QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY...

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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

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Front COVer: Radiation is all around us. and the extent of ourexposure to it varies. In the interests of preventing harmful ex-posures, national and international regulatory bodies haveadopted standards of radiation protection and safety, both torpeople in the workplace and the general public. Over the past 3years, the IAEA and five other international organizations haveheaded an unprecedented joint global effort to update and har-monize the international basic standards of radiation safety. Onceendorsed by all sponsoring organizations, these new standardswill supercede any previous ones in this field, providing renewedpractical guidance for the protection of public health and safety(Cover design: Ms. Hannelore Wilczek. IAEA)

Fscing page: Children in the marketplace. Guatemala(Credit: J. Marshall. IAEA)

.CONTENTSFeatures

Topical reports

Radiation safety: New international standardsby Abel Gon:die: I 2

Sea disposal of radioactive wastes: The London Convention 1972by Kirsti-Lii.sa Sjohlom and Gordon Li us ley I 12

Safety standards for radioactive waste management: Documenting international consensusby Ernst Warnecke and Donald Saire I 17

The interface between nuclear safeguards and radioactive waste disposal: Emerging issuesby Gordon Linsley and Abdul Fattah I 22

Education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety: Bridging the gapsby Kami Skornik I 27

Radon in the human environment: Assessing the picturebyJasimuddin U. Ahmed / 32

Radioecological research of the Black Sea: Report from Romaniaby Alexandra Bologa I 36

Departments International Newsbriefs/Datafile / 39

Keep abreast with IAEA publications /51

Databases on line / 52

Posts announced by the IAEA / 54

IAEA conferences and seminars/Co-ordinated research programmes / 56

ISSN 0020-6067 IAEA BULLETIN, VOL. 36, NO. 2 (JUNE 1994)

FEATURES

Radiation safety:New international standards

The forthcoming International Basic Safety Standards forProtection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety ofRadiation Sources are the product of unprecedented co-operation

by Abel J.Gonzalez

B*y the end of the 1980s, a vast amount of newinformation had accumulated to prompt a newlook at the standards governing protectionagainst exposures to ionizing radiation and thesafety of radiation sources.

First and foremost, a re-evaluation of theradioepidemiological findings from Hiroshimaand Nagasaki suggested that exposure to low-level radiation was riskier than previously es-timated.

Other developments — notably the nuclearaccidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and atChernobyl in 1986 with its unprecedentedtransboundary contamination — had a great ef-fect on the public perception of the potentialdanger from radiation exposure. Accidents withradiation sources used in medicine and industryalso have attracted widespread public attention:Cuidad Juarez (Mexico), Mohamadia (Moroc-co), Goiania (Brazil), San Salvador (El Sal-vador), and Zaragoza (Spain) are names that ap-peared in the news after people were injured inradiation accidents. Furthermore, the decade sawthe rediscovery of natural radiation as a cause ofconcern for health: some dwellings were foundto have surprisingly high levels of radon in air;natural radiation exposures of some non-radia-tion-related workers were discovered to be atlevels much higher than the occupational limitsspecified in recognized standards.

Following these developments, the Interna-tional Commission on Radiological Protection(ICRP) in 1990 revised its standing recommen-dations. The concerned organizations of theUnited Nations family and other multinationalagencies promptly followed by triggering areview of their own standards.

Dr Gonzalez is Deputy Director of the IAEA Division ofNuclear Safety.

This article highlights an important result ofthis work for the international harmonization ofradiation safety: specifically, it presents an over-view of the forthcoming International BasicSafety Standards for Protection Against IonizingRadiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sour-ces — the so-called BSS. They have been jointlydeveloped by six organizations — the Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations(FAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), the International Labour Organization(ILO), the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Or-ganization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (NEA/OECD), the Pan AmericanHealth Organization (PAHO), and the WorldHealth Organization (WHO).

The framework for harmonization

In 1991, within the framework of the Inter-agency Committee on Radiation Safety, the sixorganizations created a Joint Secretariat underthe co-ordination of the IAEA. The actioncapped decades of continuing efforts and markedan unprecedented international co-operation thathas involved hundreds of experts from the Mem-ber States of the sponsoring organizations forestablishing the BSS. These international stand-ards supersede any previous ones in the field ofradiation safety, in particular those developedunder the auspices of the IAEA. (See box, nextpage.)

Radiation effects. From the time of earlystudies on X-rays and radioactive minerals it wasrecognized that exposure to high levels of radia-tion can harm exposed tissues of the humanbody. These radiation effects can be clinicallydiagnosed in the exposed individual; they arecalled deterministic effects because, given aradiation dose, they are determined to occur.Posteriorly, long-term studies of populations ex-

IAEA BULLETIN, 2/1994

FEATURES

A number of bodies have supported thework to harmonize international radiationsafety standards which draw upon informationderived from extensive research and develop-ment by scientific and engineering organiza-tions at national and international levels. Forits part, the IAEA has the statutory authoriza-tion to establish or adopt, in consultation and,where appropriate, in collaboration with thecompetent organs of the United Nations andwith the specialized agencies concerned,standards of safety for protection of health...".In discharging this function, the IAEA Board ofGovernors first approved Agency health andsafety measures in March 1960. The Boardapproved the first version of the IAEA's BasicSafety Standards for Radiation Protection inJune 1962 and a revised version in September1965. A third revision was published by the IAEAas the 1982 Edition of Safely Series No. 9; thisedition was jointly sponsored by the IAEA, fieILO, the OECD/NEA, and the WHO.*

The Inter-Agency Committee on Radia-tion Safety (IACRS). A number of years ago,the IAEA promoted the formation of IACRS asa mechanism for consultation and collabora-tion in radiation safety matters with competentorgans of the United Nations and with thespecialized agencies. The Committee aimsinter alia to encourage the co-ordination ofpolicies and consistency in radiation safetyprinciples and standards. Members are theFAO, ILO, NEA/OECD, PAHO, UNSCEAR,WHO, Commission of the European Com-munities (CEC) and the IAEA. A number oforganizations — the ICRP, the InternationalCommission on Radiation Units and Measure-ments (ICRU), the International Electrotechni-cal Commission (IEC), the InternationalRadiation Protection Association (IRPA) andthe International Standards Organization(ISO) — have observer status.

United Nations Scientific Committee onthe Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR).In developing the BSS, UNSCEAR providedthe scientific information on which the stand-ards are based. The Committee — which wasestablished by the UN General Assembly in1955 and today includes representatives from21 countries — compiles, assesses, and dis-seminates information on the health effects ofradiation and on the levels of radiation ex-posure from different sources.

International Commission on Radiologi-cal Protection (ICRP). Radiation safety stand-ards are based on the recommendations of theICRP, a non-governmental scientific organiza-tion founded in 1928. Its most recent recommen-dations were issued in 1990 (Publication 60,Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 21, No.1-3)) and formthe basis of the BSS.

International Commission on RadiationUnits and Measurements (ICRU). The quan-tities and units used in the BSS are primarilythose recommended by the ICRU, a sister or-ganization of the ICRP. (See box, next page.)

The International Nuclear Safety Ad-visory Group (INSAG). This advisory body ofnuclear safety experts serves as a forum forthe exchange of information and for theprovision of advice to the IAEA on safety is-sues of international significance. In 1988, itissued through the IAEA the Basic Safety Prin-ciples for Nuclear Power Plants (Safety SeriesNo. 75-INSAG-3). Many of these principles arerelevant to the safety of other radiation sour-ces and installations and have been used inthe BSS.

* For a description of these previous internationalstandards see the author's article in the IAEA Bul-letin; Vol. 25, No. 3; (September 1983).

Internationalharmonization inradiation safety

posed to radiation, especially of the survivors of theatomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, havedemonstrated that exposure to radiation also has apotential for the delayed induction of malignanciesand possibly of hereditary effects. These radiationeffects cannot be related to any particular in-dividual exposed but can be inferred fromepidemiological studies of large populations;they are called stochastic effects because of theiraleatory statistical nature. (See box, next page.)

Human activities and radiation exposure:practices and interventions. Many beneficialhuman activities involve the exposure of peopleto radiation from both natural and man-madesources. These activities, which are planned in

advance, may be expected to increase the back-ground exposure that people already receive:they are termed practices.

On the other hand, there are radiation ex-posures incurred de facto by people. The ac-tivities which are intended to reduce these ex-posures are termed interventions.

Because of the radiation effects on health,practices and interventions need to be subject tocertain standards of radiation safety to protectthose persons adventitiously exposed.The BSSare intended to harmonize internationally thebasic requirements for protecting people againstundue radiation exposure in practices and inter-ventions. (See box, page 5.)


FEATURES

Radiation health effects

Exposure to radiation can cause detrimental health ef-fects. At large acute doses, radiation effects — such asnausea, reddening of the skin and, in severe cases, acutesyndromes — are clinically expressed in exposed in-dividuals within a short period of time after exposure. Largechronic dose rates also cause clinically detectabledeleterious effects. These effects are called deterministicbecause they are certain to occur if the dose exceeds acertain threshold level.

