Q.A. ADVISORIES (EFFECTIVE) S/N Advisory No. SUBJECT DATE (dd-mm-yy) 001 001 INCOMPLETE WORKSHEETS. 28-12-87 002 002 LOG BOOK ENTRIES IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS. 10-03-88 003 003 SQUIB CIRCUIT TEST ON BOEING 737-300 16-03-88 004 004 PREVENTION OF CORROSION BETWEEN FUEL TEMPERATURE PROBE & PROBE HOUSING – B737. 27-04-88 005 007 EGT INDICATION B737-300. 14-06-88 006 008 ENGINE FIRE WARNING – B737-300. 14-06-88 007 009 SHOCK STRUT OLEO CLEANING. 16-08-88 008 010 GROUND IDLE ADUSTMENT ON JT9D. 16-08-88 009 011 HYDRAULIC LEAKS / FAILURES ON B747. 05-09-88 010 012 UNABLE TO CLOSE CF6 FAN REVERSER COWL. 13-09-88 011 014 CLEANING OF HERMATIC CONNECTORS EXPOSED TO HIGH TEMPERATURE (ENGINE FIRE LOOP CONNECTORS). 18-09-88 012 015 FLAME OUT OF BOTH ENGINES CFM56-3B A/C B737 WHILE OPERATING IN SEVERE THUNDER STORM ACTIVITY & HEAVY RAIN. 03-07-88 013 016 PROHIBITION OF IMPROPER USE OF HIGH SPEED TAPE. 03-07-88 014 017 MAINTENANCE ACTIONS & MEL. 31-08-88 015 018 FIRE DETECTION LOOPS, SENSORS & ELEMENTS. 15-08-88 016 021 USE OF RTV 106 FOR SEALING OF ELECT. CONNECTOR. 22-10-88 017 022 REMOVAL OF INUS UNDER CODE 08/01 22-10-88 018 023 CHAFFING & SUBSEQUENT FUEL DRIPPING OF Tt2 SENSE LINE PART # 65B90280-53. ON JT9D ENGINES. 15-11-88 019 024 RUDDER RATIO CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING TIPS B747. 27-12-88 020 025 LOWER CARGO DOOR – B-747 AIRCRAFT. 29-12-88 021 026 B SYSTEM HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR FILLING ON B737 AIRCRAFT. 13-02-89 022 028 B-747 WHEEL CHANGE AT LINE STATIONS. 19-02-89 023 029 B747 IGNITION SYSTEM MAINTENANCE PRACTICES. 27-02-89 024 030 CF6-50E2 FUEL CONDITION ACTUATOR MALFUNCTION. B747 AIRCRAFT 18-03-89 025 031 MAINT. PRACTICES ON ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM (KIDDE) B747. 25-03-89 026 032 B747 HF ANTENNA COUPLER ACCESS PANEL. 25-03-89 027 033 FAA AD T89-05-54 DT. 03-03-89 REG. FWD & AFT LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR B747. 03-03-89 028 034 B737-400 LANDING ACCIDENT AT EAST MIDLAND ON 08-01-89. 11-04-89 029 035 REQUIREMENT FOR ISSUE & EXTENTION OF AME LICENSE FOR ENGINES IN GROUP NO.10 OF AIRWORTHINESS NOTICE 34. 03-05-89 030 036 RECORDING OF WORK PERFORMED WITH REGARD TO B747 AD RELATING TO LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR. 31-05-89 031 038 TRAILING EDGE INBOARD FLAP AFT SEGMENT BINDING, B737 AIRCRAFT. 02-08-89 032 039 ANTI SKID SYSTEM B747 08-08-89 033 040 SEEPAGE OF RAIN WATER FROM OPEN FORWARD MAIN ENTRY / GALLEY DOOR. 17-08-89 034 042 B747 TRAILING EDGE FLAP TRANSMISSION ASSY. LUBRICATION. 04-09-89 035 044 JAMMING OF LONGITUDINAL CONTROLS B737. 28-09-89 036 045 HIGH SPEED OF STABLIZER IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FLAP POSITION-- B737 A/C. 05-10-89 037 046 GROUND INCIDENT DURING GROUND RUN ON B737 AIRCRAFT 29-10-89 038 047 ENGINE EGT EXCEEDENCE RECORDING ON CFM56, CF6, JT9D ENGINES. 10-10-89 039 049 VIOLATION OF AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENT WHILE RELEASING A/C ON FLIGHT. 30-11-89 040 050 SPEED BUGS ON ASI 03-12-89 041 053 B737 A/C PARTIAL OPENING OF CARGO DOOR DURING TAXIING /TAKE OFF ROLL DUE BREAKAGE OF LATCH SPRING. 16-01-90 042 055 FALSE CARGO COMPARTMENT SMOKE WARNING ON GROUND 14-03-90
Transcript
Q.A. ADVISORIES (EFFECTIVE)
S/N Advisory
No.
SUBJECT DATE
(dd-mm-yy)
001 001 INCOMPLETE WORKSHEETS. 28-12-87
002 002 LOG BOOK ENTRIES IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS. 10-03-88
003 003 SQUIB CIRCUIT TEST ON BOEING 737-300 16-03-88
004 004 PREVENTION OF CORROSION BETWEEN FUEL TEMPERATURE PROBE &
PROBE HOUSING – B737.
27-04-88
005 007 EGT INDICATION B737-300. 14-06-88
006 008 ENGINE FIRE WARNING – B737-300. 14-06-88
007 009 SHOCK STRUT OLEO CLEANING. 16-08-88
008 010 GROUND IDLE ADUSTMENT ON JT9D. 16-08-88
009 011 HYDRAULIC LEAKS / FAILURES ON B747. 05-09-88
010 012 UNABLE TO CLOSE CF6 FAN REVERSER COWL. 13-09-88
011 014 CLEANING OF HERMATIC CONNECTORS EXPOSED TO HIGH
TEMPERATURE (ENGINE FIRE LOOP CONNECTORS).
18-09-88
012 015 FLAME OUT OF BOTH ENGINES CFM56-3B A/C B737 WHILE OPERATING IN
SEVERE THUNDER STORM ACTIVITY & HEAVY RAIN.
03-07-88
013 016 PROHIBITION OF IMPROPER USE OF HIGH SPEED TAPE. 03-07-88
014 017 MAINTENANCE ACTIONS & MEL. 31-08-88
015 018 FIRE DETECTION LOOPS, SENSORS & ELEMENTS. 15-08-88
016 021 USE OF RTV 106 FOR SEALING OF ELECT. CONNECTOR. 22-10-88
017 022 REMOVAL OF INUS UNDER CODE 08/01 22-10-88
018 023 CHAFFING & SUBSEQUENT FUEL DRIPPING OF Tt2 SENSE LINE PART #
65B90280-53. ON JT9D ENGINES.
15-11-88
019 024 RUDDER RATIO CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING TIPS B747. 27-12-88
020 025 LOWER CARGO DOOR – B-747 AIRCRAFT. 29-12-88
021 026 B SYSTEM HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR FILLING ON B737 AIRCRAFT. 13-02-89
022 028 B-747 WHEEL CHANGE AT LINE STATIONS. 19-02-89
023 029 B747 IGNITION SYSTEM MAINTENANCE PRACTICES. 27-02-89
61 248 AILERON TRIM TAB CONTROL SWITCH INSTALLATION. F27 AIRCRAFT
29-09-99 F-27 Aircraft
62 275/GEN-08 INTRODUCTION OF “COMPONENT SHOP OUT REPORT” PROFORMA.
07-08-02 Component shop out Proforma is changed
63 27-50 A300 FLAP SYSTEM TORQUE TUBE DAMAGE
25-11-02 A-300 Aircraft
64 280/GEN-11 WITHDRAWAL OF COMPONENT WORK PACKAGE/CONTINUATION SHEETS.
21-01-04 New component work package is in use
65 283/GEN-14 PROCESS OF USING PARTS REMOVED FROM AN A/C COMPONENT FOR ANOTHER A/C COMPONENT.
10-09-04 MOE L 2.5
66 292/GEN-14 PROCESS OF USING PARTS REMOVED FROM AN A/C COMPONENT FOR ANOTHER A/C COMPONENT
05-09-05 MOE L 2.5
67 295 NOT ISSUED ----------- --------------
PAKSITAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
REF: TS/36(A)/87/01
Dated : 28th December, 1987
Q.C. ADVISORY NOTICE NO.1
TS/36(a)/87/01 SUB: INCOMPLETE WORKSHEETS Engine change sheets / work sheets have been reviewed and observed that in almost 80% of the cases do not bear the signature in supervisor and technician column. It is the responsibility of the supervisor or Technician whosoever is assigned on the aircraft and its system that he must sign the relevant column. Engineers are advised to ensure that subordinate staff working in his team follow the above instruction religiously. Strict compliance is required.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
Ref No: TS / 36(a)/88/03 Dated: 16-03-1988
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY No. 03 SUB: SQUIB CIRCUIT TEST ON BOEING 737-300 Ref: 1. B737-300 MEL 26-9 2. DDPG PAGE 2.26-9.0
A. Referenced documents state that ENG/APU Fire Extinguisher “EXT TEST” System “SQUIB TEST” may be inoperative provided failure is verified to be in the light circuit.
B. Referenced DDPG page requires verification to the light circuit by using squib
test lamp with pig tail leads terminating in pin contacts having lamp P/N 116-565-1042-001 (28V, 40 milliamp) in a suitable holder.
C. An appropriate test lamp has been placed in spare bulb kit on board each 737-300
Aircraft. DCE (Line Stations) has also made arrangements for availability of these test lamps at each out station in B737-300 network.
D. Part number of break down parts of this test lamp are as follows:
1. Lamp P/N 25F1140 (RED IN COLOR) OR 25F1140 (GREEN IN COLOR) OR 25F1140 (AMBER IN COLOR)
OR 25F1144 (WHITE IN COLOR) These are alternate to P/N 116-565-1042-001 mentioned in Para B above.
1. Before putting test lamp in squib test circuit, make sure that its lamp is not open circuited or short circuited, otherwise it will give either the false squib open circuit indication or will fire the squib respectively.
2. Restrict personnel from fire bottle area while testing 3. Limit squib current to 50 milliamp maximum 4. Always use lamp of rating 28 V, 40 milliamp. In case of its non-
availability, a digital ohm meter selected at the highest range, thereby limiting current to 40 milliamp may also be used.
F. MAINT SCHEDULE: Development Engineering is requested to
1. Add entry in pre-flight check reading, “check availability of squib test lamp in spare bulb kit”.
2. Issue regular Technical Notice on the subject mentioned above.
All concerned to note and comply with. MUSHTAQ ALI QURESHI DY. CHIEF ENGINEER (T/S) AV DISTRIBUTION: CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY CONTROL) – 01 Copy DCE (LINE STATIONS) – 10 Copies DCE (AV) LINE MAINT – 1 – 20 Copies DCE (AV) DEV ENGG – with a request to Action Item F DCE (NORTH) – 05 Copies PRINCIPAL ENGINEER (LAHORE) – 05 Copies SVC ENGR. Mr. ISTERAJ KHAN – 01 Copy
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
REF. TS/36A/88/05 Dated 27th APR 88
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO. 4
This is in reference with ISA 88-03-2845-10 (737-300) dated February 11, 1988. Heavy corrosion between the fuel temperature probe and the probe housing has been reported and consequently removal of the temperature probe was very difficult. Recently we also faced the same problem while fuel temperature probe was removed subsequent to the delay of PK: 271/290388, AP-BCA. To prevent corrosion between the probe and its housing, it is suggested that whenever a probe is to be installed, the housing should be cleaned with a dry cloth and a coating of silicon greese (dow corning 4 or equivalent) should be applied to the probe surfaces prior to installation in the housing.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TEHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
REF. TS/36A/88/09 Dated 14th JUNE 88
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO.8
SUB:- ENG. FIRE WARNING – BOEING 737-300 REF:- Telex from Tech Services representation WALTER KIDDE KHIXTPK 071650 In the recent past the rate of defects regarding engine fire warning system on Boeing 737-300 has been observed to be very high. During analysis, it was detected that this high failure rate of the system could be due to the following:-
1. Intermittent short in the fire loop P/N:899323. 2. Breakage of engine harness wiring inside the shielding as a result of low
amplitude high frequency vibration of the engine. For the first anomaly Vendor (Walter Kidde) is investigating to modify the sensing loop. To eliminate the second cause of failure, it is suggested that wiring shake down check should be carried out to detect this type of intermittency in the wiring. This intermittent open circuit in the wiring can result in the replacement of serviceable sensing loop. For permanent cure Boeing has released SB 737-26-1051 providing retrofit of new AWG 16 wiring bundle W1508.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TEHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
REF. TS/36A/88/11 Dated: 16-8-88
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO.10
SUB:- GROUND IDLE ADJUSTMENT ON JT9D In a recent case on one of the JT9D engine after the installation of a newly overhauled JFC, the ground idle RPM could not be adjusted below 65-67% N2. The matter was referred to BEOL overhauling Agency and they have recommended the following: QUOTE BEOL SUGGEST CHECK CONDITION LEVER IS AT GROUND IDLE BEFORE IDLE RPM IS ADJUSTED. YOU CAN NOT ACHIEVE IDLE RPM IF CONDITION LEVER IS AT FLT IDLE. BEOL DID EXPERIENCE THIS PROBLEM IN THEIR OPERATION. UNQUOTE. The above please be referred for future guidance.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TEHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
REF. TS/36A/88/15
Dated: 18th SEPTEMBER,1988
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO.14
SUB:- CLEANING OF HERMETIC CONNECTORS EXPOSED TO HIGH TEMPERATURE (ENG. FIRE LOOP CONNECTORS)
Hermatic Connectors are designed to maintain an environment apart from the external environment and any foreign material introduced in the connector during maintenance or prior to installation will remain in the connector. When substances that contain chlorides are introduced into the connectors and sealed in, they will break down and turn to acid when exposed to heat. This in turn will set up a corrosion pattern that lead to Mega ohm reading and in case of fire detection system a false fire warning or high nacelle temperature. All Maintenance Personnel are advised NOT TO USE REPEAT NOT TO USE Chloride based cleaning solvent like CTC, while cleaning fire loop connectors. Recommended Solvents by manufacturer are METHYL ALCOHOL OR ACETONE. It is also mandatory that the connectors be thoroughly dried prior to installation.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGINEER (QC) SECTT:
REF. CE(QC)/92/88 Dated: 13TH Feb,1989
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO.26
SUB:- ‘B’ SYSTEM HYD RESERVOIR FILLING ON B737 AIRCRAFT There have been cases of overfilling of ‘B’ System Reservoir due inaccuracies in Qty indicating System resulting in spillage and misting of Hydraulic fluid from right wheel well. The Boeing Co. is currently working to come up with a permanent solution. However as an interim measure Boeing recommends that ‘B’ System Reservoir should be filled half way between REFILL and full mark to prevent possibility of over charging.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGR (Q.C.)’s SECTT.
Ref: CE (QC)/92/88
Dated: 1st April, 1989 QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY No. 33
In a recent incident a B747 Aircraft suffered decompression and loss of thrust on No.3 Engine. After a safe landing, inspection revealed loss of forward cargo, door and a large hole directly above the door. As a result of the above incident and a previous incident in the earlier part of 1989 in which a B747 Aircraft returned from flight due loss of pressurization and subsequent finding of unlatched forward cargo door, FAA issued a telegraphic A.D. T89-05-54 dated 03.03.89. Main features of which are given below: 1. Boeing service Bulletin 52A2206 and 52A2209 which modified the lower
lobe cargo door latch lock sectors to prevent closure of the master latch lock handle with latch sectors not fully closed were made mandatory for incorporation within 30 days.
2. Installation of Arrow and Stripes, to indicate the fully closed position of
the latch sectors on all latch pins on sill and latch sectors, was made mandatory.
3. The A.D. also required visual confirmation of proper engagement of
latching cams, to ensure the door is fully latched closed, through the view ports provided for this purpose on the cargo doors.
4. Visual verification is required to be conveyed to and acknowledged by, the
flight crew and a procedure is to be established for its recording.
