Publius and Political Philosophy

An Inquiry into the Theory of Political Legitimacy in The Federalist

Shaun Rieley

4/25/2013

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It can hardly be disputed that the American Constitution is among the most important

documents ever written, whatever ones opinion of it might happen to be; the nation which it

birthed has altered the course of history. The American Constitution represented, in many ways,

a stark break with forms of government which had preceded it. Coupled with the Declaration of

Independence, it advances a governmental system predicated on particular understandings

derived from political philosophy. These understandings of liberty, of justice, of human

nature, of equality, of happiness are informed by, and take their shape from, the long history

that is Western political philosophy, dating to Platos Socrates, but in many ways offers new

insights into the science of politics, or at least purports to. The document was not, however,

uncontroversial; quite the contrary. It was the subject of a rather intense public debate during its

ratification process, with proponents and opponents lined up to say their piece. Proponents came

to be christened Federalists, and while opponents were termed Anti-Federalists. It was three

Federalists, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, who would become the most

prominent defenders of the new Constitution, by authoring a series of papers now known simply

as The Federalist, which were published under the pseudonym Publius. Answering The

Federalist were a group of authors who published under a variety of pseudonyms, such as Cato,

Brutus and Centinal, who offered opinions opposing the ratification of the Constitution. While

these works, both Federalist and the Anti-Federalist, drew heavily on a many of the same texts of

political philosophy which were considered to be authoritative, but came to different at times

very different conclusions regarding the proper course of action for the new nation in terms of

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its founding document. Thus, I propose to examine the political philosophy of The Federalist,

and to attempt sketch it particularly in terms of Publius understanding of the legitimacy of

government, that is, what makes a government legitimate and why the government established by

the Constitution meets the requirement.

Reflection and Choice

In Federalist # 1, Publius1 begins with a statement of purpose:

After a full experience of the insufficiency of the existing federal

government [the government established under the Articles of Con-

federation], you [the People of the State of New York] are invited to

deliberate upon a new Constitution for the United States of America

(1:3).2

Here he expresses one of the foundational assumptions which pervades the Federalist: that

the government of the Articles of Confederation had been insufficient to the ends necessary for

effective governance. This point passes here without argument, presumably because the fact that

The Federalist is necessary to defend the Constitution as a new blueprint for governance which

awaited ratification by the states, assumes that the Articles of Confederation were insufficient for

governance. While The Federalist does present arguments elucidating the reasons why the

Articles failed, this is largely to show why the Constitution is superior; the main question to be

addressed here in The Federalist will be whether the new Constitution is, in fact, the document

which should replace the Articles, and by extension, whether the government established by the

Constitution is sufficient and legitimate.

1 As all of The Federalist papers are signed Publius, and as some of the papers authorships are disputed, I will,

for the sake of simplicity, use Publius in lieu of the particular authors name. 2 Page numbers reference The Federalist published by The Modern Library (2001), edited and with introduction by

Robert Scigliano.

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But The Federalist goes further than any historical contingency surrounding the particular

political climate of the Post-Revolutionary American Colonies. Rather than simply asking

whether the Constitution is sufficient for the purpose of governance, and more specifically

sufficient for the governance of this particular political arrangement being discussed, Publius

notes that

It had been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved

to the people of this country, to decide by their conduct and example,

the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or

not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or

whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitu-

tions on accident and force (1:3).

Thus it seems apparent that Publius sees the issue at hand not as merely implicating the

immediate debate surrounding the new Constitution and attendant political particularities at

hand, but as potentially establishing a definitive answer to the tension in political philosophy

between convention and choice. Further, it seems apparent that Publius understands the

government of the Constitution to be the latter, that is, a government established by deliberate

choice through thoughtful reflection, rather than a government established by accident and

force. In using the word accident Publius seems be referring to governments which

unreflectively continue in the ways handed down from time immemorial, without considering

whether the particular political practices align with the principles of good government, as

understood by contemplation and reason. In number 51, Publius states that Justice is the end

of government (51:334). Therefore, it seems that the goodness of government may be judged

