World Development Vol. 35, No. 9, pp. 1529–1541, 2007� 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

0305-750X/$ - see front matter

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.05.020www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

Property Rights and the Management of

Animal Genetic Resources

SIMON ANDERSON 1

Department for International Development, UK

and

ROBERTA CENTONZE *

Universita di Bologna, Italy

Summary. — Genetic erosion in animal genetic resources (AnGR) is of concern where livelihoodsof the poor are affected and option values for society are being lost. The poor often live in marginalareas and their livestock maintain adaptive characteristics. However, processes leading to geneticerosion do not precipitate adaptation through natural selection.

This paper explores how local property rights systems in poor communities for AnGR are orga-nized. The dynamism and dialectical aspects of these systems are considered and the impact of theirbreakdown is assessed in terms of AnGR diversity.

The conservation of AnGR option values through livestock husbandry by the poor is a hithertounrecognized and unrewarded service to society.� 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — animal genetic resource, property rights, poverty, pastoralists, option value, India,South Asia

�Final revision accepted: May 6, 2006.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to show the relevance ofproperty rights regimes to understanding thecauses behind the differential (and concerning)rates of erosion in animal genetic resources(AnGR). Critical issues related to AnGR con-servation and sustainable use are discussedfrom a pro-poor perspective. These issues in-clude the discrepancies in attribution of valueto AnGR by livestock keepers and those in-volved in conservation policy making. Oppor-tunities for in situ conservation are exploredfrom a people-centered approach consideringthe management of AnGR in terms of localinstitutions and rules in use. In particular, theCollective Action and Property Rights modelhas been utilized with respect to AnGR man-agement at the local level. A synthesis of expe-riences that used participatory approaches toanalyze local institutions provides interestinginsights into the understanding of local realitiesand the elaboration of policy tools. The field-

152

work was mainly carried out in North WestIndia (Rajasthan, Pali district) and is supportedby the findings of research in Yucatan andChiapas states of Southeast Mexico.

The first section of the paper sets out howdifferential rates of erosion of AnGR are preju-dicing the current livelihood strategies of poorlivestock keepers. The significance of the deple-tion of AnGR important as a reservoir of adap-tive traits in terms of option values (i.e., futurepotential unknown benefits) for the wider soci-ety is also discussed. The next section exploresthe problem AnGR loss poses for pro-poordevelopment. Explanation of the differentialrates of genetic erosion in AnGR is then ap-proached from a property rights perspective.The complexities of local property rights sys-tems for AnGR are illustrated with examplesof Raika pastoralists in North West India. Suchsystems are under threat of erosion that could

9

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result in a significant loss of AnGR. Processesof collective action by livestock keepers andthose interested in conservation of AnGR froma pro-poor perspective are then outlined. Thefinal remarks draw wider lessons about theneed to integrate local and national propertyrights systems in order to achieve more sustain-able management of AnGR.

2. ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCESEROSION—A PROBLEM STATEMENT

Sixteen percent of AnGR has been lost overthe last 100 years (Hall & Ruane, 1993) andcurrently breeds at risk comprise approximatelyone-third of all remaining breeds, 22% of mam-mals and 48% of avian species (FAO, 2000).

These rates of AnGR loss are differential.Developing countries have notably higher ratesthan others and socio-political, economic, andagro-ecological determinants are leading tothe most dramatic genetic erosion of AnGRimportant to the livelihoods of many of theworld’s poor (Anderson, 2003). As an esti-mated 1.96 billion people rely on livestock tosupply part or their entire daily needs, the scaleof the problem AnGR loss poses for pro-poordevelopment can be appreciated. The poorneed AnGR suitable for their purposes, yet tra-ditional pastoral groups are often accused ofclinging to an outdated way of life and repre-senting drains on national economies (Mendel-sohn, 2003). A contrary view, explored here, isthat the contribution of pastoral societies to themaintenance of biodiversity in domesticatedanimals, and their role in keeping otherwisebarren tracts of land habitable, should be esti-mated and then rewarded.

The AnGR kept by poor livestock keepers inmarginal areas have high diversity of adaptivegenetic characteristics (tolerant of high temper-atures, resistant to disease vectors and chal-lenges). Yet these AnGR are most at risk ofgenetic erosion (Anderson, 2004). In part thisis due to the rising demand for animal productsin developing countries causing structuralchanges in land use through intensification ofmixed farming systems. Genotype-environmentinteractions mean that animals bred for inten-sive production systems are often not appropri-ate for the production systems the poor utilize(Anderson, 2003). Indeed, this shift fromgrazing-based to industrial livestock produc-tion systems brings disadvantages in termsof genetic conservation and environmental

impacts. Externalities are caused both in termsof genetic resource loss and environmentaldamage. Hence, the global livestock industryfaces the challenge of developing ways of allow-ing economic development to benefit the poorthat utilize, and thereby maintain, AnGR(Blackburn, Lebbie, & van der Zijpp, 1998).Recognition of the significance of adaptivecharacteristics demonstrates the significant po-tential value for society of the AnGR kept bythe poor. The option of being able to exploitAnGR diversity becomes better appreciated astechnological developments allow the identifi-cation, characterization, and exploitation of ge-netic material. Because of this, AnGR are likelyto be valued more in the future due to theiradaptability to local ecosystems, their valuefor conservation, and their role vis-a-vis resto-ration of ecosystems (van der Zijpp, nd).

