iNDUSTRtAL RELATIONS, Vol. 16, No. 3 , October 1977

JAMES L. PERRY**

Public Policy andPublic Eraployee Strikes

THIS IS A STUDY of the impact of public policy (as expressedin public employment bargaining laws) on public employee strike levels.In following up on a suggestion by Kochan that "it is more appropriate toview policy as an intervening variable between certain antecedent condi-tions and dependent variables of interest in labor-management relations,"'it finds that public policy does have an effect, but it is less general and lessstrong than anticipated, and the effect varies considerably among threepublic employee groups.

MethodologyTo explore the impact of policy, data were gathered by state

for the three employee groups — teachers, local government employees(excluding police and firefighters), and state government employees. Thestudy is cross-sectional since data were utilized for one year only, 1973.The analysis included zero-order and partial correlations along with regres-sion analysis.

Four ratio scale measures of strike activity were used as dependent variables.with separate measurements heing made for each of these three employee groups.Frequency was measured by the number of work stoppages in 1973. The numberof workers involved per work stoppage per full-time equivalent was used tomeasure participation. Duration was measured by the number of man-days idleper worker involved. Finally a summary index was developed, based on the num-ber of man-days idle per full-time equivalent in the employee group.^ Severalmeasures were used because different aspects of work stoppages at least poten-

"Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Administration, University of California, Irvine,'Thomas A. Kochan, "Correlates of State Public Employee Bargaining Laws," Industrial Relations,

XIHOctober, 1973), 322.-These four measures were previously used together in an analysis of industrial strike activity. For

the logic of using these, see David Britt and Omer R. Galle, "Industrial Conflict and Unionization."American Sociological Review, XXXVII (February, 1972), 46-57.

273

2 7 4 / JAMES L. PERRY

tially may have different antecedents. For example, it is possible that the variableswhich significantly affect frequency may not also influence duration.

Independent variables. Two indicators of salary relationships were utilized asindependent variables. The ratio (earnings ratio) of average earnings within agiven employee group to the average earnings of all public employees in the statewas used to investigate a possible relationship between strikes and expectationsof public employees about salary increases.^ The percentage of change in averagemonthly income (income change) of the employee group between 1960 and 1970was taken as an indicator of the economic welfare of public employees over anextended period of time and was used to measure a possible relationship betweenlong-term rewards and current strike levels. Both indicators were anticipated tobe negatively related to strikes,

Measures of relative employment and level of unionization were used to probestrike antecedents related to public employee power. The number of employees(employment intensity) in each employee group (in each state) per 10,000 popu-lation provides an indicator of the likely power of public employees as a votingblock as well as their potential organizational capacity. Since public employeestrikes tend to expand the arena of active participants, the percentage of unioni-zation (of the nonagricultural labor force within the state) was used to measureprobable external support for public employee unions as well as the predispositionof a substantial group in the population to choose the union's side in the event ofa strike. Because increasing levels of public union power have been associatedwith the increased likelihood of strikes, these measures are expected to be positivelyrelated to strikes.••

Man-days idle from work stoppages, 1972, per iull-time equivalents in the em-ployee group (previous strikes) was selected as an indicator of possible varia-tions in inter-state or inter-group predispositions to engage in strikes. There isprivate sector evidence that the strike,^ as an institutional practice, becomes aroutine part of union-management interaction and it seems possible that similarroutinization could occur among public employees.^ Thus, this variable was ex-pected to be positively related to strikes.

The number of years since the passage of the first comprehensive state law gov-erning public employment labor relations within the state (legal experience)was used as an indicator of the stability of negotiating mechanisms." The length

'Average earnings of all public employees were used as the denominator of the ratio because theearnings of this group were viewed as providing a better comparison than, for example, those of manu-facturing employees. Using as the dependent variables aggregate work stoppage data for teachers, local,and state government employees in each state prevented using ratios which might more closely reflectsalary expectations among occupational subgroupings of the public sector workforce, such as health andwelfare or sanitation employees.

*See, for example. Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Unions and the Cities (Wash-ington, D.C.: Brrxikings Institution, 1971) and Robert E. Doherty, "Public Employee Bargaining andthe Conferral of Public Benefits," Labor Latv Journal, XX (August, 1971), 485-492.

^See Robert Dubin, "industrial Conflict and Social Welfare," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (June,1957), 179-199.

^Although it was preferable to use a long-term average of the history of work stoppages among eachof the groups to measure this variable, sufficiently detailed public employment work stoppage data wereavailable only for 1972 and 1973.

•This indicator was suggested by, and the data derived from, Kochan, op. dt., pp. 326-327.

Symposium: Public Sector Impasses / 275

of time since such a law was initiated should affect the parties' experience withthe bargaining process, their understanding of dispute resolution mechanisms, andtheir ability to attract or train competent labor relations personnel. This measurewas expected to be negatively related to strikes.

