+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Prop Cases

Prop Cases

Date post: 26-Oct-2014
Category:
Upload: jade-granada
View: 105 times
Download: 5 times
Share this document with a friend
Popular Tags:
55
G.R. No. 121069 February 7, 2003 BENJAMIN CORONEL AND EMILIA MEKING VDA. DE CORONEL, petitioners, vs. FLORENTINO CONSTANTINO, AUREA BUENSUCESO, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents . D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: This refers to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 27, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 44023 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 8, dated April 12, 1993 in Civil Case No. 105-M-91 2 ; and the resolution of said appellate court, dated July 4, 1995, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision. The factual background of the case is as follows: The subject property consists of two parcels of land situated in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, designated as Cadastral Lots Nos. 5737 and 5738. The property is originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One-half (1/2) of it was inherited by Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Ceferino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited by Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso. On February 20, 1991, Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan (Branch 8) against Benjamin, Emilia and John Does, docketed as Civil Case No. 105-M-91. Plaintiffs allege that: on April 23, 1981, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo purchased the property belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of sale signed by Emilia; on June 21, 1990, Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to Constantino and Buensuceso by virtue of a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 8289-M; they are the owners of the subject property and defendants have illegally started to introduce construction on the premises in question; and pray that "defendants respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of the plaintiffs to the share, interest and participation of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described property".l^vvphi1.net After defendants filed their Answer, pre-trial ensued wherein the parties stipulated that: (1) the property in question was previously owned by Honoria Aguinaldo, one-half (1/2) of which was inherited by the defendants while the other half was inherited by the plaintiffs from the same predecessor; (2) it was admitted by counsel for the defendants that there was a sale between Jess Santos and the plaintiffs covering the subject property; and (3) that there was no evidence presented in Civil Case No. 8289-M by either of the parties and that the decision therein was based on a compromise agreement. 3 After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made in favor of plaintiffs, the Court hereby declares plaintiffs as the sole and absolute owners of the properties covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 28960 and 28961 of Hagonoy, Bulacan, and orders the defendants to respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of plaintiffs over the whole property described above, to remove whatever improvements introduced by them thereon, and to pay the plaintiffs, solidarily and severally P 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. "SO ORDERED." 4 On appeal brought by defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration. 1
Transcript

G.R. No. 121069

February 7, 2003

no evidence presented in Civil Case No. 8289-M by either of the parties and that the decision 3 therein was based on a compromise agreement. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made in favor of plaintiffs, the Court hereby declares plaintiffs as the sole and absolute owners of the properties covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 28960 and 28961 of Hagonoy, Bulacan, and orders the defendants to respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of plaintiffs over the whole property described above, to remove whatever improvements introduced by them thereon, and to pay the plaintiffs, solidarily and severally P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of suit. "SO ORDERED."4

BENJAMIN CORONEL AND EMILIA MEKING VDA. DE CORONEL, petitioners, vs. FLORENTINO CONSTANTINO, AUREA BUENSUCESO, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: This refers to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 dated March 27, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 44023 which affirmed the decision of the Regional 2 Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 8, dated April 12, 1993 in Civil Case No. 105-M-91 ; and the resolution of said appellate court, dated July 4, 1995, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision. The factual background of the case is as follows: The subject property consists of two parcels of land situated in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, designated as Cadastral Lots Nos. 5737 and 5738. The property is originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One-half (1/2) of it was inherited by Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Ceferino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited by Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso. On February 20, 1991, Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan (Branch 8) against Benjamin, Emilia and John Does, docketed as Civil Case No. 105-M-91. Plaintiffs allege that: on April 23, 1981, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo purchased the property belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of sale signed by Emilia; on June 21, 1990, Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to Constantino and Buensuceso by virtue of a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 8289-M; they are the owners of the subject property and defendants have illegally started to introduce construction on the premises in question; and pray that "defendants respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of the plaintiffs to the share, interest and participation of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described property".l^vvphi1.net After defendants filed their Answer, pre-trial ensued wherein the parties stipulated that: (1) the property in question was previously owned by Honoria Aguinaldo, one-half (1/2) of which was inherited by the defendants while the other half was inherited by the plaintiffs from the same predecessor; (2) it was admitted by counsel for the defendants that there was a sale between Jess Santos and the plaintiffs covering the subject property; and (3) that there was