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by the extent to which with instantiates the requirements of justice, which are accessible to the

human mind through right reasoning.3 Accident implies a certain arbitrariness; but

arbitrariness is opposed to reason, and therefore opposed to reflection and choice, for things are

only rightly said to be chosen if they are opted for, after reflection, as the best choice among the

available options. Force, like accident, also seems to imply the opposite of choice; for, force

negates choice by requiring a particular alternative, rather than allowing for a the full range of

alternatives to be considered through deliberation and for the best to be selected. Force, then,

also implies a certain arbitrariness in governance. As accident is subjugation to arbitrary

adherence to convention, force is subjugation to the arbitrary will of the ruler.

This being the case, it seems that the first requirement for legitimacy latent in the political

theory of The Federalist is that a government be founded on reflection and choice, to the extent

that this is possible. Implicit in this requirement are two presuppositions: first, that there are in

fact, transcendent principles of good which, in government equates to just, if a good

government can be understood to be a just government which are accessible to reason (even

self-evident, to use the words of the Declaration of Independence), and second, that there is a

best regime, which may be understood through reason, and implemented through choice.

Were either of these not assumed, it seems that there would be little reason to believe that one

could do better than accident and force in the establishment of a political regime, as it is unclear

what, exactly, could be chosen, particularly if the such an establishment entails the deliberate

3 It seems that one of the fundamental understandings of the Revolution, as described in the Declaration of

Independence, is that the principles of justice viz. equality, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, etc., are self-evident, which seems to imply that they are available to reason, and are necessary rather than arbitrary.

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choosing of a better regime than might obtain by accident and force (or perhaps even the best

regime). For by what standards could such a comparison be made? A comparison of a current

regime with what might be better and more specifically, what is best seems to strongly imply

that there is a transcendent standard, accessible to reason, by which all existent regimes may be

judged. Thus a legitimate regime for Publius, being the result of reflection and choice, should in

the first place be the regime which instantiates justice to the highest degree possible by reflection

and choice.

Consent of the Governed

A legitimate regime, then, must be established, not by force and accident, but by reflection

and choice, because it recognizes the rational aspect of man, and the ability of man to deliberate

and choose, according to the laws of Nature, Natures God4, the best regime. Nevertheless,

while this maybe a necessary qualification for a legitimate regime, it is insufficient. A further

requirement for legitimacy for Publius is the consent of the governed, specifically as expressed

through popular sovereignty. If the Constitution can be understood as the practical application of

the universal principles of political philosophy expressed in the opening paragraphs of the

Declaration of Independence and it is does not seem a untenable to suggest that it should than

the principle that legitimate government should be government which rests on the consent of

the governed or, republican government. This principle, expressed in the Declaration as

Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the

4 The Declaration of Independence, Paragraph 1

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governed, seems to be presupposed in Publius philosophical defense of the Constitution, even

before he makes it explicit. Near the end of Federalist 1, he provides something of an outline for

of the topics which will be covered by the forthcoming essays. Among these, he gives the

conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of republican government. By

this statement of intention to show the Constitution as being in line with the principles of

republican government, it becomes apparent that Publius understands republican government to

be the legitimate form of government; that is, it is the normative standard by which governments

to include the government established by the new Constitution should be judged. Indeed, in

Federalist 39, he asserts that

It is evident that no other form [of government besides republican]

would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with

the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with the honorable de-

termination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all out poli-

tical experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the

plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican

character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible (39:239).

Here, it is apparent that he holds the fundamental principles of the Revolution presumably

those articulated in the Declaration of Independence to be an authoritative standard to which

the Constitution should be compared in order to ascertain its efficacy in implementing these

principles. Any defense of the constitution, then, must show that there is continuity between

said Constitution and republican principles as understood in the Declaration. Republicanism,

therefore, being the normative standard by which Publius political philosophy is animated, must

be understood in order to understand precisely what it is that Publius believes to be legitimate

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government.

Republican Government Defined

Though Publius has given a definition of republic in number 10 a government in which

the scheme of representation takes place (10:58) it is later, in 39, where Publius gives a broad,

yet more precise, definition of what he understands by the word republic.

