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Felicidad Javier vs. Regino Veridiano and Reino Rosete
G.R. No. L-48050. October 10, 1994
Bellosillo, J.
Doctrine: A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other
issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by
no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right
or title of ownership.
Facts: On January 1963, Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot
No. 1641, Ts 308 of Olongapo Townsite Subdivision in Olongapo City. On
December 1970, Javier filed Civil Case no. 926 (CC 926) for forcible entry
against Ben Babol for entering a portion of the southwestern part of Lot 1641,
Ts 308. The case was dismissed since the court considered the portion outside
Lot 1461. The case became final and executory on April 1973. Subsequently,
Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of
Title was issued in her favor. Meanwhile, Babol who was the defendant in CC
926 had sold the portion he was occupying to Rosete. 4 years after the finality of
CC 926, Javier instituted a Civil Case No. 2203-0 (CC 2203-0) for quieting of
title and recovery of possession. Rosete moved to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. The CFI of Zambales dismissed the case.
Issue: Whether res judicata is applicable in the case.
Held: No. The following are the requisites of res judicata: a) there is final
judgment or order; b) the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter; c)
former judgment is a judgment on merits; and d) identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action. The first three are present. There is identity of
parties in the case. What is required is not absolute but substantial identity of
parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor in interest of Babol by title.
Nevertheless, there is no identity of cause of action. CC 926 is a complaint of
forcible entry or accion interdictal where the issue is physical or material
possession of real property. In this case, Javier merely claimed a better right or
prior possession over the land without asserting title. CC 2203-0 is an action to
recover a parcel of land or accion reivindicatori. In this case, Javier expressly
alleged ownership (by virtue of the Original Certificate of Title issued) and
specifically prayed that she be declared the rightful owner and be given
possession of the disputed portion. A judgement in forcible entry or detainer
case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the
right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of ownership.
Javier v. Veridiano IIG.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565Bellosillo, J.FACTS:Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for lot 1641. She later instituted a complaint for forcible entry against Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of said land. The case for forcibly entry was however dismissed as it was found by the court that the occupied portion was outside Lot 1641. The same was dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and issued an OCT for lot 1641. Babol, however had sold the property he was occupying, including a portion of 200 square meters to Rosete. Javier demanded the surrender of the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply. After 4 years, Javier instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol and Rosete. Rosete moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The CFI sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Javier contends thatres judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. Javier maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land.ISSUE:Whether or not there are really different causes of action between the forcible entry case and the later quieting of title case.HELD:Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of
(4a) parties, (4b) of subject matter and (4c) of causes of action.
Javier's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties. But, there is merit in Javier's argument that there is no identity of causes of action. "The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way
bind the title or affects the ownership of the land or building. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or anaccion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. Accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacionis thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership.
Bustos vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 120784-85. January 24, 2001
Pardo, J.:
Doctrine: One of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. It follows
that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of
the same. “An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) “juses” or attributes of
ownership–the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to
accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits–is a
crippled owner.”
Facts: Paulino Fajardo died intestate in April 2, 1957. He had four children,
Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial. Subsequently, they instituted an extra-
judicial partition of the estate of the deceased. On the same day, Manuela sold
her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz, by way of Deed of Absolute
Sale.
At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga.
Later, the cadastre was conducted, and the property involved in the partition
case were specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of
Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre
and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.
Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the
land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.
Mendoza then filed a complaint.
During the hearing, Trinidad died, and her heirs parted with her estate,
including the lot claiming by Mendoza. Lot 284-B was then sold to Spouses
Viray, herein private respondents.
The trial court ruled in favor of Mendoza. He then sold the subject land to
Spouses Bustos, herein petitioners, who were actually lessees of the husband of
Trinidad on the land in question. Since Spouses Bustos were in actual
possession of the land, Spouses Viray filed an action for unlawful detainer
against the Spouses Bustos.
Issue: Whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.