On appeal brought by defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and denied defendants motion for reconsideration. Hence, herein petition brought by defendants, raising the following issues: "I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT [OF] SALE EXECUTED BY A PARENT-CO-OWNER, IN HER OWN BEHALF, IS UNENFORCEABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARES OF HER CO-HEIRS-CHILDREN; "II. WHETHER OR NOT THE MINOR CHILDREN CAN RATIFY UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS OF THEIR PARENTS; "III. WHETHER OR NOT THE CO-HEIRS ARE INDISPENSABLE DEFENDANTS IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND QUIETING OF TITLE; "IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH IS A PRIVATE DOCUMENT WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED WHEN THE COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS5 PETITIONERS ADMITTED ONLY ITS EXISTENCE BUT NOT ITS CONTENTS." The third issue was raised by the petitioners for the first time with the Court of Appeals. They claim that the complaint should have been dismissed because private respondents failed to

1

implead the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino who died in 1983 and 1990, respectively, in their complaint as indispensable parties. We do not agree. A careful reading of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" which is a private document, not having been duly notarized, shows that only the share of Emilia in the subject property was sold because Benjamin did not sign the document and the shares of Ceferino and Catalino were not subject of the sale. Pertinent portions of the document read as follows: "KASULATAN NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN "PANIWALAAN NG LAHAT: "Kaming mag-iinang Emilia Micking Vda. Coronel at Benjamin M. Coronel kapwa may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, naninirahan sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, sa kasulatang ito ay malaya naming: "P I N A T U T U N A Y A N "Na, kami ay tunay na nagmamay-ari ng isang lagay na lupang Bakuran na minana namin sa aming Lolong yumaong Mauricio Coronel, na ang ayos, takal at kalagayan ay ang sumusunod: "ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5737 "Bakuran sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan na may sukat na 416 Square Meters ang kabuuan 208 Square Meters Lot A-1 ang kalahati nito na kanilang ipinagbibili. "x x x x x x x x x "Na, dahil at alang-alang sa halagang DALAWAMPUT LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P25,000) salaping Pilipino, na aming tinanggap sa kasiyahang loob namin, buhat sa mag-asawang Jess C. Santos at Prescy Bernardo, kapwa may sapat na gulang, Pilipino at naninirahan sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, sa bisa ng kasulatang ito, ay aming isinasalin, inililipat at ipinagbibili ng bilihang patuluyan ang lahat ng aming dapat na makaparte sa lupang Bakuran Nakasaad sa dakong unahan nito, sa nabanggit na Jess C. Santos at Prescy Bernardo o sa kanilang tagapagmana at kahalili. "Na, ako namang Jess C. Santos, bilang nakabili, ay kusang loob ding nagsasaysay sa kasulatang ito na ako ay kasangayon sa lahat ng ditoy nakatala, bagaman ang lupang naturan ay hindi pa nahahati sa dapat magmana sa yumaong Honoria Aguinaldo. "Na, sa aming kagipitan inari naming ipagbili ang aming karapatan o kaparte na minana sa yumaong Guillermo Coronel ay napagkasunduan namin mag-iina na ipagbili ang bakurang ito na siyang makalulunas sa aming pangangailangan x x x."

6

"Na, kaming nagbili ang magtatanggol ng katibayan sa pagmamayari sa lupang naturan, sakaling may manghihimasok. SA KATUNAYAN NITO, kami ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito sa bayan ng Malabon, Rizal ngayong ika-23 ng Abril, 1981. (Signed) EMILIA MICKING Vda. CORONEL Nagbili (Unsigned) BENJAMIN M. CORONEL Nagbili (Signed) JESS C. SANTOS Nakabili (Signed) PRISCILLA BERNARDO 7 Nakabili"

Thus, it is clear, as already stated, that petitioner Benjamin did not sign the document and that the shares of Catalino and Ceferino in the subject property were not sold by them. Since the shares of Catalino and Ceferino were not sold, plaintiffs Constantino and Buensuceso have no cause of action against them or against any of their heirs. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, indispensable parties are parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. In the present case, the heirs of Catalino and Ceferino are not indispensable parties because a complete determination of the rights of herein petitioners and respondents can be had even if the said heirs are not impleaded. Besides, it is undisputed that petitioners never raised before the trial court the issue of the private respondents failure to implead said heirs in their complaint. Instead, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings in the lower court and raised only the said issue on appeal with the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that jurisdictional questions may be 8 raised at any time unless an exception arises where estoppel has supervened. In the present case, petitioners participation in all stages of the case during trial, without raising the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over indispensable parties, estops them from challenging the validity of the proceedings therein. Further, the deed of sale is not a competent proof that petitioner Benjamin had sold his own share of the subject property. It cannot be disputed that Benjamin did not sign the document and therefore, it is unenforceable against him.l^vvphi1.net Emilia executed the instrument in her own behalf and not in representation of her three children.

