Programme Final Evaluation Report: Post Typhoon Ketsana Cash … ARC Cash... · 2011. 2. 25. · 1...

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Programme Final Evaluation Report:

Post Typhoon Ketsana Cash Transfers in Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces

March 2010

Prepared By: Richard Rastall

theIDLgroup Ltd Vietnam Country Office 1, Lane 5, An Duong F361 Yen Phu, Tay Ho, Hanoi, Vietnam Tel: 00 84 4 37172349 Fax: 00 84 4 37172351 Web: www.theidlgroup.com

http://www.theidlgroup.com

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Contents List of Acronyms

Acknowledgements

1. Executive Summary 1

2. Background 3

3. Evaluation Approach & Methodology 6

3.1 Evaluation Objective and Purpose 6

3.2 Approach, Methodology and Work Schedule 6

4. Evaluation Findings 9

4.1 Programme Appropriateness & Relevance 9

4.2 Programme Efficiency 13

4.3 Programme Impact 20

5. Conclusions & Lessons Learned 26

5.1 Programme Strengths 26

5.2 Programme Constraints/Weaknesses 27

5.3 A Few Key Lessons 29

6. Recommendations 30

Annex 1: Guidelines for Unconditional Cash Recovery Operations

Annex 2: Workplan

Annex 3: Post distribution Survey Questionnaire

Annex 4: Post distribution Survey Training Agenda

Annex 5: Lists of Participants

List of Acronyms

ARC American Red Cross

CBDRM Community Based Disaster Risk Management

CCFSC Central Committee for Storm and Flood Control

EMMA Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis

FSCB Flood and Storm Control Board

IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PNS Partner National Societies

SOE State Owned Enterprise

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USD United States Dollar

VND Vietnam Dong

VNRC Vietnam Red Cross

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Acknowledgements

The project evaluation consultant would like to acknowledge the following individuals and organizations for their assistance in making this evaluation both possible and productive.

Firstly the efforts of Mr Le Gia Tien and Ms Tran Thi Thanh Huyen from Vietnam Red Cross for their contributions to the household survey questionnaire and for their assistance in terms of organizing the logistics for and participation in two field missions to Central Vietnam. Secondly for the insights of Mr Doan Van Thai and Mr Le The Thin, Director and General Secretary respectively of the Social Works Department at Vietnam Red Cross. The support of each of the 4 Provincial Red Cross Chapters for their sincere effort and active participation in meetings is deeply appreciated and has contributed towards the findings in this evaluation. The consultant is aware that the cash transfer programme has already usurped a considerable amount of their time and that these chapters are engaged in a number of other projects and relief efforts. In particular the efforts of the Provincial Chapters with regard to the smooth planning and implementation of household post distribution surveys in the week prior to Tet are appreciated. Special thanks go to Mr Phuong from Quang Ngai Red Cross who also took on the considerable task of collating and disaggregating the data from this province. A total of 40 Red Cross volunteers were also crucial in gathering this important household data, without their enthusiastic participation the data collection would not have been possible.

Thanks are also due to Ms Nguyen Thi Thu Quynh at ARC headquarters in Vietnam who assisted with the disaggregation of the household data from Gia Lai Province. Thanks to Ms Dang Thi Hien for organizing flights, budgets and logistics. The consultant is also grateful for the assistance of ARC International staff Ms Rebecca Scheurer and Michael Zeleke for their advice regarding the approach and methodology. Finally special and particular thanks go to Hoang Gia Yen for his patience and professionalism in assisting the consultant throughout all aspects of the assignment.

Final Programme Evaluation Report: Post Typhoon Ketsana Cash Transfers in Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai Provinces

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1. Executive Summary

The following report constitutes an independent evaluation of a United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance funded unconditional cash transfer programme, providing humanitarian assistance to victims of Typhoon Ketsana. The programme was effectively implemented by the Vietnam Red Cross, although the funding was channeled through the American Red Cross who also assisted with implementation through provision of technical guidance as well as overall monitoring, project management support and supervision.

Typhoon Ketsana struck Central Vietnam in late September 2009 causing widespread destruction and impacted an estimated 3 million people who faced multiple hazards including flooding, flash flooding, soil erosion, landslides and high speed winds. As one of the worst storms to afflict the region in decades, there was a substantive humanitarian response from the government, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) movement as well as various other sources. As part of the IFRC response, the cash transfer programme intended to complement other Partner National Society and IFRC programmes, many of which focused on the provision of food and non-food items.

There is a growing body of evidence from around the world regarding the significant advantages of cash transfer programming in the emergency/disaster response context. However, this was the first time that the VNRC had implemented a post-disaster cash transfer programme and as such it would provide a unique opportunity to learn about the potential benefits and challenges of such a humanitarian response approach in Vietnam (as well as contributing further to the international body of evidence).

The cash transfers were intended to help beneficiaries meet their immediate basic needs, begin to stabilize or rebuild their livelihoods and to re-stimulate local economies. The distributions ultimately reached over 8,500 households (a significantly greater number than originally proposed) in 4 of the worst affected provinces; Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai.

This report is based on an evaluation mission conducted between February and March 2010, approximately 4-6 weeks after the cash distributions and largely finds the programme to be a considerable success, demonstrating the appropriateness of unconditional cash transfers as a viable and appropriate humanitarian response in the post-disaster context. Results from post-distribution household surveys illustrate that whilst the majority of cash transfers have been used for buying food, there has been significant expenditure on other basic needs such as house repair, medicines and clothes. There was also significant investment in productive assets such as agricultural tools, seeds, fertilizers and/or small livestock (eg. pigs and poultry). This has proved that the cash grants have been used appropriately and in accordance with the intended objectives of the programme.

The cash transfers have had an impact by essentially assisting some of the most poor and vulnerable households in the country with getting back on their feet after Ketsana. For many the cash grants have ensured that their families will have enough to eat until the next harvest or for others the cash grants have gone towards either improving the next harvest or covering expenses so that more of the next harvest can be sold by the beneficiary. One of the most important things to note with the utilization of cash transfer data collected during this evaluation is the different ways cash has been used by different groups of people in different geographical areas i.e. the beneficiaries have been empowered to use the cash according to their needs and that those needs may differ according to a wide range of cultural, socio-economic, geographic and other contextual permutations, not at least how they specifically were impacted by the typhoon.


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The programme itself has gone a long way towards defining a very clear set of formats, guidelines and procedures for implementing programmes of type in the future. A considerable amount of time and thought went into the front-end of the project in making sure that the programme was well-designed and in accordance with international best-practice. This did mean that the distributions were slightly later than originally intended (but still within the 3 month emergency response period). Given that a longer amount of time had to be utilized in designing the programme, providing training and developing formats for various monitoring forms, it is a testament to the organizational capacity of the VNRC that such a programme involving distributions to over 8,500 households, in 63 communes, 15 districts and four provinces was effectively implemented in around 6 weeks. This included conducting orientation workshops and village meetings where a community-based and participatory beneficiary selection process was endorsed. The clarity of the beneficiary selection criteria and guidelines, together with simple yet thorough monitoring processes allowed for what were believed to be very safe, secure and transparent distributions.

There were inevitably certain constraints and weaknesses which are essentially teething problems and these have been addressed in this report towards fine-tuning the guidelines and creating a standard operating procedure for unconditional cash grants in the post-disaster context in Vietnam based on lessons learned from this programme. Overall though this programme has undoubtedly been successful and has demonstrated the massive potential for up-scaling unconditional cash transfers as a humanitarian tool in the emergency/post-disaster response context. Although this programme did help to build the capacity and confidence of the VNRC and provincial RC chapters, there is still a set of institutional capacity issues which need to be addressed as part of further roll out of the approach.

One of the other key lessons learned was the importance of the role of volunteers (in monitoring and supervision) for these kinds of distributions and that there is an urgent need for VNRC not only to build the knowledge/skills capacity of its staff but its physical human resource capacity also needs to be strengthened. One of the major challenges ahead will be how VNRC can expand its volunteer network.

Finally, the evaluation consultant would like to note that although the programme is generally believed to be an overwhelming success in terms of what it set out to achieve, special mention needs to be made of the fact that many of the most vulnerable and worst affected households have been set back considerably by Typhoon Ketsana and it will take them many, many years to recover, if indeed they do. Many beneficiaries interviewed during the evaluation mission had their houses completely destroyed, others had their red book agricultural land literally washed away and others still had their upland forestry plantations completely washed away. These kind of impacts of Ketsana will take a long time to recover from and thus certain recommendations are included stating the appropriateness of further ongoing support to livelihoods rehabilitation in some of the target provinces.


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2. Background

On 29 September 2009, Typhoon Ketsana struck central Vietnam with wind gusts of up to 160 km/hour. The typhoon swept through 12 provinces including Binh Dinh, Da Nang, Dak Lak, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Lam Dong, Phu Yen, Quang Binh, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri and Thua Thien Hue. It caused widespread destruction, with the provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai the hardest struck, resulting in the evacuation of 103,123 households (some 356,790 people). One of the key features of Typhoon Ketsana was the multiple hazards experienced by different communities in different environments and across a wide area. An estimated total of three million people were impacted by floods (the worst in Central Vietnam for 45 years), flash floods, landslides, and high winds. Fig 1 provides an illustration of some of the most severe impacts of Typhoon Ketsana as well as the ARC response (red arrows identify the worst affected provinces).