At low doses as well, radiation exposure can plausiblyinduce severe health effects, such as malignancies, whichare statistically detectable in a population, but cannot beunequivocally associated with an exposed individual.Hereditary effects due to radiation exposure have beenstatistically detected in mammals and are presumed to occurin humans as well. All these statistically detectable effectsare called stochastic effects because of their aleatorynature.These effects are expressed after a latency period,presumably over the entire range of doses without athreshold level. In addition, there is a possibility of healtheffects in children exposed to radiation in utero duringcertain periods of pregnancy, including a greater likelihoodof leukaemia and severe mental retardation.

Deterministic effects are the result of a process of cell killingdue to radiation exposure, which, if extensive enough, can

impair the function of the exposed tissue. The severity of aparticular deterministic effect is higher as doses increaseabove the threshold which varies depending on the type ofeffects. The lower thresholds are a few sieverts for acuteexposures and a few hundred millisieverts per year forchronic exposures. The likelihood of incurring the deter-ministic effect, therefore, is nil at lower doses and ap-proaches certainty at threshold doses.

Stochastic effects may develop if an irradiated cell ismodified rather than killed. Modified cells may, after a prolongeddelay, develop into a cancer. The body's repair and defensemechanisms make this a very improbable outcome as closesbecome small; nevertheless, there is no evidence of a thresholddose below which cancer cannot result. The probability ofoccurrence of cancer is higher for higher doses, but the severityof any cancer that may result from irradiation is independent ofthe dose. If a stem cell whose function is to transmit geneticinformation is damaged owing to radiation exposure, it is con-ceivable that hereditary effects of various types may develop inthe descendants of the exposed person.The likelihood ofstochastic effects is presumed to be proportional to the dosereceived without dose threshold. The likelihood of severe radia-tion-induced stochastic effects during a lifetime is currentlyestimated to be around 5% per sievert of radiation dose for thegeneral population.

Quantities and units in radiation safety

Although most of the requirements of the BSS are qualita-tive by nature, they also establish quantitative limitations andguidance levels. The quantities and units used in the BSS arebased on the ICRP and ICRU recommendations.

The main physical quantities on which the BSS arebased are: the activity or rate of emission of radiation froma radionuclide and; the absorbed dose or energy absorbedby a unit mass of a substance from the radiation to which itis exposed.

The unit of activity is the reciprocal second (number ofemissions per second) which is named becquerel (Bq). Theunit of absorbed dose is the joule per kilogram, called thegray (Gy).

The absorbed dose is the basic physical dosimetricquantity of the BSS but it is not entirely satisfactory forradiation protection purposes because effectiveness indamaging human tissue differs for different types of ionizingradiation. Consequently, the absorbed dose in tissues ismultiplied by a weighting factor to take account of the effec-tiveness of the given type of radiation in inducing healtheffects.

The equivalent dose is the quantity resulting fromweighting the absorbed dose with the effectiveness of theradiation type. But the likelihood of injurious effects due to agiven equivalent dose differs for different organs and tissues.Consequently, the equivalent dose to each organ and tissueis multiplied by a tissue weighting factor to take account ofthe organ radiosensitivity.

The effective dose is the quantity resulting from the sumtotal of the equivalent doses weighted by the radiosensitivityof organs and tissues for all exposed organs and tissues inan individual.The unit of equivalent dose and effectivedose is the same as the unit of absorbed dose, namely jouleper kilogram, but the name used for the unit is sievert (Sv).

When radionuclides are taken into the body, the resultingdose is received throughout the period of time suchradionuclides remain in the body.

The committed dose is the total dose delivered during theperiod of time the radionuclides remain in the body, and iscalculated as the time integral of the rate of receipt of the dose.Any relevant dose restriction is applied to the committed dosefrom the intake. The unit of committed dose is the sievert.

The total impact of the radiation exposure delivered by agiven practice or source depends on the number of in-dividuals exposed and on the dose they receive.

The collective dose, defined as the summation of theproducts of the mean dose in the various groups of ex-posed people and the number of individuals in the group,is therefore used to characterize the radiation impact of apractice or source.The unit of collective dose is theman-sievert.

For operational purposes, the BSS use the ambientdose equivalent and the personal dose equivalent.Theseare quantities defined by the ICRU to facilitate measure-ment and monitoring while conforming with the radiationprotection basic quantities.


FEATURES

Objective of the BSS

The declared aim of the BSS is to prevent theoccurrence of deterministic effects of radiationand to restrict the likelihood of occurrence ofstochastic effects.

For any justified practice, the objective isachieved by requirements for protecting the ex-posed individuals and for ensuring the safety ofthe source of exposure. Thus,• the risk to any exposed individual is res-tricted, regardless of where or when the in-dividual would commit the exposure, by keepingindividual doses below specific dose limits; and• any source of exposure is kept safe by, interalia, a) constraining both the doses expected tobe delivered by it with certainty and also theprobability of delivering radiation doses due to(potential) exposures that may but are not certainto occur; b) keeping the delivered doses, theprobabilities of incurring doses, and the numberof exposed individuals as low as reasonablyachievable under the prevailing circumstances;and c) applying to the source a number of ad-ministrative, technical, and managerial require-ments intended to ensure its safety.

For any justified interventions, the objectiveis achieved by:• keeping, under any foreseeable circumstance,the individual doses lower than the thresholdlevels for deterministic effects; and• keeping all doses expected to be averted bythe intervention as low as reasonably achievableunder the prevailing circumstances.

Scope of the BSS

Exclusions. Any radiation exposure essential-ly unamenable to control through the BSS require-ments is excluded from the BSS scope. Examplesare the exposure caused by the naturally radioactivepotassium, which is a normal constituent of thebody, exposure to cosmic rays at ground level, andgenerally other naturally occurring exposures.

The BSS, moreover, only apply to:• human beings (it is considered that standardsof protection that are adequate for this purposewill also ensure that no other species isthreatened as a population, even if individuals ofthe species might potentially be harmed); and• ionizing radiation, namely gamma and X-rays and alpha, beta and other particles that caninduce ionization; (the BSS do not apply to non-ionizing radiation, neither do they apply to thecontrol of other non-radiological aspects ofhealth and safety).

Apart from these exclusions, the BSS scopeextends to any practices, including any radiation

Practices and interventions

Planned human activities that add radiation exposure to that whichpeople normally receive due to background radiation, or that increasethe likelihood of incurring exposure, are termed practices. The humanactivities that seek to reduce the existing radiation exposure, or theexisting likelihood of incurring exposure, are termed interventions.

The BSS apply to both the commencement and the continuationof practices that involve or could involve radiation exposure, and alsoto existing, de facto situations in which exposure or its likelihood canbe reduced or ruled out by means of some intervention. For a practice,provisions for radiation protection and safety can be made before itscommencement, and the associated radiation exposures and theirlikelihood can be constrained from the outset. In the case of interven-tion, the circumstances giving rise to exposure or the likelihood ofexposure already exist, and their reduction can only be achieved bymeans of remedial or protective actions.

The table presents the UNSCEAR summary of the relativeradiological impact from some practices as well as from severeaccidents that required intervention. The levels of radiation exposureare expressed as equivalent periods of exposures to natural sources.

Levels of radiation exposure

Exposure resultingfrom

Basis Equivalent period ofglobal exposure to

average naturalbackground

Nuclear weaponstesting

Apparatus andsubstances used inmedicine

Severe accidents

Nuclear powergeneration (undernormal operatingconditions)

Occupationalactivities

All past tests 2.3 years

One year of practice atthe current rate 90 days

Accidents to date 20 days

Total nucleargeneration to date 10 daysOne year of practice atthe current rate 1 day

One year ofoccupational activitiesat the current rate 8 hours

sources within those practices, provided they arenot exempted from the BSS requirements, and toany interventions, including any related exposures.

Practices. The practices to which the BSSapply include:• the use of radiation or radioactive substancesfor medical, industrial, agricultural, educational,training, and research purposes; and• the generation of energy by nuclear power,comprising any activity in the nuclear fuel cyclewhich involves or could involve exposure toradiation or radioactive substances.

Sources. Within a practice, the BSS apply toany source of radiation being used in the prac-tice, both natural sources and artificial sources,including:


FEATURES

The justification of practices and interventions

The justification of practices and interventionsinvolves many factors, including social and politi-cal aspects, with radiological considerations usual-ly playing a minor role. Some practical guidanceon justification for practices and interventionsprovided by the BSS is summarized here.

Unjustified practices. The BSS provideguidance on unjustified practices. These prac-tices include those that would result in anincrease of the amount of radioactive substan-ces in food, beverages, cosmetics, or othercommodity or product intended for ingestion,inhalation or percutaneous intake by, or ap-plication to, a human being (except for medicalpurposes); and practices involving thefrivolous use of radiation in commodities orproducts such as toys, personal jewelry, oradornments. Additionally, certain medical ex-posures are also deemed to be not justified:radiological examination for occupational,legal, or health insurance purposes; radiologi-cal examinations for theft detection purposes;exposure of population groups for purposesof mass screening; and the exposure ofhumans for medical research (unless it is inaccordance with the provisions of the HelsinkiDeclaration, follows the guidelines for its ap-plication prepared by the Council for Interna-tional Organizations of Medical Sciences(CIOMS) and WHO, and is subject to theadvice of an Ethical Review Committee andto applicable national and local regulations).