2

Article 493 of the Civil Code states: "Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." Consequently, the sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos and Bernardo is limited to the portion which may be allotted to her upon the termination of her coownership over the subject property with her children. As to the first, second and fourth issues it has been established that at the time of 9 execution of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" on April 23, 1981 , the subject property was co-owned, pro-indiviso, by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner son Benjamin, and her two other sons, Catalino and Ceferino. No proof was presented to show that the coownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein petitioners has ever been terminated. Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their mother. Articles 1317 and 1403 (1) of the Civil Code provide: "Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him. "A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation or who has acted "beyond his powers shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party. "Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: "(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers. x x x x x x x x x" We do not agree with the appellate court. The three sons of Emilia did not ratify the sale. 10 In Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot we held that:

"Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the sale made by their mother. Unaware of such sale, Catalino, Ceferino and Benjamin could not be considered as having voluntarily remained silent and knowingly chose not to file an action for the annulment of the sale. Their alleged silence and inaction may not be interpreted as an act of ratification on their part. We also find no concrete evidence to show that Ceferino, Catalino and Benjamin benefited from the sale. It is true that private respondent Constantino testified that Benjamin took money from Jess Santos but this is mere allegation on the part of Constantino. No other evidence was presented to support such allegation. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by 11 evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court. Neither do the records show that Benjamin admitted having received money from Jess Santos. Even granting that Benjamin indeed received money from Santos, Constantinos testimony does not show that the amount received was part of the consideration for the sale of the subject property.1a\^/phi1.net To repeat, the sale is valid insofar as the share of petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel is concerned. The due execution of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" was duly established when petitioners, through their counsel, admitted during the pre-trial conference that the said 12 document was signed by Emilia. While petitioners claim that Emilia erroneously signed it under the impression that it was a contract of mortgage and not of sale, no competent evidence was presented to prove such allegation. Hence, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo, who purchased the share of Emilia, became co-owners of the subject property together with Benjamin and the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino. As such, Santos and Bernardo could validly dispose of that portion of the subject property pertaining to Emilia in favor of herein private respondents Constantino and Buensuceso. However, the particular portions properly pertaining to each of the co-owners are not yet defined and determined as no partition in the proper forum or extrajudicial settlement among the parties has been effected among the parties. Consequently, the prayer of respondents for a mandatory or prohibitory injunction lacks merit. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

3

1. Plaintiffs-private respondents Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso are declared owners of one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the subject property plus the one-fourth () undivided share of defendant-petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel; and, defendantpetitioner Benjamin Coronel together with the heirs of Catalino Coronel and the heirs of Ceferino Coronel are declared owners of one-fourth () share each of the other one-half (1/2) portion of the subject property, without prejudice to the parties entering into partition of the subject property, judicial or otherwise. 2. The order of removal of the improvements and the award of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees and costs of suit are DELETED. No costs.SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concu

Gertrudes as a widow. On 2 March 1956, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a "widow." On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear that he executed a will before his death. On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes, however, failed to pay the loan on the due date. Unable to pay her outstanding obligation after the debt became due and payable, on 11 March 1986, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan" which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property for the price of P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan." For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of Alexander Cruz in whose name TCT No. 130584 was issued on 21 April 1987, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro. On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing a complaint as mentioned at the outset. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. The RTC held that the land was conjugal property since the evidence presented by private respondents disclosed that the same was acquired during the marriage of the spouses and that Adriano contributed money for the purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes could only sell to petitioner spouses her one-half share in the property. The trial court also ruled that no fraud attended the execution of the contracts. Nevertheless, the "Kasunduan," providing for a sale con pacto de retro, had superseded the "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" the deed of absolute sale. The trial court did not consider the pacto de retro sale an equitable mortgage, despite the allegedly insufficient price. Nonetheless, the trial court found for private respondents. It rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

G.R. No. 125233

March 9, 2000

Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ELEUTERIO LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO, LORETA L. CAYONDA and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.KAPUNAN, J.: Private respondents, the heirs of spouses Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro, filed an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale over a lot executed by Gertrudes Isidro in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz, as well as the title subsequently issued in the name of the latter. Private respondents claimed that the contracts were vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80 years old at the time of the execution of the contracts; that the price for the land was insufficient as it was sold only for P39,083.00 when the fair market value of the lot should be P1,000.00 per square meter, instead of P390.00, more or less; and that the property subject of the sale was conjugal and, consequently, its sale without the knowledge and consent of private respondents was in derogation of their rights as heirs. The facts that gave rise to the complaint: Adriano and Gertrudes were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) a parcel of land with an area of one hundred (100) square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Nio, Marikina, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42245. The Deed of Sale described1

