Date post: | 07-Apr-2018 |
Category: |
Documents |
Upload: | ann-lexyz-manrique |
View: | 216 times |
Download: | 0 times |
of 44
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
1/44
EN BANC
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSandDIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,
REYES,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
andBRION, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:Respondent. July 16, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These consolidated petitions[1]
seek to annul Resolution No.
7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district
of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]
The Facts
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn18/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
2/44
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned
two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first
legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities.[3]
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act,
Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No.
9054 (RA 9054).[4]
Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held
in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM
Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5]
enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201
provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira,Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upiare hereby separated fromthe Province ofMaguindanao and constituted into adistinct and independent province, which is herebycreated, to be known as the Province of ShariffKabunsuan.
x x x x
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of thisprovince shall commence upon the appointment bythe Regional Governor or election of the governorand majority of the regular members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials ofthe Province of Maguindanao shall continue to servetheir unexpired terms in the province that they willchoose or where they are residents: Provided, thatwhere an elective position in both provincesbecomes vacant as a consequence of the creationof the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbentelective provincial officials shall have preference forappointment to a higher elective vacant position andfor the time being be appointed by the RegionalGovernor, and shall hold office until their successors
shall have been elected and qualified in the nextlocal elections; Provided, further, that they shallcontinue to receive the salaries they are receiving atthe time of the approval of this Act until the newreadjustment of salaries in accordance withlaw. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be nodiminution in the number of the members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law,the existing legislative district, which includesCotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6]
were carved out of the original nine
municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total
number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao
were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn38/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
3/44
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans
creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which
adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7]
provides in
pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the CommissionRESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt therecommendation of the Law Departmentthat pending the enactment of the appropriate
law by Congress, to maintain the status quowith Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan inthe First Legislative District ofMaguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the
COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845
stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only
of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902,
subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question as
ShariffKabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14
May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes
cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10]
and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11]
Thus, Sema asserted
that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in
Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs
earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as
the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative
district.[12]Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902,
the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case
and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn78/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
4/44
certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not
quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition
in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of
respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1
June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema
is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007,
Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent
Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative
district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC
could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make
Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion
legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that
Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a
legislative district within a city.[13]
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters
raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the
COMELEC acted ultra viresin issuing Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required
the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a
province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their
compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the
following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14]
stated that
when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA
7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to
the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in
newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG,
apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing
Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema,
contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-
executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly is ipso factoentitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn138/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
5/44
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the
negative on the following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by
an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on
the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact
measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the
apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of
Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every
province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of
Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinceswithout regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and
(d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not
entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in
G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such new province.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007,
the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on
the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16]
On the question of the
constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in
G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of
the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the
Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their
organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA
7160.[17]
However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly
of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution.[18]
Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19
should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from
prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum
criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following
grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those
granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe
standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn158/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
6/44
the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with
respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the
COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4
September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and
Section 6,[20]
Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create
provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section
20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created underSection 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating
a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent
Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted
in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The
COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this
issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was
disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in
the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R.
No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R.
No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC
acted ultra viresin issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the
voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of
Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in
G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG,
maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a
temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the
appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as
representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the
petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn208/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
7/44
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status
quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding
Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities;
(2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void;
and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse
of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.[21]
On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus
will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty.[22]
True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in
the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23]
Nor is there a
law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from
canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of
ShariffKabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however,
do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn218/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
8/44
and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
RespondentDilangalens Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent
Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for
representative of ShariffKabunsuanProvince with Cotabato Citymooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of
MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the
outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the
votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
ShariffKabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in
the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is
no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel
issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not
only the recently concluded elections but also all the other
succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power
of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional
provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional AssemblyCan Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, orbarangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its boundary substantially alteredexcept in accordance with the criteria established inthe local government code and subject to approvalby a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in thepolitical units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units
province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow
the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn248/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
9/44
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,[25]
subject to compliance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local
Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress
made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because
the power to create local government units is not one of the express
legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative
bodies.[27]
In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any
provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in
the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of
250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative
district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than
250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically
becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a
province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the
power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can
Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn258/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
10/44
power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in
past[28]
Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise,
as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congressshall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based onthe standards provided in this section. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress
the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in
the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to
reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts
out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law
that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or
local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn288/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
11/44
House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law
passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29]
we held that the
power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the
power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power
to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a
national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or
in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislativedistricts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can
enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body,
created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest
Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This
is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as
amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction
and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural
resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property
relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planningdevelopment;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism
development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the
cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes
autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn298/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
12/44
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional
Assembly may exercise legislative powerx x x except on the
following matters: x x x (k)National elections. x x x. Since the
ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district
whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever
Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first
representative is always elected in the next national elections from
the effectivity of the law.