Interventions. Intervention shall be justifiedif it is expected to achieve more good than harm,

having regard to health, social and economicfactors. The BSS establish that protective ac-tions shall be nearly always justified if thedoses in an intervention situation are expectedto approach the values in the table below.However, actual intervention levels should beoptimized and usually lead to much lowerdoses (see table, page 10).

Individual dose levels at which Interventionshall be expected under any circumstances

Acute exposures

Organ or Tissue Projected absorbeddose to the organ ortissue in less than 2

days(Gy)

Whole body

Lung

Skin

Thyroid

Lens of the eye

Gonads

Chronic exposures

Organ or Tissue Annual equivalentdose rate (Sv/year)

Gonads

Lens of the eye

Bone marrow

0.20.10.4

• radioactive substances and devices that con-tain radioactive substances or produce radiation,such as consumer products, sealed sources, un-sealed sources, and radiation generators; and• installations and facilities which containradioactive substances or devices which produceradiation, such as irradiation installations, minesand mills processing radioactive ores, installa-tions processing radioactive substances, nuclearinstallations, and radioactive waste managementfacilities. (When an installation could releaseradioactive substances or emit radiation into theenvironment, it is as a whole considered as asource and the BSS apply to each individualsource of radiation within the installation and tothe installation as a whole.)

Exemption and clearance. Practices, andsources within a practice, may be exempted fromBSS requirements if they meet established ex-emption criteria. The exemption criteria ensurethat the individual risks arising from an ex-

empted source are negligible and that the collec-tive radiological impact does not warrantregulatory concern. Moreover, an exemptedsource must be inherently safe.

The exemption criteria are also expressed inexemption levels, i.e. levels of [radioactivity oractivity concentration in materials below whichexemption is almost automatic.

Materials and objects from practices andsources already subject to BSS requirementsmay be released from these requirements subjectto satisfying clearance levels which shall notexceed the specified exemption levels.

Interventions. The intervention situations towhich the BSS apply include any de facto situa-tion causing people's exposure which can jus-tifiably be reduced by intervention measures.

These include:• emergency situations such as those createdby environmental contamination in the aftermathof an accident; and


FEATURES

• chronic situations such as exposure to naturalsources of radiation (e.g. radon in dwellings) andto radioactive residues from previous events andactivities (e.g. chronic environmental con-tamination from past activities).

Exposures. The BSS apply to any exposuredue to:• any relevant practice or source, including:normal exposures (i.e. exposures that are certainto occur); potential exposures (i.e. exposures thatmay or may not occur); occupational exposures(i.e. exposures of workers); medical exposures(i.e. mainly exposures of patients); or public ex-posures (i.e. the remaining type of exposures).• any relevant intervention situation involving:emergency exposure, including exposures re-quiring prompt intervention and other temporaryexposure due to situations in which an emergen-cy plan or emergency procedures have been ac-tivated; and chronic exposure, including ex-posure to natural radiation sources, exposure dueto radioactive residues from previous events, andexposure due to radioactive contamination frompractices and sources which, for whateverreason, have not been under regulatory control.

Natural sources. According to the BSS, ex-posure to natural sources shall normally be con-sidered as a chronic exposure situation and besubject to requirements for intervention. Excep-tions to this are: activities involving natural sour-ces that cause increased public exposure due to,for example, discharges of radioactive substan-ces into the environment and certain occupation-al exposures to radon which shall be subject tothe requirements for practices if the interventioncannot reduce such exposure below action levelsgiven by the BSS.

Obligations

The BSS establish general obligations inrelation to both practices and interventions. Theobligations are that, unless the exposure is ex-cluded from the BSS:• no practice shall be adopted, introduced, con-ducted, discontinued, or ceased and no sourcewithin the practice shall, as applicable, be mined,milled, processed, designed, manufactured, con-structed, assembled, acquired, imported, ex-ported, sold, loaned, hired, received, sited, lo-cated, commissioned, possessed, used, operated,maintained, repaired, transferred, decommis-sioned, transported, stored or disposed of, exceptin accordance with the requirements of the BSS,unless the practice or source is exempted fromthe requirements of the BSS; and• whenever justified, existing de facto ex-posures shall be reduced through intervention,

individual dose limitation

The dose limits established by the BSS are intended to ensurethat no individual is committed to unacceptable risk due to radiationexposure.

Dose Limits for Occupational Exposure

• an effective dose of 20 mSv per year averaged over 5 consecutiveyears;• an effective dose of 50 mSv in any single year;• an equivalent dose for the lens of the eye of 150 mSv in a year;and• an equivalent dose for the extremities (hands and feet) and for theskin of 500 mSv in a year.

(In special circumstances, workers undertaking intervention maybe exposed to up to 100 mSv in a single year.)

Dose Limits tor Members of the Public

• an effective dose of 1 mSv in a year;• in special circumstances, an effective dose up to 5 mSv in a singleyear provided that: the average dose over 5 consecutive years doesnot exceed 1 mSv per year; and the dose for special circumstancesis specifically authorized by the regulatory authority;• an equivalent dose for the lens of the eye of 15 mSv in a year; and• an equivalent dose for the skin of 50 mSv in a year.

Application of the Dose Limits

The dose limits apply to the sum of the relevant doses fromexternal exposure in the specified period and the relevant committeddoses from intakes in the same period (the period for calculating thecommitted dose shall normally be 50 years for adults and 70 years forintakes by children). Compliance with this requirement can be deter-mined through compliance with the condition that the personal doseequivalent from penetrating radiation during the year plus the sum ofcommitted doses due to the intake of radionuclides during the yearare lower than the relevant limit.

by undertaking remedial or protective actions inaccordance with the requirements of the BSS.

Additionally, the BSS establish that anysource containing radioactive substances shall betransported in accordance with the provisions ofthe IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport ofRadioactive Material (Safety Series No. 6, IAEA,Vienna (1990)) and with any applicable interna-tional convention.

Requirements

To enable fulfillment of the above obliga-tions, the BSS establish the basic requirementsfor protection and safety.

The requirements have to be fulfilled in allactivities involving radiation exposure with the


FEATURES

Guidance levels for diagnostic radiological proceduresfor a typical adult patient

Radiography

Examination

Lumbar spine

Abdomen, intravenous urography &cholecystographyPelvisHip jointChest

Thoracic spine

Dental

Skull

Entrance surface absorbed doseper radiograph (mGy)AP 10

LAT 30

LSJ 40

AP 10

AP 10

AP 10

PA 0.4

LAT 1.5

AP 7

LAT 20

Periapical 7AP 5

PA 5

LAT 3

PA= Posterior - anterior projection, LAT= Lateral protection, LSJ= Lumbo- sacral-pm projection; AP=

Anterior • posterior protection

Examination

HeadLumbar spineAbdomen

Multiple scan average absorbeddose (mGy)

50

35

25

MammographyAverage glandular dose per cranlo-caudal projection

1 mGy (without grid)3 mGy (with grid)

FluoroscopyMode of operation Entrance surface absorbed dose

rate (mGy/min)NormalHigh level

25

100

force that is derived from the statutory provisionsof the sponsoring organizations. They do notentail any obligation for States to bring theirlegislation into conformity with them, nor arethey intended to replace the provisions of nation-al laws or regulations, or the standards in force.Rather, they aim to serve as a practical guide for

public authorities and services, employers andworkers, specialized radiation protection bodies,and safety and health committees, laying downbasic principles and indicating the differentaspects that should be covered by an effectiveradiation protection programme.

Moreover, they are not intended to be appliedas they stand in all countries and regions. Rather,they should be interpreted to take account of localsituations, technical resources, and the scale ofinstallations — factors which will determine thepotential for application. As the BSS cover a broadrange of practices and sources, many of the require-ments have been drafted in general terms so thatany given requirement may have to be fulfilleddifferently according to the type of practice, andsource, or intervention, the nature of the operations,and the potential for exposures.

Requirements for practices. The BSS in-clude requirements for administration, radiationprotection, management, technological aspectsand verification:

Administrative requirements. These includenotification of intentions to carry out practices;registration or licensing of sources; respon-sibility of registrants and licensees; and exemp-tion and decontrol (clearance) of sources.

Radiation protection requirements.The.seinclude justification of practices; dose limits forindividuals; optimization for protection andsafety; dose constraints for sources; andguidance levels for medical exposure. (See boxesand tables, pages 5. 6, 7, and 8.)

Management requirements. These includesafety culture; quality assurance; human factors;and qualified experts. (See box, page 9.)

Technical requirements. These includesecurity; defense in depth; and good engineeringpractice. (See box, page 9.)