Held: No. Petitioners cannot be ejected from the subject land. The stay of
execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the
land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting
petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave
injustice. The issue of possession was rendered moot when the court
adjudicated ownership to the Spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and
logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the
property.
Heirs of Roman Soriano vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93401 June 26, 1991
Medialdea, J.:
Doctrine: There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to
exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is
defined as the holding of a thing or enjoyment of a right.
Facts: The object of the dispute in this case is a parcel of land originally owned
by Adriano Soriano who died intestate in 1947. On June 30, 1967, his heirs
leased the property to spouses David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a
period of fifteen (15) years beginning July 1, 1967. Paragraph 5 of the contract
of lease, provided that Roman Soriano, one of the children of the late Adriano,
will be the caretaker of the property during the period of the lease.
During the effectivity of the lease contract, the heirs of Adriano Soriano entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of his estate. The property subject of this case
was adjudicated to seven (7) of his rune (9) children pro-indiviso.
On January 11, 1968, the property was divided into two (2) lots, Lot No. 60052
and Lot No. 8459. The former lot was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the
heirs of Dionisia while the latter lot was assigned to Francisco, Librada,
Elcocadio and Roman. The new owners of Lot No. 60052 sold the portions
assigned to them to spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos. Likewise, the new
owners of Lot 8459, except Roman, sold their shares to the Abalos spouses.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker and
appointed Isidro Versoza and Vidal Versoza as his substitutes. Thereafter,
Roman filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera
spouses. On September 30, 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision
authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On appeal, the decision was reversed by
the Court of Appeals. However, before it was executed, the parties entered into
a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman
Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease on
June 30 1982. This agreement was approved by the CAR court in an order dated
December 22, 1972.
On August 16, 1976, the Abalos spouses filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan at Lingayen an application for registration of title. The
application claimed ownership of the entire lot No. 60052 and 3/4 pro-indiviso of
Lot No. 8459. The Director of Lands and Roman Soriano filed separate
oppositions to the application. The latter’s opposition alleged that the two (2)
lots subject of the application have not yet been subdivided and remained as one
parcel; that he is the co-owner pro-indiviso of the combined area of the two (2)
lots and not just to one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 8459 as alleged in the application;
and that the applicant’s source of ownership is voidable.
The Republic subsequently conceded that the land applied for was private and
disposable. The RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, granted the
application for Registration.
Meanwhile, on April 13, 1983, after the expiration of the original lease and the
sub-lease in favor of Roman Soriano, the Abalos spouses filed a case for
unlawful detainer against Roman Soriano. This case, however, was dismissed on
motion of the complainants, Abalos spouses.
For their part, Elcocadio, Librada, Roman, Francisco, Lourdes, Candido and the
heirs of Dionisia, filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale they executed in
favor of the Abalos spouses or should the deeds be not annulled, to allow
Roman, Elcocadio and Librada to redeem those shares sold by Candido,
Lourdes, Francisca and the heirs of Dionisia and to uphold Roman Soriano’s
possession of the fishpond portion of the property as a tenant-caretaker. After
the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, the Abalos spouses a motion for
execution of the post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Roman
Soriano and the de Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease the property.
Issue: Whether or not a motion for execution of a post decisional agreement
approved by the court in 1972 may still be filed eleven (11) years after.
Held: No. It should be noted that the meat of the post decisional agreement
sought to be executed was the creation of a sub- lessor and sub-lessee
relationship between the de Veras and Roman Soriano. While it appears from
the above resolution of the trial court that there was a basis for private
respondents’ demand for reasonable compensation for the use of the premises
and for joint possession as a co-owner, the filing of a motion for execution of the
post decisional agreement between the de Vera spouses and the petitioners
predecessor, Roman Soriano, was not the proper remedy. The pleading filed
with the trial court was captioned “Motion for Execution.” However, it was very
clear that, under the circumstances they were in, the relief demanded by the
private respondents can properly be asked for in an unlawful detainer case or in
other proper proceedings. A case for unlawful detainer was already brought by
the private respondents against the petitioner but the former sought its
dismissal for reasons not known. Be that as it may, there is still a pending civil
action between the parties (Civil Case No. 15958) where possession is one of
the issues to be resolved.
