Property Digest(Art. 419-439)

8/22/2019 Property Digest(Art. 419-439)

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CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO OWNER (ART. 419-425)

Usero v CA Digest

Facts:This is a consolidated petitionassailing the decision of the Court ofAppeals (CA). Petitioners and the privaterespondent are registered owners of

neighboring parcels of land whereinbetween the lots is a low-level strip of landwith stagnant body of water. Wheneverthere is a storm or heavy rain the watertherein would flood thereby causingdamage to houses of the Polinarsprompting them to build a concrete wallon the ban! of the strip of land about"meters from their house and riprappedthe soil in that portion.

The #seros claimed ownership of the stripdemanded the halt of the construction butthe Polinars never heeded believing thatthe strip is part of a cree!. $owever thePolinars offered to pay for the land. As theparties still failed to settle both filedseparate complaints for forcible entry. The%unicipal Trial Court ruled in favor of thepetitioner while the regional trial courtreversed and ordered the dismissal of thecomplaint and confirmed the e&istence ofthe cree! between the lots.

Issue:Whether or not the disputed stripof land is part of the cree! hence part ofpublic domain

Held:'. Art. *+, of the Philippine ewCivil Code (CC) provides for propertieswhich are part of public domain. A cree! isincluded in the phrase and others ofsimilar character. A cree! which refers toa recess or arm of a river is a propertybelonging to the public domain thereforenot susceptible of private ownership./eing a public water it cannot beregistered under the Torrens systemunder the name of any individual.

Viuda de Tan Toco v. Mun. Council ofIloilo 49 !il. "#

FACT$:The municipality of 0loilo boughtfrom the widow of Tan Toco a parcel ofland for P*+122.*, which was used forstreet purposes. 3or failure of themunicipality to pay the debt the widow

obtained a writ of e&ecution against themunicipal properties and by virtue of suchwrit was able to obtain the attachment oftwo auto truc!s used for street sprin!lingone police patrol automobile two policestations and two mar!ets including the

lots on which they had been constructed.The issue is the validity of the attachment.

H%&D: The attachment is not properbecause municipal-owned realand personal propertiesdevoted to publicor governmental purposes may not beattached and sold for the payment of a

4udgment against a municipality. 5ust as itis essential to e&empt certain properties ofindividuals (li!e the bare essentials) frome&ecution so it is also essential and 4ustifiable to e&empt property for public usefrom e&ecution otherwise governmentalservice would be 4eopardi6ed. 78T9 $adthe properties been patrimonial theycould have been levied upon or attached.(ee %un. of Pasay v. %anaois et al. :-"*;


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patrimonial and can be e&propriated uponpayment of 4ust compensation?amboanga Bel orte v. City of?amboanga3ACT9 After ?amboanga Provincewasdivided into two (?amboanga del orte

and?amboanga del ur) epublic Act","1 was passed providing that DAllbuildings properties and assets belongingto the former province of ?amboanga andlocated within the City of ?amboanga arehereby transferred free of charge in favorof the City of ?amboanga.EE uit wasbrought alleging that this grant without

4ust compensation was unconstitutionalbecause it deprived the province ofproperty without due process. 0ncluded inthe properties were the capital site andcapitol building certain school siteshospital and leprosarium sites and highschool playgrounds.

Issues:a) Are the properties mentionedproperties for public use or patrimonialFb) hould the city pay for said propertiesF

H%&D:a) 0f we follow the Civil Code classificationonly the high school playgrounds are forpublic use (in the sense that generallythey are available to the general public)and all the rest are PAT0%80A:(sincethey are not devoted to public use but topublic serviceG since they are not forpublic use under Art. *+* of the CivilCode they are patrimonial. 78T9 3orpublic use if A'/8B' can useG for publicservice if only A#T$80?B persons canuse.>.

78T9 $ad they been owned by theTAT they would not have beenpatrimonial but would have beenproperties of public dominion for thiswould include public service conformably

with Art. *+, par. +.>.