Verification. This includes safety assess-ments; compliance; and records.

Requirements for intervention. The BSS es-tablish administrative and radiation protection re-quirements for intervention as follows:

Administrative requirements. These includeresponsibilities of intervening organizations,registrants and licensees; and notification ofsituations requiring protective actions.

Radiation protection requirements. Theseinclude justification of intervention; and optimiza-tion of intervention and action levels. I See box andtables, page 6 and 10.)

The BSS are appended with detailed require-ments for all types of exposure as follows:

For occupational exposures: Responsibi-lities of employers, registrants, licensees,workers; conditions of service (special compen-satory arrangements, pregnant workers, alterna-tive employment, conditions for young persons):


FEATURES

BSS technical requirements

The BSS establish technical requirementsthat address:

Security of sources. Sources are to be keptsecure so as to prevent theft or damage and toprevent any unauthorized person from carryingout any of the actions specified in the obligationsof the BSS, by ensuring that: • control of asource not be relinquished without complyingwith all relevant requirements specified in therelevant registration or licence and without im-mediately communicating to the RegulatoryAuthority, and when applicable to the relevantsponsoring organization, information regardingany lost, stolen, or missing source; • a sourcenot be transferred unless the receiver posses-ses a valid authorization; and • a periodicinventory of sources be conducted at a fre-quency appropriate to confirm that they are intheir assigned locations and are secure.

Defense In depth. A multilayer system ofprotection and safety provisions commensuratewith the radiation hazards involved is to be ap-plied to sources, such that a failure at one layeris compensated for or corrected by subsequentlayers, for the purposes of: • preventing acci-dents that may cause exposure; • mitigating the

consequences of any such accident, if it doesoccur; and e restoring sources to safe condi-tions after any such accident.

Good engineering practice. As ap-plicable, the siting or location, design, con-struction, assembly, commissioning, opera-tion, maintenance, and decommissioning ofsources within practices is to be based onsound engineering which shall, as ap-propriate: • reflect approved codes andstandards and other appropriately docu-mented instruments; • be supported by reli-able managerial and organizational features,with the aim of ensuring protection and safetythroughout the life of the sources; • includesufficient safety margins for the design andconstruction of the sources and for operationsinvolving the sources, such as to assure reli-able performance during normal operation,taking into account quality, redundancy, andinspectability, with emphasis on preventingaccidents, mitigating their consequences,and restricting any future exposures; and •take account of relevant developments intechnical criteria, as well as the results of anyrelevant research on protection or safety andlessons from experience.

BSS management requirements

The BSS has established a number of managementrequirements to ensure radiation safety. They address:

Safety culture. A safety culture is to be established andmaintained which encourages a questioning and learning at-titude to protection and safety and to discourage complacency,by ensuring that: • policies and procedures be established thatidentify the protection and safety of the public and workers asbeing of the highest priority; • problems affecting protection andsafety be promptly identified and corrected, commensurate withtheir importance; • each individual's responsibilities includingthose at senior management levels for protection and safety beclearly identified and that each individual be suitably trained andqualified; • dear lines of authority for protection and safetydecisions be established; and • organizational arrangementsand lines of communications be established that result in anappropriate flow of protection and safety information at andbetween the various levels of the organization.

Quality assurance (QA). QA programmes are to be es-tablished that provide, as appropriate: • adequate assurancethat the specified requirements related to protection and safetyare satisfied; and • quality control mechanisms and proce-dures to review and assess the overall effectiveness ofprotection and safety measures.

Human factors. Provisions are to be made for reduc-ing as far as practicable the contribution of human error

to accidents and other events that could give rise to ex-posures, by ensuring that: • all personnel on whom protec-tion and safety depend be appropriately trained andqualified such that they understand their responsibilitiesand perform their duties with appropriate judgement ac-cording to defined procedures; • sound ergonomic prin-ciples be followed as appropriate in designing equipmentand operating procedures, so as to facilitate the safe opera-tion or use of equipment, to minimize the possibility thatoperating errors will lead to accidents, and to reduce thepossibility of misinterpreting indications of normal and ab-normal conditions; • appropriate equipment, safety sys-tems, procedural requirements, and other necessaryprovisions be provided to reduce, as far as practicable, thepossibility that human error will lead to inadvertent or unin-tentional exposure of any person; • means be provided fordetecting human errors and for correcting or compensatingfor them; and • intervention in the event of failure of safetysystems or of other protective measures be facilitated.

Qualified experts. Qualified experts are to be identifiedand made available for providing advice regarding the ob-servance of the BSS. Registrants and licensees have toinform the Regulatory Authority of the arrangements madeto provide the expertise necessary for observance of theBSS. This information shall include the scope of the func-tions of any qualified experts identified.


FEATURES

Guidelines forintervention levels

in emergencyexposuresituations

Urgent protective actions

Action Avertable dose

Sheltering 1 0 mSv for a period of no more than 2 days

Iodine prophylaxis 1 00 mGy (committed absorbed dose to the thyroid)

Evacuation 50 mSv for a period of no more than 1 week

Withdrawal and substitution of foodstuffs(From the CODEX Alimentarius Commission guideline levels for radionuclides in food moving in international

trade following accidental contamination)

Radionuclides

Caesium-134, Caesium-137,Ruthenium-103, Ruthenium-106,

Strontium-89

lodine-131

Strontium-90

Americium-241, Plutonium-238,Plutonium-239

Foods destined for generalconsumption (kBq/kg)

1

0.1

0.01

Milk, infant foods, and drinkingwater (kBq/kg)

1

0.1

0.001

Long-term actions

ActionAvertable dose

Initiating temporary relocation 30 mSv in a month

Terminating temporary relocation 1 0 mSv in a month

Considering permanent resettlement 1 Sv in a lifetime

and requirements for classification of areas; localrules and supervision; personal protective equip-ment; co-operation between employers,registrants and licensees; individual monitoringand exposure assessment; monitoring of theworkplace; health surveillance; records; anddose limitation in special circumstances.

For medical exposure: Responsibilities; jus-tification of medical exposures; optimization ofprotection for medical exposures; guidance levels;dose constraints; maximum activity in therapypatients discharged from hospitals; investigationof accidental medical exposures; records.

For public exposure: Responsibilities; con-trol of visitors; sources of external irradiation;radioactive contamination in enclosed spaces;radioactive waste; discharge of radioactive sub-stances into the environment; radiation and en-vironmental monitoring; consumer products.

For potential exposure — safety of sources:Responsibilities; safety assessment; require-ments for design; requirements for operations;quality assurance.

For emergency exposure situations: Respon-sibilities; emergency plans; intervention foremergency exposure situations; assessment andmonitoring after accidents; cessation of interven-tion after an accident; protection of workers un-dertaking an intervention.

For chronic exposure situations: Respon-sibilities; remedial action plans; action levels forchronic exposure situations.

An international effort

The BSS establish a large number of interre-lated requirements aimed at ensuring radiationprotection and safety. (See figure, next page.)Although the majority of requirements are of aqualitative nature, the BSS also establish manyquantitative requirements in terms of restrictionsor guidance on the dose that may be incurred bypeople. The range of these doses is large, spread-ing over four orders of magnitude: from dosesthat are considered so minute as not to warrant

10 IAEA BULLETIN, 2/1994

FEATURES

1

1000

100

10

1

0.1

0.01

mplicit quantitative requirementsand guidance for practices

Annual dose: (mSv)

- -« j Intervention always justified j

_ f i Limit for workers undertaking: intervention; t i Limit for workersI (normal practice, yearly)- f Limit for workers

(normal practice, average)

_, *r—j Range for optimized interventions |

; ]-•— i — i— (flange for optimized remedial action (radon)|- > ^_ Range for optimized protection~ and constraints (occupational)- " '• — Wor/d average background exposure

„ Public dose limit: (individual members of the public)

^ Range of constraints(public, individual sources)

zr

- •" — Range of optimized protection (public)

— • Exemption level

The BSS encompass a large number of interrelatedrequirements which, in their entirety, provide adequate

protection and safety. It is therefore impossible toparaphrase these requirements without losing their

essence. The figure at right, however, attempts to providea simplified visual description on how the BSS work for

practices. The chart presumes compliance with theadministrative requirements for registration or licensing.

regulatory concern, but rather exemption fromthe requirements, to doses that are so large as tomake intervention almost mandatory. (See figure.)

The BSS mark the culmination of attemptsthat have continued over the past several decadestowards the harmonization of radiation protec-tion and safety standards internationally. Follow-ing this unprecedented international effort todraft and review the Standards, the BSS wereendorsed at a meeting of a Technical Committeeheld at IAEA headquarters in Vienna in Decem-ber 1993. It was attended by 127 experts from 52countries and 11 organizations.