He says

We may define a republic to bea government which derives all

its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people,

and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure,

for a limited period, or during good behavior (39:240, emphasis original).

From here, he further qualifies that

It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great

body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favor-

ed class of itotherwise a handful of tyrannical noblesmight aspire

to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable

title of republic (39:240, emphasis original).

And one further qualification states that

It is sufficient for such a government that the person administering be

appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the peopleotherwise every

government in the United States, as well as every other popular govern-

ment that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be

downgraded from the republican character (39:240, emphasis original).

From these passages, a general theory of republican government, as understood by Publius,

begins to emerge. In the first place, republican government must derive its powers from the

sovereign, understood as the people. This echoes the Declarations assertion regarding the

necessity of governments deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Secondly,

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he identifies the essential characteristic of republican government as a government which derives

its powers from the great body of society; that is say, it seems that republican government,

rightly understood, should have no particular ruling class. He seems to intimate that a

government which adopts the name of republican, while maintaining a ruling or favored

class, does so wrongly, or disingenuously. Finally, the government must be appointed by the

people. This may occur either through directly electing the administrators, or through the

appointment of administrators through other directly elected administrators. This final

clarification is important, because, as he notes, if republican government required the direct

election of every administrator, the constitution being defended, along with any other sort of

government which is well organized and well executed, would be excluded from being

rightly described as republican, which would, of course, render it no longer defensible.

Interestingly, the clear implication of the final qualification is that republics those in which

every administrator is directly elected are not well organized or well executed. The reason

for this, elucidated elsewhere in The Federalist, seems to be a fear of the tyranny of the

majority (i.e. the nature of mobs to rule by passion rather than reason), and the political problem

presented by the paradoxical need for legitimate government to both rely ultimately on the

sovereignty of the people, and the need in all political systems for the best men to rule; or

perhaps more pointedly, the need for those who are most capable of rule by reason (or reflection

and choice) rather than passion. This problem, then, sets the stage for the crux of Publius

political philosophy: the task of reconciling these seemingly incompatible necessities such that

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the Constitution may be understood to encompass both.

Indeed, in number 55, Publius indicates that controlling passion is necessary to the very

maintenance of liberty: The sincere friends of liberty, who give themselves up to the

extravagancies of passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own cause (55:359). He

goes on to elucidate the assumptions regarding human nature which he is aware could be

problematic for republican government:there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires

a certain degree of circumspection and distrust (55:359), which necessitates that precautions be

inbuilt into any system of popular governance that are sufficiently circumspect and distrustful

of mankinds propensity for corruption. Nevertheless, he continues, there are other qualities in

human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem an confidence (55:359). Indeed, he says,

Republican government presupposes the existence of these

qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the

pictures drawn by the political jealousy of some among us

faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference

would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for

self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of

despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring

one another (55:359).

Aware that both tendencies are present in man, but working from an assumption that republican

government that is, the self-government of the people is possible; and is, in fact the only truly

legitimate form of government, Publus task, then, becomes one of finding a republican remedy

for the diseases most incident to republican government (10:61).

Wisdom and Virtue: Rule by the Best

In number 57, Publius, discussing the nature and makeup of the House of Representatives,

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recapitulates what he understands to be the purpose of the establishment of a political

arrangement: The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers

men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of

society (57:365). In other words, political arrangements should, in the first place, be orientated

toward securing rule by the best. Any political system which does not aim toward rule by the

best, the argument seems to imply, is open to tyrannical rule, or rule aimed at private, rather than

public interest or the common good of society.5 However, Publius seems to recognize that rule

by the best can only be assured if the system in which they rule conduces to the maintenance of

virtue in the rulers: in the next place [every political constitution ought] to take the most

effectual precautions for keeping [the rulers] virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public

trust (57:365). For Publius, then, rule by the best will only be secure in a system so constructed

to ensure that those selected to rule, due to the wisdom and virtue they exude, remain the best.