3. THE OPTION VALUES OF ANIMALGENETIC RESOURCES

The loss of hardy breeds and their corre-sponding adaptive genetic traits means a reduc-tion in the range of biophysical environmentsthat can be utilized by humankind. To localusers, the loss of genetic resources is a loss ofentitlements in terms of material resources(for productive purposes), which may also leadto loss of the knowledge required to husbandsuch resources.

One of the components of the economic va-lue generated by AnGR, and maintained bythose that husband the livestock, is termed ‘‘op-tion value.’’ 2 Option values refer to the benefitderived from safeguarding an asset for the op-tion of using it at a future date. It is a kind ofinsurance value against the occurrence of, forexample, a disease, drought, or climate change.The opportunity provided by locally adaptedlivestock for the production of manure, meat,wool, and milk, and the provision of work,transport, and social functions in harsh envi-ronments represents an entitlement (endow-ment) of local people. 3 Furthermore, in theeventuality of a wider market demand for thespecific traits, the livestock represent an optionvalue for a wider society. 4 Option value canthen be projected into the future either on aglobal scale or on a local scale as part of theentitlements of a given household or popula-tion.

The option value for a given breed increaseswith the uniqueness of its characteristics, with

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES 1531

the genetic distance of its traits from others’,and with the rarity of the breed itself. 5 As al-ready stated, the ability to utilize genetic traitsis a consequence of technological development.Among traditional livestock keeping communi-ties, a breed is valued according to not only itsmarket value, but also for the beliefs and tradi-tions which it is bounded to. Such traditionsmay derive from the acknowledged opportunityto maintain as many options as possible in asingle productive unit or in a cluster of interde-pendent units. For example, the Raika pasto-ralists of Rajasthan have a single term,independent of species, for animals used forreproductive purposes—‘‘Saand.’’ All saand(sheep, goats, cattle, buffalo, and camels) havereligious value and are often protected by rulespreventing sale or being slaughtered, in order tomaintain the ‘‘value’’ of the productive unit.The productive unit can be a single household,in case of sheep and goats, or the whole village,in case of cattle and buffalo. Saand can be ex-changed, but not for direct monetary profit.However, the idea of profit is not totally ex-cluded in the dynamic development of localproperty rights rules (Centonze, 2003). Similarcultural value is assigned to local Chiapas(Southeast Mexico) sheep breeds by Tzotzilindigenous shepherdesses, and this impactsupon ownership duties and property rights,and precludes the consumption of sheep meat.

In subsistence systems choices related to herdcomposition (species, breeds, age, and sex cate-gories of livestock) may be driven by the pur-pose of efficient production, which can includeminimizing risk. The following section givesexamples from India of how different speciesand breeds of animals assume different valuesin a flock/herd composition.

(a) Option value for species and breeddiversity in India

Research with the Raika ethnic group inRajasthan, North West India, has shown that,at the local level, the option value of a breedor of a species is a kind of insurance valueagainst the occurrence of, for example, a newdisease or drought (Centonze, 2003). Raikaare specialist sheep breeders. However, theirflocks often include proportions of goats (lessthan a third). Over the last few years the shrink-age in land area available to the pastoralists iscausing a shift toward goat production, andaway from sheep, due to the goats’ better forag-ing and browsing ability.

Keeping mixed herds of sheep and goats hasseveral advantages due to the complementarit-ies between the species in the agro-ecosystem,given the ways the Raika manage natural re-sources. While sheep milk is sold every morningat the dairy collection points, goats’ milk isused for household consumption. Goat meatis also preferred by the Raika and is highly val-ued for religious and ceremonial purposes.Goat meat achieves a higher market price thansheep meat and sales are an important sourceof Raika household income, especially duringthe dry season.

Furthermore, with respect to species com-plementarities in the herd, goats can serve aswet nurses for lambs whose mothers havedied. Goats are able to lead the herd helpingto control the sheep. Goats are very welladapted to the ecosystem, they are more resis-tant to diseases than sheep and during the dryseason they can browse trees and bushes. Onthe other hand, sheep have the advantage ofproducing wool, in addition to milk and meat,they are shorn up to three times per year, andsheep dung is considered of better quality thangoats’.