The IAEA's Board of Governors is expected toapprove the BSS soon. Thereafter, the IAEA willissue the BSS in an interim publication (in Englishonly). Once the Standards have been formallyendorsed by the other sponsoring organizations,they will be issued in the IAEA Safety Series asa final publication in Arabic, Chinese, English,French, Russian and Spanish. G

How the BSS work for practices

Notificationof a

practice

Yes, exposure is unamenableto control Outside

theBSS scope

Yes, doses are trivial and thesource is inherently safe BSS

requirementsdo not apply

No

No, e.g. it involves frivolous useof radiation

Yes

Isindividual

dose limitationrespected?

Is theprotectionoptimized?

No, the public or occupationalexposure of an individual

will exceed dose limits

No, doses are not ALARAor exceed constraints

No, the source does not complywith managerial or

technical requirements

Practicerejected

Yes

Are protectionand safetyverified?

Registrationor

Licensing

No '/ oan/ sourc^^ decent

Yes, it isbelow

clearancelevels

IAEA BULLETIN, 2/1994 11

FEATURES

Sea disposal of radioactive wastes:The London Convention 1972

The IAEA's technical advisory role under the internationalconvention is changing in response to global developments

by Kirsti-LiisaSjoblom and

Gordon Linsley

lor many years the oceans were used for thedisposal of industrial wastes, including radioac-tive wastes. In the 1970s, the practice becamesubject to an international convention whichhad the aim of regularizing procedures andpreventing activities which could lead tomarine pollution. As time went on, pressuremounted, especially from smaller countries notengaged in ocean disposal, for waste disposalactivities to be further restricted. In November1993, it was finally decided that the disposal ofindustrial and radioactive wastes at sea shouldbe prohibited.

This article traces the history of radioactivewaste disposal at sea from the time when it firstcame within the view of international organiza-tions up to the present.

Law of the Sea

In 1958, the United Nations Conference onthe Law of the Sea concluded that "every Stateshall take measures to prevent pollution of thesea from dumping of radioactive wastes, takinginto account any standards and regulations whichmay be formulated by competent internationalorganizations".

Pursuant to its responsibilities, the IAEA setup successive scientific panels to provideguidance and recommendations to ensure thatthe disposal of radioactive wastes in the seawould not result in unacceptable hazards to man.The first of these meetings was held in 1957 andresulted in the publication of IAEA Safety SeriesNo. 5, Radioactive Waste Disposal into the Sea(1961).

Ms Sjbblom and Mr Linsley are staff members in the IAEADivision of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management.

London Convention 1972

Following the United Nations Conference onthe Human Environment, held in Stockholm in1972, the Convention on the Prevention ofMarine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes andOther Matter (London Convention 1972, former-ly referred to as the London Dumping Conven-tion) was established and entered into force in1975.* For the regulation of materials to be dis-posed of in the marine environment, "black" and"grey" lists were established. The disposal ofsubstances on the "black" list (Annex I to theConvention) was prohibited except in tracequantities. Substances on the "grey" list (AnnexII to the Convention) were subject to "specialcare" measures to ensure that their disposal —which had to be carried out under the provisionsof a "special permit" — would not have adverseeffects on the marine environment.

High-level radioactive wastes (HLW) wereincluded in the "black" list. The IAEA — whichwas recognized by the Contracting Parties to theLondon Convention as the competent interna-tional body in matters relating to radioactivewaste disposal and radiation protection — wasentrusted with the responsibility for definingHLW unsuitable for dumping at sea.

Radioactive wastes and other matter not onthe "black" list (low- and intermediate-levelwastes) were included in the "grey" list. In issu-ing the special permits for the dumping of thesetypes of radioactive wastes, countries were ad-

*For the purposes of the Convention, "dumping" means (i)any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter fromvessels, aircraft, platforms, or other man-made structures atsea; (ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft.platforms, or other man-made structures at sea; and "wastes"or "other matter" means materials and substances of an> kind,form, and description. In this article, the word wastes is usedalone in reference to this definition.


FEATURES

vised to take the recommendations of the IAEAfully into account.

Developments in regulating the seadisposal of radioactive wastes

In fulfillment of its obligations to the LondonConvention, the IAEA formulated and peri-odically reviewed its definition of HLW andrecommendations for the use of nationalauthorities on the issuance of "special permits"for the dumping of radioactive wastes other thanHLW. In 1974, the IAEA presented the firstprovisional definition and recommendations tothe London Convention. The most recentrevision, published as IAEA Safety Series No.78, was issued in 1986.

IAEA recommendations include, amongother things, the requirement that the secretariatof the London Convention — the InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO) headquartered inLondon — be notified prior to dumping and thatrecords be kept during the dumping operations.Selection criteria for dump sites and guidancefor performing the environmental assessmentsare also included. The revisions of the definitionand recommendations between 1974 and 1986were prepared to take into account improve-ments in the understanding of the dispersion andbehaviour of radionuclides in the marine en-vironment and of developments in radiationprotection criteria.

The dumping of radioactive wastes at seatook place solely under national authority until1977. At that time, the Organization forEconomic Co-operation and Development(OECD) established a "Multilateral Consultationand Surveillance Mechanism" to co-ordinate theocean disposal of its member states. Later, theOECD also established a Co-ordinated Researchand Environmental Surveillance Programme(CRESP) to provide additional information forassessing the suitability of the Northeast Atlanticdumpsite, which was used by OECD memberstates.

The former Soviet Union, although becom-ing a Contracting Party to the London Conven-tion in 1976, continued, within the context of itsnational regulations, to dump high-, inter-mediate-, and low-level radioactive wastes in theArctic Seas and in the Northwest Pacific withoutinforming the Contracting Parties. The dumpingoperations were carried out in zones of theoceans other than those approved by the IAEAand at lesser depths than recommended. After thedisintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, theRussian Federation continued to dump low-levelradioactive wastes.

Regional conventions

After the institution of the London Conven-tion, several regional conventions for the protec-tion of the sea were established, either under theumbrella of the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) or independently.

Many of these, while promoting the objec-tives of the London Convention, adopted morerestrictive approaches to the regulation of dump-ing. Thus, the sea disposal of radioactive wastewas totally prohibited in the Baltic Sea (1974),Mediterranean Sea (1976), Black Sea (1992),and in certain areas of the South Pacific (1985)and Southeast Pacific (1989).

Temporary moratorium andinter-governmental review

By the early 1980s, there was increasing dis-quiet among many of the Contracting Parties tothe London Convention over the continuingpractice of sea dumping of low-level radioactivewastes. This led to a proposal being made at theConvention's 1983 Consultative Meeting toprohibit all sea dumping of radioactive wastes.After a vote, the meeting adopted a voluntarymoratorium on the sea dumping of all types ofradioactive waste pending a review of the safetyof the practice which was to be carried out by anindependent panel of scientific experts.

An "expanded panel" of experts concluded in1985 that "no scientific or technical groundscould be found to treat the option of sea dumpingdifferently from other available options whenapplying internationally accepted principles ofradiation protection to radioactive waste dis-posal". At the ninth Consultative Meeting in1985, it was generally agreed that the scientificreport had not shown the dumping of low-levelradioactive wastes at sea to be environmentallydangerous but neither had it shown that dumpingwas harmless. At this point, the Contracting Par-ties decided to take a broader view of the issue,recognizing that there were political, legal, so-cial, and economic issues involved besides thepurely technical aspects. Thus, the next Consult-ative Meeting (1986) established an Inter-governmental Panel of Experts on RadioactiveWaste Disposal (IGPRAD) to consider the widerpolitical, legal, economic, and social aspects oflow-level radioactive waste dumping at sea. Thevoluntary moratorium on sea dumping ofradioactive wastes was extended accordingly,pending the panel's final report.

IGPRAD was divided into two workinggroups, one to examine the political, legal,economic, and social aspects and the other to


FEATURES

Sea disposal of radioactive waste by different countries (TBq)

Time of disposal TotalsAtlantic sitesBelgium

FranceGermany

ItalyNetherlandsSwedenSwitzerlandUnited Kingdom

United StatesSubtotalPacific sitesJapanKorea, Republic ofNew ZealandRussian Federation

Soviet Union (former)

United StatesSubtotalArctic sitesSoviet Union (former)SubtotalAll sitesTotal

1960-19821967-1969

1967

1969

1967-19821969

1969-19821949-19821949-1967

1955-19691968-1972

1954-19761992-19931966-19911946-1976

1960-1991

2120.03530

0.2

0.2

336.03.2

4419.035 078.02 942.0

45 252 0

15.0

Not known

1 0

1 4

707.0554.0

1 278.0

90152.090152.0

1366820

Distribution of radioactive waste disposal between the oceans (TBq)

Atlantic Pacific Arctic TotalsReactors withand withoutfuelSolid low-levelwasteLiquid low-level waste

Total

1 000

44252

FEATURES

Northeast Pacific

0.55 PBq

Northwest Atlantic

2.9 PBq

Northeast Atlantic

42 PBq

Arctic

90 PBq

West Pacific

0.72 PBq

Conclusions of expert panel

IGPRAD finalized its work in the summer of1993. The conclusions on legal, political, social,and economic aspects referred to a growingawareness within the national and internationalcommunities that new and more effectivemeasures were needed to protect the globalmarine environment, as evidenced by the resultsof the 1992 UN Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED) and spelled out inAgenda 21. (Chapter 22, para. 5b).