That is, the political constitution must guard against the corruption of the best, or those who are

most fit to rule.

Publius continues on in number 57 to enumerate the ways in which the system established in

the Constitution answers the imperative of ensuring that the rulers are selected through popular

choice one of the primary requirements, as stated above, for true republican governance. The

people are to be sovereign through the inclusion of the mass of the population in the electorate.

5 Cf. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Ch. 18, Sec. 199 : Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond

rightmaking use of the powernot for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8, Ch. 10, 1160b7-8

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The electors will be

Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the

ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than

the sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to

be the great body of the people of the United States (57:366).

Turning to the rulers, or the objects of popular choice:

Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and

confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of

religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judg-

ment or disappoint the inclination of the people (57:366).

Thus, the establishment of the great body of people as the electors, answers the requirement

of republican government sovereignty of the people but the selection of those whose merit

recommends them presumes that those selected will be the best.

But there are, it seems, two distinct ways in which a ruler may become corrupted. The first is

to become unfaithful to those whom the ruler represents. The second, it seems, is to remain

beholden to the passions and whims of the people, thereby compromising ones claim to virtue

and wisdom as a ruler. Here, Publius seems to aim as assuaging any fear of the first form of

corruption under the Constitution. In the first place, he notes that [those who are elected] will

have been distinguished by the preference of their fellow citizens, [therefore] we are to presume

that they will bedistinguished by those qualities which entitle them to it (57:366). Thus, there

is to be a presumption that those who are selected are likely to possess the requisite wisdom and

virtue necessary to rule. However, should this prove untrue, he enumerates four additional

safeguards which will ensure that the representatives remain faithful to their constituents: a

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temporary affection at least to their constituents, motives of a more selfish naturepride and

vanity, the restraint of free elections, and the fact that they can make no law which will not

have its full operation on themselves and their friends (57:367). The first of these the passion

of affection though temporary, is here counted on, in the absence of wisdom and virtue to

induce benevolent behavior from the representative; that is, behavior consistent with the good of

his constituents. The next three operate differently. They utilize the base, selfish passions of the

representative to elicit behavior which resembles the actions of one concerned with the public

good, though they are not done for the purpose of affecting the public good. By tying the private

interest of the ruler to the public interest, that is, by decreasing the space between the two, the

system creates a nearly absolute assurance of action which affects the public good, even in the

absence of continued virtue on the part of the ruler.

This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by

which human policy can connect the rulers and the people

together. It creates between them a union of interests and

sympathy of sentimentswithout which every government

degenerates into tyranny (57:367).

This, then, is the way in which Publius understands the Constitution to meet the second

requirement of government, that is, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them

virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust (57:365). Not, however, by ensuring that

they actually remain virtuous, so much as ensuring that they act in a way which is consistent

with virtue. This, he says, is the genius of the whole system, and that which restrain[s] the

House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a

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particular class of the society (57:367).

But another form of corruption is possible, and, for Publius, a form equally as destructive to

the ends of good government: government administrators who are too beholden to the passions

of public opinion. In number 49, Publius notes that the people are the only legitimate

fountain of power (49:323). Thus, for Publius, all legitimate government must be able to

trace its power ultimately back to the people. However, the people, being subject to passion

when aggregated, present a danger to good governance. Indeed, Publius seems to believe that

any crowd, sufficiently large, will be ruled by passion, rather than reason. In number 55, he

asserts In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails

to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian

assembly would still have been a mob (55:356). But, given that legitimate government, and by

extension, legitimate governance, must be the result of reflection and choice, it is necessary to

find a mechanism by which these passions may be mitigated, allowing reason to rule, while

maintaining a firm grounding in the only legitimate fountain of power. He says It is the

reason, alone, of the public that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions

ought to be controlled and regulated by the government (49:325) It seems, then, that there is a

reciprocal relationship between the people and the government: the people ought to be the

source of power, but are incapable of ruling as the people because of the primacy of passion in

aggregations of people; therefore, the government must control the passions of the people,

such that it is only the reason of the people which rules. Reflection and choice, then, must be

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present, not only in the founding of the regime, but must be the mode of governance by which it

operates. This is the fundamental problem of republican government to create a system which

is governed by reason (reflection and choice), while simultaneously drawing its power from the

great body of the people and it is one which Publius believes is solved in the government

established by the Constitution.