5. Personnel authorized to carry out visual verification are required to be adequately trained for this function.
In compliance with the requirements of the Airworthiness Directive, PIA has accomplished the recommended Boeing Service Bulletin 52A2206 and 52A2207 on all B747 Aircrafts as required. Arrows and stripes in yellow reflective paint have been provided as directed and it has been ensured that all view ports are optically clear.
Verification of latch closure has been made the responsibility of Engineers authorized to issue release certificate since all such Engineers already have the required training. The recording requirement has been complied with by addition of the following item in the pre flight sheets and release certificate is construed as having complied with the requirement:
“Prior to each flight departure, following each fwd and aft lower lobe cargo door cooperation, conduct a visual verification through the external view ports to ensure proper engagement of latching cams to ensure that door is fully latched closed. Relay this information to flight crew and must be acknowledged by flight crew”.
This advisory cancels our Q.C. Alert 11 dated 6th March, 1989 which was issued for the interim period pending compliance with A.D. DISTRIBUTION: C.E. BASE MAINTENANCE – 01 Copy C.E. AVIONICS MAINT – 01 Copy D.C.E. (AEROSPACE) LM-1 – 10 Copies D.C.E. (AEROSPACE) BASE – 10 Copies D.C.E. (AVIONICS) BASE – 10 Copies
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGR. (Q.C.)’s SECTT:
CE(QC) / 92 / 89
Dated 31st MAY, 89
Q.C. ADVISORY NO. 36
During the discussion with Civil Aviation Authority regarding compliance with 747 AD relating to B747 Lower Lobe Cargo door locking system, it has been pointed out that the possibility exists of non availability of inspection / defect record on ground, where such work is performed immediately prior to departure e.g. in case of defect noted during electrical closing of the cargo door just prior to departure, the door is closed manually with verbal information to Cockpit Crew who record such manual operation in the Maint. Log for the information of the ground Engineer at the next Station. To obviate possibilities as mentioned above C.A.A. requires compliance with the following :-
01) All work performed on aircraft is recorded clearly and understandably and without implication.
02) The record of all work performed must be available on ground in addition to
what is carried on the aircraft. The above is applicable to all work related to aircraft irrespective of type of aircraft, engines and components. Immediate compliance is required.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGINEER (QC) ‘s SECTT
CE(QC)/92/89
2nd August 1989
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO. 38 SUB: TRAILING EDGE INBOARD FLAP AFT SEGMENT BINDING There have been two incidents of inboard flap segment drive boom cable separation plus broken wires and damaged pulley on almost all Boeing 737 aircraft. Investigation revealed that the subject incident occurred due to inboard flap aft segment binding maladjustment/ misrigging of aft flap segment rollers, combined with accumulation of dirt and dust create frictional force at the rollers which cause aft flap segment to bind and operate under greater than design loads. To eliminate the above binding, the following additional items are being added in Maintenance Schedule:
1) Throughly clean lubricating points, rollers and tracks prior to lubrication at existing 3A frequency.
2) Check inboard flap aft segment after disconnection of push pull rod for easy
extension and retraction without application of significant force and that no intermittent hang up is evident at ‘2B’ frequency. In case binding is evident, carry out rigging / adjustment of rollers strictly in accordance with MM 27-51-31 pages 401-405.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGR. (Q.C.)’s SECTT.
CE (QC)/92/89 28th September, 1989
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO.44 SUB:- JAMMING OF LONGITUDINAL CONTROLS. On one of our B737 aircraft during pax boarding, smoke was observed in Aft Cabin. APU was switched off – smoke disappeared. Physical checks carried out in APU and its compartment which was found normal. On APU start, the left wing Body over heat light illuminated. Aircraft was released for fit with APU placarded unserviceable but aborted take off as longitudinal controls found jammed. On further investigation APU clamp coupling Fwd of Aft press. Bulk Head found broken, consequently duct disconnected and hot air blast from the pneumatic Duct melted / damaged cable guards installed on 4 cables located Fwd of rear Pressure Bulk Head at F/S 1016. Melted / damaged guard material (Nylon Hose) accumulated over the cable and got stuck when cooled, thus jamming both elevator and stab trim cables resulting in jamming of control surfaces. All B737 Engineers are advised whenever APU duct leakage occurs or is suspected or wing body over heat warning light illuminates – the related ducting and area in duct vicinity be inspected thoroughly. Source of smoke / burning, if any, must be isolated and rectified prior to release of aircraft for flight.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGR (Q.C.)’s SECTT.
Ref: CE (QC)/92/89 Dated: 29th October, 1989
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY No. 46 ISSUE 2
SUB : GROUND INCIDENT DURING GROUND RUN ON B737 AIRCRAFT
Recently during high power ground run, Aircraft AP-BCB skidded and hit vehicle standing approx. 70’ away, engine No.1 was replaced as nose cowl and fan blades were badly damaged. Brakes were ON and chocks on all wheels were installed. All the Engineers are reminded that while giving ground run, especially high power ground run, the following precautions must be observed. 1. Thorough clean and check area after completion of any work. Keep inlet
are free of foreign matter. 2. Communication between Cockpit and ground must be available. Ground
personnel head set chord must be long enough to stand clear at safe distance and also to prevent personnel inadvertently entering engine hazard zone.
3. Check that Airplane is parked in clean area with wheels on areas that are
free of oil, grease or other slippery substances. 4. Check that the nose wheel is aligned in straight forward position and that
main landing gears and nose gear wheels are chocked and ground locks are installed.
5. Place parking brake in ON position. 6. The following caution is reproduced from Maintenance Manual.
To minimize the possibility of aircraft skidding during high power operation, the following additional requirement must be met; failure to meet these additional requirements could result in aircraft skidding with subsequent airplane damage. If one or both engines are to be operated at high power, the following requirements are recommended to minimize aircraft skidding. a. Ensure ramp and tires are free from contaminates – a damp ramp
surface is acceptable. No standing water, frost, ice, oil, grease, sand or other contaminations are permitted
b. Ensure Aircraft satisfies the following minimum gross weight requirements when both engines are to be operated at take off power: 88, 000 pounds (39,920 Kilograms). For CFM56 – 3B- 2.
7. No ground equipment to be parked in front or in close vicinity of Aircraft. 8. One additional person must be available in the cockpit to keep a watch
outside for any inadvertent Aircraft movement or obstruction in front or close vicinity of aircraft. The additional person will be briefed accordingly by Engineer carrying out ground run prior to commencement of the run.
(M. SALAM KHAN) CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY CONTROL)
Ref: GM(QC)/92/91 Dated: 11th Aug, 91
Q.C.ADVISORY NO .88 Airbus industrie have recommended certain precaution which MUST be observed during routine maintenance of A-310 aircraft. These precautions are listed below for all concerned to note and follow.
I. Full use of the BITE facility must be made. No component should be removed without first carrying out BIITE and recording its results. BITE should again be carried out and recorded after the replacement of component, if the replacement is necessary as per BITE.
II. Re-racking of black boxes is to be strictly avoided as it results in damage
to component pins. With the high density precision connectors used in modern components, the cost of such damage may run into prohibitively high amounts. RECYCLING of circuit Breakers is considered an acceptable operation simulating reracking. However, BITE must be carried out and results recorded before CB recycling is done.
III. Extreme care MUST be exercised when removing CRTs, to avoid damage
to Primary Flight Display and Navigation Displays. The job should be undertaken by two persons. One should put the hydraulic power on and hold the control column full aft, while the second person should ease the CRT out (or in), taking care to use only his fingers. NO HARD TOOL, SUCH AS A SCREW DRIVER SHOULD EVER BE USED .A slightly scratched or damaged CRT costs a fortune.
IV. The glass cockpit gets easily smeared with fingerprints and other greasy
material and needs frequent cleaning. Ensure that SOFT COTTON (pharmacy grade) DAMP with industrial Alcohol is used for cleaning. Alternatively SOFT COTTON wet in LIQUID SOAP may be used .Tissue paper should NEVER be used for cleaning, because as soft as it may appear , it is abrasive and will scratch the delicate surface of the CRTs.
V. Always ensure that the Quarantine (U/S) tag contains detailed information
of the defect for which the component is removed. All ground observations and results of BITE messages MUST be included along with the Flight Reported defect. Reverse side of the tag may be used for this purpose. This will greatly reduce overhaul shop workload, help accurate troubleshooting in shop, and reduce component turnaround time.
VI. Whenever any component is removed belonging to Electrical power system, serial numbers of all three GCUs, GPCU, and BITE messages on GPCu MUST be written on the Quarantine (U/S) tag.
VII. For trouble shooting purposes, components of same part number may be swapped on the same aircraft or between aircraft, provided that the defect can not be reproduced on ground and all BITE checks are GO .In such an event the BITE checks must be done and recorded before and after swapping.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SEVICES
REF. CE (QC)/92/91 September 19, 1991
Q.C.ADVISORY NO. 90
SUB: CSD OIL LEAK CHECK AFTER INSTALLATION
It has been observed that correct procedure as per M.M. is not being followed while carrying out leak check after installation of CSD. During the month of June, AP-AYW (B747) landed back after shut down No. 4 engine due complete loss of oil. Investigation revealed that CSD No.4 has been replaced prior to this flight and leak check was also carried out. After Air Turn Back CSD was removed and CSD drive seal part number M83248-1-138 was found damaged as per technical log. (Damaged seal was not handed over to Technical services). After replacement of the seals, CSD again installed and after leak check aircraft departed. In the light of the above incident, all Aerospace Engineers are advised that whenever CSD is replaced:
(a) All new seals must be installed. (b) Seals R/N No. and Part No. must be quoted.
(c) Proper leak check as per MM Chapter CR 71-00-00 A/T No. 3 or 5 or 6 must be
carried out. (d) After run up CSD cavity drain must be checked for oil wetting.
( LAYEEQUR RAHMAN)
CHIEF ENGINEER QUALITY CONTROL
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION
REF. CE(QC)/92/91 October 16, 1991
Q . C ADVISORY NO. 93
NEW PROCEDURE IN CLOSING CYCLE OF B747
LOWER CARGO DOOR IN ELECTRICAL MODE BACK GROUND: Many operators have reported damage to the safety uplock mechanism in the lower lobe cargo door lift actuators and separation of rotary actuators from their mounting structure when the door is stopped during closure, the rotating ratchet wheel in the lift actuator may result in damage that prevents disengagement of the pawl from the ratchet wheel. During subsequent closure, the forward output shaft is held fixed by the engaged pawl and ratchet. This causes excessively high loads on the aft rotary actuator and its mounting actuator. ACTION: To preclude above possibility and consequent damage, following new procedure is to be adopted while closing the doors either by engineering or traffic personnel:
A. Release lifts actuator safety uplock prior to electrically closing the door. B. Door should be closed without interruption in the closing cycle to reduce
the potential for jammed uplock. C. Any time interruption takes place while closing the door, the PDU (Lift
actuator) safety uplock must be released manually. This procedure will remain in force till S.B 747-52-2189 is incorporated on all PIA Aircraft.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
REF. TS/QC/92 Dated Feb 04, 1992
Q . C ADVISORY NO .95 B747 NOSE OLEO SEALS REPLACEMENT. Recently one of our B747flight was delayed due both TAT probe lights and probe heat light came ON after lift off. Prior to this report of defect, Nose Oleo seals were replaced at Karachi. Investigation revealed that dimension ‘B’ was incorrect and was not equal to dimension ‘A’ minus 7.495+0.045 inches. An incorrect dimension ‘B’ is a result of:
a. Twisted oleo seals
b. Improper torque leaving gap between mating parts. An incorrect dimension ‘B’ may disturb the gap between squat switches and their targets which will result in above defect. For the guidance of all B747 airframe Engineers, following points must be borne in mind, while performing above job:
1. Torque Gland nut 2100 to 2400 inch pound. Then loosen the gland nut to match nearest nut slet with lack tab.
2. Measure dimension ‘B’ (Fig 802 CH:32-21-02) Dimension ‘B’ must be equal to
dimension ‘A’ minus 7.495” + 0.045” 3. If dimension ‘B’ is not within limit disassemble shock strut and check for twisted
seal or gap between mating parts i.e. low torque.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION
REF No: CE (Q.C) / 92 / 92
Dated: 06-02-1992
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY No. 96 Lately a few verbal concessions were requested for 5% concession on check periods outside office hours and holidays. The applicable concession was duly granted but it was felt that raising of concession form was not undertaken by concerned department next working day. This necessary step of procedure could only be accomplished after repeated reminder by Q.C Department. Henceforth it is mandatory that in all such cases, the concession performa is duly filled and signed by the Duty Manager Engineering and deposited with Maintenance Control Centre. Necessary concession will only be granted on confirmation of receipt of performa by MCC. This is based on following information:
1. Invariably concession is applied for at last minute allowing Quality Control Section no time to investigate whether concession is in order and within jurisdiction of Chief Engineer (Q.C.)
2. Required information not available at time of verbal concession like possible over
flying of hard time items / SSID inspection/ Mandatory inspection etc.
3. Wrong information conveyed. Example 737 Aircraft ‘A’ Check inspection was
quoted to above at 250 hours whereas Check ‘A’ is done at 125 hours. 4. Reason of concession applied for actions taken to avoid concession / reallocation
of services not mentioned. Observance of above would be appreciated.
LAEEQUR REHMAN CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY CONTROL)
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION
REF: CE(QC)/92/92 DT: 26-02-92
QUALITY CONTROL ADVISORY NO.97 Engineering Statistics in monthly / annual reports published by Development Engineering were traditionally based on number of PIREPS reporting at the Base – (Karachi in all cases and fort Fokker F-27 ISB, combined with KHI). The above was based on the philosophy that major rectificational work is carried out at Base and not at Line Stations. Transit Stations rectify a PIREP only when it is a ‘NO GO’ or when Flight Crew makes specific request. Over the years it was noted that this philosophy was not giving the exact Picture as there are a substantial number of defects reported at Line Stations which do not reappear at Base. It is therefore decided that effective Jan, 01/1992, all statistics viz-a-viz PIREPS and their repeat levels (R1, R2, R3 etc.) shall be based on reports in the entire network. A defect will be considered as repeated if rectification has been done and the aircraft released as satisfactory after a functional check. This practice will change the base line for comparison with similar static already published in the previous months/years. Therefore, CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN DRAWING ANY CONCLUSIONS WHILE COMPARING REPEATED DEFECT PERFORMANC OF PIA FLEET WITH PREVIOUS MONTHS/YEARS.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION
REF. CE(QC)/92/92 Dated March 18, 1992
Q.C ADVISORY NO.101.
CAM LOCK ADJUSTMENT. A number of cases have been reported where fork assembly of the cam locks were found very loose and in some cases the fork assembly was found lying on the floor of the Electronics compartment. Investigations revealed that the last few threads of the bolt at the fork assembly end were damaged causing flight returns as well. The reason for this appears to be improper adjustment of the cam locks by manipulating the fork assembly. Maintenance Manual chapter 20 (B-747) lays down procedure for adjustment. As per this procedure the adjustments are to be made by adjusting the JAM Nut and NOT the FORK ASSEMBLY. To preclude such recurrences a modification is under way by which the fork assembly will be attached permanently (locked) to the bolt) In the meantime it is being re-emphasised that that all adjustments of cam locks are to be done by adjusting the JAM NUTS and NOT the FORK ASSEMBLY.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
REF. CE9QC0/92/92
Dated March 31, 1992
Q.C ADVISORY NO .105
Recently an incident occurred on one of our B-747 aircraft when a seat in economy class came off from its mounting track during flight. At Karachi, seat was found not latched and locked properly. During Check ‘C’ the seats of this area were removed for floor inspection and then installed. This incident occurred on its second flight after the check. It is believed that seat was not properly latched on its reinstallation. All Aerospace Engineers / Approved inspectors working on seat installation are advised to pay particular attention to the security of seat mounting to prevent such occurrence in future.
Persuent to the recommendations of Civil Aviation Authority, all Maintenance Managers are advised to ensure that all maintenance tasks performed in their shifts are in total compliance of Maintenance Manual. They are to further ensure that proper tools are used and all technical activities are recorded properly. Concerned Maintenance Managers shall be held responsible for any deviation / violation of Airworthiness aspects in their shift.