Fig 1: Map Showing Ketsana Affected Areas & ARC Response

The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) launched an appeal for international aid, seeking USD 5.47 million to support the affected population. This support was targeted towards the 60,000 worst affected and most vulnerable households (approximately 270,000 people) and comprised the


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distribution of food/rice, emergency kits and uniquely in the case of the American Red Cross (ARC) supported programme, unconditional cash transfers. As part of the emergency response operation the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided resources to the ARC. The Vietnam Red Cross Society (VNRC), as the primary implementer of the programme, originally led efforts to reach over 6,000 families in four of the worst affected provinces: Gai Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai.

The programme design entailed cash distributions as an emergency/early recovery intervention aimed at supporting the families that were most affected by Typhoon Ketsana, many of whom were from poorer farming communities whose reserves had been depleted by multiple recent disasters and were considered to be among the most vulnerable communities in Vietnam. The programme was coordinated with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Emergency Appeal, and was tailored to complement the livelihoods objective in the Emergency Appeal. ARC channeled this support from the US Government directly through the VNRC.

In total the unconditional cash transfer programme directly assisted more than 8,500 households in 63 communes, 15 districts and 4 provinces. The table below provides statistics on the programme’s coverage.

Table 1: Consolidated Data for Cash Programme

Province Districts Communes Villages Budget (million

VND)

1-member

HH

2-member

HH

3>-member

HH

Total HHs

Total beneficiaries

Quang Nam 4 20 124 2,000 391 412 1,637 2,440 8738

Quang Ngai 5 24 140 2,000 1,071 940 1,118 3,129 6827

Kon Tum 3 10 88 2,000 51 92 1,930 2,073 9480

Gia Lai 3 9 50 900 23 57 860 940 4336

4 15 63 402 6,900 1,536 1,501 5,545 8,582 29,381

The ARC cash transfer programme in the aftermath of Typhoon Ketsana is particularly significant as it is the first time that the VNRC has implemented a cash transfer programme in the emergency context. The conceptualization of the programme was however based on the increasingly positive recognition of the role of cash transfers in the emergency context globally as well as VNRC’s eagerness to pilot this approach to disaster response based on their own experiences with cash transfers in the livelihood support context. The programme was also justified on the basis that it complemented the relief efforts of other Partner National Societies (PNS), who distributed food and non-food items immediately after the typhoon struck, through the provision of cash to the most vulnerable and worst affected poor households in order that beneficiaries would be able to allocate financial resources according to their personal and varied needs. Thus unconditional cash transfers were believed to be an appropriate, cost-efficient and effective means of addressing the programme’s 3 key objectives:

a) To provide beneficiaries financial means to address basic needs such as food and productive asset replenishment

b) To promote economic recovery in support of local markets

c) To strengthen the VNRC capacities to engage in early recovery activities by encouraging leadership and participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project.


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3. Evaluation Approach & Methodology

3.1 Evaluation Objective and Purpose

The objective and purpose of the evaluation mission was essentially two-fold. Firstly, to assess the impact of the cash transfers on the beneficiaries – what were the cash transfers used for by beneficiaries? Was the usage in accordance with intended programme goals and objectives? The second aspect of the mission was to review the programme’s implementation strategy – as a project, was it successful? Was it appropriate, relevant, efficient, effective, and what lessons can be learned in terms of implementing programmes of type in the future? The specific objectives as presented in the TOR are listed below:

1. To assess the effectiveness and impact of the unconditional cash operation in the Vietnam context

2. To review the implementation strategy of the programme and identify areas of learning opportunity, in particular in relation to the unconditional cash distribution guidance

3. To analyze and review existing unconditional cash programmes conducted by VNRC and others in Vietnam.1

4. To provide recommendations for guidelines towards the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for unconditional emergency cash distributions that can lead to early recovery.

In order to address these TORs the consultant had a number of key guiding questions for the evaluation: Did the programme addressed typical constraints, risks and weaknesses in design, implementation and monitoring (eg. different cash transfer options, the value of the cash transfer, timing, availability of markets, targeting/beneficiary selection, corruption, transparency, security, monitoring)? What needs to be changed so that such concerns are addressed, where appropriate? The consultant referred closely to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Guidelines for Cash Transfer Programming (ICRC, 2007) and Oxfam GB’s Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies (Oxfam GB, 2006) as best-practice manuals throughout in determining the success of this ARC intervention – had best-practice been applied?

3.2 Approach, Methodology and Work Schedule

A work schedule summarizing the above approach and methodology is presented as Annex 2 at the back of this report.

The first priority of the evaluation mission was to conduct a survey with programme beneficiaries to assess what in fact the cash transfers were used for. The reason for this was that the evaluation consultant was not hired until the first week of February, between 4-6 weeks after the cash distributions. Thus it was necessary to carry out this part of the assignment first before people forgot what they had used the money for and crucially before the Tet holiday which would then delay implementation for another 2-3 weeks.

1 It should be noted that this report will not deal with point 3 above. The reason for this is that there are no existing analyses or reports documenting and evaluating previous VNRC cash transfer initiatives. The VNRC have implemented and/or currently implement several cash transfer projects or programmes including ‘Tet for the Poor’ and other ‘cow/pig bank’ projects. VNRC have also facilitated the distribution of cash following other disasters but there is no documentation and analysis of this. In order to fulfill these TORs, the consultant would have had to have spent considerably more time in the field in order to collect further primary data so as to analyse other VNRC cash transfer interventions.


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Questionnaire Design: The first task was to design a questionnaire. A simple and fairly structured questionnaire was designed in order to collect the desired information pertaining both to household use of the cash transfer as well as to collect some qualitative information on beneficiary perceptions of the cash transfer experience – Did people understand the selection criteria? Was it well organized? Clear? Transparent? The household questionnaire is presented in this report as Annex 3.

Sample Size and Confidence: The survey was to be conducted at household level and in all target provinces. The next step was to determine an appropriate sample size for the household survey of programme beneficiaries. An online sample size calculator2 was used to determine sample size. Given that the total number of beneficiaries was known to be 8,500, a sample size of 368 was determined to be appropriate with a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 5. The sample size was rounded up to 400 in order to facilitate data entry and disaggregation i.e. 100 households per province. This figure also made things easier logistically in the field as it was known that at least 10 volunteers from each province would assist with carrying out the surveys, meaning that each volunteer would conduct 10 interviews in 1 day towards the provincial target of 100 questionnaires.

The households would be randomly selected but the communes were chosen in order to try and achieve a reasonably representative cross-section of typhoon affected communities. As mentioned above, one of the key features of the typhoon was that it affected different people in different environments in different ways across a very wide area. There could be a huge range of factors which determine how different people respond to the disaster but it was decided to try and get a spread of lowland and upland communities, remote and less remote communes and those that were worst affected and those that were ‘averagely’ affected. These factors were seen to be the most crucial in terms of affecting how people may utilize their cash transfer. Table 2 below provides a summary of households interviewed.

Table 2: Household Survey Plan

Province District Commune No. of HH Dates Responsible Note

Quang Nam Nong Son

Que Ninh 20 4-5 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Remote Que Loc 30 4-5 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected

Phu Ninh Tam Phuoc 20 5-6 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Tam Vinh 30 5-6 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected

Total 2 4 100

Quang Ngai

Minh Long Long Hiep 20 5-6 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Remote Long Son 20 5-6 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Remote

Mo Duc Duc Hiep 20 5-6 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected

Nghia Hanh Hanh Tin Dong 20 5-6 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected Hanh Thien 20 5-6 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected

Total 3 5 100

Gia Lai

Chu Pah Dak To Ve 30 6-8 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Chu Prong Iato 30 6-8 Feb Volunteers & RC staff

Dak Doa Adok 20 6-8 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Gla 20 6-8 Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected

Total 3 4 100

Kon Tum Kon Ray Dak Ruong 40 6-7 Feb Volunteers Badly affected Dak To Lung 40 6-7 Feb Volunteers Badly affected Dak Coi 20 6-7 Feb Volunteers Remote

Total 1 3 100 Grand total 9 16 400

2 http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm

http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm


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The disaggregation of data by ethnicity, sex, size of household/amount received, as well as particular vulnerable groups i.e. female headed households (FHH), households with children under the age of 5 and households with disabled/elderly would also serve to further determine what different types of people spent their money on.

Household Survey Training: Once the above approach had been determined two 1-day training workshops were held for a total of 49 RC staff and volunteers from all 4 target provinces. Participants were trained in basic PRA and interview techniques as well as how to fill in the questionnaire (half-day) and a half-day field practice. Field Officers in each province were also shown how to enter the data collected by their colleagues and volunteers and how to disaggregate the data. Provincial RC leaders then developed the survey plan for their province (as summarized above in Table 2). An outline of the training course presented in Quang Nam and Gia Lai is presented as Annex 4.

Following the training, RC staff and volunteers conducted the interviews in the field and data has been entered and subsequently disaggregated as mentioned above.

Programme Evaluation through Consultation: A second field mission was conducted by the consultant between 1-5 March in order to meet with programme partners and stakeholders at commune, district and provincial levels. Meetings with People’s Committees, Red Cross and relevant government departments (eg. the Central Committee for Storm and Flood Control and Flood and Storm Control Boards) were held in order to try and gather perspectives on the programme’s Strengths, Weaknesses and Lessons Learned. Thus these consultation meetings served to address the second part of the evaluation purpose i.e. reviewing the implementation strategy and project appropriateness, relevance, efficiency and impact.