Intervening variables. The instrument employed by Kochan to scale state publicemployment bargaining laws was used to develop indices of the legal policiespresumed to be intervening variables between the independent and dependentvariables.^ This instrument classifies state labor relations policies into 12 categories,including those relating to scope of bargaining, unit determination, bargainingrights, and union security policy. Each category is coded from zero to three on anordinal scale to reflect the degree to which each policy provision approaches aformalized collective bargaining relationship.

Three legal policy indices were created from the resulting scores. The first wasan additive index of the scores from 10 of the 12 policy provisions (with a possiblerange from 0 to 21).*' These provisions encompass state regulations related bothto the establishment of collective bargaining (e.g., unit determination proceduresand the type of recognition accorded public employee organizations) and to theconduct of collective bargaining once it has been established (e.g., scope of bargain-ing, impasse and grievance procedures). Although this index differs somewhatfrom Kochan's overall index, it will also be termed comprehensiveness because itreflects his basic rationale "that the more formalized the procedures specified inthe law, the more detailed and comprehensive the regulation of labor policy."'"Scores in two of the policy categories, strike policy and union security policy, wereused as separate indices in the analysis."

Zero-order CorrelationsAnalysis of the zero-order correlations presented in Table 1

indicates: (1) some of the initially hypothesized relationships are eithernonsignificant or significant but in the wrong direction and (2) there are

"Ibid.*The names of the legal provisions added together on this index, as titled in the original instrument,

were: administrative body, bargaining rights, recognition type and procedure, unit determination,rules of procedure, impasse procedure, management rights, scope of bargaining, unfair labor practices,and grievance procedures.

In Kochan's original scale, the scores for each policy provision were added together to form a singleindex. He employed two methods in testing ihe internal consistency of ihe scales to verify the reliabilityof the index. The same procedures were utilized here, but the results differed sufficiently to lead tothe creation of three indices from the 12 policy provisions. The correlations between the scores for theseparate legal provisions and the total score for all 12 provisions averaged .78 among the three groups.However, Ihe average correlations between Ihe total scores and the strike policy and union securityprovisions were much lower, .59 and .58, respectively. Factor analysis of the provisions for each of Iheemployee groups indicated thai strike policy and union security policy consistently loaded heavily onseparate factors. The ten remaining provisions clustered together into a single factor.

'"Kochan, op. cil., p. 325."The scores for strike policy ranged from zero, where there was no state policy provision, to three

where there was some limited right to strike for the employee group in question. Scores for the unionsecurity policy ranged from zero to two. A score of two on this index indicated that state policy permittedihe negotiation and inclusion of maintenance of membership or agency shop provisions in labor-manage-ment agreements.

2 7 6 / JAMES L. PERRY

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Symposium: Public Sector Impasses / 277

substantial differences among the three employee groups in terms of whichvariables are significant.

Earnings ratios. This measure is significantly related to two or morestrike measures for each employee group — moderately negatively for teach-ers and state government employees and moderately positively for localgovernment employees. This lends support to Wellington and Winter'scontention that many local government strikes are motivated by the successof the strike as a pressure tactic for the further aggrandizement of alreadyrelatively well compensated employees.̂ ^ However, coupling this resultwith the fact that local employee strikes are also of longer duration mayindicate public employer unwillingness to concede additional rewards.Since the earnings ratio for local government employees is not related toeither the participation or summary strike measures, possibly this "hardline" phenomenon is limited to smaller governmental units.

Income change. This measure is a significant strike determinant for stategovernment employees only. However, the direction of the correlation withthe participation and summary measures is opposite from that expected forthis variable and from that exhibited by the earnings ratio. These resultsdo not necessarily conflict but rather suggest that strike participation tendsto be more widespread in those states where state employee earnings haveincreased most rapidly but where the relative position of state governmentemployees vis-a-vis other public employees has undergone little change.Thus, among state employees, the significance of current discrepanciesbetween expectations and earnings may have been enhanced by risingexpectations created by gains as well as an inability to increase relativestatus. As Kriesberg observes, a "variety of changes in either expectationsor attainments can Increase an unwanted discrepancy between them."^^

Employment intensity. Only three strike measures (participation andsummary measures for teachers and frequency for state employees) relatesignificantly to this variable. The negative correlation for these relationshipsimplies that either the relationship between this variable, as a measure ofpower, and work stoppages is the inverse of the expected relationship orthat this indicator is not a good measure of power.

Unionization. This variable is significantly and positively correlated withstrike frequency. The external support, which this variable measures, isalso an important determinant of strike duration (although only amongteachers is it at a significant level).

"Wellington and Winter, op. cit.'^Louis Kriesberg, The Sociology of Social Conflicts (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 16.

