Quantum Mechanics is a Non-universal Theory. the Realistic Schrodinger's and Positivistic Born's...

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The quantum mechanics is a non-universal theory.

The realistic Schrodingers and positivistic Borns interpretation of the wave function

Alexey NikulovInstitute of Microelectronics Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences,

142432 Chernogolovka, Moscow District, Russia E-mail: [email protected]

The controversies about quantum mechanics, in the old days and present-day, reveal an inconsis-

tency of understanding of this most successful theory of physics. Therefore it is needed to set forthunambiguously what and how quantum mechanics describes in order to cut down the number ofthe fantasies trying to eliminate the fundamental obscurity in quantum mechanics. In this chapterreaders attention is drawn first of all to a non-universality of quantum-mechanical descriptionsof different quantum phenomena. The realistic interpretation of the wave function proposed bySchrodinger is used at the description of most quantum phenomena whereas the controversies touchon the positivistic interpretation proposed by Born. These controversies are result, in the main, ofthe misinterpretation, proposed by Bohr, of the orthodox quantum mechanics. Most physicists, fol-lowing Bohr, did not want to admit that Born had assumed in fact a mutual causal relation betweenquantum system and the mind of the observer. The EPR correlation is non-local and quantummechanics predicts violation of the Bells inequalities because of non-locality of the mind of theobserver. The quantum postulate and complementarity proposed by Bohr are valid according torather hidden-variables theories than the orthodox quantum mechanics. Measurement is describedas process of interaction of quantum system with the measuring device in hidden-variables theoriesalternative of quantum mechanics. It is shown, that the mutual causal relation between res extensa

and res cogitans, presupposed with the Borns interpretation, results to a logical absurdity whichtestifies against the self-consistency of the orthodox quantum mechanic. This self-contradiction isa consequence of logical mistakes inherent in a new Weltanschauung proposed by Heisenberg for aphilosophical substantiation of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is successful in spite ofthis absurdity and these mistakes because rather the realistic Schrodingers interpretation than thepositivistic Borns interpretation is used at the description of the majority of quantum phenom-ena. The act of measurement and the fundamental obscurity connected with it are absent at thisdescription. But there are other fundamental obscurities which are considered in the last section.

Contents

1. Introduction

2. What is implied with the Borns interpreta-

tion of the wave function?2.1. Measurement might be complete only in

the mind of the observer

2.2. EPR correlation and the non-locality of

the mind

2.3. Violation of Bells inequalities uncovers the

influence of subject on object

2.4. What EPR intended to prove and what

they have proved

2.5. Hidden variables

2.6. Indeterminism of quantum mechanics. The

entanglement of cat with atom states

2.7. Whose knowledge and whose will?

3. New Weltanschauung proposed by Heisen-

berg

3.1. Quantum mechanics rejects the Cartesian

polarity between res cogitans and res extensa

3.2. The notion of the thing-in-itself by Kant

and hidden-variables

3.3. The Kantian a priori character of the law

of causality and quantum mechanics

4. Fundamental mistakes by sleepwalkers

4.1. The quantum postulate and complemen-

tarity proposed by Bohr objectivate observation

4.2. The mass delusion and the idea of quantum

computation

4.3. Two principal mistakes of Heisenberg

5. Fundamental mistakes b ecause of the preju-

dice of the QM universality5.1. The Aharonov - Bohm effects are described

both with the - functions and the wave function5.2. We can believe for the time being in reality

of the moon

6. Fundamental obscurity connected with wave

function usage

6.1. Puzzles generated with the quantum for-

malism

6.2. Experimental results which can not b e de-

scribe with help of the quantum formalism

7. Conclusion

1. INTRODUCTION

Quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful the-ory. It has given rise to revolutionary technologies ofthe XX century. The progress of physics of last centuryare fairly connected with the QM. But John Bell said inhis Introductory remarks Speakable and unspeakable inquantum mechanics at Naples-Amalfi meeting, May 7,1984 that This progress is made in spite of the funda-mental obscurity in quantum mechanics, see p. 170 in
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[1]. This fundamental obscurity as well as QM are re-sult of the proposal by young Werner Heisenberg [2] todescribe observables instead of beables, see these termsin the Bells paper [3]. This proposal to abandon anyattempt to find a unified picture of objective reality hadprovoked the battle between creators of quantum the-ory. Bohr, Pauli, Dirac and others admitted the Heisen-bergs proposal whereas Einstein, Schrodinger, de Broglie

and others rejected the repudiation of the science aim asthe discovery of the real. Schrodinger interpreted hiswave function as a real wave [4] and defended this real-istic interpretation[5]. He tried to replace particles bywavepackets. But wavepackets diffuse[6]. This diffuse-ness contradicts numerous observation. Therefore the in-terpretation of the Schrodingers wave function as prob-ability amplitudes proposed by Born was fully acceptedby most physicists. This positivistic interpretation corre-sponds to the Heisenbergs proposal and just therefore itresults to the fundamental obscurity and mass delusion.Indeterminism, subjectivity, non-locality and vaguenessimplied with this interpretation are enough obvious. Butonly few physicists, Einstein, Schrodinger, de Broglie andsome others worried about these philosophical prob-lems during a long time. Most physicists, as Bell saidstride through that obscurity unimpeded... sleepwalk-ing?, see p. 170 in [1]. Bell worried about this obscu-rity of positivistic QM but even he said: The progressso made is immensely impressive. If it is made by sleep-walkers, is it wise to shout wake up? I am not surethat it is. So I speak now in a very low voice, see p. 170in[1].

But now it is needed to shout wake up[7]. There aresome reasons why it is needed: 1) numerous false pub-lications because of misunderstanding of QM [79]; 2)misunderstanding of the idea of quantum computation[10]; 3) some authors, because of their implicit belief inQM, claim already that it is possible to prove experi-mentally that The moon - a small moon, admittedly -is not there [11]; 4) on the other hand many physicistshave already refused this implicit belief in QM. The moststriking illustration of the fourth reason is the Actionof the European Cooperation in Science and TechnologyFundamental Problems in Quantum Physics [12]. Thefirst aim of research - observer-free formulation of QMwitnesses to perception by numerous participants of theAction MP1006 that no subjectivity can be permissiblein any physical theory. But I should say that only thisperception does not indicate that these scientists have

waked up completely.They have not realized for the present a primary logi-

cal mistake of the sleepwalkers creating QM. Scientistshave in mind always that any physical theory shoulddescribe universally all its subject matters. For exam-ple, everyone believes that the Newtons laws describeuniversally the motion of all object with different mass,from major planets to smallest particles. This belief maybe justified with a universality of the laws governing aunique objective reality. Orthodox QM, in contrast to

all others theories of physics, describes rather differentphenomena than a unique reality. No description of phe-nomena should be universal if they are not considered asa universal manifestation of a unique reality. Thereforeit is logical mistake to think that QM should describeuniversally all quantum phenomena. Nevertheless QMwas developed and interpreted up to now as a univer-sal theory. General confidence predominates that only

the positivistic Borns interpretation but not the realisticSchrodingers interpretation can be valid for descriptionof all quantum phenomena.

This confidence is obviously false. Richard Feynmanin the Section The Schrodinger Equation in a ClassicalContext: A Seminar on Superconductivity of his Lec-tures on Physics [13] stated that Schrodinger imaginedincorrectly that ||2 was the electric charge density of theelectron. It was Born who correctly (as far as we know)interpreted the of the Schrodinger equation in termsof a probability amplitude. But further Feynman wrotethatin a situation in which is the wave function foreach of an enormous number of particles which are all in

the same state, ||2

can be interpreted as the density ofparticles. Thus, Feynman had pointed out that the pos-itivistic Borns interpretation could be replaced with therealistic Schrodingers interpretation at the description ofmacroscopic quantum phenomena, at least. This fact hasfundamental importance because There are two funda-mentally different ways in which the state function canchange [14] according to the Borns interpretation: thediscontinuous change at the observation (Process 1 ac-cording to [14]) and the continuous deterministic changeof state of an isolated system with time according toa Schrodingers wave equation (Process 2 according to[14]). Hugh Everett noted correctly that because of theProcess 1 No way is evidently be applied the conven-tional formulation of QM to a system that is not subjectto external observation and that The question cannotbe ruled out as lying in the domain of psychology [14].But only select few realized this fundamental obscurity inQM in that time. Feynman did not realized. Thereforehe did not attach great importance to the replacement ofthe Borns interpretation by the Schrodingers interpre-tation. Feynman did not understand that the Process 1,and all fundamental problems connected with it, disap-pear at this replacement.