Focus group discussions were also conducted with small groups of vulnerable beneficiaries (one different group in each province – female headed households, disabled/elderly, households with young children and an ethnic minority group). The purpose of these consultations was to follow up on indicative trends in the survey data where possible and to collect further qualitative information on beneficiaries’ experiences with the processes of beneficiary selection, household responses to the ‘shock’ of the disaster, and local level comments on the actual distributions themselves.


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4. Evaluation Findings

This section of the report documents findings from the evaluation mission and is intentionally structured to assess programme appropriateness, relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact in logical sequence. Thus the section begins by looking at programme design and relevance, followed by the implementation strategy itself and practical issues, strengths, constraints and weaknesses during implementation before analysing how beneficiaries used their cash transfers and what this has meant in terms of disaster affected peoples being able to meet their immediate needs and rebuild their livelihoods.

4.1 Programme Appropriateness & Relevance

4.1.1 Justifying Cash Transfers in the Emergency Context in Vietnam

The consultant believes the ARC Post-Ketsana Cash Transfer Programme to be a highly appropriate and relevant intervention. The rationale for choosing cash transfers as a humanitarian response in the initial stages-early recovery/transition period was clearly justified given:

i) The scale of the disaster: As highlighted above in Section 2, Typhoon Ketsana caused widespread destruction, communities and people suffered the severe consequences of multiple hazards in Central Vietnam and the need to provide humanitarian assistance to affected communities for people to meet their basic needs and to re-establish their livelihoods is unquestionable.

ii) Substantive assistance provided in the form of food and non-food items by other projects: There was an enormous humanitarian response by the IFRC and PNS to the devastation caused by Ketsana. Table 3 below summarises the different responses by different IFRC member societies. As can be seen from the table, the ARC cash transfer initiative is unique and as such is highly complementary with the other relief efforts which have distributed food/rice and non-food items such as household emergency kits, water containers and included a water and sanitation project. Above and beyond IFRC and PNS support, communities in the disaster affected areas also received emergency assistance from the government of Vietnam as well as numerous local charities, churches/pagodas, civil society organizations and corporate businesses. The vast majority of this support comprised rice, noodles and other food packages.

Table 3: IFRC and PNS Post-Ketsana Humanitarian Assistance

No Organisation Assistance Provided Location No of Beneficiaries

Project Cost (USD)

1 IFRC Watsan handbook, purification sachet, water treatment unit, food/nutrition parcel, rice, household kits, water containers, shelter

Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue, Danang, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Dak Lak, Lam Dong

283,223 5,246,154

2 German RC Aquatab, household kits, water container

Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue

76,908 377,812

3 French RC Rice, plastic sheeting, household kits

Binh Dinh, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Ngai

199,448 2,023,995

4 Spanish RC Rice, water container, seed Danang, Quang Nam 55,569 626,089


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5 American RC Unconditional cash transfers Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai

29,381 505,750

6 German RC & Netherland RC

Rice, unconditional cash transfer

Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue

41,700 742,132

7 Swiss RC Rice, household kits, house repair

Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue, Kon Tum, Danang, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh

13,600 209,936

In the light of all of these other forms of humanitarian assistance, the consultant believes it to be extremely appropriate to have also piloted unconditional cash transfers as a complementary measure to the worst affected areas. Statements from VNRC and provincial RC chapters during this evaluation indicated that they had witnessed significant post-distribution sale of emergency kits in particular (although also other relief items including rice) thus suggesting that in a number of cases the assistance being provided did not match beneficiary needs – of course one of the main advantages of cash transfers is that beneficiaries have the power to decide what they need most, cash is more flexible, fungible and transferable.

iii) The challenges and difficulties associated with quickly assessing detailed damages and needs: Associated with the point above, that sometimes the provision of food and non-food items may not be the most appropriate, Typhoon Ketsana impacted different people in different environments in different ways across an extremely wide area. With cash transfers there is less need to assess in detail what exactly each community and different groups of people need following the disaster because once the cash is distributed beneficiaries can decide on how best to use the funds. Particularly given the scale and scope of Ketsana’s impacts, unconditional cash transfers were justified because it was virtually impossible to assess such multiple/varied needs accurately and within the required short timeframe of emergency response.

iv) The institutional framework for emergency response, the capability of VNRC and Provincial RC Chapters and their experience of other cash transfer programmes: Vietnam has an extremely well-established institutional framework for emergency response with clearly defined relief committees which coordinate operations between state actors and mass organizations under the Fatherland Front (VFF) including the Red Cross, Youth Union, and Women’s Union. This well-established Socialist institutional structure and the clear understanding of different bodies’ roles and responsibilities is certainly an important and advantageous factor for implementing this kind of a humanitarian response programme in Vietnam. The VNRC have implemented other cash transfer programmes in the past, albeit in a non-emergency livelihood support context and based on these experiences were keen to pilot cash transfers in the emergency context.

v) Lower transaction costs: The consultant has observed that in addition to the fact that cash transfers offer beneficiaries empowerment through choice and therefore the ability to meet needs appropriately, the VNRC were particularly keen to pilot cash transfers due to the substantially lower transaction costs. Lower transaction costs (than distribution of food and non-food items) were realised by VNRC and Provincial RC chapters across the board with this programme.

vi) The existence and durability of markets for a reasonable diversity of products in most parts of Vietnam: The rapid economic growth accompanied by massive infrastructural development of the country over the last 20 years has meant that Vietnam is approaching middle-income country status. As such the vast majority of the country is reasonably well-connected to local markets. Typhoon Ketsana induced the worst floods for 45 years in some areas and yet still communities were only temporarily restricted in access to district centres and therefore markets for a maximum of a few


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weeks (in most cases only a few days). Cash transfers only work where beneficiaries have markets as well as a safe, stable local economy in which to use their money and for the most part Vietnam has those necessary pre-existing conditions for cash transfers to succeed.

4.1.2 Cash Transfer Modalities - Why unconditional cash transfers?

The consultant, having evaluated whether cash transfers were an appropriate and relevant option then examined whether the modality of cash transfer was the correct one. There are several different options for cash transfer programming, including conditional or unconditional cash transfers, cash or commodity vouchers and cash for work programmes. In this case unconditional cash transfers were chosen but why?

Cash or commodity vouchers are generally used in situations where a particular needed commodity is scarce, there is a high risk of inflation, and/or there are security concerns. None of these were deemed to be serious concerns in this case. Furthermore, this is not a traditional response in Vietnam. Choosing cash or commodity vouchers could also be appropriate if the programme was designed to achieve specific objectives such as improved agricultural production or nutrition. In this case unconditional cash support was correctly chosen due to the multi-faceted nature of the impacts of the disaster on rural livelihoods.

Conditional cash transfers are appropriate where very specific needs have to be met for large sum costs eg. housing. This might have been an appropriate response for some communities in the affected area but even in those areas people had suffered damages to both houses and land and therefore within even a small community there would have been different priorities. On a larger scale across 4 provinces, these differences are even greater and very difficult to assess in a short timeframe. Thus the consultant is bound to conclude that unconditional transfers had to make more sense in this scenario. Perhaps in a scenario where a storm has a more localized and uniform impact, conditional cash transfers could be an appropriate option.

Cash for work (CFW) programmes are often appropriate when public works are required. Given the destruction and devastation caused by Typhoon Ketsana this could also have been a potentially appropriate response, as there is usually the capacity amongst Vietnamese communities to undertake such work and there is scope for provision of equipment and supervision. However, by necessity this would have created different criteria in determining beneficiaries and may inherently marginalise the most vulnerable members of the community (eg. elderly, disabled) who cannot work. CFW programmes were also carried out in any case by provincial and district authorities in the aftermath of Ketsana. During focus group discussions with beneficiaries a number of them mentioned being employed temporarily in either public works schemes or privately clearing other people’s land/repairing other people’s houses as a short-term source of income/coping strategy.

Therefore in this case the consultant concludes that selecting the default option, unconditional cash transfers, was the correct decision since especially by the time of the transfer people were generally able to buy items they needed, there was a low risk of inflation, and a low security threat. The fact that the programme objectives were necessarily broad as a result of the broad livelihood impacts from Ketsana, also meant that the right choice was made not to ‘condition’. The programme deliberately targeted poor and vulnerable groups and as such CFW becomes inappropriate on those grounds because the most poor and vulnerable groups include people who cannot work.

This does not mean however that the other options should not be considered in other emergency situations in Vietnam, indeed the consultant would encourage the piloting of other types of cash


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transfer options in Vietnam. This can only put the IFRC, VNRC and other relevant authorities in a better position to respond to disasters and emergencies. Conditional cash transfers may be an appropriate choice now for certain communities as they begin to enter a livelihood rehabilitation stage and with more time since the disaster it is possible to identify particular areas, needs and individuals that have been much worse affected. The British Red Cross for example distributed targeted conditional cash grants for small-scale businesses in Aceh, Indonesia beginning in mid-2005 approximately 6 months after the Tsunami.

4.1.3 Addressing Risks in Programme Design

Cash transfer programming, although it presents numerous advantages as outlined above, is relatively untried in the emergency response context and there are a number of typical fears or risks associated with them. The following risks have been identified in ICRC (2007) and Oxfam GB (2006) guideline documents and the evaluation consultant is satisfied that such risks were considered in design of this cash transfer programme.