[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to
Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the
House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be
incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers
extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district
representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its
occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent
limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional
legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs
territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff
Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to
create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating
a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201provides that:
Except as may be provided by national
law, the existing legislative district, which includes
Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall
remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative
district because the Constitution mandates that each province shall
have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn308/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
13/44
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, oreach
province, shall have at least one representative.
(Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, whichstates:
Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousandshall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member or
such number of Members as it may be entitled to
on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned
to the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred and twenty days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to
one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007
elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes thestatement in Felwathat when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether
Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for
congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was
unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
14/44
apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in
the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House ofRepresentatives shall be composedof not more than one hundred andtwenty Members who shall beapportioned among the severalprovinces as nearly as may beaccording to the number of theirrespective inhabitants, but eachprovince shall have at least oneMember. The Congress shall by law
make an apportionment within threeyears after the return of everyenumeration, and not otherwise.Until such apportionment shall havebeen made, the House ofRepresentatives shall have thesame number of Members as thatfixed by law for the NationalAssembly, who shall be elected bythe qualified electors from thepresent Assembly districts. Eachrepresentative district shall comprise
as far as practicable, contiguousand compact territory.Pursuant to this Section, a representative
district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,through the creation of a province for eachprovince shall have at least one member in theHouse of Representatives; or (b) by directcreation of several representative districts withina province. The requirements concerning theapportionment of representative districts and theterritory thereof refer only to the second method of
creation of representative districts, and do not applyto those incidental to the creation of provinces,under the first method. This is deducible, not onlyfrom the general tenor of the provision abovequoted, but, also, from the fact that theapportionment therein alluded to refers to that whichis made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when aprovince is created by statute, thecorresponding representative district, comesinto existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor byapportionment, but by operation of theConstitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the
time when, territory of, or other conditions under
which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if
the consequence thereof were to exceed the
maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed
in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the
legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact,
provinces have been created or subdivided into
other provinces, with the consequent creation of
additional representative districts, without complying
with the aforementioned
requirements.[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn328/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
15/44
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695
because (1) it validly created legislative districts indirectlythrough
a special law enacted by Congresscreating a province and (2)
the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the
maximum number of legislative districtsprovided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwadoes not apply to the present case because
in Felwathe new provinces were created by a national law enacted
by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by
a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwateaches is that the creation of a legislativedistrict by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power
to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to
create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is
created by operation of the Constitution because the
Constitution provides that each province shall have at least
one representative in the House of Representatives. This does not
detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create
legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely
prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating
provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such
legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In
short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative
district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the
power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a
legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will
leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative
district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it
had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone
as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x
x x, shall have at least one representative.
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition
and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section
19,[33]
Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard
to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum
annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of
2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34]
The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like theARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or moreprovinces and thus increase the membership of a
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn338/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
16/44
superior legislative body, the Houseof Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national lawprovides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in theHouse of Representatives based on onerepresentative for at least every 250,000 residentswill be negated because the ARMM RegionalAssembly need not comply with the requirement inSection 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every provincecreated must have a population of at least 250,000;and
(3) Representatives from the ARMMprovinces can become the majority in the House ofRepresentatives through the ARMM RegionalAssemblys continuous creation of provinces or citieswithin the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the
petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas
position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government
can create legislative district[s] and pack
Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]
Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows
that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM
can create and create x x x provinces x x
x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five
(35) new representatives in the House of
Representatives without Congress agreeing
to it, is that what you are saying? That can
be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual
circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature
can create thirty-five (35) new provinces,
there may be x x x [only] one hundred
thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and
they will each have one representative x x x
to Congress without any national law, is that
what you are saying?