The agrarian court erred in not dismissing outright the motion for execution
filed by private respondents. Said court, acting on the motion for execution had
no jurisdiction to entertain propositions outside of the scope of the agreement
sought to be executed. Further, the agreement sought to be enforced was
approved by the court on December 22, 1972, eleven (11) years and eight (8)
months from the time the motion for execution was filed on August 22, 1984. It
is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a
judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the
date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an
ordinary action. Actions upon a judgment or a final order of the court must be
brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues [(Article
1144 (3)] or within ten years counted from the time the judgment became final.
Furthermore, it is indubitable that the agreement sought to be executed had
already been executed by the parties. The obligations of spouses De Vera, the
original lessees, and of Roman Soriano, under sub-lease agreement had already
been complied with. Possession and rentals under the contracts were already
delivered. In fact, at the time the motion for execution was filed the sub-lease
contract had already expired. Hence, there was nothing more to execute.
Petition granted. Motion for execution denied.
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999
Puno, J.
Doctrine: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership
exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will
in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to
dispose of the thing by way of sale.
Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of
an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other
hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior
right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
Facts: Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel
of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered,
sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter
Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos). On
March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan. On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia’s
Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-
108412/545 was issued in the name of the Magpayos. The Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the
Magpayos title. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired
without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was
consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo’s title and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138233 was issued in its name. The Magpayos
failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the
highest bidder bought the land. On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the
RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBCom’s title docketed as
Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. On
October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land which was
granted. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose
Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it
and filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which
motion was denied.
Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the
instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia,
that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia,
and that PBCom acquired no right thereover. In its summary judgment, the
lower court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of
PBCom was void. The Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the said
property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the property was
in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in
possession and hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of
the document.
On appeal, CA held that Garcia’s assertion that ownership over the disputed
property was not transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at
the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and
adverse possession thereof does not lie. Since the execution of the deed of sale
by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place earlier or on
August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, Garcia was not in possession of the
property at the time of the execution of said public instrument. Furthermore, it
appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property which was
registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then
the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the
attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.
When the land is registered in the vendor’s name, and the public instrument of
sale is also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer
may exercise the actions of an owner. That the Magpayos’ title, TCT No. S-
108412, was issued four (4) days following the execution of the deed of real
estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the Torrens system
does not vest ownership but is intended merely to confirm and register the title
which one may already have on the land.
Issue: Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner.
Held: No. Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into
ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an
intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom’s Writ of Possession). His
possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so because as
early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses
which title was subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by
PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the
latter in 1985.
The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected
to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of
others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right
to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios
exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject
property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as
the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to
actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be
had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of
a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or
one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere
holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an
owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is of no
moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale
to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership.
On the other hand, petitioner’s subsequent claim of ownership as successor to
his mother’s share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property
was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the
intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no
longer considered owned by petitioner’s parents.
The Court upheld the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom
by the Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of
title over the property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was
entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of
such ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale operates as a
formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use
the document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were
already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.
Rodil Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129609, November 29, 2001.
Bellosillo, J.
Doctrine: The owner has a right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. This is an attribute of ownership.
In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior
physical possession.
Facts: Petitioner Rodil Enterprises is the lessee of the Ides O’Racca building
(ORACCA) since 1959. It was a former alien property over which the Republic
acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477. Rodil entered into a sublease contract
with respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footware and Chua Huay
Soon, members of Oracca Building Tenants Association, Inc. (ASSOCIAION). On
January 8, 1987, Rodil offered to purchase the property. On July 22, 1998, the
Association also offered to lease the same building through DGSREPM. Pending
action on the purchase offer of Rodil, the Republic granted Rodil’s request for
the renewal of the lease contract on Sept. 23, 1987 for 5 more years. The
renewal contract however was disapproved by the DGSREPM secretary.
On October 1987, Rodil filed an action to enjoin the Association from collecting
rentals from the occupants of Oracca. This was granted by the trial court and
upheld by CA. On May 18, 1992 Rodil signed a renewal contract for 10 more
years of lease , which was approved by the DENR Secretary. The Association
filed a case to set aside the renewal contract, but the same was denied by the
trial court.
Rodil then filed an action for unlawful detainer against herein respondents. The
MTC upheld Rodil’s right to eject, which was then upheld by the RTC. While the
consolidated appeals were pending, the CA 2nd Division declared the renewal
contract between Rodil and the Republic as null and void. Rodil moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied which prompted it to file an action for
certiorari. The CA 4th division likewise se aside the MTC and the RTC’s decision
and dismissed the action of Rodil for unlawful detainer.
Issues:
Whether the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.
Whether Rodil may validly eject herein respondents even though the former is
not in actual possession of the property.
Held:
Yes. The Owner has a right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. This is an attribute of ownership. The Republic
being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a
lease contract with Rodil in the exercise of its jus disponendi.
Yes. In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior
physical possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into
any lease contract with the Republic and that their continued occupation of the
subject property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. Since the occupation of
respondents was merely tolerated by the Republic, the right of possession of the
latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it
choose. Unfortunately for respondents, the Republic chose to alienate the
subject premises to Rodil by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on May
18, 1992. Resultantly, the petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful
detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property has
been unlawfully withheld
Cornelio M. Isaguirre vs. Felicitas De Lara
G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Doctrine: As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged
property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not
pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have
possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for
whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the
mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether
judicially or extra judicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold
at a public auction and the proceeds there from given to the creditor to the
extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.
Facts: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a
Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot
502, Guianga Cadastre, filed with the Bureau of Lands with an area of 2,342
square meters. Upon his death, his wife – respondent Felicitas de Lara, as
claimant, succeeded Alejandro de Lara. The Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources amended the sales application to cover only 1,600 square
meters. By virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, a subdivision survey was made and the area was further
reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a two-story residential-
commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent’s sons – Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.
Respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank. When she
encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M.
Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. A document
denominated as “Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was
executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square
meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and
residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in
consideration of the sum of P5,000.
Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of
ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, the case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a sales application over the
subject property on the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved,
resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title, in the name of
petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000
square meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter portion
claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title, in the name of respondent.
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the RTC of Davao City against respondent. After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered judgment, in favor of petitioner, declaring him
to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the transaction entered into by
the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a
sale. The appellate court’s decision was based on the inadequacy of the
consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a
large portion of the “purchase price” was made after the execution of the deed
of sale in several installments of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that
petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title over the
property for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a
consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared Original
Certificate issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. This Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals, we denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for the
immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was
granted. Respondent moved for a writ of possession. Petitioner opposed the
motion, asserting that he had the right of retention over the property until
payment of the loan and the value of the improvements he had introduced on
the property. The trial court granted respondent’s motion for writ of possession.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Consequently, a
writ of possession, together with the Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate, was served upon
petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to
retain possession of the property pending actual payment to him of the amount
of indebtedness by the mortgagor.
Held: A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of
a principal obligation. Recording the document, in which it appears with the
proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is
nevertheless binding between the parties, constitutes it. Thus, the only right
granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the
recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. As a general
rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a
mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the
mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the
property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may
institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or
extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public
auction and the proceeds there from given to the creditor to the extent
necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioner’s contention
that “to require him to deliver possession of the Property to respondent prior to
the full payment of the latter’s mortgage loan would be equivalent to the
cancellation of the mortgage is without basis. Regardless of its possessor, the
mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the
event of the debtor’s default in the payment of his loan obligation.
A simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the
property unless the mortgage should contain some special provision to that
effect. Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other than
his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the parties was
to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment of
the loan.
The trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent.
Such writ was but a necessary consequence of affirming the validity of the
original certificate of title in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at
the same time nullifying the original certificate of title in the name of petitioner
Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it
would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply to establish her
right to possess subject property.
Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and Maria
Cristina Santos vs. Court of Appeals, Heirs of Pacifico C. Mabasa
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
Regalado, J.:
Doctrine: Every owner has an absolute right over his property and his act of
fencing and enclosing the same was an act which he may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. Whatever injury or damage that may
have been sustained by others by reason of the rightful use of the said land by
the owner is damnum absque injuria.
Facts: The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a two-door
apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas,
Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to respondents herein.
As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondent’s property, there are two
possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street.
Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses of the
petitioners The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from
Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru
said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with
5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying
the remises and who were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. However,
sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and
when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an
adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe
fence was first constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence
and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated
the area.
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because
of some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway
such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and
windows.
Trial court rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners Custodios and Santoses
to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress, to the public
street and Mabasa to pay the Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway.
Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the
lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. The CA rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification only insofar
as the. grant of damages to Mabasa The motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied.
Issues:
Whether the grant of right of way to herein private respondent Mabasa is
proper.
Whether the award of damages is in order.
Held:
No. Herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did
not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the
right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication
therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the
issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages
was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred
losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased
premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.However, the mere fact
that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
(damnum absque injuria). In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it
(damnum et injuria.)
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The
act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of
their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the
Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had
no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of
the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of
just compensation.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their
property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they
may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat,
whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by
reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque
injuria.
Abejaron vs. Nabasa
G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001
Puno, J.
Doctrine: For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is
essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
Facts: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and
claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in
Silway, General Santos City. In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started
occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been
surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa
roofing and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode to become a
two-storey house made of round wood and nipa roofing. Abejaron also
introduced several improvements on the land including a store, 5 coconut trees
on the property of controversy, and avocado and banana trees. All this time that
the Abejarons introduced these improvements on the land in controversy,
respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the improvements.
Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only
his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes.
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the
remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. Nabasa built
his house about four (4) meters away from petitioner Abejaron’s house.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in
controversy. Abejaron merely watched them do the survey and did not
thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title
over it as it was government property. Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and
consent, however, Nabasa “clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully
applied for and caused the titling in his name” of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-
154953, including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion. Petitioner
imputes bad faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and
causing the titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa
represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor of the entire Lot 1,
Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion despite
knowledge of Abejaron’s actual occupation and possession of said portion.
On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-
154953 including therein the lot occupied by the petitioner.
On March 12, 1982 an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City.
Issue: Whether the allegation of fraud has been proven for the action for
reconveyance to prosper.
Held: No. An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the
property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not
seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the
registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud
is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to
prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and
convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. Such was not
performed by the petitioner.
Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public
Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that
occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does
not apply to him. Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land
in 1945. At that time, he built a nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of
wood to delineate his area. This nipa house was improved in 1949 into a two-
storey house. The small store was also made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence
was also changed to a fence made of hollow blocks. The two-storey house,
bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this day. In 1951, petitioner
planted coconut trees near his house. While the petitioner has shown continued
existence of these improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced
later than January 24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the
disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence
actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot
determine the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he
may acquire under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact
that the disputed land was surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only
in the 1970′s. Therefore, prior to the survey, it would be difficult to determine
the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947
in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.
Also, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for
taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property or supported by other effective proof. Even the tax
declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the
earliest of these was dated 1950.
Petitioner’s evidence does not constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible”
evidence necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the
disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands
of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must
be “well-nigh incontrovertible.” As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any
evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of
title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for
reconveyance.
German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495Fernan, J.FACTS:Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July 1948. On 26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, the German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by Gernale and Villeza and20 other persons, German Management advised the occupants to vacate
the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al. Gernale, et.al. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the MTC Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have occupied and tilled their farm holdings some 12 to15 years prior to the promulgation of PD 27, and that they were deprived of their property without due process of law when German Management forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing their farm holdings without notice and bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops that they planted by means of force, violence and intimidation The MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.'s complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MTC. Gernale then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by German Management, they have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. German Management moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, here is the present recourse.ISSUE:Whether the doctrine of self-help may be availed of when respondents refused to vacate the premises.HELD:No. The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of the prior possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is unavailing because the such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession, which is absent in the present case. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 New Civil Code which provides that "in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He, who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
Felix Caisip vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970
Concepcion, C.J.
Facts: The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who
cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in
sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land
used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico
is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of
the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein.
On May 17, 1958 Roxas y Cia filed a forcible entry case against Guevarra. The
court decided in favour of Roxas y Cia and issued a writ of execution. The return
of the writ showed that possession of Lot 105-A was turned over to the owner
thru Caisip and that Guevarra and Cabalag were given 20 days from June 6,
1959 to vacate the premises. It also appears in the record that due to the
tenacious attitude of Cabalag, Caisip sought the help of policemen Federico
Villadelrey and Ignacio Rojales.
On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which
was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave but Cabalag
refused to do so claiming that she and her husband has a right over the
property. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the
police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both
of the local police, who were some distance away, and brought them with him.
Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop weeding. As
Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand
and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding.
Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly
dragged her. The appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that their acts are justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether Article 429 of the Civil Code applies in the present case.
Held: Article 429 is inapplicable, Cabalag was given 20 days from June 6, 1959
within which to vacate the premises. Cabalag did not, on June 17, 1959 — or
within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in
possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-
possessor. Appellants did not “repel or prevent in actual or threatened . . .
physical invasion or usurpation.” They expelled Gloria from a property of which
she and her husband were in possession.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had
committed a crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned
20-day period, which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant.
This contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in
the presence of the hacienda owner’s representative, appellant Caisip, who, by
not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed
by the sheriff; 2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and
had, in fact, remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the
owner of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing
weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the
crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not constitute a
criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced
to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that
they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any
kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as “necessary expenses
shall be refunded to every possessor,” and the cost of cultivation, production
and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and
without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from “doing
something not prohibited by law,” (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and
compelled her “to do something against” her will (stopping the weeding and
leaving said lot), “whether it be right or wrong,” thereby taking the law into
their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
People of the Philippines vs. Pletcha
G.R. No.19029. June 27, 1977.
Bison, J.
Doctrine: The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory
rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws.
Facts: Tito Pletcha is a farmer who owns a land which he has been cultivating
for 19years. A private corporation sought to take over the aforementioned land
by fencing 4 hectares of his property. Such fencing was without authority or
court order. Because of this, Pletcha foughjt-off any the take over and resisted
the company. This forced the company to file a case for grave coercion against
Pletcha in the Municipal Court of Murcia, Negros Occidental.
Pletcha invokes the protective mantle of Article 429 of the Civil Code which
gives him the right to use reasonable force to exclude any person threatening
his exclusive ownership over the land.
The People asks for affirmance on the ground that the appellant should not have
taken the law into his own hands but rather have the courts decide the case.
Issue: Whether or not Pletcha can properly invoked Article 429.
Held: Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force
not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is
sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses
force to defend his possession does not possess by force. The use of such
necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a
justifying circumstance under our penal laws.
The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting
the invasion of property. The situation required immediate action and Article
429 gave him the self-executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance.
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990, 191 SCRA 195Fernan, C.J.FACTS:Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action against respondent corporation for damages. The trial court dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The appellate court affirmed the order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.ISSUE:Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages.HELD:Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUOUT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. However, responsibility for fault or negligence under the said article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. The plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The decision is reversed and set aside.