Richard Feynman and Hugh Everett were doctoral stu-dents of the same doctoral advisor - John ArchibaldWheeler. But their conception of QM was fundamen-tally different. Such dissent marks out QM from othertheories of physics. The dissent was from the very out-set of QM. It was observed both between defenders ofQM, for example Heisenberg and Bohr, and its critics,for example Schrodinger and de Broglie. But now thediversity of opinion is unusually wide. Einstein wroteas far back as 1928 to Schrodinger [15]: The soothingphilosophy-or religion?-of Heisenberg-Bohr is so cleverlyconcocted that it offers the believers a soft resting pillow

from which they are not easily chased away, see the cite


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on the page 99 of [16]. The diversity of opinion about QMwitnesses that Einsteins words turned out prophetic: thedissent can be about a religion but our right comprehen-sion must be unified. At least we must believe that it ispossible. Otherwise no science could be possible. There-fore first of all it is important to show that subjectivity,non-locality, indeterminism and vagueness of QM are de-duced unambiguously from the Borns interpretation. It

will be made in the next Section. This positivistic in-terpretation can be valid and understood correctly onlyin a new Weltanschauung proposed by Heisenberg. Thisnew Weltanschauung will be considered shortly in theSection 3. Unfortunately only few scientists have re-alized that the correct understanding of QM demandsthe new Weltanschauung. Both mass delusion connectedwith this lack of understanding and mistakes made byHeisenberg will be considered in the Section 4. Mistakesof other type connected with the misinterpretation ofquantum mechanics an a universal theory will be con-sidered in the Section 5. The fundamental obscurities inquantum mechanics worrying Einstein, Schrodinger, Belland others disappear with the realistic interpretation ofwave function proposed by Schrodinger. But other fun-damental obscurities appear with this realistic interpre-tation. These fundamental obscurities of other type willbe considered in the Section 6.

2. WHAT IS IMPLIED WITH THE BORNS

INTERPRETATION OF THE WAVE FUNCTION?

Feynman wrote [13] when Schrodinger imagined in-correctly that ||2 was the electric charge density of theelectron He soon found on doing a number of problemsthat it didnt work out quite right. Schrodinger had tried

to replace particles by wave-packets

(r) =

dp[A0(p)exp i

Et]exp

i

pr (1)

But this wave-packets spreads in empty space, for exam-ple, when the energy E = p2/2m. Therefore the realwave-packets cannot explain the observations of parti-cle localized in the space, for example particle tracks intrack chambers. Because of this and other defectionsof the Schrodingers interpretation most physicists hadaccepted the Borns interpretation. Most of they strideunimpeded through the nonsense that the wave-packetscan be localized only under influence of the mind of theobserver.

2.1. Measurement might be complete only in the

mind of the observer

Feynman wrote [13] that Born had proposedvery dif-ficult idea that the square of the amplitude is not thecharge density but is only the probability per unit volumeof finding an electron there, and that when you do find the

electron some place the entire charge is there. Feynmanwas sure that this idea is correct because he did not raisethe question: How can the entire charge be there whenan observer has found the electron some place? Let con-sider the electron in empty space, or better a fullerene, oreven a long biomolecule, quantum interference of whichwas observed already [17, 18]. Quantum state of suchparticle can be described with the wave-packets (1) in

which the wave functions expi(pr Et)/are deducedfrom the Schrodingers wave equation [19]

i

t =

2

2m2 + U(r) (2)

whereas the amplitudes A0(p) can be estimate only withhelp of an observation at a time t= 0. According to (2)E=p2/2m in empty space where U(r) = 0. It is possi-ble, for example with help of the scanning laser ionizationdetector used in[20], to observe att = 0 that a fullerene,for example, is localised in a space region r nearr = 0.The result of this observation may be describe approx-imately with the probability density function (r) =

(2)

1/4

1/2exp(r2/42) [13] where r/3. Thewave-packet (1) diffuses, Fig.1, because its amplitudes,equal A0(p) = ( 8)1

/41/2exp(p22/2) at t = 0,change with time A(p, t) = (8)1/41/2exp(p22/2 ip2t/2m). Because of this Process 2[14] the probabil-ity to observe the particle in a space region near r = 0decreases and far off r = 0 increases with time, Fig.1.The Process 2 is continuous and is determined with theSchrodingers wave equation (2). But the discontinuouschange of the probability |(r, t)|2 and the wave-packet(r, t) at an observation, i.e. the Process 1 [14], can notbe described with this equation (2).

The Process 1, at t = t1 for example, Fig.1, cannot be

described outside the domain of psychology. Everett [14]was right. No physical interaction of the particle withphotons radiated with laser or any measuring device cancompact the wave-packet. It is quite obvious that ac-cording to the Borns interpretation the wave-packet issqueezed in a smaller volume because of the observationby an observer the particle near, for example, r 8,Fig.1. The observation changes first of all the mind of theobserver. Before the observation att < t1he conjecturedto see the particle in any space region with a probability|(r, t1)|2. His knowledge changes discontinuously whenhe sees the particle nearr 8, Fig.1. Such change of theknowledge takes place at any observation. Schrodingernoted that the simple statement, that each observa-tion depends both from the object and the subject whichare entangled by extremely complex manner is a state-ment which is hardly possible to consider new, it is oldalmost also, as the science [21]. But according to QM the causal interconnection between the subject andobject is considered reciprocal. It is stated, that the unre-movable and uncontrollable influence of the subject on theobject takes place [21]. According to the Borns inter-pretation both the observer knowledge and the quantumstate change at the observation.


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FIG. 1: The initial conditions, i.e. the amplitudes A0(p) ofthe wave-packet (1) are determined with results of an externalobservation at a time moment t = 0, i.e. during the Process1, when the quantum state changes discontinuously under in-fluence of an external observer (the upper picture). Quantummechanics can predict the probability |(r, t1)|

2 per unit vol-ume of finding the particle in any space place r at any timemoment t1 (the middle picture) using the initial conditions

and the Schrodingers wave equation (2). But no physicalinteraction of the particle with an agency of observation de-scribed with the Schrodingers wave equation (2) can compactthe wave-packet (the bottom picture) and provide with newinitial conditions. The initial conditions can be provided onlythe mind of the observer who has found the particle someplace.

It could be clear from the very outset that according tothe Borns interpretation the observation should be inter-preted unambiguously as interplay between the quantumsystem and the mind of the observer. But Heisenberg andBohr had convinced most physicists that we can considerthe act of the observation (measurement) as an interac-tion between quantum system and measuring instrument.The famous[16] Heisenberg uncertainty microscope[22],

the quantum postulate and complementarity by Bohr [23]have misled some generations of physicists. Even the fa-mous EPR paper[24] and the Bells works[1] could notundeceive most physicists about this error up to now.Bell wrote in 1989 [24] about the paper Ten theoremsabout quantum mechanical measurements, by NG vanKampen [26] This paper is distinguished especially byits robust common sense. The author has no patiencewith such mind-boggling fantasies as the many worldinterpretation . He dismisses out of hand the notionof von Neumann, Pauli, Wigner - that measurementmight be complete only in the mind of the observer: . .. I find it hard to understand that someone who arrivesat such a conclusion does not seek the error in his argu-ment. There is important to remind that Everett hadproposed the many world interpretation in order to de-scribe the Process 1, i.e. measurement, as lying outsidethe domain of psychology [14]. But the believers in thesoothing philosophy or religion of Heisenberg-Bohr rejectflatly, as well as van Kampen[26], both the mind of theobserver and the many world interpretation. Althoughit must be obvious that the attempt by Heisenberg andBohr to propose the realistic substantiation of the un-certainty principle was false it is needed to explain againand again that EPR correlation and Bells inequalitieshave proved this obvious fact.

2.2. EPR correlation and the non-locality of the

mind

Bell wrote in 1981 [27]: The philosopher in the street,who has not suffered a course in quantum mechanics,is quite unimpressed by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen corre-lations. He can point to many examples of similar cor-relations in everyday life. The case of Bertlmanns socksis often cited. Dr. Bertlmann likes to wear two socks ofdifferent colours. Which colour he will have on a given

foot on a given day is quite unpredictable. But when yousee that the first sock is pink you can be already sure thatthe second sock will not be pink. The last sentence de-scribes the influence of the object (the first sock) on thesubject (the mind of the observer). Such influence canastonish nobody because it is old almost also, as thescience [21]. Bell asked: And is not the EPR business

just the same? [27]. He considered a particular versionof the EPR paradox[24], developed by David Bohm[28],i.e. the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken exper-iment with two spin 1/2 particles. Quantum mechanicsdescribes the spin states of two separate particles with


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two separate equations

A= A| A(rA)> +A| A(rA)>

B =B | B (rB)> +B| B (rB)> (3)

where the probability amplitudesA,A,B,B dependon a free choice of a certain axis along which the compo-

nent of particle spin will be measured and |A|2+|A|2 =1, |B |2 + |B|2 = 1 always. The spin state of pair of twoseparate particle may be described also with the productof the equations (3) in which the amplitudes 1= AB ,2 = AB, 3 = AB , 4 = AB and as a conse-quence 14 = ABAB = 23 = ABAB. TheEPR correlation takes place when 14 = 23 and thespin states of the particles cannot be separated. Twoparticles in the singlet spin state