GENERAL PURPOSE GREASES FOR ROUTINE RE-LUBICATION DURING AIRPLANE MAINTENANCE
This is to notify all concerned that as per Boeing Service Letter 707-SL-20-10, 737-SL-20-39, it is recommended that all alternates to general purpose grease MIL-G-23827 should meet the requirements provided in Document D6-56491 dated 30th October, 1992 developed to provide the necessary tests and criteria to evaluate alternate greases. To date, two greases, Aeroshell 7 and Castrolease AI, have been shown to meet the requirements of the reference document. Both of these greases are qualified to MIL-G23827, and are the suggested greases when MIL-G-23827 is specified, even though all the MIL-G-23827 greases are acceptable.
B747 AIR TURN BACK DUE FLASE FIRE WARING – JT9D ENGINE Recently a PIA JT9D powered aircraft returned from flight due # 4 engine fire warning coming on and high nacelle temperature indication on both “A” and “B” loops. Warning became intermittent when #4 throttle was pulled back. Trouble shooting revealed a loose piece of aluminum foil wrapped around fire wire terminal connector DM219A at 2 o’clock position. Defect was simulated on aircraft and confirmed to be cause of above turn back. The incident occurred 39 hours after engine installation. This Q.C advisory is issued to advise Aerospace / Avionics Engineers to take particular care while inspecting engine for loose items before closing cowls to prevent recurrence of similar incident in future.
Reproduced below is an extract from an airbus industry OIT (Operator information Telex) Quote: “One operator recently experienced a cargo compartment smoke warning in flight on an A300-600 aircraft .Inspection of the cargo bay after the flight revealed that a genuine fire had occurred in the bulk cargo compartment. The ceiling around the last ceiling light at the rear end of the bulk cargo compartment showed evidence of burning i.e. black soot).It has been established that the lens and also the plastic grill which are designed to protect the light bulb were missing before the flight. Investigation confirmed that the fire had been caused by direct contact between a mail bag and the light bulb, the fire was reproduced by placing a mail bag in direct contact with a similar bulb.” Unquote” This is true with all other types of aircraft. It is therefore recommended that a general visual inspection of the cargo compartments be carried out at” A” check intervals to ensure that all ceiling light in the forward, aft and bulk cargo compartments are maintained in a correct condition to ensure that no direct contact of cargo with light bulb is possible and that lenses / plastic grills etc and all other protections as required are available.
Distribution: Standard. Cc: ME (AV) DE – Kindly issue Card at Check ‘A’ frequency for all type of Aircraft.
REFUELLING FORM COCPIT
This advisory is being issued to clarify that Maintenance Manual Procedures for all Aircraft Types clearly specify that refueling must be done form the Wing Stations. The only exceptions to this NORM are aircraft AP-BCL, AP-BCM, AP-BCN and AP-BCO which have provisions for refueling form the Flight Engineer Station as well. Instances have been reported time and again where Engineers have been refueling for the cockpit and this causes disturbances in Cockpit Crew functions. Maintenance Manual Chapter 12-11 for aircraft B747, A-300, A-310, B737; Chapter 12-1 for B707 and Chapter A1.8.4 for F27 aircraft may be referred to for reference and compliance. However for confirmation, Cockpit gauges may be checked during refueling or after refueling is completed to eliminate any discrepancy / anomaly.
The purpose of this Q.C. Advisory is to ensure proper understanding, distribution, collection and up dating of Aircraft history. As per the decision of the Management the number of copies (coloured pages) of Aircraft Tech. log Book were reduced from four to three. Before reduction of pages, the distribution of coloured pages (log slips) was as under:- 1- WHITE - OFFICE COPY (Not to be removed) 2- PINK - COMPUTER 3- YELLOW - WORK SHEET 4- BLUE - TO BE REMOVED AND PLACED IN HIL POCKET 5- GREEN - REMOVED AT LINE STATIONS After reduction of number of pages, the current distribution is as under:- 1- WHITE - OFFICE COPY 2- PINK - COMPUTER 3- YELLOW - WORK SHEET 4- BLUE - TO BE REMOVED AND PLACED IN HIL POCKET 5- GREEN - REMOVED AT LINE STATIONS AND AT BASE KARACHI/ISLAMABAD The defects and rectifications should be written with firm hand on the WHITE pages. This is absolutly imperative to ensure legible reproduction of impressions on all the pages, especially the last copy (THE GREEN PAGE). GREEN PAGE (Log slips) should be removed at LINE STATIONS) at the time of release of aircraft for light and dispatched to ICCO of Technical Records sections-Karachi., by the next flight and dispatch details sent by telex to the above referred section.(KHI MX PK) PINK PAGE is to be removed ONLY at Karachi / Islamabad by Tech.Record-(Line Maint Unit). BLUE PAGE Should only be removed if the defect is carried forward and placed in hil POCKET. Otherwise it should not be removed.
On arrival at BASE – Karachi, the aircraft Tech.log book is handed over to (Line Maintenance Unit) Tech. Record Section for preparation of aircraft work sheets. At this stage, white page and all other copies have defects only. The PINK page is removed by the Tech. Record staff and defects only are fed to the computer. At the time of release of aircraft for flight, green copy SHOULD BE REMOVED; ATTACHED TO WORK SHEETS AND HANDED OVER/ COLLECTED BY TECH.RECORDS SECTION. Explicit adherence has become MANDATORY as it is the only page remaining at the Base- Karachi ,which has the defects and rectifications, only document for up dating the aircraft history.
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS DURING GROUND RUN
It has been observed that on engines ground run of all aircraft, proper procedure and safety precautions as per M.M. are not followed. This has resulted in a number of incidents and in some cases consequences could have been serious. All aircraft Engineers are hereby reminded to take utmost care in Engine ground runs and strictly follow the procedures and safety precautions as given in relevant Maintenance Manuals of the aircraft. In particular all vehicles, equipment and non essential manpower must be well clear of the aircraft / engines. A competent person must be on the intercom through out the engine run. Any deviation from the proper procedures and safety precautions will be taken seriously and may result in endorsement of Approvals.
162 I
02-05-94 01 of 02
PROPER BLANKING AND PACKING OF REMOVED AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS Time and again, maintenance engineers have been advised not to tamper with aircraft components in efforts to rectify defects. Partial dismantling of the components like FCU, PCU etc. is not covered in the scope of their Maintenance Engineer’s licences and reflects poor Maintenance standards and jeopardizes safety. Proper care of the removed components is also essential on the part of the maintenance engineer. This entails blanking of ports and electrical plugs and wrapping and safe delivery to P&PC for onward dispatch to overhaul Shop concerned. Recently two reports regarding a JT9D fuel pump and an FCU were received from EMMS Cardiff. Several blanking plugs of fuel pump were loose and without wire locking. The FCU trimmer housing was not secured with wire locking and observed loose with a gap between trim head and housing which shows that it was tampered with during maintenance. This Q.C. Advisory is being issued to advise all Aircraft Maintenance Engineers as follows:
01) The ports / electrical plugs of removed component must be properly capped to prevent ingress of foreign matter.
02) Blanking plugs / screws / bolts / nuts etc. wire locked ex overhaul shop must
never be opened, except the ones specified in applicable Maint. Manual.
03) Do not dismantle or tamper with any part of the component which is beyond the
scope of work of a Maint. Engineer.
162
I 02-05-94 02 of 02
Serious actions shall be taken in case of non compliance with the above instructions. A copy of this Q.C. Advisory is being marked to Manager Engineering (Rotable Planning) to instruct his staff not to accept components which are not properly capped, wrapped and tagged as per requirement.
ENGINE DE-PRESERVATION CFM-56-3B – B737 AIRCRAFT
BACK GROUND Ref. Engine change on AP-BEC # 1dated 01\06\94 OFF 720-241, ON 720-242, was tested on ground run after installation, was rejected for giving high EGT and required take off power could not be achieved. Appropriate bleed pressure was also not available. Engine change was again decided .720-242 was replaced with 720 – 229. Removed Engine was again tested on Test Bench and found to be serviceable with all function normal after performing depreservation procedures. TECHNICAL DISUSSION Normally after each overhaul in engine shop, preservation of the engine is accomplished. If the preservation of serviceable engine is done for period of 30-365 days, engine depreservation becomes mandatory, Ref .M.M chap 71-00-03 page 227 .it is suspected that engine depreservation procedure was not accomplished on the above mentioned engine , resulting abnormal engine behavior. RECOMMENDATIONS If the power plant preservation is done for more than 30 days, the procedure for despreservation of the power plant must strictly be followed after each installation before giving ground Run Up. Recording of M.P.A reading must also be made a regular practice.
INFLIGHT FIRE ON CF6- 80C2 ENGINE
Recently an incident of in flight fire occurred on CF6-80C2 engine due fuel leak at IDG fuel-oil Heat Exchanger which caused considerable damage to the engine. Post fire incident inspection revealed that source of the fuel leak at the forward flange of the IDG fuel / Oil Heat Exchanger. A gap of approx 1/8 inch was observed between the FUEL IN TUBE FLANGE WAS EXTRUDED FROM THE GROOVE. Prior to this incident the IDG fuel-oil Heat Exchanger had been replaced. It is emphasized that whenever an IDG fuel –oil Heat exchanger is replaced, a visual check of IDG fuel oil Heat Exchanger flanges is made. The visual inspection must ensure that the gasko seal and flange are properly seated. All bolts are securely fastened .This visual inspection is in addition to the idle speed pressure check specified in the Maintenance Manual. All A-310 Engineers are advised to strictly check for the correct installation and fuel leak from the IDG fuel oil Heat Exchanger after any maintenance activity in the area.
CAUTIONS WHIE WORKING ON / AROUND FLT CONTROL SYSTEM ON B-747 / 737 / 707 AIRCRAFT Boeing has informed that while working on elevator control system of a B-767 aircraft with hydraulic system depressurized, a mechanic got injured .Reason for this accident was, inadvertent movement of elevator surface, when the mechanic put his arms into the power control actuator to remove a bolt. The centre power control actuator summing linkage was inadvertently moved which depressurized the power control actuator and allowed the surface to drop. Extreme caution should be taken when working around Flight controls as with hydraulic system pressurizes when an input is commanded either intentionally or unintentionally by either movement of the cockpit flight control or movement of cables or a movement of hydraulic actuator input linkage, the control surface will move and injure the personnel working around it. With system depressurized, movement of the control surface may occur when the input to hydraulic is moved .This motion is usually due to trapped pressure within the actuator which bleeds off with input to the actuator. All precautions must be taken whenever maintenance is performed on flight control systems and hydraulic system should be depressurized as per appropriate Maintenance manual Procedure. Make sure all personal are free and clear of all moving flight Control surfaces and components prior to providing an input to a control surface.
CF6-50 ENGINE FAN COWL,DEPARTURE FROM AIRPLANE A Boeing TLX MSG.32-9430 STA 747 advises Operators that a CF6-50 powered 747 Airplane experienced departure of the #1 engine left and right fan cowl due to combustion of a lean fuel / air mixture under the fan cowl. Further inspection indicated in flight operation of the starter motor caused the unit to overheat resulting in disintegration of some internal components. Formal investigations revealed a minor fuel leak in the vicinity of the starter. Preliminary investigation results conclude that combustion of lean Air / Fuel mixture occurred beneath the fan cowl in the vicinity of the starter motor. The concerned Engineers are advised to be more cautious while working / inspecting this area. Moreover they are required to be vigilant while inspecting for fuel leaks in the vicinity of the starter motor.
PIA AIRBUS A310 GREEN SPEED AND UNCOMMANDED
PITCH MOVEMENT ANOMALIES
A310 aircraft is equipped with EFTS, Electronic Flight Instrument system, which consists of two CRT displays for each pilot and copilot. The top CRT display is called PFD (Primary Flight Display) while the lower one is ND (Navigational Display) .The central portion of PDF displays the horizon and command bars, the upper portion of this screen is used for flight mode annunciation while the left portion is used for the display of a vertical airspeed column. The display of airspeed and different advisory speeds is a function of FAC (Flight Augmentation Computer). During take off, roll and climb V1, Vr,V2,F (Flap retraction Speed), S (Slat retraction speed) and a small green doughnut “O” (Green dot speed) is displayed. Green dot speed is also called “safe maneuverable speed”on which the aircraft is safe to be maneuvered. In case of one engine out operation it becomes more critical as it is the minimum speed to be maintained with one operating engine. On earlier four A310 aircraft (AP-BDZ, AP-BEB,AP-BEC &AP-BEG) the over reading of green dot speed has become on old problem. Several attempts were made to rectify the problem by replacing FAC, angle of attach sensors one by one, other relevant LRUs and wiring checks, but the problem remained unsolved. Airbus industry was also contacted on different occasions. Another serious problem was observed on he same four A310 aircraft when uncommanded pitch movement along with jerks on control column were noticed on disconnection of autopilot. Replacement of FCC (Flight Control Computer) and AFS BITE checks did not help. Airbus Industry advised us carry out OAT 27-20 which calls for the quick check of autopilot and pitch trim actuators NUL / Rigging .AOT was carried out on all A310 aircraft, but no abnormality was found. A complete flight observation was carried out on PK-772/060495 ( KHI-SIN sector ) A/C AP-BEC by a quality control Avionics Engineer an his report along with DFDR read-out converted on a floppy disk was sent to Airbus Industry for their analysis.
Meanwhile all three angle of attack (AOA) sensors were replaced on the same aircraft AP-BEC and the crew was requested to observe the behavior of both Green dot and uncommanded pitch anomalies during flight. The crew reported on subsequent flights that “both the subject defects had disappeared and the aircraft AP-BEC the subject defects had disappeared and the aircraft AP-BEC was flying normal. In the meantime the replay of airbus Industry regarding flight observation and DFDR read out received. In which they pointed out AOA sensors 2 and 3 to be the most probable cause of anomalies. They advised us to send these AOA sensors to the vendor for investigation / detail examination. As the respective A.O.A sensors were already replaced as a set and were found serviceable in shop now held back in shop. We are now trying to find out any abnormality in these A.O.A sensors locally in our Instrument Overhaul shop and also planning to dispatch them to vendor as advised by airbus Industry. We hope to rectify the similar anomalies on our rest of A-310 aircraft soon after we get our Angle of attack sensors checked and repaired by the vendor. This is for the information of all A-310 Maintenance and flying crew.
JT9D-7 ENGINES THRUST REVERSER LOCK OUT Boeing MM 78-31-00 dated April 25, 1995, page 215, item B (4) specifies QUOTE CAUTION: USE ONLY TURNBUCKLES FOR LOCKOUT OF THE REVERSER UNQUOTE. Some of the JT9D -7 engines in PIA Fleet have provision of blots for locking carriages to the tracks with no provision for turnbuckles. The matter was referred to Boeing who have clarified that blots can also be used for lock out of the thrust reversers. Blots Part NO. BACB30LM4H8 recommended Alternate Part Nos. NAS1304-8H, HPMT4HT8 BACB30NE4H8 BACB30MT4H8 BACB30NH4H8 BACB30LE4H8 Also size 10 bolts can be used with corrosion resistant washers under the blot head to prevent thread shank out. The blot must protrude through the carriage flange a minimum of one thread. Boeing shall amend the Maintenance Manual in October 25, 1995 issue. Meanwhile this advisory is being issued to advise all JT9D-7 Aircraft Engineers that only turn buckles or only blots must be used to lock out JT9D -7 engine thrust reversers but never use a combination of turn buckles and bolts.
JT9D ENGINE INFLIGHT SHUTDOWN DUE OIL LOSS Recently AP-BCM, operating Pk-303/LHE-KHI encountered oil loss in Engine # 4 causing in flight shut down (IFSD). On inspection, Main Gear Box MCD housing found sheared causing oil leak. This housing is made of light alloy (Magnesium) and is not designed to take extra stress . Over-torquing during installation or mishandling of the MCD may lead to failure. Quality Control Advisory (No: 145 /261293) was circulated on the subject incident in 1993 .However, recurrence of the mentioned incident indicates that this QC Advisory has not been given its due importance. Following precautions are required to be followed strictly to avoid such ocurrences in future:
1) Screw type MCD plug shall not be over-torqued in any case (torque limit is 8-12 lbs –inch).
2) During 0225 hrs inspection, care should be taken while removing or
inserting the MCD plug in to its hosing.
3) No tool shall be applied to open or close the bayonet type MCD plug.
JT9D-7 SERIES 747 SIDE COWL LOSS- SIDE COWL CLOSING / LATCHING PROCEDURE.