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn358/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
17/44
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your
Honor, that is what we are saying.
x x x x
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand
(1000) new provinces, sen[d] one
thousand (1000) representatives to theHouse of Representatives without a
national law[,] that is legally possible,
correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the
provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37]
nor Congress in
enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous
consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or
reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but
must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional
Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or
reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section
3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province
that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member, refers to a
province created by Congress itself through a national law. Thereason is that the creation of a province increases the actual
membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only
Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th
Congress,
there are 219[38]
district representatives out of the maximum 250
seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members
shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there
should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in
case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves
only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219
incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for
Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the
House, even before Congress can create new provinces.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm#_ftn368/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
18/44
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot
prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies
are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The
Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the
ARMM Government is established within the framework of the
Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution
which mandates that the ARMM shall be created
x x xwithin the
framework of this Constitutionand the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local government
unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative
district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the
creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with
the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of
such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of
legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an
appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of
Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only
Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without a legislative district because theConstitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a
law creating a national office like the office of a district representative
of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act
201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
19/44
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies
with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic
Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the
Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we
declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
20/44
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP Superintendent,Metropolitan Traffic Command, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Branch62, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITYOF PARAAQUE, METRO MANILA, PALANYAG KILUSANGBAYAN FOR SERVICE,respondents.
Ceferino, Padua Law Office for Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for service.
Manuel de Guia for Municipality of Paraaque.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtseeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunctionapplied for by respondents Municipality of Paraaque and PalanyagKilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag for brevity) against petitionerherein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed OrdinanceNo. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel,G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishmentof a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by themunicipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979,authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipalstreets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sitesfor flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms andconditions.
On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approvedOrdinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council of respondentmunicipality subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used forvehicular traffic, and that the majority of theresidents do not oppose the establishment of theflea market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as fleamarket/vending area shall be marked distinctly, andthat the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall beused by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is tobe used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall betemporary and shall be closed once the reclaimedareas are developed and donated by the PublicEstate Authority.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued aresolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enterinto contract with any service cooperative for the establishment,operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/orvending areas.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondentPalanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement wherebythe latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
21/44
aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to thetreasury of the municipal government of Paraaque. Consequently,market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the saidstreets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNPSuperintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered thedestruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. GabrielSt. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondentPalanyag.
On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote aletter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days todiscontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall bedismantled.
Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag
filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibitionand mandamuswith damages and prayer for preliminary injunction,to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to theissuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restrainingorder to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of October16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminaryinjunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding thevalidity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality' of Paraaque
and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing hisletter-order against respondent Palanyag.
Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of theSolicitor General alleging grave abuse of discretion tantamount tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge in issuingthe assailed order.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not anordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque
authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares assites for flea markets is valid.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipalroads are used for public service and are therefore public properties;
that as such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation orprivate contract by any person, even by the respondent Municipalityof Paraaque. Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated topublic use cannot be used for another public purpose and thatabsent a clear showing that the Municipality of Paraaque has beengranted by the legislature specific authority to convert a propertyalready in public use to another public use, respondent municipalityis, therefore, bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for theestablishment of a flea market. Petitioner also submits that assumingthat the respondent municipality is authorized to close streets, itfailed to comply with the conditions set forth by the MetropolitanManila Authority for the approval of the ordinance providing for the
establishment of flea markets on public streets. Lastly, petitionercontends that by allowing the municipal streets to be used by marketvendors the municipal council of respondent municipality violated itsduty under the Local Government Code to promote the generalwelfare of the residents of the municipality.