EPR= 2| A(rA) B (rB)> +3| A(rA) B (rB)>(4)

when 1 = 0, 4 = 0, and 2 = 0, 3 = 0 is called EPR

pair. The axis along which the component of particlespin will be measured is the direction of a non-uniformmagnetic field produced by magnets of a Stern-Gerlachanalyzer [16]. The particles will deflect up in the state| >and down in the state | >. The observersA (Alice)andB (Bob) can choose any direction of their analyzersaxis. Whether either particle separately goes up or downon a given occasion is quite unpredictable. But accordingto the basic principle of quantum mechanics formulatedby Dirac as far back as 1930[29] a measurement al-ways causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of thedynamical variable that is being measured. This Dirac

jump, wave function collapse [30], or quantum jumpfrom the possible to the actual [31] must take placelogically during the act of observation because Alice can-not see that one particle deflects up and down simulta-neously. When Alice sees that the particle deflects up inher Stern-Gerlach analyzer directed along an axis n thespin state of the EPR pair (4) changes discontinuouslyto the eigenstate

n= | A(rA) B (rB)>n (5a)

or to the eigenstate

n= | A(rA) B (rB)>n (5b)

when the particle deflects down. Thus, according tothe basic principles of quantum mechanics deduced logi-cally from the Borns interpretation one particle A of theEPR pair (4) goes up the other B always goes down andvice-versa when axis of two analyzers located at widelyseparated points in space rA and rB is directed in thesame direction n. This EPR correlation should be non-local because of the opportunity to observe the deflec-tion of the particle A and the particle B at the sametime independently on the distance |rA rB | betweenthe Stern-Gerlach analyzers. This non-locality is deduced

unambiguously from the Borns interpretation as a con-sequence of non-locality of the mind. Heisenberg noted:Since through the observation our knowledge of the sys-tem has changed discontinuously, its mathematical rep-resentation also has undergone the discontinuous changeand we speak of a quantum jump[31]. He justified thequantum jump with help of the fact that our knowl-edge can change suddenly [31], i.e. the obvious fact that

the knowledge of Alice, for example, changes at the in-fluence of the object, the deflection of the particle, onthe subject, her mind. Already before the observationthe Alice knowledge about the probability of the deflec-tion up or down of particles A and B is entangled. Sheknows that if the deflection of one particle, for exam-ple A, will be up than the deflection of other particle Bshould be down. Thus, the EPR correlation (4) describesthe entanglement of the Alice knowledge about the spinstate of two particles. Therefore, motivated[32] by EPR[24], Schrodinger coined[33,33] the termentanglementof our knowledge: Maximal knowledge of a total sys-tem does not necessarily include total knowledge of allits parts, not even when these are fully separated fromeach other and at the moment are not influencing eachother at all. Maximal knowledge of a total system in-clude total knowledge of all its parts in the case (3) when14= 23 but not in the case (4) when 14=23.

In his last talk[35] Bell considered the question: Whatcan not go faster than light? He said: The situation is

further complicated by the fact that there are things whichdo go faster than light. British sovereignty is the clas-sical example. When the Queen dies in London (may itlong be delayed) the Prince of Wales, lecturing on modernarchitecture in Australia, becomes instantaneously King,

(Greenwich Mean Time rules here) [35]. There is im-portant to define more exactly that the Prince of Walesbecomes instantaneously King in the mind of witnesses ofthe Queen death. Like manner the spin state of the dis-tant particleB changes instantaneously from (4) to (5a)in the mind of Alice when she sees that her particleAhasdeflected up. The analogue of the British sovereignty inthe EPR correlation is the Dirac jump, or wave functioncollapse, which should be at the Process 1. But thereis a fundamental difference of the Dirac jump from theBritish sovereignty. The witnesses of the Queen deathcannot have an influence on the Prince of Wales whereasAlice can govern the spin state of the distant particle B .Each of the eigenstates (5a) and (5b) of the operator ofthe spin component along n (this dynamical variable) issuperposition of eigenstates of the spin component alongother direction (other dynamical variable) [19]. Supposethat initially Alice had chosen to orient the non-uniformmagnetic field of her Stern-Gerlach analyzer perpendic-ular to the line of flight of the approaching particle, they-axis, and pointing vertically upward along the z-axis.And Bob had oriented his non-uniform magnetic fieldalso perpendicular to the y-axis but at an angle to thez-axis. Than the EPR pair jumps discontinuously to the


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state

z = | A,zB,z>=cos(/2)| A,B,>+

+sin(/2)| A,B,> (6a)

when Alice will see that her particle has deflected up andto the state

z = | A,zB,z>= sin(/2)| A,B,>+

+cos(/2)| A,B,> (6b)

when her particle has deflected down. The operator ofthe turning round the y-axis[19] is used hear and below.Each of these states is the eigenstate of the operator cor-responding to the orientation on the Alice analyzer butit is superposition the eigenstates of the operator corre-sponding to the orientation on the Bob analyzer. Alicecan turn her Stern-Gerlach analyzer on an angle duringthe flight of the particles of the EPR pair (4). This turn

changes the spin states of both her and Bobs particleafter her observation to

= | A,B,>=cos(( )/2)| A,B,>+

+sin(( )/2)| A,B,> (7a)

if her particle has deflected up and to

= | A,B,>= sin(( )/2)| A,B,>+

+cos(( )/2)| A,B,> (7b)

if it has deflected down. Thus, the EPR correlation re-veals that quantum mechanics concedes that Alice canchange instantaneously the quantum state of the distantparticle with her will and her observation. According tothe Borns interpretation she can act faster than lightthanks to non-locality of her mind.

2.3. Violation of Bells inequalities uncovers the

influence of subject on object

Heisenberg justified[31] the discontinuous change con-ceded quantum mechanics with the argument that ourknowledge of the system changes discontinuously at anyobservation. But quantum mechanics represents not onlyour knowledge. It predicts first of all the probability ofdifferent outcomes of observations. For example, the re-lation (7) predicts that the probability to observe the de-flection up of the Bobs particle equals |cos(( )/2)|2

and down |sin(( )/2)|2 when the Alice particle hasdeflected up. Thus, the Alices will and her observationinfluence instantaneously on the outcome of observationsof the distant particle. This influence is revealed most

FIG. 2: Sketch of the EPR experiment (a) and experimentalapparatus for measurement of the probability P+P withhelp of a source of single electrons Se (b). In a case (a) oneof the electrons of each EPR pair flies from the EPR pairssourceSEPRto the Stern-Gerlach analyzerA, and another tothe analyzerB . The probabilitiesPA+= NA+/(NA++NA)

and PB+ =NB+/(NB++ NB) are defined as the relationof number NA+ (or NB+) of detection by detector DA+ (orDB+) to the sumNA++ NA (or NB++ NB) of detectionby detectors DA+ and DA (or DB+ and DB). In a case(b) electron flies from the source Se to the first Stern-Gerlachanalyzer and gets in the second analyzer if it deflects up, andgets in the first detector D1 if it deflects down. After thesecond analyzer electron gets in the detectorD2+or D2. TheprobabilityP+P = N2/(N1 +N2++ N2) is defined asthe relation of the number N2 of detection by detector D2+to the sum N1+ N2++ N2 of detection by all detectors

definitely with help of the Bells inequalities [36]. Only

condition used at the deduction of the Bells inequalityis the requirement of locality, or more precisely that theresult of a measurement on one system be unaffected byoperations on a distant system [36]. Bell had proposedin[27] a most simple example of this logical deduction.Bell started with an trivial inequality

P0+P45+ P45+P90 P0+P90 (8a)

asserting that the probability P0+of the deflection up atthe orientation of the Stern-Gerlach analyzer verticallyupward along the z-axis, i.e. at = 0o and the P45of the deflection down at = 45o plus the probabilityP45+ of the deflection up at = 45

o and P90 - downat = 90o is not less than the probability P0+ of thedeflection up at = 0o andP90 - down at = 90

o. Theinequality is obvious when all probabilities P0+, P45,P45+ and P90 are measured in the same spin state.Any particle in the same spin state which deflects up at= 0o and down at = 90o (and so contributing to thethird probability P0+P90 in (8a)) can deflect either upat = 45o (and so contributes to the second probabilityP45+P90in (8a)) or down at = 45

o (and so contributesto the first probability P0+P45 in (8a)). The inequality


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is trivial but it can not be verified experimentally withmeasurements of single particles, as shown on Fig2b, be-cause a measurement always causes the system to

jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that isbeing measured [29]. All particles flying from the firstto the second Stern-Gerlach analyzer on Fig.2b shouldbe in the state spin up because of this Dirac jump. Theeigenstate spin up for this orientation of the first Stern-

Gerlach analyzer differs in common case from the initialspin state of the particles. Therefore it is impossible tomeasure the probabilities both P0+ and P45, for ex-ample, in the same spin state with the method shownon Fig.2b. The probabilities at different orientation ofthe Stern-Gerlach analyzers and can be measured inthe same state with help of the EPR pair if the require-ment of locality is valid. The equality of the probabilitiesPA+ = PB and PA = PB+ must be observed be-cause of the EPR correlation when if one particle A ofthe EPR pairs (4) deflects up then the other B alwaysdeflects down and vice-versa. This equality is valid forall orientation including = 45o and = 90o. The Bellsinequality