In past three months three cases of JT9D-7 series engine side cowl losses in flight have been reported. In each case, airplane damage. including damage to engine, strut and wing has resulted. Since1969. Approximately 40 cases of 747 JT9DD-7 series engine side cowl losses have occurred. Following is a list of the reported and / or suspected causes for those losses:
i. 14 cases attributed to improperly latched or unlatched forward latches.
ii. 03 cases due to fuel manifold nozzle separation. iii. 04 cases due to Borescope Boss separation
iv. 01 case due to precooler duct separation
v. 07 cases due to fire and / or over pressure inside cowling
vi. 02 cases due to starter disintegration
vii. 01 case due to 15th stage bleed duct rupture.
viii. 01 cases due to engine oil tank cap not installed ix. 06 cases – cases determined.
x. 02 case – suspected cause, eighth stage duct rupture.
Examination of latches from cowl loss occurrences revealed that they were worn to a point where they could appear to be latched without actually engaging the U– bolts. In order to prevent occurrences where cowl latches appear to be engaged with U-bolts and properly latched, when in fact hey are not. Following procedures / precautions detailed below should be accomplished when opening and closing side cowls:
A. As the side cowls are being closed, a cursory inspection of the side cowl hinge hooks, latches and mating U-bolts should be conducted to assure their integrity.
B. Once the cowls have been moved to their closed position, specific
attention should be paid to ensure that the side cowl latches are properly and fully engaged with their mating u-bolts, during the latching process.
C. After latching, a check of the latches and general exterior of the side cowls
should be accomplished to ensure the cowls are securely latched and are structurally sound.
D. If the side cowl latches appear to be loose or do not function properly, they should be adjusted per 747 MM 71-11-07 pages 501 thru 503/JT9D-3A/ 7 Series and / or replaced as necessary. Please note that airplane with longer service lives have side cowls that may have been repaired several times. While each of the individual repairs have been accomplished in accordance with approved procedures, it is possible that cumulative effect of such repairs, would result in a reduction in the overhaul strength of the cowl assembly. All Engineers / concerned personnel are advised to follow above procedures to avoid cowl loss in flight.
POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARD CHAFFING OF ELECT CABLES BEHIND P-5 PANEL B-737 AIRCRAFT Recently during flight on a B737 aircraft it reported that No.2 ignition C.B along with No.2 start valve CB popped out. Upon reset sparks were observed from P5 overhead panel. When the overhead panel was opened after landing, wires were found burnt in the wire bundle carrying wiring to the ignition switch as a result of chaffing with the edge of No.2 Start switch. Finding after inspection of the area.i.e the evidence at damaged wires, arcing, the marks on the switch on early indicate improper routing of wires connected to the start switch on engine No.2. Industry record of B737-300 also indicates that wiring behind P5 over head panel, where the above switch is instilled is a known weak area and a slight negligence could lead to subsequent wiring damage or an incident of a serious nature. For this reason Boeing have issued a number of service letters advising rerouting and inspection for evidence of chaffing and damage behind p-5 panel. This advisory is issued to apprise all concerned that after performance of work behind the p5 panel in particular and other panels in general, it should be ensured that all wires / wire bundles are properly clamped, tied and routed, to prevent damage when panels are being secured. All concerned are expected to comply strictly.
EXTRE PRECAUTIONS FOR ENGINE H1-POWER RUN –UP
OCCURRENCE: Recently one of PIA’s A-310 aircraft experienced skid on run-up bay during a Hi-power ground run test. This also resulted in injury to one of the engineer performing work on a nearby aircraft. RECOMMENDATIONS: Based on the investigation of field office CAA (Pak) KHI & Head Quarters Office CAA (Pak), desire the following must be ensured in addition to the laid down standard run up procedures of the EMPM and the Aircraft Maintenance Manual.
1. Serviceable chocks at main wheels should be used with operative locking mechanism.
2. Relevant pre run-up check must be accomplished & signed by concerned Engineer.
3. The aircraft is to be parked on hard ground, free of grease, oil, lubricants dirt, ice or pool of water
4. No equipment is packed or placed close to the aircraft, specially around inlet of the engine and the jet blast area.
Strict compliance in designed by all concerned.
BOROSCOPIC INSPECTION REQUIRED ON BIRD STRIKE/FOD --------------------------------------------------
In case of bird strike the Baroscopic Inspection is to be performed on an engine if any of the following is observed;
Damage or debris is found on spinner, fan blades inboard of mid-span shroud, fan blade platforms and fixed inlet guide vanes.
-Bird remains / damage is evident in areas located adjacent to core.
-or an unusual odor is reported in cabin after a bird strike.
All Aircraft Engineers are advised to follow this guideline religiously.
PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHILE PERFORMING MAINTENANCE ON B747-300 AIRCRAFT UPPER DECK DOORS
Background Recently, during routine maintenance of a B747-300 aircraft R/H upper deck door, which involves servicing & lubrication, a technician inadvertantly operated escape slide while trying to open the door. Such incidents are extremely unwanted being safety, hazard as well as causing financial loss to the Airline. Moreover B747-300 aircraft are being operated under lease agreement with Cathay Pacific due to which unscheduled replacement of components become a problem. Discussion Mutual investigation by Corporate Safety and QC Divisions revelead that necessary precautions were not adopted before opening the door and thus deployment of escape slide occurred. As some systems of B747-300 aircraft are different from those of B747-200 aircraft, proper procedures & precaution as depicted in M.M, shall be strictly adhered to. Recommended action
. Qualified Aircraft Engineer should personally supervise work on U/Deck doors.
Procedures/precautions laid down in M.M. 52-33-00 should be strictly adhered to.
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SUB: OCCURANCE REPORTING TO DIRECTOR ENGG. Recently one F-27 aircraft landed at PEW with Pressurization failure. On investigation, starboard side emergency window was lying loose in its place causing heavy air leakage, thus aircraft failed to pressurize. Although it was a very serious occurrence on PIA aircraft yet Director Engineering was not informed accordingly. All Aircraft Engineers working in Maintenance are required to ensure that information of such occurrences is provided to Director Engineering through quickest means. Maintenance Control is one again reminded to ensure that such occurrences are promptly brought into the knowledge of Director Engineering. Strict compliance is desired.
NOTE: Please ensure the dispatch of this form to Technical Services after performing the job.
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Subject: Ensine Oil / Hydrau
BACKGROUND
AP-AYW encountered an in-flight shut down during first flight after check-D. Duringinvestigation it was observed oil cans were drawn from tool stores for topping-up thiengine but same was not indicated in Technical Log Book. Similar discrepancy hai alsobeen observed in the case ofAP-BCL on 23-08-2001.
DISCUSSION
It is generally observed that engine oil and hydraulic fluid cans are lying in tool stores andanybody can take it without making a record. Also the practice of recording the issue ofconsumable fluids for an aircraft from tool store is not being followed religiouly. Thispractice is very dangerous since these fluids are generally taken by Technicians or offcerEngineering to top up the engine and hydraulic tanks without bringing the same in theknowledge of Engineers. This is an irresponsible act, which may culminate into enginedamage. If proper oil / hydraulic top-up record is not made and engineer attending theaircraft remains unaware a serious occurrence may happen.
To REGULARTZE the issue/receipt of oil /hydraulic fluid from tool store and to make itCOST EFFECTfVE also, following actions are being recommended.
I . It is advised that engine oil and hydraulic fluid ISSUE AND RECEIPTREGISTER should be maintained at all stations including Base Maintenance toolstores. The register MUST contain following data ; date, aircraft registration,quantity issued / received back, name & staff number
2- Engine oil quantity should be religiously recorded in Technical Log Book andname of officer Engineering / Technician should also be recorded in shift resister.
Strict compliance is desired., / t
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Distribution:Standard
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.TROTJBI,E S}IOO'I ING -RIIPORl 'ED SNAGS
I{ccer l t obsetval ions by Sl tS CAA (Pak) conccrning subject issue are rcproduccd verbat imhereunder fbr benel l t ofal l concelned
Quote
l . Mcasures arc taken to el lsurc thal t l torotrgh ancl systernat ic l louble shoot i rrg is c lorrc beforcrccl i f icat iorr , and cl fcrr t is rrradc kr lcnrorrc l l tc t . ( )ol causc
2. Change ofseveral contponents togcther on the basis ofsuspicion is avoided as lar as possible
3 Contponents set l l to thc sl top ale t lackcr i arrc l i rnportant occur lenccs/ i6cidcnts arc notconsidetcd closed Lrnt i l receipt of ' the resul t l tonr the shop.
'1 1)roper t loublc shoot ing and safety are not conlpronr isecl under pressure to c lel iver. t l re aircral lqt t icklyAny deviat ion f i 'onr proper t rouble shoot ing process,when necessi tated , is direct lyaut l rol izct l I tv sel t , , r e lrgirrec1irrr .1 1talagel le l t t
lJ nq rr ote
' l hese recott t t l tet tdat ions ale airnecl at avoiding i r r t f iscr iminate renroval /change of conrponents and
ensurlng a nlelhodical al ld thorough process of 1r 'ouble shoot i t rg to pre-etnpt repeat occurrences.
Corrpl iance r .v i th al tove rv i l l serve to reinfol .ce thc nraintcnarrcc process.
/ , nr y ^ * ,/ --T
Muhanrnrad I-aiqueChicf E,ngineer (Q C)
Distr ibut ionStandard
No. oo - 04/265
ls,c----- +-D o b " q - n n . : 0 0 t
PqW---s+-,"f-€+-
I - - e u A r . r T Y c o N T R o L D r v r s r o N'+JTPIA 6: c. ADViSohY
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po. oa_- n /2r4lqr r
Dote 3 t-oa-"LtPoge ot or r,:
PROCEDURE FOR TEST ITLIGUTS CONDUCTED IN BASE }'AINTENANCE
In Base Main tenance, Tes t F l igh t o f an a l rc ra f t cons t i tu tes a par to f the work package and is conducted a f te r comple t ion o f a rna j o rcheck . There ex is ts no exp l i c l t and c lear ly de f ined procedure to th ise f fec t wh ich g ives r i se to confus ion and ho ldups a t t imes. In o rderLo avo id any arnb igu i t ies the fo1 lo r^ r ing procedure is spec i f ied wh ichw l l l h e n c e f o r t h b e s t r l c t l v a d h e r e d t o :
A request fo r the Tes t F l j gh t shou l .d be fo rwarded by there levant Manager l ing ineer ing o f Base Main tenance to the F l1ghtopera t ions we l l in advance w i th in t lmat ion to ManaserEng ineer ing Qua l i t y Cont ro l (Base l " la in tenance) .
A cer t i f i ca te o f F ITNESS FOR FLIGHT \d i l l be issued onprescr ibed f ron by appropr la te ly qua l i f ied Base Maln tenanceE n g i n e e r s a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r t h e T e s t F l i g h t .
Paper work re la t in€ l to the work package shou ld be conp le te ina l l respec ts a t leas t th ree hours p r lo r to the connencenento f Tes t F11ght . Th is p recond i t ion wou ld be endorsed by Qua l i t yC o n t r o l ( B a s e M a i n t e n a n c e ) .
A l1 re levant Log Books , du ly comple ted , shou ld be madeava l lab le on the a i rc ra f t two hours p r lo r to the depar tu re o ft h e a i r c r a f t f o r T e s t F l i g h t . Q u a l i t y C o n t r o l r e p r e s e n t a t i v ewi l l rev iew the docunents and c lear the a i rc ra f t fo r Tes t F l igh t .
0n1y the abso lu te ly necessary persons du ly nominated tod e s p a t c h t h e a i r c r a f t w 1 1 1 b e a l l o w e d o n t h e a l r c r a f t .Qua l l t y Cont ro l w111 ensure s t r l c t conp l lance o f th is ru le .
As a po1 lcy , there is no requ i re rnent o f Eng ineer ing personne lacconpany ing a Tes t F l igh t , However , exempt ions on a case tocase bas is rnay be gran ted by the Ch ie f Eng ineer (Qua l i t yCont ro l ) o r h is du ly au thor lsed nomlnee.
C) On conclus ion of Test F l ight , Qual l ty Contro l representat ivewl l l a t tend the arr iva l and l la lse n l th the F1lght Crewr e g a r d i n g t h e f l i . g h t r e p o r t e d d e f e c t s o r o t h e r o b s e r v a t l o n s .
P a g e N o . I
#fPtA u:'i:'fl['fri36hi)h) Qua l i t y con t ro l (Base Mainr ) w i l l rev iew the f l igh t repor ted
d e f e c t s , m o n i t o r t h e i r r e c t i f i c a t i o n a n d e n s u r e t h a tappropr ia te remed ia l ac t ions have been taken.
j ) A i rcraf t wi l l be re leased for f i rs t scheduled f l ight af tercomplet ion of a major check only af ter Qual i ty Contro l (BaseM a i n t ) i s f u l l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h r e g a r d t o p r o p e r r e c t i f i c a t i o no f f l i g h t r e p o r t e d d e f e c t s , a i r w o r t h i n e s s , s a f e t y a n d i n t e g r i t yo f s y s t e m s a n d e q u i p n e n t o f t h e a i r c r a f t .
1 )
U n ( l e r n o r u a l c i r c u n . j t a n c c s , a l r c r a . [ t \ ^ ' 1 1 1 o p e r a t e f i r s t t w os c h e c l u l e d f l i g h t s o r r d o n e s t i c r o u t e s o n l y a f t e r c o n p . l . e t l o n o f an a j o r c h e c k i n o r d e r t o p r e c l u d e i n s u r m o u n t a b l e s i t u a t l o n s a tf o r e i g n s t a t i o n s .
In case the we ighment o f the a i rc ra f t i s a lso schedu led in thew o r k p a c k a g e , i n t i n a L i o n t o t h i s e f f e c t h a s t o b e f u r n l s h e d i nwr l t lng to Manager Eng ineer ing Qua l i t y Cont ro l (Base Main t ) a tleas t four days pr io r to the ten ta t i ve da te o f we ighrnent . Th isw i l l fac i l l ta te necessary a r rangements and requ is i te l ia lsonwi th concerned agenc ie s .
Weigh ing check l i s t shou ld be c lu1y comple ted and i t s comple t ionver i f led by Qua l i t y Cont ro l twenty - four hours be fore thew e i g h m e n t o f t h e a i r c r a f t . R e p r e s e n E a t i v e o f t h e C o n t r o l l e r o fA i r w o r t h i n e s s w j 1 1 o n l y b e c a l l e d i n w h e n c o n p J e t l o n o f c h e c k1 i s t 1 s c o n f i r m e d .
No. oo - 13/254
Dole 3l-0s- ' ,k I
lsue
Pqge 02 of 02
k )
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/1,^--c/ -1-
I{UHAIIUAD LAIQUEChlef Euglneer (Quality Control)
Dis t r ibut ion :
Standard
{),PIA H:'['fl['ii36'RVBACKGROUND:
Recently AP-BCL aircraft parked on Bay # 26 rolled back after beingdisconnected from towing truck although wheel chocxs were instailed onrear of nose wheels. This not onry caused damage to both Nose wheers butalso damaged the steering cabre carrier. Furthir undue maintenance onsaid A,/C had to be performed causing financial impact as well.
DISCUSSION:
T.he gradient at bay # 24,25 & 26 is more as compared to other bays atJTC. This anomaly requires to practice additionar saiety measures on thesebays. Through this advisory, ail concerned staff/Aircraft Engineers are beingadvised to exercise great care whire aircraft parking brakeslre rereased anitow bar is being disconnected.
RECOMMENDATION:
ln view of above-mentioned scenario, folowing actions are required to beundertaken on bay # 24,25 & 26 only.
1. Wheel chocks to be placed on rear of Main / Wing Gear Wheels inaddition to nose wheels chocks.
^0. c^. to.ola{flr* t
31-10 -2 0 0r
^ 1 o f lroge_
Dole
2. Parkin_g brakes to be kept',ON" after parking the aircraft, if possible.Aircraft shall be parked with nose steering in neutral position.
/"-l^--4 -/ -J-
Mrrr{AMMAb LIUQUE
Qc.advisory/3oxo 1 /p-5O
&*PtA H:'i:'fl[Vi36'RVf t ) - r - .