1. Inflationary Risks: With the distribution of large amounts of cash to communities it is theoretically possible that a large enough injection could have an inflationary impact. Prices, including food and petrol did increase between 5-10% in the project area but this was not linked to the distribution of cash itself but due to the scarcity and infrastructural problems caused by the disaster. Almost all beneficiaries, especially those in the worst affected provinces had also already received food aid. Based on findings from the Oxfam GB study (2006), even the largest cash transfer programmes still represent only a small fraction of the local economy and this one was no different with cash transfer amounts designed to assist beneficiaries with purchasing enough food for their household until the next harvest with a little left over to spare for investment in productive assets. Indeed as will be shown later on in section 4.3 this is more or less how most cash transfers were used by beneficiaries in this case. Thus, as such the cash transfer amounts of up to 1 million VND (or approximately 50 USD) distributed to only selected households on a one-off basis were never sufficient to seriously affect local market prices.

2. Targeting: Targeting or beneficiary selection is typically the most contentious issue in any cash transfer programme and as shall be discussed further below was also the case here. The programme however designed and then implemented a participatory and community-based household selection process with very clear beneficiary selection criteria and guidelines. Thus targeting was seriously considered during the design phase and thus ensured that communities selected and agreed on who should benefit from the programme.

3. Security: Any distribution of resources presents a security risk although so far there is no evidence to suggest that cash transfers are susceptible to any greater risk than food or non-food items. Once again though the community-based and participatory beneficiary selection approach served to minimize security concerns. Security was also addressed by the production of clear guidelines on how to carry out the cash distributions in an ordered manner and with a good security presence.

4. Intra-household tension: There is a concern that the provision of cash into the household economy may lead to disputes within the household over the use and control of the money. In most cases the fear is that men will control the money and misuse the funds or that women may be subjected to violence. In some societies it may be appropriate to specifically allocate cash transfers only to female recipients in order to also encourage female empowerment. However in Vietnam, in almost all cultures i.e. that of the majority ethnicity Kinh people and most of the other ethnic minority cultures, traditionally women have a strong position at least in terms of managing domestic finances


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- indeed amongst some of the ethnic minority groups in the project area, the societies are matrilineal and thus households are female headed. An open selection of the household member leaving it up to the household themselves to decide who collected the cash is believed to be an appropriate and fair distribution method in this case. By stipulating that only women could receive the grant a) it may have created greater tension within the household (i.e. men trying to get their hands on the money), b) it would not have been fair to households who did not have any women eg. an elderly man living by himself and c) it could serve to further disempower male members of matrilineal households. This is likely to be an appropriate decision in most cases in Vietnam.

5. Inappropriate Use: There has been a somewhat irrational and misplaced fear amongst donors that large amounts of money will be misspent by beneficiaries on inappropriate items. Oxfam GB’s M&E results from various cash transfer programmes worldwide indicate that in fact there is very little inappropriate use. The results from this study also do not indicate any misuse of cash transfers.

6. Corruption/Diversion: A major fear surrounding cash transfers is that local elites will not transfer the cash to beneficiaries but will instead divert cash. There is not logically any greater chance of this happening with cash than with any other form of aid distribution however there is a very real threat of this. The programme tackled this as we shall see through very close supervision and monitoring.

4.2 Programme Implementation Strategy and Efficiency

4.2.1 Project Implementation Overview

Fig 2 below presents a programme implementation timeline outlining the key steps taken between the receipt of OFDA funds for the programme and the distribution of the cash transfers.

Fig 2: Programme Timeline


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The programme actually started on 16th October but the cash transfer programme plan of action was not developed until early November and key methodological approaches and documents (including the beneficiary selection criteria, guidelines, monitoring forms and coupons were not finalised until 12th November. The programme was widely agreed by project partners and stakeholders to have been a little bit late overall with cash distributions finally taking place in the last two weeks of December (between 2.5-3 months after Typhoon Ketsana). 45% of beneficiaries interviewed during the household surveys believed that the cash transfers were received ‘slightly late but ok’. The evaluation consultant believes that in future it should be possible to implement this programme around two weeks faster due to the fact that the above-mentioned documents and approaches have now been developed.

Once the programme plan of action was developed in early November, the project was actually implemented extremely efficiently i.e. to distribute a total of 327,000 USD to 8,582 households in 63 communes, 15 districts and 4 provinces within 6-8 weeks is very impressive and testament to the institutional structure and organizational capacity of the Provincial RC chapters. It is doubtful that these phases involving orientation workshops at provincial/district and commune/village levels, the beneficiary selection processes through village meetings, the subsequent verification of beneficiaries, distribution of coupons and ultimately the cash itself could be carried out much faster without compromising the quality of the targeting.

4.2.2 Beneficiary Selection and Targeting

Beneficiary selection and targeting is often the most contentious issue for any cash transfer programme and thus a considerable amount of attention was paid towards this throughout the evaluation.

Targeting Provinces

The primary level of beneficiary selection was carried out based on the reports submitted by both Provincial RC chapters as well as the official government reports coming in from the Central Committee for Storm and Flood Control (CCFSC) and their provincial departments and line agencies. These initial reports clearly indicated that the worst affected provinces were Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Later on it became clear that Kon Tum was also severely affected. Thus based on this preliminary analysis the cash transfer programme was allocated these provinces as well as Gia Lai. Even though it was known that Gia Lai was not as badly affected as the other provinces, the province was included in the programme for what have been understood by the consultant to be three main reasons; i) Gia Lai is a highland province with a higher concentration of poor and vulnerable ethnic minority farmer groups, ii) Gia Lai had not received much other assistance and iii) it meant that another province could share in the learning experience of implementing cash transfers. Less money was also allocated to Gia Lai province and thus there were less beneficiaries as is indicated in table 1.

A small sample of the field sites were visited during the evaluation mission and it did seem apparent that households in Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai were significantly worse affected than those in Gia Lai. This in turn also meant that many very badly affected farmers in the other three provinces could not receive the much-needed cash grant whilst those in a better position in Gia Lai could receive the grant. The evaluation consultant believes that there was less need for the cash transfers in Gia Lai province and that actually much of this reduced need stemmed from the livelihood options at local peoples’ disposal. Many of the Gia Lai households supported lived in areas of large coffee, rubber and tea plantations with large scale, often State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or reformed SOE producers. In addition to small areas of their own arable land, generally upland maize or cassava plots, most households worked on a seasonal, temporary or even permanent basis for these industrial plantations. Therefore as a livelihood response to the disaster, it seemed apparent that many of the cash transfer


15

beneficiaries were able to earn a reasonable income from working on the nearby estates – they already had a source of cash income. This was not the case for many of the affected communities in the other provinces who were largely dependent on their rice harvest and their own agricultural land.

The evaluation consultant does not want to draw too much from this as it is only supported by brief observation and anecdotal evidence, however perhaps it should serve to recognize that perhaps more deserving beneficiaries are already eliminated by political decisions or due to constraints regarding the accuracy, consistency, detail and speed of damage assessments. CCFSC reports contain statistics on number of deaths, injuries, damage to major infrastructure, housing, numbers of hectares of agricultural land destroyed/inundated etc but they do not contain information on livelihood needs and responses and there are inconsistencies between sectors and geographical areas. Such weaknesses in the GoV damage assessment reporting mechanisms were acknowledged by project partners and stakeholders and have been documented in other literature in Vietnam3. This is not only applicable to cash transfers but more broadly with respect to disaster response, weaknesses in damage/need assessment reporting affect the distribution of emergency assistance. This programme did not set out to address this problem and thus it is only mentioned as a constraint and not as a criticism of the project per se but it is one that should be borne in mind for future potential scaling-up of cash transfer programmes.

It is believed that a rapid assessment of damages/needs should have been carried out in all proposed target provinces prior to finalizing the project proposal by ARC/IFRC specialists. Rapid Needs Assessments were only carried out in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Such a needs assessment would not only assist in allocating scarce resources where they are most needed as well as ensure that cash transfers are the most appropriate option for all beneficiaries. Results from the household surveys indicate that beneficiaries overwhelmingly prefer cash grants to other forms of humanitarian assistance (83%). However, more detailed analysis of the data in Kon Tum province shows that 77% of Xe Dang ethnic minority interviewees actually prefer food and similarly there is a high percentage of So Ra minority people (44%) who also prefer food aid. During the follow-up evaluation mission visit, the consultant was not able to meet either of these minority groups and unfortunately is not able to definitively explain this result. It is possible that this result is indicative of cultural values amongst the groups but more likely it stems from the distance to markets. The evaluation consultant visited Dak To Lung commune, Kon Ray district in Kon Tum where although it is possible to buy some basic products in the commune centre, a 9 km walk to the district centre is required in order to purchase most items (including rice) at the nearest market. For those in outlying villages of course the walk may be significantly further. Especially for an elderly or disabled beneficiary, this may then explain the preference for food aid amongst some groups in Kon Tum.

The initial rapid needs assessments also did not include a market mapping or analysis. Based on field interviews and observations, the evaluation consultant believes that in the vast majority of cases cash transfers were highly appropriate since by mid-December infrastructure had generally been sufficiently restored to allow relatively easy access to markets. However, the above results from remote areas in Kon Tum suggest that there are areas where cash transfers may not necessarily be the optimal intervention. In order to determine this, an initial rapid needs assessment should also include a basic market assessment, the importance of which is stressed by current best-practice guidelines (ICRC, 2007 & Oxfam GB, 2006 and others).

3 Country Disaster Risk Management Notes, Vietnam (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), World Bank, 2008)


16

Targeting Districts, Communes and Villages

Once the target provinces had been established, target districts and communes were established according to levels of disaster impact as well as the levels of support already received. Once again there is potential here for misallocation. However, it would appear that in all provinces, the worst affected districts and communes were included in the cash transfer programme.