Geerlings (2001) recorded quantitative infor-mation about breed diversity in the Raika com-munity. Breed diversity in the herd does notdepend on herd size. Small herds were observedwith more than five different breeds, while somelarge herds had only one or two breeds and viceversa. Of all the breeds, the so-called Boti breedwas highest both in absolute number per flockand in numbers of owning households. TheBoti breed was present in 72% of flocks, whilethe so-called Bhagli sheep breed was presentin 42% of flocks.

Boti is also called ‘‘desi’’ which means localand according to the FAO classification it cor-responds to the Marwari breed (FAO, 2000).The Boti breed is better able than other sheepto survive deficiencies in fodder and wateravailability, although it is relatively less pro-ductive than other breeds under good condi-tions. Government incentives to introduceother breeds to increase production have ledto a decline in the proportion of Boti sheep.However, when a bad year is expected (mon-soon failure), people still prefer to breed orcross breed their females with Boti rams. Onthe other hand, in better years people preferbreeding with Bhagli or other more productivebreeds. This way of utilizing animal diversityindicates the local people’s perception ofAnGR option value.

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4. LOSS OF ANIMAL GENETICRESOURCES FROM A PROPERTY

RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

Given the values of AnGR to local peopleand society, why is this differential loss of adap-tive AnGR happening? Meinzen-Dick andPradhan (2002) state that missing or poorly de-fined property regimes can cause inefficienciesin markets through the production of external-ities. Pearce and Moran (1994) cite market fail-ures as one of the main causes of (agricultural)biodiversity loss. When the activity of geneticresource conservation generates economic val-ues that are not captured in the market place,the result of this ‘‘failure’’ is a distortion wherethe incentives are against genetic resources con-servation and are in favor of the economicactivities that erode such resources. Such out-comes are associated with market, intervention,and/or global appropriation failures.

To further explore the differential loss of live-stock genetic diversity, an understanding ofAnGR as property resources and the rights re-gimes under which these resources are owned isrequired.

Property is defined by Bromley (1991, p. 2) asa ‘‘benefit stream’’ that the state will agree toprotect through the assignment of duty to oth-ers who may cover or somehow interfere withthe benefit stream. Property rights convey theright to benefit or prejudice oneself or another(Demsetz, 1967) and they affect the formationof peoples’ expectations of each other. Expecta-tions are expressed in the laws, customs andmores of a society. Property rights influencethe way a resource is invested, managed, ex-changed within and between societies. Eachmarket transaction represents an exchange oftwo bundles of property rights. According toDemsetz (1967), the value of the rights deter-mines the value of what is exchanged. On theother hand, the value of the resource exchangeddetermines which kind of rights is applied to it(Bromley, 1991; Bromley & Cernea, 1989). Thisis because transaction and administrative costsincrease as soon as the property regimes be-come stricter. These two views look at propertyrights institutions, respectively, as cause or ef-fects of changes in the appreciation and man-agement of resources.

Thus the institutional environment and thetechnological level are crucial to the manage-ment of available resources. In particular, ini-tiatives for conservation and sustainable useof AnGR depend on the values and the func-

tions that are attributed to the resourceitself. Any change in property rights requiresre-adjustment of other components of thesocio-economic system. A series of dialecticalprocesses start, dynamic equilibrium positionsare gained and abandoned (Wang, 2001). Thesemechanisms produce new costs and benefits todifferent agents. How the externalities producedare redistributed among the stakeholders willdepend on the nature of the rules, of the re-sources, and of the community. The system willadjust through changes in values, mores, laws,and technologies (Norgaard, 1994). The per-ception of a resource’s value, as well as theinterest in exerting property rights over it, isdependent on the knowledge about the resourceitself. As soon as new knowledge arises abouta specific resource, new property rights mayemerge due to interacting agents desiring tore-arrange cost–benefit options (Bromley,1991). For example, the interest that differentstakeholders have to exercise property rightsover a certain breed or eco-type of livestockchanges as the value of the breed’s unique ge-netic material is understood and recognized.

Biotechnology has shifted the public atten-tion on previously neglected resources byrevealing genetic properties and informationrelevant at a technological level (Dutfield,2000). Often the properties at issue are notignored by indigenous population, but simplyknown under a different code.

AnGR provide public and private goods andservices. Their values are derived from the pri-vate functions for the household plus the func-tions of public interest (Drucker et al., 2001).Disparities arise in the appreciation of valuein part due to the different technological toolsused to access to the resource: paradoxicallythe global society (macrolevel) explores themicrostructure (genotype—alleles, nucleotides,etc.), while households or local communitieshave been interested in macro structure (pheno-type—adaptive traits, productive performance,appearance, etc.).

