arranged to commit us morally oft the eastern side-and it was- I think-successful.

Further-this guarantee (unlike the Belgian) is not one we can really enforce. In Belgium-we cd depend on France to support us agst

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256 NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS Germany & vice-versa, and our forces were held sufficient to turn the scale. But if France violates Germany we have only 8o,ooo men now & Germany 100,ooo agst-say 3,000,000 + Belgium-We cannot therefore now enforce in any true sense-so our guarantee' is a paper one-and not on the Canning line at all. the only meaning I can attach to it is that the Foreign Office do not believe that France will attack Germany.

p. i23. Your last par. I think-might be supplemented. In the Treaty of Guarantee agst unprovoked aggression-of 28 July i 9I9

the Dominions were excluded, evidently because it was considered a European concern. In Locarno the Dominions are allowed to come in, if they like. The distinction is perhaps worth drawing.

Canada is the strongest agst intervention in Europe-and in I9I9 and again in I921-2 conducted a vigorous agitation agst Article X of the Covenant, because it might involve such intervention.

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