In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance, the trial courtruled:
. . . that Chanter II Section 10 of the LocalGovernment Code is a statutory grant of powergiven to local government units, the Municipality of
Paraaque as such, is empowered under that law toclose its roads, streets or alley subject to limitationsstated therein (i.e., that it is in accordance withexisting laws and the provisions of this code).
xxx xxx xxx
The actuation of the respondent Brig. Gen. LeviMacasiano, though apparently within its power is infact an encroachment of power legally vested to the
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
22/44
municipality, precisely because when themunicipality enacted the ordinance in question the authority of the respondent as PoliceSuperintendent ceases to be operative on theground that the streets covered by the ordinanceceases to be a public thoroughfare. (pp. 33-34, Rollo)
We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of whetherthe disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the flea market on thepublic streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in forceduring the time the said ordinance was enacted, namely, BatasPambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local Government Code, inconnection with established principles embodied in the Civil Code anproperty and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, CivilCode). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 ofCivil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces,cities and municipalities, consists of the provincialroads, city streets, the squares, fountains, publicwaters, promenades, and public works for publicservice paid for by said provinces, cities ormunicipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. GarciaExtension and Opena streets are local roads used for public serviceand are therefore considered public properties of respondentmunicipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted topublic service are deemed public and are under the absolute controlof Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City ofZamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence,
local governments have no authority whatsoever to control orregulate the use of public properties unless specific authority isvested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authoritygiven by Congress to the local governments is the power to closeroads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local GovernmentCode, which states:
Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local governmentunit may likewise, through its head acting pursuantto a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordancewith existing law and the provisions of this Code,close any barangay, municipal, city or provincialroad, street, alley, park or square. No such way orplace or any part of thereof shall be close withoutindemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Aproperty thus withdrawn from public usemay beused or conveyed for any purpose for which otherreal property belonging to the local unit concernedmight be lawfully used or conveyed. (Emphasisours).
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority tolocal government units to close roads and other similar public placesshould be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principlesalready established by law. These basic principles have the effect oflimiting such authority of the province, city or municipality to close apublic street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays downthe basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted topublic use and made available to the public in general are outside
the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by thelocal government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirementof due process which should be complied with before closing a road,street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose ofwithdrawing the road or other public property from public use whencircumstances show that such property is no longer intended ornecessary for public use or public service. When it is alreadywithdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonialproperty of the local government unit concerned (Article 422, CivilCode; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474,August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
23/44
municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which otherreal property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfullyused or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code. In onecase, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared theterminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as anabandoned road, the same not being included in the CityDevelopment Plan. Thereafter, the City Council passes anotherresolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road throughpublic bidding. We held therein that the City of Cebu is empoweredto close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from publicuse. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property whichcan be the object of an ordinary contract (Cebu Oxygen andAcetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No.L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However, those roadsand streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarilyused for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devotedto public use. In such case, the local government has no power to
use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to privatepersons. This limitation on the authority of the local government overpublic properties has been discussed and settled by this Court enbancin "Francisco V. Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macaria Asistio,Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. 93654, May 6, 1992." This Courtruled:
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from whichthe private respondents' market stalls are sought tobe evicted are public streets, as found by the trialcourt in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street isproperty for public use hence outside the commerceof man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outsidethe commerce of man, it may not be the subject oflease or others contract (Villanueva, et al. v.Castaeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142 citing theMunicipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602;Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil.869; And Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Governmentfor the right to occupy portions of the public street,
the City Government, contrary to law, has beenleasing portions of the streets to them. Such leasesor licenses are null and void for being contrary tolaw. The right of the public to use the city streetsmay not be bargained away through contract. Theinterests of a few should not prevail over the good ofthe greater number in the community whose health,peace, safety, good order and general welfare, therespondent city officials are under legal obligation toprotect.
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Roblesauthorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as avending area for stallholders who were grantedlicenses by the city government contravenes thegeneral law that reserves city streets and roads forpublic use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may notinfringe upon the vested right of the public to use citystreets for the purpose they were intended toserve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles andpedestrians.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality hasthe authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot bevalidly implemented because it cannot be considered approved bythe Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance byrespondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former forthe approval of the ordinance, to wit:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used forvehicular traffic, and that the majority of theresidents do(es) not oppose the establishment of theflea market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as fleamarket/vending area shall be marked distinctly, andthat the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall beused by pedestrians;
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
24/44
3. That the time during which the vending area is tobe used shall be clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall betemporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed
areas are developed and donated by the PublicEstate Authority. (p. 38, Rollo)
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it hascomplied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval ofthe ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality that theclosed streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majorityof the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market onsaid streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that thisfirst condition has been met. Likewise, the designation byrespondents of a time schedule during which the flea market shalloperate is absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area arecongested with people, houses and traffic brought about by theproliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allowthe establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz,Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaranwould not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note ofthe other observations of the Solicitor General when he said:
. . . There have been many instances ofemergencies and fires where ambulances and fireengines, instead of using the roads for a more direct
access to the fire area, have to maneuver and lookfor other streets which are not occupied by stalls andvendors thereby losing valuable time which could,otherwise, have been spent in saving properties andlives.
Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. RitaHospital. However, its ambulances and the peoplerushing their patients to the hospital cannot passthrough G.G. Cruz because of the stalls and the
vendors. One can only imagine the tragedy of losinga life just because of a few seconds delay broughtabout by the inaccessibility of the streets leading tothe hospital.
The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy ofthe roads by stalls and vendors, normaltransportation flow is disrupted and school childrenhave to get off at a distance still far from theirschools and walk, rain or shine.
Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litterleft by vendors on the streets at the end of the day.Needless to say, these cause further pollution,sickness and deterioration of health of the residentstherein. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)
Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing findings andobservations of petitioners. Instead, respondents want this Court tofocus its attention solely on the argument that the use of publicspaces for the establishment of a flea market is well within thepowers granted by law to a local government which should not beinterfered with by the courts.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. Theyare subject to limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the lawssuch as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powersshould be subservient to paramount considerations of health andwell-being of the members of the community. Every local
government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that willenhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peaceand order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants ofthe local units. Based on this objective, the local government shouldrefrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adverselyaffect the general welfare.
As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public havea legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructedstalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
25/44
municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office toclear the city streets and restore them to their specific publicpurpose.
The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an ordinance
which is void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in lawsapplicable during its time. However, at this point, We find it worthy tonote that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local GovernmentLode, has already been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 knownas Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1,1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights andobligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code andarising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving alocal government unit shall be governed by the original terms andconditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time suchrights were vested.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of therespondent Regional Trial Court dated December 17, 1990 whichgranted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as PNPSuperintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing thedemolition of market stalls along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets is hereby RESERVED andSET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ.,
concur.
8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
26/44
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122058. May 5, 1999]
IGNACIO R. BUNYE, JAIME R. FRESNEDI, CARLOS G.TENSUAN, ROMAN E. NIEFES, ROGER C. SMITH,RUFINO B. JOAQUIN, NOLASCO L. DIAZ, and RUFINOIBE, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECONDDIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and theKILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGAMAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NGMUNTINLUPA, INC., (KBMBPM), respondents.
DECISIONPURISIMA, J.:
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 13966 before the SecondDivision
[1]of the Sandiganbayan, the Amended Information charging
the herein petitioners with a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) ofR.A. No. 3019,
[2]alleges:
That on or about August 1988, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa,Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused all public officers being
the Mayor (Ignacio R. Bunye), Vice Mayor (Jaime D. Fresnedi),Municipal Attorney (Victor C. Aguinaldo), Municipal Councilors(Carlos C. Tensuan, Alejandro L. Martinez, Epifanio A. Espeleta, ReyE. Bulay, Lucio B. Constantino, Roman E. Niefes, Nemesio Q. Mozo,Rufino J. Joaquin, Nolasco L. Diaz and Roger C. Smith, BarangayChairman of Putatan (Rufino Ibe) and Barangay Chairman ofAlabang (Nestor Santos), all in the municipality of Muntinlupa, MetroManila, said accused while in the performance of their officialfunctions in conspiracy with one another and taking advantage oftheir official positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, andfeloniously enact Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 on August 1, 1988, and on
the basis thereof, forcibly took possession of the New Public Marketin Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter took over theoperation and management of the aforesaid public market startingAugust 19, 1988, despite the fact that, there was a valid andsubsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for a termof 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, between theMunicipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, represented by the formerMunicipal Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Bayan saPaglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda sa Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ngMuntinlupa, Inc. (Kilusang Magtitinda, for brevity), a Cooperative,represented by its General Manager then, Amado G. Perez, anddespite also the warnings from COA Chairman Domingo and MMMCGovernor Cruz that appropriate legal steps be taken by the MMCtoward the rescission/annulment of the contract xxx to protect theinterest of the Government, and x x x to evaluate thoroughly andstudy further the case to preclude possible damages of financialliabilities which the Court may adjudge against that municipality asan off-shoot of the case, which forcible take-over had caused undue
injury to the aforesaid Cooperative members, and in effect, theherein accused themselves, unwarranted benefits, advantage orpreference in the discharge of their official functions as aforesaid,through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence,considering that, the Cooperative members had introducedimprovements, including the construction of the KBS Building, RRSection-Phases I and II, asphalting of the roads surrounding themarket place, and for the purpose, the cooperative had investedThirteen Million Four Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand NineHundred Pesos (P13,479,900.00) in connection therewith, which hadbeen deposited in trust to the Municipal Government, and inconsideration thereof, the cooperative was extended the above long
term lease to manage and operate the public market and to pay amonthly rental of P35,000.00 only -- said offense having beencommitted by the accused in their performance of official duties.
