Pubcorp (Repaired)

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25811 April 3, 1968THE CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO, represented byits BARRIO CAPTAIN, HONORIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.CITY TREASURER, MAXIMO ASISTIDO, THE HON. CITY COUNCIL,THE HON. CITY AUDITOR, ATTY. FELIX PEPITO and the HON. CITYMAYOR, CARMELO PORRAS,respondents-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No.732 declaring as officially and legally existing, pursuant to Republic Act 2370, the

several barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion.

Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was

created under Section 27 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, asked from Davao City

for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio,

as provided in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however,refused to release the share for said barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining

to said barrio, in relation to those of barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be

determined, because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as

required by law.

Stated otherwise, Davao City's stand was that the amount covering the 10% share of

these three barrios combined has been allocated, but it cannot be determined how

much thereof pertains to each of said barrios, because their boundaries not having

been fixed as regards each other, it could not be determined how much of the taxes

were collected from real properties located in each of the three aforesaid barrios,

taken separately.

On September 3, 1964, however, the Secretary of Finance, acting on the request of

the same barrio Central or Poblacion for release of its 10% share in real property

taxes, stated that barrios Agdao and Bucana were created only in 1963 in violation of

Republic Act 2370 that prohibited creation of barrios out of chartered cities, so that

said barrios are not recognized under Republic Act 3590 providing for the

abovementioned share of 10% in realty taxes. Accordingly, he ruled that the

allocated 10% share of taxes for barrios Agdao, Bucana and Central should accrue

and be given to barrio Central only, after all conditions therefor are met.

On December 2, 1964, barrio Central filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao,

thru its barrio captain, a petition for declaratory relief with mandamus, against Davao

City's Treasurer, Council, Auditor and Mayor, alleging the facts mentioned earlier in

this decision. Among others, the petition questioned the legality of Resolution No.

732 of Davao City's Council creating barrios Agdao and Bucana; the actuations of

the Auditor in passing in audit an alleged expenditure of P50,000 out of the 10%

fund; and the failure of the council to delimit the territorial boundaries of the three

barrios concerned. And it prayed that the court order payment to petitioner by

respondents of its 10% share in realty taxes as provided by Republic Act 3590,

declare illegal the creation of barrios Agdao and Bucana, and prohibit the Auditor

from approving expenditures out of its 10% share.

Respondents moved to dismiss but their motion was denied. On January 29, 1965,

respondents answered, stating among other averments, that barrio Central is

inexistent or not a part of Davao City; that there are other barrios claiming the 10%

share in real property taxes corresponding to the territory claimed by petitioner; that

Republic Act 3590 providing for the 10% share applies only to barrios in

municipalities and municipal districts, not to those in cities; and that the alleged

expenditure in question was legal and not taken from the 10% share allocated for

barrios.

After issues were thus joined the case was set for trial. On August 2, 1965, however,

the Court, upon motion of the Fiscal, dismissed the case without prejudice, on the

ground that the issues were rendered academic by the passage of Republic Act 4354,on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of Davao City. Petitioner, having failed in

its motion for reconsideration, took the present appeal.

At issue is the legal question of the propriety or correctness of the dismissal

order.1wph1.t

Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City of

Davao. Petitioner barrio Central or Poblacion was not mentioned therein.

Accordingly, thereprima faciearises the conclusion that said law abolished barrio

Central as part of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo

had sufficient and tenable reason to dismiss the suit in the face of said law, for being

academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not situated in Davao City, cannotpresent a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under Republic Act 3590.

Said law must be presumed, until squarely challenged and declared by the courts to

be otherwise, as constitutional, especially because the power to create or abolish

municipal corporations resides in Congress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-17803, June

30, 1962). Petitioner may of course assail the constitutionality of said new law. The

present suit, however, is not for that purpose. Nothing in the pleadings questions said

law's validity, for the reason that said law came after the pleadings were joined.

Neither was there amendment to said pleadings. The court a quo, therefore, rightly

dismissed the present suit, without prejudice, that is, not thereby precluding the filing

of a suit to assail the validity of Republic Act 4354.


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WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby aff irmed. No costs. So

ordered.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 165547. January 24, 2007.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary,

RENE C. VILLA,petitioner, vs. SARANGANI AGRICULTURAL CO., INC.,ACIL CORPORATION, NICASIO ALCANTARA and TOMASALCANTARA,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA,Jp:

This is a petition for review1by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

seeking the reversal of the Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and

September 24, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

79899, entitled "Sarangani Agricultural Co, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Manuel Domingo, etal."

Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been

reclassified from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal

zoning ordinance, and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the

Municipality of Alabel.