IGPRAD noted that there had been sustaineddevelopment of international law in the previous20 years. The trend was towards, firstly, restrict-ing and controlling, and secondly, prohibitingsea disposal of radioactive wastes on a regionalbasis, and later challenging the legitimacy ofStates' use of the high seas and the ocean floorsbeyond their national jurisdiction for activitiesthat might result in the pollution of the marineenvironment.

The work of the group on scientific andtechnical issues was fraught with difficultiesthroughout its meetings, largely because of theentrenched positions of many of the par-ticipants. The statement of its conclusions isambiguous. In the discussion which followed thepresentation of the IGPRAD report at the Con-sultative Meeting in November 1993, different

Contracting Parties used the report to supportopposing positions. In fact, none of the techni-cal evidence presented to the IGPRAD work-ing group in the seven years of its existenceindicated that any significant radiological im-pact has resulted or would result from properlyconducted sea disposal of solid low-levelradioactive wastes in accordance with IAEArecommendations.

Prohibition of sea dumping ofradioactive wastes

The Consultative Meeting of ContractingParties in November 1993 was characterized byan extensive debate which was inflamed byreports of the illicit dumping of liquid radioac-tive waste by the Russian Federation in the Seaof Japan in October 1993. The meeting adopted,by a majority vote, the prohibition of dumping ofall types of radioactive waste to come into effecton 20 February 1994. The meeting also adoptedthe prohibition of dumping of industrial wastesto come into effect by 1 January 1996.

The prohibitions were brought about byamending the Annexes to the Convention. As aresult of the amendments, all types of radioactivewastes and radioactive matter are now includedin the "black" list (Annex I).

Disposal at sea ofradioactive wastes


FEATURES

The Russian Federation made a declarationnot accepting the amendments associated withradioactive waste dumping , though stating that itwill continue its endeavours to ensure that the seais not polluted by the dumping of wastes andother matter. For it. the old Annexes of the Con-vention concerning th i s specific issue are s t i l l inforce, and so too are the IAEA's definition andrecommendations.

ces hut to eliminate the pollution caused by un-restricted releases of them. In addition, theguidelines do not have the status of an interna-tional convention, rather they are recommenda-tions to countries. As a follow-up to theUNCED. an Intergovernmental Conference onProtection of the Marine Environment fromLand-Based Activities w i l l be oreanized in 1995.

Coastal discharges

A l t e r the t e rmina t ion of solid indus t r ia land radioact ive waste disposal into the oceans.the only remaining route by which wastes canlegally enter the marine environment is by ef-fluent discharges to rivers and from coastallocations.

At the present time, the Montreal Guidel inesfor the Protection of the Marine EnvironmentAgainst Pollution from Land-Based Sources(1985) is the main international document con-cerned w i t h this subject, although it also comeswi th in the scope of several regional conventions.Recognizing the potential sensit ivi ty of coastalenvironments to pollutants, the MontrealGuidelines recommend that pollution, meaningthe introduction by humans of substances to themarine environment which are likely to causeharm to living resources and marine ecosystemsand hazards to human health, should beeliminated. Radioactive substances come w i t h i nthis categorization.

The guidelines do not attempt to e l iminatedischarges of small amounts of harmful substan-

Through variousprogrammes. IAEA

scientists are working tohelp protect the marine

environment.

IAEA's current responsibilities to theLondon Convention 1972

As a result of the amendment of the Annexes,the mandate of the IAEA under the London Con-vention was also changed. Whi le it continues tobe ident i f ied by Contracting Parties as the com-petent international body in the field ofradioactive waste management under the Con-vention, the IAEA's specific responsibil i t ies.as stated in the revised Annexes to the Conven-t ion, are now limited to def in ing exempt or demiiiimis levels of radioactivity for the purposesof the Convention.The work related to thisnewly specified mandate is already under way.The principles for exemption are expressed inIAEA Safety Series No. 89. Principles for theExemption of Radiation Sources and Practicesfrom Rexulatorv Control, which was publishedin 1988.

In the case of marine disposal, the exemptionprinciples are being applied to materials, such assew age sludge and dredged material, the disposalof which is in principle not prohibited under theLondon Convention. These materials have notusual ly been subject to regulatory control.Nevertheless, they might contain radionuclidesfrom anthropogenic sources on land or fromcoastal discharges. Now that the London Con-vention prohibits the sea disposal of all radioac-t ive matter, it is seen as necessary to define quan-titative exemption levels (expressed as bec-querels per kilogram or becquerels per cubic-meter), i.e. levels below which a material can beconsidered to be non-radioactive in the contextof the Convention.

In addition, the IAEA continues to maintainother act ivi t ies in support of the Convention.These include administering the InternationalArctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP). Its ob-ject i \ es are to assess the potential risks to humanhealth and to the environment associated u. ith theradioactive wastes disposed of by the formerSoviet Union in the Arctic Seas and to evaluatewhether any remedial actions are necessar\ andjustified. The IAEA is also developing and main-taining an inventor, of radioactive materialentering the marine environment from allanthropogenic sources. ~~\

16 IAEA BULLETIN. 2/1994

FEATURES

Safety standards for radioactivewaste management: Documenting

international consensusUnder the IAEA's RADWASS programme, a special series of safety

documents covering six key areas is being prepared

nadioactive waste is generated from the prod-uction of nuclear energy and from the use of radio-active materials in industry, research, medicine,and other fields. The importance of its safe man-agement for the protection of human health andthe environment has long been recognized andconsiderable experience has been gained.

Over the past several years, the IAEA hasbeen working to provide evidence that radioac-tive waste can be managed safely and to helpdemonstrate a harmonization of approaches atthe international level. A special series of safetydocuments devoted to radioactive waste man-agement is being prepared within the frameworkof the IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Stand-ards (RADWASS) programme, which covers allaspects of radioactive waste management.

The programme's purpose is to documentexisting international consensus in the ap-proaches and methodologies for safe radioactivewaste management; create a mechanism to es-tablish consensus where it does not exist; andprovide Member States with a comprehensiveseries of internationally agreed upon documentsto complement national standards and criteria.This article presents an overview of theprogramme's structure and status.

Programme structure

RADWASS publications are organized in ahierarchical structure following the generalframework of IAEA Safety Series documents.(Specifically, they will be published as advisorydocuments under IAEA Safety Series 111.) The

Mr Saire is Head of the IAEA's Waste Management Section,Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management, andMr Warnecke is the RADWASS programme co-ordmator inthe same Section.

top-level publication is a single Safety Fun-damentals document which provides basic safetyobjectives and fundamental principles thatshould be followed in national waste manage-ment programmes.

Documents below this level — Safety Stand-ards, Safety Guides, and Safety Practices — willbe organized into six subject areas. The areas areplanning; pre-disposal; near-surface disposal;geological disposal; waste from uranium/thoriummining and milling; and decommissioning andenvironmental restoration. Five Standing Tech-nical Committees (STCs) have been establishedfor these six areas to review the respective docu-ments. (One STC covers both near-surface andgeological disposal.) This will contribute to aconsistent approach in the development of RAD-WASS documents and provide the national ex-pertise of participating countries.

The entire RADWASS programme is over-seen by the International Radioactive WasteManagement Advisory Committee (INWAC),which consists of senior experts from selectedIAEA Member States. With respect to RAD-WASS, the committee specifically provides ad-vice on establishing the publication plan andschedules. It further reviews and approves theSafety Fundamentals and Safety Standards andthe terms of reference for all other documents inthe RADWASS series. The close and intensiveco-operation among national senior experts thusis an important element in the elaboration ofRADWASS documents.