Following provincial level orientation workshops with target districts, District RCs then (in some cases with the support of provincial RC chapters) held commune level orientation workshops with target communes explaining the project objectives, guidelines, principles, selection criteria etc. During this workshop, villages were prioritized and resources allocated for each village based on the numbers of households in the villages and the number of households affected. Plans of action were developed at the commune level.

Targeting Households

The programme endorsed a community-based beneficiary selection process at the village level where all villagers were invited to participate in a village meeting to vote for those who should receive the cash transfers in accordance with the guidelines and within the budget allocated to that village. Village meetings began with an explanation of the cash transfer programme, its objectives, principles and beneficiary selection guidelines. The guidelines had very clear criteria for the selection of households、as below.

• Poor and nearly poor households who are seriously affected by typhoon Ketsana, specifically: - Having house collapsed, washed away or badly damaged; - Lost food stock, asset, and materials; - Lost main sources of income; - Has not received significant support from RC and other sources

• Of the above, priority should be given to the family that is living in difficulty and vulnerable conditions:

- Having pregnant or breast feeding women; - Having women with children under 5; - Woman headed family; - Having people with disability, elderly - Having no labour force;

In fact, in the majority of cases, village leaders with assistance from other key individuals in the community often made a first cut of who the beneficiaries should be since they know and have recorded what humanitarian assistance has been provided to who in the village. This step is not documented in the selection guidelines but makes a certain amount of sense in trying to facilitate the selection process. The proposed list is then presented during the village meeting and villagers had the opportunity to, and usually did, dispute and/or revise this list.

Results from the household surveys indicate an overwhelming satisfaction with this community-based selection process with 87.5% of interviewees rating it as ‘very transparent’. Fig 3 below shows the predominant types of beneficiary selected. What also emerged from the results is that no one stated that they didn’t know why they had been selected.


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Fig 3: Beneficiaries Selected

86

8.25

3122

34

90

20

40

60

80

100

Poor Near Poor Housedamaged

Lostfoodstock

Lost mainincome

No othersupport

PercentageBeneficiaries

It is also clear from the survey results that the selection processes were observed seriously with different vulnerable groups prioritized as is shown in Fig 4 below. Only 17.5% of beneficiaries were not of one of the pre-defined vulnerable groups. It should be noted that a household can fall into more than one of the vulnerability categories and hence the figures do not add up to 100%（similarly with the above diagram). In fact from analyzing the data it is clear that very often beneficiaries selected do fall into more than 1 category and this provides a good indication that the selection was indeed targeted to those most vulnerable.

Fig 4: Vulnerable Groups Prioritized

1

33.25

41 39.25

14.2517.5

05

1015202530354045

Pregn

ant

Childre

n <5FH

H

Disabled/e

lderly

No labour f

orce

None

Percentagebeneficiaries

Defining the Cash Transfer Value

Consultations with project partners and stakeholders revealed there is some debate as to the best way of deciding the amounts which different households should receive. In fact the consultant believes the system used to be fairly appropriate to the objectives of the cash transfer programme and certainly was a good estimate for a first attempt! Section 4.3 below will illustrate that ultimately cash was used in more or less the manner intended. Cash transfer amounts were allocated on the following basis:

- 1-member family = 300,000 VND (approx 15 USD) - 2-member family = 600,000 VND (approx 30 USD) ≥ 3-member family = 1,000,000 VND (approx 50 USD)

The amounts were calculated to be sufficient for households to meet immediate short term basic food needs for the interim period until the next harvest with a small amount of surplus to assist households in rebuilding their livelihoods by investing in productive assets.


18

The amounts appear to be roughly correct however there are two main findings with regard to the cash transfer amounts. Firstly, at the programme’s closing workshop in Quang Ngai, there was widespread agreement to reduce the amounts to 2 categories as such:

1-3 member households = 500,000 VND (approx 25 USD)

>4 member households = 1,000,000 VND (approx 50 USD)

This concept appears to be supported by VNRC as well as most of the provincial RC chapters and until it is piloted it cannot be dismissed. Certainly it seems slightly more straightforward and that has its advantages. The only concern of the consultant is that with this breakdown, could there be a subconscious tendency to ignore people living on their own during voting? And yet these are probably the most vulnerable.

Secondly, average household sizes in the highland provinces of Kon Tum and Gia Lai are substantially larger than in the lowland areas i.e. with more than 5 people/household. This explains why so few beneficiaries received 300,000 or 600,000 VND in these provinces. Moreover it raises the issue that since these amounts have been calculated on relatively small household sizes, is 1 million VND really a useful amount to a household of 7 or more members. There is a strong case for increasing the grant size to 1.5 million VND for large households.

The opinion of the consultant in this matter is that there seems to be no reason why a flexible system cannot be implemented at the programme level i.e. why not have 3 different systems and each province can decide the most appropriate way to divide up their budgets according to average household sizes and local conditions in their provinces. However, the autonomy should stop there, as it would be confusing if different districts and communes were all implementing different systems for determining cash transfer amounts.

It should also be noted that the consultant believes that the amounts transferred as they are served their purpose however it is also known that significant numbers of typhoon affected families have been very seriously set-back by Ketsana and that in terms of rehabilitating their livelihoods, the cash amounts transferred under this programme are a drop in the ocean. The consultant is aware that other PNS are considering implementing similar post-Ketsana cash transfer programmes in Central Vietnam. The amounts provided under this programme were primarily intended to address emergency basic needs - if the objective were more focused on livelihood rehabilitation then substantially larger amounts would be appropriate.

4.2.3 Monitoring and Supervision

One of the core strengths of the programme was the thorough monitoring system developed and implemented. The monitoring formats were clear and relatively simple to use and because of this strengthened implementation by ensuring transparency. Following the development of the guidelines and monitoring formats in October by ARC specialists, VNRC headquarters staff were consulted and orientation training was provided. Further orientation training in how to organize, manage, monitor and supervise the cash distributions for RC staff and volunteers at provincial, district and commune levels (15 per province) followed the provincial orientation workshops. It would appear that the training was well-delivered and this ensured the smooth delivery of the transfers.

Monitoring took place at each step in the process. Firstly, the village meetings were monitored by independent volunteers who attended the meetings and completed a monitoring form documenting attendance and providing a checklist to ensure the meetings were carried out in the right way (eg. with


19

adequate explanation of the programme, selection criteria and guidelines), and whether the beneficiaries selection was fair and equitable.

Following the village meetings, ARC field staff also completed beneficiary verification forms which involved site visits to communities to verify those on the lists were indeed expecting to receive a cash grant. This form checks that the beneficiary attended the village meeting, that they understand why they have been selected and also checked the beneficiary against the main criteria.

Once beneficiary lists were verified, communities would be informed about the distribution plan and a cash coupon would be sent to beneficiary households. Each beneficiary was allocated a number and the number on the coupon should match. Beneficiaries would then exchange the coupon for cash in a very secure manner at the distribution points (see section below). Volunteers also completed distribution point monitoring forms verifying that the correct procedures, steps and ethical behaviours were followed at the distributions and that all beneficiaries had received and signed for their cash grants.

The system was widely recognized by project partners to be thorough and yet simple and straightforward enough. All steps were agreed to be important and ensured that the right beneficiaries were selected and that the right amounts of money went to those beneficiaries.

This evaluation mission also further serves to verify that the programme was carried out properly, safely and securely. The monitoring steps and procedures developed and implemented by this programme are considered to be extremely good and very little if anything needs to be done to alter either the formats or the processes. Such monitoring is time consuming for volunteers but this needs to be done in order to guarantee the proper implementation of the cash transfer programme.

4.2.4 The Distributions

An important element to consider during this evaluation was once the beneficiaries had been selected, how were the distributions themselves organized? Were they safe, secure and clear? This had the potential to be something of a problem since unlike in neighbouring southern China where the rural banking system has widespread coverage and thus post Sichuan earthquake cash grants could be transferred electronically to bank accounts, in Vietnam the only realistic option was the physical distribution of envelopes with cash.

It was evident that the distributions themselves were on the whole well organized. 86.75% of beneficiaries interviewed evaluated the distributions as ‘very well organised’ and during follow-up group discussions in the field no complaints were mentioned and nor was there any indication that the distributions themselves were anything other than extremely efficient, safe, secure and well-organised. Detailed instructions and training were provided on how to set up and manage the distributions on the day and this went a long way towards ensuring their apparent success.

One problem noted with regard to the distributions was that in certain cases beneficiaries were too elderly or sick to get to the distribution points but due to the rules regarding collection of the cash grants (i.e. by ID card and signature), they could not be transferred to another family member. This created a lot of work for volunteers who had to travel long distances in order to hand-deliver the cash transfers. The only solution that can be foreseen by the consultant is for beneficiaries with mobility issues to sign a document identifying a family member, friend or neighbour to collect the grant on their behalf.

In the highland provinces of Gia Lai and Kon Tum there was also repeated mention of the lack of need for ID cards in collecting the cash transfers since village elders could vouch for the correct identity of the


20

individuals. The evaluation consultant disputes this and believes that the programme was correct to insist on ID cards and that ID card identification and confirmation remain part of the cash transfer distribution process. However, there are incidences where people have genuinely lost or do not possess ID cards and alternative means are necessary in the event of such cases.

