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53715

IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers

Since1998,Indonesiahasbeenundergoingamomentouspoliticalandeconomictransition.The

fall of the New Order, the economic crisis, and radical decentralization have changed the

political, economic and social context.Within this new context, power relations are in flux,

identitiesarebeing renegotiated,and institutionsarechanging.Changes in incentives,and in

the roleof formal and informal institutions at various levels, havealtered theways inwhich

individualsandgroupsrelatetoeachotherandthestate.Understandingthisnewcontext,and

theways inwhich various actors (national and international) can promote progressive social

changeisimportant.

The Indonesian Social Development Papers series aims to further discussion on a range of

issues relating to the current social and political context in Indonesia, and to help in the

generationof ideasonhowdemocratic andpeaceful transition canbe supported. The series

willcoverarangeofissuesincludingconflict,development,corruption,governance,theroleof

thesecuritysector,andsoon.Eachpaperpresentsresearchonaparticulardimensionofsocial

developmentandofferspragmaticpolicysuggestions.Papersalsoattempttoassesstheimpact

ofvariousinterventions—fromlocalandnationalactors,aswellasinternationaldevelopment

institutions—onpreexistingcontextsandprocessesofchange.

The papers in the series are works in progress. The emphasis is on generating discussion

amongst different stakeholders—including government, civil society, and international

institutions—rather than offering absolute conclusions. It is hoped that they will stimulate

further discussions of the questions they seek to answer, the hypotheses they test, and the

recommendationstheyprescribe.

PatrickBarron(serieseditor) [email protected]

Bagian dalamcover depan

DeliveringAssistanceto

Conflict‐AffectedCommunities

TheBRA‐KDPPrograminAceh

AdrianMorel

MakikoWatanabe

RobertWrobel

December2009

IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.13

PapersintheIndonesianSocialDevelopmentseriesarenotformalpublicationsoftheWorldBank.They

arepublishedinformallyandcirculatedtoencouragediscussionandcommentbetweenthoseinterested

inIndonesiandevelopmentissues.Thefindings,interpretations,judgments,andconclusionsexpressed

in thepaper are thoseof the authors and shouldnotbe attributed to: theWorldBankandaffiliated

organizations; members of the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors or the governments they

represent;oranyofthefundingagencies.

ThefullrangeofpublicationsassociatedwiththebroaderstudyoflocalconflictinIndonesia(ofwhich

thisreportisaproduct)isavailableonlineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org.

Emailaddressesforcorrespondence:

[email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]

Copiesofthispaperareavailablefrom:

PNPMSupportFacility

JalanDiponegoroNo.72

Jakarta10310Indonesia

Tel:+62(0)213148175

Fax:+62(0)2131903090

i

Preface

The end of the conflict in Aceh led to the arrival of a range of different programs aimed at

‘reintegrating’ former combatants and providing assistance to conflict‐affected groups. The

BRA‐KDP programwas an innovative attempt by local and national governments to employ

lessons learnedfromsuccessfulcommunity‐developmentprogramstopost‐conflictAceh.The

program, designed and implemented with support from the World Bank, delivered around

US$ 21.7 million to over 1,700 conflict‐affected villages, aiming to support the welfare of

conflictvictimswhilebuildingsocialcohesionandtrustinthestate.

DidBRA‐KDPwork?Whatdidtheprogramachieve?Whatchallengeswerefacedandwerethey

addressedsuccessfully?WhatlessonscanbelearntfromtheBRA‐KDPexperiencethatmightbe

usefultosimilarprogramsinthefuture?Thispaperaddressesthesequestionsbypresentingan

assessment of program achievements drawing from data and evidence from the project’s

Monitoring Information Supervision (MIS) system, supervision missions and qualitative

fieldwork. It should be read in conjunction with a complementary impact evaluation,

Community‐BasedReintegrationinAceh:AssessingtheImpactsofBRA‐KDP (IndonesianSocial

DevelopmentPapernumber12),which identifiesproject impactsonwelfare,socialcohesion,

andtrustingovernment.

PatrickBarron

Conflict&Developmentteam

WorldBank,Indonesia

ii

ExecutiveSummary

The Community‐based Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims (or BRA‐KDP) channeled

overUS$20millionto1,724conflict‐affectedvillagesacross67sub‐districtsin17districtsfrom

August 2006 to August 2007. The program was designed and implemented after earlier

attemptsbytheAcehPeace‐ReintegrationAgency(BRA)toapplyanindividualproposal‐based

system to identify and assist conflict victims proved unsuccessful, and an alternative

mechanism was needed. BRA, with technical assistance from the World Bank, adapted the

community‐basedblockgrantmechanismutilizedbytheGovernmentofIndonesia’sKecamatan

DevelopmentProgram(KDP)toempowercommunitiestodecidewhoisavictimandwhatkind

ofassistancevictimswouldreceive.Allvillageswithinthetargetedsub‐districtsreceivedblock

grantsrangingfromRp.60million(US$6,000)toRp.170million(US$17,000)dependingonthe

intensity of past conflict in the sub‐district and the village population size. The primary

objectiveofBRA‐KDPwastoimprovethelivingconditionsofconflict‐affectedcommunitiesand

conflictvictimsbydeliveringdevelopmentassistancetailoredtolocalneeds.

Mainfindings

The program aimed to identify and deliver assistance to conflict‐affected villagers. The

responsibilityforidentifyingwhowaseligibletobenefit,byhowmuch,andinwhatwayswas

devolved to communities who made these decisions through a series of village meetings.

Overall,thisprocesswentwell.Whilefundswerespreadtoalargeproportionofhouseholdsin

target areas, communities differentiated categories of beneficiaries based on levels of

conflict‐affectedness.The ‘most‐affected’ conflict victimswereprioritizedand received larger

amountsofassistance.

Communityparticipationinprogrammeetings,evenamongstvulnerablegroupssuchasconflict

victims and women, was strong: 40 to 56 percent of households were represented at key

meetingsoftheprogramcycle.Conflictvictimsshowedsatisfactorylevelsofparticipationand

awareness of program objectives and processes. A large proportion of women attended

meetings,althoughthequalityoftheirinvolvementindecision‐makingprocessesoftenproved

poor. Ex‐combatants interactedwith and influenced BRA‐KDP in positive and negativeways.

Thenatureoftherelationshipwithformercombatantsvariedacrossareasandwasinfluenced

by the local conflict history, relations between ex‐combatants and villagers and the level of

influenceformercombatantsretainedovercommunitiesafterthepeaceagreementand,above

all, theways inwhichprogramfacilitatorsengagedwith formercombatants.Despite the fact

thatprogramprocedurespreventedex‐combatantsfrombenefitingdirectlyfromtheprogram,

theywerebroadlysupportiveandsometimesplayedaveryconstructiveroleinsocializingand

implementing the program.A number of attempts by former combatants at capturing funds

through extortion or by exerting pressures on villagers were resolved peacefully after

mediationbyprogramstakeholders.

BRA‐KDP had positive welfare impacts in target areas. The program applied an openmenu,

whichmadebothpublicandprivategoodseligible for funding.Communitiesoverwhelmingly

iii

preferred economic activities over public goods. Eighty‐nine percent of fundswere spent on

livelihoodsprojects.CommunitiesassociatedBRA‐KDPwithcompensationfortheconflictand

opted for projects that would provide direct individual benefits. The large majority of

beneficiaries invested funds in productive activities, such as the purchase of livestock and

agricultureinputs.Technicalassistanceforsmall‐scalelivelihoodsprojectsprovidedthroughthe

programwasinadequateandeffortstolinkbeneficiarieswithoutsidesourcesofknow‐howand

capitalfellshort.

LevelsofsatisfactionwerehighandcommunitiesfeltthatBRA‐KDPwassuccessfulinproviding

a well‐needed injection of capital as well as fulfilling the needs of conflict victims for

compensation and recognition. The program instituted a complaints handling system that

trackedcomplaintsovertimeandprovidedinformationandclarificationofprogramprocedures.

ComplaintsoverBRA’sshiftfromaproposal‐basedtoacommunity‐basedsystemforassisting

conflict victims, the amounts of sub‐district and village block grant allocations, and

implementationdelaysdecreasedovertimeasaresultof intensivesocializationactivitiesand

asfundshittheground.

ImplicationsandRecommendations

BRA‐KDPcouldhavebeenmoreeffectivehadseveralmodificationsbeenmade.Theseinclude

the articulation of a clear policy stance by government linking BRA‐KDP assistance to the

obligations defined in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, upgrading the skills of

program facilitators to assist communities in the process of identifying conflict victims, and

linking small‐scale livelihoods sub‐projects to outside sources of technical assistance and

capital.

Policymakers inAceh should continue to leverageKDP, now called theNational Community

Empowerment Program (PNPM Mandiri), to channel assistance to conflict‐affected villages

throughouttheprovince. In2009,thenewFinancialAssistanceforVillageProsperityprogram

(BKPG)willchannelaroundUS$100millioninprovincialanddistrictgovernmentfundsthrough

PNPMtoall villages inAceh.Thegovernment shouldexplorepossibilitiesofusingBRA‐KDP’s

targeting mechanism within BKPG to deliver private goods to vulnerable groups. Future

development programs in Aceh should avoid targeting mechanisms linked to conflict‐era

identities.Instead,programsshouldapplytargetingmechanismsbasedonindicatorsofwelfare,

suchasunemployment,education,andassetlevels.

ExperiencefromBRA‐KDPisrelevanttoDDRandcommunity‐drivendevelopmentpractitioners

in conflict‐affected countries and regions, as well as for policy makers in other parts of

Indonesia. BRA‐KDP’s positivewelfare impacts suggest that funds intended as compensation

canhavedevelopmental impactsprovided that theproperdeliverymechanismsare inplace.

ThisquestionsthewidelyheldassumptionthatDDRprogramsmustfollowasequenceinwhich

compensation is delivered prior to implementing programs with a developmental focus. In

terms of targeting, the program proved more successful when beneficiaries were identified

strictly based on criteria related to conflict loss and victimhood. This suggests that

iv

community‐based DDR programs should allow all groups, including former combatants for

whichothertargetedprogramsmayexist,accesstoprogrambenefitsprovidedthattargeting

criteriaarebasedonwelfareindicatorsratherthanidentity.

v

TABLEOFCONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY ...................................................................................................................II

TABLEOFCONTENTS .................................................................................................................... V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................................ VIII

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................. IX

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 ThePeaceProcessinAceh.............................................................................................................. 1

1.2 Community‐BasedAssistancefortheReintegrationofConflictVictims ........................................ 2

1.3 Structure,Aims&Methods ............................................................................................................ 4

2 THEBRA‐KDPPROGRAM....................................................................................................... 6

2.1 ObjectivesofBRA‐KDP.................................................................................................................... 6

2.2 TargetAreasandAllocations .......................................................................................................... 6

2.3 HowwastheProgramImplemented? ............................................................................................ 7

3 IDENTIFYINGCONFLICTVICTIMS .............................................................................................. 11

3.1 WhoisaConflictVictim?PerceptionsofVictimhoodandIdentificationCriteria ........................ 11

3.2 HowCommunitiesIdentifiedConflictVictims .............................................................................. 13

4 INCLUSION:INVOLVINGDISADVANTAGEDGROUPSINDECISION‐MAKING.......................................... 21

4.1 LevelsofParticipation................................................................................................................... 21

4.2 ParticipationofDisadvantagedGroups:WomenandConflictVictims ........................................ 23

4.3 EngagingEx‐Combatants .............................................................................................................. 27

5 HOWFUNDSWEREUSED:THEECONOMICIMPACTOFTHEPROGRAM.............................................. 34

5.1 WhatdidBeneficiariesUseFundsFor? ........................................................................................ 34

5.2 ReasonsfortheChoicesmadebyCommunities........................................................................... 37

5.3 TechnicalQualityofProjects ........................................................................................................ 39

6 VIEWSOFCOMMUNITIES:LEVELSOFSATISFACTION&COMPLAINTS ................................................ 41

6.1 LevelsofSatisfaction .................................................................................................................... 41

6.2 ComplaintsHandlingMechanisms................................................................................................ 42

6.3 Complaints .................................................................................................................................... 43

6.4 Socialization .................................................................................................................................. 49

6.5 OneYearafterCompletion:WhatIssuesareIdentifiedbyBeneficiaries? ................................... 52

vi

7 IMPLICATIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................... 54

7.1 HowCouldBRA‐KDPhaveContributedmoreEffectivelytoReintegrationinAceh? ................... 54

7.2 What’sNextforCommunity‐BasedReintegrationandPost‐ConflictRecoveryinAceh?............. 56

7.3 ImplicationsforDDRTheoryandPractice .................................................................................... 57

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................60

ANNEXA:LISTOF2006TARGETSUB‐DISTRICTSANDALLOCATIONS ..........................................62

ANNEXB:SUPERVISIONMISSIONS‐EFE RENCES I ONSD SECO CATIONS......................................65

ANNEXC:COMPLAINTSHANDLINGFLOW‐CHART .................................................................. 68

TableofTables

Table1.1BRAReintegrationPrograms2005‐2007 ........................................................................2

Table2.1SizeofVillageBlockGrants(Rp.) ....................................................................................7

Table2.2BRA‐KDPImplementationTimeLine ............................................................................10

Table3.1VariationintheProportionofBRA‐KDPDirectBeneficiariesinSub‐districtPopulation

......................................................................................................................................................14

Table3.2VariationintheProportionofWomenAmongBRA‐KDPBeneficiariesAcross

Sub‐districts ................................................................................................................................15

Table4.1LevelsofAttendanceofFemaleVillagersinBRA‐KDPandRegularKDP ......................24

Table4.2ReportedCasesofExtortionbyEx‐combatants ...........................................................31

Table6.1CategoriesofIssues ......................................................................................................43

TableofFigures

Figure2.1BRA‐KDPProgramCycle ................................................................................................8

Figure3.1SampleofConflictVictimsMap...................................................................................13

Figure3.2DirectBeneficiariesasaPercentageoftheTotalPopulation......................................14

Figure3.3ProportionofWomenAmongBeneficiaries,ByDistrict .............................................15

Figure3.4AverageAmountsofAssistanceReceivedByVictimhoodCategory ...........................18

Figure4.1ComparisonofAttendanceRateBetweenBRA‐KDPandKDP,asaProportionofAll

Households...................................................................................................................................22

Figure4.2ParticipationandAwarenessbyGender .....................................................................26

Figure4.3ParticipationandAwarenessbyVictimhoodCategory ...............................................26

Figure5.1FundsSpentByTypeofActivity ..................................................................................35

vii

Figure5.2EconomicSub‐projectsvs.otherActivities,PerDistrict,asaProportionofFunds

Allocated.......................................................................................................................................36

Figure5.3BreakdownofSub‐projectsbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoEconomicActivities)...36

Figure5.4BreakdownofSub‐projectsbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoInfrastructure) ...........37

Figure6.1BreakdownofInformationRequestsandComplaintsReceivedViaTextMessage ....47

Figure6.2EvolutionofInformationRequestsOverTime ............................................................48

Figure6.3PerceptionsofBRA‐KDP ..............................................................................................53

TableofBoxes

Box1.1TheKecamatanDevelopmentProgramandPNPMinIndonesiaandAceh ......................3

Box2.1ObjectivesofBRA‐KDP.......................................................................................................6

Box3.1BRACriteriaforConflictVictims ......................................................................................12

Box3.2CriteriaUsedtoRankConflictVictimsandScaleAssistance ...........................................16

Box3.3RankingConflictVictimsinAcehTimurandAcehUtara .................................................20

Box4.1DefusingTensionsinBireuen ..........................................................................................30

Box4.2Ex‐combatantsDemandaPieceofthePie‐‐theCaseofNisam,AcehUtara...................32

Box4.3Ex‐combatantsasSpoilers‐‐theCaseofSawang,AcehUtara .........................................33

Box5.1TheOpenMenu...............................................................................................................35

Box5.2TheBalancebetweenLivelihoodsandInfrastructureinBateeDabai,Makmur,Bireuen

......................................................................................................................................................39

Box5.3BagiRata–CasesofSuccessfulandUnsuccessfulSub‐projectSelectionand

Implementation............................................................................................................................40

Box5.4PoultryFarminTimanangGading ...................................................................................40

Box6.1ReallocationofVillageGrants‐‐theCaseofManyakPayed,AcehTamiang ....................45

Box6.2ConstraintsandIssueswithInitialDisbursementtoSub‐districts...................................46

Box6.3SummaryofSocializationActivities .................................................................................50

viii

Acknowledgements

This paperwas funded by generous contributions from theUKDepartment for International

Development (DFID), the Decentralization Support Facility (DSF) and the World Bank’s Post

Conflict Fund.Many other individuals and institutions contributed to this report. The whole

Aceh Conflict and Development team participated in supervisionmissions. Pak Rusli and his

teamatKDP’sRegionalManagementUnit (RMU),aswellasKDP facilitators in the field,also

joined missions and played a key role in ensuring their success. Susanne Schafer provided

inputsonthequalityofwomen’sparticipation.MilenaSeiboldprovidedinsightsregardingthe

efficacy of the program’s complaints handling system. The section of this paper devoted to

socialization borrows largely from Teuku Zukhradi Setiawan’s assessment of socialization

impacts. Wawan Herwandi processed data from KDP’s MIS system. Patrick Barron, Victor

BottiniandSusanWongprovidedcritical feedbackthroughout.Keystaff fromtheMinistryof

HomeAffairs,BappenasandtheKDP’sNationalManagementCommitteewerealsosupportive.

TheauthorswouldalsoliketothankBRA’sleadership,bothPakIslahuddin(theagency’sformer

head)whowasinstrumentalinimplementingtheprogram,andcurrentdirectorPakNurDjuli.

ix

Glossary

Acronyms

AMM AcehMonitoringMission

CDD Community‐DrivenDevelopment

DDR Disarmament,DemobilizationandReintegration

FGD FocusGroupDiscussion

Forbes JointForumtoSupportPeaceinAceh(ForumBersama

PerdamaianAceh)

GAM FreeAcehMovement(GerakanAcehMerdeka);organization

formerlyseekingAcehneseindependence

GoI GovernmentofIndonesia

IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson

IOM InternationalOrganizationforMigration

Kodam ProvincialCommandoftheIndonesianarmedforces

KPA AcehTransitionCommittee(KomitePeralihanAceh);namefor

demobilizedGAM

LoGA LawontheGoverningofAceh

MIS ManagementInformationSystem

MoU MemorandumofUnderstanding(thepeaceagreementsigned

betweenGAMandGoIinHelsinkionAugust15,2005)

NGO Non‐GovernmentalOrganization

PETA DefendersoftheHomeland(PembelaTanahAir):anti‐separatist

front

RRI IndonesianStateRadio(RadioRepublikIndonesia)

Tapol/Napol Amnestiedpoliticalprisoners(TahananPolitik/NarapidanaPolitik)

TNI Indonesianarmedforces(TentaraNasionalIndonesia)

UNDDR UnitedNationsDisarmament,DemobilizationandReintegration

ResourceCenter

WB WorldBank

IndonesianJurisdictionalLevels

Kotamadya UrbanDistricts(fiveinAceh)

Kabupaten RuralDistrict(18inAceh)

Kecamatan Sub‐district(276inAceh)

x

Desa Village(6,411inAceh)

Dusun Sub‐village/hamlet

GovernmentMinistries

Bappenas NationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency(BadanPerencanaan

PembangunanNasional)

Dinsos DepartmentofSocialAffairs,provinciallevel(DinasSosial)

KPPN OfficeofStateTreasury(KantorPelayananPerbendaharaan

Negara)

PMD CommunityDevelopmentdivisionoftheMinistryofHomeAffairs,

provinciallevel

GovernmentPositions

Bupati RuralDistrictHead

Camat Sub‐DistrictHead

Geuchik VillageHead(Acehnese)

KepalaDesa VillageHead

Walikota MayorofUrbanDistrict

BRA‐KDPTerms

ARLS AcehReintegrationandLivelihoodsSurveys

Bapel AgencyresponsibleforimplementingBRAprograms(Badan

Pelaksana)

BKPG FinancialAssistanceforVillageDevelopmentprogram(Bantuan

KeuanganPemakmurGampong)

BRA AcehPeace‐ReintegrationAgency(BadanReintegrasi‐DamaiAceh)

BRA‐KDP Community‐BasedReintegrationAssistanceforConflictVictims

program

DOK Operationalfunds(DanaOperasionalKegiatan)

FD VillageFacilitator(FasilitatorDesa)

FK Sub‐DistrictFacilitator(FasilitatorKecamatan)

KDP KecamatanDevelopmentProgram

KM DistrictManagementConsultant(KonsultanManagemen

Kabupaten)

MAD KecamatanDevelopmentForum(MusyawarahAntarDesa)

MD VillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesa)

xi

MDI FirstVillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesaI)

MDII SecondVillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesaII)

MDIII ThirdVillageMeeting(MusyawarahDesaIII)

PIU ProjectImplementationUnit

PjOK Sub‐districtlevelDevelopmentCoordinator

PL FieldAssistant(PendampingLokal)

PNPM NationalCommunityDevelopmentProgram(ProgramNasional

PengembanganMasyarakat)

PTO OperationalGuidelines

RMU RegionalManagementUnit

TK‐PPK KDPCoordinationTeam(TimKoordinasiPPK)

TPK ProjectImplementationTeamatthevillagelevel(TimPelaksanaan

Kegiatan)

UPK ImplementationManagementUnitatthesub‐districtlevel(Unit

PengelolaanKegiatan)

OtherTerms

Bagirata Equaldivisionofblockgrantsacrossallindividualsorhouseholdsin

agivenvillage

Diyat Formofcompensation

Meunasah Villagecommunityhall,alsotypicallyusedforreligiousteaching

andprayers

Musyawarah Meetingwheredecisionsaremadebasedondeliberationand

consensus

Mukim Traditionalfigure

Panglima Commander

Panglimawilayah Commanderatwilayahlevel

Pilkada Localexecutiveelections

Wilayah Region,roughlyequivalenttodistrict

xii

BRA‐KDPTargetSites

1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 ThePeaceProcessinAceh

On15August2005, theGovernmentof Indonesia (GoI)andtheFreeAcehMovement (GAM)

signed the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) putting an end to a separatist

conflictthatlastednearlythirtyyearsandresultedinalmost30,000deaths.Almostfouryears

on,muchprogresshasbeenmadetowardsconsolidatingpeaceinAceh.TheAcehMonitoring

Mission(AMM)successfullyoversawthedestructionof840GAMweaponsandthewithdrawal

of31,681policeandmilitaryby theendofDecember2005.On11 July2006, the Indonesian

nationalparliamentpassedtheLawonGoverningAceh(LoGA),asrequiredundertheMoU.In

2006, during Aceh’s first direct local executive elections, GAM‐affiliated independent

candidatesIrwandi‐Nazarwonalandslidevictoryinthegubernatorialrace,andGAM‐affiliated

candidates won half the regency contests. Despite sporadic violence, the 2009 legislative

elections took placewithoutmajor incident. Partai Aceh, the local political party formed by

GAM,felljustshortofobtaininganabsolutemajorityintheprovincialparliamentandsecured

over half the seats in seven district legislatures, a further step in the transformation of the

formerseparatistmovementintoademocraticpoliticalorganization.