Document preparation and review

Following its approval by the IAEA Board ofGovernors in September 1990, the RADWASSprogramme was established in 1991 to provide aseries of documents incorporating international

by ErnstWarnecke andDonald E. Saire


FEATURES

Overview of RADWASS documents

Safety fundamentalsPhase-1 Principles of radioactive waste management

Planning Pre-disposal

Safety standardsPhase- 1 Phase-1.Establishing a Pre-disposalnational legal system management offor radioactive waste radioactive wastemanagement

Near-surface Geological disposal Uranium/thoriumdisposal mining and milling

Phase-1: Phase-2:Near-surface Geological cdisposal of of radioactivradioactive waste

Safety guidesPhase- 1 Phase-2:Classification of Collection andradioactive waste treatment of low- and

intermediate-levelwaste from nuclearfuel cycle facilities

Phase-2: Phase-1.Planning and Pre-disposalimplementation of management ofnational radioactive t radioactive wastewaste management from medicine,programmes industry, and

research

Phase-2: Phase-2:Licensing of Conditioning andradioactive waste storage of low- andmanagement facilities intermediate-level

waste from nuclearfuel cycle facilities

Phase-2. , Phase-2:Quality assurance for Treatment,the safe conditioning, andmanagement of storage of high-levelradioactive waste reprocessing waste

Phase- 1 Phase-2:Clearance levels for Preparation of spentradionuclides in solid fuel for disposalmaterials: Applicationof exemptionprinciples

Phase-3: Phase-2:Derivation of Safety assessmentdischarge limits for for pre-disposalwaste management waste managementfacilities facilities

Phase-1: Phase- rSiting of near-surface Siting of geedisposal facilities disposal fac

Phase-2: Phase-3:Design, construction, Design, conoperation, and operation, aclosure of closure of gnear-surface repositoriesrepositories

Phase-2: Phase-2:Safety assessment Safety assefor near-surface for geologicdisposal disposal

Phase-2:disposal Management ofe waste waste from mining

and milling ofuranium and thoriumores

Decommissioning/Environmental

restoration

Phases-2 & 3:Decommissioning ofnuclear facilities (toincludeenvironmentalrestoration)

Phase-2:slogical Siting, design,hties | construction, and

operation of facilitiesfor the managementof wastes frommining and milling ofuranium and thoriumores

Phase-2:struction, Decommissioning ofnd surface facilities andeological closeout of mines,

waste rock, and milltailings from miningand milling ofuranium and thoriumores

Phase-3:ssment Safety assessmental for the management

of waste from miningand milling ofuranium and thoriumores

Phase-2:Decommissioning ofnuclear power andlarge researchreactors

Phase-2:Decommissioning ofmedical, industrial,and small researchfacilities

Phase-2:Decommissioning ofnuclear fuel cyclefacilities

Phase-2:Safety assessmentfor thedecommissioning ofnuclear facilities

Phase-2:Environmentalrestoration ofpreviously used oraccidentallycontaminated areas

Phase-3:Recommendedcleanup levels forcontaminated landareas

Phase-2Radioactive wastemanagementglossary


FEATURES

Overview of RADWASS documents

Planning Pre-disposal Near-surfacedisposal

Geological disposal Uranium/thoriummining and milling

Decommissioning

Safety practicesPhase- 1:Application ofexemption principlesto the recycle andreuse of materialsfrom nuclear facilities

Phase- 1:Application ofexemption principlesto materials resultingfrom the use ofradionuclides inmedicine, industry,and research

Phase-3:Data collection andrecord keeping inradioactive wastemanagement

Phase-3:Off-gas treatmentand air ventilationsystems at nuclearfacilities

Phase-3:Characterization ofraw waste

Phase-3:Control of wasteconditioningprocesses

Phase-3:Testing or radioactivepackages

Phase-3:Validation and verification of models forlong-term safety assessment of radioactivewaste disposal facilities

Phase-3:Procedures for closure of radioactive wastedisposal facilities

Phase-2:Waste acceptancerequirements fornear-surface disposalof radioactive waste

Phase-3:Selection ofscenarios for safetyassessment ofnear-surface disposalfacilities

Phase-3:Waste acceptancerequirements forgeological disposal ofradioactive waste

Phase-3Selection ofscenarios for safetyassessment ofgeological disposalfacilities

Phase-3:Systems for operational and post-closuremonitoring and surveillance of near-surfacedisposal facilities

Phase-3:Procedures forcloseout of mines,waste rock, and milltailings

Phase-3:Operational andpost-operationalmonitoring,surveillance, andmaintenance offacilities for themanagement ofwaste from miningand milling ofuranium and thoriumores

Phase-3:Techniques toachieve and maintainsafe storage ofnuclear facilities

Phase-3:Procedures andtechniques for thedecommissioning ofnuclear facilities

Phase-2:Methods for derivingcleanup levels forcontaminated landareas

Phase-3:Monitoring forcompliance withcleanup levels

Safety fundamentals/standards

CM TC CM TCi i i i

i IINWAC SSRC

Production time: 3.5 years

Safety guides/practices

CM TC CM PCI I 1 I

I 1INWAC* SSRC

(for information)

Production time: 2 years

MS CMI i

iINWAC

BGCMINWAC =

MSPCSSRC =

TC

BG PC1 I

SSRC

Board of GovernorsConsultantsInternational WasteManagement AdvisoryCommitteeMember States' ReviewPublications CommitteeSafety Series ReviewCommitteeTechnical Committee

Process foi thepreparation ofRADWASSdocuments


FEATURES

consensus on the safe management of radioac-tive waste. The first phase of the programme wasdeveloped to include 12 high priority documentsto be published by the end of 1994. Phase 2 willbe initiated with the development of additionaldocuments in the post-1994 period.

At the time, it was already envisaged that aformal review of the programme would be un-dertaken in 1993 to define publication produc-tion rates and the resources needed for the post-1994 period. INWAC held this planned reviewin March 1993. It resulted in the completion andextension of the programme from 24 to 55 docu-ments. (See table.) In particular, Safety Practiceswere defined for al! six subject areas, and 11Safety Guides were added, covering topics suchas licensing, quality assurance, safety assess-ments, definitions, and environmental restora-tion. Additionally, some modifications weremade in the area of decommissioning, which willinclude the subject of environmental restoration.

A standardized process is applied to thedevelopment of individual RADWASS docu-ments. Additional steps may be added as neces-sary. A particularly elaborate process is appliedin the preparation of the Safety Fundamentalsand the Safety Standards, reflecting their highhierarchical level and the importance of achiev-ing international consensus on the documents.Before these documents are submitted to theIAEA Board of Governors for approval, for ex-ample, they undergo three consultants' meet-ings, two STCs, two INWAC reviews, and final-ly are submitted to all IAEA Member States.

The RADWASS publication plan is split intothree phases: the first phase extends to 1994; thesecond covers 1995-98; and the third covers thepost-1998 timeframe.

Status of RADWASS documents

A number of RADWASS documents havebeen prepared, with many now in the reviewprocess.

In December 1992, the first document issuedunder the programme —Application of Exemp-tion Principles to the Recycle and Reuse ofMaterials from Nuclear Facilities — was pub-lished as a Safety Practice. It assesses variousscenarios for exposures of people to radio-nuclides from such nuclear materials.

During 1994, the revised draft of the SafetyFundamentals document is expected to be readyfor submission to the IAEA Board of Governors.It has been reviewed by Member States and byconsultants at meetings in late 1993 and early1994 and was resubmitted to Member States inFebruary 1994.

A number of other documents have been orare being submitted to Member States for reviewshortly. They include four Safety Standards: Na-tional Legal System for Radioactive WasteManagement; Pre-disposal Management ofRadioactive Waste; Near Surface Disposal ofRadioactive Waste; and Decommissioning ofNuclear Facilities.

Additionally, two Safety Guides — namelyClassification of Radioactive Waste and Siting ofGeological Disposal Facilities — have beensubmitted for publication. A third Safety Guide— Siting of Near Surface Disposal Facilities —has been approved internally, while another —Clearance Levels for Radionuciides in SolidMaterials — presently is under internal review.Being prepared for completion by the end of1994 is the Safety Guide entitled Pre-disposalManagement of Low and Intermediate LevelWaste from Medicine, Industry and Research.

Another document — the Safety Practiceentitled Application of Exemption Principles toMaterials Resulting from the Use of Radionuciidesin Medicine, Industry and Research — now isbeing prepared for internal review. It previouslyhas been separately reviewed by consultants andnational specialists participating in technicalmeetings and advisory groups.

Convention on the safety ofradioactive waste management

In October 1993, the IAEA General Con-ference, in adopting a resolution for strengthen-ing nuclear safety through the early conclusionof a nuclear safety convention, inter alia re-quested the IAEA Director General to initiatepreparations for a convention on the safety ofradioactive waste management. The prepara-tions were to begin as soon as broad internationalagreement was reached from the ongoingprocess of developing the Safety Fundamentalsdocument for waste management.

Such a convention would be a "stand alone"document legally binding for signatory States.Its preparation has to be initiated and carried outwith great care, with respect to its timing as wellas its contents. IAEA Member States are ex-pected to provide further guidance in these areas.It now seems to be agreeable that work on awaste management convention can be initiatedonce the RADWASS Safety Fundamentals, andpossibly also the Safety Standard on the nationalwaste management system, have gained the ap-proval of the IAEA Board of Governors. A"bridging process" will be able to identify thoseelements of the RADWASS documents that shouldbe used for the formulation of the convention.


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Further impetus for the convention can beexpected from an international seminar — "Re-qui rements for the Safe Management ofRadioactive Waste" - - being organized by theIAEA from 28 August to 1 September 1995. Itwill provide a forum for discussion of resultsfrom the f i r s t phase of the RADWASSprogramme, as well as for updating national ex-perience in the field of waste management.

Safety principles and requirements

Safe management of radioactive waste invol-ves the application of technology and resourcesin an integrated and regulated manner. The ob-jective is to control occupational and public ex-posure to ionizing radiation and to protect theenvironment in accordance with national regula-tions and international recommendations. In fur-therance of these objectives, a number of safetyprinciples, to be agreed upon internationally,have been defined in the latest draft version ofthe RADWASS Safety Fundamentals documententitled The Principles of Radioactive WasteManagement. The principles are:

Principle I: Protection of human health.Radioactive waste shall be managed in a way tosecure an acceptable level of protection ofhuman health.