2 7 8 / JAMES L. PERRY

Previous strikes. This variable is nonsignificant for all local employeestrike measures but significantly related to duration and the summarymeasures for teachers and state employees. Teachers represent an essential-ly unitary governmental function, and state employees face a single adver-sary, so aggregate data for these groups may reflect a relationship moreclearly than aggregate data for local government employees which may beconfounded by additional institutional factors.

The single correlations indicate that no reduction of work stoppagesoccurs with an increasing number of years since the passage of the state'sfirst comprehensive law. In fact, this variable is positively and significantlyrelated to teacher strike frequency and duration. The sum of the resultsacross the three groups lends support to Kochan's contention that the "ma-ture" interorganizational bargaining relationship in the public sector is muchdifferent than that in the private sector because high levels of conflictcontinue even with increasing familiarity with collective bargaining.'-*

Legal policies. The legal pohcy indices provide a mixed picture of theinfluence of public policy on strike behavior. Although no significant rela-tionships occur between the three policy indices and state employee strikemeasures, they are significantly related to strike frequency among bothteachers and local employees. On the other hand, the comprehensivenessindex is positively related to the strike measures in all cases where it issignificant. The positive correlations may reflect the fact that unions becomestronger and employee expectations become greater, once a comprehensivepublic employee collective bargaining law is passed. This result may alsoindicate that unresolved issues which remain during strikes that occurwithin comprehensive legal frameworks are much more intractable than theissues associated with strikes under less comprehensive legal frameworks.Since the comprehensiveness index is significantly correlated with strikeduration for both teachers and local government employees (.49 and .25),some support exists for this interpretation.

Several alternative explanations may account for the fact that unionsecurity policy exhibits significant or near significant correlations for strikefrequency and duration among teachers and local government employees.First, more liberal legal policies toward union security arrangements maystimulate their introduction as an issue, and this issue may be one whichlocal policy makers are unwilling to concede but which public unions areheavily committed to attaining. Alternatively, these relationships may

'*Thomas A. Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Colleclive Bargaining in City Governments," Industrialand Ixibor Relations Review, XXVII (July, 1974). 525-542, and "City Government Bargaining: A PathAnalysis," Industrial Relations. XIV (February, 1975), 90-101.

Symposium: Public Sector Impasses / 279

reflect the increased power of public unions that have previously negotiatedsome form of union security. Finally, it is possible that union security pro-visions in state law may have heen enacted in response to public employeestrikes. Strike activity then would be considered the source rather than anoutcome of policy.

Partial CorrelationsTable 2 represents an extension of the analysis to the relation-

ships between the independent and dependent variables when the publicpolicy variables are controlled. The partial correlation between the inde-pendent and dependent variables should be reduced to zero in those caseswhere legal public policy is an intervening variable. A comparison of thepartial correlations in Table 2 indicates that only four of the zero-ordercorrelations significant at the .05 level are reduced below that level whencontrolling for legal public policy. The relationships between previousstrikes and the frequency and summary strike measures among teachersand the relationship between earnings ratios and frequency for state gov-ernment employees were reduced to just below the .05 level. The correla-tion between earnings ratios and local government strike duration under-went a substantial reduction (.27 to .19). Perhaps the most noteworthydecline occurred for the correlations between legal experience and the

TABLE 2

PARTIAL CoBotiLATioNs BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENTVARIABLES CONTROLLING FOH THE THREE PUBLIC POLICY INDICES

Strike indices

TeachersFrequencyParticipationDurationSummary index

LocalFrequencyParticipationDurationSummary index

StateFrequencyParticipationDurationSummary index

Earningsratio

.08-.36-.02-.29

.27

.04

.19

.05

-.24-.32-.15-.28

Inco 111 echange

-.02-.04-.02-.01

.07-.02-.23-.13

.00

.51

.18

.37

Employmentintennitt/

.15-.48

.10-.41

.20

.03-.17

.03

-.32.07

-.23-.22

Unionisation

.52

.02

.44

.17

.41-.04

.15

.07

.31-.07

.18

.13

Preriousstrikes

.23

.16

.31

.21

.23

.09

.25

.21

.12-.10

.69

.52

Legatexperience

.28-.11

.29-.01

.06

.04-.04-.01

-.11-.10

.02-.04

Correlation coefficientsCorrelation coefficientsNotes: See Table 1.

.36 are significant al the ,01 level.

.25 are significant at Ihe ,05 level.

2 8 0 / JAMES L. PERRY

summary strike measure (to - . 0 1 , - . 0 1 , and .04 for teachers, local, andstate government employees, respectively). Although these reductions maymerely reflect the high intercorrelations between the independent andintervening variables, this result accords with the suggestion that the com-prehensiveness index is related to strikes only as an intervening variable inthe causal sequence between bargaining stability and strikes.