PA0+PB45++ PA45+PB90+ PA0+PB90+ (8b)

is deduced from the obvious inequality (8a) at the sin-gle requirement: a turning of the Stern-Gerlach ana-lyzer A located in a space region rA can not change in-stantaneously on the spin of the distant particle B lo-cated in a space region rB and vice-versa. The proba-bility to observe the deflection up in the Stern-Gerlachanalyzers A equals always the same value PA+ =(|2|2 + |3|2)/2 = 0.5 if Alice is first observer becauseof the same probability for each particle of the EPRpair (4) to flow toward Alice. Bob, as second observer,

should observe the deflection up with the probabilityPB+ = |sin(( )/2)|2 according to (7a). The re-sult PA+PB+ = 0.5|sin(( )/2)|2 gives the valuesPA0+PB45+ = PA45+PB90+ = 0.5sin2(45

o/2) 0.0732,PA0+PB90+ = 0.5sin2(90

o/2) 0.25. The inequality(8b) would then require

0.1464 0.25 (8c)

which is not true.This violation (8c) of the Bells inequality (8b) reveals

that quantum mechanics presupposes that a turning ofthe Stern-Gerlach analyzer can influence instantaneouslyon the distant particle because the Bells inequality (8b)was deduced only from the requirement of impossibility ofsuch non-local influence. According to the Borns inter-pretation this non-local influence is actualized by meansof the Alices mind. The probability that the Bobs par-ticle will deflect up should equal PB+ = 0.5 until Alicehas seen that her particle has deflected up. Thus theprobability of the observation spin up by Bob changesfromPB+= 0.5 toPB+= |sin(( )/2)|2 because ofthe discontinuous change of the Alices knowledge. Theknowledge changes because of the influence of object on

subject and the probability of the observation changesbecause of the influence of subject on object. Thus,the EPR correlation and the Bells inequalities have con-firmed the statement by Schrodinger that in the orthodoxquantum mechanics the causal interconnection be-tween the subject and object is considered reciprocal. It isstated, that the unremovable and uncontrollable influenceof the subject on the object takes place [21].

2.4. What EPR intended to prove and what they

have proved

EPR [24] denied any possibility of the EPR correla-tion. It was in conflict with the Einsteins belief: Buton one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutelyhold fast: the real factual situation of the system S2 isindependent of what is done with the systemS1, which isspatially separated from the former[37]. EPR intendedto prove that the description of reality as given by awave function is not complete [24]. Of course they had

in mind the wave function in the Borns interpretation.It is stated in the abstract of the EPR paper [ 24]: Inquantum mechanics in the case of two physical quantitiesdescribed by non-commuting operators, the knowledge ofone precludes the knowledge of the other. Then either(1) the description of reality given by the wave functionin QM is not complete or (2) these two quantities cannothave simultaneous reality. Consideration of the problemof making predictions concerning a system on the basisof measurements made on another system that had pre-viously interacted with it leads to the result that if (1)is false then (2) is also false. Indeed, if Alice revealsa real situation existing irrespective of any act of obser-

vation when she sees that the particle has deflected upin her Stern-Gerlach analyzer pointing vertically upwardalong the z-axis (6a) than all other spin components (7a)or (7b) of her and Bobs particles should exist before herobservation. Alice can know any spin component (7a)or (7b) in the same spine state turning her analyzer inthe respective axis. Therefore she can obtain the knowl-edge about different spin component of the Bobs par-ticle, | B,z> and | B,> for example, contrary to thefoundation of QM, if this knowledge about a real situa-tion existing irrespective of her mind.

Thus, QM is observably inadequate if it is interpretedas the description of reality. The description given by thewave function in QM can be adequate and complete onlyif two physical quantities described by non-commutingoperators does not have reality simultaneous before theirobservation. QM can be valid only if physical quantitiesare rather created by the mind of the observer than mea-sured at the observation. Just this absurdity of QM hadbeen proved by EPR[24]. Bell proposedto replace theword measurement which misleads: When it is saidthat something is measured it is difficult not to thinkof the result as referring to some pre-existing propertyof the object in question [24]. The pre-existing prop-


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erties revealed at measurement are in hidden-variablestheory, alternative the orthodox QM using the Borns in-terpretation. According to this theory, hidden variablesdetermine results of individual measurements and thuseliminate subjectivity and indeterminism inherent QM.

2.5. Hidden variable

Bell asserted that vagueness, subjectivity, and inde-terminism, are not forced on us by experimental facts,but by deliberate theoretical choice [38]. It is not ab-solutely so. The main reason of refusal of realism wereproblems with the realistic description of some quantumphenomena, such as Stern-Gerlach effect [39]. Bohr wrotein 1949[40], that as exposed so clearly by Einstein andEhrenfest[41], it presented with unsurmountable difficul-ties any attempt at forming a picture of the behaviour ofatoms in a magnetic field. And Bell wrote 32 years later:Phenomena of this kind made physicists despair of find-ing any consistent space-time picture of what goes on the

atomic and subatomic scale Going further still, someasserted that atomic and subatomic particles do not haveany definite properties in advance of observation. Thereis nothing, that is to say, in the particles approachingthe magnet, to distinguish those subsequently deflected up

from those subsequently deflected down. Indeed even theparticles are not really there [27].

As Bell wrote [42] To know the quantum mechani-cal state of a system implies, in general, only statisticalrestrictions on the results of measurements. The clas-sical statistical mechanics also describes only statisticaldistribution of parameters. But these parameters are as-sumed to exist irrespective of any act of observation and

the mind of the observer. Just the negation of real ex-istence of parameters results to subjectivity and indeter-minism of QM. Therefore Bell was sure: It seems inter-esting to ask if this statistical element be thought of asarising, as in classical statistical mechanics, because thestates in question are averages over better defined states

for which individually the results would be quite deter-mined. These hypothetical dispersion free states wouldbe specified not only by the quantum mechanical state vec-tor but also by additional hidden variables-hidden be-cause if states with prescribed values of these variablescould actually be prepared, quantum mechanics would beobservably inadequate[42]. But most physicists did nottake an interest in this problem fifty years ago and up tonow many physicists underestimate the fundamental im-portance of hidden variables. Few experts, who did findthe question interesting, believed that the question con-cerning the existence of such hidden variables received anearly and rather decisive answer in the form of von Neu-manns proof on the mathematical impossibility of suchvariables in quantum theory[42].

But this belief was false. David Mermin writes inthe paper Hidden variables and the two theorems ofJohn Bell[43]: A third of a century passed before John

Bell, 1966, rediscovered the fact that von Neumanns no-variables-hidden proof was based on an assumption thatcan only be described as silly - so silly, in fact, that one isled to wonder whether the proof was ever studied by eitherthe students or those who appealed to it. Von Neumanndid not take into account that non-commuting opera-tors do not have simultaneous eigenvalues [43]. There ismore important to realize a physical mistake correspond-

ing to this mathematical mistake. Eigenvalues non-commuting operators cannot be simultaneous measuredaccording to the quantum postulate and complementar-ity proposed by Bohr [23]. Bell noted [42] that additionaldemands of the von Neumanns proof are quite unrea-sonable when one remembers with Bohr [40] the impos-sibility of any sharp distinction between the behaviourof atomic objects and the interaction with the measur-ing instruments which serve to define the conditions un-der which the phenomena appear. In order to exhibitof the error of the von Neumanns proof Bell had con-structed a hidden-variables model which reproduces allpredictions of results of a single spin 1/2 measurementgiven by QM. There is important to accentuate that Bellused in this model the Bohrs quantum postulate whichimplies that any observation of atomic phenomena willinvolve an interaction with the agency of observation notto be neglected [23]. According to the quantum postu-lateWith or without hidden variables the analysis of themeasurement process presents peculiar difficulties [42],because no theory can describe an interaction with theagency of observation. Any result of this interaction maybe assumed because of this vagueness.

In the Bells model [42] the interaction of single spin1/2 with the agency of observation results to mea-surement of the same value of spin component, as

it is observed in the paradoxical Stern-Gerlach effect[39]. Thanks to the vague interaction the results ofobservation can be described with the relation sn =1/2cos()/|cos()| proposed by Bell in [27]. This rela-tion describes an individual measurement of spin com-ponentsn along n, as well as the superposition (3), buthas a fundamental advantage: is the angle between anaxis n of Stern-Gerlach analyzer and an axis z+ m ofspin. Therefore results of an individual measurement isdetermined with the spin axis z + mand the mind of theobserver can not influence on these results. In the Bellsmodel[42] z is a unit vector directed along the z-axis inthe spin state z = | z> and m is a random unit vec-tor which plays the role of hidden variable. This model

predicts the same probabilities of observation of positivevaluesP+= 1/2 +

/2 dx2 sin x/4= (1 + cos )/2 =

cos2(/2) and negative values P =0

dx2 sin x/4=

(1 cos )/2 = sin2(/2) as orthodox QM.