[3]
On July 24,1992, petitioners interposed a Motion toDismiss,
[4]placing reliance on the September 23, 1991 Decision
[5]of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16930[6]
that unless anduntil declared to be unconstitutional and expressly annulledResolution No. 45
[7]deserves the presumption of constitutionality
and therefore is entitled to obedience and respect.[8]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn18/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3
27/44
On September 23, 1992, the respondent court deniedpetitioners motion to dismiss on the ground that the C.A. Decisioncited by movants did not touch squarely on the constitutionalityof the subject Resolution No. 45
[9].
After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan came out with
its July 26, 1995 Decision,[10]
finding petitioners guilty of a violationof the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act and sentencing them,thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered findingaccused Ignacio Bunye y Rivera, Jaime Fresnedi y de la Rosa,Victor Aguinaldo y Duliabi, Carlos Tensuan y Gutierrez, RomanNiefes y Esporlas, Nemesio Mozo y Rillana, Rufino Joaquin y Bunye,Nolasco Diaz y Lampito, Roger Smith y de la Cruz and Rufino Ibe yLacanilao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in theviolation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, asamended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and each of them are hereby sentenced to suffer theindeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARSand ONE (1) MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARSand ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum, to indemnify, jointly andseverally, the offended party, the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod NgMga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc.(KBMBPM) in the amount of P13,479,900.00 as actual damages,and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of this action.
xxx
SO ORDERED.
With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,[11]
petitionersfound their way to this Court via the present Petition for Review onCertiorari anchored on the following submissions:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURTSDECISION PROCEEDS FROM THE GRAVELY ERRONEOUSPREMISE THAT A COURT ACTION IS NECESSARY IN
REVOKING AND CANCELLING THE LEASE CONTRACT DATED02 SEPTEMBER 1985 (EXHIBIT D-5) DESPITE THE FACT THATIT IS INDUBITABLY A VOID CONTRACT;
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULDHAVE RENDERED A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL SINCEKAPASIYAHAN BILANG 45 (EXHIBIT K and K-1) HAS NOTBEEN DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHICH IS THEREFOREENTITLED TO OBEDIENCE AND RESPECT; THUS, ALL OFFICIALACTS DONE PURSUANT THERETO, SUCH AS THECHALLENGED ACTS OF THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS, ARE VALIDAND LEGAL.
III.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE RECORDS SHOW THAT THEACUSED-MOVANTS DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION 3,PARAGRAPH (E) OF REPUBLIC ACTS NO. 3019, AS AMENDED(THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), SINCEELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.
A. THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS DID NOT COMMIT ANYPROHIBITED ACTS.
B. NO UNDUE INJURY WAS CAUSED TO ANY PARTY.
C. NO UNWARRANTED BENEFITS, ADVANTAGE ORPREFERENCE WAS GIVEN TO ANY PARTY.
D. THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS DID NOT ACT WITH MANIFESTPARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLENEGLIGENCE.
E. THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS CLEARLY ACTED IN GOODFAITH IN REVOKING AND CANCELLING THE LEASE CONTRACTDATED 02 SEPTEMBER 1985 (EXHIBIT D-5) AND IN
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/122058.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurispr