Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk
D. Kanheman and A. Tversky
Riccardo Bianchi Vimercati Andrea Mattia Zamuner
IGIER Visiting Student Presentation
May 13, 2014
Outline
1 Introduction
2 CritiqueCertainty, Probability and PossibilityThe Reflection EffectThe Isolation Effect
3 The TheoryThe Value FunctionThe Weighting Function
4 Discussion
5 Main Problems
6 Conclusions
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Introduction
This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptivemodel of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model,called prospect theory
Published by Econometrica in 1979, it is one of the most cited papers insocial sciences
In 2002, Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Prize for having integratedinsights from psychological research into economic science, especiallyconcerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty.Amos Tversky died in 1996 and hence he could not be awarded
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Expected Utility Theories
In 1657, Christiaan Huygens states that the fair price to pay toparticipate in a game involving risk is equal to the expectedmonetary value of the game
In the early 1710s, Nicholas Bernoulli presents the so-calledSt. Petersburg paradox, a lottery with an infinite expected valuethat seems to be worth only a very small amount to any sensible man
In 1738, his cousin Daniel Bernoulli resolves the paradox proposing anew assumption: individuals evaluate risks taking into account theexpected utility of the prospect
He noticed that most people are risk averse and if they can choosebetween a gamble and an amount equal to its expected value theywill pick the sure thing
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Expected Utility Theories
In their seminal work Theory of games (1944) von Neumann andMorgenstern give an axiomatic foundation to Bernoulli’s hypothesis
Preferences over lotteries are binary relations with the following features
completeness
transitivity
continuity or archimedean property
independence
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Expected Utility Theories
Von Neumann and Morgenstern also proved the following theorem:
Theorem
A preference relation � over lotteries satisfies the four axioms if and onlyif there exists a function u over the lottery outcomes such that:Lottery A � Lottery B if and only if∑
A
u(xi )pi >∑B
u(xi )pi
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Expected Utility Theories
Four years later, in a fundamental article, Milton Friedman and LeonardJimmie Savage introduced
the well-known graphical representation of the utility function
its interpretation in terms of attitudes towards risk
its as-if interpretation
Nowadays expected utility theory is the foundation of rational-agent modeland is one of the most important theories in social sciences
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Critique
Expected Utility Theory
normative: prescribes how decisions should be made
descriptive: describes how Econs (rational and selfish individualswith stable tastes) make choice
Prospect Theory
purely descriptive: describes how Humans make choice
the paper presents several classes of decision problems in whichpreferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theoryand an alternative model of decision making under risk
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Framework
Decision making under risk can be viewed as a choice betweenprospects or gambles
A prospect (x1; p1; ...; xn, pn) is a contract that yields outcome xiwith probability pi , where p1 + p2 + ...+ pn = 1. Kahneman andTversky’s prospects correspond to von Neumann and Morgenstern’slotteries
The analysis is restricted to prospects with objective probabilities
The demonstrations are based on the responses of students anduniversity faculty to hypothetical choice problems
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Certainty, Probability and Possibility
The following series of choice problems induces preferences that violate amain tenet of expected utility theory
Consider the following pair of choice problems:
PROBLEM 1: Choose between
(2500, 0.33; 2400, 0.66; 0, 0.01)
[18]
(2400)
[82]∗
PROBLEM 2: Choose between
(2500, 0.33)
[83]∗
(2400, 0.34)
[17]
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Certainty, Probability and Possibility
Here we have a simpler demonstration of the same phenomenon
PROBLEM 3: Choose between
(4000, 0.80)
[20]
(3000)
[80]∗
PROBLEM 4: Choose between
(4000, 0.20)
[65]∗
(3000, 0.25)
[35]
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Certainty, Probability and Possibility
It is easy to verify that this pattern of preferences does not obey theindependence axiom
The French economist Maurice Allais was the first one to propose thisparadox in 1953
Certainty Effect
Overweighting of outcomes that are considered certain, relative tooutcomes which are merely probable
This effect undermines the validity of the independence axiom for choiceof risks bordering on certainty
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Certainty, Probability and Possibility
The following problems present a situation in which the independenceaxiom fails, but not because of the certainty effect:
PROBLEM 7: Choose between
(6000, 0.45)
[14]
(3000, 0.90)
[86]∗
PROBLEM 8: Choose between
(6000, 0.001)
[73]∗
(3000, 0.002)
[27]
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Certainty, Probability and Possibility
The results suggest the following empirical generalization concerning themanner in which the independence axiom is violated:
if (y , pq) is equivalent to (x , p), then (y , pqr) is preferred to (x , pr),0 < p, q, r < 1
This property is incorporated in the new theory proposed by the authors inthe second part of the paper
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The Reflection Effect
What happens when we move from the domain of gains to the domain oflosses? Look at the following table:
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The Reflection Effect
We may notice a peculiar pattern of preferences: in each case, thepreference between negative prospects is the mirror image of thepreference between positive prospects
Reflection Effect
Reversal of the preference order caused by the reflection of prospectsaround 0
This phenomenon had been noted early by Markowitz (1952) and Williams(1966)
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The Reflection Effect
Implications of the reflection effect:
also the preferences between negative prospects are inconsistent withexpected utility theory
risk aversion in the positive domain is accompanied by risk seekingin the negative domain
aversion for uncertainty or variability, proposed by Allais, iseliminated as an explanation of the certainty effect
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The Isolation Effect
PROBLEM 10: Consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage,there is a probability of 0.75 to end the game without winning anything,and a probability of 0.25 to move into the second stage. If you reach thesecond stage you have a choice between:
(4000, 0.80) (3000)
Your choice must be made before the game starts
Now recall Problem 4:
Choose between
(4000, 0.20) (3000, 0.25)
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The Isolation Effect
You may notice that in terms of final outcomes and probabilities, thisis equivalent to PROBLEM 4
However, the dominant preferences are opposite in the two problems:78 per cent of subjects chose the latter prospects
It seems that people ignored the first stage of the game, whoseoutcomes are shared by both prospects. In this case, PROBLEM 10resembles PROBLEM 3, as confirmed by preferences
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The Isolation Effect
We can see two different representations of the problem, that may inducea change of preferences:
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The Isolation Effect
In the previous case, preferences are altered by different representationsof probabilities. We now show how choices may be altered by varyingthe representation of outcomes
Consider the following problems:
PROBLEM 11: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given1,000. Choose between
(1000, 0.50)
[16]
(500)
[84]∗
PROBLEM 12: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given2,000.Choose between
(−1000, 0.50)
[69]∗
(−500)
[31]
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The Isolation Effect
You may note that when viewed in terms of final states, the two choiceproblems are identical.They ask to choose between:
(2000, 0.50; 1000, 0.50) (1500)
Evidently, the initial bonus does not enter into the comparison ofprospects beacause it was common to both options in each problem
This represents another violation of the theory, according to which thedomain of utility function is final states. This demonstration implies thatthe carriers of value are in fact changes in wealth
Isolation Effect
Disregard of components shared by two different alternatives and focus onthe components that distinguish them. Since a pair of prospects can bedecomposed in several ways, this effect may bring about inconsistentpreferences
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The Editing Phase
Two phases of the choice process:
Editing phase: reorganizing outcomes and probabilities
Evaluation phase: choice of the prospect with the highest value
The editing phase can be decomposed in four major operations:
1 Coding: outcomes are perceived as gains and losses
2 Combination: prospects are simplified by combining probabilitiesassociated with identical outcomes
3 Segregation: the sure component of a prospect is segregated fromthe risky component
4 Cancellation: common components of different prospects arediscarded (entire phases or outcome-probability pairs)
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The Evaluation Phase
In the evaluation phase, the DM evaluates prospects of the form(x , p; y , q) and chooses the one with highest value
The overall value V of an edited prospect depends on two scales:
π, that associates to each probability p a decision weight π(p). π isnot a probability measure, since π(p) + π(1− p) < 1
v, that associates to each outcome x the subjective value of theoutcome v(x)
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The Evaluation Phase
If (x , p; y , q) is a regular prospect, i.e. either p + q < 1 or x ≥ 0 ≥ y orx ≤ 0 ≤ y , the basic equation that describes the evaluation of a prospect is
V (x , p; y , q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y) (1)
where v(0) = 0, π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1
If (x , p; y , q) is a strictly positive or negative prospect, i.e. p + q = 1and either x > y > 0 or x < y < 0, the equation becomes
V (x , p; y , q) = v(y) + π(p)[v(x)− v(y)] (2)
Equation (2) reduces to equation (1) if π(p) + π(1− p) = 1, but as wesaid this is not always the case
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The Evaluation Phase
To sum up, prospect theory retains the bilinear form that underliesexpected utility maximization, but
values are assigned to changes rather than to final states
decision weights do not coincide with stated probabilities
In this way prospect theory is able to predict departures from expectedutility maximization that lead to normatively unacceptableconsequences (inconsistencies, intransitivities, violations of dominance...)