It predicts also that if one particle A of the EPR pairgoes up the other B always goes down and vice-versawhen axis of two analyzers is directed in the same di-rection n because if cos(A) > 0 for the angle A be-tween n and +(z + m) then cos(B) < 0 for the an-


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gle B between n and (z + m) and vice-versa. Thehidden-variables model implies also the Dirac jump atobservation in order to correspond to the prediction ofQM. Therefore it also predicts violation of the trivial in-equality (8a). Because of the vague interaction with theagency of observation, i.e. with the first Stern-Gerlachanalyzer, shown on Fig.2b, the particle deflecting withthe probability P+ = 0.5 to the second Stern-Gerlach

analyzer jumps to the spin state = | >. Thereforethe particle will deflect down after the second analyzerwith the probabilityP = |sin(( )/2)|2. The totalprobabilityP+P= 0.5|sin(( )/2)|

2 to hit the de-tectorD2predicts violation (8c) of the trivial inequality(8a): P0+P45 = P45+P90 = 0.5sin

2(45o/2) 0.0732,P0+P90 = 0.5sin

2(90o/2) 0.25. Thus, the hidden-variables model can reproduce almost all prediction ofQM. Among few predictions which it can not reproduceis violation of the Bells inequality (8b). The probabilityof observation both sn = +1/2 and sn = 1/2 of eachparticle of the EPR pairs is the same PA+ = PA =PB+ = PB = 0.5 because the results of individualmeasurements are determined by the spin axis +(z + m)or (z + m) and therefore the act of measurement of oneparticle can not influence on the result of observation ofother particle. The corroboration of the Bells inequality(8b)PA0+PB45++ PA45+PB90+= 0.5 0.5 + 0.5 0.5 =0.5 > PA0+PB90+ = 0.5 0.5 = 0.25 reveals that ifdefinite properties exist in advance of observation thenmeasurement might be complete without the mind ofthe observer.

There is important to note that hidden variables re-place the mind of the observer with soulless agencies ofobservation. This fact reveals that the quantum postu-late and complementarity proposed by Bohr [23] is valid

according to rather hidden-variables theories than theQM based on the Borns interpretation. Variables arehidden just becauseany observation of atomic phenom-ena will involve an interaction with the agency of obser-vation not to be neglected [23]. Bohr concluded fromthis statement implied with his quantum postulate thatan independent reality in the ordinary physical sense canneither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agenciesof observation [23]. This conclusion misleads. A cel-ebrated polymath who is quoted in [43] declared thatMost theoretical physicists are guilty of fail[ing] todistinguish between a measurable indeterminacy and theepistemic indeterminability of what is in reality deter-minate. The indeterminacy discovered by physical mea-surements of subatomic phenomena simply tells us thatwe cannot know the definite position and velocity of anelectron at any instant of time. It does not tell as thatthe electron, at any instant of time, does not have a def-inite position and velocity. [Physicists] convert whatis not measurable by them into the unreal and the non-existent [44]. Bohr was among these most theoreticalphysicists and had misled some generation of physicistswith his quantum postulate and complementarity. Hedid not take into account that an interaction with the

agency of observation can change variables at observationbut it can not create observed variables. Only the mindof the observer can create definite properties observed bythe observer if they were not definite with variables evenhidden in advance of observation. The EPR correlationand violation (8c) of the Bells inequality (8b) reveal thatan interaction rather with the mind of the observer thanwith the agency of observation is implied in the orthodox

QM thanks to the non-locality of the first interaction andthe locality of the second one.

2.6. Indeterminism of quantum mechanics. The

entanglement of cat with atom states

Von Neumann, Pauli, Wigner and also Heisenberg andothers were forced to notethat measurement might becomplete only in the mind of the observer [24] becauseof indeterminism of QM: if a cause of a definite result ofthe observation is absent in nature then only the mind ofthe observer can be the cause. Bohr reminder in 1949 [40]

that during the Solvay meeting 1927 interesting discus-sion arose also about how to speak of the appearance ofphenomena for which only predictions of statistical char-acter can be made. The question was whether, as to theoccurrence of individual effects, we should adopt a termi-nology proposed by Dirac, that we were concerned with achoice on the part of nature or, as suggested by Heisen-berg, we should say that we have to do with a choice on thepart of the observer constructing the measuring instru-ments and reading their recording. Bohr wrote: Anysuch terminology would, however, appear dubious since,on the one hand, it is hardly reasonable to endow naturewith volition in the ordinary sense, while, on the other

hand, it is certainly not possible for the observer to influ-ence the events which may appear under the conditions hehas arranged and advertised his complementarity: Tomy mind, there is no other alternative than to admit that,in this field of experience, we are dealing with individ-ual phenomena and that our possibilities of handling themeasuring instruments allow us only to make a choicebetween the different complementary types of phenomenawe want to study [40]. But this pet idea by Bohr cannot answer on the question: What or who can a defi-nite result of the observation determine? It can resultand even had resulted [19] to the illusion that individualeffects are chosen by the agency of observation, namedthe classical object usually called apparatus [19].

This illusion is logically absurd. Nevertheless it pre-dominated and predominates up to now among mostphysicists thanks to the followers [19] of Bohr. Bell hadcalled the spontaneous jump of a classical apparatusinto an eigenstate of its reading as the LL jump, con-sidering in [24] Quantum Mechanics by L D Landau andE M Lifshitz [19] as the first of the good books whichmislead. The assumption[19] about the LL jump is ab-surd first of all because a apparatus even classical isa part of nature as well as the cat in the famous para-


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dox proposed by Schrodinger[33]. The Schrodingers catparadox is well-known but pure understood. Thereforeit is useful to reminder its text here: One can evenset up quite ridiculous cases. A cat is penned up in asteel chamber, along with the following diabolical device(which must be secured against direct interference by thecat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactivesubstance, so small that perhaps in the course of one hour

one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability,perhaps none; if it hap-pens, the [Geiger] counter tubedischarges and through a relay releases a hammer whichshatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has leftthis entire system to itself for an hour, one would saythat the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed.The first atomic decay would have poisoned it. The -

function of the entire system would express this by havingin it the living and the dead cat (pardon the expression)mixed or smeared out in equal parts [33], see also p.185in the book [16]. Schrodinger had entangled with the-function of the entire system

cat= AtdecayGyesF lyesCatdead+

+AtnoGnoF lnoCatliving (9)

cat state C atdead, Catliving with the states of the smallflask of hydrocyanic acidF lyes,F lno, the Geiger countertubeGyes,Gyes and radioactive atomAtdecay,Atnowiththe experiment conditions. The act of observation of thedead cat is described with the - function (9) collapseto

cat= AtdecayGyesF lyesCatdead (10)

One can draw the conclusion that the cat is deadCatdeadbecause the hammer has shattered the small flask of hy-

drocyanic acidF lyes. The hammer has shattered it be-cause the Geiger counter tube has discharged Gyes. Itis has discharged because the atom has decayedAtdecay.Till this each event had a cause. But the atom decayis causless. There is no term to the right of Atdecay in(9). According to the assumption[19] about the LL jumpthe cat kills himself. Moreover one may demonstrate tocombine two famous paradoxes, the EPR paradox andthe Schrodingers cat paradox, that the death of a catA can preserve life of a distant cat B and vice-versa.Thereto one may substitute of the radioactive atom forthe EPR pairs with two spin particles in the singlet state(4), as well as in the Bohms version [28] of the EPR

paradox. We will use also two Stern-Gerlach analysers,two Geiger counter tubes, two flasks of hydrocyanic acidand two catsC atA andC atB. The Geiger counter tubeswill be located on the upper trajectory of each particleafter its exit from its Stern-Gerlach analyser, so it willdischarge when spin up and will not discharge when spindown. The subsequent events will be as well as in theSchrodinger paradox[33]. This gedankenexperiment canbe described with the -function

EPR,cat = 2| A(rA) B (rB)> CatA,deadCatB,liv+

+3| A(rA) B (rB)> CatA,livCatB,dead (11)

with two types of entanglements: because of the con-servation law (the EPR correlation) and because of thecondition of experiment proposed by Schrodinger [33].The results of observations will be

EPR,cat = CatA,deadCatB,liv (12a)

or

EPR,cat = CatA,livCatB,dead (12b)

when the axis of the Stern-Gerlach analysers are paral-lel. Advocates of quantum mechanics justify the using ofstate superposition (11) with the absence of any cause ofthe atom decay. They convert what is not measurableby them into the unreal and the non-existent [44]. Letimagine that we do not know why the observed states ofcats are correlated as well as we do not know the cause ofatom decay. Then, to convert our lack of knowledge intothe unreal we can describe the results of our observations

of the cats state with superposition

EPR,cat = 2CatA,deadCatB,liv+ 3CatA,livCatB,dead(13)

which should collapse to (12a) or (12b) at each obser-vation. The absence of any cause of (12a) or (12b) inadvance of observation raises a question: What or whomakes a choice? According to the concept of the spon-taneous collapse of a macroscopic system into a definitemacroscopic configuration [19], i.e. the LL jump [24],the choice is made by a cat, which is a classical appara-tus in the Schrodingers paradox. But what cat A or Bwould make a choice (12a) or (12b)? The collapse of thesuperposition of cats states (13) must be instantaneousirrespective of a distance |rArB | between cats. Accord-ing to the principle of relativity by Einstein both the catA and the cat B may be observed first in the same casebut in different frames of reference. Therefore it is im-possible to say the spontaneous collapse of what cat canchoose the fate of other cat with help a mystical actionof a distance. The absurdity of the LL jump assumed in[19] is obvious even without this consideration of the catsfate. It must be obvious for any one that only a magicalapparatus even classical can collapse spontaneously.

