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Public Health Emergency Public Health Emergency PreparednessPreparedness
An Integrated ApproachAn Integrated Approach
Office of the Assistant SecretaryPublic Health Emergency
PreparednessU.S. Department of
Health and Human Services
Jerome M. HauerAssistant Secretary
February 5, 2003
IntroductionIntroduction
HHS has been involved with public health preparedness for bioterrorist attacks against U.S. since 1999
Efforts have greatly accelerated since 9/11
HHS preparedness and response plan involves many components and stakeholders
Why Are We Concerned?Why Are We Concerned? Since September 2001, heightened concerns
about terrorists’ access to biologic agents Sophisticated dissident groups
1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin attacks, 2001 Al Queda Known BW programs in other countries Increasing numbers of laboratories with
competence to produce agents -- difficult to track
Internet Agents available from many sources Manufacturing methods on aerolization of smallpox
Biological Weapons and Bioweapons Development Programs
Evidence alleging the existence of offensive bioweapons programs in 13 countries
Soviet bioweapons program manufactured tons of anthrax in powder form
Iraq admitted to producing 8,000 liters of concentrated anthrax powder
Al Queda laboratories intending to make anthrax bioweapons recently discovered
Biological Weapons and Bioweapons Development Programs Following 1972 Biological Weapons Convention,
some signatories continued work Bioweapons scientists from former Soviet Union
recruited by other nations Iraq admitted to producing 19,000 liters
botulinum, 3x more than needed for entire human population
Russia’s work on splicing botulinum toxin into bacteria
Smallpox adapted for use in bombs and missiles
Overall Goal Overall Goal HHS Bioterrorism ProgramHHS Bioterrorism Program
To ensure sustained public health and medical readiness for our communities and our nation against:
bioterrorism infectious disease outbreaks other public health threats and
emergencies
Objectives ofObjectives ofHHS Bioterrorism Preparedness HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness ProgramProgram Enhance capacities for early detection and
control of infectious diseases
Receipt and delivery of antibiotics and vaccines
Strengthening laboratory systems
Train the public health and medical workforce for bioterrorism preparedness and response
Ensure community and regional health care systems are prepared for medical and psychological needs of victims, “worried-well”
Objectives of the Objectives of the HHS Bioterrorism ProgramHHS Bioterrorism Program Develop effective risk communication
and information dissemination strategy to address needs of stakeholders and the public
Lead a national bioscience research and development effort related to civilian biodefense
Coordinate medical and public health preparedness with other efforts at the community, State, and Federal level
Enhanced Funding forEnhanced Funding forAnti-Terrorism EffortsAnti-Terrorism Efforts
Prevention of Bioterrorism
State and Local Assets
Federal Government Assets
Research and Developmen
Transfers to Homeland Transfers to Homeland SecuritySecurityOffice of Emergency Response including 25
regional emergency officers Includes headquarters, National Disaster
Medical System, Metropolitan Medical Response System
National Pharmaceutical Stocpkile Budget and decision to deploy DHS
responsibility
Secretary of HHS responsible for determining content of stockpile
Smallpox Vaccine
Different Funding Streams: Different Funding Streams: One Integrated ProgramOne Integrated Program
Share a common purpose
Complement and reinforce each other’s objectives
Synchronize efforts as needed
Build upon pre-existing plans
Some Lessons Learned from Some Lessons Learned from ExperienceExperience
After-Action Reports typically describe communications systems that couldn’t communicate
Difficulty or impossibility of accommodating external assets
Integration is the key
Fragmentation is the curse
Bioterrorism Preparedness Planning Must encompass coordinated systems
approaches to bioterrorism including public policies incident command and management
Include local, regional, public and private institutions
Prevention requires Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Public Health and Medical Systems required to prepare for, respond to, and lessen impact
Major Focus on Major Focus on State and Local AssetsState and Local Assets
All terrorism is local
An effective national response requires an effective local and state response
When a public health emergency event occurs, it unfolds at local level
State and Local State and Local PreparednessPreparednessThree Guiding PrinciplesThree Guiding Principles
Empower the States to seek integrated response capabilities within their borders
Give States incentives to address inter-State and transnational preparedness
Ensure that USG assets complement and supplement State assets
Current Integrative EffortsCurrent Integrative Efforts
The State is the primary unit of program organization
Congress endorsed this policy in recent authorizing legislation
(Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002)
Integration of HHS/DHS Integration of HHS/DHS Programs Programs Link efforts to prepare hospitals and
health departments for infectious disease outbreaks and mass casualty events
Encourage State officials to incorporate MMRSs within plans as appropriate
Coordinate with other emergency management programs (e.g., FEMA, DOJ)
State Programs:State Programs:Horizontal IntegrationHorizontal Integration
State Health Officer Responsible for
Enhancement of Health Departments
Enhancement of Hospital Preparedness for Mass Casualty Events
Coordination with Public Safety Agencies
State and Municipal Advisory Committee Participants State-local health departments and
government Emergency management agencies and
medical services Rural and urban health Police, fire department, emergency rescue
workers and occupational health workers Community health care providers Indian nations and tribes Red Cross and other voluntary organizations Hospital community, including VA
One Integrated Program:One Integrated Program:Three WatchwordsThree Watchwords
SPEED in making funds available for use
FLEXIBILITY in how funds are used
ACCOUNTABILITY for results obtained
Oversight of Cooperative Oversight of Cooperative AgreementsAgreements
Financial auditing Are funds being expended in accordance with
all applicable statutory requirements?
Project monitoring Are activities being conducted consistent with
the HHS-approved workplan?
Readiness Assessment Have the activities under the cooperative
agreement led to improved preparedness for bioterrorism and other public health emergencies
Critical Smallpox Vaccine Critical Smallpox Vaccine Policy IssuesPolicy Issues Factors to consider in decision-making
process: Level of threat – risk of infection with
smallpox Vaccine supply Expected adverse reactions Vaccinia immune globulin supply (VIG) Liability and compensation issues State and local smallpox operational
planning
Administration of Smallpox Administration of Smallpox CountermeasuresCountermeasures
Recommended domestically for smallpox response teams, health care workers, emergency response/public safety workers
Personnel associated with certain U.S. facilities abroad
Section 304 of Homeland Security Act intended to alleviate liability concerns
Smallpox Vaccination IssuesSmallpox Vaccination Issues
Logistics/Costs of Program
Education of Potential Vaccinees
Medical Screening of Potential Vaccinees
Costs for Treatment of Adverse Events
Reimbursement for Lost Wages
Beyond Smallpox: Beyond Smallpox: Challenges We Face Challenges We Face
Finding qualified candidates for certain positions especially in more rural parts of the state
Strengthening surge capacity and patient transfer needs
Adhering to tasks within compressed timelines with multiple competing forces
Integration of different programs at Federal, State and local levels
Public Health Preparedness Public Health Preparedness Program ChallengesProgram Challenges
Maintaining the sense of urgency
Speed in achieving an optimal level of readiness
Demonstrating to Congress the need to maintain funding levels to support public health infrastructure
Establishing and maintaining relationships with public health, hospitals, clinicians, health care providers, and other responders to ensure a cohesive emergency response system