Various explanations for why state legal policy has so little impact areworth mentioning here. In the first place, only formal state legal policieswere measured; policies in practice may be very different. For example,in 1970, 25 per cent of the collective bargaining agreements in Michiganmunicipalities contained either maintenance of membership or union shopprovisions, both oi which were illegal at the time.'""' Secondly, since theanalysis dealt only with one outcome variable, strikes, it provides a neces-sarily limited view of the role of policy as an intervening variable. For in-stance, state policy might have a more substantial effect on labor-manage-ment cooperation or on the terms of agreements than on strikes.

Regression AnalysisTo complete the analysis, multiple linear regressions were

derived for the four strike measures for each employee group. Both theindependent and legal policy variables were entered into the equations.These variables predicted least well for the four strike measures amonglocal government employees (R '̂s: frequency, .31; participation, .06;duration, .23; and the summary measure, .25). As suggested above, theselow predictions for local strikes may be due to the possibility that aggrega-tion may be inappropriate at the local level. The regression equationsworked better with teachers (R '̂s — .40, .46, .47, .41). Two of the regressionequations for state employees were substantially affected by the measureof previous strikes, suggesting that the measure of previous strikes maybe too closely parallel to the summary measure of current work stoppageactivity to be used as an indicator of predispositions to engage in workstoppages. The R̂ results for the four strike measures at the state level were.13, .32, .56, and .51, respectively.

The impact of public policy is placed in perspective by the multipleregression equations. Strike policy remained a significant determinant ofstrike frequency among teachers, and union security policy was the mostimportant determinant of the summary strike measure for local employees.

'^Lee C. Shaw and R. Theodore Clark, Jr., "The Practical Difference Between Public and PrivateSector Collective Bargaining," UCLA Law Review, XIX (1972). 875.

Symposium: Public Sector Impasses / 281

Although some of the zero-order correlations between the comprehensive-ness index and the strike measures were significant, the independent con-tribution of the comprehensiveness index was nonsignificant in eachregression equation.

ConclusionsWhile my results are not conclusive, they raise questions about

the feasibility of developing a unitary explanation of public employee strikes.Although my methodology may be responsible for some of the problems,the diversity of results makes me wonder why the three groups differed somuch. Two possible reasons for these differences are discussed below.

First, altbough the analysis suggests that state laws did not have thehypothesized effect as an intervening variable, they had some impact onstrike activity, although this varied among groups. These differences mayoriginate in variations among the three groups in the professional composi-tion of their workforces, in the amounts of pressure exerted to preventstrikes, and in orderliness of transition to collective bargaining. The resultssuggest that this transition has been much more orderly in state governmentthan among school districts or local governments. In addition, evidencethat unions and association members in state government are predominatelyprofessional employees,̂ *' together with the professional status of teachers,suggests that union security policy may be less important for these groupsthan it may be at the local level, where labor organizations are often con-cerned with a more diverse and less professional group of employees. Fur-thermore, the capacity for developing group cohesion because of similarityin training and occupation, together with the possibility that fewer pressuresexist to prevent strikes in education (e.g., a widely shared view that strikesby teachers do not have an immediate impact on the public health and wel-fare) may explain why strike legislation is significantly related to strikefrequency only among teachers.

Secondly, variations in structure among state government, local govern-ment, and school districts may explain some of the differences in the impactof public pohcy discussed above. State and local governments perform avariety of functions and possess considerable autonomy and flexibility intaxation and spending. School districts, by contrast, are special ptirposegovernments, performing a highly visible and socially important function,with more limited revenue generating capability. Governmental structure

,,...,,. . i . Hopkins, George E. Rawson, and Russell L. Smith, "TIK; Impact of Public Employee Union-ization on the Work Situation," paper presented al the Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation, San Francisco, California, September 2-5, 1975.

2 8 2 / JAMES L. PERRY

differs in other areas as well: the method of selecting a chief executive(by election or appointment), the size and nature of the legislative body,the size and complexity of the type of governmental unit, and accessibilityof the type of governmental unit to the general public. These factors relateto ability to pay as well as to the degree to which public employee laborrelations become politicized. Both factors may affect strike activity.

These findings suggest some directions for future research. It may befruitful to investigate the relationship of state policies to changes in labor-management relations and organizational variables at the point of intendedimpact (the school district, local government, or state government) to assesshow pubhc policies affect this iink in the processes which lead to differentbargaining outcomes. For example, how do state policies affect interunioncompetition, and how does this competition, in turn, affect strike issues?More attention should be given to the influence on employee-employerconflict of occupational and work group dynamics and government structurevariables. Future research should also include longitudinal designs. Giventhe multiple and interrelated sources of variation in the phenomena ofinterest in public sector labor relations, longitudinal designs are likely tobetter control for competing hypotheses and other threats to researchvalidity.