However, these differences in ways of appre-ciating value do not necessarily imply anincompatibility of objectives. On the contrary,it includes the potential for combined actionsor partnerships for in situ and ex situ genetic re-sources management. At the local level, AnGRare part of the assets portfolio of a household,and, depending on the entire portfolio options,AnGR are more or less crucial in the livelihoodstrategies toward a sustainable well being (Dor-ward, 2005). At the global level where, given

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES 1533

that the entire portfolio of AnGR endowmentsis decreasing and many unknowns exist interms of requirements for AnGR, it has becomecrucial to maintain diversity at, at least, itspresent status (The Crucible II Group, 2002).

To establish sustainable AnGR managementregimes capable of making contributions toimproving the livelihoods of poor livestockkeepers’, greater understanding is required of:

The ways local communities organize own-ership, access, and management of AnGR;The enabling environment required for localpeople to best maintain and enhance AnGR.

Once (a) and (b) are better understood, sus-tainable AnGR management regimes shouldprovide the means whereby local, national,and international property rights systems areintegrated to provide security of assets for thepoor and processes of benefit sharing fromthe maintenance and realization of the optionvalues of AnGR managed by the poor.

5. LOCAL RULES AND INSTITUTIONSFOR ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES:

EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

The importance of local norms for natural re-sources management (creating sui generis regu-lations) depends upon ‘‘four main uncertaintyvariables: ecological uncertainties, livelihooduncertainties, social and political uncertainties,and knowledge uncertainties’’ (Meinzen-Dick& Pradhan, 2002, p. 8). Solving uncertaintiesand acquiring more knowledge about the con-text allows greater control reducing one’s vul-nerability. Local norms and customs increasein number and peculiarity through collective at-tempts to reduce uncertainties. A closely wovennet of social interdependencies creates recipro-cal insurance against external variables.

Local institutions define the rules of access tocomplementary goods and services for livestockproduction, such as land and water, thus shap-ing the productive patterns in a village commu-nity. Consequently, depending on the socialarrangements for animals, land, water owner-ship, and access rights, contributions that live-stock provide to different livelihoods vary.

Systems of AnGR ownership can be de-scribed and analyzed according to the Institu-tional Analysis and Development framework 6

(Ostrom, 1985). A synthesis of the rules in forcefor animal ownership in the Raika pastoralistcommunity in Rajasthan, North West India,is summarized in Table 1.

Property rights for natural resources are dy-namic and divided into sub-rights, accordingto agents’ position in a community (Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 2002). Ostrom and colleaguesdistinguish between ownership and use rights(Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Owner-ship of resources brings related duties, andprivilege of access carries related responsibili-ties (Bromley, 1991). In the case study consid-ered, AnGR are subject to different rights andmores from which the idea of property can bedisaggregated in different ways. Firstly, theright to make decisions related to the selectionof animals, which may involve purchase, loan,exchange, etc., at the moment of breeding. Sec-ondly, the right to make and implement hus-bandry decisions central to the rearing of theanimal. Thirdly, the right to prescribe slaughter(that may be reserved to God only and if someans the duty/responsibility for avoidingand preventing any harm to the animal is leftto the human owner).

The way AnGR are managed in low externalinput systems is also dependent upon the prop-erty rights of the livestock owners over the re-sources required in the rearing process. InRajasthan, North West India, property rightsfor animals and land include common landresources—holy land (oran) and grazing land(gochar); private land resources—agriculturalland; common livestock resources—village bulland village male-buffaloes (their shelters arealso common property); and private livestockresources—cows and female-buffaloes, smallruminants, and other livestock.

Land suitable for cropping is owned by Raj-put (a higher caste) people, who normally culti-vate it once or twice a year. Livestock keepershave access to the land during post-harvestand fallow periods. Thus, although a hierarchi-cal disparity between rights exists, a kind ofmultiple tenure, as defined by Bromley andSjiaastad (2000, p. 13), applies also to privateland.

When local pastures, either private land orcommon areas, are not sufficient for the num-ber of animals of a given area, livestock keepersmigrate toward Madhya Pradesh or Uttar Pra-desh forests; depending on the water availabil-ity they may or may not decide to come backto the village during the rainy season. Since1974, 7 access to common land (gochar) hasbeen threatened through the establishment ofnursery areas by the Forest Department. Envi-ronmental legislation, combined with corruptmechanisms in the forest department, burdens

Table 1. Property rights rules for Animal Genetic Resources of the Raika pastoralists in Rajasthan, North West India

Property right rules Example from Raika AnGR management systems in Rajasthan

Boundary rules Sale of female animals out of the Raika caste prohibited. The rule filtersaccess and avoids outward flows. Although declared as religious, thisnorm has political and economic aspects. Members of othercommunities are prevented from starting the activity of animalbreeding, thus not exceeding the use of common property resources(‘‘gochar,’’ ‘‘oran’’). Females are maintained inside the flock asrenewable production resources preventing the financial collapse inemergency situations