4

1. Declaring Exhibit G "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" Null and Void and declar[ing] that the title issued pursuant thereto is likewise Null and Void; 2. Declaring the property in litigation as conjugal property; 3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch to reinstate the title of Gertrudes Isidro; 4. Ordering the plaintiff[s] [sic] to comply with the provision[s] of Article 1607 in relation to Article 1616 of the Civil Code; 5. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] P15,000.00 nominal damages for the violation of plaintiffs' rights; 6. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] the sum of P8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; 7. Dismissing defendant[s'] counterclaim; and 8. Ordering defendant[s] to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.2

heirs, which includes his widow Gertrudes, who is entitled to the same share as that of each 6 of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Adriano, a regime of co-ownership arose between Gertrudes and the other heirs in relation to the property. Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that Gertrudes' redemption of the property from the Daily Savings Bank vested in ownership over the same to the exclusion of her co-owners. We dismissed the same argument by one of the petitioners in Paulmitan 7 vs. Court of Appeals, where one of the petitioners therein claimed ownership of the entire property subject of the case by virtue of her redemption thereof after the same was forfeited in favor of the provincial government for non-payment of taxes. We held however, that the redemption of the land "did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership." We expounded, quoting our pronouncement in Adille vs. Court 8 of Appeals: The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common? Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retrothe right to demand redemption of the entire property. There is no merit in this petition. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code: Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title

5

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in vain. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, holding that since the property was acquired during the marriage of Gertrudes to Adriano, the same was presumed to be conjugal property under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The appellate court, like the trial court, also noted that petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code. Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is not conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT No. 43100 as a widow. Second, assuming the land was conjugal property, petitioners argue that the same became Gertrudes' exclusively when, in 1979, she mortgaged the property to the Daily Savings Bank and Loan Association. The bank later foreclosed on the mortgage in 1981 but Gertrudes redeemed the same in 1983. The paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative of the ownership of the disputed property. If the property was paraphernal as contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro would have the absolute right to dispose of the same, and absolute title and ownership was vested in petitioners upon the failure of Gertrudes to redeem the property. On the other hand, if the property was conjugal as private respondents maintain, upon the death of 3 Adriano Leis, the conjugal partnership was terminate, entitling Gertrudes to one-half of the 4 property. Adriano's rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his

5

thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of 9 the primary objects of the Torrens system." As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals' finding and conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents failed to repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision on the premise that there was no compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial hearing before registration of the property in the name of petitioners. This provision states: Art. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard. The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers.1wphi1 A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while 10 the determination is being made. It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer

of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the 11 consolidated title. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that the petitioners are deemed owners of the property by reason of the failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the same within the period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 130584, in the name of Alexander M. Cruz, which was issued without judicial order, is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without prejudice to compliance by petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176858

September 15, 2010

HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA, Petitioners, vs. DOMINADOR MAGDUA, Respondent.DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Orders dated 8 September 2 3 2006 and 13 February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161. The Facts Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother1

6

Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real 4 Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The records do not show that the land was registered under the Torrens system. On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of Ricardo. Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third parties. Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited from her parents. Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte. In an Order dated 20 February 2006, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of P590.00 was less than 6 the amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its previous stand and took cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since5

prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardos daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the order states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is reconsidered in so far as the pronouncement of the Court that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. The dismissal of the action, however, is maintained not by reason of lack of jurisdiction but by reason of prescription. SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Order dated 13 February 2007 since petitioners raised no new issue. Hence, this petition. The Issue The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription. The Courts Ruling Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit executed in 1966 does not conform with the requirement of sufficient repudiation of co-ownership by Ricardo against his co-heirs in accordance with Article 494 of the Civil Code. Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became part of public records only because it was kept by the Provincial Assessors office for real property tax declaration purposes. However, such cannot be contemplated by law as a record or registration affecting real properties. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit is not an act of appropriation sufficient to be deemed as constructive notice to an adverse claim of ownership absent a clear showing that petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had knowledge of the Affidavit issued by their mother in Ricardos favor. Respondent Dominador, on the other hand, maintains that Juanita, during her lifetime, never renounced her signature on the Affidavit or interposed objections to Ricardos possession of the land, which was open, absolute and in the concept of an owner. Dominador contends that the alleged written instrument dated 15 May 1978 executed by Juanita years before she died was only made known lately and conveys the possibility of being fabricated. Dominador adds that the alleged highly questionable signature of Juanita on the Affidavit was only made an issue after 35 years from the date of the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the case in 2001. As a buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners.