The antecedents are as follows:

The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on

March 16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities, namely, Alabel, Glan,

Maasin, Maitum, Malapatan, Malungon and Kiamba which were segregated from the

Province of South Cotabato. Under said Act, the Municipality of Alabel was made

the capital of the new province where the capitol building and all other national and

provincial offices shall be established.2

On February 14, 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution

No. 97-08 or "Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal

Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2005) of the Municipality of

Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance for Adoption and

Approval of the Provincial Governor, Honorable Priscilla L. Chiongbian, Thru The

Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province."

On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series

of 1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the

Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that

were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the

municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.3

On March 2, 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved

Resolution No. 98-018 or the "Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal

Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land UseDevelopment Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, SaranganiPer Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the

Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel." A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares,

however, was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)

commercial farms deferment scheme.4

The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and

Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents' properties located atBarangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and

pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space

in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel.5

On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI)

filed an application for land use conversion of the following parcels of land with an

aggregate area of 1,005 hectares:

Registered Owner TCT No. Lot No. Area AreaApplied

(Ha.) (Ha.)

SACI T-7207 1-C 52.4365 52.4365

SACI T-48807 2 181.3353 181.3353

(T-4807)

SAC I T-48808 3 281.0874 281.0874(T-4808)

SACI T-48809 4 241.7880 241.7880

(T-4809)

SACI T-48810 5 40.6738 40.6738

(T-4810)

SACI T-48811 6 137.0340 137.0340(T-4811)

SACI T-48812 7 12.3265 12.3265

(T-4812)

Nicasio Alcantara T-(10885) 10 20.9149 20.9149

T-44538

SACI T-9210 2 12.1425 12.1425


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Tomas Alcantara T-14359 39 10.9390 10.9390

(T-1185)

Nicasio Alcantara Untitled 53 5.0672 5.0672

ACIL Corporation T-(41758) 806 3.3115 3.3115

(T-4150)

SACI Untitled 807 6.7871 6.7871

Accompanying SACI's application for conversion were the documentsrequired under the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No.

7, Series of 1997.6

Subsequently, a Site Inspection Report was prepared by the Housing and Land

Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional Office (Region XI) and was indorsed to

DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr.

On March 16, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the

Provincial Land Use Technical Committee (PLUTC)7conducted an inspection of the

subject properties. In a Memorandum dated July 9, 1999, the PLUTC recommended

that SACI's application be made subject to the following conditions: 1) presentationby SACI of its development plan; 2) submission of the lacking documents; 3) re-

survey and segregation of the property according to use or project in coordination

with the DAR Regional Office; and, 4) submission of the resulting map indicat ing

the technical description of the area per actual use/project attested by the Regional

Director.

Meanwhile, on March 22, 1999, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform

Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter -petition to the DAR Secretary

opposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged

that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the

commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, an "Urgent

Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of Banana CommercialFarm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI and was received by the PARC Secretariat on

July 14, 1999.

In the March 30, 2000 deliberation of the PLUTC, the committee agreed to

recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares that had been planted with bananas

and coconuts. The committee noted that said portion of the property was still viable

for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with

opposition from SARBAI. It likewise recommended that the decision as to the rest of

the area applied for conversion shall be deferred subject to the submission of the

following within a period of thirty (30) days: 1) a five-year comprehensive

development plan; 2) a survey plan signed by the Regional Technical Director of

Land Management Service and noted by the DAR Regional Director (Region XI); 3)SACI's proof of undertaking, which will contain the package of benefits it intends to

give to the affected farm workers except those working in the banana plantation; 4)

the concurrence of all the workers who would be affected by the proposed

conversion, which concurrence should be noted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform

Office (MARO) and acknowledged by a notary public.

On its part, SACI contended that 1) its projects were aligned to address the

current and anticipated commercial and residential needs of Sarangani province, and

the removal of any portion of its property included in its comprehensive

development plan will affect the viability of the plan; 2) the banana plantations willbe transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made available to

the displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 3) the company

will construct and install power generation facilities in the entire area; 4) at the time

the application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever

issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular

because the same may be issued only after the final resolution of the application for

land use conversion; and 5) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a legal

barrier to the filing of an application for land use conversion.

On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI's

application for land use conversion. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:

. . . The proponent also submitted another DA certification stating that 12

parcels of land (Lot Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 807, 53, 10, 39 and 806) with an

area of 816.7401 hectares, located at Maribulan, Alabel, Sarangani are part of

expansion for urbanizing areas. Though discussed on several meetings, no

decision was made on the application since the applicant was not able to

comply with the documentary requirements and clarify the issues raised by

the Committee. DCESaI

[I]n [the] 30 March 2000 Meeting of the PLUTC, the Committee deliberated

again [on] the subject application and agreed to recommend the disapproval

of 158.0672 hectares area planted to banana[s] and coconuts. The Committee

noted that said portion of the property is still viable for agriculture, irrigated,with Notice of Coverage and with protest or opposition from SARBAI. The

Committee also agreed to request the DAR to determine the metes and

bounds of the area planted to banana[s] and coconuts vis--vis areas devoted

to other enterprises. Relative to the rest of the area applied for conversion, the

committee deferred its decision subject to the submission of a 5-year

comprehensive development plan, showing among others, the schedule of

development by phase, the specific lots involved and the corresponding

proposed use.