Fig 5: Layout of the Distributions

4.2.5 Financial Management

No major problems arose during this project, but financial accounting procedures should be simplified where possible and training and guidelines should be provided as part of the training packages to provincial and district RC chapters, especially to finance staff, as part of any scale-up of future cash transfer operations in Vietnam.

4.3 Programme Impact on Beneficiaries

This sub-section analyses household use of the cash transfers overall as well as by province and different vulnerability groups.

4.3.1 Overall Impacts of the Cash Distribution

Distribution table

Guard

2

3

4

Beneficiary

Distributor Assistant

Guard + check

Distributor

Registration desk

(List of beneficiaries)

Make beneficiaries sign Caller

Coupon collector

Banner & Flag

1

Guard

The guard maintains the crowd away from the registration desk


21

The cash transfers have on the whole been extremely well-received by beneficiaries who are grateful for the opportunity to allocate this much-needed resource according to their needs.

Cash transfers have been used as intended/in line with programme objectives: No household confessed to using the cash transfers for alcohol, cigarettes or other inappropriate uses and despite further questioning about this during focus group discussions, the evaluation team could find no evidence to the contrary.

Results from the household surveys indicate that the majority of households (85%) have spent on food (usually rice). This high level of spending on food in spite of other considerable relief efforts providing food is not surprising because the timing of the cash transfer must be considered. The distributions were in mid-late December, a full 2.5-3 months after the disaster, by which point the food previously distributed immediately after the disaster had by then, been used up. Typhoon Ketsana struck just before the autumn-winter harvest meaning that the majority of households were either low on food stocks or they had lost them due to flooding or other damage from the storm and almost all lost that crop.

There were also high levels of expenditure on items such as house repairs (37% of households) and medicines (30% of households), which thus indicate that there has been considerable spending on immediate emergency needs. In fact, one of the other significant areas of spending was on debt repayment (just less than 15% of households) and whilst we cannot conclude across the board, it seems from group discussions that quite a lot of this debt repayment is in fact for either house repair and/or land clearance. In many cases (it was particularly notable in Quang Nam), local contractors fixed people’s houses or cleared in some cases several metres of clay, boulders and alluvial deposit from people’s land on credit using heavy machinery. Certain households have used their cash transfer to help pay for this and indicates that when combined with the other results, the vast majority of affected households spend on emergency needs.

The survey results also show that almost 30% of households have used the cash transfer to invest in agricultural tools, seeds and/or fertilizers. In other words a significant number of beneficiaries have also invested in productive assets so as to start rebuilding their lives. This figure could be interpreted as being even higher since it would appear that a considerable percentage of beneficiaries in Gia Lai and Kon Tum provinces invested in piglets and poultry (chicks), representing almost all of the ‘other’ category used in this survey.

Fig 6 shows the percentages of households that have spent on each category. The percentages in the pie-chart do not need to add up to 100% because a single household can and has more often than not spent on more than one category.


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Fig 6: Percentage of Households Spending on Each Category

Fig 7: Percentage of Total Transfers Spending By Category

Fig 7 above shows an interesting result, just over 40% of the total amount of money distributed was spent on food, just less than 20% on house repair, agricultural tools and clothes roughly equal at around 14% (in this case the percentages do add up to 100%). Here the data shows that although less households have spent on clothes than for example debt repayment, the amounts spent by those individuals on clothes and medicine is considerably higher, suggesting relatively small-scale debt repayment. Similarly, although roughly the same number of households invested in agricultural tools as those in medicine, more was spent on agricultural tools, seeds and fertilizers. The case of debt repayment is particularly interesting as it was expected to be considerably higher, however as will be shown later this is because there is almost no debt repayment in the highland, ethnic minority areas, whereas debt repayment is much more common in the lowland provinces. It is also likely that significant debt repayment is not really possible with the size of the transfer and given other priority needs. Clearly repaying debts is still one of a number of important uses of cash for the rural poor and may be a higher or lower priority depending on their circumstances. It also has considerable association with social well-being, pride and being free from the burden of debt – an important psychological position of strength.

1.25

37.25

85.75

29.25

29.50

14.25

9.75

2.75

0.25

5.00

0.25

4.50

1.75 5.00

2.25 0.25

0

Cash Transfers - % of HH spending per category

Funeral

Repair house

Buy food

Agri tools, fertilizers, seeds

Medicines/healthcare

Debt

Other

Temporary shelter

Water

Other livelihood equipment

Save money

School fees

HH goods

Clothes

Transport


23

The analysis of Fig 7 leads nicely into Fig 8 below which shows an average of household expenditure by category.

Fig 8: Average Household Expenditure by Category

Fig 8 shows a profile of how an average household from our sample might have spent their cash transfer. Given that whilst most households surveyed (68.25%) received 1 million VND, 15.5% received 300,000 VND and 16.25% received 600,000 VND, the average amount received by a household in our sample was 824,450 VND. Thus just less than half was spent on food and the other categories especially house repair, agricultural tools and medicines represent the other most significant areas of spending.

Cash has been used for a variety of purposes: As mentioned above and shown in figs 2-4, the main areas of expenditure were on food, house repair, agricultural tools and productive assets, medicines and debt repayment. However it is also important to note the diversity of uses as this further supports the justification of unconditional cash transfers as an appropriate form of emergency response. The ability for a household to be able to pay for items such as school fees (4.5% of households) or clothes or ‘other livelihood equipment’4 (5% of households respectively) is no less important.

Cash has been used to meet immediate/emergency needs as well as to rebuild or stabilize livelihoods, however for many the disaster may have much further reaching consequences: The data shows that most of the cash transfer has been used for emergency needs. Some has been used to invest in productive assets and importantly it was noted during group discussions in the field that the cash transfers have helped to reduce the need for households to take on further debt or sell assets. In many cases, disaster affected households have responded by staking their next harvest on repayments for house repair and land clearance. Whilst unfortunately the cash transfers have not been substantial enough to offset this entirely they have meant that people have been able to pay off some of their debts or avoid selling too many other assets, whilst at the same time at least being able to maintain their shelter, health and enough food.

In many of the worst affected areas however, the cash transfers are a drop in the ocean, whilst they have been able to stave off starvation and have rooves over their heads, the impacts of the disaster have been far-reaching and it may take years for some of the poorest and most vulnerable households to recover. Ironically, the situation may be worsened by anticipated droughts this year resulting from El

4 ‘Other livelihood equipment’ as was explained to surveyors represents non-agricultural items which a household requires to support their livelihood or business eg. a hair dryer for a hair dresser or perhaps pots, pans and plates for a restaurant owner.


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Nino oscillations (there is also typically more and heavier rainfall in the year following El Nino, meaning that many households will become increasingly vulnerable to drought-flood cycles over the next couple of years). The combined effects of a missed harvest, land irredeemably lost in some cases, the significant costs associated with major asset destruction (houses, forestry plantations and agricultural land), and forthcoming drought means that there are real and substantial concerns over increased poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity.

All cash was spent within 3 weeks, hence providing some immediate stimulation to the local economy: The majority of households (72.75%) spent their cash transfers immediately (within 3 days) which both suggests that the cash was indeed much-needed for basic needs and that it has provided a small injection to the local economy. More detailed analysis would be required in order to study where the money went but in the more remote communes and as observed in Kon Tum, in fact much of the money is spent in district centres, so there is a question regarding increased dependency on more powerful contractors and traders and cycles of debt to these more powerful individuals. In the case of meeting emergency needs however this is difficult to avoid. The evaluation team could find no evidence of price-hikes to take advantage of people in need. Prices did reportedly go up by between 5-10% (for petrol, rice and other basic goods) but this is probably more attributable to general shortage and infrastructure difficulties associated with the impacts of the storm.

4.3.2 Analysis of Cash Utilization in Different Provinces

Deeper analysis and disaggregation of the survey data shows there are certain differences in the way that the cash transfers have been used by beneficiaries in different areas. In particular, there appear to be certain commonalities or trends in the data between the highland and lowland provinces. Fig 9 below illustrates these apparent trends.

Fig 9: Cash Utilization in Different Provinces

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Gia Lai Kon Tum Quang Nam Quang Ngai

Give to othersTransportClothesHH goodsSchool feesSave moneyLivelihood equipmentWaterTemp housingOtherDebtMedicinesAgri toolsHouse repairsFood

Expenditure on food was significantly higher in the highland provinces, an average of 444,100 VND in Gia Lai and 470,600 VND in Kon Tum as opposed to 309,400 VND in Quang Nam and 191,000 VND in Quang Ngai. In Kon Tum beneficiaries received a considerable amount of food aid but continued expenditure on food is perhaps not surprising due to the impacts of the flash-flooding on already severely limited agricultural production land. Vulnerable households in the province are likely to suffer much longer term food security problems particularly in Dak To Plung where 50% of agricultural land


25

remains unrecovered and much may be unrecoverable. Meanwhile follow-up visits to Gia Lai beneficiary communes indicated that even under normal circumstances a considerable proportion of household expenditure is on food and rice because people either grow cash crops or work as labourers on cash crop plantations.

There is also significantly more expenditure on agricultural tools, fertilizers, seeds etc in these provinces i.e. productive assets. The statistics would be even more different if ‘other’ expenditures were also included. In the majority of cases, ‘other’ expenditures referred to investments in piglets and poultry i.e. more productive assets.

In the lowland provinces and Gia Lai there is noticeably more expenditure on house repairs, where levels are fairly consistent measured against Kon Tum levels of expenditure on this item which are much less. This was explained in Kon Tum by the fact that house repair generally costs between 25-40 million VND, thus spending 500,000 – 1 million VND would be insignificant. However, it may also be explained by different social, cultural, and economic prioritizations or due to the different ways in which the storm affected highland and lowland areas.

Another substantial difference is in the levels of debt repayment, almost non-existent amongst the highland ethnic minority populations but much more significant in lowland Kinh regions. Many highland ethnic minority households are notoriously reticent to take on debts mainly due to concerns over being able to pay them back given their lack of access to other forms of capital. Others simply don’t have access to credit. Even in the lowland areas however, higher levels of debt repayment might have been expected but it would appear that cash transfers had to be used for more urgent needs (and debt repayment stalled until after the winter-spring harvest). In many cases it would seem that where there has been debt repayment it has also in fact been to assist in paying back contractors for house repair and land clearance. Typically, shortly after the disaster local households had contractors clear their land (often buried under 3-5 m of debris and earth deposit) with heavy machinery and would pay back following the next harvest or in installments. One of the impacts of the cash transfers is that it has allowed people to at least pay some of the debt back, thereby reducing the burden later on and being able to keep slightly more of their harvest.

Expenditures on medicines are also noticeably higher in the lowlands, and in particular Quang Ngai. This may be a result of greater access to medicines or could be indicative of the nature of the disaster. The consultant suggests it is probably the former.

4.3.3 Analysis of Cash Utilization by Different Groups

In addition to comparing results from the different provinces, the data has been disaggregated by the ethnicity and vulnerability categorizations of the interviewees. Fig 10 below illustrates cash utilization by these different groups of beneficiaries.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the results comparing ethnic minorities and Kinh bear a striking resemblance to the data trends between lowland and highland areas as discussed above i.e. ethnic minority groups tend to spend more on food and agricultural tools whilst the Kinh spend less on these areas but have a generally more diversified set of expenditures, in particular with higher debt repayment, more expenditure on medicines.

Female-headed households are arguably the most marginalized group in rural Vietnam. Often such households do not have land use right certificates for agricultural and forestry production land (or possess extremely little of it), and even those that do are significantly challenged to produce substantial quantities of product due to the lack of labour – perhaps this is why there is comparatively less


26

investment in agricultural tools. Added to this there are typically numerous other constraining factors on their livelihoods including a lack of access to information and social capital. With this in mind and what appears to be what the data is telling us, the poorest and most marginalised groups prioritise buying food. They invest less in agricultural tools but otherwise use around 50% of their grants in a quite evenly distributed manner, carefully balancing their needs for clothes, medicines and payment of debts.

Fig 10: Cash Utilization by Different Groups

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

Avg Kinh

Ethnic Minoriti

esFHH

Disabled/elderly

Children <5

GiftsTransportClothesHH goodsSchool feesSave moneyLivelihood equipmentWaterTemp shelterFuneralsDebtOtherMedicinesAgri toolsHouse repairFood

Young families too often used around half their grants to purchase food, again probably unsurprising given the young mouths to feed, especially in comparison with the elderly who clearly consume much less food. Otherwise the young families’ expenditure profile is very much akin to the average and again given Vietnam’s population dynamic this is possibly not surprising. Elderly and disabled beneficiaries spent less on agricultural tools and more on medicines.

Beyond these more obvious trends, it is possible to also discover other more subtle differences in some of the expenditures on some of the smaller items. For example, although there wasn’t a great deal of spending overall on ‘other livelihood equipment’ the average and total figures for Kinh are significantly higher than for ethnic minorities – perhaps indicative of a more developed rural economy. The Kinh also spent more on children’s education and clothes.

To fully explain the reasons behind all these differences between groups and geographical areas would have taken a considerably more detailed survey than was realistically possible but in any case it is not essential to know all of this. Differences in expenditure may be based on an almost limitless range of contextual permutations. The important thing to note here is not necessarily the specific differences themselves. Although this is interesting and useful data in itself, it is more important to recognize the diversity of expenditures and hence provides further justification for cash transfer programmes in the post-disaster context as people are empowered to make their own decisions and decide on the most appropriate expenditures for their situation.


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5. Conclusions & Lessons Learned

The following section draws on the evaluation findings to present the main conclusions that can be drawn from the ARC-VNRC implemented cash transfer programme. As the first initiative of its kind in Vietnam, it is a credit to the programme that there are such a large number of clear and evident strengths upon which to build. Overall this must be classed as an overwhelmingly positive evaluation since the programme is clearly highly relevant and appropriate and has been well-managed to deliver the outputs in the allotted timeframe. The unconditional cash transfers have served their intended purpose allowing some of the poorest and most vulnerable rural households in Vietnam to meet their basic food and other immediate needs in the post-disaster/emergency context. For many of these households it will take them a lot longer to fully recover from such a substantial set-back but the cash grants have reduced the burden to some extent and in many cases also enabled beneficiaries to begin rebuilding their livelihoods through investment in productive assets. It has also clearly been a successful intervention in terms of building both the capacity and the confidence of both the VNRC and the RC provincial chapters. However, as with almost all programmes there are also some weaknesses or lessons to be taken into account.

5.1 Programme Strengths

1. The programme has demonstrated the potential of unconditional cash transfers in the post-disaster emergency context in Viet Nam: This programme has clearly shown that there is enormous potential for the scaling-up of unconditional cash transfers in Vietnam as a cost-efficient and effective way of providing appropriate humanitarian relief in the post-disaster context. The programme has shown that by careful planning and the development of clear processes and guidelines which include close monitoring and supervision, it is possible to successfully address typical cash transfer risks in Vietnam. Senior staff from VNRC are contemplating an increase in the ratio of cash transfers (versus other types of humanitarian relief) to 30% or more based on the success of this programme.

2. The programme has created a set of very clear guidelines, processes and formats which addressed key risks and can be utilized by future cash transfer programming initiatives: ARC staff and specialists and VNRC staff spent a fair amount of time at the beginning in designing a very clear plan of action for how the programme was going to work, what values the cash grants should have, and how beneficiaries should be targeted and selected. Annex 1 is a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which the consultant has largely taken from the programme’s guidelines with one or two small amendments based on issues discussed within this report. The programme also developed simple to use monitoring forms and this is essential for the success of any cash transfer programme by ensuring transparency and accountability.

3. Many of the typical benefits of unconditional cash transfers have been successfully realized: Results from the household surveys and follow-up visits to beneficiary communities demonstrated that the vast majority of beneficiaries prefer cash and that with it they felt empowered to make their own decisions about what the household needed and in so doing ensure the most effective allocation of resources. The cash grants effectively and successfully served their purpose to meet basic needs whilst in many cases also allowed for some level of investment in productive assets and livelihood rehabilitation. Although the amounts of cash transferred were relatively small, they were spent very quickly and this has in some way contributed towards re-stimulating local


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economies. The implementing agencies and their partners have also recognized the logistical advantages of cash i.e. that it is much easier to transfer envelopes of cash rather than transporting tonnes of rice or other non-food items (which also must be quality-assured). As a result the transaction costs are naturally considerably lower with cash and therefore in terms of efficiency, a cash transfer programme has the potential to reach many more beneficiaries.

4. Well established institutional coordination mechanisms for emergency relief and VNRC capacity and cash transfer experience: Vietnam’s institutional framework for emergency response through its disaster relief committees which facilitate coordination between government agencies and mass organizations is a considerable strength of the programme. Roles and responsibilities are clear and well-understood and this means that with there is high potential for effective cash transfer programmes. Although some shortfalls in capacity and some weaknesses remain, on the whole VNRC has a reasonable level of capacity and has some experience of implementing other unconditional cash transfer programmes.

5. High levels of support provided by ARC and VNRC has built capacity and confidence of RC Chapters at all levels: It was clear throughout the evaluation mission that RC staff at all levels and gained a great deal from the programme. ARC effectively facilitated the project (and provided some technical advice) but it was actually implemented by VNRC. This high level of ownership has empowered VNRC and built their confidence to deliver similar programmes in the future. Close levels of support from ARC and VNRC throughout the programme helped considerably in this capacity-building process.

6. Community-based targeting and beneficiary selection: The evaluation mission found widespread support for the clear and highly transparent processes of community-based beneficiary selection. The high levels of participation in the village meetings meant that people had the opportunity to decide the households with the greatest need, in particular vulnerable groups.

7. Secure distributions: The programme has designed and piloted a very clear set of guidelines for how to setup cash distributions on the day. In combination with the transparent beneficiary selection process this helped significantly towards extremely safe distributions.

8. Simple yet thorough monitoring systems: The efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of cash transfer programmes are highly dependent on close monitoring. The programme developed a simple yet effective monitoring system and whilst it is time consuming it is extremely necessary.

5.2 Programme Constraints/Weaknesses

1. There are still weaknesses in approaches, capacity and institutional coordination for damage/needs assessments during initial stages of disasters: Although as noted in the section above, the community-based selection of beneficiaries is one of the strengths of the programme, prior to this areas and therefore beneficiaries were targeted according to CCFSC damage assessment reports. The net result of this was that certain communities were considerably less needy than others (eg. those cash income earning communities in Gia Lai). This is because CCFSC reports do not take into account livelihood needs and responses in their assessments and as a consequence this affects the allocation of scarce resources.