7

At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the 8 issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription based solely on the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the property from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative. Thus, a review of the case is necessary. Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states: Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied) The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than 30 years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in favor of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had already prescribed. After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit alone in order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners evidence. The facts show that the land was sold to Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos daughters had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal personality to sell the property:

On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal personality or right to [sell] the subject property is of no moment in this case. It should be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his] daughters and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have already consented to or ratified the 9 alleged deed of sale. Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that Ricardos possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years in 10 order to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Dominador merely assumed that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do not mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the land or whether Ricardos family ever lived there. Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for taxation purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was filed. Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession of the land. Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or coowners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or coowners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his coowners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence 11 thereon must be clear and convincing. In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanitas death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mothers land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardos interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of 12 entitlement to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated

8

the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run. However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardos repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription. Further, Dominadors argument that prescription began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos alleged possession 13 since 1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals, we held that the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to present any other competent evidence to prove the alleged extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over the land. Since the property is an unregistered land, Dominador bought the land at his own risk, being aware as buyer that no title had been issued over the land. As a consequence, Dominador is not afforded protection unless he can manifestly prove his legal entitlement to his claim. With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold that the RTC did not err in taking cognizance of the case. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions: Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. "(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; "(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or14

buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where the assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). The provision states: Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxx "(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots." In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P590.00 according to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the value alone, being way belowP20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since annulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over the 15 case. 1avvphi1 Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,16

we held that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

9

When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of sale executed between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims 17 asserted. In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominadors rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the land. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Orders dated 8 September 2006 and 13 February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161. SO ORDERED.

The petition is casts against the following factual backdrop:cra:nad Following the death of the spouses Maximo Soriano and Manuela Delatre, their two children, namely, Maria and Felipa, inherited from them two (2) adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 9,838 square meters, situated in Licsi, Manaoag, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 9825 in the name of Maximo Soriano. One parcel has an area of 5,219 square meters, while the other, an area of 4,619 square meters. On May 27, 1959, the sisters Maria and Felipa executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition whereunder the bigger parcel was adjudicated to Maria while the smaller parcel went to Felipa. The land subject of this case is the 5,219 square meter parcel representing Maria's share in the property left by the parents. It was declared in Maria's name under Tax Declaration No. 17723 (1960) and 17730. Maria was married to Eleuterio Valera, while her sister Felipa, to Fidel Generosa. Maria and Eleuterio were childless, while Felipa and Fidel had three (3) children, namely, Alfonso, Pedro and Florencio, all surnamed Generosa. Maria died on February 8, 1971, while her sister Felipa, on June 3, 1960. On October 18, 1984, or long after Maria's death, her husband Eleuterio married the herein respondent, Pacita Prangan-Valera. On March 31, 1989, Eleuterio executed an affidavit adjudicating unto himself as sole heir the property left behind by his deceased first wife Maria. Consequently, the tax declaration formerly in the name of Maria was cancelled and replaced by Tax Declaration No. 4528 in the name of Eleuterio. On October 17, 1990, Eleuterio died, survived by his second wife, Pacita Prangan-Valera. On November 5, 1990, the brothers Alfonso, Pedro and Florencio, all surnamed Generosa (children of Maria's sister Felipa) executed a document entitled "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition With Sale," therein stating that they are the sole heirs of Eleuterio Valera and as such succeeded to his rights, interest and ownership of the property left by Eleuterio's first wife, Maria. In the same document, the brothers Alfonso and Florencio sold their alleged share in the property to their brother Pedro and the latter's wife, Vida Rosario Generosa. Pursuant to said document, Pedro and his wife, Vida, obtained a tax declaration in their own names covering the entire parcel of what used to be Maria's share in the property of her parents. Such was the state of things when, on November 25, 1991, in the RTC of Urdaneta City, herein respondent Pacita Prangan-Valera filed the complaint in this case against the brothers Pedro, Alfonso and Florencio. Docketed in said court as Civil Case No. V-5268 and raffled to Branch 47 thereof, the complaint prayed for the annulment of the aforesaid Deed of

G.R. No. 166521 August 31, 2006 PEDRO GENEROSA, DECEASED, NOW SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, VIDA R. GENEROSA, ROBERT R. GENEROSA, EDMUNDO R. GENEROSA, PEDRO R. GENEROSA, JR., AMALIA R. GENEROSA, LIZA R. GENEROSA, MELODY R. GENEROSA and FIDEL R. GENEROSA, Petitioners, v. PACITA PRANGANVALERA, Respondent.DECISION GARCIA, J.: This recourse, styled as a "Partial Petition for Review on Certiorari," seeks the modification of 1 the Decision dated September 29, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its 2 Resolution of December 1, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79749, reversing and setting aside an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47, in an action for annulment of documents, recovery of possession and damages with application for a writ of preliminary injunction thereat commenced by the herein respondent Pacita Prangan-Valera against, among others, Pedro Generosa, now substituted by his widow Vida R. Generosa and their children.