. . . The Committee acceded to the request of SACI and deferred its

recommendation to deny conversion of that portion of the property planted to

banana[s] and coconut[s] pending submission of a manifesto or SACI's proof


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of undertaking that it will compensate farm workers affected by showing,

among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots

involved and the corresponding proposed use [of] the conversion, concurred

by the workers/oppositors, noted by the MARO and duly notarized. The

Committee also requested SACI to submit details of the pomelo farm in

Malandag being offered as a replacement farm for the relocation of the farm

workers. SACI was given a 30-day period to submit these documents.

SACI, however, failed to submit the oath of undertaking to pay disturbancecompensation to affected workers being required by the Committee and as

provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1999. Instead,

SACI submitted an undertaking executed by the affected workers stating that

they are amenable to the package of benefits offered by the company.

Nevertheless, those who executed the deed of undertaking did not represent

the majority of the farm workers. Out of the 95 regular banana workers only

45 and eight (8) supervisors including four (4) workers who were not

included in the workers' master list of SACI executed a deed of undertaking.

As regards the 105-hectare pomelo farm, SACI failed to affirm whether they

are going to pursue their offer. Likewise, DAR Region XI reported that

coverage of the same area is on-going, and a different group of potential

beneficiaries have already been identified. Therefore, it could no longer beoffered as a relocation site. Foregoing considered, the Committee, during its

18 August 2000 Meeting, sustained its earlier recommendation to deny the

conversion of that portion of the property planted to bananas and coconuts.

With regard to the rest. of the area, the Committee deferred its decision

subject to the delineation by the SACI of the total area that they can develop

within the allowed fiveyear period. Likewise, the PLUTC is requesting the

SACI to submit a revised five-year development plan that will show the

schedule of development by phase, by year, and the proposed use for each

parcel of land.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that:

1. The application filed by the Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc.

(SACI), represented by Cynthia Adao-Prat, involving parcels of land planted

to banana[s] and coconut[s] and with Notice of Coverage identified as TCT

Nos. T-10885 (20.9149 ha.), T-14359 (10.9390 ha.), T-41718 (3.3115 ha.),

OCT No. V-19574 or T-9210 (12.1425 ha.), Lot 807 (6.7871 ha.) and portion

of P-V-125 (95.00 ha.) and [an] area covered by Lot 53 (5.0672 ha.) with an

aggregate area of 154.622 [actually it is 154.1622] hectares is hereby

DENIED. The Dar Regional Office of Region XI is hereby instructed to

determine the metes and bounds of the area subject for distribution to the

qualified FWBs.

2. The resolution of the application involving the rest of the area applied

for conversion is DEFERRED pending submission by the applicant of a

revised five-year development plan indicating the specific use of each parcel

of land.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision but the

same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, dated September 24, 2004.

Their Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order having been denied,

respondents appealed to the Office of the President (O.P. Case No. 02-1-47.4,

alleging that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform committed serious errors in 1) finding

that a notice of coverage had been issued for the banana area of the land holdings; 2)

giving undue significance to the protest or opposition by SARBAI; 3) requiring a

deed of undertaking even after applicant-appellant's written commitment to pay

whatever lawful obligation SACI may incur as a consequence of the conversion; 4)

holding that farms with commercial farm deferment cannot be applied for

conversion; 5) ruling that irrigated lands suitable for agriculture were disqualified for

conversion; and 6) ruling that applicant-appellant had not submitted a five-year

development plan. 9

In a Decision dated June 30, 2003, the Office of the President through

Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto

the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied,10

so they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the

same issues.

On July 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the

petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVENDUE COURSE. Consequently, the assailed Decision and Order dated June

30, 2003 and September 12, 2003, respectively, of the Office of the President,

as well as the Orders dated November 9, 2000 and August 28, 2002 of the

DAR Secretary are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the DAR

directs the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the distribution of

the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of

Coverage. The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby

directed to issue a conversion order covering the aforesaid area under the

terms and conditions as provided in pertinent guidelines of the department.

As to the rest of the area applied for conversion, action on which has been

deferred, the DAR Regional Office (DAR Region No. XI) is hereby

DIRECTED to expedite the processing and evaluation of petitioners' land useconversion application in accordance with the provisions of DAR AO No. 7,


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Series of 1997, and DAR AO No. 01-99 whenever the provisions of the latter

issuance are made applicable to those applications filed before its effectivity.