No 12 - ::1Z,Se, 0 llsuepo6 02 -01- -2k2
Poge0 r - 0 t
t
It ha.s been highrighted by the Fright operations represenlative in the coordinarionmeeting with Engineering Departmenr that very oiten on reaching the cockpit tocarry out pre-fiight checks the crew finds the aircraft rereased,whire at the iametime some cBs are puiled out / tr ipped. This is not onry an avoidabre initant butcould be a cause of a potentiar deray as weil as safety hazard. rt courd arso causeunnecessary and totally avoidable altercation and stress between maintenanceand cockpit crew.
A circuit breaker is puiled out or rt is automaticaily tripped as a safety precautionagainst aircraft equipment during maintenance or during normar operation. In eithercase it indicates an abnormar condition and as a standird aviation practice ii rs-notreset unless it is ensured by a competent authority which in this case is an AircraftEngineer, that conditions .warranting the 'puil-out' have been eriminated. Thustechnically the rerease of aircraft with any c'B puiled out is incorrect as it oovious,yindicates to the incoming cockpit crew that some work is in progress unolnu "i"*would be correct and justified to wait unttl the A,/E ,clears, the aircraft.
In any case such a rerease of aircraft is not coirect and is a deviation fronrstandard practices warranting appropriare action. However ir engineer is - incompletion stages of his work ancj desires to save a deray and b! retease oraircraft wants the prejrioht arso to be initiated simurtaneousry, nJ ,nrri-Lk"cockpit crew into
"onf",dun"" and act accordin! to the understanding sodevelooed.
It is therefore expected that henceforth under normar conditions, THE ATRcRAFTRELEASING ENGINEER SHALL ENSURE THAT ALL CES EiC NCSiiFCIONTO HANDING OVER THE AIRCRAFT TO OPENNTINE CREW.
C H I E F E N G I N E E R - ( O U E L T 1 .coNTROL)
Poge 01 of 01-11t,v PIA Gl. c. ADVISORY
Q U A L I T Y C O N T R O L D I V i S I O NNo. sz - orl ;ci 7r$ue
Dob 29-04-2k2
DAMAGE OF A-3OO t.GE GEAR SELINDARY MR
BACK GROUND: -
DISCUSSIOTI : -
BANANA IJNK DUE IACK OF GREASIIiG
RFERETGS:
Recently at LHE during W/A Check, nose qea_r LllSsecondary door found disconnected from sirut, onarrival of A/C Ap-BBM. During inspection doorrotating control rod (Banana Link) fork-end Lugfound fractured. Aircraft was relased as per CDL.At KHI, Banana Link was replaceri along with fittinglubrication assy/hinge aram (part No. MS-1500-1)as found Jarnrned completely.
The jarnrning of fitting lubrication assy/hinge arm(which resulted darnage of Banana-Link fork endLug) was due to lack of greasing, due to its hidden/ un-kncrurn greasing point. Banana Link assy nasa twisting movement (i.e. dual direction npv6ment)during extension of nose gear & hence opening /closing of nose gea_r secondary door. This BananaLj"nk assy has three gearsing points, one at lc ^,/erend (on bearing assy) other one center of the link& the last one which is at upper end (on lubricationfitting assy / hinge arm). This point normallyremains un-detected while greasing in Maintenance,being hidden / unknown. The location of this pointj-s on tire oppos j-te side of Banana link assy innose wheel wel.t front lo,ver side of nose-gear stiut.
vftt I L2-22-32 / Page 05-13IPC * 52-82-0L I Page 2-OIPC I 52-82-13 / Page 1-0,1"-1
EP90|!{ENDAII9NS,: The operation and function of Rotating controtrod (Banana link assy) is sarne on A300-84 & A310_300fleet and damages of Banana Link assy exists inPIA, due such lapses (i.e. inporper greasing) inpas L.
IL is therefore advised that all concerned Engineers / Techniciansto be very particular while greasing on nose landing gears and strictlyadhere to procedures / steps of greasing as per !+t I 12-22_32.
IJ..,/.4*..1,.
f' - - f .
MIfiANNAD IAiOUEqEIcW
II - o u A L r T Y c o N T R o L D r v r s r o N
Jjft,PlA 6: c. ADVISohYf t2- r- .
SHIPMENT OF SEAFOOD
Dote
Poge
;r,0. " Gns- 031258
lsueoL-01-2k2
01 of 01
BACKGROUND:
Recently n B-737 aircraft AP-BFT was grounded due stinking fishsmell. Inspection revealed corrosion in fwd & rear freight holds whichwas attributed to the carriage / transportation / uplift of seafood inimproperly sealed containers which resulted in salted fishy waterleakage, causing this corrosion. Aircraft remained on ground for 14days for structure repair, resulting in substantial financial loss tocorporation.
RECOMMEDATIONS:
Basically this is the job of Cargo Section but at the same time there is nodenying the fact that this is serious airworthiness concern. Through thisadvisora all Aircraft Engineers are advised to closely monitor theloading / uplifting of all types of cargo in properly built pallets Iconttiners so as to avoid recurrence in future'
4tPIA Q. C. ADVISORYQ U A T I T Y C O N T R O L D I V I S I O N
32 - oz/zegNo.- /
IFq,e-
Dote 02-0?-2€
^ 01 of 02roge_
SUB: BRA|(,ElOueuznO nOD DEucHmEln.
BAGKGROUND:
fr*naft tQqA( urivcd'at .crl,E, b (ry-205 / 160502 wirfr #2 6rafo ryaaEziq,d (6ro&g 6") *itthg, nnttngn suisquent [anage to tfre SraQg assan6[1. <Erafgt6ar tws ruotrttnfim QX$ nmny in onz pien ttng uitfr 6mft9n pizrt's of 6tafosmsorant hmftg assm6$ fnse 6ruQgrt.
DISGUSSION:
this is tfic tfiitd oportks of hrafuf ryafrai,A d [ztacfrtncnt in QIA. "nt tfie 03apond casa an on "LX-Q'UAWIA' type futng gmx Airhas hrltsttb snscontzact od tfrcy cnjind tfrat ncfr a faitare is not an lfllt$try walanattauracr tutittg 1996 - :rg, tfrm rnn tfrnz tqo* af nufrfaihos eryrienul 67two otficr opcratan (itohrhg aU) Auling tfrat pcridAIM'US faarcLzt an in'
tcptfr innXigatiot in omlcr to [cten.iru potmtia[ toot cusc for sufr &tachnen'ts
$fotowittg nants:
1- Static cMtiont of tfu foats e4ettef, to tfrt fttaittitg fufu (ean No. NSn1i04-i6D)
2- Sperifu tcsts A 4ftnle con&tiorr to nann tfie foaf,s on etcining 6otts witfrt ttetel nattng syxm (cottp'tttittg &gitat cancra aal coil)
flJtcr tfn tests, tfrzy cotutudl,l tfrat in any casl tfu sfreaitq staw qpfrct to tlui*rnA **" petc hter tfran tfu pemiss;hte stnssa of tfie 6otts. ttonwer tficy
itsul a SvB A3N-324:70 ryatfing hu?.rtiort t 4lI 16 6nQ9 6art r*airhq Sotts
for tfioit confrtion, hteqritlY ant pnpcr ntqu vahes tuhg an tp.yrtpria'te-irrspea:'ottttznnls. On tfrc 6rrri, of tfrit St&, AIA inttducd an inrycctb,n Ad No.
4- Cfrafu n6seqnLt to a tyn 6urtt Oqufg off ahrt incitat etc
5- transit / hy na'cfucfo.
No._n _ azl267
qcA47/t2O72WP-12
?s ' rz c A)
$fPlA u:'i:'flb'ii36h1iNo.-.-Gm : 04 /z?Dlsx -I-
!6ys !.!-0?-2k2
Pcge-o r of 01
SUB: ffi!ilEn TRADE IIfiAiNTENANCE
BACKGROUND:
Recenfly one A31O-300 aircraft oxperienced th€ failure of landing gear rett':rction
on uot systems. Aircraft l.andrrd back subsequer*ly upon investigatiorl- both
i-rimit" detec{ors electrical connectors of R/H Bogie Beam were found
disconnec'ted.
Aircraft technical record indicated that hydraulic leak rectification was carrled out
;ifi ih; t;"ximity of electricat connictors on the R/H bogie beam just SIX
r"nting. prior to the incidont. lt is undErstood that during leak rectifi'cation
i*Jf"&*.* of O, ring) th€ rernoval of above 3aid conn€c{ors was not nrrquired
iui to gain ample clearance for performing the job the connectors were relttotred.
It is su-speded that the r€m,rval / installation of connectors was considen;d less
important by the concemeri A:rospace personnel and the job was perilrrned
wlinout asking Avionics Englineer to inspec't the area'
The inc identwasAVo|DAELE,hadtheEng ineer rec t i f y ing theh.ydrau l i c |eak
""i.a tn Avionics Engineerr to check th€ area for any anomaly after hydraulic
leak rectification.
t t i s , there fore ,adv isedto ; r t ! ccncemed, tha twhenever rec t i f i ca t ion isdon,e inany araar it should be checked by the other trade Engineer for any abnorrnality
aif,r?ompretion cf work i.e. if the pIimary work is lreing don€ by rhe Aerospace
ingineer'and after the completion of the job, an ontry should be rairs€d in
refiJant documents by the Aer,)space Engineer asking the Avionics Engin€er to
check th€ ar€a for any abnormality and vice vetsa'
k q '*r/r*rffit"qrqL'
acAd//oElr4n|o1x2P-1
{)"PIA H:''i:'f['ii3b'iiNo. ,-rt - gtl27t
hsue I -
Doh or-o?-'k?
Pos ----r*-oe-gr-
In thc porll llrcrc hqvc bccn incldcnls d alr'condlilonlng duclruplurc. lnvesllga|lon npvcslcd fhol whenevcr alr'condillonl,ngvsn ond olrcrqfr alr-condfrlonlng pocks src urcd slmultancoutlyfie prasrura and alil|ov ln lhc duct tlsar bcyond llmll: resultlng Inruptvtc d alr-condltlonlng ducls,
I'hfr couscs axlra groundlng lhus rcsulllng ln flnoncial loss lo lheCorporatlon.
Akcroll Englncan dopurled on alrc,oft orc requlrcd lo ansurctbol
oaUt onc gruiglzlco ot alr'condltlonlng is operotcd at t tlma snd
thcna It no rca of pdrs rlrtcn atrcr nildotthrg Ytlt' tt tn
During the last Flight Operation / Engineering CoordinationMeeting the subject point was raised by flt. ops, lnstances werehighlighterj wheri the cockpit-crew cjiii not know the actualtechnical status of the aircraft about a C/F defect which involvedperformance penalties, thus resulting in tast minute discussionand possibly a delay. To avoid this situation following isrecommended.
REGOTIMEI{DATIONS:
Concemed Manager / Aircraft Engineers deputed on theAircraft must go through C/F Pouch, and ensure that C/Fgefects which involve performance and weight penaltieshave been notified to Operafions / Dispatch through M.C.C.
When such C/F defects are rectified / cleared. thisinformation shall be immediately conveyed to FlightOperation / Dlspatch through M.C.C.
Str;ct comoliance is <Jesire:1.
/-*/ ---T-'
1 .
A^UHA,I rtlAD LAIQUE
QCA-7/l 7072K2P- l,N. A"BAIc
+)PIA Gl. c. ADVISORY
IJ'J"*+ 'i *'t--'
TUHATTAD IAIQUECHIEF ENGINEER (OUALITY CONTROL)
QCA-08/1 8072K2/P-rN.ABAtc
Q U A T I T Y C O N T R O L D I V i S I O Nl'1s. @tt Lo.o2 i 27 J
lsrr r -
Dole- lg-of,-gc2-Pog o1 ot or
sttB: PLAGEMENT OF WHEEL CHOGKS
DISGUSSION:I ir Ffrld cn ry Hl s|d 0G sudit0r$ thrt dildild lrrcrfiiroe rre nothffi fdloftd fx t|smill oI mGd choGls. flrt.dl tm Q.G. rdriroriorIr.23f lJ.a 2t.ttltll d b. GII t0 - 0l fitd ll-1&20!l ffi. lldt hrhx no Drfilorr mHcil rd adwno $rilril.I frril Tcn$nrl, ill #rr||$n{ll *rt D.ffi rccomlhlh.
REGOMMENDATIONS:t. Pr.F r, fidrd r||ccl olrocls tnlanily mrde ol firblm or md
3. HGfs lo b ffc.d m th. ru.r 0t t h / ffiE !|s rfis.b inrilmbr to toso nlocl chocls.
{ llcrdltrr. rt rt! $qrld !o in lEunflrrdiil rhffi nrr|rhc.
5. lff M{m d EE[no 0l hiil [oml, stlol clocl$ .ro t0 [s drcrdh frlrl.l kh t ilhr rou scrls
0. lt tlrrur, Drldng U*es to D0 tril af fier lrilFo &0 rircnn.
Suict orilrrcr h $.lictud.
{)"PlA H:'['fl['fri3'6'iiSUB: REPORTING OF INCIDENT /ACCIDENT
At BID( the Tow Bar connected to PIA ASro-Aoo aircraft, was hit bythe Ttrg Maater which rcgulted in a cevere jolt to the aircraft. Theaircraft wa,s cleared for flight after initial inspection by theaccompanying Aircraft Engineers. After two landingc thuddingnoiee started coming from nose wheel steering persictently andfinally the nose landing gear waa replaced. Iluring stripexamination in shop, fixed rod assembly of inner cylinder wasfound out of alignment, resulting in subst ntial financial loss toPIA-
It is alco to be noted that incident was neither logged with thehandling rgent at out station nor it was reported at base. This non-reporting of the incident is a wiolation of the laid down procedures,refer EMPM COM-o4-32. This created a lot of misunderctandingbetween thc handling agency at out station and the Officers whoinvestigrted the incident.
1. It is the prime responsibility of accompanying Engineer orEngineer tlrc transit to fill an incident performa andinform all rcspective Sections including the handling agentinvolved.
z. At foreign stations t'he concerrred PIA reprecentative should becalled upon to wifress the incident and a copy of the report begiven to him.
Strict compliance is decired.
#"*1 'i uHAl l eb uereue
No.ens : qzj2:4lssrr o1y1r22.O7.?k2
Pog0l-of-,-01-
cHrEF EI\TGINEER (QUALITY CONTROL)
qr]|at./22072Qa{tcrtg
$IPIA U:U'fl[V|36'RV10. cEN - 09riz /f,
t$,e 01
ood2:9?:?It -pr,r6 01 of 02
AIRGRAFT CABIN DEFEGTS RE IFICATION
It has been noted with concern that oven after the deploynnent of recenily prornotedAircraft Engineers in cabin Maintenance; the cabin defects siiii remainneglected/unattended. 'fhe same has also been communicated by Foreign TechnicalHandling Agents and also by l,'light Scrviccs pcrsonncl.
open defects in the 'cabin log book' are not only a violation of laid down rules but alsoresult in passenger inconvenience and bring a bad name to the Air l ine.
This situation is arising due to lack of coordination and understandine betweenLine/tsase Maintenance and Cabin Nlaintenrnce Divisions and also al l the- divisionshave their own limitations and reservations. llut this situation cannot be allowed topersist. To bring about an improvement in the system, following actions are requiredto be implemented with immediate elfect.
All cabin defects to be attended/rectified by cabin Maintenance Engineers/staffafter consultatior.r with Line/llase Maintcnance lingir.reer deputed on lle concernedaircraft.
After accomplishrnent of the job, the certification shall be done as follows:-
(i) rN GABTN MATNTENANGE LOG
(a) cabin Maintenance -I'echnician to sign in right bottom of 'Action item'with
P.No.(b) Cabin Maintenance Engineer to certify if qualified on that equipment.(c) Line/Base Maintenance Engineer to certify if cabin Maintenance Engineer
is not qualified on that cquipment. cabin Maintenance Engineer to sign inright top of signature column with p.No.
Cont 'd Page. . . . . .02 .
J4I'PIA U:U'ft'ii36'RVf t2- r - .
No.I$,e
Dob 19-09-2k2
prv,a 02 to 02
(ii) rN WoRK-SHEET / ARO
(a) Cabin Maintenancc Technician to sir lr-r in .Tech / Mech, column.(b) Cabin Maintenance Engineer to cert i fy i f qual i f ied on that equipment.(c) Line/Base Maintenance Engineer to certify if Cabir.r IWaintenar.rcc Dngincelis
not qualilied on that equipmcnt. cabin Mai'tena.ce llngince' to'iign inEngineer's Column and will write his p.No.