Access rules Being able to gain access to breeding male animals depends oncommunity boundaries and personal relationships

Position rules The owner livestock may dedicate the animal to God, and define whohas access to the animal (borrowing). The owner has to ensure goodcondition to the ‘‘saand’’ till natural death

Scope rules Female small ruminants, holy males, and any cattle cannot beslaughtered. Furthermore, no money can be gained from the ‘‘saand’’through the exploitation providing breeding services

Aggregation and payoff rules Collective access and use of genetic resources requires the livestockbreeders to contribute to feeding (ghee, oils, sweets, and fodder)Each herder, depending on his access to labor and capital, will adjustthe number of animals grazed in the ‘‘gochar’’Periods of resource appropriation with respect to small and largeruminants accessing common land. Small ruminants, more destructiveof the available fodder, are allowed in only after the larger onesCommunal mechanisms of solidarity toward herders in need‘‘Common bull’’ and ‘‘buffalo bull’’ purchased by all the villagersfor their religious valueThe activity of grazing is also organized in common for all the villagecattle and buffaloes. This institution is called ‘‘four legs’’ and it worksduring the rainy season when the animals need to be kept out of theagricultural fields. It relies on a ‘‘village herder’’ paid by all cowand buffalo owners‘‘Gowsala’’ a collective shelter where non-productive and productivecattle are brought at an inter-village level during drought

Authority and information rules Selection mechanisms of AnGR vary across species. For smallruminants the choice is personal and may benefit from informal advice.However, the purchase of a bull is a village matter and the bestknowledge available in the community is identified and utilized

Source: The authors’ own elaboration according to the clusters of rules indicated in Ostrom (1985).

1534 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

the pastoralists’ production system. Conse-quently, the pressure from pastoralists on farm-ers is becoming greater due to the drasticdecreases in fodder sources (Agrawal, 1992).

Animals grazing on common land not onlygrow and produce milk and wool, but theyalso transfer nutrients from the grazing areato where they are kept at night and dungcan be collected for private use. Such trans-fers also involve changes from low to highquality and value, and public to private re-sources. At the village level, livestock keepers

have the duty to provide the landowners allthe dung collected in the corrals. Landownershave the right of first access over the villagedung.

However, the dependence of farmers on pas-toralists has declined due to the formers’ great-er use of chemical fertilizers. Moreover, theintensification of cropping systems reduces thefallow periods and thus the access to the land(Agrawal, 1992).

Environmental policies aimed apparently atnatural resource conservation as well as the fad-

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES 1535

ing reciprocity between farmers and livestockkeepers are challenging the sustainability ofAnGR management in such a marginal environ-ment.

(a) Common and private livestock management

Property rights for breeding animals varyby location and by animal type. It is oftenthe case that breeding males are either man-aged as a common resource or are managedby individuals, but access is allowed subjectto local property rights rules. Females are of-ten under private ownership. Where grazingof common land resources can be organized,animals owned by different individuals aremanaged (and bred) as a single group.

The village bull ‘‘godha,’’ and the village buf-falo bull ‘‘padha,’’ are traditional institutions inRajasthan. These animals are common propertyof all villagers and are not dependent on theirownership of cows. All the villagers contributeto the purchasing of bulls. Good bulls are nor-mally too expensive to be purchased by a singlefamily, especially those of preferred breeds. Allvillagers desire to have access to a good breedboth for production and because good animalsgive status to the villagers. The right of use ofthese males for breeding is unconditional for allthe villagers. Everybody contributes to feedand health care as necessary. This practice is stillintact due to the holiness of the bulls. Access formating is allowed to outsiders who pay in kind orin money for fodder or sweets for the bull. Thepayment may not be required if the person ispoor.

In contrast all the female cattle, buffalo, andsmall ruminants are private goods. The mecha-nisms of sharing ram or buck goats are condi-tioned by personal relationships. Costs forthese animals are borne by the owners (pur-chase, feeding, and health care). Benefits areshared among owners and users (the reproduc-tive resource is lent to other herders). Respon-sibilities for the maintenance of the resourceare assigned to each user who temporarily con-tributes to feeding expenses.

An example of a private AnGR managed insuch a way that provides benefit to the widercommunity is the amar. In the Godwar area,an amar is normally the best male in the herdand it is used for reproductive purposes. Anyamar is devoted to Shiva and cannot be sold,nor slaughtered. Having an ‘‘amar’’ sheep con-tributes to the social status of Raika. Thus, the

owner keeps an amar until its natural death asreligious norms prevent its slaughter.