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The Value Function
The assumption that the value function is defined over changes inwealth rather than final states is consistent with general principles ofperception and judgement
This does not imply that changes should be evaluated independentlyof the reference point
However, when it comes to relatively small or moderate variations inasset positions, the preference order is not significantly altered by thereference point
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The Value Function
Consider the following prospects
PROBLEM 13:
(6000, 0.25)
[18]
(4000, 0.25; 2000, 0.25)
[82]and
PROBLEM 13’:
(−6000, 0.25)
[70]
(−4000, 0.25;−2000, 0.25)
[30]
As one would expect, the value function is concave in gains and convexin losses, i.e. the marginal value of gains and losses decreases with theirmagnitude
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The Value Function
To see this, note that the above mentioned prospects are regular, soapplying equation (1) yields
π(0.25)v(6000) < π(0.25)[v(4000) + v(2000)]
π(0.25)v(−6000) > π(0.25)[v(−4000) + v(−2000)]
hence,v(6000) < v(4000) + v(2000)
andv(−6000) > v(−4000) + v(−2000)
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The Value Function
Another property of the value function can be derived by the followingfacts
people consider symmetric bets, like (x , 0.50;−x , 0.50), unattractive
the aversiveness to symmetric bets increases with the size of thestake, i.e. if x > y ≥ 0 then
(y , 0.50;−y , 0.50) % (x , 0.50;−x , 0.50)
So again by equation (1) and letting y approach to x it can be derivedthat v ′(x) < v ′(−x), which means that the value function is steeper forlosses than for gains
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The Value Function
In summary, the value function
1 is defined on deviation from the reference point
2 is concave in gains and convex in losses
3 is steeper for losses than for gains
Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) provided evidence that a standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern utility function shows the same properties forchanges of wealth
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The Value Function
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The Weighting Function
In prospect theory, the value of each outcome is multiplied by adecision weight
Decision weights measure the impact of events on the desirability of aprospect, not merely the perceived likelihood of these events
They are inferred from choices of prospects as subjective probabilitiesare inferred from preferences in the Ramsey-Savage approach
In the present theory, the weights are function of stated probabilities
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The Weighting Function
We discuss the properties of the weighting function
1 π is an increasing function of p, with π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1, but isnot well behaved at the endpoints
2 π(p) > p for small p, so small probabilities are generallyoverweighted. A simple example is a lottery tickets that can berepresented by the following prospect
PROBLEM 14:
(5000, 0.001)
[72]
(5)
[28]
so that π(0.001) > v(5)/v(5000) > 0.001 by concavity of v
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The Weighting Function
3 ∀p ∈ (0, 1), π(p) + π(1− p) < 1. This property is labelled assubcertainty and can be derived from the first two prospects we saw,yielding π(0.66) + π(0.34) < 1
4 if (x , p) is equivalent to (y , pq), then (x , pr) is not preferred to(y , pqr), which turns out to be equivalent to
π(pq)
π(p)≤ π(pqr)
π(pr)
This property is called subproportionality: for a fixed ratio ofprobabilities, the corresponding ratio of decision weights is closer tounity when the the probabilities are low than when they are high
5 subproportionality and overweighting of small probabilities givesubadditivity over all the range, i.e. π(rp) > rπ(p)
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The Weighting Function
In summary, the main properties of the weighting funcition are:
1 not well-behaved at endpoints
2 overweighting of small probabilities
3 subcertainty
4 subproportionality
5 subadditivity
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The Weighting Function
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Violation of Independence