Note: whcre P.No is to be writ ten then letter 'p' must be writ ten before numbers.
Strict Compliance :urd adhcrencc to the procedures are desirerl.
l-r(4''-MU{IID ABBAS KHAN SUMBAI^Ol'TG: CII IEI ' ENGINEBR (OUAt,tT'. l , CON'IROL)
Q( / \ I l l ' - t ' N .A .AA tc
\ " " ' ' - v J
C]dP - - O27 / )7nNo.-- l o / /
. g3PlA H:'i:'flt'ii36'ililisr€ 01
uole _. 12 .2y ,2
^ 0 1ros. of 01
UR|ECT:- 8747-ZAA RUDDER PCU RAM ROD RETAti',lERCOLLAR HOUSING BROKEN.
CKGe@ntly PIA B74T-200 night stopped at LHR due hydraulic Ieak from upper rudder pCU.uring investigation it rvas reveaied that PCU Ram Rad Retainer Collar Housing broken
USSeral similar induslry cases were observed and pubiished rn /SAR'S and Sevice Lefter tst I
be[ieve that fztigue cracks have been rewfted in the aduator housing assembly at thethread for the exwrnally threaded ing- The extematiy thread ing holds the rod end
ainer and the snubber ring in the housing. Hene fl is esfab/lsned that these crac(s are theof high snubbing laads reaching in the root af (hreads or the thread undercul frllet radius.snubbing loads are caused by unnecessary high rate boftoming of the actuator during
nd Pre-Flight Check or mainlenanae.
cTtot{:it is requtred to move rudder pedals duing ground maintenance or pre-Flight Chee\,
Refer Maintenanee Manual, 27-21-00, Page 501, whereis cautioned fo observe minimum time to move Rudder one ful! cycle rs nof /ess lfianseconds. Damage lo tudder Fov/er contro{ unit may occur.
---------
nce:747-SL-27-16, Dated May 6th, 1977. Maintenance Mdnual 27-21-00 page S7i.
c c m p I i a n c e r's clesired.
t , . '
#rPlA U:'i:'flt'fri36'RV
MURID ABBAS KHA}I SUMBALCHIEF ENGINN,ER (OUALITY CONTROL)
QCA/070403/P-2
lssue
Pefs 08.04.2k3
01
Poge 01 of 01
SEALING OF GOGKPIT IVINDOWS OT{ AIRBUS A-3OO/A-3{O
BAGKGROUilD:Cockpit windshiekl is one of thc most expensive components having *ON
CONDIT|ON" maintcnancc philosophy. In the recent past, therc have been threcwindshield failures and subscqucnt rcjcction duc itcm beyond cconomical rcpair'
In the most recent incident, AP-BEG aircraft was grounded at OSLO for threedays due Captain windshield outer pan shattered, result ing in a huge loss offoreign exchange to the corporation.
INVESTIGATION / DICUSSION:A thorough investigation has rcvcaled that thc window pan shattered due to ingrcss ofmoisture from windshield pcripheral area. These areas rre sealed after windowinstallation and ifsealing found damagcd during C-Check inspection.
Basic cause ofcockpit window failurc is attributcd to improper aerodynamic sealing i.e.use ofnon-standard scalant such as RTV.
REGOMMENDATIONS:
A. Onc Timc lnspcction of A-300 / A-310 ncct Cockpit windows' scaling should bccarricd out
It. Spccifictl aenrdynamic scalant dcstribed in AMM Ch:20-31-00 Page-l4. [MILs-lll733 TYPE-Il (l'R-I436-(,;l| % 2)l shoukl ltc uscd.
C. l)uring Chcck-C grounding thorough inspcction shoultl hc pcrformed asdcscribctl in Card No.56l ll)-03-1.
D. l{TV must not bc used for window scaling, as it is a fillcr compound and not ascalanL
{)"PlA H:' i:'f[Vi36'RVS t r l i . l l i ( l ' l ' : - l .oss ( ) t r ( ) t t ( ; , \N t7 . , \ ' ( )N , \ t . ( ' , ( )N l t t ( ) t . t . t , ] )
l )O( l t IN I la N l S / i \1 , \N t r , \ l ,S
I t l ras bcct t o [ tsc tvct l t l t t t cor r t lo ] lcd docrr r r rcr r ls i l r rar r r r : r ls t t l l ' lA l :ng i r rccr i r rg& Nl t r i r r tcn i rncc ( ) r 'gurr iz t r t ior r arc los l [ r r ' l ro ldcr -s o l ' l l rc t locr r r r rcn l . I l isc t t l l l l t l ts izc i l t l l t t t s t tc l t r loc t t t t tc r r ts r rusI bc kc l t l i t r a su lc ar r r l : ;ccr1c p l i rcc .l l l i i r rg i r l l n lc i tsu lcs lo l ) r 'c \c l l l l l rc l i l r l r t l ror r r r rsp l i rcc t r rcr r l
I t t c l t scs t r ' l t c t t s t tc l r co t t t lo l l c i l l )oc r r r r rc r r l s i lV lan tu t l s t r re r r r i s l r l l cc r l e1 lps { [ r tpc t so t r i r r n l rosc r l rn rc l l r c i loc r r r l c r r l s r ,n l t r ru l r l l r i t s [ rcc r r i ss r rc r l o r . l t c , ' s l rc i st ' csPot ts i t r l c l t l t t l t c c t ts t t tdv o l t l r c cor r t lo l l c r l c loc t r r r rc r r l . , i r t r l l [ , c i ssLrc t l l r"Cn tJ - l l ( )N I . l r l ' l ' t r l t " a t t t l r t cop l ' o l ' i t . ' ' i l l l r c p lacc t l i r r l r i s i l r c i pc rsor ra lrccolt l , t .
; \ l l ho l r l c rs o f o rg l tn iz : t l ion i t l con t ro l l c r l r locunrcn ls / r r ranua ls a r -e adr i sc r lto l le vc r " r ' carc f r r l rcg : r r r l i t rg l l r c cus lo t l r , o l thc r locunrc r r l s .
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Visual check to ensure that there are no implcts on the fuselase around the Pi(ot-Staticprobes/ports & alpha probes.Leak check ofPitot Static System.Frmctional check of Air Data System.Fmctional check of ATC Trans;pcrnder System.Cheok to confirm that no signrfi,rant extemally visible skin irregularities (damage, corrosion,cracking etc) exist ext€mally. which can e{fect skin waviness.Undet CPCP program, a swveillance inq)ecti,n of the fuselage extemal surfaces and thefuselage lower lobe intenor is to be perfl:rmed. Thrs includes examining the skjn panels,splices, joints, frames, stringers, sheer ties and skin cutouts.Subsequent to above, if any damage is found, rJo necessary repairs as per FIM AT-A 34 andSRM ATA 51.Waviness check around the probes. (Refer to SJIM ATA 53 for the allowable damages).New Task Cards regarding "Low-Range l-eak Test of Pitot-Static System" have als,r beenintroduced on A300B4 and 8737-300 aircraft as follows:-
a. A300M aircraft: Call # 34-11-00iR! SM at every 5A check'b. 8737-300 aircraft: Cad # 34-11-10/RVSM at every 4A check.
All concemed shall ensure strict compliance to laid do\m procedures & requirements.
.E'ffective November 27 , 2003 , RVSlvl o peratron o1' airc raft between flight level 290 and 4 I 0 (bothk:vels inclusive) has been implementeri in MID/AS IA P ACIFIC region, including Pakrstan. This hasittcreased enroute capacity & provides ntore fuel-efiicietrt altitudes & routes for operations.
pIA fleet (except F-27,IDHC-6) is Rrr'SV compliant. flowever, as international ht:ight monitoringagencies like EURO CONTROL & NIEL'1\4A cons,:anti / keep a watch on RVSM compliance statuscf aircraft so it has become imperative to religirusl)' adhere to the laid down rt:quirements ofcontinued Airworthiness compliance ibr. RVSM opr:ratir:n.
lrcTIONs REOUIREp:
I;ollowing work is required as per MPD must be perftirmed with more vigilance to ensure RVSMc ornpliance at all times.
vl l l .
g.rPlA U:U'fl[Vi3'6hliBACKGROUND:
Recently during flight aircraft AP-BFY #2 Engine Shut Down due toheavy fuel leak suspected by the Crew. During investigation excessivefuel leak observed on lower tube connection at fuel flow transmitterplate seal Part No. H3-1016-2.
INVESTIGATION:
Prior to this flight HPSOV of #2 Engine was replaced due to indicationproblem. While replacing HPSOV, tube connected to fuel flowtransmitter was removed for ease of installation. During re-installation oftube at fuel flow transmitter end, one bolt of incorrect P/No. AS21515being more in length did not hold the plate seal of fuel flow Tx. properlyseal deformed which finally blew away during flight and resulted inexcessive fuel leak and subsequent IFSD.
RECOMMENDATION:
l- Through this Q.C. Advisory all Engineers are advised to bemore vigilant to use conect Part Numbers.
2- Every effort be made to complete the job in same shift in orderto avoid any ambiguity arises due shift personnel change over.
3- Removed components along with their hardware must beproperly tagged so as to avoid unintentional swapping ofhardware.
+ Maintenance manual procedures must be followed anduncalled for removal of adjacent components for ease ofinstallation be avoided.
5- lf at all it became necessary to remove any adjacentcomponent for ease of installation, than each step ofperformed inaintenance must be documented.
No. 284/7Ta1
Doh 14-02_i2k5
Pon o'1 of or
lsue
Ii
I
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C O N T R O L D I V I S I O N
- . . l_1Fr .. :i..i -
285 I 7t_01
bif,
pop 03-05-2k5
PoS 01 OF 01
i.b.O U A T I T Y
Gl. c.$,PtA ADVISORY0 l
Background
|ecen!v. aP;BFX (Equipped with RB21r-524 Engines) grounded in Base Mainrenanccfor scheduled 'c' check maintenance. Engine #l was removed in compliance with #1pylon inspection task card. During removai of #1 engine. all four aft mount bolts werefound loose.
Findings
Post engine removal inspection revealed the ibliowing:
l Scoring in bolt holes inner diameter in mount t'itting at engine and pyron as well.1. Frening at shank outer diameter of two mount boitsl3. Stepped damage at aft mowrt shear pin.
Investigation
Investigatisn into subject matter disclosed that the run on torque of #l engine aft mountnuts was less than the minimum rimit cited in AMM 71-00-02. page 435, p; -s.c anJ inRB2l1-524 engine change sheets as well.
Conclusion
self tocking capability check_of engine mo.nt Nuts play a pivota.l role in providingprolong_ on wing engine life. procedure to do rhis ctreci ii cedned in evrvr c'rrapte, -TremovaUinstallation procedure ofevery engine in pIA Fleet.
All Aircraft Engineers and rechnicians 'rvolved in engine repracement are advised tostrictly comply with each and every step of engine .r--ouuyi*tr ution proced,re inrelevant A.MM ChaprerTl. Aciherence to the AMM procedure while doing anymaintenalce task on prA aircraft enswes the e'ality and cost effective ,nurn,""^un"E
--
Strict compliance in rhis regard is required by all concemed.
pL-**
ENGR M. TARIQ FAROOQChief Engineer (Quality Systems)
$"PlA H:'['ibVi36'RV10. :86 , '3: - 0t '
l s . r o l -
Dde 03-06 2k5
?oge 0l of 0l -
BACKGROUND:
A PIA 8777-2O0ER arrcraf i recent ly encountereo Main Landing Gear Whee, Brake f t rewhich was sixth of i ts nature. Posi incident prelrminary invest igat ion revealec that ei lhe:excessive grease in wheei bear ing or heat shield ceramic paper mater ial soaking withcleanino soivent. was the cause whicn iead to smoke i f i re.
INVESTIGATION:
PIA Engineerang Team examineC € \ /heei Assembl ies in the Tire Ba; shop ancadCit ionai 2 Wheel Assembiv removec from a serviceable aircraf i tn Line lMalntenancefor cr i t ical assessrneni. Same were founc wrth ceftain amount of excessive orease.
RECOMMENDATION:
In order to avor i such occurrences in future-wheel ' t i re assembiy shop shal lensure appl icat;cn of grease on bearing rol lers & i ts outer race. bY using thepalm method as recommended in t i re BF GOODRICH CMM. (do not appi lexcessive grease as this is also a potent iai f f fe hazard )
After removing the heat shields (qty 03) f rom the wheel hub assembly. the),wi l r not be dipped into anv l iquid for the purpose of c leaninq or looseningthe din gr i t whicn accumulales on these heat shields af ter normal operat ion.Preference wi l be given for c leaning them with steam, (per CMMrecommendat ions j bui i i tn is is not possible. then hand cleaning with a l ight i rmoisi c loth with apcrovec PD-680 chemical maybe used. However. pr ior tornstal iat ion or these heai snields in the wheel assembly. i t is tc be ensurecthat the cjouble wal led heat snield assembly, which contains glass wooilnsuiat ion. is nci soakec with the chemical usec for th is c leanrng procedureThis can easi ly be conf i rmed by weighing the shielc on a commercial scalethe weight shoulC be approxlmately. 900 grms or 2 Lbs. In case the weight isgreater than this. then the) ' should not be instal leC and should be kepi asidefor dr i r ing. ln no case shouic a shield be instal led which contains any l iquicchemical as this is a potent ia FIRE HAZARD which has been pract ical l ! '
experienced on these 8777 -20OER aicrafl.
L ine Maintenance Staff to ensure that no grease is appl ied tc the axle dur lnEwheei assem5l) instal iatron Any excess i extruded grease in the vic ini t ) ' " of
the wheel bear ing shoulc ce cleaned pr ior to instal lat ion of a whee assemblv
Str ict complrance to the aSove ts requirec to el iminate wheer brake f i re lncidenaes l t
future./'
/'rt't--/-_-tlb\r.
(Engr. M. TARIO FAROOQ)Cnief Engineer (Quali tY SYStem )
3-
287 | 3 4 - 1 0No.
{).PIA H:'U'ftVi3'6'RV
p\sf-1-q61"
ENGR. M. TARIQ FAROOQChief Eneineer (Oualib, Systems)
0tlrgcl'!r*c 13-06-2k5
loge 01 of 0l
ENSURE PROPER CONNEGTIVITY OF PITOT/ STATIC LINES ONDADC#2 WHILE REMOVING IRU.1 ON 8737.300 AIRCRAFT
BACKGROUND:
A 8737-300 Aircraft returned from flight due erroneous reading on Altitude, Airspeed and Vertical speed indicators on F/O side instruments. Troubleshootingrevealed Pitot Static lines (Quick Attach Detach Connector) were found notconnected to Digital Air Data Computer # 2 in E & E compartment.
INVESTIGATION:
In the course of investigation, rt was revealed that the PitoV Static lines wereremoved to facilitate the removal of IRU # 1. However, this maintenance activitywas not documented and ult imatelv the installations of these l ines wereoverlooked.
In past, various incidents of similar nature have occured because of theundocumented maintenance activit ies carried out on the aircraft.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
In order to preclude the possibil i ty of recurrence of such incidents, al l Engineersare advised that all the maintenance activit ies in general and specif ically theRemoval/ Installation of any componenV subpart of any component must bedocumented prior to performing any maintenance activity. This would ensure thepositive completion of the work on the aircraft.
Strict compliance to the above is required.