Despitetheseearlysuccesses,thetransitionfromconflicttosustainablepeacewilltakemany

years.Experiencefromotherpost‐conflictcontextsdemonstratesthataseriousriskofrenewed

conflictexistsforanumberofyearsafteranypeaceagreement(Collieret.al.2003).TheAceh

conflict had significant impacts, which continue to shape social and state‐society relations.

Thousands of liveswere lost, thousandsmorewere traumatized, the economywas severely

stunted,civilsocietywasweakened,andgovernmentcapacityreduced(MSR2009).Whilethe

initial returnof combatantsand formerpoliticalprisonersoccurredwithout seriousproblem,

addressing their needs as well as those of the wider community is crucial to healing the

fracturesinsocietyandensuringsustainablepeace.

TheMoUmandated the establishment of a Reintegration Fund, financedout of thenational

budget andmanagedby provincial government, to addressmanyof these challenges and to

facilitatethereintegrationofformerconflictactors intosocialandeconomic life.1 TheBadan

Reintegrasi‐DamaiAceh(AcehPeace‐ReintegrationAgencyorBRA)wasestablishedinFebruary

2006 tooversee the reintegrationprocess,anddevelopeda seriesofprograms targetingkey

populationgroups.Tocarryouttheseprograms,theIndonesiangovernmentbudgetedRp.1.5

trillion (approximately US$ 150 million)2 for the Reintegration Fund for 2005‐2007.3 The

1 “GoIandtheauthoritiesofAcehwilltakemeasurestoassistpersonswhohaveparticipatedinGAMactivitiesto

facilitate their reintegration into the civil society. These measures include economic facilitation to former

combatants,pardonedpoliticalprisonersandaffectedcivilians.AReintegrationFundundertheadministrationof

theauthoritiesofAcehwillbeestablished”(HelsinkiMemorandumofUnderstanding,Clause3.2.3).2 TheexchangerateusedthroughoutthisreportisofUS$1=Rp.10,000.3 The central government allocated BRA a budget of Rp. 200 billion (US$ 20 million) in 2005, Rp. 600 billion

(US$60million) in2006andRp.700billion (US$70million) in2007,bywhich time itwasanticipatedthatBRA

2

Reintegration Fund provided social and economic assistance (see Table 1.1). The former

includedcompensationfortherelativesofthosedeadormissingduetotheconflict,housing

assistance, assistance for physically disabled people, and medical assistance. The latter

providedasetamountofcompensationtodifferenttargetgroupssuchasformercombatants,

politicalprisonersandconflictvictims.

Table1.1BRAReintegrationPrograms2005‐2007

CategoryPlannedno.of

beneficiariesFormofassistance Amount(US$)

GAMcombatants 3,000 Cash 2,500/person

GAM“non‐combatants” 6,200 Cash 1,000/person

Politicalprisoners 2,035 Cash 1,000/person

Pro‐Indonesiamilitiagroups 5,000 Cash 1,000/person

GAMwhosurrenderedbeforethe

MoU(andwhousuallyjoinedthe

militiagroups)

3,204 Cash 500/person

Medicalassistance 3packets In‐kindassistance 500,000/year

Village‐basedassistance(2006to

mid‐2007)

1,724villages Villagegrants 6,000–17,000/

village

Individualconflictvictimassistance

(mid‐tolate2007)

1,059persons Cash 1,000/person

Compensationforlossoffamily

member(diyat)

33,424persons Cash 300/personper

year

Housingassistance 31,187units Cashallocation 3,500/house

Assistanceforthephysicallydisabled 14,932persons Cash 1,000/person

Source:Forbes(2007a;2007v);BRA(2008);communicationwithBRAmembers

1.2 Community‐BasedAssistancefortheReintegrationofConflictVictims

The Reintegration Fund included support for conflict victims. In April 2006, BRA invited all

individualswhosufferedconflict‐relatedlossestosendproposalsdirectlytoBRA.Thisprocess

proveduntenableasover48,500requestsforfundsweresubmitted,andBRAhadnomeansto

researchandverifytheseproposals (SharpeandSim2009).AttherequestofBRA,theWorld

Bank supported the design of an alternative delivery system that utilized the existing

GovernmentofIndonesia’sKecamatanDevelopmentProgram(Box1.1).

wouldhavecompleteditsmandateanditsfunctionswouldbemainstreamedintoexistinggovernmentstructures.

Thecombinedcontributionof centralandprovincialgovernments to the reintegrationeffortamounts toRp1.7

billionorUS$170millionandrepresentsjustunderhalfofthetotalamountofpost‐conflictassistancecommitted

toAceh (Rp3.7 trillionorUS$370million).Theotherhalfhascomefromdonors, theprivatesectorandNGOs.

(MSR2009).

3

Box1.1TheKecamatanDevelopmentProgramandPNPMinIndonesiaandAceh

KDPwas identifiedasanappropriateplatformthroughwhich todeliverassistance toconflict

victimsandconflict‐affectedcommunities.Theprogramhaddemonstrateditsabilitytooperate

insensitiveconflictandpost‐conflictareas.ItwasabletosustainitsAcehactivitiessince1998,

despitethecontinuingconflict,inlargepartbecauseofitspopularitywiththecommunityand

itsperceivedpolitical neutrality. KDPhas also successfullyoperated inother conflict areas in

Indonesia,includingPoso,Ambon,andCentralandWestKalimantan.

AnumberofKDP’sdesignelementsmadeitasuitablemechanismfordistributingreintegration

assistance.First,theprogramdesignemphasizesequity,transparencyandaccountability.These

principles are important in all developmentprojects, but are evenmore vital in post‐conflict

contexts.Second,theprogramdevolvesdecision‐makingtothelocallevel.Alldecisionsonfund

allocationinKDParemadeatthevillageandsub‐districtlevels,ensuringthatlocalknowledgeis

utilized.Giventhescarcityofresources,anddifficultiesinensuringaccuratetargeting,involving

communities in decision‐making can make resource allocations more acceptable. Allowing

communitiestodecidewhoshouldbenefitandwhatthemoneyshouldbespentonincreases

theirownership.Thisinturncancurbelitecaptureandmakescommunitiesmorereceptiveto

theoutcomesoftheprogram.

KDPwasajointWorldBank–Governmentcommunitydevelopmentprogramthatwasfirstlaunchedin1998atthe

onsetoftheAsianfinancialcrisis.Overthreephasesdeliveredfrom1998to2007,theprogramchanneledUS$1.4

billionofWorldBank loansandgrantsandnationalgovernmentfundsto33,500ofthepoorestvillages,almost

halfofIndonesia’scommunities.

KDP consisted of a straight‐forward system of decision‐making and administration. Block grants of between

US$60,000‐170,000foreachsub‐district(kecamatan)wereprovideddirectlytocollectiveaccountsatthatlevel.

Thesegrantswereusedforalmostanythingvillagersidentifiedasadevelopmentpriorityfortheirvillage.

In2008,theGovernmentofIndonesiadecidedtoscale‐upKDPtoachievenationalcoverage,undertheumbrella

oftheNationalProgramforCommunityEmpowerment(PNPM).In2009‐2010,PNPM‐KDPwillchannelgrantsof

uptoUS$300,000toeverysub‐districtnationwide,coveringeachofthearchipelago’s70,000communities.The

centralgovernmentwillscale‐upitsfinancialcontributiontotheprogramtofullfinancingby2011,andplansto

extendprogramimplementationuntilatleast2015.

InAceh,KDPoperatedthroughouttheconflictyearsandwasusedasaplatformthroughwhichtorespondtothe

tsunami.Afterthatdisaster,KDPwasscaled‐uptocovereveryruralvillageintheprovince.Itwasthefirst large

international post‐tsunami project to start and finish. Over a two‐year period, the project covered every

sub‐districtinAcehandNias,reachingalmost6,000villages.Givencoverageandpastsuccesses,KDPprovideda

mechanismforchannelingreintegrationfundstoconflict‐affectedareas.

Recently, the provincial government of Aceh elected to use PNPM as a key instrument in its development

strategy.Launchedin2009,theFinancialAssistanceforVillageDevelopment(BKPG)programwillprovidegrants

ofRp. 150million (approximatelyUS$15,000) toevery village inAceh through thePNPMmechanism.BKPG is

financedjointlybyprovincialgovernment(Rp.100millionpervillage)anddistrictgovernments(Rp.50millionper

village)andisthelargestsub‐nationalpovertyprograminIndonesia.

4

BRA‐KDPdeliveredaroundRp.204billion(US$20.4million)inblock‐grants4 to1,724villagesin

67sub‐districtsacross17districts.ItwasinitiallyplannedthatBRA‐KDPwouldbeimplemented

over two years, with around Rp. 564 billion (approximately US$ 56 million) of central

governmentfundingchanneledtoeveryruralvillageinAcehintwosuccessiverounds.However,

as the first round was nearing completion in mid‐2007, BRA decided to revert to its initial

scheme of individually‐targeted assistance and BRA‐KDP’s second round was never

implemented.

BRA‐KDPallowedcommunitiestoproposealmostanykindofproject;beneficiariescouldbethe

entirecommunity,agroupofvillagersorindividuals,dependingonthecommunity’sdecision.

Villagers affected by conflict were the principle target group and had to benefit from the

program.

1.3 Structure,Aims&Methods

ThispaperpresentsanoverviewofBRA‐KDP’sachievements,ananalysisof issues faced,and

provides recommendations for community‐driven development (CDD) and Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) practitioners designing or overseeing programs that

use community‐based mechanisms to deliver reintegration assistance. It should be read in

conjunctionwithanaccompanyingimpactevaluation(Barronet.Al.2009).Thispaperdrawson

fourprimarysources:(i)asurveyofKDPdistrictfacilitators;(ii) jointsupervisionmissions;(iii)

KDP’s Management Information System (MIS) database; and (iv) findings from the Aceh

ReintegrationandLivelihoodsSurveys.

KDPDistrictFacilitatorSurvey.AtelephonesurveyofallKDPdistrictfacilitatorswasconducted

in November 2006. The aim was to get a snap‐shot of progress before funds reached the

ground and to identify key technical and socio‐political issues that could affect program

implementation. This also allowed for the identification of districts that needed special

attention. A total of 25 responses (24 male and one female) from 15 out of 17 districts

(responses from Aceh Jaya and Nagan Raya were missing) were collected. A focus group

discussion with representatives from six diverse districts was conducted for more in‐depth

discussion.

Supervision Missions. In order to capture a more detailed picture of progress and

implementation dynamics, the World Bank, together with BRA and KDP’s Regional

ManagementUnit(RMU),conductedthreemajorsupervisionmissions.Thesemissionscovered

acombinedtwo‐thirdsofprojectlocations(44outof67sub‐districts)–seeAnnexB.Thefirst

missionwas conducted in November 2006 before fundswere disbursed to target villages. A

morecomprehensivesupervisionmissionwasconductedinMarch2007whenimplementation

was well underway. Five teams surveyed 20 sub‐districts across eleven districts, almost

4 ThetotalbudgetoftheprogramwasofRp.217.7billion(US$21.7million),ofwhich94percentweredisbursed

to beneficiary communities as block grants, while the remaining six percent were used to cover program

operationalexpensesatsub‐district(threepercent)andvillage(threepercent)levels.

5

one‐thirdoftargetsub‐districts.AthirdsupervisionmissionwasheldinJulyandlateSeptember

2007 tomake an initial assessment of program outcomes. In all threemissions, selection of

target areas took into account geographic diversity, representation of diverse levels of

conflict‐affectedness,populationsize,andthesizeofblockgrants.InterviewsandFocusGroup

Discussions(FGD)wereconductedwithawiderangeofinformantsincludingBRAdistrict‐level

officials, KDP facilitators, ex‐GAM combatants, Homeland Defenders Front (PETA) members,

localgovernment,communityleaders,conflictvictims,andwomenheadsofhousehold.

MISDatabase.Projectdatawasusedtoobtaininformationonprogramprogress,participation

rates at inter‐village and village meetings, samples of proposals prioritized by villagers, and

conflictvictimmaps.

AcehReintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS).A largesurveywascarriedoutoneyear

aftercompletionoftheprogram,fromJulytoSeptember2008toevaluateprogramimpactsin

three distinct areas: welfare of the conflict victims and conflict‐affected communities;

reintegration and social cohesion; and trust in local government and state‐society relations.

2,150 randomly selected households, as well as all village heads, were interviewed in 215

villages spread across each of the 67 rural sub‐districts that received BRA‐KDP, and 215

matched control villages that did not benefit from the program but were otherwise similar.

Thesesurveysincludeddetailedmeasuresofhouseholdwelfare,socialcohesionandattitudes

towards government, to assess how villages treated in BRA‐KDP differed post‐program from

thosethatwerenottreated.ThepresentpaperusespreliminaryfindingsfromtheARLS,buta

morecomprehensiveanddetailedanalysisofthesurvey’sresultsispresentedintheseparate

impactevaluationpaper(Barronet.al.2009).

Thepaperisdividedintosevensectionsplusannexes:

• SectionIIgivesabriefdescriptionoftheprogramandtheprogramcycle;

• Section III discusses how communities handled the challenging tasks of identifying

conflictvictimsanddirectingassistancetothemost‐affected;

• Section IV looks at participation and inclusion issues, including ways that

ex‐combatantsinteractedwiththeprogram;

• Section V discusses beneficiary communities’ usage of funds and program welfare

impacts;

• Section VI assesses the level of satisfaction of communitieswith program outcomes

andprovidesananalysisofmaincomplaintsandconcerns;

• SectionVIIprovidesasummaryoffindingsandrecommendations.

6

2. THEBRA‐KDPPROGRAM

ThedesignoftheBRA‐KDPprogramdifferedinanumberofwaysfromregularKDP.Thissection

describes the BRA‐KDP program: its objectives, target areas, institutional arrangements, and

the basic program cycle. It also outlines arrangementsmade to assure quality and promote

institutionallearning.

2.1 ObjectivesofBRA‐KDP

BRA‐KDP aimed to deliver quick assistance to conflict‐affected villagers to improve their

material wellbeing in the short‐term. In addition, it sought to promote social cohesion, to

strengthen village‐level decision‐making institutions, and to cultivate greater faith in

governmental institutions in the aftermath of the conflict (Box 2.1). A previousWorld Bank

study on the efficacy of KDP suggested that by applying the principles of participation,

transparency, local choice and accountability, community‐drivendevelopmentprogramshelp

improve inter‐group and state‐society relations, which in turn builds immunity to violent

conflicts (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 2006). BRA‐KDP applied the community‐driven

developmentapproachtoreintegrationwiththehopethatitwouldimproverelationsbetween

variousconflict‐affectedgroups,includingex‐combatants,IDPs,conflictvictims,andthestate.

Box2.1ObjectivesofBRA‐KDP

2.2 TargetAreasandAllocations

BRA‐KDP targeted1,724villagesacross67 sub‐districts in17districts,oraroundone‐thirdof

villages inAceh.Urbanareasdidnot receive theprogram.Target sub‐districtswere selected

based on conflict intensity5 and past performance in regular KDP. All villages within the

selected sub‐districts received block grants varying from Rp. 60 million (approximately

US$6,000)andRp.170million(approximatelyUS$17,000),withtheamountdependentonthe

intensityofpastconflictinthesub‐districtandthepopulationofthevillage(Table2.1).Villages

5 Conflictintensitywascalculatedatthesub‐districtlevelbasedonthefollowingnineindicators:conflictvictims

(2002 Dinsos); conflict victims (2003 Dinsos); conflict victims (2004 Dinsos); military intensity (Kodam); GAM

returnee estimates (AMM/WB); political prisoners (IOM), GAM‐GoI incidents (2005 Aceh Kita & Serambi);

perceptionsofsafetypre‐MoU(WB);andperceptionsofconflictpre‐MoU(WB).Insufficientinformationexistedto

targetbyconflictintensityatthevillagelevel.

• Deliverquickassistancetoconflict‐affectedvillagersinatransparentandacceptedmannertohelp

stabilizethesecuritysituationandtoensurereintegrationfundsdonotleadtonewconflict

• Enhanceproductiveeconomicactivitiesoractivitiesthatenhanceconflict‐affectedindividuals’and

communities’livingconditionsthrougheconomicorcommunityinfrastructureprojects

• Enhancecommunityparticipationandinvolvementindecidingpriorityactivitiesthathelpaddress

peace‐buildingandpost‐conflictreconstruction

• Promotecohesionandacultureofpeaceinvillagesanddevelopandstrengthenthedevelopment

ofinstitutionsinvillagesforthispurposes

7

weredividedintothreebandsbasedonpopulation—large(over700persons),medium(300–

699persons),andsmall (below299persons).Thefollowingtableshowsthedifferentsizesof

theblockgrantsforeachvillage.Alistoftargetedsub‐districtsandblockgrantsisprovidedin

AnnexA.

Table2.1SizeofVillageBlockGrants(Rp.)

Population

Large Medium Small

High 170,000,000 150,000,000 120,000,000

Medium 120,000,000 100,000,000 80,000,000

Conflic

t

Inte

nsi

ty

Low 80,000,000 70,000,000 60,000,000

Where there were discrepancies in the number of villages or village population size, village

allocations could be readjusted through discussions at the inter‐villagemeeting, which took

placeatthesub‐districtlevel.Theallocationforeachsub‐districtcouldnotbeaugmented,but

theamountcouldberedistributedbetweenvillages.

2.3 HowwastheProgramImplemented?

BRA‐KDPwasmanagedjointlybyBRAandKDPwithtechnicalassistanceandsupportfromthe

World Bank. The provincial‐level Department of Social Affairs (Dinsos) had fiduciary

responsibilityfortheprogram.BRAattheprovinciallevelwasresponsibleforoverallpolicyand

implementation.DinsosandBRAcoordinatedcloselywiththeMinistryofHomeAffairs,which

executesKDP,aswellastheGovernor’sOffice,theNationalPlanningAgency(Bappenas), the

KDPRegionalManagementUnit(RMU),andtheWorldBankonanymajorissuesrelatedtothe

program.BRA’sProject ImplementationUnit (PIU)alongwith theKDPRegionalManagement

Unitwasinchargeofday‐to‐dayimplementationandmonitoringoftheprogram.

The program used the same open menu as regular KDP—meaning that communities could

propose almost any kind of project. Villagers affected by conflict were the principle target

group.6 Former combatants were not intended to benefit from BRA‐KDP assistance as the

Reintegration Fund included other programs that specifically targeted them. During public

villagemeetings communitymembers decidedwhowould receive assistance and howmuch

wouldbeprovidedtoeachpersonorproposalgroup.Tobettertargetassistance,theprogram

includedaconflictvictimsmappingprocess,whichassistedcommunitiesinidentifyingthemost

vulnerable victims to help ensure that they would benefit. Individuals and groups who had

submitted proposals to BRA under the previous system could present their proposals at the

6 Funds were disbursed based on proposals and could not simply be equally divided among individuals or

households.

8

village‐levelmeetingforconsiderationbythecommunityatlarge.However,existingproposals

receivednospecialconsiderationandwerenotnecessarilyprioritizedoverotherproposals.The

projectfollowedtenmainstepsasshowninFigure2.1.

Figure2.1BRA‐KDPProgramCycle

9

Step1–Socializationatthesub‐district level:theinter‐villagemeeting(MAD).Here,district

facilitatorsexplainedtheBRA‐KDPprogramanditsprocedurestoabroadaudience.Thetarget

groupsforthismeetingincludedthesub‐districtheads(Camat),religiousandtraditionalfigures

(Mukim),sub‐districtlevelgovernmentdevelopmentcoordinators(PjOK),BRA,ex‐combatants,

communityrepresentatives,police,theIndonesianmilitary,villageheads,community leaders,

andKDPfacilitatorsat thedistrict, sub‐districtandvillage levels.Aplanonhowtospendthe

sub‐districtoperationalfee(threepercentofthesub‐district’sblockgrant)wasdiscussed,and

thescheduleforvillagemeetingswasdetermined.

Step 2 – Socialization at village level: the first villagemeeting (MD I).Theprogramand its

proceduresweresocializedanddiscussedatthevillagelevelbylocalKDPfacilitatorsandfield

assistants(PL).Discussioncoveredthebackgroundtotheprogram,explanationofprocedures,

fundallocationandreleaseprocedures,reportingrequirements,andschedulingofthesecond

villagemeeting(MDII).Aplanforhowtospendthevillageoperationalbudget(threepercent

ofthevillage’sblockgrant)wasalsodiscussed.Theoperationalbudgetcoveredvillagemeeting

expensesandexpensesofthevillageimplementationteams.

Step3–Developmentofprojectideasandmappingconflictvictims.Tomakesurevulnerable

groupswerenotexcluded,BRA‐KDPinstitutedtwomeasures:theconflictvictimsmappingand

smallgroupmeetings,includingawomen’smeeting.Villagefacilitators(FD)andPLsorganized

themappingandsmallgroupmeetings.Thevillagefacilitatorshelpedidentifythemostaffected

conflictvictims,which inturnenabledthefacilitatorstoworkwiththemtohelpensuretheir

effective participation. The small group meetings provided avenues for marginalized groups

such as women and the poor whose voices were otherwise likely to be dismissed at larger

community‐widemeetings.KDPfacilitatorssatwiththesmallergroupsandhelpedthemdefine

theirprioritiesandchooseprojectsthatcorrespondedtotheirneeds.7

Step4–Communityprioritizationanddecision‐making:secondvillagemeeting(MDII).Ideas

for sub‐projectswere prioritized during theMD II, and conflict victimsmapswere reviewed.

Prioritization followed the same process as KDP—open discussion followed by voting. The

numberof proposals and the amount allocated for eachproposal selecteddependedon the

availabilityoffundsandthecommunity’sdecision.

Step 5 – Sub‐district verification and proposal writing. After priorities were determined,

prioritizedgroupspreparedtheirproposals.Thesewerethensubmittedtoaverificationteam

whoprovidedtechnicalinputsandadviceonhowtoimprovethem.Theverificationteamhad

toverifyproposalswithinfivedaysofreceipt.

Step6–Thirdvillagemeeting(MDIII).Thismeetingwasheldtoconfirmfundallocationforthe

prioritizedproposalsandtoschedulethedateforthereleaseoffunds.

7 Seethesubsequentsectionsformoredetailsonconflictvictimsmappingandthewomen’sgroupmeeting.

10

Step7–Sub‐districtHead’ssign‐off.Wheneachvillagewasready,proposalsweresubmitted

to the Camat for sign‐off. The Camat could issue an endorsement letter as proposals were

submitted without waiting for other villages to submit their proposals. Information on the

issuanceoftheendorsementletterhadtobepostedonprojectinformationboards.

Step 8 – Fund disbursement. Upon receipt of the Camat’s sign‐off, the KDP financial unit

releasedfundstoprojectteams.Villagerswitnessedthisfunddistribution.

Step 9 – Implementation. Villagers implemented sub‐projects under the supervision of the

villageimplementingteamandtheKDPfacilitators.