Normally, the Raika control inbreeding byselling males after two or three years. Amarsare often lent for free for a period of two to threeyears to other Raika, then returned to the origi-nal owner. The borrower has the privilege to usethe amar and is responsible for its health. 8

(b) Collective management of private livestock

The chopa system is a form of collective ac-tion to manage private and common resources.The chopa (four legs) entails gathering all cattleand buffaloes in the village, private and com-mon ones, in the accria (village main square)and then taking them for grazing. In the lateafternoon all livestock is brought back to theaccria. The chopa is normally managed by agwal or gori (village herder) who is the personin charge of taking the animals to the nearbypastures and looking after them during theday until evening. The seasonality of activityfor the chopa system goes in parallel to the agri-cultural cycle. 9 Every village needs a gwal for3–10 months per year depending on rain and/or irrigation availability. The gwal belongs nor-mally to the Raika community. Raikas aredefined as ‘‘the best herders’’ due to theirknowledge of animal health care. The gwal ispaid by the cow and buffalo owners in kindor money. The price for the buffaloes is nor-mally higher due to the relative difficulty inherding them. 10 The responsibility of findinga gwal is that of the village’s Raika people.They have to find somebody to take care ofthe livestock. If the payment is low due to asmall village herd, the Raika normally establisha rotation of herding duty.

Another kind of collective agreement forAnGR management is the collective shelter,called gowsala, where non-productive cattleand productive ones are brought at an inter-vil-lage level, especially in emergency situations(Rathore & Kohler-Rollefson, 2001). The gow-sala are open also to other holy animals suchas rams and bucks (amar). This activity is orga-nized by Jainists (religious group) and the main-tenance of the animals is financially supportedby the government.

(c) Collective action and property rightsframework

Olson (1965, p. 2) stated that ‘‘[. . .] unless thenumber of individuals is quite small, or unless

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there is coercion or some other special device tomake individuals act in their common interest,rational, self-interested individuals will not actto achieve their common or group interest.’’On the other hand, Ostrom (1990) points outin her research that in situations where resourceusers come into regular contact and are able tocommunicate, negotiate, observe, and learn topredict the actions of others, co-operation, in-stead of free riding, may be possible. Wade(1988) makes a similar point. Such conditionscan be found where resources have few userswho have the opportunity to develop trust aswell as to monitor each other’s behavior.

In order to verify Ostrom’s hypothesis aboutself-governing strategies of co-operation inmanagement strategies for sustainable use ofAnGR, we differentiate management activitiesby two dimensions: their time frames and spa-tial scales, borrowing an adaptation of the Col-lective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi—CGIAR Systemwide Program of Collative Ac-tion and Property Rights) conceptual frame-work (Knox, Meinzen-Dick, & Hazell, 2001,

Low Tenure Sec

Migration

Gowsala

Chopa and

Low

Spat

ial s

cale

Hig

h

Access to

agricultural land for

grazing

Gochar and Oran

Low Temporal scale

Figure 1. Animal Genetic Resources management by the

framework. Source: Authors’ own elaboration adap

see Figure 1) and applying it to the pastoral sys-tem of Raika. This conceptual frame allows usto highlight the influence of the degree of secu-rity of access to land, either common or private,over the activities chosen by livestock keepersto manage AnGR more or less collectively.Specifically, we have considered that all theinstitutions described represent a ‘‘collective ac-tion’’ since they are norms, created and agreedby all the local stakeholders. All of them assurea certain degree of security of access to thedifferent resources (land, fodder, AnGR).Furthermore, shared property rights to AnGRindirectly affect the maintenance of access rightto common pastures.

Some institutions refer to the village level(gochar, oran, godha, and padha), others ex-tend to an inter-village area (migration); somerefer to the Raika community (amar ex-change), others involve the local communityas a whole (gowsala). With respect to time,some activities are seasonal, others annual,others an investment of more than one year.The different practices described above are

urity High

Amar exchange

Gwal Godha and Padha

High

Collective A

ctionL

ow

High

Raika of Rajasthan through the prism of the CAPRi

ted from the framework by Knox et al. (2001).

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES 1537

plotted in Figure 1 (according to their spatialand temporal characteristics). The practice ofamar exchange is carried out over the longterm (exchanged for two, three years and giv-ing progeny), and requires a high degree ofspatial co-ordination that involves the Raikacommunity and reaches beyond the villagelevel. By contrast, the village bull and buffalomale (godha and padha) institutions interestthe single village, yet investment is continuousand long term. The gwal (cow herder) is nor-mally recruited at a village level although insome cases two villages can join herds andthus collective action needs to extend over vil-lage boundaries. The gwal activity for thechopa system is seasonal.

The opportunity to send animals to thecommon shelter (gowsala) is utilized at aninter-village level and possibly involves allcastes. The recourse to gowsala is seasonalbut may increase with the level of insecurityof access to land, water, and fodder sourcesthat may compromise the livestock keepingactivity.