HYDRAULIC FAILURE DUE UNDETECTED LEAK BACKGROUND: A B737-300 aircraft landed back after take-off from ISB. Landing Gear selected up, hydraulic System-A low pressure light came on. Hydraulic pressure and quantity also dropped to ZERO .Gears extended manually. On inspection, R/H Main Landing Gear up-line found leaking ,same replaced. INVESTIGATION: On LHE – ISB sector, hydraulic system-A pressure fluctuation defect was reported. Rectification and leak Check was carried out as per reported defect at LHE found satisfactory. Discrepancy existed in performing the leak check as the leak emanated from a hidden area and involved some open-up, which was not carried out RECOMMENDATION: Even a minor hydraulic leak must not be overlooked/ underestimated during Transit Base Maintenance Check which may cause subsequent delay / held up at out-stations The following recommendations should be followed:
1. For any flight reported defect pertaining to hydraulic system i.e. low pressure or pressure fluctuation, make every endeavor to troubleshoot in accordance with guidelines provided in AMM
2. If leak observed from a drain point / hidden area, then carry out further investigation / open –up to pin point the source of leak
3. Recommended inspection procedure should be followed in consultation with AMM for hydraulic leak detection and rectification
4. If leak observed repair / replace the leakage source before next flight. Strict compliance to the above is required.
2 9 1 l G E N - 1 8
0747-216Prvs 01 of 01
INSPECTION OF AIRCRAFT WHEEL ASSEMBLIESIN THE STOCKROOMS
BACKGROUND
During the April 2005 GSAC / EASA Audit, at a stock room the GSAC Auditorpointed out to a Wheel Assembly stored as serviceable stock which was havingvisible signs of conosion. During the close inspection, using inspection lenses, thecorrosion at the tie bolt washers was confirmed.
CORRECTIVE MEASURES TAKEN
During the investigations it was further found that most of the tie bolt washers arerequiring replacement. The visible signs of corrosion were such that any personwhether technical or non-technical having seen the subject wheel assembly wouldhave pointed out the discrepancy. As for the immediate conective action the wheelassembly was removed from stock room and is now being overhauled at wheelshop. Shop personnel were given recurrent training on the relevant subjects andthe inspection processes at the shop was made more stringent.
FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Visual check of the stored wheel assemblies shall be carried out on regularbasis by stockroom personnel.
2. lt is recommended that stock room personnel involved in the storageorocess of serviceable wheel assemblies must report to the Wheel Shop ofPower plant Overhaul Division or respective Quality System ManagerEngineering in cases any abnormality is observed with the stored wheelassemblies.
3. Physical inspection of Wheel assemblies must also be canied out afterevery inter stockroom transfer (Local or Abroad).
Strict compliance to the above is required.
No.
g.rPrA H:'U'fwi3',6hTbsrrDde
01
7fr/,s'
J{t"Pl A QUAL'rYSYSrEMSDrvrsroN
\E)'! . {r.r Q.C. ADVISORY
BACKGROUND
AP-BAO operating PK 604 on 13tn July, 2005 went off the runway at LHE.Lef t Engine propel lers d id not go into ground f i re posi t ion (below 1gdegrees lock position)
INVESTIGATION:
A detail inspection of left hand Engine, revealed that the throtfle controlrod was found disconnected at the Engine Control Box. Control leverbolt and nut were found inside the bottom of Engine Cowl. Split pin wasnot retrieved. The engine was installed 8 days prior to the incident.
Further investigation revealed that the split pin was not installed fromthe very in i t ia l s tage which is the pr imary responsibi l i ty of Shop.
The same remained over looked by Engineer who instal led the Engine aswell as by Aircraft Engineer who carried out double check. Negligence atthree consecutive stages led to the above incident.
REGOMMENDATIONS:
All concerned are advised to follow the laid down procedures religiouslyand give special attention to crit ical areas specially requiring doublecheck.
ftDO NOT SIGN THE WORK WHIGH YOU HAVE NOT DONEI'
Strict compliance to the above is desired.
No: 293 / GEN-15Issuc : 0 lI )arc: t2- l2-2{X}5I )age : I o l l
E$'" PIA QUALITY SYSTEMS DIVISION No ' .294 IGEN- i6j ^ ^ , . ^ n , tr 55UU . t J I
Jate . 17tn February 2C05Page. 1 o f 1
Q,.C. ADVISORY
AiRCRAFT REFUELING
\ rv i th reference to a number oi iecent occurrences / i regularr ; ies regarding fuetuplift, i t is disccuraging to note that these rvere avoidable if proper refuelingprocedures hacj been followed.
it is hereby advised to ail acncernec ,,\ ircrafi lrgineers fo srrictly ccmprvat ; 'Cfa i t n fanUfaCtUfef i 'ecCrnmenCed rraf i rs l i ' rn nr . \ .3 , '1 i . . l r^S a iCng wi th fOi lOWingpc in is wh i le re fue i ing ,
' Befcre start of reiueiirrg ncte dou,'n arnval fuei i iqures frcm master gaugesor measur ing st ick(s) as the case ma; l be. and tctar iz:r f icui-e of therefuel ing eguipment, a lso ensure volunte rreter has been reset to zero.
n Ensure the presence of an appropr iatetv qual i i iec Aircran Engineer dur incret 'uet ing.
n A,ircraft must be refueled skictly as per the figure mentroneC on the fuelindent duly f i l led by operat ions" in case of change in fuel f igqre. same is tpbe rnent icned rvr th reason and sigrred by the operat ing Capiain.
' Current specific g.ravrty of the fuet berng uplifted must b3 verii iec befci 'ethe refuel ing commences.
. Ahy discrepancy obsenred betr.veen the votume of fuet requrred anC thefuei del ivered shoulC be ociniec out to the refueler and r-nent ioned on th;receiot s l ip.
. All precautionS rnust L'e taken to avorrl fuel scll!age
Rernenrber an ovei"-refueled aircraft has to carq/ ncn-ooeratigral fuel wei';htwhich in ium decreases pay-load and atso affects cash flow due acidrtionalexo€nses of extra fuel. Cn the other hand unCer-refrrelec aircrati i .q unsafe as theai'ci.aft snould have sufficient fue! tc safely rcac.: ' l [ntended destinatiorr o(
.a l iernate airport in case cf adiversron"
Consrdering safq,ty and econcrnv of a fl iqht. atl concerrred are adviseci to refuetlf.'e airCrait tO requrred qUanttty ,nentroned On the friel rnCent as Der (n4rrufa,:ti.ri'erreccffrT'iendeC procedure. whenever ril cloubt verifv ex;cl enrcunt of ftrel eirrboarctusing al ternate rTleeris f ike i 'T ' ia. ;gui-rr ,1c ; i ic:<{s)
: i . i c i cc t -np l la r ,ce is {esr r 'ed
BACKGROUND Proper recording of all maintenance activities is the prime responsibility of the person performing the task. It has been observed that dents & scratches on the aircraft skin are either not recorded properly or not recorded at all. The recent example of this malpractice was noted on B737 aircraft AP-BCD Aft cargo door skin during grounding of the aircraft 4A check. A dent was filled with potting compound, and there was no previous record available for the subject repair. This was also highlighted by Senior Airworthiness Surveyor (CAA PAK) during a spot check on the subject aircraft. When the potting compound was removed, skin under the filling was found damaged / cracked. Structural repair was carried out as per SRM. Filling of dents beyond SRM limits is an irresponsible practice and gross violation of SRM requirements. RECOMMENDATION:
1. All structural repairs carried out either in Line Maintenance or Base Maintenance must be recorded properly with reference to relevant SRM.
2. Repairs requiring re-inspection at specified intervals should be clearly recorded and marked as Logged Entries.
3. All dents or scratches should be properly evaluated for damage as per SRM and then repaired. Accurate dimensions of the damaged area with type of repair embodied must also be mentioned on the relevant records.
4. Fillings of within limit dents as per SRM must also be recorded on relevant documents for later reference.
5. All cracks on fuselage skin must be repaired as per SRM. Strict adherence to the above-mentioned recommendations is required.
CONTROL OF CONSUMABLE MATERIAL LIST
BACKGROUND: During the last concluded GSAC surveillance audit, it was pointed out by the GSAC auditors that the consumable materials list available at one of the shops was not controlled. Windshield cleaner WWF-2 kill frost was listed as an alternate to engine penetrating oil CP 2162. RECOMMENDATIONS: To avoid repetition of such finding in future, following recommendations are to be followed by concerned maintenance personnel of all sections:
1. Manager Engineering Quality Systems for the respective shop is required to ensure that a list of consumable materials used under the maintenance scope of shop is available with concerned Manager Engineering Production.
2. Where required, the list shall contain the part number of the alternate
being used.
3. The list is required to be accepted by concerned Manager Engineering
(QS) and controlled by respective Manager Engineering (Production). 4. All concerned maintenance personnel are required to consult and use the
consumable materials from the approved list only. Strict compliance to above is required.
HUMAN FACTOR ISSUES DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY BACKGROUND: During the last concluded GSAC surveillance audit, it was pointed out by the GSAC auditors that several human factor issues need to be addressed, in order to avoid human errors during maintenance activities. The human factor issues recorded during the audit were:
1. Static ports were protected using grey tape and no red streamer / flag or appropriate equipment (placard) was used.
2. Screws were found on the dock next to the elevator without any identification. 3. Panels were found partially installed and no identification was provided to alert
maintenance personnel. RECOMMENDATIONS: Once again as a reminder to all concerned, following maintenance procedures and standard practices are mandatory for each person involved in any type of maintenance activity on aircraft / aircraft components. Deviations from these procedures could hazard the safety of aircraft systems causing unnecessary delays, incidents and even accidents. 1. Whenever an aircraft is parked for longer ground time, the Pitot and Static ports
should be blanked using proper covers. These covers must have red streamers / flags attached (having statement Remove before Flight written on them) in order to be visible to all concerned, to ensure removal before the release of aircraft.
2. Whenever items including panels, screws, fittings etc. are removed from the
aircraft or installed partially, proper identification tags as sampled in AMP 2-1 must be attached to them. Unidentified aircraft items must be considered as an unairworthy item and must not be reinstalled on aircraft.
Strict compliance to the above is required.
.*{Fc"
OUALITY SYSTEMS DIVISION I .Jo: 301lssue: () lI )a tc : l3 - l2 -2 {Xf6Itage: I oi I
Q.G.ADVISORYINTERFERENCE ON UHF GUARD CHANNEL DUE TO
UNAPPROVED TESTING OF ELT
Deputy Chief Engineer (HR and Tr'aining) has beenadvised to schedule Training of certifyingstaff on the subject LRU.Quality Systems (Avionics) Base maintenance is cantrolling removal and installatiott of [-LTcontrol panel through Aircraft Repair Orders (AROs) to arrest possibility of inadvertet,ioperation. D.C E (aS) North has'also been advised to follow sintilar practice on aircta{tgrounded for maintenance at lSB,
' '
Further to this it is emphasized that the tost of'ELT of:any type is to be carried cut only byadequately trrined staff, and in.accordande with a'pprbved, maintenance data
Strict compliance is desired,. :
--i-- }. r '\ri
{ Atr.:rJ A\j1^-2(n\ l( L;-{-t.^. tAvl i l ) sARl)Al l I( l lANCHIDF ENG.INETI{ (QUALITY SYSTE[1].
g"P-IA
BACKGROUND: '
UHF channel "Guard" is being used is a distress signal all over the world to help th'e civil antlmilitary aircraft / ships in emergency to provide timely search and rescue facility 1o save h,.lmanlife and equipment.
Aviation industry utilizes Emergenc-y:Locator Transrlitter (ELT) equipment for sencling disfresssignal on this "Guard" in case of accidents to assist search and rescue party in their operation.
Occasional unapproved testing of this equipment has been reported by concerned authorities an(lit is desired that awareness level of the staff on the subject malter should be raised io avoidrecurrence of such acts.
Operation or self test of ELT transmits distiess signal which can only be disoritit inated as'teslsigna/' if carried out for specified duration within the allotted time, lf a test of this equipmert iscarried out in a manner other than spe'cifieO by the apprgved rjatir, lhe trrnsmission is construeCas an actual "distress signa/" and results in ar undue alert call to the concerned authorities irnijwastage of time and valuable resources otherwise.alloqated to save human li{e.
Accordingly following steps have been.'initiated to arrest thg issue of inadvettent lestinq antl larrkof awareness to consequences of such tests.
' Subject Quality Control advisory ls issued for the awareness of all concerned,. Chief Engineers Base and Line Maintenance have been requested to include the subject
matter in recurrent training sessiori'of all technical.stdf{.'
g'RlA a.';;uilo*'BACKGROUND
There have been cases when Starler' fiom different Aircrafls removcti on srrari "\,letalParticles Found on NICD" in both Line / Base Maintenance. The opcrator / E-rrgirrcersupon checking the N4CD plug on Starters and finding rnetal particlcs, dcclarcs tfio start(rrsas unseiviceable. However rvhen tlrese startels are reccived in shon {br dcfcctrectification, No Metal Particles is found.
INVESTIGATION:
The possible cause of thc atrove is that cithcr thc particlcs / chips alc cliscalrlcti dLrlirrgthis activity, or thc N4CD Plug is cleancd as a geireral practice by thc opcrators in I_inc /Base Maintenance. Dtte to losing thesc Metal l)articlcs, the reportcd dcl'cci corrltl nr.rt lrcascertained r'confit'rncd by the shop. Component IVlaintenance Nlanual calls for circcl<inqthc size / ditnetrsiotts of tlrcse particles to detcrnrine the extent or work to bc carrio(l ott aishop level lnaintenallce.
REGOMMENDATION:
I t is t 'ccottr tnct tdcd t l rat ot t c lc:h MCi) chcr:k rr l l , iuc / I lusc, l l rc ruclal l l i r r l ic lcs i r rc nol r i ,bc r l iscart lcd by thc opcrators an( l lhc plug is to l rc i r rstal lcd l rack orr to t l r r : s lar lc ls i l "AsIt Is Coudition", so that Shop Enginccrs could confinn the reportt:d clclect luuldetennine the cxtent ofrepair work that is required to be carried or"rt as pcr Cllll\4.
56; ;.fri.,--zllsl;ue: IDate: l9-01-2007Page: I ol l
*-F{r"PE A ouALrrYsYSrEMsDrvrsroN
K/) ' l L1 Q,G.ADVISORY-V Pori. t"nlntcr-rElrDnir l
BACKGROUND
During SAFA inspect ion i t had been pointed oul by CAA that condit ion of LRRAantennas instal led on aircraf t are not wi thin l imits. Inspecl ions were carr ied out ofAntennas inslalled on aircraft and those received in Shop respectively.
OBSERVATION
LRRA antennas are only painted once dunng manufaclur ing under a very preciousprocess with a stenciled warning 'DO NOT PAINT". Repaint / rework of lhese anlennasunder any other process can downgrade their performance.
RECOMMENDATION
To avoid such situation in future, following recommendations are to be followed byconcemed maintenance personnel of al l sect ions:
1. Protect LRRA antennas prior to washing of lhe aircmfl. (Avoid direct pressure flowof cleaning agents on lhe antennas surface).
2. During aircraf t painl ing i t is preferable lo remove al l LRRA antennas, i f removal notpossible then protect antennas surface and edges.
3. l f fo l lowing defaul t(s) exhibi ls then antenna musl be serr i : for Shop check.a. Rust on connecto r .b. Conosion / Corrosion tracks / scratches within acl ive area.c. Painl f laking of f outside or within acl ive area.d. Antenna entirely or parlially repainled inside aclive area.e. Mount ing direct ion mark on internal or exlemal s ide of anlennas not,r is ib le.f . Protect ive f iber cei l ing covers damage or missing or having evidence of oi l
No: 303/ 34-00Issuc: {f lDate: 3 l -01-2007Page: 0 l o f0 l
g'nm ili.'ffi:;i3b*,No: 308 / cEN-28Issue: 0lDate: 16 May 2007Page: 1 of I
BACKGROUND:
In a recent incident on 03-05-2007 while towing Aircraft ATR 42-500, its TOW-BARfractured into two pieces, resulting damage to Aircraft AP-BHN as the person sitting inCockpit failed to apply the brakes.
In a second incident of row-BAR safety pin shear again on 09-0s-2007 which also wentun-noticed and Aircraft continued to be pulled in straight direction.
INVESTIGATION:
Investigation revealed that most of the personnel were not familiar with immediateindication of sheared pin failure which is evident when main towing bolt floats in a bigoval hole (after shear bolt / pin has failed). This is also evident that Aircraft will not befollowing the turning motion of the Tractor / Tug-Master.
RECOMMENDATION:
This is to clarify that in case eri TOW-BAR shear pin is sheared.it is not totally detached /disconnected from Aircraft. Rather it remains attached by the second bolt in an oval holewhich takes the load only when shear pin is sheared and gives an immediate indication ifthe operator observes free play. This is the time to immediately slowdown and stop theaircraft and inspect the shear pin for shear (Photo of Tow-Eiar with oval hole is attachedfor ready reference).