Liberty and Order

In number 9, Publius begins by asserting that A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to

the peace and liberty of the States (9:47) He says

It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of

Greece and Italy without feeling horror and disgust at the

distractions with which they were continually agitated, and

at the rapid revolutions by which they were kept perpetually

vibrating between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. (9:47)

Here, he illustrates the need for a strong Union by highlighting the precarious political

situation actuated by anything less. Nevertheless, though anarchy is to be avoided, so too is

tyranny; indeed, it is the need for political order, coupled with the disorder brought by anarchy,

which provides a sure path to tyranny. He notes, however, that those who are advocates of

despotism assert that free government is inconsistent with the order of society(9:48), a

position which Publius clearly disagrees. He says

Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis

of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few

glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I

trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other

edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent

monuments to their error (9:48).

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It is Publius aim, then, to elucidate a form of republican government which is capable of

avoiding both extremes of anarchy and tyranny, such that it is able to remain both free and

ordered by the rule of reason over passion in perpetuity.

Representation, Rightly Understood

The science of politics, Publius says, like most other sciences, has received great

improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not

known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients (9:48). He enumerates The distribution of

power, legislative balances and checks, the institution of courts, the representation of the

people in the legislature by their own election. These, he says are wholly new discoveries,

or have made their principle progress toward perfection in modern times. They are means, and

powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained, and its

imperfections avoided (9:48, emphasis added). It is, then, through the establishment of these

mechanisms, in the correct configuration, by which a political constitution gains both the

legitimacy endowed by truly republican government, as the form which gains its power from the

fountain of the people, and avoids the problems inherent in some forms of republican

government, viz. the attendant disorder of rule by the passions. However, it is apparent that

Publius believes these innovations, though powerful, yet remain insufficient. To these, Publius

adds one further principle, which he admits is novel, controversial and contentious: the

ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which the systems revolve (9:48, emphasis original).

This innovation, for Publius, is crucial for the elimination of the problem posed by factions in

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a free society, as he contends in number 10. Factions, in a free society, create a problematic

situation in which a majority of the society may unite to the detriment of another minority

faction. By faction, he says, I understand a number of citizenswho are unitedby a

common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the

permanent and aggregate interests of the community (10:54, emphasis added). The solution to

this problem, he says, is the enlargement of the society, to the point that it is difficult for any one

faction to become dominant. As he states in number 51, Ambition must be made to counteract

ambition (51:331). Therefore, in this way, the passions of the various factions are rendered

inert, allowing for an alternate way of ruling; one constant with both the fundamental

requirements of republican government, as well as with rule by reason. With the passions

eliminated as a threat through the enlargement, reason becomes the sole remaining source of

rule. And it is through the principle of representation, rightly understood, that this type of rule

by reason actuates.

Publius assertion in number 9, when discussing the advancement of the science of politics,

that representation was either unknown or unperfected in ancient political constitutions, is again

taken up in number 63 while discussing the composition of the Senate as proposed by the

Constitution. Here, in providing examples of representation from ancient regimes, Publius

demonstrates that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor

wholly overlooked in their political constitutions (63:406), contra the position taken by some,

which Publius mentions earlier in 63, that [representation was]unknown to [other republics],

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or at least to the ancient part of them (63:405). However, he does admit that there is a

distinction which can be justly made between then American republic and those other ancient

republics.

The true distinction between [the ancient republics] and the

American governments, lies in the total exclusion of the people,

in their collective capacity, from any share in the latter, and not

in the total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the

administration of the former (63:407, emphasis original)

Thus, Publius states that the true innovation in the American government is that the people, as an

aggregate, are removed from any share in the American government. Their representatives do

the work of administering the government, but the people qua the people, do not. This must be

admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States (63:407).