Step10–Accountabilitymeetings.Thevillageimplementationteamwasobligedtoupdatethe

community on the progress of the sub‐projects and provide financial reports twice during

implementation through accountability meetings. The first meeting took place before the

implementationteamrequestedthethirdtrancheoffunding.Communities’approval,andthe

KDP facilitator and local government’s endorsement at the accountabilitymeeting, triggered

payment of the third tranche. Once the project was completed, a second accountability

meetingwasheld.8 Table2.2showstheprogressofprogramimplementation,stepbystep.

Table2.2BRA‐KDPImplementationTimeLine

8 Eventually,thedecisionwasmadetoallowdisbursementofblockgrantsintwotranchesonly:sixpercentand94

percent.Themainreasonforthisdecisionwastheprevalenceoflivelihoodsprojectsamongactivitiesselectedby

beneficiarycommunities.Whilesuccessivetranchesofdisbursementsallowbettermonitoringandcontroloverthe

implementation of infrastructure projects, one‐off disbursement is more fitted to the purchase of livestock or

agricultural inputs. Therefore, only one accountability meeting was eventually held in most villages, after the

completionofactivities.

S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

Receipt of 6% DOK

Receipt of 94% BLM

Inter-Village Meeting (MAD)

1st Village Meeting (MD I)

Conflicts Victims Mapping

Sub-village meetings

2nd Village Meeting (MD II)

3rd Village Meeting (MD III)

Disbursements to communities

Implementation of Activities

Accountability Meeting

2006 2007

11

3. IDENTIFYINGCONFLICTVICTIMS

The program aimed to deliver assistance to conflict‐affected villagers. Failing to ensure a

transparent, fair andwidely accepted targeting process risked increasing tensions and social

jealousies. BRA‐KDP devolved decision‐making over who qualified as a conflict victim to

communities.Thisapproachpresentedseveralsignificantchallenges.First,theoutcomeofthe

targetingprocessverymuchreliedon thebeneficiarycommunities’ subjectiveperceptionsof

victimhood.Asitturnedout,thedominantperceptioninmanytargetlocationswasthatmost

villagerswere victims to some extent. Indeed, given the intensity of the conflict in program

areas,manyindividualscouldlegitimatelyclaimsomeformofconflict‐relatedloss.Toaddress

asmanyoftheseclaimsaspossible,communitiesoftendecidedtospreadfundsthinlyacrossa

largeproportionofhouseholdsorindividuals,includingtothosewhohadbeenonlylightly,ifat

all,affectedbytheconflict.Whilethispreventedtensionsfromemergingbetweenbeneficiaries

andnon‐beneficiaries,itmeantthatlesssupportwasavailableforthemostaffectedvillagers.

Second, community‐based mechanisms are susceptible to influence by elites or powerful

groups,suchasex‐combatants,whosometimestriedtocapturethedecision‐makingprocessto

secureashareoftheassistance.

This section analyzes theways inwhich communities identified conflict victims. It begins by

discussingthedefinitionofconflictvictimusedbytheprogram.Itthenprovidesadescriptionof

identificationproceduresandmechanisms.Thisisfollowedbyananalysisofhowcommunities

actuallyidentifiedandprioritizedvictims.

KeyFindings:

• The targeting process went well overall. The most heavily‐affected victims were

prioritized,andtheamountofassistancetheyreceivedwastypicallyhigherthanthatof

non‐victimsbyalmost20percent.

• Fundswerespreadbroadlyacrosshouseholds.Atotalof233,282individuals(22percent

oftheoverallpopulationoftargetsub‐districts)benefiteddirectlyfromtheassistance.

Thirty‐ninepercentofbeneficiarieswerewomen.

• Communities differentiated categories of beneficiaries according to levels of

conflict‐affectednessandscaledassistanceaccordingly.

• Theidentificationprocessprovedtobesensitive.Thisresultedindemands,widespread

during early stages of the program cycle, for funds to be divided equally across all

households or individuals in a given village. A range of factors affected the ability of

programfacilitatorstoovercomethesedemands.

3.1 WhoisaConflictVictim?PerceptionsofVictimhoodandIdentificationCriteria

TheHelsinkiMoUdoesnotincludeadefinitionofwhoisandisnotavictimandhencewhois

entitledtoassistance.MeetingsbetweenBRAandGAMproducedanagreedlistofcriteriatobe

usedfordeterminingvictimstatus.MostofAceh’spopulationfellunderthisbroaddefinition,

giventhedecisiontoincludethenegativeimpactofconflictonlivelihoods(seeBox3.1).

12

Box3.1BRACriteriaforConflictVictims

Specific BRA programs targeted some of themost‐affected andmost objectively identifiable

categories of conflict victims, such as thosewho lost a familymember as a result of conflict

violence(throughtheDiyatprogram),individualswhosehousehadbeendamagedordestroyed

(through the BRA housing program), and those who suffered physical or mental injuries.

However,theseprogramsdidnotbenefitthewidershareoftheAcehnesepopulationthathad

alsosufferedfromtheconflictbuttoa lesserdegree.Thisemergedasasignificantsourceof

tensionwithincommunitiesasvillagerswhohadnot receivedassistance resented thosewho

had.BRA‐KDPaimedtodefusethesetensionsbycomplementinghighlytargetedprogramsfor

themost‐affectedbyprovidingsomelevelofcompensationtothewiderpopulationthatwas

lessaffected.

BRA‐KDPConflictVictimIdentificationMechanisms

AftertheMDI,hamletmeetingswereheldwherevillagersmadealistofconflictvictims.The

programallowedcommunitiestoapplyitsowndefinitionforvictimhood.TheBRAcriteriawere

used as a starting point for discussions but villagers could decide to expand or amend the

criteriatoadapttargetingtolocaldynamicsandneeds.Theselistswerebroughttothesecond

villagemeeting (MD II)where thewhole community reviewed the list. Communitymembers

drewupamapofconflict‐affectedpersonstoassistinproposalselection(seeFigure3.1foran

example).DuringtheMDII,themapswerereviewedandcommunitiesagreedonafinallistof

beneficiaries.WhereKDPfacilitatorsfelttheprocesshadnotbeeninclusive,orthatvictimshad

notbenefited,theyoftencalledmorevillagemeetings.

InFebruary2006,representativesofBRA,formercombatantgroupsandcivilsocietyagreedinajointmeeting

onthefollowingcriteriatodefineconflictvictimsanddetermineeligibilitytocompensation:

• Widows/widowersandchildrenofindividualsdeceasedbecauseoftheconflict;

• Relativesofindividualswhodisappearedasaresultoftheconflict;

• Individualswhosehousewasdamaged,destroyedorburnedbecauseoftheconflict;

• Individualswhosepropertiesweredamaged,destroyedordisappearedasaresultoftheconflict;

• Individualswhoweredisplacedasaresultoftheconflict;

• Individualswhowerephysicallydisabledormutilatedasaresultoftheconflict;

• Individualswhosufferedpsychologicaltraumabecauseoftheconflict;

• Individualswhowerephysicallyinjured;

• Individualswholosttheirsourceofincomebecauseoftheconflict.

13

Figure3.1SampleofConflictVictimsMap

Note:highlyaffectedvictims'housesarecoloredinblack

3.2 HowCommunitiesIdentifiedConflictVictims

Villagers perceived a large proportion of the population to be victims. Communities

differentiated types of victims based on the level of affectedness, usually using three

categories:highlyaffected,mediumaffected,andslightlyaffected.Thesecategorieswereoften

usedtoprioritizeproposalsandscalethesizeofbenefits.Thosemostaffectedreceivedmore

thanthosewhowerelessaffected.

“Everybodyisaconflictvictim”

According toMISdata, 233,282 individuals, or22percentof theoverall populationof target

locations,benefiteddirectlyfromBRA‐KDPassistancethroughtheprovisionofcashorin‐kind

assistance for economic activities. Most were identified by communities as conflict victims,

although a share of the assistance was often directed towards ‘non‐victims’ in order to

maintaincohesionor inanattempttoaddresstheneedsofothervulnerablegroups,suchas

the poor.9 Figure 3.2 below shows that there was important geographic variation across

9 AccordingtoARLSprojections,anestimated530,000individualsliveinhouseholdsthatbenefitedfromBRA‐KDP.

Of these,overhalf (287,000)areconflictvictims.Note that these figures reflect thenumberofpersons living in

The image part with relationship ID rId16 was not found in the file.

14

districts,with thepercentageofdirectbeneficiaries ranging fromseven to58percentof the

totalpopulationoftargetlocations.

Figure3.2DirectBeneficiariesasaPercentageoftheTotalPopulation

Source:MISdata,KDPRegionalManagementUnit

In some sub‐districts, the proportion of direct beneficiaries reached over two‐thirds of the

population:66percent inBeutong,NaganRaya;71percent inSamalanga,Bireuen;andeven

theentirepopulationofPeusanganSiblahKrueng,Bireuen.However,Table3.1belowshows

thatin85percentofBRA‐KDPtargetsub‐districtstheproportionvariedmoremoderatelyfrom

lessthantento30percentofthepopulation.

Table3.1VariationintheProportionofBRA‐KDPDirectBeneficiariesinSub‐districtPopulation

Proportionofthepopulation

whobenefiteddirectlyfromBRA‐KDP

Numberof

sub‐districts

%

sub‐districts

>50% 5 7.5

30%‐50% 5 7.5

20%‐30% 20 30

10%–20% 24 36

<10% 13 19

Total 67 100


Anestimated209,026peoplebenefited indirectly from infrastructureandotherprojects that

benefitedthecommunityasawhole.Thisgroupoverlapswiththatofdirectbeneficiaries,as

many individuals benefited both directly from livelihoods support and indirectly from

infrastructureandcommunalprojects.

beneficiaryhouseholds,notthenumberofdirectbeneficiaries(Barronet.al.2009).

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Sim

eulu

eN

agan R

aya

Bireuen

Aceh T

am

iang

Pid

ieAceh U

tara

Aceh B

ara

t D

aya

Aceh S

ingkil

Gayo L

ues

Aceh T

imur

Aceh T

enggara

Aceh J

aya

Aceh T

engah

Bener M

eriah

Aceh B

ara

tAceh B

esar

Aceh S

ela

tan

15

Representationofwomenamongbeneficiaries

Amongdirectbeneficiaries,90,166(39percent)werewomen.Theproportionvariedfrom18to

51percentacrossdistricts(Figure3.3).

Figure3.3ProportionofWomenAmongBeneficiariesbyDistrict


Atthesub‐district level,boththehighestand lowestratiosofwomenwererecorded inAceh

Timur,with 58 percent ofwomen benefiting in Peureulak sub‐district and eleven percent in

Madatsub‐district.However, inmost locations, thepercentageofwomenvariedbetween30

and50percentofbeneficiaries(Table3.2).

Table3.2VariationintheProportionofWomenAmongBRA‐KDPBeneficiariesAcrossSub‐Districts

ProportionofwomenamongBRA‐KDP

directbeneficiaries

Numberof

sub‐districts

%total

sub‐districts

>50% 7 10%

30%‐50% 40 60%

<30% 20 30%

Total 67 100%


Notallconflictvictimsarethesame

“Everyone in thevillage is a conflict victimandwill benefit fromBRA‐KDP,but these twenty

householdsneededmorethantherest.”

VillageHead,BateeDamai,Makmursub‐district,Bireuen

Communities often understood the need to differentiate victims according to degree of

affectednessandtoscalebenefitssuchthatthosethatwereseriouslyaffectedreceivedmore

than others. Strategies for creating categories and ranking beneficiaries typically originated

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Aceh T

am

iang

Aceh J

aya

Nagan R

aya

Aceh B

ara

tA

ceh S

ingkil

Bireuen

Aceh T

engah

Aceh T

imur

Gayo L

ues

Sim

eulu

e

Pid

ieA

ceh B

esar

Aceh B

ara

t D

aya

Aceh U

tara

Aceh S

ela

tan

Bener

Meriah

Aceh T

enggara

16

from the KDP facilitators and were socialized through village‐level facilitation and

implementationteams.CommunitiesgenerallyusedBRA’ssetofcriteriaasastartingpointbut

also occasionally applied other criteria. Themost common combination used to identify and

classify conflict victims was the degree of conflict‐affectedness and the level of economic

vulnerability. In some cases, prior receipt of outside forms of assistance was used as an

additionalcriterion.Forexample, inSingahMulovillage,BenerMeriah,severalconflictvictim

widowswere excluded as BRA‐KDP beneficiaries because they had received assistance from

governmentprogramsin2005.Box3.2givesanumberofexamplesofhowcommunitiesused

and combined different types of criteria to rank conflict victims and scale assistance

accordingly.

Box3.2CriteriaUsedtoRankConflictVictimsandScaleAssistance

A.Degreeofconflict‐affectedness

AsongTongpeuding,TiteuKeumalasub‐district,Pidie.Fourcategoriesofconflictvictimsweredecidedupon,with

each category receiving a different amount of assistance. These are: High ‐ people whose house was burned

receivedapproximatelyRp.3.5millionperhousehold;Medium‐peoplewhohadadeathinthefamilyreceived

approximatelyRp.2millionperhousehold;Low‐peoplewhoweretorturedreceivedapproximatelyRp.1million

perhousehold;andcommoncommunitymemberswhoreceivedapproximatelyRp.500,000perhousehold.

Blang Pantei, Paya Bakong sub‐district, Aceh Utara. All households in the community were divided into four

proposal groups. The first group, consisting of five households, each of which suffered a death in the family,

received30percentofthetotalblockgrantallocation.Thesecondgroup,consistingofsevenhouseholdswhose

housewereburnt,received25percent.Thethirdgroup,consistingoffivehouseholdswhosememberssuffered

heavy beatings, received 25 percent. The fourth group, consisting of the rest of the community, shared the

remaining30percent.Thoseinthefourthgroupwereconsideredashavingsufferedfromminorbeatingsandloss

oflivelihoods.

B.Degreeofconflict‐affectednessandeconomicneed

Meriah Jaya, TimangGajah sub‐district, BenerMeriah. Of 322 households, 167were selected as beneficiaries.

Beneficiariesweredividedintothreegroups:(i)householdswhosufferedadeathinthefamily,orhadhousesand

fieldsdestroyed;(ii)householdswhosufferedtraumaorwhowereunabletotendfields;and(iii)poorhouseholds

that did not possess land or did not havemoney to purchase food. Assistancewas scaledwith the first group

receivingthelargestamountofsupport.

Jaba,Peudadasub‐district,Bireuen.Seventy‐twoof102householdswereidentifiedasconflictvictims.Giventhat

theconflictwasveryintenseinthisvillage,thesehouseholdswereidentifiedbecausetheywererelativelypoorer

than theother30households.Beneficiariesweredivided into twoproposal groups, livestockand farming. The

amountof assistancewas scaledwithin theproposal groupsaccording to levelsof conflict‐affectedness. In the

livestock group, twelve households who suffered a death in the family, an assault that resulted in a family

memberbeingdisabled,orwhohadplantationsburnt,receivedsixgoatseach.Eighthouseholdswhosemembers

sufferedbeatingsor psychological trauma received three goats each. Sevenhouseholdswho suffereda lossof

livelihoodreceivedtwogoatseach.Forty‐fivehouseholdsthatwerenotaffectedbytheconflictreceived inputs

forricefarmingduetotheireconomicsituation.

C.Degreeofconflict‐affectednessandpriorreceiptofeconomicassistance

Timanang Gading, Kabayakan sub‐district, Aceh Tengah. Twelve out of a total population of 49 IDPs were

prioritizedasBRA‐KDPbeneficiariesbecausetheywereseverelyaffectedbytheconflictandhadnotreceivedany

priorformsofassistance.EachbeneficiaryreceivedRp.2.5million.Theremainingblockgrantfundswereusedfor

communityprojects.

17

The examples in Box 3.2 illustrate how communities took advantage of the flexibility of the

BRA‐KDP identification mechanism by forming categories of beneficiaries based on a

combination of criteria, some conflict‐related and others not, that best fitted local realities,

dynamics andneeds. They also reflect theprevailingpatternof communities applying a very

broaddefinitionofconflictvictimswhileatthesametimeextendingbenefitstonon‐victims.In

alltheexamplescitedabove,aminorityshareofthebenefitswasallocatedto“therestofthe

community”, either in the form of direct individual assistance to villagers that were not

identified as conflict victims but who needed economic support, or indirectly through

infrastructure or communal projects that benefited the whole village. Such decisions were

typicallyaimedatavoidingsocialenvyandtensionsthatmightresultfromexcludingpartofthe

community from the assistance. Similar concerns about maintaining social cohesion and

avoiding inequities affected the balance between livelihood and infrastructure proposals in

termsofactivitiesselectedbycommunities.Inmanyvillages,whilethebulkofthefundswere

allocated to economic activities, some money was invested in the rehabilitation or

reconstructionofcommunalinfrastructureasawaytoensurethatthewholecommunitywould

benefitinsomeway(seeSection5).

Findings from the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS) confirm some of the

observationsfromsupervisionmissions.Thesurveysfoundthatassistancewasindeedbroadly

distributed.Largenumbersofdirectbeneficiarieswerereachedandincludedconflictvictimsas

well as thewider population. The ARLS data justifies some reservationswith regards to the

efficacyofvillage‐level targeting,as it shows thatconflictvictimswerenot significantlymore

likelytobenefitfromtheassistancethanothervillagers.Onaverage,44percentofvictimsand

41 percent of the most‐affected in target areas received support, while 40 percent of

non‐victims also benefited. However, the survey does show that the average amount of

assistance received by victims was higher than that received by non‐victims, and that the

most‐affected received the greatest amount. Figure 3.4 shows that victims received

approximately thirteen percent more than non‐victims, and the most‐affected nearly 20

percentmore(Barronet.al.2009).

18

Figure3.4AverageAmountsofAssistanceReceivedbyVictimhoodCategory

Source:Barron,Humphreys,PalerandWeinstein(2009)

Identifyingvictims:acontroversialprocess

Evidence from the impact evaluation suggests that communities were satisfied with the

outcomeofthetargetingprocess.10 However,designatingvictimsandscalingassistanceoften

proved controversial and sensitive. An unwillingness to label individuals or subsets of

households as conflict victims or non‐victims led inmany cases to community requests that

funds be dispersed equally across all individuals or households. Villagers claimed that they

wouldrathergetnoassistanceiftheycouldnotdivideupthefundsequally.Suchdemandsfor

‘equal division’ (bagi rata) were widespread during the early stages of the program.11 In

variouslocationsboththeMADandMDImeetingsfailedandhadtoberepeated,asfacilitators

didnotconsiderbagiratatobeanacceptableoutcome.TheMarch2007supervisionmission

found that in some locations reaching consensus required up to five successive village

meetings.

Demandsforequaldivisionoffundsacrosshouseholdsorindividuals

Bagi rata demands were typically regarded by KDP facilitators as contrary to program

procedures, and therefore strongly discouraged. Communities often presented legitimate

reasons in favor of equal division of the assistance. Some communities argued that in their

villageeveryonehadsufferedmoreorlessinthesamewayfromtheconflictandthattryingto

10

Only ten percent of respondents thought that not enough people had benefited, and twelve percent that

conflictvictimshadnotbeensufficientlyprioritized(Barronet.al.2009). 11 Aphonesurveyof facilitators in67sub‐districts in the initial stagesof implementation found that therehad

beendemandsforequaldistributionofmoneyin158villages,orapproximatelyninepercentofalltargetvillages.

Theexactproportionofvillagesthateventuallydividedtheassistanceequallyishardtoassess,asvillagerstended

tohide it fromfacilitatorsandmanycases remainedunreported.However, supervisionmissions found that this

trendwasparticularlystronginAcehTimur,insomewestcoastdistrictssuchasNaganRaya,andinGayoLuesand

partsofAcehTengah.InMarch2007,everyvillageineachofthefourAcehTimursub‐districtsthatweresurveyed

hadperformedbagirata.Bybagirata,werefertothedistributionofequalsharesoffundsorin‐kindassistanceto

allindividualsorhouseholdsinthevillage,withoutexceptionoranylevelofdifferentiation.

19

distinguish further between categories of victims was an unnecessarily painful process that

would threaten social cohesion and result in inequities. Concerns over the fairness and

inclusivenessofcommunaldecisionswerealsoraised.Community‐drivenapproachescarryan

inherentriskofexcludingthemarginalized.12 Marginalizedgroupsmaynotbeinvitedorfailto

attenddecision‐makingormaylackthevoicetolobbyinfavoroftheirinclusionintheprogram.

In villages surveyed in November 2007 in Aceh Selatan, two communities insisted on equal

disbursementoffundsbecauseconflictvictimsfearedmissingoutonprogrambenefits.

“Conflictvictimshavelesseducationandareaminorityinthisvillage.Wedon’thaveleverage

inthecommunity.Ifwerelyonthecommunitytodeterminewhoqualifiesforassistance,we

won’tgetthebenefitsthatwedeserve.”

Conflictvictim,KluetSelatansub‐district,AcehSelatan

“Onemanburned theMD Iattendancesheetwhenhewas told that themoneycouldn’tbe

divided up equally. Hewas very upset because his son died during the conflict, but he still

hasn’treceivedanyassistanceorcompensation.”

Villager,KluetSelatansub‐district,AcehSelatan

Demandsfordividingfundsequallycouldthereforeoriginatefromconcernsoverinclusiveness,

equity and justice. In other cases, demands for equal division did not emanate from the

community as a whole, but rather from pressures exerted by specific groups. Supervision

missions found that many demands for bagi rata were the result of interventions from

ex‐combatants within the community. As ex‐combatants received support from other

assistance schemes specifically targeted at them, theywere not intended to benefit directly

fromBRA‐KDP.However,theysometimestriedtocircumventprogramrestrictionsbypushing

forequaldivisionoftheassistance,whichwouldallowthemtosecureashareofthefunds.In

Nagan Raya, all four villages surveyed in September 2007 did not rank conflict victims and

opted for bagi rata. Although the rationale offered by villagers was the need to avoid

generatingtensionsoverthedistributionofassistance,evidencesuggestedthatex‐combatants

hadstronglyadvocated,ifnotimposed,thisoptionasawaytoensuretheytoowouldbenefit

fromtheprogram.Suchcasestypicallygeneratedbitternessanddisappointmentamongcivilian

victimswhohadsufferedseverelyduringtheconflict.

Box3.3belowcontrastshowdemandsforequaldivisionandtargetingissueswerehandledin

Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur. Although these two neighboring districts shared a number of

important similarities, targeting was done very differently. Comparing them helps to isolate

factors that explain why some communities identified subsets of conflict victims and scaled

assistancewhileothersfailedtodoso.

12 Although the risk of exclusion of marginalized groups is just as great in projects that use more top‐down

approaches,where,forexample,governmentofficialsorotherkeyinformantsidentifybeneficiaries.

20

Box3.3RankingConflictVictimsinAcehTimurandAcehUtara

Aceh Timur and Aceh Utara are neighboring districts that share several important characteristics. Both

were the seat of someof themost intense conflict violence and have large numbers of ex‐combatants.

These districts benefited from the largest share of BRA‐KDP allocations, with Aceh Utara receiving

approximatelyUS$5.5millionor27percentofBRA‐KDPblockgrantallocationandAcehTimurreceiving

around US$ 5million or 24 percent of block grant allocation. The size of the target population in both

districtsisalsosimilar.Despitethesesimilarities,targetingoutcomeswerestrikinglydifferent.Mostvillages

inAcehTimurdistributedequalallocationstoallhouseholdswhereasrelativelyfewdidsoinAcehUtara.

There are several factors that explain why communities in Aceh Utara tended to carry out a detailed

processofidentifyingandrankingconflictvictims:

FacilitationskillsofKDPfacilitators:TheAcehUtaradistrict‐levelKDPmanager(KM)heldaspecialsession

for all FKs during which they were instructed not to allow equal distribution of assistance across all

households.TheKMinsistedthatFKsfacilitatearankingprocess.

The influence of ex‐combatants:KDP facilitators inAcehUtaraengagedex‐combatantsconstructively in

theprogram,thusturningthemintoalliesandnotspoilers.InBlangPantei,AcehUtara,amemberofthe

Village Implementation Unit (TPK) that was also an ex‐combatant advocated using BRA‐KDP funds for

sustainablelivelihoodsactivitiesratherthanforone‐offconsumption.Bycontrast,inAcehTimur,ex‐GAM

combatantsstronglyadvocatedinfavourofbagiratasothattheywouldreceiveashareoftheassistance.

Village authorities and non‐elites tended not to intervene in the face of such overt manipulation by

ex‐GAM.

Levelsof elite capture: InvillagessuchasSeneubokBayu,AcehTimur,non‐elites indicatedthattheydid

not trustvillageauthoritiesandthereforewantednothingmorethantheir individualcutof theBRA‐KDP

assistance.

Levels of trust in the village:Villagers interviewedduring supervisionmissionFGDs inAcehTimurwere

oftenreluctanttopursueprojectsthatrequiredcollectivearrangementsforimplementation,maintenance

orprofitsharing.Theconflictnegativelyimpactedonsocialrelationswithinandacrossvillages.Oneresult

wasa lackof trustanduncertainty,whichmeant thatmany favored immediateover long‐termbenefits.

The samepatternwas clear inother areas, as illustratedby thequote fromanAcehBaratDaya villager

below:

“Everyoneaskedforequaldisbursementbecausegroupactivityisdifficult.Ifagroupplantedrice

and rats ate it, they’ll blame each other. If a group bought a tractor to share, it is difficult to

decidewho’sinchargeoffixingifitbroke.It’seasierforeveryonetogetsmallamountsofcash

individually.”

Femalevillager,Babahrotsub‐district,AcehBaratDaya

Informationflows:InAcehTimur,communitiesreceivedinstructionsfromBRAallowingthemtodistribute

assistanceequallyacrossallhouseholdsandheardrumorsthatneighboringvillageshadalreadydoneso.

21

4. INCLUSION:INVOLVINGDISADVANTAGEDGROUPSINDECISION‐MAKING

In a program that aimed to provide assistance to conflict victims, and particularly themost

vulnerableamongthem,the inclusivenessofthedecision‐makingprocesswaskeytosuccess.

Community‐basedmechanismspresentaninherentriskthatthevoiceoftheminorityandthe

most disadvantaged social groups will be ignored by the majority. Guaranteeing wide

participationandrepresentationofall incollectivediscussions,andpreventingspecificgroups

fromexertingundueinfluenceoverthesediscussions,werethereforecritical.

This section analyzes community participation in BRA‐KDP programmeetings and processes,

with a focus on the involvement of two groups that are typically vulnerable to exclusion,

namely women and the most affected conflict victims. It begins with a breakdown of

attendance levels at meetings, and a comparison with attendance at regular KDPmeetings.

AnalysisthenturnstothedegreetowhichvariousgroupswereabletoinfluencetheBRA‐KDP

decision‐makingprocessesandthechallengesthatdifferentgroupsfacedintryingtodoso.The

sectionconcludeswithadiscussionofhowex‐combatantsinteractedwiththeprogram.Former

combatants were formally excluded as program beneficiaries, yet often exerted a strong

influence over communities and decision‐making processes. Depending on how they were

engaged by program stakeholders, former combatants could be spoilers or supporters in

socializationeffortsandindefusingtensions.

KeyFindings:

• Levelsofparticipationwerehigh,varyingfrom40to56percentofhouseholdsattending

keymeetings.AttendanceatBRA‐KDPvillagemeetings compared favorably to thatof

regularKDP.

• Women’s participation was high with women making up 38 percent of meeting

attendees.Relativelyhighattendance levelsofwomendidnotresult in influenceover

decision‐making.

• Conflict victims showed similar levelsof attendance, awareness, andefficacyasother

villagers.

• Engagingex‐combatantsandKPA13 inpositivewaysledtobetteroutcomes.

4.1 LevelsofParticipation

This section breaks down levels of attendance at themost importantmeetings. Attendance

levelsatsimilarmeetingsinregularKDPofferausefulmeansofcomparisonasKDPfollowsthe

same program cycle and has been received positively by communities in Aceh.14 Figure 4.1

compareslevelsofattendanceinBRA‐KDPandregularKDP.

13 The Aceh Transition Committee (KPA) is the civilian organization formed after the peace agreement to

representformercombatantsfromGAM’smilitarywing. 14 SeveralroundsofKDPhavebeenimplementedinAcehsince1998.Theprogramiswellknownofvillagers.Data

usedhereforcomparisonwastakenfromthe2007‐2008roundofKDP,knownasPNPM‐KDP.

22

Figure4.1ComparisonofAttendanceRateBetweenBRA‐KDPandKDP,asaProportionofAllHouseholds15


AttendanceattheMAD

TheMADisaforumtosocializetheprogramtoawideaudienceatthesub‐districtlevel.Each

sub‐districtenjoyedhighparticipationwithanaverageof120peopleattending theMADper

sub‐district.Onaverage,142peopleattendtheMADforregularKDP.However,inregularKDP,

theMADisaparticularlyimportantforumwherevillagescompeteforblockgrantsandhence

participationishigh.InBRA‐KDP,theMADsimplyprovidedinformationonblockgrantsizesand

operationalprocedures; itwas important intermsofsocializingtheprogramtocommunities,

but no key decisionswere to be taken during thismeeting. That participation levels for the

BRA‐KDPMADweresohighdemonstratesthestronginterestofcommunityrepresentativesin

theprogram.

AttendanceatMD1

MDIisthevillage‐levelsocializationmeetingwhereinformationontheprogramisprovidedto

thecommunityatlarge.MostoftheMDIenjoyedhighlevelsofattendance.Insomevillages,

more than 300 people attended with the average attendance 57 people per village. Across

program areas, forty‐two percent of households were represented at MD I. Participation

comparesfavorablytoregularKDPvillagemeetings,whoseaveragenumberofparticipants is

49pervillage,or38percentofhouseholds.

Attendance–dusunmeetings

BetweenMD I andMD II, sub‐village meetings were held in each hamlet (dusun). At these

meetings villagers drafted lists and maps of conflict victims and discussed activities to be

fundedthroughBRA‐KDP.Thehighestlevelsofattendancewerereachedduringthesemeetings.

15 AttendancetoMAD,discussedinthetext,isnotshowninthisfigure,becauseitisameetingatsub‐districtlevel

wheretheattendanceofallvillagersisneitherrequirednorexpected.Eachvillagewilltypicallysendadelegation

composedofalimitednumberofpeople.Therefore,theproportionofhouseholdsattendingisnotanappropriate

indicatorofsuccess.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

MD I Dusun-level MD II

BRA-KDP

KDP

23

Anaverageof76peopleattendedineachvillage,representing56percentofhouseholds.Thisis

significantlyhigher than for regularKDP,wheretheaverage isof60peoplepervillage,or46

percentofhouseholds.

Anumberoffactorsexplainwhyahigherproportionofvillagersattendeddusunmeetingsthan

village‐levelmeetings.Forone,theyweresmaller‐scaleandmoreflexiblegatheringsthatcould

be organized in a way that better accommodated the respective schedules of participants.

Second, they weremeetings that gathered people whowere immediate neighbors, possibly

makingdiscussionsanddecision‐makingsmoother.Finally,sub‐villagemeetingsweremeantto

prepareidentificationofbeneficiariesbylistingandmappingconflictvictimsineachdusun,and

discuss activities that would best address their needs. Provided they were happy with the

outcomeof thesemeetings,many villagers considered that their active participationwas no

longernecessary.Theyentrustedanumberofdelegatestoconveythesub‐villagelistingsand

proposalsduringtheMDII.Attheendofthedecision‐makingprocess,thisresultedquiteoften

intheorganizationofprioritizedproposalgroupsalongdusunlines,withtheconflictvictimsof

eachsub‐villageassembledinthesamegroup.

AttendanceattheMDII

In theMD II, the listing andmapping of conflict victims was reviewed by communities and

villagersselectedproposalsforfundingafteropendiscussion.TheMDIIwasthusakeymeeting

wheredecisionsweremadeaboutwhoshouldgetassistanceandhowthefundswouldbeused.

Anaverageof55peopleparticipatedineachMDIIrepresenting40percentofhouseholds.This

againcomparesfavorablytoKDP,whoseaveragenumberofparticipants inMDIIwas41per

village,or32percentofhouseholds.

WhywereattendancelevelshigherforBRA‐KDP?

Atthevillageandsub‐villagelevel,significantlyhigher levelsofattendancewererecordedfor

BRA‐KDP.A reason for thisdifferencemaybe the typesofactivities financedbyBRA‐KDP. In

contrast with KDP, where infrastructure projects are dominant, BRA‐KDP communities gave

preference to livelihoods proposals that would provide benefits to individuals or individual

households.Theprospectofreceivingdirectbenefitsprovidedvillagersandvictimsalikewitha

strongincentivetoattendmeetings.

4.2 ParticipationofDisadvantagedGroups:WomenandConflictVictims

The participation ofwomen and conflict victims in the programwas high. However,women

oftenplayedapassiveroleinthedecision‐makingprocess.

Participationandinclusionofwomen

TheparticipationofwomeninBRA‐KDPmeetingswasrelativelyhighwithwomenrepresenting

38 percent of the audience of meetings on average. This percentage varied little from one

meetingtoanother(Table4.1).Therewasalsoverylittlegeographicvariationacrossdistricts,

with theproportionofwomenamongtheaudienceofMAD,MD I,dusun‐levelmeetingsand

24

MDIIbetween36and39percentinallareas.

Table4.1LevelsofAttendanceofFemaleVillagersinBRA‐KDPandRegularKDP

BRA‐KDP RegularKDP

Meeting

%ofmeeting

attendeeswhoare

women

Averagenumberof

womenattending

%ofmeeting

attendeeswhoare

women

Averagenumberof

womenattending

MAD 37 44 40 57

MDI 38 22 44 22

Dusun 39 30* 43 26

MDII 38 21 43 18

*Thisistheaveragetotalnumberofwomenwho,ineachvillage,attendedoneortheotherofthesub‐villagemeetings,not

theaveragenumberofwomenwhoattendedeachofthesemeetings.


Womenwerealsowell representedamongbeneficiaries (39percent).However, FGDsduring

the supervisions missions showed that women’s understanding and influence over the

decision‐makingprocesswasonthewholeveryweak.16 Mostwomenhadlittleknowledgeof

theprogrambeyondtheamountofblockgrantallocations.

Thereareanumberofreasonsforlowlevelsofunderstandingandinvolvementfromwomen.

Programsthatencouragewomen’sparticipationarechallenging inAcehassucheffortsoften

collide with local traditions and perceptions. Husbands and sons tend to represent the

householdinpublicdiscussionsandmakedecisions.Meetingswereoftenheldatnightorearly

in themorning, at a time that was convenient for men but not for women, who attend to

household matters at these times. Married women would typically only attend when their

husbandshadotherobligations.Whentheydidaccompanytheirhusbandstomeetings,women

would generally let thehusband represent thehousehold anddid not takepart in the talks.

During FGDs, many women admitted being uncomfortable when offered to play a more

assertive and influential role in program discussions. Lower levels of education and literacy

amongwomenalsohinderedtheircapacitytounderstandprogramproceduresandparticipate

moreactively.

Incentives were not sufficient to strengthen women participation. BRA‐KDP procedures

emphasized flexibilityasawayofallowingcommunities todesignsolutionsbest fittedtothe

needsoflocalconflictvictims,regardlessofgender.Theprogramcycleincludedwomen’sgroup

meetings, to be held betweenMD I andMD II. Thesemeetingswere aimed at encouraging

womenconflictvictimstodevelopandsubmitproposals.However,evidencefromsupervision

missionsshowsthatwomen’sgroupmeetingswereoftennotheld,orwerepoorlyorganized

andfacilitated.Thesemeetingsgenerallydidnotresultinthesubmissionofwomen’s‐oriented

proposals,letaloneselectionbycommunities.Therewere,however,notableexceptions.

AsiscommoninCDDprograms,theextentandqualityofwomen’sparticipationhingedonthe

16 TheMarch 2007 supervisionmission rankedwomen’s awareness as satisfactory in only three of the twenty

sub‐districtssurveyed.

25

qualityoffacilitation. Ineachvillage,thecommunityelectedtwoVillageFacilitators(FD),one

manandonewoman.Supervision teamsevaluated theperformanceofFDsasgenerallyvery

poor.AmajorityofFDsappeared insufficiently trainedandunder‐utilizedbysub‐district level

facilitators.Thisimpactedonwomen’sparticipation,asfemaleFDswereexpectedtoplayakey

role in mobilizing women, organizing meetings, providing them with further information on

programobjectivesandprocedures,andencouragingthemtoformproposalgroups. Insome

areas,however,goodqualityoffacilitationatthesub‐districtlevelmanagedtoovercomethese

challenges. SomeKDP facilitators interruptedmeetingswhen they felt too fewwomenwere

present and conditioned the continuation of the program on higher levels of women’s

participation. Women’s proposal groups were formed in 31 villages of Titeu Keumala

sub‐district,Pidie,andeachsubmittedaproposalforarevolvingfund.

“Therewasveryhighparticipation in theprogramhere.Peoplewere really interested in the

program. In one village, the PLs [field assistants] stopped themeeting because not enough

womencame.Theytalkedwiththelocalleadersaboutthis.Thenlater,theprogramwasable

tostartagainwithveryhighfemaleparticipation.”

KDPsub‐districtfacilitator,Seunuddonsub‐district,AcehUtara

Finally,findingsfromFGDssuggestthatwomenwhowereheadsofhouseholds,oftenconflict

widows, tended to be more actively engaged than other women. As they could not be

representedbymen,theyweremorelikelytoattendmeetingsandparticipateactively.InFGDs,

mostshowedabetterunderstandingofprogramprocedures,althoughtheyoftencomplained

thattheirclaimswereinsufficientlytakenintoconsideration.

Findings of the ARLS survey (see Figure 4.2), by and large confirm program MIS data on

women’s participation. Female respondents were less likely than men to have heard about

BRA‐KDP (men: 62%; women: 52%), heard about meetings (men: 40%; women: 34%) or

attended meetings (men: 27%; women: 12%). However, female heads of households were

more involved thanotherwomenand their levels of awareness and attendance atmeetings

nearly matched that of men (17 percent attended meetings compared to 20 percent of

male‐headedhouseholds)(Barronet.al.2009).

26

Figure4.2ParticipationandAwarenessbyGender


Participationandinclusionofconflictvictims

Onthewhole,thelevelofparticipationofconflictvictimswassatisfactoryandvictimswereas

aware and involved in BRA‐KDP as the rest of the community. Figure 4.3 shows only slight

differencesacrossgroups.

Figure4.3ParticipationandAwarenessbyVictimhoodCategory


Mixedoutcomesacrossregions

FindingsfromtheSeptember2007supervisionmissionshowedevidenceofsignificantvariation

inparticipationandinclusivenessacrossregions. InAcehTimur,thecentralhighlandsandthe

westcoastofAceh,non‐elitesanddisadvantagedgroups, includingconflictvictims,oftendid

notattendMDsbecausetheywerenotinvitedtothemeetings.Inthesameareas,findingsalso

suggested that village elites, and in some cases ex‐combatants, monopolized key

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Heard of BRA-KDP Aware of meetings Attended meetings

Men

n

Women

n

Male-headed Households Female-headed households

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Heard of BRA-KDP Aware of meetings Attended meetings

Non-Victims All Victims Only Most-affected

27

decision‐makingprocesses. “Meetingsarenormallyattendedonlybyvillageauthorities.HamletHeads, religious figures,

communityleadersandvillagegovernmentofficialsattend.”

Femalevillager,LutTawarsub‐district,AcehTengah

“It is always a groupof peoplewho are close to the village authorities thatmonopolize the

benefits.”

Villager,IndraMakmusub‐district,AcehTimur

On the other hand, some areas enjoyed high degrees of inclusiveness. In Bireuen, key

informants from disadvantaged groups, including conflict victim widows, IDPs and youth,

indicatedthattheyfrequentlyparticipatedinMDs.Theywereabletodescribethevenue,the

agendaandtheapproximatenumberofattendees.SatisfactionwithBRA‐KDPdecision‐making

processeswashigh.Thekeyfactorexplaininghigherlevelsofnon‐eliteparticipationinBireuen

is the way in which ex‐combatants were formally engaged in the program as PLs or TPK

members.Giventhehighpopulationofex‐combatantsinthedistrict,theirbuy‐inwasessential

forsuccessfulprogramimplementation.

4.3 EngagingEx‐Combatants

FormercombatantsinteractedwithandinfluencedBRA‐KDPbothpositivelyandnegatively.In

someplacesthereweretensions,asformercombatantswereexcludedasdirectbeneficiaries.

In other areas, former combatants played a supportive role. The nature of the relationship

betweenBRA‐KDPandex‐combatantsdependedon factors suchas the local conflict history,

powerrelationswithcommunitiesand,aboveall, theextenttowhichfacilitatorsmanagedto

engagetheminsocializationeffortsandotherprogramprocesses.

Ex‐combatants’relationshipswithcommunities

Therewerevery fewseriousproblems related to the returnofGAMcombatantsand former

political prisoners to Acehnese villages. 17 However, supervision missions observed wide

variation intherelationshipsbetweenGAMandothervillagersacrossregions.Threetypesof

relationship were identified, and each helped shape the nature of the participation of

ex‐combatantsintheprogram.InareaswhereGAMenjoyedstrongsupportduringtheconflict,

suchastheeastcoastofAceh,ex‐combatantscontinuedtoplayastrongroleinvillagelife.This,

however, sometimes led to attempts at extortion or fund diversion, impacting on program

performance.

“The peace process is not realized 100 percent but only 80 percent. The shadow of GAM’s

powerstillprevails.ThereisstillhighinfluenceofGAMineveryaspectoflife.”

Villager,Seunuddonsub‐district,AcehUtara

17 The GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment found that 89 percent of former GAM combatants had not

encounteredanyproblemsreturningtotheirvillages,primarilybecausetheyreturnedtoplacesoforigin(World

Bank2006).

28

In other villages, ex‐GAM enjoyed strong support but did not have exclusive dominance in

decision‐making.AllthevillagesthesupervisionteamvisitedinAcehBaratDaya,forexample,

werepro‐GAM.Familiesinthesevillageshadtiestoformercombatants,eitherasrelativesor

throughfriendships,andmanyhadassistedGAMinthepast.However,thepowerofGAMwas

neversuchthatotherformsofauthorityweremarginalized.Inthesevillages,therelationship

between ex‐combatants and communities (and their leaders) was not a problem and GAM

returneesreintegratedsmoothlyintotheircommunities.Excludingthemfromtheprogramdid

notbecomeamajorissueperhapsbecausetheystillhadsupportfromtheirfamiliesandtheir

familiesweremostlikelygettingassistancefromBRA‐KDP.

Third,invillageswherecommunitiessufferedaggressionfromboththemilitaryandGAM,such

as in thecentralhighlandsandAcehSelatan, the relationshipbetweenordinaryvillagersand

formercombatants remained tense.Although fewactsofvengeancehave takenplace, some

villagers,especiallyvictims,saidthattheytriedtostayawayfromGAMreturnees.

“To be honest, we’re really hurt bywhat GAM did to us.Wewould like to take revenge if

possible.Sowedon’tinteractwiththematall.”

Villager,Samaduasub‐district,AcehSelatan

In such villages, GAM returnees’ participation in communitymeetings or collective activities

waslower.Becausetheydidnotparticipate,theirunderstandingoftheprogramwasminimal.

Knowingtheywerenot includedinthetargetbeneficiaries,someactivelytriedtosteersome

communitymembers to demand equal disbursement with the hope to get a portion of the

assistance.

Ex‐combatants’senseofentitlementtoassistance

Manyex‐combatantsfeltthattheirsacrificeduringtheconflictmeantthattheyshouldcontrol

local leadershippositions.Somealsofeltthattheyfoughtforindependence“onbehalfofthe

community” and hence should be prioritized in receiving assistance. Such views possibly

justifieddemands insomeareasforashareofthefunds,and insomeoccurrences,extortion

attemptswhenthesedemandswerenotmet.

“EveryoneshouldunderstandthatreturningGAMareheroes.Weshouldreceivemoney.There

are1,000combatantshere[inNisam]andthere’spotentialforthemtoconductcriminalactsif

BRA‐KDP doesn’t target them. GAM are conflict‐affected people as well and therefore we

shouldalsogetmoney.Wehavepriorityoverothersinthecommunity.Peopleshouldrespect

usandourvalues.Don’tgiveussmallmoneyaswewilllosedignity.”

Ex‐GAMcommander,Nisamsub‐district,AcehUtara

Thismentalitywasexacerbatedbythelackoftransparent,equitableandconsistentdistribution

of other forms of reintegration assistance to GAM. To provide economic support to former

GAM combatants, BRA initially developed a program targeting 3,000 combatants with

individual payments worth Rp. 25 million. Funds were channeled through KPA. Wilayah

29

(roughlyequivalenttoadistrict)‐levelKPAleaderswereresponsiblefordeterminingthenames

of the former combatants eligible for assistance. Themoneywas then to be divided among

otherex‐combatantsandGAM‐affiliatedpeoplewhowerenot includedinthelist.Eventually,

the assistance, planned for 3,000 individuals, ended up being divided across a much larger

number of beneficiaries (Barron and Burke 2008). Moreover, KPA’s management of funds

lackedtransparencyandwasnotconsistentacrossregions.This resulted innumerous former

combatants receivingmuchsmallersumsthantheyexpected,ornot receivinganythingatall

(MSR2009).

Some ex‐combatants also felt they should play a formal role in the program because they

thought they knew better than others who the ‘real conflict victims’ were. Some GAM

interviewed during the second supervision mission felt the program was less than effective

becauseitprovidedassistanceto‘victims’whodidnotactivelysupportGAMduringtheconflict.

In thewordsofone localcommander,“communitiesmayhaveonedefinitionofconflict,but

we knowwho the real victims are. It is thosewho sacrificed for Aceh by actively becoming

involvedinthestruggle.”

ImpactofSocialization

Lackofsocializationoftheprogramtoex‐combatants ledtoinappropriate interventionsfrom

some of them later during implementation. Insufficient information about BRA‐KDP and, in

cases, misinformation spread by word of mouth resulted in attempts to capture assistance

throughillegitimatemeans.Someex‐combatantsfeltneglectedandthisinturndeepenedtheir

frustrationtowardsBRAandjealousyfortheprogrambeneficiaries.Whereex‐GAMdidattend

socializationmeetingstheyusuallyplayedaconstructiverole.

Ex‐combatantsaspartnersinprogramimplementation

Findings from supervision missions indicated that a vast majority of ex‐combatants were

supportiveoftheprogram. Inelevenoutofthe15sub‐districtssurveyedinMarch2007,KPA

andex‐combatantsgavepositiveopinionsofBRA‐KDP.Theyoftenplayedaconstructiverolein

the program, acting as intermediaries between the communities and facilitators, providing

furthersocializationtovillagers,andhelpingdefusetensions.Inareaswithahighpopulationof

GAM returnees, they often held positions as Field Assistants (PLs), Heads of Village

ImplementationTeams(TPK)orVillageFacilitators(FD).InBireuenandAcehUtarainparticular,

the role of GAM‐affiliated program staffwas key in overcoming tensions and problems that

arose during the early stages of program implementation, such as demands by other

ex‐combatants to benefit from BRA‐KDP, pressures to divide funds equally and extortion

attempts.Box4.1providesexamples.

30

Box4.1DefusingTensionsinBireuen

On the whole, BRA‐KDP facilitators interviewed during supervision missions underlined the

importanceofsecuringthebuy‐inofex‐combatantstoensuresatisfactoryprogramoutcomes.

Facilitatorssuggestedadditionalsocializationeffortsspecificallydirectedatformercombatants,

and often advocated the formalization of their involvement in the program through the

recruitment of a specific number of ex‐combatants as facilitators and program staff in each

sub‐district.

Ex‐combatant’sdemandsforassistanceandextortionattempts

Most ex‐combatants understood the rationale for not allowing them to benefit from the

assistance. However, in a few cases former combatants did not accept it and interfered

negativelywiththeprogram.IntwovillagesinAcehSelatanvisitedinNovember2006,ex‐GAM

insistedthatthevillageblockgrantbeequallydisbursedsothattheycouldreceiveashareof

thefunds.SimilarcaseswereobservedinNaganRayaandinAcehTimur.

“ThereisarumorherethatGAMhaverequested20percentofthe[BRA‐KDP]projectfunds.I

thinkthemoneyshouldgotothemfirst,notthecommunity.Becauseoncetheyhavereceived

somethingtheprocesswillgomoresmoothly.”

Villager,Seunuddonsub‐district,AcehUtara

In SeunuddonandNisam sub‐districts inAcehUtara, ex‐combatants stronglydemanded that

theyreceiveaportionoftheblockgrants,leadingKDPfacilitatorsandcommunitiestofearthat

theprogramwouldnotgoonunlesssomemoneywaspaidtothem.Suchattemptsatextortion

wererecordedineightofthe67targetsub‐districts(Table4.2).

DuringearlysocializationofBRA‐KDPinCotKatepangvillage,Jeumpasub‐district,over40ex‐combatantsinthe

villagemistakenly thought that BRA‐KDP assistancewas to be directed specifically to them.Attempts by KDP

stafftoclarifythismisunderstandingledtoaviolentbacklash,andasub‐districtofficialwasphysicallyassaulted.

However, thanks to the efforts of Baharuddin, an ex‐combatant employed as a KDP field assistant (PL) in

Jeumpa, resistance to BRA‐KDP among ex‐combatants was overcome over time. Baharuddin carried out

repeated, face‐to‐face socialization efforts with ex‐combatants in local coffee shops. By approaching

ex‐combatants in an informal manner, Baharuddin was successful in clarifying BRA‐KDP objectives and

methodologies.Asaresult,ex‐combatantsremainedengagedintheprogram,andsubsequentMDstookplace

withoutfurtherincident.

KDPstaffinGandapurasub‐districtfacedsimilarchallengeswithex‐combatants.Inoneincident,ex‐combatants

stopped an FK while she was driving to a village and demanded BRA‐KDP funds from her. Munzir, an

ex‐combatantemployedasPL,intervenedontheFK’sbehalftodefusetensionswiththeex‐combatants.

“IexplainedtomyfriendsthatBRA‐KDPassistanceisforconflictvictims,notforthosethatmakethe

conflict.”

Munzir,PL,Gandapurasub‐district,Bireuen

31

Table4.2ReportedCaseofExtortionbyEx‐Combatants

Location(sub‐district,district) Natureoftheincident Stepstakenandoutcome

Seunuddon,AcehUtara DemandsbyKPAfora20percent

cutofvillageblockgrants.

Demandsdroppedafterfurther

socialization.

Terangon,GayoLues DemandsbyKPAfora15percent

cutfromvillageblockgrants.

Demandswithdrawnafterprotests

fromcommunities.

Kabayakan,AcehTengah KPAissuedalettertotheCamat,

demandingaRp.3million

(US$300)cutpervillage.

AftermediationfromtheBRA

districtoffice,demandswere

withdrawn.

KluetTimurandSamadua,Aceh

Selatan

ReportedattemptsbyKPAto

obtaina21percentcutofblock

grantsinbothsub‐districts.

Intimidationandthreatsstopped

afterfurthersocialization.

Nisam,AcehUtara DemandsofaRp.13million

(US$1,300)cutpervillage.

Demandsdroppedafterspecial

follow‐upmeetings.

GeulumpangBaroe,Pidie Asblockgrantsweredisbursedto

BlangBaroevillage,Rp.58million

(US$5,800)washandedovertoa

KPAmember.

Themoneywaslaterretrievedby

localpolice.

Gandapura,Bireuen ReportsofdemandsbyKPAfora

Rp.2.5million(US$250)cutfrom

villageblockgrants.

LocalKDPfacilitatorslaterdenied

thatanyattemptwassuccessful.

Source:MISComplaints‐HandlingDataandsupervisionmissions

Mostcasesweresortedoutaftersocializationandmediation,sometimeswiththehelpofBRA

district offices. On the whole, KPA showed good will and withdrew demands withoutmuch

resistance. Only in Nisam sub‐district in Aceh Utara were there significant implementation

delaysthatnecessitatedtheinterventionofprovincialBRAandKDPmanagement(seeBox4.2).

These experiences illustrate how inadequacies in BRA’s reintegration assistance to GAM

ex‐combatantssometimesnegativelyimpactedonBRA‐KDP.

32

Box4.2Ex‐combatantsDemandaPieceofthePie—theCaseofNisam,AcehUtara

Such problems were not specific to BRA‐KDP alone. The two supervision missions found

attempts by ex‐combatants to appropriate funds from a range of development programs. In

fact, attempts by former combatants to obtain a “tax” of ten percent from development

projects have become common practice in Aceh (Aspinall 2009). Another case in Sawang

sub‐district, Aceh Utara, deserves mention. Although not directly related to extortion, it

illustrates how the intervention of ex‐combatants could worsen existing tensions between

communitiesandKDPfacilitators,playingaleadingroleinescalatingprotestsandfrustrations

tophysicalintimidation(seeBox4.3).

Nisam sub‐districtwasoneof themost severely affectedareasduring the conflict. Largenumbersofpeople

werekilled,numeroushousesdamagedandlivelihoodsweredestroyed.Boththecauseandeffectofthiswas

thehighconcentrationofex‐combatants inthesub‐district.AccordingtosomeGAMsources,thereare1,000

ex‐GAMmembers in Nisam ofwhom at least a half are former combatants.Many did not receive any BRA

assistanceastheagreementbetweenGAMandthecentralgovernmentcoveredonly3,000combatantswhose

nameswere submitted toBRA. Thosewhomissedout felt theywere entitled to reintegrationbenefits from

elsewhere.ThisresultedinpersistentdemandsfromlocalKPAforapieceofBRA‐KDP.

In late2006,twoKPAcommandersfromWilayahPasee(YusopHSandJafarDaud), issueda letter instructing

thateveryvillageallocate fundstobenefit the followinggroups:at least five formercombatants;at least ten

GAMcivilians;15GAMsupporters;andfourregularcommunitymembers.Inaddition,theymadeanumberof

conditions such as “if female combatants had their houses burnt down, they should receive a special

allocation”,“villagesthatwerelessconflict‐affectedshouldgive50percentoftheirfundstoothervillagesthat

sufferedfromhigherconflict impact”.Such instructionswereclearlyagainsttheprinciplesofBRA‐KDP,which

statethatfunduseshouldbedetermineddemocraticallybycommunitymembers.

These initialclaimswereabandonedfollowingnegotiations involvingtheprovincialmanagementofBRA,KDP

andtheWorldBank.However,inMarch2007,facilitatorsreportedthatKPAwasmakingnewdemandsdirectly

to communities, whereby each village should save a Rp. 13 million (US$ 1,300) share, allegedly to build a

cemetery and memorial for ex‐combatants. It appeared that some communities actually supported the

initiative. The issue was further complicated when local police informed that KDP facilitators could be

prosecuted for “complicity of public funds embezzlement” if they allowed villagers to accommodate KPA

demands. KDP staff consequently decided to freeze funds disbursements until the issue was sorted out.

Eventually,afteranewroundofnegotiationsledbyajointBRA,KDPandWorldBankdelegation,KPAagreedto

withdrawanydemandscancausenofurtherdifficulties.RelationsbetweenKPAandKDPfieldstaffremained

cordialafterthis.

33

Box4.3Ex‐CombatantsasSpoilers—theCaseofSawang,AcehUtara

ImpactsofBRA‐KDPontherelationshipbetweenex‐combatantsandothervillagers

The ARLS surveys provide some evidence that the program impacted negatively on

communities’, and particularly conflict victims’, levels of acceptance of returning former

combatants(Barronet.al.2009).Thisispossiblyduetoattemptsbyex‐combatantstoclaima

shareoftheassistance,as illustratedintheexamplesabove.Thesurveysshowthatthemost

frequent complaint of beneficiaries regarding BRA‐KDP outcomes was that ex‐combatants

benefited toomuch. On the other hand, levels of acceptance are higher in locations where

communitiesdecidedtoexertsomeflexibilityandallowex‐combatantstobenefit.Theremight

betworeasons for theseseeminglycontradictory findings.First,villagersweremore likely to

accommodate the claims of ex‐combatants in communities where former combatants were

betterintegratedfromthestart.Second,allowingformercombatantstobenefitwasprobablya

goodway toprevent them frommaking troubles. Conversely, enforcingprogramprocedures

toorigidlybyexcludingex‐combatantsmighthaveledtotensions,thusaffectingnegativelythe

relationshipbetweenex‐GAMandothervillagers.

Thesefindingspointtotheexclusionofex‐combatantsfromtheassistanceasapossibleflawof

the program that undermined the program’s objective of strengthening social cohesion. This

suggests that specific groups should not be excluded fromprograms delivering reintegration

assistance throughcommunity‐basedmechanisms,and thatmoreemphasis shouldbeplaced

onengagingex‐combatantspositivelyinprogramprocesses.

Sawang isaneighboringsub‐districtofNisamthatsharesanumberofsimilarcharacteristics, includingahigh

levelofconflictintensityandalargenumberofformercombatants.InSawang,inequitiesinthedistributionof

reintegrationassistancetoex‐combatantsledtoafeudbetweenrivalgroupswhichresultedinseriousviolence,

includingkidnappingsandassassinations.Sawangalsohasahistoryofwidespreadextortionandintimidationby

KPAonpublicprojectsanddevelopmentprograms.

On7February2007,amobledbyfourKPAmembersraidedthelocalKDPImplementationManagementUnit

office. Office equipment, documents and archives were destroyed. Computers were damaged or stolen.

TroublesseemedtooriginatefrommisinformationdisseminatedbyamemberoftheBRAdistrictoffice,which

created the perception that facilitators were responsible for delays in implementation. The perpetrators

allegedly acted “on behalf” of frustrated local communities. The incident resulted in a two‐month halt in

program implementation. Itwas eventually sortedout through a specialMADwith theparticipationof BRA,

KDPandWorldBankprovincialstaff.

Itisunclearwhetherextortionwasalsoatriggeringfactorintheincident.However,whatisinterestinginthis

caseishowKPA’sinterventionallowedforexistingbutmanageabletensionstoescalateandledtheprogramto

atemporaryhalt.

34

5. HOWFUNDSWEREUSED:THEECONOMICIMPACTOFTHEPROGRAM

BRA‐KDPencouragedbeneficiariesto investfunds inproductiveactivitiesthatwouldresult in

sustainable improvements ineconomicwelfare.Theprogramoffereda trulyopenmenuthat

allowedcommunitiestochoosetospendmoneyoninfrastructureaswellasonprivategoods.

Deliveryof fundswasconditionalon thesubmissionof soundprojectproposalsandprogram

facilitatorsprovided technical assistance tobeneficiaries todevelopandcarryoutproductive

economicactivities.Bothmeasureshelpedsafeguardagainstassistancebeingwastedinone‐off

consumption. Communities largely gave preference to livelihoods projects, and two‐thirds of

beneficiaries invested project funds in productive activities (Barron et al 2009). Although

relativelymodestamountsofassistancewereprovidedtoindividualsandhouseholds,thereis

evidence that this injection of capital had significant impacts on the welfare of beneficiary

communities.

Thissectionbeginswithabreakdownofthetypesofsub‐projectsselectedbycommunities.Itis

followedby adiscussionof the reasons for theprevalenceof privateoverpublic goods, and

concludeswithanassessmentoftheprogram’seconomicimpacts.

KeyFindings:

• Most beneficiary communities preferred to use program assistance for economic

activities rather than common goods and infrastructure. Eighty‐nine percent of block

grantswerespentonlivelihoodprojectswithcattle‐breedingandagricultureinputsthe

dominantactivities.Tenpercentoffundswereinvestedininfrastructure.

• The most important reason for the prevalence of livelihoods projects over common

goodsisthatcommunitiesassociatedBRA‐KDPwithcompensationfortheconflict.They

consequentlyoptedforprojectsthatwouldtranslateintodirectindividualbenefits.

• Higher levels of satisfaction were found in communities where a minority share of

assistancewasusedforcommongoodsandinfrastructure,asastrategytoensurethat

thewholecommunitywouldbenefit.

• BRA‐KDP was successful in providing beneficiary communities with a much‐needed

injectionofcapital.Two‐thirdsofbeneficiariesinvestedfundsinproductiveactivities.

• The program was associated with significant impacts on the welfare of target

communities,includingareductioninthenumberofhouseholdsreportedaspoor,gains

inhouseholdassetholdingsandanincreaseinlanduse.

5.1 WhatdidBeneficiariesUseFundsFor?

The program procedures allowed for great flexibility in terms of the activities eligible for

funding(seeBox5.1).Communitiescouldproposealmostanykindofproject.

35

The program used the same open menu as regular KDP. Funds could be spent on economic activities,

infrastructure, health and education‐related activities or anything the community proposed except the

following: development/rehabilitation of office buildings; financing of civil servants’ salaries; purchase of

chainsaws,weapons, explosives, asbestos, and othermaterials damaging to the environment; financing of

activities related to the employment of under‐working age children; financing of activities related to

politics/politicalparties;andfinancingofanythingrelatedtothemilitaryorarmedforces.UnlikeregularKDP,

buildingorrehabilitationofmosquesandpurchaseoffertilizerswasallowed.

Box5.1TheOpenMenu

IncontrasttoregularKDP,wherecommunitiestypicallyuse80to90percentofthefundsfor

infrastructure projects such as access roads and irrigation canals, BRA‐KDP beneficiaries

overwhelmingly preferred economic activities. Eighty‐nine percent of BRA‐KDP funds were

spentoneconomicactivities (Rp.181.8billion,orapproximatelyUS$18million); tenpercent

wereinvestedininfrastructure(Rp.21.4billion,orUS$2million); lessthanonepercentwere

usedforotherkindsofactivities(seeFigure5.1).

Figure5.1FundsSpentbyTypeofActivity


Trends in project selection variedby region (Figure 5.2). InAceh Tamiang and Simeulue, the

assistancewasexclusivelyspentoneconomicactivities.Similarly,inPidie,Bireuen,AcehUtara

andAcehTimur,thefourdistrictswhichbenefitedfromover80percentofallBRA‐KDPfunds

due to high levels of conflict‐affectedness and large populations, at least 90 percent of the

moneywasusedforeconomicactivities.Bycontrast,AcehTengahandAcehBaratgavepriority

to infrastructure over economic sub‐projects, allocating 60 percent and over 80 percent of

fundsrespectivelyfortheseactivities.

020406080

100120140160180200

Economic Public Goods Education Health Others

Billion Rp.

Activities

36

Figure5.2EconomicSub‐projectsvs.otherActivities,PerDistrict,asaProportionofFundsAllocated


Among the economic activities, animal husbandry and agricultural activities were the most

preferred(Figure5.3).AroundRp.138billion(approximatelyUS$14million)or67percentofall

BRA‐KDPblockgrantswereallocatedforthesetwoactivities.Thedominationoflivestockand

agricultureprojectsreflectsthesocialcompositionofthetargetpopulationoftheprogram,but

alsoreflectsthepreferencegiventoactivitiesthatwouldaddresspressingeconomicneeds.

Figure5.3BreakdownofSub‐projectsbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoEconomicActivities)


Where communities selected infrastructure, they largely favored social and religious facilities

Livestocks48%

Agriculture & Plantations

25%

Fisheries & Aquaculture

3%

Small industry13%

Small Trade10%

Cooperatives & Revolving

Funds1%

37

suchascommunityhalls(meunasah)andmosquesoverroads,irrigationandotherpublicgoods

(see Figure 5.4). There are a number of reasons for this. First, the amount of BRA‐KDP

allocationswouldgenerallybe insufficient toallowforheavy infrastructurework. Incontrast,

facilitiessuchasmeunasah,mosqueandprayerroomswerelesscostly.Second,asdiscussedin

greater detail below, communities often used infrastructure projects to address perceived

inequities resulting fromprojects thatprovided funds to setsof individualsorhouseholds. In

this scenario, the majority of funds financed livelihoods projects, while the remainder was

investedinpublicgoodsfromwhichallbenefited.Thisstrategymitigatedjealousiesandhelped

maintain social cohesion. With these objectives in mind, the choice of social and religious

facilitieswasthereforeasensibleone.

Figure5.4BreakdownofSub‐projectbyType(%ofFundsAllocatedtoInfrastructure)


5.2 ReasonsfortheChoicesmadebyCommunities

Whyweremostfundsusedforeconomicactivities?

There are a number of reasonswhy livelihoods activities were generally preferred. Villagers

expected compensation for the hardships suffered during the conflict. Individual economic

benefitsprovidedbeneficiarieswithabettersenseofrecognitionthaninfrastructureprojects.

“Thisassistanceisforconflictvictims.Ifthefundsshouldbeusedforcommunitygoods,then

peopleshoulduseanothersourceofmoney.”

Villager,KluetSelatansub‐district,AcehSelatan

A lack of capitalwas and remains amajor impediment to economic recovery and growth in

rural Aceh (World Bank 2005). Many villagers noted that provision of capital, compared to

other formsof livelihoods support,wouldbest enable them to rebuild and recover from the

losses they had suffered. This is common in post‐conflict settings where severely

Meunasah50%

Mosques & other religious facilities

24%

Roads & Bridges17%

Other public facilities

5%

Wells & Irrigation4%

38

conflict‐affected communities often have a need for immediate livelihoods support such as

capital, inputs for fishing and farming, and income‐generating activities. Programs such as

regular KDP were in place to provide infrastructure whereas in most villages programs

providing capitalwere scarce. BRA‐KDP, through its openmenuwhich allowed for economic

activities,servedasabadlyneededsourceofcapital.VillagersinAcehBaratDaya,forexample,

clearly noted that if they needed rural infrastructure, they would use other sources of

assistance.

Mixedmessagesandmiscommunicationfromdifferentprogramstakeholdersplayedarole in

influencing communities’ project preferences. BRA viewed the need to fulfill compensation

claims of the most‐affected conflict victims as an important part of its mandate, and

encouraged the use of BRA‐KDP funds for economic activities over infrastructure. BRA’s

preferenceforlivelihoodsactivitiesranagainstprogramrulesthatallowedforpublicgoodsto

be funded. On more than one occasion, this tension was exacerbated by insufficient

coordination between BRA provincial leadership and district branches, which resulted in

contradictorymessagesbeingcirculatedtoKDPfacilitatorsandcommunities.Duringtheearly

stagesoftheprogramcycle,BRAdistrictofficesinAcehTimurandAcehSelatanissuedofficial

instructions toKDP facilitators that infrastructure sub‐projectswerenotallowed inBRA‐KDP.

These instructions were quickly revoked by the BRA provincial level management and

clarificationletterswerecirculatedtoKDPfieldoffices.Thecirculationofinconsistentmessages

led to considerable confusionas communitieswere forced tounnecessarilywithdrawand/or

revise proposals. In Aceh Tengah, villages such as KelupakMata abandoned community hall

constructionprojectsaftertheinterventionofBRAdistrictpersonnel.

Theroleofinfrastructureinmaintainingsocialcohesion

Although on the whole infrastructure projects were rarely selected for funding, records of

village meetings show that communities often indicated a strong need for drinking water,

irrigation systems and roads. Project proposals for such activities frequently figured among

thoseinitiallysubmittedforselection.However,inlocationswherethemajorityoffundswere

used for infrastructure sub‐projects (up to 100 percent of funds in some villages), decisions

wereusuallybasedonthedesire toavoidconflictsandtensionsgeneratedby theprocessof

identifyingconflictvictims.Singlingoutthemost‐affected,differentiatingcategoriesaccording

tolevelsofsuffering,andprioritizingsometothedetrimentofotherswasoftenaverysensitive

process(seeearlierchapter). Invillageswhereallhadsufferedmoreorlessthesamelevelof

impact from the conflict, categorization and prioritization was even more challenging. In

communitieswhere somehadobjectively sufferedmore, their claims could still conflictwith

theneedofthewidercommunityforsomemeasureofcompensationandrecognitionoftheir

ownsuffering.Infrastructuresub‐projectsservedasamechanismthroughwhichcommunities

could avoid tensions related to identifying victims by providing public goods for the whole

village.

Complementaryaspectsoflivelihoodsandinfrastructuresub‐projects

Higher levelsofsatisfactionwereobserved incommunities thatmadethemostofBRA‐KDP’s

39

flexible procedures and openmenu by selecting both economic and infrastructure projects.

InfrastructureprojectsweresometimesfundedthroughacombinationofBRA‐KDPandfunds

from other programs or private contributions (see Box 5.2). Infrastructure projects helped

maintain social cohesion by offsetting jealousies that stemmed from the prioritization and

delivery of assistance to the most‐affected by providing public goods benefiting the entire

community.

Box5.2TheBalancebetweenLivelihoodsandInfrastructureinBateeDabai,Makmur,Bireuen

5.3 TechnicalQualityofProjects

“BRA‐KDPgaveus a kick‐start this year. It reducedour loanburdenandallowedus toplant

more.”

Villager,Peudadasub‐district,Bireuen

The ARLS data shows evidence of significant program impacts on the welfare of target

communities. BRA‐KDP was associated with an eleven percent drop in levels of poverty as

reportedbyvillageheads.Theprogramalsoresultedingainsinhouseholdassetholdings,such

as stoves and motorcycles, especially amongst conflict victims. Most strikingly, the survey

showsstrongevidenceassociatingBRA‐KDPwithalargeincreaseintheamountof landbeing

farmed(Barronet.Al.2009).

Durableimprovementswerepresumablymorelikelyinlocationswherestrongprioritizationof

the most‐affected allowed them to benefit from higher amounts of capital. One would

thereforeexpectmarginalimpactswherebenefitswerespreadthinlyacrossalargenumberof

individualsorhouseholds,asoccurredwherebagiratatookplace.Whilesufficientdataisnot

availabletotestthesehypotheses,supervisionmissionsfoundexamplesofbagiratathatledto

meaningfulwelfareimpactsandothersthatfailedtodoso(seeBox5.3).

FromablockgrantallocationofRp.150million(approximatelyUS$15,000),BateeDabaiusedRp.109million

to purchase livestock for the benefit of twenty highly‐affected households, including eight widow‐headed

families.Theremaining41millionwasusedtobuildameunasah(communityhall).AlthoughtheRp.41million

wasnotsufficienttocompletetheconstructionofthemeunasah,villageauthoritiesraisedanadditionalRp.30

millioninvoluntarycontributions.

40

Box5.3BagiRata–CasesofSuccessfulandUnsuccessfulSub‐projectSelectionandImplementation

Strongfacilitationduringprojectdesign,andpriorexperienceandtechnicalknowledgeofthe

activity amongst beneficiaries, also contributed greatly to the success of projects. Box 5.4

showsanexampleofalivelihoodprojectthatresultedinsustainableeconomicgainsasitwas

tailoredtotheprofessionalskillsandexperienceoftheproposalgroup.

Box5.4PoultryFarminTimanangGading

Successfulcase:KandehVillage,Seunagansub‐district,NaganRaya

Kandehvillagewasalmost totallydesertedduring the last six yearsof the conflict.After theMoU,nearly all

households returned. Many were former GAM combatants. The community decided to use the totality of

BRA‐KDPfundstostartarubberplantation,witheachhouseholdreceivinghalfahectare.Fiveconflictwidows

conveyed their frustration with project selection. They felt they should have been prioritized over other

villagers. They also complained that ex‐combatants manipulated the decision‐making process to their

advantage,astheybenefitedfromplantationlotsontopoftheRp.25milliontheyhadalreadyreceivedfrom

BRA.Nonetheless,villagersonthewhole,includingthewidows,acknowledgedthattherubberplantationwasa

soundprojectthatshould,overtime,haveasignificantimpactonthecommunity’swelfare.Thevillagersknew

theywouldnot collect anydirect benefit from theplantationbefore five years.However, in this community

where rubber is the traditional trade,most considered the project “as an investment for their children and

grandchildren”.

Unsuccessfulcase:BlangBeurandehvillage,Beutongsub‐district,NaganRaya

Similar factors influencingsub‐project selection led toa total failure inBlangBeurandeh. In1999, thisvillage

wasthetheaterofoneofthemostinfamousincidentsoftheconflictyears:themassacrebythe IndonesianmilitaryofTeungkuBantaqiah,a controversial Islamic scholaraccusedof supporting the rebellion,andabout

sixtystudentsfromhisIslamicboardingschool.AsinKandeh,theBRA‐KDPdecision‐makingprocesswasheavily

influenced by ex‐combatantswho pushed forbagi rata in order to get a share of the benefits. However,insteadof investingassistancefundsinasoundandsustainableeconomicproject,cashwashandedout,with

every individual inthevillagereceivingRp.160.000(US$16).Withfundsspreadsothinly,moneywasquickly

spent on consumer goods. The widows of the sixty victims of the 1999 massacre strongly deplored this

outcome.Ironically,evenex‐combatantscomplainedthefundswereinsufficient.

TwelveconflictvictimsinTimanangGadingvillage,Kebayakansub‐district,AcehTengah,eachreceivedRp.2.5

million(US$250)inassistancefromBRA‐KDPtopursueeconomicactivities.Apoultryfarmhadanimmediate

positive impacton the livelihoodofoneof thebeneficiaries.Prior to receivingBRA‐KDPassistance,aconflict

victimownedclosetoahundredchickens.However,hedidnothaveaproperplacetohousethepoultry,nor

did he have the capital to fatten, breed and market them. Upon receipt of the assistance, the beneficiary

investedaportionoftheamounttoconstructalargecooptohousethechickens.Hepurchasedanadditional

100chickensatatotalcostofRp.260,000(US$26)andinvestedtheremainingamountinfeed.Atthetimeof

the September 2007 supervision mission, the conflict victim was selling chickens to food vendors and

restaurantsataprofitofRp.4000–5000perchicken.Hewasusingtheprofitstoconstructanothercoopand

purchasemorepoultry.

41

6. VIEWSOFCOMMUNITIES:LEVELSOFSATISFACTION&COMPLAINTS

This section draws from supervision mission findings and the Aceh Reintegration and

LivelihoodsSurveys(ARLS)toassessoveralllevelsofsatisfactioninbeneficiarycommunities.It

also presents the prevalent types of complaints conveyed by beneficiaries and the ways in

whichthesewereaddressedbytheprogram.

MainFindings:

• Levels of satisfactionwere high and communities felt that BRA‐KDPwas successful in

fulfillingtheneedsofconflictvictimsforcompensationandrecognition.

• Complaints,widespread intheearlystagesoftheprogramcycle,werefocusedonthe

following issues: change in the delivery mechanism from earlier BRA proposal‐based

system to BRA‐KDP’s community‐based system; sub‐district and village block grant

allocations;anddelaysinimplementation.

• Project‐relatedcomplaintsdecreasedovertimeasaresultofeffectivesocializationby

KDP facilitators and as funds hit the ground. There were very few cases where

complaintsorprotestsledtointimidationorresultedinsignificantdelaysordisruptions

inprogramimplementation.

• Theprogramundertookanextensivesocializationcampaignthatutilizedmultipletypes

ofmedia.Face‐to‐facesocializationactivitiesweremosteffective,while radiohad the

leastimpact.

6.1 LevelsofSatisfaction

Ninety‐four percent of all respondents from target locations, and 97 percent of the

most‐affected conflict victims, deemed the program “typically helpful” to them and the

community.18 Overalllevelsofsatisfactionobservedduringsupervisionmissionswerealsohigh.

In March 2007, thirteen of fifteen surveyed sub‐districts showed strong support for the

program.Dissatisfactionorhostilereactionswererecordedintwosub‐districtsofAcehTimur.

Theseweredrivenby the frustrationof localex‐combatantsatnotbeing formallyallowedto

benefitorstemmedfromimplementationissues,suchasdelaysorprotestsovertheamountof

allocations,thatwerelateraddressed.

Regarding satisfaction with program decision‐making processes, findings of the September

2007supervisionweremorenuancedwithsubstantialvariationacrossregions.InAcehUtara,

Aceh Timur, the central highlands and thewest coast, some felt that decisionswere unduly

influencedbyelites.Intheseareas,womentendedtobelesssatisfiedwiththeprogramthan

men.Incontrast,boththeMarchandSeptember2007supervisionsrecordedthehighestlevels

of support and satisfaction in Bireuen and Pidie. In these two districts, the decision‐making

process was widely regarded as fair, despite initial resistance from ex‐combatants. High

satisfaction levels across groups including women, most‐affected conflict victims and other

18 Barronet. al. (2009).Respondents could choosebetween threeoptions: typicallyhelpful;neitherhelpfulnor

harmful;ratherharmful.

42

disadvantaged groups was in large part attributable to higher levels of participation from

non‐elitesandtheprogram’sconstructiveengagementofex‐combatants.

While most people were satisfied with overall outcomes and agreed that BRA‐KDP was

successful in providing a needed and immediate injection of capital to conflict‐affected

communities, respondents interviewed during supervision missions conveyed doubts that

BRA‐KDP assistancewould result in sustainable impacts. The amount of BRA‐KDP fundswas

deemed insufficient in theabsenceof linkages toand follow‐up fromprograms that improve

infrastructureandprovideaccesstocapital,skillstraining,andmarketingsupport.

“Thecommunity ishappyenoughtogetassistance,even ifamountswerenotsufficient.The

moneyatleastgivesushopeandrenewedspirittoundertakenewactivities”

HeadofTPK,TimangGajahsub‐district,BenerMeriah

Of particular importance with regards to BRA‐KDP’s main objective, most communities

acknowledgedthatBRA‐KDPsuccessfullyfulfilledtheneedsofconflictvictimsforcompensation

and recognition of enduring past hardships. Even in locations where assistance funds were

spread thinly, many beneficiaries interviewed during supervision missions felt satisfied with

havingreceivedcompensationandwerereadytofocusmoreonlonger‐termdevelopment.

“Itwasimportantforustoreceivecompensation.Nowthatwehavereceivedit,wenolonger

needfurthercompensation.Wewillchooseeconomicdevelopmentinthefuture”

VillageHeadofacommunitywhooptedforequaldivisionoffundsacrossallhouseholds,

SyamtaliraBayusub‐district,AcehUtara

6.2 ComplaintsHandlingMechanisms

Communities had high expectations for the reintegration benefits provided by local

government and, formanyof them, ahistoryofdisappointment in local government service

delivery.Itwasthereforevitaltocreateamechanismthroughwhichcommunitiescouldsubmit

inquiriesandcomplaintsandprovideevidencetocommunitiesthatcomplaintsandquestions

wasbeingheardandactedupon.InBRA‐KDP,inquiriesandcomplaintsweresubmittedthrough

avarietyofchannels,includingtextmessagestoapublicizedphonenumber,walk‐instoKDPor

BRAoffices,adesignatedpostofficebox,KDPfacilitators,otherstakeholders,andthemedia.A

Complaints Handling Specialist was hired at the KDP Regional Management Unit (RMU) to

compile and categorize all incoming complaints. Once categorized, all complaints were

registered in the BRA‐KDP database before being relayed, when deemed relevant, to the

appropriate KDP or BRA staff for follow‐up. Complaints submitted directly to KDP and BRA

personnel,newspapersandtextmessageswerethechannelsutilizedmostfrequently,withtext

messagingthemostpopularamongstcommunitymembers.19

Giventhepoliticalsensitivityoftheprogram,therewerecomplaintsofanaturethatKDPstaff

19 TheflowchartofBRA‐KDP’sComplaintsHandlingmechanismisshowninAnnexC.

43

alonecouldnotaddress.ThesewereforwardedtotheBRAProjectImplementationUnit(PIU)

(Table6.1).TogetherwithBRAPIU,theComplaintsHandlingSpecialistdeterminedthebestway

toaddresstheissuesandwasinchargeofprovidingresponsestothecomplaints.Verification

andproblemsolvingwerefollowed‐upbytheComplaintsHandlingSpecialisttogetherwithKDP

facilitators.

Table6.1CategoriesofIssues

IssuestobehandledbyKDP

1

2

3

4

Problemsrelatedtoprogramprocess/procedures

• Problemsregardingsizeofblockgrants

• Problemsregardingcategoriesofconflictvictims

• Problemsregardingtargetsiteselection

Misallocationofprogramfunds

InappropriateinterventionfromgovernmentofficialsorKDPconsultants

Unforeseeableeventssuchasnaturaldisasters(forcemajeure)

IssuestobehandledbyBRA

5 • Problemsrelatedtotheconceptofprogram(e.g.shifttocommunity‐basedmechanism)

• Problemsregardingalreadysubmittedproposals

• Inappropriateinterventionfromex‐combatants/KPA,PETA,politicalprisoners,securityforcesetc.

• Complaintsregardingreintegrationprogramingeneral

6.3 Complaints

Thenumberofcomplaintswasrelativelylow.Widespreadduringearlystages,thefrequencyof

inquiries by communities progressively decreased as implementation progressed and further

socializationwas carriedout,providing communitieswithabetterunderstandingofprogram

mechanisms.

Complaintsandconcernsmostcommonlyreportedwererelatedtothefollowingissues:

(i) Questionsoverthefateofpreviouslysubmittedproposals;

(ii) Conflictintensitycategorizationandvillageblockgrantallocations;

(iii) Delaysinimplementation;

(iv) Demandsforfundstobedistributedequally;

(v) Ex‐combatants/KPArequestingapartoftheassistance.

Issues (iv) and (v) were discussed at lengths in previous sections. The others are discussed

below.

Questionsregardingpreviouslysubmittedproposals

Over 48,500 proposals from conflict victims were submitted to BRA in April 2006. On

supervisionmissions,itwasnotuncommontofindvillagesinwhichoverahundredpeoplehad

sentproposals toBRA.Peoplehadhighexpectationsandagenuineneed forBRAassistance.

Mosthadinvestedsignificantamountsoftimeandmoneyinpreparingtheproposalsandhad

noinformationthattheproposal‐basedsystemhadbeenabandoneduntilthiswasdiscussedin

44

BRA‐KDP’sfirstvillagemeeting.Individualswereunderstandablyupsetatthischangeinpolicy,

disappointed that theirproposalswouldnotbeactedupon,anddismayedat theprospectof

havingtoexpendadditionaltimeandeffortinparticipatinginBRA‐KDP.BRA’schangeinpolicy

wasamajorsourceofcomplaintsearlyonintheBRA‐KDPcycle.Asfundsreachedcommunities

in early 2007, tensions over past proposals largely disappeared and community satisfaction

grew.TheMarch2007supervisionmissionfoundnoseriouscasesofcomplaintsabouttheshift

toBRA‐KDP’scommunitybasedsystem.

“A lot of community members sent proposals to BRA so people initially thought that the

[BRA‐KDP]moneywasfortheproposals.Therewasnoexplanationabouttheshift insystem,

andmanyarestillwaiting for themtobe funded. In fact,onlyaweekago, therewasa flyer

fromtheBRAdistrictofficeencouragingpeopletosendmoreproposalsforBRA‐KDP.”

VillageHead,KluetSelatansub‐district,AcehSelatan

Conflictintensityandvillageblockgrantallocation

Some communities noted that conflict intensity varied significantly within sub‐districts and

hence village allocations should be scaled according to both population size andvillage‐level

rather than sub‐district level conflict intensity. Finding consensus on this contentious issue

often required more than one village meeting; some communities held a series of

KDP‐facilitatedmeetingstoreachconsensus.AnextremecasewasthatofKecamatanManyak

Payed in Aceh Tamiang, where a second MAD was held to reallocate village block grants

accordingtovillage‐levelconflictintensity(Box6.1).

45

Box6.1ReallocationofVillageGrants‐‐theCaseofManyakPayed,AcehTamiang

Other communities pointed out that the population of certain villages was larger than that

identified by BRA‐KDP and that allocations should be revisited accordingly. An extreme case

wasGampongMesjidvillage,Nurussalamsub‐district,AcehTimur,whichhad1,818inhabitants

and suffered from high levels of conflict intensity. The village benefited from the highest

possible block grant allocation (Rp. 170million,US$17,000), but itwas still regardedby the

communityasinsufficienttocoverlocalneeds.Itwasalsoconsideredunfairincomparisonto

villagesthatreceivedthesameamountbuthadbeenlessaffectedandhadfewerinhabitants.

Thiscausedtrouble, leadingvillagerstorefusetogothroughwiththeprogram. InNovember

2006, a delegation of villagers came to Banda Aceh to convey their complaints to BRA’s

provincial management. Although BRA was sympathetic to the communities’ claims, no

agreementwasreached:budgetlimitationsmeantthatitwasnotpossibletoaddtoGampong

Mesjid’sblockgrantwithoutreducingtheallocationsofothervillagesinthesamesub‐district.

Program implementationwasstill frozenwhen theMarch2007supervisionmissionsurveyed

thevillage.Eventually,BRAfoundabudgetarysolutionthatallowedGampongMesjidtobenefit

fromaRp.50million (US$5,000)blockgrantcomplementandprogram implementationwas

resumed. This was the only case where disagreements over allocation amounts led to

protractedprotestsandatotalhalttoprogramactivities.

TheMADinManyakPayedsub‐districtconductedonNovember2006wasattendedbymanycommunity

representatives, village heads, KDP facilitators, ex‐combatants, BRA and other prominent figures. It

ended in dispute because community representatives disagreedwith the village allocations. Villagers

thoughtallocatingvillageblockgrantsbasedonsub‐district‐levelconflictintensityandvillagepopulation

sizewas unjust. Failing to consider village‐level variation in conflict intensitymeant that villageswith

high conflict intensity but small populations got lower allocations than villages with lower conflict

intensity but larger populations. Ex‐combatants and villagers argued that some villages experienced

difficultsituationsduringtheconflictandthereforedeservedmoreassistance.Theythusdemandedthat

villageallocationsberevisedbyconductinganotherspecialMAD.

KPA Aceh Tamiang took the initiative to organize a special MAD. With 300 participants, including

community representatives from 36 villages, the Camat, military, district police, KPA, and KDP

facilitators, the meeting’s attendance was well above the provincial average. At the meeting, it was

decided that village allocations should be revised based on village‐level conflict intensity. Allocations

werethendeterminedandagreedbyallparticipants.Thetablebelowshowstheagreedreallocation:

Population

Large Medium Small

High Rp.150,000,000

(6villages)

Rp.130,000,000

(10villages)

‐

Medium Rp.110,000,000

(4villages)

Rp.95,000,000

(5villages)

‐

Conflict

Intensity(village)

Low Rp.75,000,000

(5villages)

Rp.65,000,000

(6villages)

‐

This reallocation did not entail changes to the previously determined sub‐district allocation of Rp.

3,880,000,000.Allthevillagesfelttheyhadasayindeterminingtheblockgrantandthemeetingadjourned

witheveryonefeelingsatisfied.

46

Issues (i) and (ii) mostly appeared during early stages, betweenMD I and MD II. They lost

importanceasfurthersocializationwascarriedoutand implementationprogressed.Afterthe

MDII,theywerereplacedbyprotestsoverthepaceofimplementation.

Delaysindisbursements

The programwas socialized in August 2006 but due to administrative delays program funds

weredeliveredtosub‐districtFinancialManagementUnitsonlyinDecemberofthesameyear

(Box6.2).

Box6.2ConstraintsandIssueswithInitialDisbursementtoSub‐districts

Thedelayinthedisbursementoftheoperationalbudgetledtocomplaints.Insomeareas,the

delayraisedcommunitysuspicionsthateitherBRAorKDPfacilitatorswerestealingthemoney,

or thatnoassistancewasgoingtocomethroughafterall.Thisnegatively impacteduponthe

credibility of BRA and KDP personnel. Negative perceptions persisted until funds were

transferredfromcollectiveaccountsatthesub‐districtleveltothevillagelevel.Thissteptook

anadditionalseveralmonthsasvillagershadtosubmitsoundproposalsbeforefundscouldbe

released. Hence, therewerewidespread suspicions by communities in some areas that KDP

facilitators were deliberately slowing down the implementation process in order to collect

interestonprogramfundsdepositedinbankaccounts.

“There’sdistrustofpeopleheretowardsKDPfacilitators.Thisisbecausetherewasfalsenews

inthenewspaper.ThepapersaidthatthefundshadalreadybeendisbursedtotheFinancial

ManagementUnit,butthatthedisbursementtothevillageswasdelayedbecausetheUPKwas

tryingtoearninterestoffthefunds.”

KDPFacilitator,ManyakPayedsub‐district,AcehTamiang

“The delay in disbursement is the biggest problem. The community’s trust towards the KDP

facilitatorsisdecreasingbecausethedisbursementisslow.”

KDPFacilitator,Samaduasub‐district,AcehSelatan

Operational funds and block grants were first transferred to collective accounts created by KDP’s Financial

ManagementUnits(UPK) ineachofthe67participatingsub‐districts inDecember2006.Theprimaryreasons

for slow initial disbursement to the sub‐district accounts were BRA’s and the Department of Social

Affairs‘ (Dinsos) lackof familiaritywith thecommunity‐drivenapproachanda lackofcapacity tomanagethe

necessarypaperwork.ThesituationimprovedafterBRAestablishedaProjectImplementationUnit inOctober

2006. Nonetheless, to prevent the 2006 budget from being taken away by the Ministry of Finance after

December2006,theendoftheIndonesiangovernment’sfiscalyear,theWorldBankhadtomobilizefinancial

experts from the KDP teamwhoworked full‐timewith BRA, Dinsos, and the Treasury (KPPN) to ensure the

disbursementhappenedintime.

In the end, operational costs (six percent of the total allocation) were disbursed on 1 December and the

remaining94percentfor65outof67sub‐districtswasdisbursedbetween18‐20December.Twosub‐districts

(SimpangKramatandKutaMakmur,bothinAcehUtara)werelateinsubmittingtherequestfordisbursement

andhencewerepaidoutoftheunspentportionofBRA’s2005budgetinlateApril2007.

47

Concerns over disbursement delays had largely dissipated by the time of the March 2007

supervisionmission,inpartduetoeffectivefurthersocializationandfacilitationbyKDPstaff,in

partbecausefundshadstartedtoreachvillagesandbeneficiaries.

Theevolutionofissuesovertime:Inquiriesandcomplaintsreceivedviatextmessages

Asoneofthechannelsmostoftenusedbycommunitiestoaddressinformationandcomplaints,

textmessagingprovidesausefulinstrumenttoidentifyissuesandanalyzetheirevolutionover

time.Textmessageswereclassifiedintooneoffivesub‐categories:(i)clarificationofpreviously

submitted proposals; (ii) questions concerning the process and mechanisms of BRA‐KDP

(beneficiaries,mechanisms,timingofdisbursement,etc.);(iii)questionsconcerningotherBRA

reintegration programs; (iv) complaints and requests related to BRA‐KDP, such as GAM

extortion attempts, demands for direct cash transfers, complaints regarding KDP facilitators

andcorruptionallegations;and (v)others,usually inquiries thatwerenotdirectly relevant to

theprogram.Between23August2006,andtheendofApril2007,atotalof493messageswere

received. As Figure 6.1 shows, 41 percent of all messages received sought information on

eligiblebeneficiaries,disbursementschedulesortheprogramimplementationprocess.Another

22percentwerequestionsregardingBRA’sotherreintegrationassistance.Fifteenpercentwere

complaints about BRA‐KDP, including demands to equally divide the funds, corruption

allegations,andGAMextortionattempts.Afurthersixpercentsoughtclarificationonthestatus

ofpreviouslysubmittedproposals.

Figure6.1BreakdownofInformationRequestsandComplaintsReceivedViaTextMessage

Source:MISComplaintsHandlingSystem

Thenumberofcomplaintsandinformationrequestsevolvedovertime(Figure6.2).Therewas

a steady increase in the number ofmonthly incomingmessages until the end of December,

except for a temporary drop in November. The number of inquiries, however, dropped

significantly starting in February.Nomessageswere recordedafterApril and theComplaints

Handling Specialist handling the line was demobilized in June. The significant decline in the

numberofinquiriesappearstorelatetothreefactors:first,asmeetingsprogressedcommunity

6%

41%

22%

15%

16%

Status of former proposals

Questions about BRA-KDPprocess and mechanismsQuestions about other BRAprogramsComplaints related to BRA-KDP

Others

48

understanding of the program increased; second, articles on BRA‐KDP appeared more

frequently in the localpress (throughoutFebruary, forexample,newspapers featured stories

about the program almost every day); third, complaints and concerns declined as funds

disbursementsstartedinFebruary.

Figure6.2EvolutionofInformationRequestsOverTime

Source:MISComplaintsHandlingSystem

Figure 6.2 also shows that the type of information requested changed as the program

progressed.InAugust,mostsoughtclarificationonthestatusofpreviouslysubmittedproposals

and eligibility criteria. Inquiries about proposals rapidly decreased, however, demonstrating

increasing acceptance of the shift ofmechanism. The number of textmessages on eligibility

alsodecreasedovertimewhilethedisbursementschedulebecamethecommunities’foremost

concern.20 Statementssuchas“Weneedit[thefunds]urgently”or“Isit[BRA‐KDP]justalie?”

expressed a sense of impatience among communities. This type of inquiry progressively

disappearedasdisbursementsstartedinFebruary.

A positive trend was the general demand for program oversight. In August and September

people sought information about the program and fund allocation in order to preempt any

misconduct.FromSeptemberonwards,messagesreporting(alleged)corruptionorelitecapture

started. A case was reported fromManyak Payed in Aceh Tamiang that a Village Head had

prioritized his family in the allocation of funds. In one sub‐district in Aceh Selatan, the

sub‐district facilitator allegedly decided on who would receive funds. In Lawe Alas, Aceh

Tenggara,theKDPFinancialManagementUnit(UPK)andcommunitiesreceivedpressurefrom

theCamat’s office to save funds from the grants allocated to the sub‐district to finance the

20 Both inquiries about eligibility and disbursement schedule fall under the same category – Questions about

BRA‐KDPprocessandmechanism–inFigure6.2.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

A 06 S O N D J 07 F M A

Status of former proposals

Questions about BRA-KDP process and mechanisms

Questions about other BRA programs

Complaints related to BRA-KDP

Others

49

rehabilitationofaroad.InManyakPayed,AcehTamiang,reportswerereceivedofattemptsby

theCamattotakeacutfromtheoperationalfundsallocatedtothesub‐districtfinancialunits

(UPK). March saw a significant increase in complaints related to implementation issues as

disbursementtovillageswasinfullswing.Themaintypesofcomplaintswere:(i)thoseoverthe

way assistance was distributed, including by heavily affected conflict victims who felt they

should have been prioritized more; (ii) corruption allegations; and (iii) reports of extortion

attemptsbyKPA.Inallcases,therewasfollow‐upbyprogramstaffandmostcasesweresolved.

MessagesaboutotherBRAreintegrationassistancewerealso frequentlysent throughout the

ninemonths,andnotablyaccountedforthemajorityofmessagesinDecember.Theseincluded

questions from ex‐GAM combatants, amnestied political prisoners, members of former

anti‐separatist militia, IDPs and ordinary villagers asking about reintegration assistance in

general,and,specifically,abouthousingassistanceandDiyat.Thenumberofmessagesoneach

issuefluctuatedovertimebutqueriesoverhousingassistancewerethemostfrequent.

6.4 Socialization

Thediscussionofthenatureandevolutionofcomplaintsaboveunderlinesthe importanceof

socialization. Many concerns and issues stemmed from insufficient understanding by

communitiesofprogrammechanisms,andtheywereeventuallysortedoutbysimplycarrying

outfurthersocializationactivities.Socializationwasalsocriticalindefusingclaimsfromformer

combatantstoashareoftheassistance.

BRA‐KDP’ssocializationstrategy

BRA‐KDPwassocializedthroughthreeprimaryformsofmedia:printmedia,radioandmeetings

between program facilitators and beneficiary communities (see Box 6.3). Initial information

disseminationtargetedthepublicatlargethroughnewspapers,communityradio,posters,and

brochures. Q&A advertorials were published in three different newspapers. Five editions of

Ceureumen,abi‐weeklytabloiddeliveredwiththeBandaAceh‐baseddailySerambiIndonesia,

provideda full‐page reporton theprogressofBRA‐KDPandprovidedanswers to complaints

sentbytextmessage.FourepisodesofradiodramaproducedbyalocalNGOwerebroadcast

throughouttheprovincetoprovidedetailsoftheprograminahumorousmannerusingeasily

understandablelanguage.

More targeted socialization activities came in the formofworkshopsheld at thedistrict and

sub‐district levels by BRA, KDPprovincial and district staff and theWorld Bank.District‐level

workshopswereheldbetweenSeptemberandOctober2006inten locationsclusteringall17

targetdistricts.Inter‐villagemeetingswereheldinall67sub‐districts.Thesegatheringsaimed

atsocializingtheprogramtosub‐districtheads(Camat),governmentcoordinationbodies,BRA

districtoffices,KPA,religiousfigures,communityleaders,villageheads,military,andpolice.

50

Box6.3SummaryofSocializationActivities

A follow‐upsocializationcampaignwaspreparedthat includedadditional trainingtoBRAand

KDPfacilitators,distributionofamonthlyprogramnewsletter,additionalQ&Adocuments,and

thedevelopmentofatextmessagingsystemforrapiddisseminationof information.BRA‐KDP

jointmonthlycoordinationmeetingsstartedinMarch2007toimproveinformationsharingand

coordination between BRA and KDP facilitators. These additional socialization efforts helped

reduce the amount of inaccurate information disseminated by BRA district offices. In

intractable situations where the two parties could not agree on an issue in the field,

representatives of BRA, RMU and theWorld Bank conducted follow‐up missions to help to

clarifyissues.

Villagemeetingsappeartobethemosteffectivemeansofsocializationatthecommunity‐level

(SharpeandSim2009).KDPfacilitatorsnotedthatcommunities’loweducationlevelsandlack

of awareness sometimes limited the impact of print media; personal contact was a more

effectiveapproachbecausethecommunitycouldhavequestionsansweredimmediately.Field

missions also found that communities regarded KDP facilitators as the best source of

information. However, depending on verbal socialization alone posed risks. Both quality and

1.PrintedMaterials

• 5,000postersonprogramintroduction

• 5,000postersontheprogramcycle

• 100,000Q&Aleaflets

• 2,000flipchartsforvillage‐levelsocialization

• 3,800copiesofoperationalguidelines

2.Q&ANewspaperAds

• SerambiIndonesia(August18andOctober18)

• Waspada(August18andOctober18)

• Ceureumen(mid‐August)

3.RadioDrama

• Four episodes broadcast on RRI fromOctober 16 toNovember 20, three times aweek for one

episode

4.Bi‐weeklyProgramUpdateinCeureumen

5.UpdatedQ&A

• SecondsetofQ&Awasproducedimmediatelytoanswermajorquestionsandtoclarifyconfusing

information.CopiesweresenttoallBRAdistrictofficesandKDPfacilitators.

6.Workshops&SocializationMeetings

• District‐level workshops held between late September and early October in ten locations

(representativesfromall17districtsattended)

• Sub‐district levelsocializationmeetings(MADs)wereheldbetweenOctoberandNovember inall

67sub‐districts

• Every village held the first village meeting between October and November to socialize the

programtocommunitymembers

51

quantityofinformationdiminishesasitcascadesdowntheKDPfacilitatorchain.Furthermore,

vulnerableandoftenmarginalizedgroups, includingwomen,were less likely toattendvillage

meetings. As such, special socialization efforts were required to seek out and engage these

groups.

Printmediawaseffectiveatthedistrictandsub‐districtlevel,buthadamorelimitedimpactat

thecommunitylevel.Thereareseveralreasonsforthis.First,particularlyinruralareas,villages

showed a reluctance to read print materials, such as the Q&A advertisements published in

newspapers. Acquiring the newspapers required time and money and some community

members had difficulties understanding the technical language presented exclusively in

Indonesian.Visualaids,suchasflipchartsandposters,weremoreeffectiveatthecommunity

level.

Radio was the least effective medium. The primary reason for this is that the radio drama

episodes were broadcast exclusively by the local station of Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI).

AlthoughRRIhasabroadcoveragearea,amultitudeof localradiostationsreachroughlythe

same number of communities throughout Aceh. Research shows that communities exhibit a

strong preference for local radio stations rather than public radio (Sharpe and Wall 2007).

Airing the radiodramaon localaswell aspublic radio stationswouldmost likelyhavehada

greaterimpact.

Mobile phones are one communicationmedium increasingly used by NGOs and the private

sectorinIndonesia.RegionalmobilephoneuseisexplodingandphoneownershipinruralAceh

is significant. While no concrete data on phone ownership is available, anecdotal evidence

suggeststhatvulnerablegroups,includingyouthandformerGAMcombatants,frequentlyown

mobile phones. Mobile phones can be used as a two‐way communications tool that

disseminates information and allows the users of such information to provide feedback.

BRA‐KDP’s complaints‐handling system allowed communities to channel complaints via text

messageswithgreat success. This suggests thatmobile communications couldbeusedasan

effectivesocializationmedia.

Challengestosocializingtheprogram

Engaging vulnerable groups such as women and the most‐affected conflict victims required

extraordinaryeffortsfromprogramfacilitators.Marginalizedgroupswerelesslikelythanothers

toattendprojectsocializationmeetings.Publicspacessuchascoffeeshopsareexclusivelymale

environments in Aceh and therefore women are effectively excluded from this information

source (Sharpe andWall 2007). Further, women in rural villages have few opportunities to

access television and print media. To compensate for this lack of access to information,

program facilitators experimented with organizing informal meetings or women’s groups as

meansthroughwhichtomoreeffectivelyreachouttowomen.

Logistical obstacles in rural areas severely hampered efforts to socialize BRA‐KDP. Village

facilitatorsworkinginremoteareastendedtohavearelativelyweakunderstandingofprogram

52

processes because they often did not attend training sessions held at the sub‐district level

becauseofhigh transportation costs. This lackof information in turn limited the information

thatcouldbepassedontocommunities.Similarly,villagers livinginremoteareashadlimited

access to print media and other sources of information on the program. Because of high

transportationcosts,villagersinremoteareaswouldrarelytraveltosub‐districtcenterswhere

theycouldaccessnewspaperorvisittheKDPsub‐districtorsub‐districtadministrator’sofficeto

request information. In addition, it took longer for print materials, such as posters and flip

charts,toreachremoteareas.Insomecasesthesewereonlymadeavailableafterkeymeetings

tookplace.

Deliveryofprintmaterialswasdelayedandthereforedidnotreachsub‐districtandcommunity

levelspriortoMADandMDI.Assuch,sub‐districtandvillagefacilitatorswereunabletouse

valuablevisualaidsduringthiscrucialstageofthesocializationprocess.

Lack of coordination between BRA and KDP personnel at the district level had negative

consequencesforthesocializationeffort.Inseveralcases,informationprovidedbyBRAstaffat

both the provincial and district levels caused confusion among communities. For example in

AcehSelatan,theBRAdistrictofficedistributedflyersrequestingthatcommunitiescontinueto

sendindividualproposalsforconflictvictimsassistancetotheoffice.TheBRAdistrictofficealso

toldcommunities that the fundscouldbedisbursedequally to individualswithoutaneedfor

proposals.ThisledafewvillagestorejectKDPfacilitators’explanationthatthefundscouldnot

bedisbursedequally,bringingtheprojectprocesstoastandstill.

“We went to the BRA district office and heard about the program. BRA told me that the

[BRA‐KDP]fundswereforpreviouslysubmittedproposals.”

Ex‐GAMcombatant,Samaduasub‐district,AcehSelatan

Finally,facilitatorshadalimitedtimespaninwhichtosocializetheprogram.Theywereunder

pressuretocompleteprogramsocialization,conflictvictimmapping,andproposalidentification

activities so that all disbursements could bemade to UPKs by December 2006. As a result,

facilitatorshadto rushsocializationactivitiesandcouldnotwait forprintmaterials toarrive.

Socialization to all stakeholders requires a significant amount of time and resources but can

lead to benefits in terms of greater ease of program implementation and decreased local

tensions.Keymessagesmustbereinforcedonnumerousoccasionsandthroughvariousmeans

inordertohaveanimpact.

6.5 OneYearafterCompletion:WhatIssuesareIdentifiedbyBeneficiaries?

The ARLS, implemented in mid‐2008, provides a useful indication of what beneficiary

communities think about the program a year after its completion. A striking 94 percent of

villagers and 97 percent of themost‐affected victims thought the programwas generally or

veryhelpful(Barronet.al.2009).Thesurveyalsoshowsthatthelevelofcomplaintswasvery

low(Figure6.3).Thegreatestcomplaints,madebytwelvepercentofrespondents,wererelated

toperceptionsofdiversionsofmoneyandprojectselection.Amongthemostaffectedconflict

53

victims, the main complaint was that the program benefited other groups, such as

ex‐combatants,toomuch.Onlytwelvepercentofconflictvictimsfeltthattheydidnotbenefit

enoughfromtheprogram.Thisfiguresdropstotenpercentamongthemost‐affected.

Figure6.3PerceptionsofBRA‐KDP


0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Activities n

ot m

ost im

portant

Did not benefit enough people

Did n

ot benefit conflict victim

s

Benefited G

AM

/PETA too m

uch

Disagre

em

ents not well handled

Divers

ions o

f m

oney

Extortion

Allo

cations a

cro

ss villages u

nfa

ir

Pro

gra

m w

as typically

helpfu

l

All Non-Victims All Victims Only Most-Affected Victims

100%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

All Non-Victims All Victims Only Most-Affected Victims

54

7. IMPLICATIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

BRA‐KDP complemented highly targeted reintegration programs designated for former

combatants,politicalprisonersandothercategoriesofconflict‐affectedgroups.Theprogram’s

community‐drivenprocessaimedtostrengthensocialcohesionwhilesupportingtheeconomic

andsocialreintegrationofcivilianconflictvictims.ThispapershowsthatBRA‐KDPwaslargely

successful in delivering assistance to conflict victims in a swift, transparent and locally

appropriateway, and led towelfare improvements in target areas.However, asdiscussed in

detail in the accompanying BRA‐KDP impact evaluation, the program was less successful in

buildingsocialcohesiondespite itsattempttoengageformercombatantsandvictimsalike in

decision‐making processes related to post‐conflict reconstruction and recovery. This final

sectiondrawsfromthemainfindingsofthepapertoconsiderhowBRA‐KDPcouldhavebeen

moreeffective,providerecommendationsforfuturepost‐conflictprogramsinAceh,andassess

thebroaderimplicationsforDDRtheoryandpractice.

7.1 HowCouldBRA‐KDPhaveContributedmoreEffectivelytoReintegrationinAceh?

While BRA‐KDP funds intended as compensation produced positive welfare impacts, the

programfellshortonseveralothercounts,suchasidentifyingconflictvictimswithinvillages.A

lackofcommitmentfromgovernmenttodevolvedecisionsoncompensationtocommunities,

and inadequate training for project facilitators and technical assistance to beneficiaries are

some of the obstacles that prevented the program from fully achieving its objectives. The

recommendationsbelowhighlightwaysinwhichobstaclescouldhavebeenovercomeandmay

thereforeberelevanttoCDDandDDRpractitionersoperatinginotherpartsofIndonesiaorin

otherconflict‐affectedcountriesandregions.

Recommendation 1: Encourage government stakeholders to define clear policies and

programsfordeliveringcompensation.

TheGovernmentofAcehprioritizedthequickdeliveryofcompensationtoformercombatants

andconflict victims inorder tomeet its commitments stipulated in theHelsinkiMoU.At the

sametime,someofthegovernment’sinternationalpartnersstressedtheneedtomaximizethe

developmental impactsof thecompensationandencouraged theuseofmechanismssuchas

BRA‐KDP to achieve both objectives. While the government used BRA‐KDP to channel

assistancetoconflictvictims,therewasneveraclearpolicystatementthatassistancedelivered

throughtheprogramwouldfulfillthegovernment’sobligationtocompensateconflictvictims.

The failure to clearly articulate the program’s policy objective vis‐à‐vis the Helsinki MoU

resulted in tensions and the dissemination of conflicting messages during project

implementation. Conflict victims with high expectations of being compensated did not

understandwhytheywererequiredtosubmitaproposalinordertoobtainassistancethrough

BRA‐KDP. Conflicting instructionswere issued by KDP facilitators and BRA counterparts over

howprogramfundscouldbeused.Thelackofaclearpolicystancedamagedthecredibilityof

BRAandhinderedtheimplementationofBRA‐KDP.

55

Recommendation2:Provideprogramfacilitatorswiththeskillsandtoolsneededtofacilitate

aprocessofidentifyingconflictvictimswithinvillages.

BRA‐KDPleveragedanetworkofexperiencedKDPdistrictandsub‐districtfacilitatorswhowere

embeddedincommunitiesandfamiliarwithlocalconflictdynamics.KDPfacilitatorswerehighly

adeptatfacilitatingaprocessofmanagedcompetitionthroughwhichKDPprogramfundsare

allocatedacrossvillage‐level infrastructureprojects.TheseskillsbenefitedBRA‐KDP,asonlya

handful of program‐related conflicts resulted in violence or the destruction of property.

However, the KDP facilitators were ill equipped to guide communities through a process of

identifyingconflictvictims.Facilitatorshadneverundertakensuchaprocessbefore,andwere

unfamiliarwithconceptsofvictimhood,compensation,andreconciliationandhowthesecould

beappliedwithinthecontextofKDP.TheprogramusedBRA’sbroadcriteriatodefineconflict

victims and claims for compensation were widespread. Further complicating matters, the

subjectofvictimhoodwasasensitiveandpainfulonewithincommunities,andconflictvictims

were reluctant to publicly identify themselves, or even to discuss the matter, without

prompting.

Identifyingconflictvictimsmayhavebeenmoresuccessfulhad itbeen linkedwithabroader

processofcommunity‐levelhealingandreconciliation.Adiverserangeofpeace‐buildingskills,

ranging from conflict resolution to social psychology, would be needed to facilitate such a

process.Whileitisunrealistictoexpectallorevenamajorityoffacilitatorswithinaprogramof

thescaleofBRA‐KDPtopossesssuchskills,ataminimumtheyshouldhaveabasicknowledge

ofconflictresolutiontechniques,includingmediationandnegotiation,andbeprovidedwitha

clearsetofcriteriaforidentifyingconflictvictims.

Recommendation3:Provideamechanismandsafeguardsthroughwhichformercombatants

areabletobenefitfromBRA‐KDPassistance.

Chapter 4 points out the importanceof allowing all groups, including former combatants, to

accesstheprogramregardlessofotherobjectives.ForBRA‐KDP,definingamechanismthrough

which to provide benefits to former combatants was difficult given that former combatants

were entitled to large amounts of support through separate targetedprograms. Prioritywas

rightly given to non‐combatantswho lackedother sources of assistance.However, given the

poordeliveryofgovernmentprogramstargetingformercombatants,manyoftherank‐and‐file

received little to nothing, and therefore had legitimate claims for assistance at the time

BRA‐KDPwasimplemented.

One strategy to provide former combatants access to program benefits would be to define

targetingcriteriasolelyonvictimhoodratherthanstructureprogrammingbyotherconflict‐era

identities.Insuchascenario,formercombatantswouldbeeligibleforassistanceprovidedthat

they could demonstrate an extraordinary need that had not beenmet by other government

reintegrationprograms.Safeguards topreventprogramcaptureby formercombatantsmight

includereachingouttoformercombatantleadershiptosocializetheprogram’sprioritizationof

non‐combatantsandcrosscheckingBRAbeneficiaryliststoavoidoverlap.

56

Recommendation 4: Provide high quality technical assistance to victims in support of the

privategoodsdeliveredthroughBRA‐KDP,includingbuildinglinkagestotrainingandsources

ofcapital.

BRA‐KDPledtoclearwelfareimprovementsintargetsub‐districtsandvillages.Thisfindingisin

some ways surprising given that the KDP program structure is better suited to support

infrastructure sub‐projects, while BRA‐KDP funding was overwhelmingly used for small‐scale

livelihoods activities. As KDP facilitators did not have the experienceor resources needed to

provide training and follow‐up support for these livelihoods activities, some stakeholders

feared thatBRA‐KDP fundingwouldbeusedonly for short‐term consumption. In reality, the

largest proportion of BRA‐KDP funding was used for productive investments in agriculture,

livestock,andothersmall‐scaleeconomicactivities.ThissuggeststhatBRA‐KDPwelfareimpacts

couldhavebeenevengreateriftheprogramhadbeenabletolinkbeneficiarieswithaccessto

trainingandothersourcesofcapital.

7.2 What’sNextforCommunity‐BasedReintegrationandPost‐ConflictRecoveryinAceh?

A recent studyofpost‐conflict recovery inAceh shows that theneedsof former combatants

andconflictvictimshaveevolvedsignificantlysinceBRA‐KDPwasconceivedandimplemented

in 2006 (MSR 2009). Aceh has benefited from solid levels of economic growth driven by

tsunami reconstruction over the last four years. Former combatants have by and large

reintegrated successfully into political and social life and most now benefit from full‐time

employment.However,certaingroups,suchasformercombatantsaged36‐45,women‐headed

households and displaced persons, have not benefited proportional to others and are

vulnerable to economic shocks. Moving forward, inclusive economic growth rather than

targetedreintegrationprogramsisneededtogeneratesustainablelivelihoodsandsustainthe

socialandeconomicimprovementsofthepastfouryears(MSR2009).

The Government of Aceh should use the substantial resources at its disposal to promote

inclusive growth by providing public goods through investments in agriculture and rural

infrastructure,encouragingregulatoryandsecurityenvironmentsthatarefavorabletoprivate

investment, and offering programs and services to vulnerable groups. The following

recommendationsoutlinewaysinwhichprogramslikeBRA‐KDPcansupportinclusivegrowth.

Recommendation 5: The Government of Aceh should continue to leverage PNPM’s

community‐drivenmechanismtochannelassistancetoruralvillages.

In 2009, the Government of Aceh will deliver the first round of the Bantuan Keuangan

Pemakmur Gampong (Financial Assistance for Village Development —BKPG) program. This

program, which is financed from provincial and district budgets, will deliver approximately

US$15,000toeveryvillageinAceheachyearforthenextthreeyears.BKPGoffersanexcellent

opportunityforvillagesthatmightotherwisemissoutonothersourcesofassistance,including

regular PNPM, to meet pressing infrastructure needs. Similar to BRA‐KDP, BKPG grants are

deliveredat thevillage level, therebyeliminatingcompetition for fundingacrossvillages.The

57

community‐driven approach that delivers public goods will ensure that benefits are spread

widelyratherthantargetedtospecificgroups.

Recommendation6:Exploreopportunitiestotargetanddeliverprivategoodstovulnerable

groupsthroughBKPG.

In 2009, PNPM and BKPG will channel around US$ 130 million to villages in Aceh. Around

US$100millionofthiswillbedeliveredatthevillagelevelthroughBKPG.Whileinfrastructure

needsarehigh inmanypartsof theprovince,particularly inruralareas, theconcentrationof

largeamountsoffundingatthevillagelevelwillencouragevillagestoprioritizeneedsthatgo

beyond infrastructureandotherpublicgoods.Villagesshouldbeencouragedtoprioritizethe

needsofvulnerablegroupsanddeliverbenefitsintheformofprivategoodsthroughBKPG.The

Government of Aceh should consider piloting an approach similar to BRA‐KDP that expands

BKPG’s project menu to include private goods for vulnerable groups. Key elements of this

approach would include an open menu that includes private goods, criteria for identifying

vulnerable groups, and specialized technical assistance to small‐scale economic activities

initiatedbyprogrambeneficiaries.Thegovernmentcouldchanneladditional fundingtoareas

whereitwishestopilotsuchanapproach,orsimplyusefundsthathavealreadybeenallocated

forBKPG.

Recommendation 7: Policymakers should use welfare indicators rather than conflict‐era

identitiestotargetfutureprograms.

Therehavebeenliterallyhundredsofgovernmentanddonor‐supportedpost‐conflictprograms

implemented inAceh,many ofwhich have targeted the needs of former combatants.While

overallformercombatantsarereportinghighlevelsofemployment,thereis littleevidenceto

suggestthathighlytargetedprogramshaveledtosignificantwelfareimprovementsacrossall

groups of former combatants (MSR 2009). Nearly four years on from the signature of the

Helsinki MoU, programs that deliver assistance based on conflict‐era identities will further

harden these identities and ultimately undermine social cohesion. There is little if any

justificationtocontinueprogramsthattargetspecificgroupsbasedonconflict‐eraidentities.

Thisisnottosuggestthatsomeformercombatantsandconflictvictimsdonotrequirefurther

assistance.Lower levelsofwelfare tendtocorrelatewithcharacteristicssuchasage,gender,

unemployment,andassetlevels(MSR2009).Policymakersshouldthereforeusesuchcriteriato

targetprograms inordertoassistvulnerablepeople fromarangeofgroups including former

combatants,conflictvictims,anddisplacedpersons.

7.3 ImplicationsforDDRTheoryandPractice

BRA‐KDP emerged from a growing consensus amongst DDR practitioners that the needs of

victims must be addressed in addition to the needs of former combatants in order for

communities to reconcile and heal. DDR programs that focus solely on providing cash and

in‐kind assistance as incentives for combatants to lay down their arms ignore the needs of

58

civilianswhosuffergreatlyasa resultof theconflict,and facemajorchallenges in rebuilding

their lives. This can create jealousies within the non‐combatant population, damage social

cohesion,andunderminetheprocessofreintegratingformercombatants.Giventhattargeted

programs were provided to former combatants and other groups, BRA‐KDP’s policy was to

assistcivilianconflictvictimsonly.

Recommendation8:Community‐based/drivenreintegrationprogramsthataimtostrengthen

social cohesion should avoid program rules that exclude specific groups, including former

combatants,asprogrambeneficiaries.

Findings fromtheaccompanying impactevaluationshowthatBRA‐KDPhadmarginal impacts

onsocialcohesion(Barronet.al.2009).Surprisingly,communities inprogramareaswereless

likely to accept former combatants than theywould have been if they had not received the

program.Thefindingspresentedinthispapershowthatthisnegativefindingisverylikelydue

to the decision to exclude former combatants as direct beneficiaries. Findings from the

evaluation and the supervisionmissions showed that acceptance of former combatants was

higher in communities inwhich former combatants actuallybenefiteddirectly fromBRA‐KDP

assistance. This suggests that relaxing program rules to allow former combatants to benefit

directlyfromtheprogramcontributedpositivelytosocialcohesion.

DDR practitioners, particularly those that are designing or overseeing programs that apply

community‐basedandcommunity‐drivenmechanisms,shouldconsiderthepotentiallynegative

impacts on social cohesion when deciding whether or not to restrict access to benefits for

groupssuchasformercombatants.

Recommendation 9: Under the right conditions, community‐based/driven reintegration

programs can deliver ‘emergency’ compensation in ways that maximize developmental

impacts.

DDRprogramsgenerallyfollowasequenceinwhichcompensation/reparationsaredeliveredto

combatantsandvictims immediatelyfollowingapeaceagreement.This ‘emergency’phaseof

DDRprioritizesthepoliticalimportanceofthedeliveryofthesecashorin‐kindpaymentsover

the impacts that these resourcesmay have on thewell‐being of the individuals that receive

them. Programs with broader development objectives, such as the reconstruction of

infrastructure and provision of sustainable livelihoods, generally come after the ‘emergency’

phaseiscompleted(UNDDR2006).

DDR in Aceh followed a similar sequence (Barron 2009). The Helsinki MoU mandated the

compensation of combatants and victims, after which broader ‘economic empowerment’

programswould be delivered. Compensation to former combatantswas delivered through a

top‐downmechanisminwhichpaymentsweremadedirectlyfromthegovernmenttoformer

combatants through the KPA. Minimal efforts were made by the government to track how

muchcompensationwasreceivedandbywhom,much lesswhetherthefundswereusedfor

productive purposes (Zurstrassen 2006). BRA‐KDP by contrast attempted to compensate

59

conflictvictimsinawaythataimedtomaximizedevelopmentalimpacts.Theprogramdidsoby

devolving decision‐making authority over who is entitled to compensation to communities,

linkingthedeliveryofcompensationtothesubmissionofsub‐projectproposals,andproviding

TAtohelpcommunitiesusefundsforviablesmall‐scaleeconomicactivities.While,asdiscussed

in Section 7.1, each of these mechanisms had its shortcomings, findings from the impact

evaluation show that the program had positive impacts on welfare. Themajority of project

fundswereusedforproductivepurposesasopposedtoone‐offconsumption.Ultimately,itwas

thecommunity‐drivenmechanismforidentifyingvictimsthatprovedpoliticallyunacceptableto

theBRA.BRApreferredatop‐downapproachinwhichcompensationwastransferreddirectly

tovictimsthatwereidentifiedbydistrict‐levelverificationteams.

BRA‐KDP shows that it is not necessary in all cases to separate programs that deliver

‘emergency’compensationfromprogramswithbroaderdevelopmentaims.Community‐based

and community‐driven reintegration programs can deliver compensation in ways that have

positivewelfareimpactsonthosebeingcompensated.Thekeytothesuccessofthisapproach

lieswith the politicalwill of national and local governments to allow communities to decide

whodeservescompensationandwhatformthecompensationshouldtake.

60

References

Aspinall,Edward(2009).“CombatantstoContractors:ThePoliticalEconomyofPeaceinAceh.”

Indonesia75:1‐34.

Barron, Patrick (2009). “The Limits of DDR: Reintegration Lessons from Aceh” in Small Arms

Survey,SmallArmsSurveyYearbook2009.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Barron,PatrickandAdamBurke(2008).“SupportingPeaceinAceh:DevelopmentAgenciesand

InternationalInvolvement.”PolicyStudiesNo.47.Washington,D.C:East‐WestCenter.

Barron,Patrick,SamuelClarkandMuslahuddinDaud(2005).“ConflictandRecoveryinAceh:An

Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process.” Jakarta:

DecentralizationSupportFacility.

Barron,Patrick,RachaelDiproseandMichaelWoolcock(2006).“LocalConflictandCommunity

Development in Indonesia: Assessing the Impact of the Kecamatan Development Program.”

IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.10.Jakarta:WorldBank.

Barron, Patrick, Macartan Humphreys, Laura Paler and Jeremy Weinstein (2009).

“Community‐BasedReintegrationinAceh:AssessingtheImpactofBRA‐KDP.”IndonesianSocial

DevelopmentPaperNo.12.Jakarta:WorldBank.

BRA (Aceh Reintegration Agency) (2008). Economic Section Update. Unpublished document.

November.

Collier, Paul et al. (2003). “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy”.

Washington,D.C.:WorldBankandOxfordUniversityPress.

ForbesDamaiAceh(2007a).Update.5June.Unpublisheddocument.

ForbesDamaiAceh(2007b).Update.October.Unpublisheddocument.

MSR(2009).“Multi‐StakeholderReviewofPost‐ConflictProgramming inAceh: Identifying the

FoundationsforSustainablePeaceandDevelopmentinAceh”.BandaAceh/Jakarta:MSR.

Governmentof IndonesiaandFreeAcehMovement(2005).“MemorandumofUnderstanding

betweentheGovernmentoftheRepublicofIndonesiaandtheFreeAcehMovement”.Helsinki.

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Sharpe, Joanne and Sim Kok Eng Amy (2009). “Promoting Peace: Communications, Public

OutreachandSocializationof theAcehPeaceProcess.” IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaper

No.17.Jakarta:WorldBank.

Sharpe, Joanne and Imogen Wall (2007). “Media Mapping: Understanding Communications

EnvironmentsinAceh.”IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.9.Jakarta:WorldBank/DSF.

UNDDR (United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center)

(2006). “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards”. New York:

UNDDR.

World Bank (2006). GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through

Community‐LevelDevelopmentProgramming.BandaAceh/Jakarta:WorldBank.

Zurstrassen, Matthew (2006). “An Evaluation of BRA Support to Former Combatants”.

UnpublishedWorldBankevaluationreportforBRA.10September.

62

ANNEXA:LISTOF2006TARGETSUB‐DISTRICTSANDALLOCATIONS

No. Kabupaten Sub‐district #Villages Population Intensity Allocation

1 AcehBarat SAMATIGA 34 17,118 LOW 2,410,000,000

2 AcehBaratDaya BABAHROT 7 16,243 MEDIUM 840,000,000

3 AcehBaratDaya TANGANTANGAN 21 17,272 LOW 1,580,000,000

4 AcehBesar MESJIDRAYA 13 12,451 LOW 970,000,000

5 AcehBesar KRUENGBARONAJAYA 12 12,865 LOW 910,000,000

6 AcehBesar DARUSSALAM 29 19,508 LOW 2,020,000,000

7 AcehBesar SUKAMAKMUR 35 12,537 LOW 2,350,000,000

8 AcehJaya KRUENGSABEE 17 15,477 MEDIUM 1,840,000,000

9 AcehSelatan KLUETTIMUR 7 8,925 MEDIUM 800,000,000

10 AcehSelatan TAPAKTUAN 15 19,308 MEDIUM 1,700,000,000

11 AcehSelatan SAMADUA 27 15,282 MEDIUM 2,800,000,000

12 AcehSelatan KLUETSELATAN 17 12,538 LOW 1,210,000,000

13 AcehSingkil LONGKIP 10 4,531 LOW 690,000,000

14 AcehSingkil SULTANDAULAT 17 12,065 LOW 1,240,000,000

15 AcehTamiang MANYAKPAYED 36 26,774 MEDIUM 3,880,000,000

16 AcehTengah KEBAYAKAN 19 12,891 LOW 1,380,000,000

17 AcehTengah LAUTTAWAR 15 17,605 LOW 1,130,000,000

18 AcehTenggara LAWEALAS 23 14,390 LOW 1,690,000,000

19 AcehTimur BANDAALAM 16 8,521 HIGH 2,240,000,000

20 AcehTimur JULOK 35 21,559 HIGH 5,140,000,000

21 AcehTimur RANTAUSELAMAT 14 16,248 HIGH 2,280,000,000

22 AcehTimur PEUREULAKBARAT 11 9,672 HIGH 1,740,000,000

23 AcehTimur PEUREULAK 33 30,658 HIGH 5,200,000,000

24 AcehTimur PANTEBIDARI 23 21,403 HIGH 3,610,000,000

25 AcehTimur INDRAMAKMU 5 3,289 HIGH 760,000,000

26 AcehTimur SIMPANGULIM 23 5,051 HIGH 2,890,000,000

63

27 AcehTimur PEUDAWA 17 9,836 HIGH 2,510,000,000

28 AcehTimur IDITUNONG 25 8,651 HIGH 3,290,000,000

29 AcehTimur MADAT 26 22,265 HIGH 4,110,000,000

30 AcehTimur RANTAUPEUREULAK 22 29,887 HIGH 3,410,000,000

31 AcehTimur NURUSSALAM 42 17,352 HIGH 5,860,000,000

32 AcehTimur DARULAMAN 45 15,054 HIGH 5,970,000,000

33 AcehUtara LANGKAHAN 23 13,159 HIGH 3,430,000,000

34 AcehUtara SAWANG 39 26,212 HIGH 5,930,000,000

35 AcehUtara NISAM 44 34,264 HIGH 6,900,000,000

36 AcehUtara SIMPANGKEURAMAT 16 9,098 HIGH 2,390,000,000

37 AcehUtara SEUNUDON 33 22,881 HIGH 5,150,000,000

38 AcehUtara SYAMTALIRABAYU 49 19,627 HIGH 6,630,000,000

39 AcehUtara KUTAMAKMUR 39 18,660 HIGH 5,540,000,000

40 AcehUtara MATANGKULI 72 25,120 HIGH 9,730,000,000

41 AcehUtara PAYABAKONG 39 12,097 HIGH 5,160,000,000

42 AcehUtara BAKTIYABARAT 27 16,942 HIGH 4,020,000,000

43 BenerMeriah PINTORAMEGAYO 5 4,087 MEDIUM 540,000,000

44 BenerMeriah TIMANGGAJAH 15 26,641 MEDIUM 1,720,000,000

45 BenerMeriah SYIAHUTAMA 16 8,696 LOW 1,060,000,000

46 Bireuen PEUDADA 44 24,910 HIGH 6,570,000,000

47 Bireuen PEUSANGANSIBLAH

KRUENG

19 10,525 HIGH 2,940,000,000

48 Bireuen PEUSANGANSELATAN 19 11,181 HIGH 2,820,000,000

49 Bireuen GANDAPURA 38 15,109 HIGH 5,340,000,000

50 Bireuen SAMALANGA 46 23,017 HIGH 6,650,000,000

51 Bireuen MAKMUR 26 13,021 HIGH 3,800,000,000

52 Bireuen JEUMPA 40 30,760 HIGH 6,390,000,000

53 Bireuen JEUNIEB 39 20,655 HIGH 5,780,000,000

54 Bireuen JULI 21 24,443 HIGH 3,420,000,000

64

55 Bireuen JANGKA 45 25,639 MEDIUM 4,620,000,000

56 GayoLues TERANGON 16 9,916 HIGH 2,350,000,000

57 GayoLues PINDING 9 4,664 MEDIUM 880,000,000

58 NaganRaya SEUNAGANTIMUR 35 11,025 HIGH 4,710,000,000

59 NaganRaya BEUTONG 28 10,618 MEDIUM 2,600,000,000

60 Pidie MILA 20 11,937 HIGH 3,100,000,000

61 Pidie GEULUMPANGBARO 21 9,346 MEDIUM 2,080,000,000

62 Pidie MANE 4 9,064 HIGH 680,000,000

63 Pidie BANDARDUA 45 18,631 HIGH 6,310,000,000

64 Pidie SAKTI 49 20,501 MEDIUM 4,680,000,000

65 Pidie GEUMPANG 5 6,740 HIGH 830,000,000

66 Pidie TITEU/KEUMALA 31 14,411 MEDIUM 3,080,000,000

67 Simeulue TEUPAHSELATAN 16 6,780 LOW 1,100,000,000

1,724 217,380,000,000

65

ANNEXB:SUPERVISIONMISSIONS‐TIMINGANDTARGETLOCATIONS

Supervision

No. Kabupaten Sub‐District Intensity AllocationNov06 Mar07 Sep07

1 AcehBarat SAMATIGA LOW 2,410,000,000

2 AcehBaratDaya BABAHROT MEDIUM 840,000,000

3 AcehBaratDaya TANGANTANGAN LOW 1,580,000,000

4 AcehBesar MESJIDRAYA LOW 970,000,000

5 AcehBesar KRUENGBARONAJAYA LOW 910,000,000

6 AcehBesar DARUSSALAM LOW 2,020,000,000

7 AcehBesar SUKAMAKMUR LOW 2,350,000,000

8 AcehJaya KRUENGSABEE MEDIUM 1,840,000,000

9 AcehSelatan KLUETTIMUR MEDIUM 800,000,000

10 AcehSelatan TAPAKTUAN MEDIUM 1,700,000,000

11 AcehSelatan SAMADUA MEDIUM 2,800,000,000

12 AcehSelatan KLUETSELATAN LOW 1,210,000,000

13 AcehSingkil LONGKIP LOW 690,000,000

14 AcehSingkil SULTANDAULAT LOW 1,240,000,000

15 AcehTamiang MANYAKPAYED MEDIUM 3,880,000,000

16 AcehTengah KEBAYAKAN LOW 1,380,000,000

17 AcehTengah LAUTTAWAR LOW 1,130,000,000

18 AcehTenggara LAWEALAS LOW 1,690,000,000

19 AcehTimur BANDAALAM HIGH 2,240,000,000

20 AcehTimur JULOK HIGH 5,140,000,000

21 AcehTimur RANTAUSELAMAT HIGH 2,280,000,000

22 AcehTimur PEUREULAKBARAT HIGH 1,740,000,000

23 AcehTimur PEUREULAK HIGH 5,200,000,000

24 AcehTimur PANTEBIDARI HIGH 3,610,000,000

25 AcehTimur INDRAMAKMU HIGH 760,000,000

66

26 AcehTimur SIMPANGULIM HIGH 2,890,000,000

27 AcehTimur PEUDAWA HIGH 2,510,000,000

28 AcehTimur IDITUNONG HIGH 3,290,000,000

29 AcehTimur MADAT HIGH 4,110,000,000

30 AcehTimur RANTAUPEUREULAK HIGH 3,410,000,000

31 AcehTimur NURUSSALAM HIGH 5,860,000,000

32 AcehTimur DARULAMAN HIGH 5,970,000,000

33 AcehUtara LANGKAHAN HIGH 3,430,000,000

34 AcehUtara SAWANG HIGH 5,930,000,000

35 AcehUtara NISAM HIGH 6,900,000,000

36 AcehUtara SIMPANGKEURAMAT HIGH 2,390,000,000

37 AcehUtara SEUNUDON HIGH 5,150,000,000

38 AcehUtara SYAMTALIRABAYU HIGH 6,630,000,000

39 AcehUtara KUTAMAKMUR HIGH 5,540,000,000

40 AcehUtara MATANGKULI HIGH 9,730,000,000

41 AcehUtara PAYABAKONG HIGH 5,160,000,000

42 AcehUtara BAKTIYABARAT HIGH 4,020,000,000

43 BenerMeriah PINTORAMEGAYO MEDIUM 540,000,000

44 BenerMeriah TIMANGGAJAH MEDIUM 1,720,000,000

45 BenerMeriah SYIAHUTAMA LOW 1,060,000,000

46 Bireuen PEUDADA HIGH 6,570,000,000

47 Bireuen P.SIBLAHKRUENG HIGH 2,940,000,000

48 Bireuen PEUSANGANSELATAN HIGH 2,820,000,000

49 Bireuen GANDAPURA HIGH 5,340,000,000

50 Bireuen SAMALANGA HIGH 6,650,000,000

51 Bireuen MAKMUR HIGH 3,800,000,000

52 Bireuen JEUMPA HIGH 6,390,000,000

53 Bireuen JEUNIEB HIGH 5,780,000,000

54 Bireuen JULI HIGH 3,420,000,000

67

55 Bireuen JANGKA MEDIUM 4,620,000,000

56 GayoLues TERANGON HIGH 2,350,000,000

57 GayoLues PINDING MEDIUM 880,000,000

58 NaganRaya SEUNAGANTIMUR HIGH 4,710,000,000

59 NaganRaya BEUTONG MEDIUM 2,600,000,000

60 Pidie MILA HIGH 3,100,000,000

61 Pidie GEULUMPANGBARO MEDIUM 2,080,000,000

62 Pidie MANE HIGH 680,000,000

63 Pidie BANDARDUA HIGH 6,310,000,000

64 Pidie SAKTI MEDIUM 4,680,000,000

65 Pidie GEUMPANG HIGH 830,000,000

66 Pidie TITEU/KEUMALA MEDIUM 3,080,000,000

67 Simeulue TEUPAHSELATAN LOW 1,100,000,000

68

ANNEXC:COMPLAINTSHANDLINGFLOW‐CHART

Cross‐check/

Clarification

IncorrectCorrect

Categorizeandregisterinto

BRA‐KDPdatabase

IfproblemsrelatedtoBRA,

consultwithBRAPIU.

(Category5problems)

Complaints/Problems

Action‐taking/

Intervention

KeyActorsforcomplaints

handling

Solved NotSolved

ComplaintsHandlingSpecialistto

disseminate/reporttheprogressand

resultsofhandledcomplaints&

recordfinaloutcomeindatabase

Classifyproblemstobehandledthrough

BRA‐KDPorBRA

Consideranothercourse

ofaction

IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers

No. Title Authors(s) Date

1 TheDynamicsofDistrictGovernance:Forums,BudgetProcessesand

Transparency

LuthfiAshari May04

Dynamika Pemerintahan Kabupaten: Forum, Perencanaan Anggaran

danTransparenci

2 ViolenceandConflictResolutioninNon‐ConflictRegions:TheCaseof

Lampung,Indonesia

PatrickBarron

DavidMadden

Aug04

3 Mobilizing for Violence: The Escalation and Limitation of Identity

Conflicts

YuhkiTajima Aug04

4 More Than Just Ownership: Ten Land andNatural Resource Conflict

CaseStudiesfromEastJavaandFlores

SamuelClark(ed.) Dec04

Bukan Sekedar Persoalan Kepemilikan: Sepuluh Studi Kasus Konflik

TanahdanSunberDayaAlamdariJawaTimurdanFlores

5 Crisis, Social Ties, and Household Welfare: Testing Social Capital

TheorywithEvidenceFromIndonesia

AnnaWetterberg Apr05

6 Village Corruption in Indonesia: Fighting Corruption in Indonesia's

KecamatanDevelopmentProgram

AndreaWoodhouse Apr05

7 CountingConflicts:UsingNewspaperReportstoUnderstandViolence

inIndonesia

PatrickBarron

JoanneSharpe

May05

8 Aceh:ReconstructioninaConflictEnvironment AdamBurke

Afnan

Oct05

9 Media Mapping: Understanding Communications Environments in

Aceh

JoanneSharpe

ImogenWall

Apr07

10 Conflict and Community Development in Indonesia: Assessing the

ImpactoftheKecamatanDevelopmentProgram

PatrickBarron

RachaelDiprose

MichaelWoolcock

Jul06

11 Peaceful Pilkada, Dubious Democracy: Understanding Aceh’s

Post‐ConflictElections

SamuelClark

BlairPalmer

Aug08

12 Community‐Based Reintegration in Aceh: Assessing the Impacts of

BRA‐KDP

PatrickBarron

MacartanHumphreys

LauraPaler

JeremyWeinstein

Dec09

13 DeliveringAssistancetoConflict‐AffectedCommunities:TheBRA‐KDP

PrograminAceh

AdrianMorel

MakikoWatanabe

RobWrobel

Dec09

Papersareavailableon‐lineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org

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