/#T if we follow the law of %unicipalCorporations (and not the Civil Code) aslong as the purpose is for a public service(governmental service li!e publiceducation public health localadministration) the property should beconsidered for P#/:0C #.

b) 0f the Civil Code classification is usedsince almost all the properties involvedare patrimonial the law would beunconstitutional since the province wouldbe deprived of its own property without

4ust compensation.

0f the law on %unicipal Corporations wouldbe followed the properties would be ofpublic dominion and therefore 8C8%PAT08 would be re@uired. 0t isthis law on %unicipal Corporations thatshould be followed. 3irstly while the CivilCode may classify them as patrimonialthey should not be regarded as ordinaryprivate property. They should fall underthe control of the tate otherwise certaingovernmental activities would beimpaired. econdly Art. *+* +ndparagraph itself says Dwithout pre4udice tothe provisions (or P0C0P:) of speciallaws.H

$alas vs 2arencio

Facts:8n 3ebruary +* =1=1 the *th /ranch ofthe Court of 3irst 0nstance of %anilaacting as aland registration court rendered 4udgmentdeclaring the City of %anila the owner infee simple of a parcel of land containingan area of 12;1.; s@uare meters moreor less. 8n various dates in =1+* the Cityof %anila sold portions of theaforementioned parcel of land in favorof Pura Iillanueva. 8n eptember +==12, the %unicipal /oard of %anilapresided by then Iice-%ayor Antono 5.Iillegas adopted a resolution re@uesting$is &cellency the President of thePhilippines toconsider the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by 3lorida an

Andres andebras!a treets containing a total area of J*


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bonafide occupants. The bill was passed by theenate and approved by the President and became A *==;.

Issue:W8 the property involved in A *==; is a

private or patrimonial property of the Cityof%anila.

,uling:The conclusion of the respondent court that epublic Act o. *==; converted apatrimonial property of the City of %anilainto a parcel of disposable land of thetate and too! it awayfrom the City without compensation istherefore unfounded. 0n thelast analysis the land in @uestion pertainsto the tate and the City of %anila merelyacted as trustee forthebenefit of the people therein for whomthetate can legislate in the e&ercise of itslegitimate powers. 0f it were itspatrimonial property why the City of%anila should be re@uesting the residentto ma!e representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposedof in favor of the actual occupantsF Therecould be no more blatant recognition ofthe fact thatsaidland belongs to the tate and was simply granted in usufruct to theCity of %anila for municipal purposes.

C%(U )3-+%* A*D AC%T-&%*% C). V.(%,CI&&%$ $C,A 456FACT$: The land sought to beregistered in this case was formerly apart of a street. Through a resolution itwas declared to be an abandoned roadand not part of the City developmentplan. Thereafter it was sold through apublic bidding and petitioner was thehighest bidder. $e then sought to

register said land but his application wasdismissed.

H%&D: The portion of the city streetsub4ect to petitionerEs application forregistration of title was withdrawnfrom public use. Then it follows thatsuch withdrawn portion becomespatrimonial property of the tate. 0t is

also very clear from the Charter thatproperty thus withdrawn from publicservitude may be used or conveyedfor any purpose for which other realproperty belonging to the City may belawfully used or conveyed.

Ce7u )80gen and Acet0lene Co. Inc.v. (ercilles &44;4 Aug. #9 69;"

FACT$:The CityCouncil of Cebu in =12;considered as an abandoned road theterminal portion of one of its streets.

:ater it authori6ed the sale thru publicbidding of the property. The Cebu 8&ygenand Acetylene Co. was able to purchasethe same. 0t then petitioned the TC ofCebu for the registration of the land. Thepetition was opposed by the Provincial3iscal(Prosecutor) who argued that the lotis still part of the public domain andcannot therefore be registered. 0ssue9 %aythe lot be registered in the name of thebuyerF

H%&D:'es the land can be registered inthe name of the buyer because the streethas already been withdrawn from publicuse and accordingly has becomepatrimonial property. The lotEs sale wastherefore valid.