However, he is quick to note that this qualification alone is insufficient to ensure the primacy of

reason and the mitigation of passion in the administration of the government: we must be

careful not to separate [this principle] from the other advantage, of an expansive territory

(63:407). Expansive territory, as discussed above, serves to mitigate the passions through

conflict with one another. The representative principle then, rightly understood, enables rule by

reason, reflection and choice, rather than passionate mob rule. Hence, for Publius, the political

system contained in the Constitution is able to meet both requirements for good government, viz.

fidelity to true republican principles, deriving its power from the consent of the people, and rule

by reason through the mitigation of passion and mob rule.

In number 71, Publius takes up the defense of the Executive, as outlined in the Constitution.

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Here we get yet another glimpse into precisely what he understands to be the nature of

republican governance to be, and a further defense of the removal of governance from the direct

hands of the people. He says

The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense

of the community should govern the conduct of those to

whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but does

not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden

breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the

people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their

prejudices to betray their interests (71:458).

Here, as in number 39, Publius seeks to correct common notions regarding the nature of

republican principles, and exactly what they do and do not require. It is the duty, he says, of

those who govern to resist the intemperate passions of the people. Further, it is the duty of the

Executive to resist the passions of both the people, and the legislature. There are some, he

says, who would regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current, either in the

community or in the legislature as its best recommendation (71:458). Not so, says Publius. A

relatively strong Executive is necessary to counteract these momentary sweeps of passion which

may overtake the public from time to time. These passions may go so far as to infect the

legislature, rendering them incapable of resisting what may prove to be a harmful current. It is

here that the Executive has a duty to resist. Though Publius is willing to give the people the

benefit of the doubt by noting that the people commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD (71:458,

emphasis original). Nevertheless, he goes on to assert that [the peoples] good sense would

despise the adulator who should pretend that they always reason right about the means of

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promoting [the public good] (71:458, emphasis original). Here, then, Publius appeals to right

reason as that which is most capable of ascertaining the correct means of promoting the public

good. Again, it appears that Publius understands reason to be an integral part of legitimate

governance, as legitimate governance requires choice and reflection or, the use of reason. But,

as has been seen, popular rule is diametrically opposed to governance through reason for Publius.

Popular governance, understood as direct rule by the aggregate of the people, can only rule by

passion, rather than reflection and choice. And, as we have seen, even legislatures can be subject

to mob rule of they are too large, or do not contain men fit character. Therefore, Publius

appears to believe that the Executive must be vigorous enough effectively counteract these

passions of the people, or those of the legislature, if they, rather than reason, should begin to be

the principle by which the government is ruled.

When occasions present themselves, in which the interests

of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the

duty of the persons whom they have appointed guardians of

those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order

to give them time and opportunity for cool and sedate reflection (71:458).

The peoples interests, Publius asserts, may on occasion be opposed to their

inclinations. For Publius, then, it seems that it is the duty of those administrators of the

government, whom the people have put into place, to guard the interests of the people, even

against their immediate will, if necessary. Conduct of this kind may [save] the people from the

very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, he says, and rulers who have answered the call

of duty, and opposed threats of this kind to the public good have secured for themselves lasting

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monuments as those who have had the courage and magnanimity enough to serve [the people]

at the peril of their displeasure (71:458-59, emphasis added)

Thus, the political problem of legitimacy is solved in Publius account of the Constitution.

By constructing a political system in which both of the seemingly irreconcilable requirements for

legitimate government are met, that is, rule both by republican principles and by reason, the

Constitution establishes a truly legitimate government for Publius. Publius explication and

defense of the Constitution gives insight into the reasoning, the assumptions and the political

philosophy of those who defended the Constitution against its detractors, and still serves as a

starting point for those interested in better understanding the true nature of the American political

system. It is true that the interpretation and analysis offered by Publius is not beyond dispute

and indeed, was disputed by the Anti-Federalists. Nevertheless, the ideas expressed by Publius

in The Federalist still reverberate through our national discourse, and constitute the many of the

assumptions by which those who live under the regime he helped to construct judge the

legitimacy of all other regimes.