Problem 1 and 2 provided a first example of violation of independence:
π(0.33)
π(0.34)>
v(2400)
v(2500)>
π(0.33)
1− π(0.66)
This paradox is explained by prospect theory as a result of subcertaintyof π
Problem 7 and 8 are another example:
π(0.001)
π(0.002)>
v(3000)
v(6000)>π(0.45)
π(0.90)
This paradox is explained by prospect theory as a result ofsubproportionality of π
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Shifts of Reference
The reference point is usually assumed to be the current asset position
Sometimes gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation
More importantly, changes in the reference point alters thepreference order for prospects
As a result, incomplete adaptation to recent losses increases riskseeking in some situation
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Shifts of Reference
Consider a risky prospect (x , p;−y , 1− p) that is just acceptable:
V (x , p;−y , 1− p) = 0 ⇐⇒ π(p)v(x) = −π(1− p)v(−y)
A negative translation of the propspect is (x − z , p;−y − z , 1− p), whichturns out to be preferred over (−z):
V (x − z , p;−y − z , 1− p) =
= π(p)v(x − z) + π(1− p)v(−y − z)
> π(p)[v(x)− v(z)] + π(1− p)[v(−y) + v(−z)]
= −π(1− p)v(−y)− π(p)v(z) + π(1− p)[v(−y) + v(−z)]
= −π(p)v(z) + π(1− p)v(−z)
> v(−z)[π(p) + π(1− p)]
> v(−z)
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Risk Attitudes
Prospect theory allows to predict these risk attitudes:
Gains Losses
High Prob.95 chance of winning 1000 .95 chance of losing 1000
Low Prob.05 chance of winning 1000 .05 chance of losing 1000
where, given the prospect (x , p) and its expected value (px), risk aversionis given by π(p)v(x) < v(px)
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Risk Attitudes
Prospect theory allows to predict these risk attitudes:
Gains Losses
High Prob.95 chance of winning 1000 .95 chance of losing 1000
Low Prob RISK SEEKING RISK AVERSE.05 chance of winning 1000 .05 chance of losing 1000
where, given the prospect (x , p) and its expected value (px), risk aversionis given by π(p)v(x) < v(px)
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Risk Attitudes
Prospect theory allows to predict these risk attitudes:
Gains Losses
High Prob RISK AVERSE RISK SEEKING.95 chance of winning 1000 .95 chance of losing 1000
Low Prob RISK SEEKING RISK AVERSE.05 chance of winning 1000 .05 chance of losing 1000
where, given the prospect (x , p) and its expected value (px), risk aversionis given by π(p)v(x) < v(px)
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Risk Attitudes
Prospect theory allows to predict these risk attitudes:
Gains Losses
High Prob RISK AVERSE RISK SEEKING
.95 chance of winning 1000 .95 chance of losing 1000
Low Prob RISK SEEKING RISK AVERSE.05 chance of winning 1000 .05 chance of losing 1000
where, given the prospect (x , p) and its expected value (px), risk aversionis given by π(p)v(x) < v(px)
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Main Problems
Main problems of prospect theory:
Individuals are real but choices are merely hypothetical
It has no clear axiomatic foundation. That is, Kahneman andTversky do not describe basic characteristics of preferences that drivethe behavior
This original version gives rise to violations of first-order stochasticdominance. Cumulative prospect theory, proposed in 1992 by theauthors, overcomes this problem
It provides no ex-ante prediction since the realizations of V depend ona non-predictable combination of factors. Ex post it can rationalizealmost any observed decision pattern. Therefore it cannot befalsified
It fails to allow for emotions like regret and disappointment, even ifdecision makers anticipate them when making their choices
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Conclusions
How do we explain the longevity of expected utility theory?
Theory induced blindness: once you have accepted a theory, it isextremely difficult notice its flaws
Why is EUT still taught at the undergraduate level?
– The standard models are relatively easier to understand– They allow a better understanding of the discipline– Failure of rationality is often irrelevant
Why is PT the main alternative?
It yields low cost in terms of complexity and high benefits in termsof explanatory power
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