10

Extrajudicial Partition With Sale executed by the defendant brothers and the recovery of possession and ownership of the property in dispute, plus damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In gist, the complaint alleged that the brothers Alfonso, Pedro, and Florencio were never legitimate heirs of the plaintiff's deceased husband, Eleuterio Valera, nor are they related to the latter; that when her husband's first wife Maria died in 1971, Eleuterio continued in possession of the subject property even after he married her (plaintiff) in 1984; that when Eleuterio died in 1990, she continued in possession of the same property until her possession thereof was interrupted when the defendant brothers surreptitiously took possession of the property in 1991, after arrogating unto themselves the very same property on the basis of a falsified Deed of Extrajudicial Partition With Sale wherein said defendants made it appear that they are the sole heirs of her husband, Eleuterio Valera; that on account of the misrepresentation committed by the three, she filed against them a criminal complaint for falsification of public document, docketed as Criminal Case No. D-11039; that the brothers Alfonso and Florencio were convicted in said case and subsequently applied for probation while their brother Pedro was dropped from the case on account of his death during the pendency thereof. In their Answer, the defendant brothers basically sought refuge on their claim of prescription, alleging that they have been in possession of the disputed property for more than thirty (30) years. During the pendency of the suit, defendant Pedro Generosa died and was accordingly substituted by his widow, Vida Generosa, and their children, to wit: Robert, Edmundo, Pedro, Jr., Amalia, Liza, Melody and Fidel, all surnamed Generosa, the petitioners herein. In a decision dated February 7, 2003, the RTC found for the plaintiff, now respondent Pacita Prangan-Valera. It annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition With Sale executed by the three brothers and awarded the entire property subject of the suit to the respondent, with damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. More specifically, the decision dispositively reads:cra:nad WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:cra:nad 1. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with sale dated 5 November 1990 (Exh. "C") is hereby ANNULLED and declared NULL and VOID; 2. Tax Declaration No. 5428 in the names of Pedro Generosa and Vida Rosario (Exh. "E") is hereby CANCELLED and ANNULLED; 3. Tax Declaration No. 4528 (Exh. "C") in the name of Eleuterio Valera is hereby ordered to be reinstated. The Municipal assessor of Manaoag, Pangasinan is ordered to reinstate the3

same in the name of Eleuterio Valera. Likewise, the Provincial Assessor of the Province of Pangasinan is directed and ordered to reinstate the same in the name of Eleuterio Valera; 4. Defendants Alfonso Generosa, Florencio Generosa, Vida Generosa and the heirs of deceased Pedro Generosa, namely: Beda Generosa, Robert Generosa, Edmundo Generosa, Pedro Generosa, Jr., Amalia Generosa, Liza Generosa, Melody Generosa and Fidel Generosa, are directed to deliver, reconvey the possession and ownership of that property located in Licsi, Manaoag, Pangasinan containing an area of 5,319 square meters, more or less, bounded on North by Maximo Soriano; East by Road; South by Pedro Rous and Crispin Buessa; West by Mariano Soriano, declared under Tax Decl. No. 4528 and assessed at P1,900.00 to the plaintiff; 5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation and the additional sum of P30,000.00 for and as moral damages. Costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. From the aforementioned decision of the trial court, the defendants, now petitioners, went on appeal to the CA whereat their appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 79749. As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its decision of September 29, 2004, reversed and set aside that of the trial court, thus:cra:nad WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the appeal decision in Civil Case No. U-5268 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered declaring that the legal heirs of Maria Soriano Valera are her surviving spouse, the late Eleuterio Valera (succeeded by his widow, herein plaintiffappellee), who is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the subject property; and her brothers (sic), Alfonso, Pedro (deceased) and Florencio, or their children, herein appellants, who are entitled to the other half of the property. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. In decreeing the division of the subject property between the petitioners and the respondent in equal shares, the CA ruled that the conviction of the brothers Alfonso and Florencio in the criminal case for falsification of public document filed against them and their brother Pedro at the instance of the respondent "is a concern of the authorities" . and "will not result in the nullification of their rights as co-owners [of the respondent] where such act does not fall under any of the legal grounds for disqualification to succeed as heirs under Articles 1027 and 10324