Principle 2: Protection of the environment.Radioactive waste shall be managed in a waythat provides protection of the environment.

Principle 3: Protection beyond nationalborders. Radioactive waste shall be managed insuch a way as to assure that possible effects onhuman health and the environment beyond na-tional borders will not be greater than what isacceptable within the country of origin.

Principle 4: Protection of future genera-tions. Radioactive waste shall be managed in away that predicted impacts on the health of fu-ture generations do not exceed relevant levelsthat are acceptable today.

Principle 5: Burdens on future generations.Radioactive waste shall be managed in a waythat will not impose undue burdens on futuregenerations.

Principle 6: Legal framework. Radioactivewaste shall be managed within an appropriatelegal framework including clear allocation ofresponsibilities and provision for independentregulatory functions.

Principle 7: Control of radioactive wastegeneration. Generation of radioactive wasteshall be kept to the minimum practicable.

Principle 8: Radioactive waste generationand management interdependencies. Inter-dependencies among all steps in radioactive

waste generation and management shall be ap-propriately taken into account.

Principle 9: Safety of facilities. Safety offacilities for radioactive waste management shallbe appropriately assured during their lifetimes.

In order to put these principles into practice,countries must have an established national legalsystem for radioactive waste management. Sucha system must specify the objectives and require-ments of a national strategy for radioactive wastemanagement and the responsibilities of the par-ties involved. It must also describe other essen-tial features, such as licensing processes andsafety and environmental assessments.

The elements of such a system are sum-marized in the latest draft version of the RAD-WASS Safety Standard, Establishing a NationalLegal System for Radioactive Waste Manage-ment, which is the leading publication in thesubject area, "Planning". The document assigns10 responsibilities to the State, the regulatorybody, or the operators.

Responsibilities of the State are to 1) estab-lish and implement a legal framework; 2) estab-lish a regulatory body; 3) define responsibilitiesof waste generators and operators; and 4) pro-vide for adequate resources.

Responsibilities of the regulatory body areto 1) apply and enforce legal requirements; 2)implement the licensing process; and 3) advisethe government.

Responsibilities of the operators are to 1)identify an acceptable destination for the radio-active waste; 2) safely manage the radioactivewaste; and 3) comply with legal requirements.

The IAEA also is working to formulate asSafety Standards the definition of technicalsafety requirements for each of the other fiveRADWASS subject areas. This additionally willassist countries in implementing the safety prin-ciples outlined in The Principles of RadioactiveWaste Management. L~)

Extensive experiencehas been acquired forthe safe management ofradioactive wastes.(Credit: BNFL)


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The interface between nuclearsafeguards and radioactive wastedisposal: Emerging issues

Experts are examining requirements and policies for applyingsafeguards at geological waste repositories and related sites

by Gordon f number of questions arise in considering theLinsley and application of safeguards measures to radioac-

Abdul Fattah live wastes, especially in the disposal phase.The main concern from the waste manage-

ment side is that safeguards should not disturbthe arrangements made to ensure the long-termsafety of radioactive wastes, including spentfuel, in a geological repository. The requirementto safeguard certain nuclear materials must becarried through the entire nuclear fuel cycle tothe stage where the materials may be consideredto be waste from an economic standpoint.Safeguards must be continued for materials stillconsidered to represent a potential target fordiversion for undeclared and non-peaceful uses.At this point, the need to continue safeguardingmay conflict with the plans to ensure that wasteis managed and disposed of in a way that ensureslong-term safety.

In 1992, issues concerning the interface be-tween nuclear safeguards and radioactive wastemanagement were discussed at a meeting of theStanding Sub-Group of the International WasteManagement Advisory Committee (INWAC) on"Principles and Criteria for Radioactive WasteDisposal". Discussion at that meeting suggestedthat the full implications of the need to applynuclear safeguards are not well understood bythe radioactive waste management community.The Sub-Group requested that a working paperbe prepared to examine the current safeguards

Mr Linsley is a staff member in the IAEA Division of NuclearFuel Cycle and Waste Management, Department of NuclearEnergy and Safety, and Mr Fattah is a staff member in theIAEA Division of Concepts and Planning. Department ofSafeguards. The article is based on a paper — "The InterfaceBetween Nuclear Safeguards and Radioactive Waste Dis-posal" — presented at the IAEA International Symposium onSafeguards in March 1994. Full references are available fromthe authors.

position with respect to radioactive wastes, in-cluding spent fuel, from a radioactive wastemanagement perspective. This article is based onthat working paper,* which should be seen asone input to a dialogue between the radioactivewaste management and nuclear safeguards com-munities.

Safeguards policy for radioactivewastes and spent fuel

In recent years, the IAEA's Department ofSafeguards has worked towards defining asafeguards policy on radioactive waste and spentfuel. A basic consideration in relation to radio-active wastes and spent fuel is whether condi-tions can be met for termination of safeguards orwhether safeguards must be continued in-definitely. Agency documents INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 and INFCIRC/153 state that safeguards can beterminated once the IAEA determines that thematerial has been consumed or diluted in such away that it is no longer usable for any nuclearactivities or has become practicably irrecover-able. (It is noted that some regional safeguardsauthorities, such as Euratom, do not allow fortermination of safeguards at all.) It has beensuggested that there should be more preciselydefined technical criteria based on the "con-sumed", "diluted" or "practicably irrecoverable"attributes relevant to materials from the nuclearfuel cycle.

In 1988, an advisory group was convened toconsider the subject of safeguards related to finaldisposal of nuclear material in waste and spent

*The participants in the working group were D. Gentsch fromGermany; F. Gera from Italy: S. Wingefors from Sweden: andG. Linsley and A. Fattah from the IAEA.


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fuel. It recommended that the IAEA should, inconsultation with Member States, undertake todefine specific criteria for the termination ofsafeguards on waste other than spent fuel. Thecriteria for making determinations of "practicab-ly irrecoverable" should include waste materialtype, nuclear material composition, chemicaland physical form, and waste quality (e.g. thepresence or absence of fission products). Totalquantity, facility-specific technical parameters,and the intended method of eventual disposalshould also be considered.

In relation to spent fuel, the group concludedthat it does not qualify as being practicably ir-recoverable at any point prior to, or following,placement in a geological formation commonlydescribed as a "permanent repository", and thatsafeguards should not be terminated on spentfuel. Since that meeting, work has continued inthe safeguards department towards definingcriteria for the termination of safeguards on was-tes and on the development of methods for im-plementing safeguards for spent fuel in geologi-cal repositories.

Principles for radioactive wastemanagement

The main objective of radioactive wastemanagement is to design systems for the han-dling, treatment, and disposal of radioactive wasteswhich ensure the protection of human beings bothnow and in the future. The concern for the futurearises because of the long-lived radioactive com-ponents present in some types of waste, par-ticularly high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel.

This concern for the long-term has led to theIAEA's development of principles such as thefollowing:

"Radioactive waste shall be managed in away that predicted impacts on the health of futuregenerations do not exceed levels that are accept-able today." This principle is derived from anethical concern for the health of future genera-tions. In order to achieve this, the wastes shouldbe isolated from the human environment overextended timescales, and while it is not possibleto ensure total containment indefinitely, the in-tent is that there will be no significant impactswhen radionuclides enter the environment. Indeep geological repositories, isolation will beachieved by a system of barriers surrounding thewaste, some engineered (the waste canister, thebackfill material) and some natural (the geo-sphere, the biosphere).

An additional principle is that:"Radioactive waste shall be managed in a

way that limits the burden on future genera-

tions." The ethical principle for this is thepremise that the generation that produces wasteshould bear the responsibility for managing it.The responsibility of the present generation in-cludes developing the technology, operating thefacilities, and providing funds for the manage-ment of radioactive waste. This includes themeans for disposal. Long-term management ofradioactive waste should, as appropriate, rely oncontainment without reliance on long-term in-stitutional arrangements as a necessary safetyfeature. This does not exclude the possible use ofinstitutional control arrangements, such as,monitoring and recordkeeping, but, because ofthe timescales involved, the primary reliance forsafety should not be on such measures.

Interface issues

The main concern from the waste manage-ment standpoint is that any intended safeguardsmeasures should not impair the safety of wastemanagement system. Other concerns, not dealtwith here, might include consideration of anyadditional costs associated with the need to im-plement safeguards measures.

In the following sections, the concerns withrespect to safeguards and waste management arediscussed for radioactive waste and spent fuel atvarious stages to final disposal.

Termination of safeguards on wastes

Following the recommendations of the 1988advisory group, work on the development ofcriteria for termination of safeguards on differentwaste types went on through meetings at theIAEA in the period 1989-90. A set of technicalcriteria was developed although there weredivergent views on the quantity limits. Most ofthe waste which is generated in the nuclear fuelcycle will fall within the cr

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