Migration involves a large spatial scale anda seasonal time scale. It is the extreme solu-tion for a Raika family or group of familieswhen a severe resource scarcity occurs atthe local level. This happens either due tolack of access rights to private or commonland at the village level. Since Raikas donot own land it may happen either that land-owners practice intensive agriculture andforbid access to land not having fallow peri-ods, or environmental legislation is veryrestrictive even over village resources such asoran and gochar setting plant nursery forsome species conservation. Another limitingfactor can be climatic determinants such asextreme drought. Migration may include co-ordination between migrants and sedentarypeople along the migration route, althoughincidents and forms of intolerance are notrare. Above all, migration requires a good le-vel of security of access to some forest landwhich is the main source of fodder. A lackof such certainty would force livestock keep-ers to abandon the activity.

The CAPRi framework allows an initialassessment of the needs for and possibleeffects of different policy interventions thatinfluence access to resources and socialrelations, and may be used to identify fac-tors necessary to facilitate a more sustain-able management of AnGR at the locallevel.

(d) Dynamic and dialectical aspects of collectiveaction and property rights for Animal Genetic

Resources

Local property rights for AnGR are dynamicand dialectical. The dynamism refers to thetemporal dimension of changes and adapta-tions; the dialectic includes interrelationsamong coexistent antithetic institutions andstakeholders. In Rajasthan, AnGR are con-ceived as private goods but are also includedin situations of ‘‘multiple tenure.’’

Rights of use of land and multiple tenure sys-tems are crucial. Pastoralists will not continuetheir traditional livestock keeping activitieswhen the mechanisms for land access and ten-ure security are fading, leading to a foreshort-ening of fallow periods of cultivated land, lessaccess to forest, and less access to commons(Agrawal, 1999). Indeed, as already pointedout, agricultural intensification as well as envi-ronmental degradation and legislation are caus-ing greater and greater difficulties for theactivities of pastoralists as either sedentary ormigratory groups.

In Rajasthan it has been observed that, withrespect to the status of AnGR, economic fac-tors are prevailing over socio-cultural ones.The common bull (godha) has always had animportant role in the community. However, asthe economic returns from buffalo bull-keepinghave increased, private ownership of buffalobulls has become widespread, representing agood business for some farmers. The paymentis 100 rupees per successful mating and theactivity lacks of any religious significance.

The amar used to be exchanged within theRaika community. Although still valid, thisrule is sometimes broken and the amar are lentto non-Raika in return for monetary compen-sation.

6. PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES FORA PRO-POOR MANAGEMENT OFANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES

Research on genetic erosion of AnGR in dif-ferent continents has shown that social margin-alization and poverty reduce access to resourcesimportant to the sustainable management ofAnGR (Anderson, 2004). Poor householdsoften take decisions that reduce AnGR diver-sity based on short-term livelihood priorities,rather than emphasizing longer-term aspectsof AnGR access and improvement strategies.

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This will continue to be the case until incentivesare provided, or benefits accrue, to those in-volved in activities that conserve AnGR. Thereare important genetic and socio-economicreasons why AnGR should be conserved‘‘in situ.’’ Firstly, adaptive traits are best main-tained through processes of natural selectionbrought about by exposing AnGR to changesin local environments. Second, a greater set ofbenefits should accrue to those directly in-volved in the conservation activities.

In situ conservation can be distinguished intoat least two different approaches. Externalstakeholders such as national governmentagencies interested in conservation, environ-mental NGOs, private organizations like in-dustry, scientific and commercial enterprisesmaintain an approach to conservation of genet-ic resources that may be termed resource-cen-tered, while local stakeholders like livestockkeepers, farmers, or their associations aimingat a more immediate utilization of genetic re-sources put their own livelihoods first, throughan approach that may be termed ‘‘people-cen-tered.’’

Only where investment in social organizationby and within marginalized livestock keepergroups can provide benefits in terms of moresustainable AnGR management and geneticimprovement, equitable access to the resourcesand livelihood improvements, in situ conserva-tion activities can emerge and be recommendedas sustainable solutions.

The following two examples from Mexicohighlight the possibilities. Investment in the hu-man and social capital in Mayan communities,in Southeast Mexico, led to the re-valuation ofplants (local legume varieties) and AnGR (alocal pig breed). While the processes that tar-geted plant and animal genetic resources wereenabled by outsiders, the aspects of social orga-nization favored the conservation of the localpig breed and a more non-exclusive sharing ofbenefits. Firstly, a non-cash transfer systemwas customary for the payment of mating ser-vice whereby the owner of the boar takes oneof the resulting litter. Thus, only successfulmating was paid for and even owners withoutmoney could afford to mate their animals. Sec-ondly, pigs and pig products were tradedlocally following a traditional system of equita-ble allocation of sale days across households.This meant that competition for sales opportu-nities between pig keepers was minimized.Thirdly, most pig keepers were women and theydemonstrated more willingness to share ideas

of improved pig keeping, than the men involvedin crop innovations who tended to covetinformation. Interestingly, in many cases thewomen and men were from the same house-holds (Anderson, Clark, Keane, Mogel Pliego,& Trejo Diaz, 2002).