11

of the Civil Code." To the CA, the rightful heirs of Maria Soriano-Valera to whom the property involved in the case originally belonged are, on the one hand, the petitioners herein, in representation of Maria's nephews, and on the other hand, her deceased husband Eleuterio Valera, represented by his second wife, the herein respondent Pacita Prangan-Valera, which two (2) sets of heirs are entitled to each of the property left by Maria. In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration claiming that to them alone belong the entire property left by Maria. With their motion having been denied by the CA in its Resolution 5 of December 1, 2004, the petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse on their lone submission that THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS ARE THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE-HALF (1/2) AWARDED TO RESPONDENT BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION HAVING BEEN IN POSSESSION THEREOF FOR MORE THAN TWENTY (20) YEARS. No similar recourse was taken by the respondent. We DENY. The evidence on record belies the petitioners' pretension of possession for more than twenty (20) years. As found by the trial court and borne by the evidence: xxx xxx xxx "It was only in 1991, after the death of [respondent's] husband that the said defendants [i.e., the brothers Alfonso, Pedro and Florencio] on the basis of the falsified deed of extra-judicial partition with sale took possession of the property. The claim that they were in possession of the property for more than thirty (30) years appears unsupported. In fact, their own evidence (EXHIBITS "5" and "6") belies their claims of prescription and possession of the property. It was only in 1971, after the death of MARIA, former wife of ELEUTERIO, that defendants were entitled to successional rights over the property in question in conjunction with ELEUTERIO as surviving spouse. xxx xxx xxx It appearing that the property under litigation was transferred in the names of the defendant spouses [Pedro Generosa and Vida Generosa] in 1991 and the action for annulment of document and reconveyance of ownership and recovery of possession was filed in 1993, the action has not yet prescribed." (Words in brackets supplied.) In any event, and as correctly pointed out by the CA, acquisitive prescription, as laches, is based on the doctrine equity. It cannot be invoked to defeat justice or to perpetuate an

injustice. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunguam 6 7 contravenit legis. The positive mandate of Article 494 of the Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and the herein respondent can validly vindicate her inheritance despite the lapse of time. To reiterate, the herein parties are co-owners of the property subject of the controversy. Surely, in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his 8 claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run. The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without shadow 9 of doubt. This is not the case here. To stress, the petitioners' claim that they were in possession of the property for more than thirty (30) years appears unsupported. In fact, their own evidence belied their claim of prescription and possession of the property. As found by the trial court, it was only in 1991, after the death of the respondent's husband Eleuterio that the petitioners on the basis of the falsified deed of extrajudicial partition with sale took possession of the property. As it is, the petitioners could neither invoke acquisitive prescription because their mode of acquisition was illegal and void. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title of the time fixed by law. It may also be added that the possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee. In order that his possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Even granting, arguendo, that the falsified deed of extrajudicial partition with sale could be taken as a positive act of repudiation of the co-ownership existing between the respondent and the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, there is clearly no showing that prescription has set in, given the fact the property under litigation was transferred in the names of the petitioners in 1991 and the action for annulment of documents, reconveyance of ownership and recovery of possession was filed by the respondent in 1991. The action has not yet prescribed. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that if a property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. This provision, in conjunction with Article 1144, gives the respondent a prescriptive period of ten years, for an obligation under an implied trust is one created by law. Accordingly, an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten

12

years, the point of reference being the date of the registration of the deed of sale or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. All told, the Court rules and so hold that the CA correctly adjudicated the disputed parcel of land in such a way that one-half (1/2) thereof shall pertain to the respondent as successor of Eleuterio Valera, while the other one-half (1/2) to the petitioners, in accordance with Article 10 1001 of the Civil Code. cra WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78. On October 3, 2002, the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be 4 distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on 5 August 11, 2003, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of 6 the family home. Hence, the instant petition on the following issues: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. II. COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 7 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP. The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.3

G.R. No. 170829

November 20, 2006

PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Respondents.DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and 1 set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence. On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square 2 meters, more or less. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.

13

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises. On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their 8 father, hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of. The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished 9 memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or 10 by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is 11 constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment 12 except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and 13 overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who constituted the family home.1wphi1 Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the continuing existence of the family home: Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home, the property will remain as family home for ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs who are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning the property after the period provided by this article? We believe that although the heirs will continue in ownership by 14 not partitioning the property, it will cease to be a family home. (Emphasis supplied) Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner: The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies 15 regardless of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied) The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.