2.7. Whose knowledge and whose will?

Therefore von Neumann, Pauli, Wigner, Heisenbergand others admitted that measurement might be com-plete only in the mind of the observer and the Dirac

jump is forced by an external intervention[24] which canbe only the mind of the observer. But a choice on thepart of the observer suggested by Heisenberg can notdeliver from a logical absurdity. According to the basicprinciple of QM formulated by Dirac a measurementalways causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of


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the dynamical variable that is being measured[29]. Butinto which eigenstate should the system jump when twodynamical variables described by non-commuting oper-ators are measured at the same time? Alice may orienther Stern-Gerlach analyser at an angleto the z-axis andBob may orient his Stern-Gerlach analyser at an otherangle. Then Alice will be sure that her and Bobs par-ticles jump to the spin state (7a) when she will see that

her particle has deflected up. But Bob will be sure thathis and Alices particles jump to the other state

= | A,B,>= sin(( )/2)| A,B,>+

+cos(( )/2)| A,B,> (14)

when he will see that his particle has deflected up. Thus,according to orthodox QM, knowledge of two observersof the same system can be various. Moreover, each ofthem can impose her (or his) will on the distant particle.When Alice has oriented her Stern-Gerlach along the z-axis the Bobs particle should jump in the spin state (5a)or (5b) at her measurement. And when Bob has oriented

his Stern-Gerlach at an angle to the z-axis the Alicesparticle should jump in the spin state (6a) or (6b) athis measurement. Here it is impossible to solve, whoseknowledge is correct, and whose will can win because ofthe principle of relativity according to which Alice ob-serves her particle ahead of Bob in a frame of referencewhereas in an other frame of reference Bob observes hisparticle ahead of Alice.

This absurdity of QM has became especially relevantafter experimental evidence [4547] of violation of theBells inequalities. Before these experiments Bell ex-pressed a hope that Perhaps Nature is not so queer asquantum mechanics [27] and rated a possibility of vio-

lation of his inequalities as indigestible. One of the in-terpretations of this violation could be a conclusion thatApparently separate parts of the world would be deeplyand conspiratorially entangled, and our apparent free willwould be entangled with them [27]. The results of theexperiments of the Aspects team [4547] Bell appraisedas a fundamental problem of theory: For me then thisis the real problem with quantum theory: the apparentlyessential conflict between any sharp formulation and fun-damental relativity. That is to say, we have an apparentincompatibility, at the deepest level, between the two fun-damental pillars of contemporary theory p. 172 in [1].As opposed to Bell contemporary believers in the sooth-ing philosophy or religion of Heisenberg-Bohr, for exam-ple the authors of the book[48] are sure that violation ofthe Bells inequalities has corroborated the correctnessof QM. Mermin wrote as far back as in 1985 [49]: Inthe question of whether there is some fundamental prob-lem with quantum mechanics signaled by tests of Bellsinequality, physicists can be divided into a majority whoare indifferent and a minority who are bothered.

This division observed up to now witnesses againstQM as a consistent and transparent theory. The incon-sistency the assessment discloses vagueness of QM. The

majority who are indifferent rather believe than under-stand QM. The authors of the book [48] and other be-lievers do not want to understand that no experimentalresult can save QM because it is self-contradictory andvague. Because of its vagueness the contradictions wereobserved even between its creators, Heisenberg and Bohr,first of all about the role of the observer. Heisenberg ad-mitted that measurement might be complete only in

the mind of the observer. It is obvious, for example,from his destructive criticism of Soviet scientists Alexan-drov and Blochinzev in the Section VIII Criticism andCounterproposals to the Copenhagen Interpretation ofQuantum Theory of the Lectures 1955-1956 Physicsand Philosophy[31]. These Soviet scientists stated thatAmong the different idealistic trends of contemporaryphysics the so-called Copenhagen school is the most re-actionary [31] and rejected the role of the observer inQM. Heisenberg quotes Alexandrov We must thereforeunderstand by result of measurement in quantum theoryonly the objective effect of the interaction of the electronwith a suitable object. Mention of the observer must beavoided, and we must treat objective conditions and ob-

jective and effects. A physical quantity is objective char-acteristic of phenomenon, but not the result of an ob-servationand notesAccording to Alexandrov, the wave

function in configuration space characterizes the objectivestate of the electron [31]. Further Heisenberg explainswhy the Alexandrovs point of view is false: In his pre-sentation Alexandrov overlooks the fact that the formal-ism of quantum theory does not allow the same degree ofobjectivation as that of classical physics. For instance,if a interaction of a system with the measuring appara-tus is treated as a whole according to QM and if both areregarded as cut off from the rest of the world, then the

formalism of quantum theory does not as a rule lead to

a define result; it will not lead, e.g., to the blackening ofthe photographic plate in a given point. If one tries torescue the Alexandrovs objective effect by saying thatin reality the plate is blackened at a given point afterthe interaction, the rejoinder is the quantum mechani-cal treatment of the closed system consisting of electron,measuring apparatus and plate is no longer being applied[31].

This disproof by Heisenberg of the objectivation of QMis doubtless. Its obviousness is illustrated in the Section2.1 and must be quite clear at consideration of the exam-ple shown on Fig.1: the wave-packet can be compactedonly by the mind of the observer. In spite of this ob-viousness not only the Soviet scientists Alexandrov andBlochinzev but most physicists including Bohr objectifiedand objectify the matter of quantum mechanical treat-ment. Bohr objectified it with his quantum postulate andcomplementarity [23] according to which the act of obser-vation is an interaction with the agency of observation.Most physicists had followed rather Bohr than Heisen-berg because of their robust common sense according towhich both the many world interpretation and the mindof the observer are mind-boggling fantasies. QM seems


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reasonable to most physicists only thanks to its misinter-pretation. The following word by Heisenberg can explainpartly the cause of this mass delusion: Above all, we see

from these formulations how difficult it is when we try topush new ideas into an old system of concepts belongingto an earlier philosophy - or, to use an old metaphor,when we attempt to put new wine into old bottles [31].Therefore it is needed to give an account of the essence

of a new bottle proposed by Heisenberg for QM.

3. NEW WELTANSCHAUUNG PROPOSED BY

HEISENBERG

QM had originated from the proposal by young Heisen-bergto try to establish a theoretical quantum mechanics,analogous classical mechanics, but in which only relationsbetween observable quantities occur [2]. Only few scien-tists, first of all Einstein, realized at that time and lateron that this proposal presupposes a revolutionary revi-sion of the aim of science and even a new Weltanschau-

ung. The essence of this revolutionary revision was ex-pressed by Einstein in his explanation of reasons whichkeep he from falling in line with the opinion of almostall contemporary theoretical physicists: What does notsatisfy me in that theory, from the standpoint of prin-ciple, is its attitude towards that which appears to meto be the programmatic aim of al l physics: the completedescription of any (individual) real situation (as it sup-posedly exists irrespective of any act of observation orsubstantiation)[50]. The philosophical fundamentals ofQM, proclaimed by Heisenberg as far back as 1927 are:subjectivity,I believe that one can fruitfully formulatethe origin of the classical orbit in this way: the orbitcomes into being only when we observe it[22]; the nega-tion of an objective reality, As the statistical characterof quantum theory is so closely linked to the inexactnessof all perceptions, one might be led to the presumptionthat behind the perceived statistical world there still hidesa real world in which causality holds. But such specula-tions seem to us, to say it explicitly, fruitless and sense-less. Physics ought to describe only the correlation ofobservations [22]; indeterminism, One can express thetrue state of affairs better in this way: Because all ex-periments are subject to the laws of quantum mechanics,and therefore to equation (1), it follows that quantummechanics establishes the final failure of causality [22].The equation (1) in [22] is the famous Heisenbergs un-

certainty relation. Thus, the uncertainty principle resultsto indeterminism, according to its author.

3.1. Quantum mechanics rejects the Cartesian

polarity between res cogitans and res extensa

Later on Heisenberg had developed his new Weltan-schauung more neatly, in particular in his Lectures 1955-1956 Physics and Philosophy[31]. In the beginning of

the Section V The Development of Philosophical IdeasSince Descartes in Comparison with the New Situationin Quantum Theory he stated: This reality was full oflife and there was no good reason to stress the distinc-tion between matter and mind or between body and soul[31]. This point of view by Heisenberg contradicts funda-mentally to the scientific Weltanschauung of the previouscenturies and Heisenberg emphasizes that QM compels

to change this Weltanschauung. He reminds: The firstgreat philosopher of this new period of science was ReneDescartes who lived in the first half of the seventeenthcentury. Those of his ideas that are most important forthe development of scientific thinking are contained in hisDiscourse on Method [31]. And then Heisenberg pointsout on the importance of the Cartesian philosophy forthe posterior development of natural science: While an-cient Greek philosophy had tried to find order in the in-

finite variety of things and events by looking for somefundamental unifying principle, Descartes tries to estab-lish the order through some fundamental division Ifone uses the fundamental concepts of Descartes at all, itis essential that God is in the world and in the I and it isalso essential that the I cannot be really separated fromthe world. Of course Descartes knew the undisputablenecessity of the connection, but philosophy and naturalscience in the following period developed on the basis ofthe polarity between the res cogitans and the res ex-tensa, and natural science concentrated its interest onthe res extensa. The influence of the Cartesian divisionon human thought in the following centuries can hardlybe overestimated, but it is just this division which we haveto criticise later from the development of physics in ourtime[31].

The latter sentence clarifies in a greatest extent thefundamental difference of QM from all other theories ofphysics. All other theories concentrated their interest onthe res extensa, i.e. all objects of the Nature, existingirrespective of any act of observation and the mind of theobserver, i.e. the res cogitans. Heisenberg points out ona philosophical basis of these theoriesSince the rescogitans and the res extensa were taken as completelydifferent in their essence, it did not seem possible thatthey could act upon each other [31]. He attacks thisbasis Obviously this whole description is somewhat ar-tificial and shows the grave defects of the Cartesian par-tition but admitsOn the other hand in natural sciencethe partition was for several centuries extremely success-

ful. The mechanics of Newton and all the other parts of

classical physics constructed after its model started fromthe assumption that one can describe the world withoutspeaking about God or ourselves [31]. Before the QMemergence This possibility soon seemed almost a nec-essary condition for natural science in general. But atthis point the situation changed to some extent throughquantum theory[31]. Therefore Heisenberg comes to acomparison of Descartess philosophical system with ourpresent situation in modern physics [31].

His next remark demystifies the essence of his con-


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tradictions with Einstein and other critics of QM: Ifone follows the great difficulty which even eminent sci-entists like Einstein had in understanding and acceptingthe Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, onecan trace the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian par-tition. This partition has penetrated deeply into the hu-man mind during the three centuries following Descartesand it will take a long time for it to be replaced by a really

different attitude toward the problem of reality [31]. Ac-cording to Heisenberg an old-fashioned attitude towardthe problem of reality may be called dogmatic realismand metaphysical realism [31]. He explains the essenceof the first: Dogmatic realism claims that there are nostatements concerning the material world that cannot beobjectivated actually the position of classical physicsis that of dogmatic realism. It is only through quantumtheory that we have learned that exact science is possiblewithout the basis of dogmatic realism. When Einstein hascriticised quantum theory he has done so from the basis ofdogmatic realism[31]. Einstein saidI like to think thatthe moon is there even if I dont look at it , explaining hisdislike for QM. Heisenberg and Einstein did not agree butthey discussed on the common language of European phi-losophy. Therefore this controversy of they makes quiteclear the essence of dogmatic realism. There is importantalso to know the essence of metaphysical realism accord-ing to Heisenberg: Metaphysical realism goes one step

further than dogmatic realism by saying that the thingsreally exist. This is in fact what Descartes tried to proveby the argument that God cannot have deceived us[31].Heisenberg reminded above: On the basis of doubt andlogical reasoning he[Descartes]tries to find a completelynew and as he thinks solid ground for a philosophical sys-tem. He does not accept revelation as such a basis nordoes he want to accept uncritically what is perceived by

the senses. So he starts with his method of doubt. Hecasts his doubt upon that which our senses tell us aboutthe results of our reasoning and finally he arrives at his

famous sentence: cogito ergo sum. I cannot doubt myexistence since it follows from the fact that I am think-ing. After establishing the existence of theI in this wayhe proceeds to prove the existence of God essentially onthe lines of scholastic philosophy. Finally the existence ofthe world follows from the fact that God had given me astrong inclination to believe in the existence of the world,and it is simply impossible that God should have deceivedme [31]. Soon after Descartes his faith that God cannot deceive was call in question by representatives for

early empiristic philosophy, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.According to Heisenberg: The criticism of metaphysicalrealism which has been expressed in empiristic philosophyis certainly justified in so far as it is a warning againstthe naive use of the term existence [31].

3.2. The notion of the thing-in-itself by Kant andhidden-variables

According to the empiristic philosophyto be perceivedis identical with existence [31]. Heisenberg admitted:This line of argument then was extended to an extremescepticism by Hume, who denied induction and causationand thereby arrived at a conclusion which if taken se-

riously would destroy the basis of all empirical science[31] but he followed just this line when he rejected thething-in-itself and the law of causality of the Kantsphilosophy. Heisenberg wrote: The disagreeable ques-tion whether the things really exist, which had givenrise to empiristic philosophy, occurred also in Kants sys-tem. But Kant has not followed the line of Berkeley andHume, though that would have been logically consistent.He kept the notion of the thing-in-itself as different fromthe percept, and in this way kept some connection withrealism [31]. He was right that Considering the Kan-tian thing-in-itself Kant had pointed out that we cannotconclude anything from the perception about the thing-

in-itself [31]. But his interpretation of the Kantianthing-in-itself is very doubt: This statement has, asWeizsacker has noticed, its formal analogy in the factthat in spite of the use of the classical concepts in all theexperiments a non-classical behaviour of the atomic ob-

jects is possible. The thing-in-itself is for the atomicphysicist, if he uses this concept at all, finally a mathe-matical structure: but this structure is - contrary to Kant- indirectly deduced from experience[31].

The Kantian thing-in-itself is rather a cause of ourperceptions than a mathematical structure. Any math-ematical structure is a method of description and can-not belong to the percept or the perception. It canonly describe they. Heisenberg and Weizsacker obscuredthe obvious meaning of the Kantian thing-in-itself as acause of our perceptions because of their persuasion thatcausalitycan have only a limited range of applicability[31]. They rejected the thing-in-itself as the cause ofour perceptions as well as they rejected hidden-variablesas the cause of an individual observation of quantum phe-nomenon.

3.3. The Kantian a priori character of the law of

causality and quantum mechanics

The most doubt principle of QM and the new Weltan-schauung by Heisenberg is indeterminism. Consideringthe law of causality Heisenberg wrote: Kant says thatwhenever we observe an event we assume that there isa foregoing event from which the other event must fol-low according to some rule. This is, as Kant states, thebasis of all scientific work. In this discussion it is notimportant whether or not we can always find the forego-ing event from which the other one followed. Actually wecan find it in many cases. But even if we cannot, noth-ing can prevent us from asking what this foregoing event


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might have been and to look for it. Therefore, the law ofcausality is reduced to the method of scientific research;it is the condition which makes science possible. Sincewe actually apply this method, the law of causality is apriori and is not derived from experience [31]. If thelaw of causality is the method of scientific research, asKant stated, then QM proposed by Heisenberg is obvi-ously no-scientific theory. Heisenberg tried to prove that

the scientific method actually changed in this very fun-damental question since Kant [31].His first argument: We have been convinced by expe-

rience that the laws of quantum theory are correct and, ifthey are, we know that a foregoing event as cause for theemission at a given time cannot be found[31]. The otherargument: We know the foregoing event, but not quiteaccurately. We know the forces in the atomic nucleus thatare responsible for the emission of the -particle. Butthis knowledge contains the uncertainty which is broughtabout by the interaction between the nucleus and the restof the world. If we wanted to know why the-particle wasemitted at that particular time we would have to know the

microscopic structure of the whole world including our-selves, and that is impossible [31]. Both arguments aredoubt and have no relation to the fundamental questionabout the law of causality. If this law is a priori and isnot derived from experience then its disproof can not bealso derived from experience. At least, the arguments byHeisenberg could not satisfy Schrodinger, proposing thecat paradox, Einstein and other critics of QM. Neverthe-less Heisenberg stated thatKants arguments for the apriori character of the law of causality no longer apply[31]. Most believers in the soothing philosophy or religionof Heisenberg-Bohr overlook this philosophical statementby Heisenberg.

4. FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKES BY

SLEEPWALKERS

Most sleepwalkers stride unimpeded, first of all,through the new Weltanschauung proposed by Heisen-berg. Partly this carelessness may be explained withthe inconsistency of Heisenberg. In the same paper [22]Heisenberg refutes a real world in which causality holdsand substantiates his uncertainty relation with help ofthe famous uncertainty microscope existing in this realworld in which causality holds. Later on he criticises theCartesian polarity between the res cogitans and the resextensa and notes: In classical physics science started

from the belief - or should one say from the illusion? -that we could describe the world or at least parts of theworld without any reference to ourselves [31]. On theother hand he states that in the Copenhagen interpre-tation of quantum theory we can indeed proceed withoutmentioning ourselves as individuals [31]. Then, whatis fundamental difference between the classical physicsand the Copenhagen interpretation? Heisenberg confusesconstantly the res cogitans and the res extensa. For

example, disproving the claim by Alexandrov thatMen-tion of the observer must be avoided (see above) Heisen-berg writes: Of course the introduction of the observermust not be misunderstood to imply that some kind ofsubjective features are to brought into the description ofnature. The observer has, rather, only the function ofregistering decisions, i.e. processes in space and time,and it does not matter whether the observer is an appa-

ratus or a human being [31]. Any apparatus be-longs to the res extensa whereas any human being isthe res cogitans, at least according to Descartes. Ifthe observer is an apparatus then the Cartesian divisionshould not be criticisedfrom the development of physicsin our time[31] and Heisenberg rather follows than dis-proves Alexandrov stating thatresult of measurementin quantum theory only the objective effect of the interac-tion of the electron with a suitable object, see above. Thenew Weltanschauung by Heisenberg could be unaccept-able not only for most physicists but even for Heisenberghimself if it would be logically consistent.

4.1. The quantum postulate and complementarity

proposed by Bohr objectivate observation

Heisenberg defines: The position to which the Carte-sian partition has led with respect to the res extensawas what one may call metaphysical realism. The world,i.e., the extended things, exist [31]. According to thisdefinition and the Cartesian division the dogmatic real-ism claims that there are no statements concerning theres extensa that cannot be conceived outside of and in-dependently of the res cogitans. Therefore accordingto Heisenberg the term to objectivate should signify to

conceive any real situation outside of and independentlyof the mind of the observer. But he gives fundamentallydifferent definition: We objectivate a statement if weclaim that its content does not depend on the conditionsunder which it can be verified[31]. Heisenberg as well asmost theoretical physicists confuses here what is not mea-surable with the unreal. Therefore his practical realismis very vague. Practical realism assumes that there arestatements that can be objectivated and that in fact thelargest part of our experience in daily life consists of suchstatements[31]. If the term to objectivate signifies onlyindependence on the conditions of verification than theHeisenbergs practical realism can not make a distinc-tion between the orthodox QM and theories of hiddenvariables. This distinction can be made only with helpof the philosophically true definition of the term to ob-

jectivate. We ob jectivate a statement if we claim that amatter of its description (belonging to the res extensa)exists outside of and independently of the mind of the ob-server (belonging to the res cogitans). According to thisdefinition hidden variables can be objectivated whereasthe uncertainty relation, the superposition of states, theDirac jump and the act of observation in QM can not beobjectivated.


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But the true definition of the term to objectivate aswell as the true essence of QM of Heisenberg-Bohr couldbe unacceptable for most physicists. Therefore QM basedon the quantum postulate and complementarity by Bohrhad became the symbol of almost general faith in spiteof its self-contradiction. Bohr had ob jectivated the actof observation when he considered it as an interactionbetween quantum system and measuring instrument. It

must be obvious that the Dirac jump can not be describedby this way. Nevertheless most physicists including sucheminent one as Feynman [13] and Landau [19] had fol-lowed Bohr in his wrong belief. Bell wrote that Lan-dau sat at the feet of Bohr [24]. Therefore Landau wassure that, in speaking of performing a measurement,we refer to the interaction of an electron with a classicalapparatus, which in no way presupposes the presence ofan external observer [19] and could not understand thelogical absurdity of the LL jump. Even the EPR cor-relation [24] could not shake the wrong belief of Bohrand his followers. It must be obvious that non-localityof the EPR correlation precludes any possibility to inter-pret the act of observation realistically as an interactionwith measuring instrument. Nevertheless Bohr tried tosave his quantum postulate and his complementarity. Inhis reply [51] on the EPR paper [24] Bohr criticizes theEPR criterion of the existence of an element of physicalreality: the wording of the above mentioned crite-rion contains an ambiguity as regards the meaning ofthe expression without in any way disturbing a system.Of course there is in a case like that just considered noquestion of a mechanical disturbance of the system underinvestigation during the last critical stage of the measur-ing procedure. But even at this stage there is essentiallythe question of an influence on the very conditions whichdefine the possible types of predictions regarding the fu-

ture behaviour of the system their argumentation doesnot justify their conclusion that quantum mechanical de-scription is essentially incomplete This descriptionmay be characterized as a rational utilization of all pos-sibilities of unambiguous interpretation of measurements,compatible with the finite and uncontrollable interactionbetween the objects and the measuring instruments in the

field of quantum theory.

This criticism is very obscure and Bell quoting it writesin [27]: Indeed I have very little idea what this means. Ido not understand in what sense the word mechanical isused, in characterising the disturbances which Bohr doesnot contemplate, as distinct from those which he does.I do not know what the passage means - an influenceon the very conditions . Could it mean just thatdifferent experiments on the first system give differentkinds of information about the second? But this was justone of the main points of EPR, who observed that onecould learn either the position or the momentum of thesecond system. And then I do not understand the finalreference to uncontrollable interactions between measur-ing instruments and objects, it seems just to ignore theessential point of EPR that in the absence of action at

a distance, only the first system could be supposed dis-turbed by the first measurement and yet definite predic-tions become possible for the second system. Is Bohr justrejecting the premise - no action at a distance - ratherthan refuting the argument?Indeed, Bohr could save hisquantum postulate and his complementarity only reject-ing the premise - no action at a distance. The quantumpostulate implies that any observation of atomic phenom-

ena will involve an interaction with the agency of obser-vation not to be neglected [23]. EPR had proposed amethod of the observation, for example, by Alice the spinstate of the distant particle flying toward Bob at whichno interaction between the agency of observation of Aliceand the Bobs particle can be assumed without action ata distance between they. The Bohrs complementaritycan be valid also if only the premise - no action at adistance could be rejected. This action should be realbecause of the reality of an interaction with the agency ofobservation which belongs to the res extensa, as well asany quantum object. The mind of Alice and Bob belongto the res cogitans. But the quantum postulate andcomplementarity exclude an interaction with the mindof the observer. Bohr and his followers objectivated (inthe meaning of the true definition) the act of observation,the Dirac jump and even the EPR correlation. The ob-

jectiveness of the EPR correlation implies a real actionat a distance between the res extensa contradicting tothe relativity. The neglect by sleepwalkers this essentialconflictbetween the two fundamental pillars of contem-porary theory has resulted to mass delusion.

4.2. The mass delusion and the idea of quantum

computation

This mass delusion shows itself, in particular, in theidea of quantum computation enjoying wide popularitynow[48]. The widespread interest in this idea seems quitevalid. The minimal sizes of nanostructures come nearerto atomic level and subsequent miniaturization will notbe possible in the near future. Therefore exponential in-crease of calculating resources with number of quantumbits has provoked almost boundless enthusiasm. Thisexponential increase seems possible thanks to the princi-ple of superposition of states, interpreted as the cardinalpositive principle of the QM[19]. Feynman[52] proposeduniversal simulation, i.e. a purpose-built quantum sys-tem which could simulate the physical behaviour of anyother, noting that the calculation complexity of quantumsystem increases exponentially with number Nof its ele-ments. Indeed, the number gN= 2

N 1 of independentvariablesj describing, for example, the spin 1/2 statesofN particle

= 1| ... >+2| ... >+...

+gN1| ... >+gN| ... > (15)


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increases exponentially with the number of these particlesthanks to the EPR correlation.

The Feynmans idea of simulation was based on his be-lief in QM as an universal theory. But this belief is false.The idea of universal quantum computer was proposedby David Deutsch as a way to experimentally test theMany Universes Theory of quantum physics - the ideathat when a particle changes, it changes into all possible

forms, across multiple universes [53]. There is impor-tant to remind that the concept of multiple universes wasproposed by Hugh Everett [14] in order to describe theProcess 1, i.e. the act of observation out the domain ofpsychology, i.e. without the mind of the observer. In theearly 1990s several authors sought computational taskswhich could be solved by a quantum computer more effi-ciently than any classical computer. Shor has describedin 1994 [54] an algorithm which was not only efficienton a quantum computer, but also addressed a centralproblem in computer science: that of factorising largeintegers. This possibility has provoked mass enthusiasm.But most authors of numerous publication on quantum

computation ignore the statement of the author of thisidea that quantum computer can be real only in multipleuniverses. Deutsch writes in his book [55]: For whosewho still thinks that there is only one universe I offerthe following problem: to explain a principle of action ofthe Shors algorithm. I do not request to predict that itwill work, as for this purpose it is enough to solve someconsistent equations. I ask you to give an explanation.When the Shors algorithm has factorized numb

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