The success of one of the few cases of genuineparticipatory AnGR improvement is due, atleast in part, to the recognition and respectof local property rights. In Chiapas, Mexico,ethno-veterinarians have enlisted the expertiseof Tzotzil shepherdesses in a genetic improve-ment program of three local sheep breeds runby a university (Perezgrovas, 2001). The rightsof the Tzotzil people over the local sheep breedshave been maintained in the following way: thenucleus flock was founded from the local pop-ulation and is managed in respect of localcustoms; representatives of the Tzotzil shep-herdesses make all the breeding and cullingdecisions; Tzotzil communities get first choiceof the progeny of the nucleus flock.

Demonstrable genetic gain has been achievedin the traits prioritized by the local people anda high demand for rams produced by theprogram is evident from Tzotzil communities(Perezgrovas, 2001).

7. FINAL REMARKS

Poor people’s reliance on AnGR confersupon these resources a value of endowment asthey enable wider choices of livelihood activi-ties. The option values of adaptive AnGR ste-warded by the poor are also significant forsociety. In part, the option values are main-tained through traditional husbandry in mar-ginal and often harsh environments. This is aservice poor livestock keepers provide to thesociety.

Collective action for the management ofAnGR by the poor is only possible where thegenetic resource is central to livelihoods in cul-tural and/or socio-economic terms. The waysuch collective action is organized (in terms ofequity of access, exclusivity of benefit distribu-tion, etc.) depends not only on the characteris-tics of the local AnGR ownership rights, butalso on the access to rights over the commonproperty resources required for animal produc-tion. Property rights rules in use for thoseresources complementary to livestock produc-tion are often complex and reciprocal, amongdifferent stakeholders. Customary practices ofanimal husbandry central to the management

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES 1539

of AnGR are at risk and in some cases arebreaking down in the face of external factorsthat are also marginalizing livestock keepers.

Processes for the maintenance of local insti-tutions of AnGR management are requiredthat allow the development of markets andthe provision of incentives for the conservationof the option values of AnGR managed by thepoor. Local property right systems need to betaken into account and respected (wherepossible through integration) in the develop-ment of national legislation for AnGR manage-ment.

Sustainable AnGR management regimesshould provide the means whereby local,national, and international property rightssystems are integrated to provide security ofassets for the poor and processes of benefitsharing from the maintenance and realizationof the option values of AnGR managed bythe poor. A process of negotiation over AnGRproperty rights is required between the sets ofactors currently involved in managing AnGRof likely high option value (often poor livestockkeepers) and those investing in the biotechnol-ogy necessary to exploit those option values.

NOTES

1. Address: Department for International Develop-ment, AH 1 Abercrombie House, Eaglesham Road,East Kilbride, Glasgow G75 5EA, UK.

2. A review on the different components of totaleconomic value for AnGR is provided by Drucker,Gomez, and Anderson (2001).

3. This consideration finds its basis in Sen (1987).

4. See the definition of option value in Pearce andMoran (1994).

5. Henson (1992) provides thresholds for judging therelative status of vulnerability to extinction of animalpopulations.

6. Formulating elements of institutional analysis areBoundary rules set the entry, exit, and domain conditionsfor individual participants.Position rules establish positions, specify procedures bywhich participants are assigned into positions, anddefine who has control over tenure in a position.Scope rules specify which outcomes can be affected andset the range within which these can be affected.Authority rules prescribe which positions are authorizedto take which sets of actions and how a series of actionsare ordered, processed, and terminated.

Information rules affect the information individuals haveabout the structure of the situation by establishinginformation channels, stating the conditions when theyare to be open or closed, creating an official language,and prescribing how evidence is to be processed.Aggregation rules affect control by prescribing theformulae for weighting individual choices and calculat-ing collective choices at different points in a process.Payoff rules prescribe how benefits and costs are to bedistributed to participants in positions given theiractions and those of others.

7. Cfr. Government of India (1974).

8. For an exhaustive analysis of the situation, seeRobbins (2000).

9. Rainy season: time for cropping so that the land isoccupied by crops—animals excluded. The chopa systemstarts in order to organize the animals to graze oncommon areas instead of grazing on the fields. Winter:land may or may not be cropped depending on theabundance of water received during the monsoon.Summer: no chopa because the land is left fallow dueto water scarcity. Use of private land for grazing.

10. The gwal is paid 3 kg of wheat per month perbuffalo and 2 kg per cow.

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