14

It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code. As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.1wphi1 Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education 16 and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) 17 It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount. Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 18 199. We agree with this view. The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997. With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property. The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations from arising. As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a coownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner 20 may demand at any time the partition of the common property. Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Not more than three competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct. When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may order it19

15

assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners 21 shall sell the same accordingly. The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied in 22 Art. 996 of the Civil Code. Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same share as each of her two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, we held that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of coownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in 24 the same action. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the property and the proper share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.23

G.R. No. 188802

February 14, 2011

REVELINA LIMSON, Petitioner, vs. WACK WACK CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Respondent.DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: On January 22, 1996, Revelina Limson (Revelina) purchased from Conchita Benitez an apartment unit (Unit 703) at Wack Wack Apartments, Wack Wack Road, Mandaluyong City. Upon moving in, Revelina noticed defects in the electrical main panel located inside the unit, drawing her to report them, by letter of February 22, 1996, to the Wack Wack Condominium Corporation (respondent), a non-stock corporation organized for the purpose of holding title to and managing the common areas of Wack Wack Apartments Racquel Gonzalez, who sits as Member of respondents Board of Directors, replied by letter of February 23, 1996 that under Section 3 of the House Rules and Regulations, it is the duty of the unit owner to maintain the electrical and plumbing systems at his/her expense. By still another letter dated February 28, 1996, Revelina informed respondent that the "switch board is such that No. 12 wire is protected by 30 ampere fuse" and that five appliances refrigerator, freezer, iron, dryer and washing machine are connected to only one fuse. Revelina later sought professional assistance from a private electrical consultant, Romago, Incorporated. It was concluded that the wirings in Unit 703 are unsafe, hazardous and did not comply with the Philippine Electrical Code. On Revelinas request, the City Building Office conducted an inspection of Unit 703 following which a Report dated January 21, 1997 was accomplished with the following findings and recommendations: Findings: 1. The load center consists of 100 A 2 pst main switch and fusible cut out Blocks with 16 circuits. The fusible cut out block enclosure is not provided with cover, exposing electrical live part that makes it hazardous, unsafe and will be difficult to maintain because a portion was blocked by a shelf. 2. The jumper cable from main safety switch to fusible cut-out blocks used 2 #10 wire (Capt. 60 amp) per phase. This is undersized and would overheat.1

16

3. The fusible current protective devise where all 30 Amp., sp., 240 v FOR 2 #12 TW (20 AMP. Capacity wire) this does not comply with the provision of the Philippine Electrical Code that stipulates rating of the protective devise shall be the same as the conductor ampacity especially on a multi outlet circuit. 4. Power supply for water heaters was tapped to small appliance for convenience outlet circuit. Recommendation: 1. Replacement of fusible load center with panel board and circuit breaker components to correct the problem as enumerated on items 2, 3, 4 of our findings. 2. Replace the embedded circular loom with conduit on moulding. 3. Check all grounded circuit for water heater lad. 4. Provide separate circuit for water heater lad. 5. Submit As Built Electrical Plan signed and sealed by a Professional Electrical Engineer together with the previous approved Electrical Plan. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Report was sent by then Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. to respondent by letter dated January 31, 1997. On February 3, 1997, respondent, through Architect Eugenio Gonzalez, wrote Revelina to demand that repairs in line with the above-stated recommendation of the City Building Office be undertaken within ten (10) days. Before the deadline, respondents Board of Directors convened on February 7, 1997 and resolved to impose a daily fine of P1,000.00 on Revelina and her husband Benjamin, to commence on February 14, 1997, should the latter fail to comply. Revelina and her husband refused to undertake the repairs and to pay the fine. They claimed that the electrical main panel forms part of the common areas, citing Section 6 of Republic 2 Act No. 4726 , "An Act to Define Condominium, Establish Requirements for its Creation and Government of its Incidents," the pertinent provision of which reads: Sec. 6. Unless otherwise expressly provided in the enabling or master deed or the declaration of restrictions, the incidents of a condominium grant are as follows: a.) x x x The following are not part of the unit: bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations, and other common structural elements of the buildings; lobbies, stairways, hallways and other areas of common use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central refrigeration and central air conditioning equipment, reservoir, tanks, pumps and other

central services and facilities, pipes, ducts, flues, chutes, conduits wires and other utility installations, wherever located, except the outlets thereof when located within the unit. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) They argued that an electrical main panel is in the nature of a utility installation. Meanwhile, Revelina and her husband purchased an oversized whirlpool. In the process of installation, the 7th floor utility room which is adjacent to Unit 703 was damaged. Revelina claimed that an agreement had been reached under which respondent would take charge of the repair of the utility room and would bill her for the cost incurred therefor but respondent failed to do so. Yet the Board of Directors assessed her and her husband a fine of P1,000.00 per day until the utility room is repaired. Respondent thereupon filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Revelina and Benjamin before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) upon the following causes of action: 1. To compel the defendants (Spouses Limson) to undertake the necessary repairs of the defective and hazardous condition of the electrical wiring of their Unit 703 in accordance with the report and recommendation of the Office of the Building Official of Mandaluyong City; 2. To seek payment of liquidated damages from the defendants in accordance with the Resolution of the


Recommended