2. Initial rapid assessment should include an assessment of markets (eg EMMA): As has been discussed previously, Vietnam now has a reasonably well developed rural infrastructure and all but the very most remote communities generally have access to markets and that such infrastructure can often be re-established relatively rapidly. Thus, for the majority of target areas, beneficiaries


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were able to buy more or less the normal range of products at their local markets by the time of the distributions. ICRC and Oxfam best practice guidelines both stress the fundamental importance of conducting market assessments as a preliminary step in designing cash transfer programmes. Thus, it should not be assumed that all areas will not be susceptible to non-functioning markets. Even with this programme there was a reasonably sizeable minority who would have preferred food aid, which indicates that there are areas where it is in fact still difficult to spend money and that ‘local’ markets have in fact been rather a long way away. Thus cash transfers may not always be appropriate for all and in all situations. It is important to stress the need for including some type of market mapping and analysis (such as an EMMA) as part of the initial assessment process, especially for such a pilot which attempts to create a blueprint for future post-disaster cash transfer programmes of type.

3. Training in facilitation and vulnerability assessments should be provided to district and commune staff in particular prior to village meetings: RC staff and volunteers were well-trained in the organization, supervision and monitoring of the cash transfer programme. However, whilst it is recognized that on this occasion there probably would not have been time to do it, the village meetings could perhaps been better facilitated by people trained in participatory facilitation techniques and other tools for vulnerability assessments. The survey results indicate that in fact vulnerable groups were indeed selected and there would appear to be general agreement that the right people were selected. However the consultant believes that such an approach during village meetings (as opposed to the meetings being led by commune/village leaders) could lead to different selections and would represent better practice in the participatory selection process.

4. The support arrived a little bit late: Most partners and beneficiaries stated that the cash distributions took place a little late and would have been better delivered in November. The consultant is confident that the programme could be implemented slightly quicker next time around since now guidelines, processes and templates are available.

5. Financial management capacities of VNRC chapters: There should have been introductory training for administrative staff or clear guidelines provided for financial management affiliated with operational costs.

6. Posters/banners not prepared in time for many village meetings: This is a relatively small point but it was noted that the majority of village meetings were held without the programme banners which were not prepared in time. It was also noted that there could possibly have been greater emphasis on VNRC and their logo (rather than sharing with USAID and ARC logos). By strategically placing VNRC to the fore, it would further emphasize ownership and increase locals awareness of what VNRC is and what they do.

7. The training course on PRA/HH surveys, data collection and collation should have been afforded more time for preparation and delivery: This is an important skill for monitoring and evaluation of cash transfer programmes. At least 2 days should have been allocated towards this instead of 1.

5.3 A Few Key Lessons

1. The RC has the capacity to implement unconditional cash transfer programmes in the emergency context

2. Cash transfers have the potential to play an important role in emergency relief operations in Viet Nam


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3. Different cash amounts may be appropriate for different localities: As discussed above in section 4.2.2, there were different opinions as to how best to allocate resources to households according to average household sizes in different areas. For example in Kon Tum and Gia Lai provinces, there were very few 1 and 2 member households selected but this is because there are very few households of this size in these provinces. In fact, in this situation one has to consider the relative worth of 1 million VND if it is for 7 or more people.

4. Volunteers are crucial in distribution implementation, supervision and monitoring: The programme and the evaluation itself would not have been possible without the full and active participation of RC volunteers in the four target provinces. The success of the beneficiary selections and the distributions themselves depends on close supervision and monitoring. The RC does not have sufficient human resources to be able to implement a cash transfer programme over such a wide area without additional support.

5. Village leaders play an important role in making a first cut of beneficiary selection: One of the difficulties of fairly distributing the cash transfers is that the cash transfers are not distributed in isolation. Instead in the aftermath of Ketsana many communities received assistance from numerous sources. Some of this assistance was blanket, whereas others targeted. The only people who are fully aware of how all aid has been distributed within the village are the village leaders. Something that is neglected by the guidelines was the role village leaders would play in making an initial cut of the beneficiaries and in facilitating the village meetings. The whole process in many ways is therefore extremely dependent on the nature of village leaders and their sense of equality and fairness.

6. Be prepared to take time over village meetings, they may need to be repeated: As with all participatory and community-based decision-making processes, they must be given time and meetings repeated if necessary.

7. Not all beneficiaries have ID cards so alternative independent verification measures should be employed in such situations: Particularly in the highland provinces the problem of beneficiaries not having ID cards was frequently recounted during the evaluation. It was also often proposed by certain provincial and district RC staff that this was an unnecessary part of the guidelines. However, the consultant believes that such official verification is crucial and this step should be maintained. There is however a need for some sort of secondary verification measures for those beneficiaries that don’t have ID cards.

8. Many disaster affected areas/people have much longer term needs to address: It was clear from the evaluation field visits that the cash grants may have served their intended purpose for people to meet their basic needs and begin to rebuild their livelihoods but in many cases people have suffered a very substantial set back. Unconditional cash transfers of relatively small amounts can have a positive impact but it is just one tool that needs to be employed in trying to resurrect some of these communities.


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6. Recommendations

This recommendations section is mainly intended for ARC, IFRC and PNS in Vietnam and VNRC and seeks to encourage these institutions to build on the many strengths of this initial pilot programme, address some of the weaknesses or constraints and take on board some of the lessons learned for further generic replication. There is also a section which presents a few recommendations for the target provinces as well.

For Generic Replication:

1. That ARC, VNRC and other PNS replicate similar emergency unconditional cash transfer projects in other appropriate situations following the guidelines (fine-tuned in Annex 1): Such projects should also incorporate evaluations in order to contribute further towards the body of evidence regarding cash transfers in Vietnam and globally.

2. That scaling-up or further roll out of unconditional cash transfers as an emergency response tool be preceded by or include a tailored capacity-building programme: There were a number of identified capacity-oriented weaknesses with this programme and these should be addressed by VNRC especially if the institution intends to expand cash transfers to account for 30% or more of a given humanitarian response. In-service training packages should be developed consisting of:

i) Damage/needs assessments

ii) Facilitation skills for vulnerability assessments

iii) Supervision and monitoring of cash transfer programmes (as provided under this programme)

iv) Cash transfer project management

v) Financial management

Ideally such a capacity building programme should seek to agree upon and institutionalize one training methodology, approach, curricula and training materials and for reasons of sustainability and efficiency of roll out, the programme should endorse a Training of Trainer’s (ToT) approach.

3. That all target sites are visited at the initial assessment stage: Naturally it will not be possible to visit all target communes and districts particularly for a disaster on such a large scale as Ketsana. However, in future a greater effort must be made to capture a more representative cross-section of the potential target areas.

4. That an EMMA is integrated within the initial rapid assessment: As has been mentioned previously, some form of market mapping and assessment should take place during the initial rapid assessments, especially if this programme is intending to provide a blueprint for future cash transfer operations. The EMMA will provide a better understanding of critical market systems in the emergency context and therefore enable the VNRC to consider a broader range of humanitarian responses. A detailed toolkit has been produced to assist with implementing this methodology - ‘Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Toolkit’5 (Albu, 2009).

5. That flexibility is offered to stakeholders in setting the levels of cash distribution per household: The cash value amounts distributed to households under this programme were approximately correct for their purposes. The VNRC seem determined to simplify this to two levels of cash grants,

5 http://practicalaction.org/markets-and-livelihoods/emma-toolkit

http://practicalaction.org/markets-and-livelihoods/emma-toolkit


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however the consultant believes that the appropriate amount depends on the programme objectives and that a certain amount of flexibility should be structured into the design of the cash transfer programme to allow for differences between provinces. For example in this case where there were large household sizes in the highland provinces.

6. That ARC, other PNS and donors support VNRC in strengthening their network of volunteers throughout the country: The success of this cash transfer programme and others like it will be highly dependent on the existence on a network of committed volunteers. This will require awareness raising and outreach activities, promoting the mission and role of the VNRC.

7. That current financial management procedures are reviewed and that clear guidelines are developed: VNRC should review its financial management procedures for projects of this type. Following such a review, efforts should be made to simplify procedures, and clear and agreed guidelines should be drawn up. This would then form the basis of the financial management training espoused under recommendation 2 above.

For the Target Provinces:

8. That Provincial RC Chapters to continue to learn and grow by passing on skills and training in the design, implementation and monitoring of cash transfer programmes: This cash transfer programme has presented an excellent capacity building opportunity for provincial RC staff. The momentum should be maintained however and refresher training should take place to remind staff and volunteers (as well as train new staff) about cash transfer guidelines and procedures. This is particularly relevant if the VNRC intends to expand cash transfers for disaster response.

9. That Provincial RC Chapters continue to strengthen their networks of volunteers: As with the above recommendation, the VNRC needs to expand its volunteer network throughout the country including the provinces of Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai.

10. That ARC and other PNS conduct further and more detailed livelihoods assessments to be carried out in some of the more badly affected areas (especially Kon Tum) with a view towards developing appropriate livelihood recovery support projects: With greater information now available on the impacts of Ketsana, it should now be possible to target areas that have been particularly impoverished by the disaster. Further detailed livelihood needs assessments should be carried out to determine appropriate livelihoods rehabilitation interventions in those areas.

11. That resulting livelihood recovery projects comprise assisting target areas with getting prepared through integrated CBDRM and livelihood support: The rural poor of central Vietnam are likely to become increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of disasters associated with climate change. In particular, over the next 2 years, the area is likely to be susceptible to extreme drought-flood cycles linked to El Nino oscillations. The development of CBDRMPs should help to prepare communities for these changes but there also need to be adaptation/mitigation measures which present tangible benefits.

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