The DAR Secretary and all officers and employees acting on his behalf are

hereby enjoined from proceeding with the distribution of petitioners' lands

under compulsory acquisition provided in Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6657.

Whatever actions already taken in pursuance of the June 16, 1998 Notice of

Coverage under CARP are hereby nullified for DAR's failure to observe due

process therein.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

I

WHEN IT RULED THAT THE JUNE 16, 1998 NOTICE OF COVERAGE WAS

ILLEGAL AS DAR ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.

II

WHEN IT RULED THAT DAR SHOULD USE THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND

USE PLANS AND ACCOMPANYING ORDINANCE OF THE LOCAL

SANGGUNIAN AS PRIMARY REFERENCE SO AS NOT TO DEFEAT THE

VERY PURPOSE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT (LGU) CONCERNED

IN RECLASSIFYING CERTAIN AREAS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL AND

ECONOMIC BENEFITS IN PURSUANCE TO ITS MANDATE TOWARDS THE

GENERAL WELFARE.

III

WHEN IT FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE BASIC

PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO

THE REQUIREMENTS OR PRECONDITIONS FOR LAND

CLASSIFICATION/CONVERSION AND THE BASIC MANDATE OF THE

CARP.

With regard to the first issue on due process, this Court holds that, under the

circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR

can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment

period

12

under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998. The pertinent provision of the law states:

Sec. 11. Commercial Farming.Commercial farms, which are privateagricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetables and

cut-flower farms, cacao, coffee and rubber plantations,shall be subject to

immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from

the effectivity of this Act.[xiii]13In the case of new farms, the ten-yearperiod shall begin from the first year of commercial production and

operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year per iod, the

Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon

payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon,

preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall

thereafter manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries. (AS amended

by R.A. 7881; Rules and regulations on the acquisition, valuation

compensation and distribution of deferred commercial farmsDAR AONo. 09, s. 1998)

DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998,14

on theRules and

Regulations on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of

Deferred Commercial Farmsapplies to all commercial farms as defined under

Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657:15

SEC. 2. Statement of Policies.The acquisition, valuation,compensation, distribution, operation and management of deferredcommercial farms shall be governed by the following policies:

(a) All commercial farms whose deferment expired as of June 15, 1998

shall be subject to immediate acquisition and distribution under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Those whose deferments

have yet to expire will be acquired and distributed only upon expiration of

their respective deferment period as originally determined by the Department

of Agrarian reform (DAR), or earlier if the DAR determines that the purpose

for which it was deferred no longer exists and revokes its deferment;

The process of acquisition of these commercial farms by DAR is specificallyprovided under Article III, Section 9 of the above administrative order, to wit:

SEC. 9. Procedure for Acquisition.The acquisition of deferredcommercial farms shall be governed by the following procedures:

(a) Voluntary Offer to Sell/Compulsory Acquisition

1) The Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shallserve, upon expiration of the deferment period of the subject commercial

farm, as the Notice of Coverage,16

supported by the Compliance Work

Program and Summary of Exceptions (Form A) originally submitted with theapproved deferment application. However, for record purposes, the
http://www.lis.dar.gov.ph/documents/4451#_edn13http://www.lis.dar.gov.ph/documents/4451#_edn13http://www.lis.dar.gov.ph/documents/4451#_edn13


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landowner shall be served a Notice of Expiration of Deferment (Annex 2)

which shall contain a reminder of his right of retention, should he wish to

exercise the same;

2) In general, the procedure for acquisition shall follow DAR

Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, as amended by DAR

Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, entitled "Revised Rules and

Procedures governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands subject of

Voluntary offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to RepublicAct No. 6657," subject to certain modifications intended to expedite the

process as provided herein.

Clearly, it was unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage to

respondents in order to place the properties in question under CARP coverage.

Hence, the contention by respondents that due process was not duly observed by

petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the application for conversion must

be upheld.

As regards the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997,

or the Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands

toNon-agricultural Usesprescribes the guidelines for land use conversion:

VI. POLICIES AND GUIDELINES

A. . . .

B. General Guidelines

xxx xxx xxx

b) Conversion may be allowed if at the time of the

application, the lands are reclassified as commercial,

industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the

new or revised town plans promulgated by the local

government unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing

and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or by the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988, in

accordance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, as

implemented by MC No. 54, and Executive Order No.

72, Series of 199317

of the Office of the President.

In connection with the afore-stated administrative order, Section 20 of

Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,

empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands:

Sec. 20. Reclassif ication of Lands.(a) A city or municipality may,through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian after conducting public

hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands

and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following

cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for

agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2)

where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for

residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the

Sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited

to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of

the passage of the ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, FIFTEEN

PERCENT (15%);

(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten

percent (10%), and

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%);Provided

further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries

pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as "The ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification and

the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section

65 of said Act.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The local government units shall in conformity

with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective

comprehensive land use plans enacted though zoning ordinances

which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use

of land resources:Provided, That the requirements for food

production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be

taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed as

repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions

of R.A. No. 6657.18

Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section

20 of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991

Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses" issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the


7/47

scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify

agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances authorizing

reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of

the province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for

highly urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with Executive

Order No. 72, Series of 1993, thus:

SECTION 4. Use of the comprehensive land use plans19

and

ordinances as primary reference documents in land use conversions.Pursuant to RA 6657 and EO 129-A, actions on applications for land useconversions on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of

DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference documents the

comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinance passed upon and

approved by the LGUs concerned, together with the National Land Use

Policy.

Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-

agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in

declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the

ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:

Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent

administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion that

while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving

applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners on their

landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance

with the requirements and limitations under existing laws and regulations,

such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to be reclassified,

ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and

those falling under environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for

conversion under the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR's power in such cases

may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the

LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economicbenefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. Precisely,

therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land use plans and

accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as primary references in

evaluating applications for land use conversion filed by individual

landowners. In this case, petitioners have already complied with the standard

requirements laid down under the applicable rules and regulations of the

DAR. . . .20

The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly

regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No.

6657 are present.21

In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA

that DAR's scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limitedto examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and

regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case where,

because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to

urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the

local government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to

non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993,

and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the

comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of

respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local government for

non-agricultural uses. SCaIcA

This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is

included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be

automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject

to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is

present here is that a portion of respondents' property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion

totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts,

are covered by CARL's ten-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15,

1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon

the lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL

or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the

Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands intonon-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents' properties are

located.

In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification

that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the

applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands

explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing,

amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657." Thus,

where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for

interpretation. There is only room for application.22

In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the third

issue presented in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the issue on

due process is concerned. In connection with this, the denial by the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR) of respondents' application for conversion with regard to

the 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares, the deferment period of which has already

expired, is AFFIRMED; and the Orders of the DAR dated November 9, 2000 and

August 28, 2002, directing the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the

distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of

Coverage, are REINSTATED. The Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and


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September 24, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

79899, are hereby MODIFIED accordingly.

No costs.

LEAGUE OF CITIES

During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion ofmunicipalities into component cities were filed before the House ofRepresentatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act onbills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12 thCongress,R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the LocalGovernment Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify forconversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 millionlocally-generated income. In the 13thCongress, 16 of the 24 municipalitiesfiled, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each ofthe cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particularmunicipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No.

9009. Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into citiesconstitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

November 18, 2008 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is

unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such

exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. TheCityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a

fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followedbecause such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the justshare of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes. (League of Cities ofthe Philippines v. ComelecGR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)

March 31, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.

April 28, 2009 Ruling

No. The SCEn Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for

reconsideration.

December 21, 2009 Ruling

Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and

declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting

16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations andclear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside

the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill

No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar

as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a citywill only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added.

The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities

by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants

before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher incomerequirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair.

Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legalremedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all thenecessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC

of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Ci ties

of the Phil ippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the

Phi li ppines v. COMEL EC; GR No. 178056, League of Citi es of the Phil ippin es

v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE : The November 18, 2008 rulingalready became final and executory and was recorded in the SCs Book ofEntries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)

August 24, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18,

2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts(RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did notoverrule the prior majority en bancDecision of 18 November 2008, as well as

the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying

reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the

same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision, theCourt said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which

expressly provides that no cityshall be createdexcept in accordance with

the criteria established in the local government code. It stressed that while all


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the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local

Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the

increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the

LGC. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact thatCongress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the

Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, renderingthe challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution, the

Court held.

The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all

similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondentmunicipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities

can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,

even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still

be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No.176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec ; GR No. 177499,League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec ; GR No. 178056, League of

Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)February 15, 2011 Ruling

Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the

fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.

April 12, 2011Ruling

Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We shouldnot ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws notonly had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also

complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGCprescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave

these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this

Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear andunmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective

wisdom of Congress, the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the localgovernment units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage

of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million forthe creation of cities.

The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon,the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several

municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that

RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient.By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by

the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of

Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to

Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate

failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint

Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and

forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it.Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the

Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably

voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously

approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption

clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the expressarticulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without

exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by

necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the expressexemptions being embodied in the exemption

clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/0414110

1.php)

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitutionmandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the

criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution

must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment

imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to

promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and theconcomitant national growth. (GR No. 176951, League of City of thePhilippinesv. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippinesv. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of City of the Philippines v.COMELEC, April 12, 2011)
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NAVARRO vs ERMIITAThe National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annualincome is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local GovernmentFinance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, theCOMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the

creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmativevotes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from boththe mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of DinagatIslands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincialofficials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during theMay 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new setof provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.

Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarroand other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC apetition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagatas a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act ofCongress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of alarge chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA),and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?

Suggested Answer:

February 10, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the LocalGovernment Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000

inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of

802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of

2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of

Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government

Code,which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands fromthe land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found

in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy betweenthe basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic

law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms andprovisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v.Ermita,May 12, 2010)

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, andDinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its

Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.

April 12, 2011 Ruling

Yes. In Navarr o vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, Apri l 12,

2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as

VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of

Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, Theland area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed

of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.

According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, landarea is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation

of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of

viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and

land area, are provided for.

But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to becreated consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area

requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if

the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,

respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for

the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expresslystated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.


11/47

xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption

should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,

considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a

greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the landarea of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,

therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was

expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component

cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted inSection 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided

in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the

congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the truelegislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validityof Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local governmentunits genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land

area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberallyconstrued in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted

by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if notoutright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province thatconsists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves,

also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of

islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to

Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be

made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 squarekilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This

would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a

province with contiguous land area over one composed of islandsand negatethe greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural

progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential

option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometerterritory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of

water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.

xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability ofa local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot

become a province, taking into account its average annual income of

P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified bythe Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the

minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The

delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and

sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10,2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in

favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from theperspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.(Navarrovs. Ex ecuti ve Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, Apr il 12, 2011)

NAVARRO v ERMITA

Facts:Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands,formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality

for not being in compliance with the population or the land area

requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous

decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as

unconstitutional.

Issue:Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province

constitutional?

Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the

creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation

of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land

area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under

Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been

the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces

especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine

archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461

of the LGC (provision relating to creation of provinces), such was

incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional

oversight in said provision and reflecting the true legislative intent.

Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which

could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the

purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the

Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together

with territorial contiguity.
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DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS andCLAUDE P. BAUTISTA

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELECDivision in an election protest may not directly assail the order before theSupreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy isto to seek the review of said interlocutory order during the appeal of thedecision of the Division.

FACTS:

Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorialrace for the province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival,

filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying

and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled tothe COMELEC First Division.

In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisitecash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of

the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the

special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to

the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, beingmerely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. TheCOMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas motion forreconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the

Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an

interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC

HELD:

Petition DENIED.

Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the

power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits suchpower to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not

extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory

order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC

First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The properremedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first

decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal

the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along

with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an

interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC was issued without or inexcess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded inKho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application

herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine

the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as

required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether

such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.


13/47

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105120. September 4, 1992.]

SIMPLICIO C. GRIO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NGDEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, EVELYN C. JIZ AND PERLA

ZULUETA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ILOILOPROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, Respondents.

Jiz, Jiz, Andrada & Gellada and Santos B. Aguadera, for Petitioners.

Juanito M. Acanto for himself and for other intervenors.

Leonardo E. Lozano for petitioner-in-intervention.

R E S O L U T I O N

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the act of

respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of disallowing the voters of thesub-province of Guimaras, to vote for the governor, vice-governor of the

province of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the

second district of the province, in the recently conducted May 11, 1992 local andnational elections.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

This petition was filed by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a dulyregistered and accredited political party, through its Iloilo Provincial Chairman,

co-petitioner, Simplicio Grio. Grio was also the official candidate of the party

for the position of governor of Iloilo. The other co-petitioner, Arturo Gadian,

claimed to be a registered voter of the municipality of Buenavista, sub-province

of Guimaras, Iloilo.

The sub-province of Guimaras is composed of three municipalities, namely,

Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia, with a combined voting population of

fifty thousand (50,000), more or less. These three municipalities also constitute apart of the second district of Iloilo, with the municipalities of Pavia, Leganes,

Sta. Barbara, New Lucena, Zarraga, Alimodian, Leon and San Miguel

composing the remaining municipalities constituting the entire second district. In

the previous elections, the voters from the municipalities comprising the sub-province of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of the

entire province of Iloilo.

On January 1, 1992, the 1991 Local Government Code came into effect (Sec.

536, R.A. 7160). Section 462 thereof called for the conversion of existingsubprovinces into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes

cast in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected by such conversion.

Said section likewise directed the holding of the said plebiscite simultaneouslywith the national elections following the effectivity of R.A. 7160.

The first national elections conducted after the effectivity of R.A. 7160 was the

recently concluded May 11, 1992 elections which was also held simultaneously

with the local elections. Pursuant to Section 462 of R.A. 7160, the Comelecconducted a plebiscite for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province

simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections.

On April 15, 1992, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 2410 providing for the

rules and regulations governing the plebiscite to decide the question on the

conversion of the sub-province of Guimaras into a regular province. Section 3thereof provided that all registered voters of Iloilo, except Iloilo City, and in the

sub-province of Guimaras, who are qualified to vote for the provincial officialsthereof in the May 11, 1992 elections, were qualified to vote in the plebiscite.

The ballots used for the three (3) municipalities of the sub-province of Guimaras

and the entire province of Iloilo were provided with appropriate spaces at the

bottom for this question:chanrobles law library : red

PLEBISCITE QUESTION

Do you vote for the approval of the conversion of the sub-province pursuant to

Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160?


14/47

[ ] Yes [ ] No

It was however, observed by the herein petitioners, that the ballots distributed by

the Comelec for use in the three (3) municipalities of Guimaras did not containany space or provision for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the

members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of

Iloilo, of which the sub-province of Guimaras was a part.

On May 13, 1992, or two (2) days after the election was conducted, herein

petitioners filed the instant petition far certiorari. Petitioners alleged in

substance that respondent Comelec acted without jurisdiction and with grave

abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-province ofGuimaras from voting for the governor and vice governor of Iloilo and the

members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of

Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed providing

specifically for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a full-fledged

province, it do not specifically provide that the voters of the subprovince shall nolonger be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who, in case of a vote

against its conversion into a regular province, would continue to represent said

sub-province. Furthermore, respondent Commission on Elections failed toinform the candidates and the voters of such disenfranchisement.

On May 14, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the

Commission on Elections and the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo City

to cease and desist from canvassing and proclaiming the results of the electionfor the office of the governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Iloilo. We also ordered the public respondents to file their

comments.

On May 29, 1992, public respondents filed their comment through the Office of

the Solicitor General. On June 9, 1992, the petitioners filed their reply to publicrespondents comment.chanrobles virtualawlibrarychanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On June 17, 1992, We lifted the temporary restraining order.

On June 22, 1992, Perla S. Zulueta, who claimed to be the official candidate of

the Nacionalista Party for the office of the governor of the Province of Iloilo andwho allegedly ranked number two behind the frontrunner Arthur Defensor, filed

a motion for leave to intervene and for admission of her petition in intervention

which was attached to the motion. Zulueta alleged the same allegations as those

presented in the main petition and claimed that she has an interest in the matter

of the main petition because the same is crucial and determinative of whether or

not she would win for the office of governor. We admit herein the said petition

for intervention and resolve the issue she raised therein in this decision

considering that it is the same issue raised in the main petition.

Still another motion for intervention dated June 25, 1992 was filed by Rodolfo

Legaspi and Richard Garin, Juanito Acanto and Alberto Javellana, Grace

Fernandez and Pablito Araneta, and Nerio Salcedo and Antonio Teodeco,

candidates for members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the first,third, fourth and fifth districts of Iloilo, respectively. Apparently, unaware of the

lifting of the restraining order, they alleged in their motion that they were unduly

prejudiced by the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 14,

1992 because the issue presented in the main petition had no direct effect onthem or their election and they prayed for the lifting of the said restraining order.

On July 9, 1992, We issued a resolution denying the motion for intervention

filed by Legaspi, Garin, Acanto, Javellana, Fernandez, Araneta, Salcedo and

Tedoco because We had previously lifted the temporary restraining order andconsidering that they were not directly affected by the principal issue in the main

petition (p. 126, Rollo) which involved only the positions of governor, vice-

governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second districtof Iloilo.

On July 8, 1992, the petitioners filed another motion to admit Amended Petition

with the Amended Petition attached thereto. The original petition was amended

to include as petitioners, Evelyn C. Jiz another candidate for member of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.

The pertinent provision affecting the principal issue in this case is Section 462 of

the 1991 Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). It provides in

full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 462. Existing Subprovinces.Existing sub-provinces are herebyconverted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast ina plebiscite to be held in the said sub-provinces and the original provinces

directly affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Comelec

simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this Code.

"The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shallcontinue to be represented in Congress by the duly elected representatives of the

original districts out of which said new provinces or districts were created until

their own representatives shall have been elected in the next regular

congressional elections and qualified.


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"The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular

provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy

occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting

from expiration of their terms of office in case of a negative vote in the plebisciteresults, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold

office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections

following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such

conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newlycreated province through appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same

as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other

members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold

office until their successors shall have been elected in the next regular localelections and qualified.

"All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said

sub-provinces at the time of their conversion into regular provinces shall

continue in office in accordance with the civil service law, rules andregulations."cralaw virtua1aw library

We have carefully examined this section of the 1991 Local Government Codeand We observed its incompleteness and inadequacy to govern all or any

eventuality. It should be remembered that the law should take into consideration

the decision of the populace to be affected by a change in its political set-up. As

it is worded, Section 462 completely addresses an eventuality where the people

of both the original district and the people of the new district to be created agreeto the proposed creation of the latter. The law provides that, "After the effectivity

of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the

newly created province through appointment, if none has yet been appointed to

the same (as hereinafter provided), and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the

other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

But suppose the proposed-conversion of a subprovince is rejected by those

affected by such conversion, what does the law say? The law states only thefollowing in case of a negative vote: "The incumbent elected officials of said

sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until

June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent

elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case a

negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by thePresident. The appointee shall hold office until their successors shall have been

elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein

and qualified. . . ." Whatever incumbent elective positions exist under the present

set-up, it appears that in case of a negative vote, these sub-provincial positions

shall be filled by appointment of the President. The makers of the law however,

failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails naturally, the sub-

province shall continue to be a part of the original province and continue to be

represented by the provincial officials of the original province. The law is silent

or whether the voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regularprovince shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the

election held simultaneously with the plebiscite. If the voters of Guimaras were

allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo and the "Yes" vote in the

plebiscite prevailed, these votes shall not be considered. If however, the "No"vote prevailed and the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the

provincial officials of Iloilo, their votes shall be taken into consideration. The

Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the plebiscite

decided not to let the voters of Guimaras vote for the provincial officials. TheCommission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the

1991 Local Government Code, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a

regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up

the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors

shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of anegative vote, the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by

the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint

provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people ofthe sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial

officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo

province including the sub-province of Guimaras.chanrobles law library

However, it would serve no useful purpose if We undo all that the Commissionon Elections had done in that plebiscite. It is more relevant to deal with the facts

actually obtaining in the instant case. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the

voters of the subprovince of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the

conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. The total "Yes" votes was

283,224 as against 42,524 "No" votes (p. 34, Rollo). In this event, the President

shall appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to newspaper reports,the governor for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also

appoint a vice-governor and the member of the sangguniang panlalawigan inaccordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-

province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from the

province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a special

election for the municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia for the

purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and

academic.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library


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SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and

Nocon, Jr.,JJ., concur.

Equal Protection Gerrymandering

**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment ofrepresentative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in

power. **

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution

No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwiseprovided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities,

and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial

elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a

chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue tothe list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf ofthe other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed)

questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They

said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the

right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering

motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charterof Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and

historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered

voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebuwould be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu.

Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter.

Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including

Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to

vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in thatsuch classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the

purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the

right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a

denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of

local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is

stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of localgovernment units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or

legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger,abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio

should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite

in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into

being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character andtherefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into

existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities onthe basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction.

The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and

development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It

would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity

as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographicallysituated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial

government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the

election of provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal

protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to

vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of

allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials anddenying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of

legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters rightof suffrage.


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Tobias v. AbalosFacts:RA 7675 converted Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city.

Sec. 49 of the law provides that the City of Mandaluyong shall have its

own legislative district. Petitioners contend that said section violatethree provisions of the Constitution: the one-subject one-bill rule (Art.

VI, Sec. 26(1)); that the House of Representatives shall be composedof not more than 250 members (Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)); and that it

preempted Congress of its right to reapportion legislative districts (Art.VI, Sec. 5(4)).

Issue: WON Sec. 49 ofRA 7675 violates the Constitution, as asserted

by petitioners.

Ruling: No violation. Liberal construction of the one-title, one-subjectrule: sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and

all the provisions are germane to that general subject. Absence ofcensus data showing 250K inhabitants: not required that all laws

emanating from Congress contain all relevant data considered by it inthe enactment of said laws. 250-member limit not absolute: "unless

otherwise provided by law". Preempting of Congress' right: Congresspassed the bill. Gerrymandering accusation: division of SanJuan/Mandaluyong into two diminished Zamora's constituency, which

could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts:

Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of

the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong

into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same

bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by

invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to

for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying

RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one

subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members

of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.

Ruling:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention

of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a

practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient

compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject

and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was

enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the

members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which

drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra7675-mandaluyong-city-charter.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra7675-mandaluyong-city-charter.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra7675-mandaluyong-city-charter.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra7675-mandaluyong-city-charter.html


18/47

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Miranda vs Aguirre

Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM

G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of

Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA

No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.

1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 thatpractically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independentcomponent city to a component city. Petitioners assail the

constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit

the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a properplebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying

that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an

independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not

involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantialalteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, aplebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also

questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued

that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacksjurisdiction.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition atbar.

RULING:

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court

has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a politicalquestion but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could

decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is

unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger,division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local

government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected ismandatory.

Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No.

8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was thePresident of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners

were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to

be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to beconducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.

8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law asunconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial powershall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may

be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts ofjustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not therehas been a grave

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