MU*ICIA&IT- of $A* MI+U%& vs.F%,*A*D%'

Facts0n Civil Case o. 2,*-/ entitled %argaritaB. Ida. de 0mperio et al. vs. %unicipalKovernment of an %iguel /ulacan etal. the then C30 rendered 4udgmentholding herein petitioner municipalityliable to private respondents. The courtordered the partial revocation of the Beedof Bonation signed by the deceased Carlos0mperio in favor of the %unicipality of an

%iguel /ulacan insofar as :ots os. = + "* and


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=1J, up to and including =1J< plusinterest. Petitioner filed a %otion to Luashthe writ of e&ecution on the ground thatthe municipalityEs property or funds areall public funds e&emptfrom e&ecution. $e said motion

to @uash was however denied by therespondent 4udge and the alias writ ofe&ecution stands in full force and effect.espondent 4udge ordered petitioners tocomply with the money 4udgment. Whenthe treasurers (provincial and municipal)failed to comply with theorder respondent 4udge issued an orderfor their arrest and that they will berelease only upon compliance thereof.$ence the present petition.

Issue: Whether the funds of the%unicipality of an %iguel /ulacan in thehands of the provincial and municipaltreasurers of /ulacan and an %iguelrespectively are public funds which aree&empt from e&ecution for the satisfactionof the money 4udgment in Civil Caseo.2,*-/.

Held:Well settled is the rule that publicfunds are not sub4ect to levy ande&ecution. The reason for this wase&plained in the case of %unicipality ofPaoay vs. %anaois that they are held intrust for the people intended and usedfor the accomplishment of the purposesfor which municipal corporationsare created and that to sub4ect saidproperties and public funds to e&ecutionwould materially impede even defeatand in some instances destroy saidpurpose.:i!ewise in Tantoco vs.%unicipal Council of 0loilo it was held thatit is the settled doctrine of the law thatnot only the public property but alsothe ta&es and public revenues ofsuch corporations Cannot be sei6ed undere&ecution against them either in the

treasury or when in transit toit. 5udgments rendered for ta&es and theproceeds of such 4udgments in the handsof officers of the law are not sub4ect toe&ecution unless so declared bystatute. Thus it is clear that all the fundsof petitioner municipality in the possessionof the %unicipal Treasurer of an%iguel as well as those in the possession

of the Provincial Treasurer of /ulacan arealso public funds and as such they aree&empt from e&ecution. /esides PB o.*JJ!nown as The Becree on :ocal 3iscalAdministration ection + (a) provides93undamental Principles. :ocal

government financial affairs transactionsand operations shall be governed by thefundamental principles set forthhereunder9 (a) o money shall be paid outof the treasury e&cept in pursuance of alawful appropriation or other specificstatutory authority. 8therwise statedthere must be a correspondingappropriation in the form of an ordinanceduly passed by the angguniang /ayanbefore any money of the municipality maybe paid out. 0n thecae at bar it has notbeen shown that the / has passed anordinance to this effect

+overn1ent v. Ca7angis "5 !il.66#

FACT$:0n =;12 A owned a parcel of landbut because of the action of the waves of%anila /ay part of said land was graduallysubmerged in the sea. 0t remainedsubmerged until =1=+ when thegovernment decided to ma!e thenecessary dredging to reclaim the landfrom the sea. As soon as the land hadbeen recovered A too! possession of it.

Issue: the ownership of the reclaimedland.

H%&D: The government owns thereclaimed land in the sense that it hasbecome property of public dominionbecause in letting it remain submerged Amay be said to have abandoned the same.$aving become part of the sea or theseashore it became property for publicuse. When the government too!steps to ma!e it land again its status as

public dominion remained unchangedGtherefore A is not entitled to the land.

CHAV%' V. U(&IC %$TAT%$AUTH),IT-5


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forest land and 2+; hectares ofagricultural land (alienable anddisposable) valid and constitutionalF

,uling:0n issuing Proclamation o. =,2*President Kloria %acapagal-Arroyo merely

e&ercised the authority granted to her toclassify lands of the public domainpresumably sub4ect to e&isting vestedrights. Classification of public lands is thee&clusive prerogative of the &ecutiveBepartment through the 8ffice of thePresident. Proclamation o. =,2*classifies /oracay into *,, hectares ofreserved forest land and 2+;.12 hectaresof agricultural land. The Proclamationli!ewise provides for a =


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OWNERSHIP (ART. 427)

,I+HT$ )F )=*%, >Art.4#


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and not the TC had 4urisdiction over theaction of the petitioners since the caseinvolved title to or possession of realproperty with an assessed value of lessthan Php+,,,,.,,. As the Court ofAppeals had held9

DThe determining 4urisdictionalelement for the accionreinvindicatoria 7sic> is as A J21=discloses the assessed value of theproperty in @uestion.

3or properties in theprovinces the TC has 4urisdictionif the assessed value e&ceedsPhp+,,,,.,, and the %TC if thevalue is Php+,,,,.,, or below. Anassessed value can have referenceonly to the ta& rolls in themunicipality where the property islocated and is contained in the ta&declaration. 0n the case at benchthe most recent ta& declarationsecured and presented by theplaintiffs-appellees is &hibit /. Theloose remar! made by them thatthe property was worth ".< millionpesos not to mention that there isabsolutely no evidence for this isirrelevant in the light of the factthat there is an assessed value. 0tis the amount in the ta& declarationthat should be consulted and noother !ind of value and asappearing in &hibit / this isPhp


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avers the 4urisdictional facts i.e. that theplaintiff had prior physical possession andthat he was deprived thereof by thedefendant through force intimidationthreats strategy and stealth. Thecomplaint in this case ma!es such an

averment. $ence the irrelevantcircumstance that the evidence adducedduring the hearing rendered improper anaction for forcible entry is of no momentand cannot deprive the %CTC of its

4urisdiction over the case. The %CTCcontinues to have that 4urisdiction.

#.'. To begin with the Court is at onceconfronted by the uncontested findings ofthe %CTC 4udge himself during his ocularinspection of the premises in dispute thatwhat he saw thereat Dconfirmed theallegations of the defendant 7nowpetitioner ampayan> that hispredecessors-in-interest have introducedimprovements by planting caimito treescoconut trees and others on the land in@uestionH adding that D7>othing can beseen on the land that plaintiff had onceupon a time been in possession of thelandH and categorically stating that D7T>heallegation that Cristita Luita thepredecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffshad been in possession of the saidproperty since =1


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and not anaction for unlawful detainerand thus dismissing the complaint.

I$$U%: Whether the %TCC properlye&ercised 4urisdiction over the complaint.

H%&D:'. All actions for forcible entry orunlawful detainer shall be filed with theproper %etropolitan Trial Courts the%unicipal Trial Courts and the %unicipalCircuit Trial Courts which actions shallinclude not only the plea for restoration ofpossession but also all claims for damagesand costs arising therefrom. The saidcourts are not divested of 4urisdiction oversuch cases even if the defendants thereinraises the @uestion of ownership over thelitigated property in his pleadings and the@uestion of possession cannot be resolvedwithout deciding the issue of ownership.

The Court found no error in the %TCCassuming 4urisdiction over petitionerEscomplaint. A complaint for unlawfuldetainer is sufficient if it alleges that thewithholding of the possession or therefusal to vacate is unlawful withoutnecessarily employing the terminology ofthe law. $ere there is an allegation inpetitionerEs complaint that respondentsEoccupancy on the portion of his property isby virtue of his tolerance.

PetitionerEs cause of action for unlawfuldetainer springs from respondentsE failureto vacate the @uestioned premises uponhis demand sometime in =112.

0t bears stressing that possession bytolerance is lawful but such possessionbecomes unlawful when the possessor bytolerance refuses to vacate upon demandmade by the owner. 8ur ruling in o&asvs. Court of Appeals "1= CA "


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possession they confuse the remedy of an

action for forcible entry with that of

unlawful detainer. 0n unlawful detainer

prior physical possession by the plaintiff is

not necessary. 0t is enough that plaintiff

has a better right of possession. Actual

prior physical possession of a property by

a party is indispensable only in forcible

entry cases. Also the defendant is

necessarily in prior lawful possession of

the property but his possession eventually

becomes unlawful upon termination or

e&piration of his right to possess. Thus

the fact that petitioners are in possession

of the lot does not automatically entitle

them to remain in possession. And the

issue of prior lawful possession by the

defendants does not arise at all in a suitfor unlawful detainer simply because prior

lawful possession by virtue of contract or

other reasons is given or admitted. #nli!e

in forcible entry where defendants by

force intimidation threat strategy or

stealth deprive the plaintiff or the prior

physical possessor of possession. $ere

there is no evidence to show that

petitioners entered the lot by any of these

acts.

An unlawful detainer is different from a

possessory action and from a

reinvidicatory action in that the first is

limited to the @uestion of possession de

facto. Aside from the summary action of

e4ectment accion publiciana or the

plenary action to recover the right of

possession and accion reinvidicatoria or

the action to recover ownership which

includes recovery of possession ma!e up

three !inds of actions to 4udicially recover

possession. $erreraEs allegationssufficiently present a case of unlawful

detainer9 (=) she owns :ot =++J (+) she

tolerated Kanila et al to construct houses

(") she withdrew her tolerance and (*)

Kanilaet refused to heed her demand. The

suit was well-within the 4urisdiction of

%CTC. /esides Kanila et al raised their

opposition only for the first time in their

appeal they are now stopped from doing

so. Petition is denied.

,)$$ ,ICA $A&%$ C%*T%, vs. $$.

)*+

+.,. *o. 65#69;.


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=. Whether the complaint satisfies the

4urisdictional re@uirements for a case of

unlawful detainer properly cogni6able by

the %TC

+. Whether the case should be considered

as one for accion reivindicatoria and thus

the 4urisdiction would lie with the TC

H%&D:

=. - '. Well-settled is the rule that what

determines the nature of an action as well

as which court has 4urisdiction over it are

the allegations of the complaint and the

character of the relief sought. 0n 5avelosa

vs. Court of the Appeals it was held that

the allegation in the complaint that there

was unlawful withholding of possession issufficient to ma!e out a case for unlawful

detainer. 0t is e@ually settled that in an

action for unlawful detainer an allegation

that the defendant is unlawfully

withholding possession from the plaintiff is

deemed sufficient without necessarily

employing the terminology of the law.

$ence the phrase Dunlawful withholdingH

has been held to imply possession on the

part of defendant which was legal in the

beginning having no other source than a

contract e&press or implied and which

later e&pired as a right and is being

withheld by defendant. 0n osanna /.

/arba vs. Court of Appeals the upreme

Court held that a simple allegation that

the defendant is unlawfully withholding

possession from plaintiff is sufficient.

/ased on this premise the allegation in

the Complaint that9

D. . . . despite demand to vacate the

defendants have refused and still refuse tovacate said lots thus unlawfully

withholding possession of said lots from

plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use

of their lotsGH is already sufficient to

constitute an unlawful detainer case.

:i!ewise the case of Co Tiamco vs. Bia6

provides for a liberal approach in

considering the sufficiency of a complaint

for unlawful detainer thus9

D. . . The principle underlying the brevity

and simplicity of pleadings in forcible

entry and unlawful detainer cases rests

upon considerations of public policy.

Cases of forcible entry and detainer are

summary in nature for they involve

perturbation of social order which must be

restored as promptly as possible and

accordingly technicalities or details of

procedure should be carefully avoided.H

+. - 8. The issue involved in accion

reivindicatoria is the recovery of

ownership of real property. This differs

from accion publiciana where the issue is

the better right of possession orpossession de 4ure and accion interdictal

where the issue is material possession or

possession de facto. 0n an action for

unlawful detainer the @uestion

of possession is primordial while the issue

of ownership is generally unessential.

Petitioners in all their pleadings only

sought to recover physical possession of

the sub4ect property. The mere fact that

they claim ownership over the parcels of

land as well did not deprive the %TC of

4urisdiction to try the e4ectment case. ven

if respondents claim ownership as a

defense to the complaint for e4ectment

the conclusion would be the same for

mere assertion of ownership by the

defendant in an e4ectment case will not

oust the municipal court of its summary

4urisdiction. This Court in Kanadin vs.

amos stated that if what is prayed for is

e4ectment or recovery of possession it

does not matter if ownership is claimed by

either party. Therefore the pendingactions for Beclaration of ullity of Beed

of ale and Transfer Certificates of Title

and @uieting of title in Civil Case o. %A-

+"


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title over the same property or for

annulment of the deed of sale over the

land does not divest the %TC of its

4urisdiction to try the forcible entry or

unlawful detainer case before it the

rationale being that while there may be

identity of parties and sub4ect matter in

the forcible entry case and the suit for

annulment of title andMor reconveyance

the rights asserted and the relief prayed

for are not the same.

The long settled rule is that the issue of

ownership cannot be the sub4ect of a

collateral attac!. 0n Apostol vs. Court of

Appeals this Court had the occasion to

clarify this9

D. . . #nder ection *; of PresidentialBecree o. =


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the one year period the suit must be

commenced in the TC via an accion

publiciana a suit for recovery of the right

to possess. 0t is an ordinary civil

proceeding to determine the better right

of possession of realty independently of

title. 0t also refers to an e4ectment suit

filed after the e&piration of one year from

the accrual of the cause of action or from

the unlawful withholding of possession of

the realty independently of title. :i!ewise

the case may be instituted before the

same court as an accion reivindicatoria

which is an action to recover ownership as

well as possession. 0t is clear that

petitionerEs averment ma!e out a case for

forcible entry because she alleged prior

physical possessionof the sub4ect lot way bac! in =1J2 and

the forcible entry thereon by respondent.

Considering her allegation that the

unlawful possession of respondent

occurred two years prior to the filing of the

complaint on 5anuary =; =112 the cause

of action for forcible entry has prescribed

and the %TC had no 4urisdiction to

entertain the case. Therefore petitionerEs

complaint should have been filed with the

proper TC.

8n this point the Court held in /ongato

vs. %alvar that9

D0t is wise to be reminded that forcible

entry is a @uieting process and that the

restrictive time-bar is prescribed to

complement the summary nature of such

process. 0ndeed the one-year period

within which to bring an action for forcible

entry is generally counted from the date

of actual entry to the land. $owever when

entry is made through stealth then theone-year period is counted from the time

the plaintiff learned about it.

After the lapse of the one-year period the

party dispossessed of a parcel of land may

file either an accion publiciana which is a

plenary action to recover the right of

possessionG or an Accion reivindicatoria

which is an action to recover ownership as

well as possession.H

,egina Dion et al v. CA and )verland

%8/ress &ines Inc.

+.,. *o. 6##"44 2anuar0 #


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I$$U%:

W8 8verland &press :ines actually paid

the alleged P",,,,,.,, to 3idela Bi6on

as representative (agent) of petitioners in

consideration of the option

H%&D:

o. CA opined that the payment by

8verland &press :ines of P",,,,,.,, as

partial payment for the leased property

which petitioners accepted (through Alice

A. Bi6on) and for which an official receipt

was issued was the operative act that

gave rise to a perfected contract of sale

and that for failure

of petitioners to deny receipt thereof

8verland &press :ines can therefore

assume that Alice A. Bi6on acting asagent of petitioners was authori6ed by

them to receive the money in their behalf.

CA went further by stating that in fact

what was entered into was a Dconditional

contract of saleH wherein ownership over

the leased property shall not pass to the

8verland &press :ines until it has fully

paid the purchase price. ince 8verland

&press :ines did not consign to the court

the balance of the purchase price and

continued to occupy the sub4ect premises

it had the obligation to pay the amount of

P=J,,.,, in monthly rentals until full

payment of the purchase price.

0n an attempt to resurrect the lapsed

option 8verland &press :ines gave

P",,,,,.,, to petitioners (thru Alice A.

Bi6on) on the erroneous presumption that

the said amount tendered would

constitute a perfected contract of sale

pursuant to the contract of lease withoption to buy. There was no valid consent

by the petitioners (as co-owners of the

leased premises) on the supposed sale

entered into by Alice A. Bi6on as

petitionersE alleged agent and 8verland

&press :ines. The basis for agency is

representation and a person dealing with

an agent is put upon in@uiry and must

discover upon his peril the authority of the

agent. As provided in Article =;2; of the

ew Civil Code there was no showing that

petitioners neither consented to the act of

Alice A. Bi6on nor authori6ed her to act on

their behalf with regard to her transaction

with private respondent. The most prudent

thing private respondent should have

done was to ascertain the e&tent of the

authority of Alice A. Bi6on. /eing negligent

in this regard private respondent cannot

see! relief on the basis of a supposed

agency.

very person dealing with an agent is put

upon in@uiry and must discover upon his

peril the authority of the agent. 0f he doesnot ma!e such in@uiry he is chargeable

with !nowledge of the agentEs authority

and his ignorance of that authority will not

be any e&cuse. Persons dealing with an

assumed agency whether the assumed

agency be a general or special one are

bound at their peril if they would hold the

principal to ascertain not only the fact of

the agency but also the nature and e&tent

of the authority and in case either is

controverted the burden of proof is upon

them to establish it.

&i1itations on )Bners!i/ >Art.

45"45? ?..

United $tates v. Caus70 5#< U.$. #"

>694?

FACTS:

espondents owned a dwelling and a

chic!en farm near a municipal airport. The

safe path of glide to one of the runways of

the airport passed directly over

respondentsN property at ;" feet which

A+AD),. ,IV%,A. T)&%D). VI&&A,TA age

=2

ro/ert0 Case Digest Co1/ilationNo copyright infringement intended


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was 2J feet above the house 2" feet

above the barn and =; feet above the

highest tree. 0t was used * of the time in

ta!ing off and J of the time in landing.

The Kovernment leased the use of the

airport for a term of one month

commencing 5une = =1*+ with a

provision for renewals until 5une ", =12J

or si& months after the end of the national

emergency whichever was earlier.

Iarious military aircraft of the #nited

tates used the airport. They fre@uently

came so close to respondentsN property

that they barely missed the tops of trees

the noise was startling and the glare from

their landing lights lighted the place up

brightly at night. This destroyed the use of

the property as a chic!en farm and causedloss of sleep nervousness and fright on

the part of respondents. They sued in the

Court of Claims to recover for an alleged

ta!ing of their property and for damages

to their poultry business. The Court of

Claims found that the Kovernment had

ta!en an easement over respondentsN

property and that the value of the

property destroyed and the easement

ta!en was Q+,,,G but it made no finding

as to the precise nature or duration of the

easement.

Held:=. A servitude has been imposed upon the

land for which respondents are entitled to

compensation under the 3ifth

Amendment. Pp. "+; #. . +2,-+2J.

(a) The common law doctrine that

ownership of land e&tends to the

periphery of the universe has no place in

the modern world. Pp. "+; #. . +2,-+2=.

(b) The air above the minimum safe

altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil

Aeronautics Authority is a public highway

and part of the public domain as declared

by Congress in the Air Commerce Act of

=1+2 as amended by the Civil Aeronautics

Act of =1";. Pp."+; #. . +2,-+2= "+; #.

. +22.

(c) 3lights below that altitude are not

within the navigable air space which

Congress placed within the public domain

even though they are within the path of

glide approved by the Civil Aeronautics

Authority. Pp. "+; #. . +2"-+2*. Page "+;

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Date post:	08-Aug-2018
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Property Digest(Art. 419-439)

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