Furthermore all TOWING PERSONNEL are advised to religiously observe towing(Maximum 5 KM per Hour) and avoid abrupt jerks and sharp turnings.
Strict compliance is desired from all concerned.
l ,* . i \ , ' - , tLt - l l l -" ,1(JAVED SARDAR KHAN)CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)Q A ADVISORY # 108/CEN-28 I6052k7
speed
QUALITY ADVISORY No: 313/GEN-33 Issue: I Date: 24-04-08 Page: 1 of 1
ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE
PROPER FILLING OF “REASON OF REMOVAL” ON LRU TRACKING TAG / REPAIR TAG
BACKGROUND: It is being observed that components removed from aircraft are being sent to shop with LRU Tracking tag or Repair Tag with insufficient details of reason of removal. This results in increased, over maintenance and increased component turnaround time which in turn causes undesirable losses to the organization. RECOMMENDATIONS: Reference is made to Quality Advisory 88, dated 11-Aug-91, mandating Airbus Industrie Recommendations, to be followed during routine A310 maintenance. Para (v) states: “Always ensure that the LRU Tracking / Repair (U/S) tag contains detailed information of the defect for which the component is removed. All ground observations and results of BITE messages MUST be included along with the Flight Reported defect. Reverse side of the tag may be used for this purpose. This will greatly reduce overhaul shop workload, help accurate troubleshooting in shop, and reduce component turnaround time.” Scope of the recommendation is extended to all PIA / Customer aircraft components being removed for snag rectification / troubleshooting / MIC. Incase, the component is removed as per MIC sheets (On condition / Hard time), it should be clearly stated as follows: “For shop check as per MIC” LRU Tracking Tag Removal Codes must also be filled in. Strict compliance is desired.
QUALITY ADVISORY
No: 314 /GEN-34 Issue: I Date: 06-06-08 Page: 1 of 3
ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE
SUBJECT: DELETION OF ADVISORIES It has been observed that a number of Quality Advisories are related to either phased-out aircraft type or obsolete company procedures. Following is the list of advisories that fall in above categories and are being deleted with immediate effect:
S/No. Advisory No. Subject Issue Date
(dd-mm-yy)Reason for
deletion 01 05 Cables in Big Pylon Area B707. 31-05-88 B707 Aircraft
02 06 Engine Over Temp. Warning Module Peculiarity on EX CP AIR B747-AP-BCL, BCM, BCN & BCO. 31-05-88 Aircraft phased-out
03 07-A F-27 Pneumatic System Contamination 16-10-88 F-27 Aircraft
04 13 Tightening of Main Generator Terminal Nuts on Part No. 9775-150-4 15-09-88 A300 Aircraft
05 19 Generator Voltage Adjustment of F-27 A/C. 28-09-88 F-27 Aircraft 06 20 F-27 Pneumatic System Contamination 22-10-88 F-27 Aircraft 07 27 APU Starting – A300 Aircraft. 16-02-89 A300 Aircraft
08 37 Procedure for Intimation of T/X Items of ISB Based Aircraft. 29-06-89 Procedure is changed
11 48 Trouble Shooting of Defects CF6 Engine Failure to Shut With Fuel Lever Control on A300 30-11-89 A300 Aircraft
12 51 Adjustment of Spoiler Position T/X on A300 Aircraft A300 Aircraft 13 52 Burning Smell in the Cabin of AP-ALW 18-12-89 F-27 Aircraft 14 54 Smoke Emission from Glare Shield Panel. AP-ALW 23-01-90 F-27 Aircraft
15 56 Spurious Smoke Warning During Flight on A300 Aircraft. 26-03-90 A300 Aircraft
16 60
Repeated Defects of NLG Red Light Remain ‘ON’ After Retraction on AP-ALW in the Month of March’ 90 due Steering System Follow Up Mechanism Malfunction.
53 197 F27 Fire Extinguisher Handling Procedure. 25-06-96 F-27 Aircraft 54 201 Physical & Metal Fitness of AME(S) Air Safety
Circular No. 61 10-10-96
Addresses Air safety circular
QUALITY ADVISORY
No: 314 /GEN-34 Issue: I Date: 06-06-08 Page: 3 of 3
ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE
55 213 Damage to Wheel Brake on A-300 A/C due
Missing Spacer 10-06-97 A-300 Aircraft
56 214 Precaution While Working on A300 Nose Landing Gear
11-06-97 A-300 Aircraft
57 217 A300 Main Cargo Door Operation in Case of Yellow Hydraulic System Failure/Qty Loss
01-10-97 A-300 Aircraft
58 230 Trouble Shooting of Pitot / Static Defect F-27 16-06-98 F-27 Aircraft 59 231 Hard Time Control of Components 19-11-98 Procedure is changed 60 235 Improper Greasing of F27 Accessory Gear Box
Drive Shaft 02-12-98 F-27 Aircraft
61 237 Use of Proper Washer During Corrector Motor Bell Crank Installation.
63 248 Aileron Trim Tab Control Switch Installation. F27 Aircraft
29-09-99 F-27 Aircraft
64 275/GEN-08 Introduction of “Component Shop Out Report” Proforma.
07-08-02 Component shop out Proforma is changed
65 27-50 A300 Flap System Torque Tube Damage 25-11-02 A-300 Aircraft 66 280/GEN-11 Withdrawal of Component Work
Package/Continuation Sheets. 21-01-04 New component work
package is in use 67 283/GEN-14 Process of Using Parts Removed From An A/C
Component For Another A/C Component. 10-09-04 MOE L 2.5
68 292/GEN-14 Process of Using Parts Removed From An A/C Component For Another A/C Component
05-09-05 MOE L 2.5
BABAR KAMAL MUMTAZ CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)
QUALITY ADVISORY No: 315/GEN-35 Issue: II Date: 18-11-08 Page: 1 of 1
ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE
COPIES OF TECHNICAL LOG SLIPS FROM CUSTOMER AIRCRAFT
This Quality Advisory updates and supersedes Quality Advisory No. 315 / GEN35 Issue-I on the same subject. BACKGROUND: Proper record keeping of all maintenance activities performed on aircraft / components is a mandatory regulatory requirement. However, at times, lapses are observed either due negligence or due internal communication failures. During recent external third party Audit, conducted by Quality Assurance Department of a PIA Engineering & Maintenance customer, copies of log slip pages for transit checks were not found archived with the Line Maintenance Division. ANALYSIS: On detailed review it was revealed that the copies of log slip pages being removed at Karachi line Maintenance are transferred to Maintenance Operation Center for invoicing purpose, and are not being archived at Engineering for any period. RECOMMENDATIONS: To avoid recurrence of such audit objections, Line Maintenance Aircraft Engineers certifying customer aircraft, under any approval other then PCAA, are required to positively ensure that relevant copies of Technical Log Slips are detached before departure and handed over to LM planning. These records shall remain archived for a period of three months at Line Maintenance Planning, before handing over to the concerned contracts section under Maintenance Operation Center. The cyclic archiving shall be for the last three months at Line Maintenance means at any time during the records review Quality Assurance shall be able to look at the last three months customer record at Line Maintenance. Archiving of Major Check documentation shall be done in accordance with the established procedures in CEM and MOE. Strict compliance is desired.
BABAR KAMAL MUMTAZ CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)
ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE NO: 3 16/GEN-36 Issue: I %B P I A ENGINEERING MAINTENANCE QUALITY ADVISORY Date: 04-02-09 Page: 1 of 1
TRAINING DOCUMENTATION FOR EXTERNAL MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
BACKGROLIND:
In order to ensure that the External Maintenance Organizations / Technical Handling Agents for PIA aircraft are conversant with orgar~izational policies and regulatory
' requirements from the PCAA, related to services taken from them, these External I Maintenance Organizations / Technical Handling Agents are required to be provided
wlth current organizational procedures and relevant regulations.
Existing processes are requiring Deputy Chief Engineer (Rotable Planning) to ensure that company procedures and their subsequent revisions are provlded to external maintenance organizations/ Technical Handling Agents as soon as contracts are
I finalized with them. However, the process is required to be documented within the organizational procedures.
ACTION REQLIIRED:
Deputy Chief Engineer (Rotable Planning) shall ensure that each External Maintenance Organization / Techn~cal Handling Agent for PIA aircraft is provided with latest procedure manuals (CEM I MOE / AMP). Records of dispatch and receipt of above training documentation for External Maintenance Organizations / Technical
, Handling Agents shall be maintained at Deputy Chief Engineer (Rotable Plann~ng) office.
Dispatch of documentation may also be carried out using PIA lntranet facility, where required documents are made available on the Intranet. However, such transfers shall also be kept in records.
Furthermore specific training sessions shall be arranged, if substantial differences are identified between PIA Engineering & Maintenance processes and processes of External Maintenance Organizations I Technical Handling Agents during initlal assessment or an audit I evaluation as per check list no. PINIQA-CLIOI Rev.00.
1
, REMARKS:
, Organizational procedures and responsibilities shall be amended in next revisions of i a ~ ~ l i c a b l e documents to include the actions desired bv this Advisorv.
BABAR KAMAL MUMTAZ CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)
ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE No: 3 17/GEN-37 Issue: I 3 P IA ENGINEERING L MAINTENANCE QUALITY ADVlSO RY oate: 04-02-09 Page: 1 of 1
INTIMATION OF RECURRING DEFECTS TO FLIGHT CREW
, BACKGROUND: I
I I In order to minimize troubleshooting time / number of rectification attempts, for defects
arising during line operations of PIA aircraft, repetitive defects and defects showing recurring nature are being analyzed at Technical Services (Line Maintenance). These repetitive defects are also being discussed during daily morning brief to ensure that other relevant departments, such as Flight Operations, are made aware of such recurrences.
However, ~t is observed that operating crew of particular aircraft remain unaware of any recurring defect at times due to undocumented nature of the process.
- ACTION REQUIRED:
Technical Services (Line Maintenance) upon identifying a repetitive defect I defect showing recurring nature shall evaluate such defect for intimation to Flight Crew.
Technical Services Engineer (concerned) shall raise 'Technical Services Requirement' for Line Maintenance, clearly specifying 'REMARKS' to be made in Technicai Logbook of particular aircraft for the awareness of Flight Crew.
Upon receiving such TSR, Aircraft Engineer (Line Maintenance) concerned shall make specified remarks in "Attention to Crew Notes" of applicable Technical Logbook. The closed TSR shall then be returned to Technical Services Engineer (concerned) for accomplishment intimation.
Same process shall be followed for removing the remarks from "Attention to Crew Notes" made with respect to repetitive defects.
L
REMARKS:
Organizational procedures and responsibilities shall be amended in next revisiorls of applicable documents to include the actions desired by this Advisory.
BABAR K A M A ~ MUMTAZ CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)
BACKGROUND: CAA (Pakistan) has shown deep concern on late submission of licenses for extension in Airworthiness Directorate. ACTION REQUIRED: It is obligatory for each individual to submit his license for endorsement by PCAA, in QA secretariat on utmost priority but not later than 15 days after announcement of oral examination result. In future, no AME license will be accepted for extension after allowed time unless time relaxation is permitted by Chief Engineer (QA) in genuine cases. Moreover, issuance of letter to PIA finance department, for the payment of endorsement allowance, will only be made after receiving AME license booklets for onwards submission. Strict compliance is required by all concerned.
Engineering Procedures Manual (EPM) shall be developed by each division of PIA Engineering & Maintenance. Chief Engineer (concerned) shall ensure that contents are in conformance to the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA) requirements and must not be in contradiction with organization procedure detailed in CEM and MOE. Each EPM and its revisions shall be distributed as per distribution list (Engineering Procedures Manual Part 1-4.3). Each EPM hard copy shall remain a controlled document. APPROVAL AND DISTRIBUTION OF EPMAPPROVAL AND DISTRIBUTION OF EPMAPPROVAL AND DISTRIBUTION OF EPMAPPROVAL AND DISTRIBUTION OF EPM::::
1. Chief Engineer (concerned) shall submit two copies of respective EPM and its subsequent revisions to Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance) for review/ approval of contents.
2. Upon approval of the manual or its subsequent amendment, Chief Engineer
(Quality Assurance) shall return one approved copy to Chief Engineer (concerned). This master copy shall remain in record of Chief Engineer (concerned).
3. Chief Engineer (concerned) shall make one copy of approved EPM and send it
to Manager (Technical Publications). Chief Engineer (concerned) shall also provide soft copy of the same in single file PDF format to DCE (Quality Audit) for uploading on PIA website.
4. Manager (Technical Publications) shall archive one copy at Main Technical
Library and make further copies to be distributed in standard format set forth by the organization.
Recently a B777 aircraft AP-BGJ operating PK-228 returned to bay after a takeoff abort at Dubai due flight crew reporting “On Opening of take off power, Main gear configuration warning came ON”. Previously on arrival at DXB a defect was reported regarding “Status message main gear steering”. The defect was C/F as per B777 Dispatch Deviation Guide (DDG).
DISCUSSIONDISCUSSIONDISCUSSIONDISCUSSION
The DDG reference 32-53-01 of Section 2 requires (a) Main gear steering actuators (PCA) are verified locked in the center position (Deactivation of Steering/locking PCA, AMM Ref; 32-00-00/901: 32-00-50 Task 32-00-50-040-801 Sub Task: 32-00-50-860-001) (b) Main gear steering system is deactivated by opening of Left Power Management Panel CB and installing Safety tag as per AMM 32-00-00/901, 32-00-50 (MG Steering System), Task # 32-00-50-040-801, Sub task: 32-00-50-040-001. Part (b) above of Maintenance action was not performed by Maintenance personnel at Dubai resulting in the aborted takeoff as evident from investigation report.
RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDATION The takeoff abort incident and costly delay could have been avoided had the procedure/ task 32-00-50-040-801 Main landing Gear steering system deactivation and Sub Task 32-00-50-040-001, as called for in DDG, was followed properly and completely. Please also refer our previous QC ADVISORY No 17 Dated 31-07-1988 on the same subject. It is again emphasized that for any defect being carried forward under DDG/MEL, relevant maintenance procedure must be fully applied to ensure compliance with mandatory dispatch requirements prior to releasing the aircraft under MEL. Also all maintenance actions taken must be clearly logged in Technical log with complete details.
DDG instructions are mandatory and all concerned are advised to strictly ensure compliance.
SPOT CHECK BY SPOT CHECK BY SPOT CHECK BY SPOT CHECK BY DDDDEPUTY EPUTY EPUTY EPUTY CCCCHIEF HIEF HIEF HIEF EEEENGINEER NGINEER NGINEER NGINEER ((((PRODUCTION) CONCERNEDPRODUCTION) CONCERNEDPRODUCTION) CONCERNEDPRODUCTION) CONCERNED
BACKGROUNDBACKGROUNDBACKGROUNDBACKGROUND::::
MOE Procedure 2.13 and CEM procedure 6-7 require that Deputy Chief Engineer (Production) concerned shall perform spot checks on daily basis. However during audits, it is revealed that spot checks of different sections were being performed at different frequencies. ACTION REQUIREDACTION REQUIREDACTION REQUIREDACTION REQUIRED:::: The above mentioned procedures are therefore amended to the extent as mentioned below:
1. Deputy Chief Engineer (Production) concerned / Area incharge, not less than Aircraft Engineer shall perform spot check in his/her production area. Frequency may be decided in consent with Chief Engineer (concerned). However one spot check per week must be carried out as minimum.
2. Each spot check must be in relevance to an aircraft / aircraft component under
maintenance at the section. 3. Items to be covered during spot check may include but not limited to:
(a) Availability and Usage of appropriate / recommended safety equipment (b) Progressive maintenance recording (c) Completion of maintenance record in respect of items traceability (d) Availably / usage of required facilities / Tools / Equipment / Material (e) Competence of personnel working on aircraft / aircraft components (f) Human factor issues during maintenance processes
4. Record of last 2 years spot checks with corrective actions shall be maintained with
Deputy Chief Engineer (Production) concerned / Area incharge. It is suggested to use handing over register for such recording. Spot check findings related to Safety and human factor issues shall be forwarded to Technical services Engineering (concerned) and Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance).
5. Corrective actions beyond the scope of Deputy Chief Engineer (Production)
concerned / Area incharge shall be forwarded to Chief Engineer (concerned) for execution.
