I wrote this successful appellate brief for California prisoner claiming violations of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.
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Case 08-15414 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ____________________________________________ LEE V. QUILLAR Plaintiff-Appellant v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants-Appellees ____________________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of California Case No. 2:04-CV-01203-FCD-KJM The Honorable Frank C. Damrell, Jr. ____________________________________________ PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S OPENING REPLACEMENT BRIEF ____________________________________________ Steven H. Frankel (SBN 171919) Manuel Alvarez, Jr. (SBN 253874) SONNENSCHEIN NATH & ROSENTHAL LLP 525 Market Street, 26th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 Tel: (415) 882-5000 Fax: (415) 882-0300 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant LEE V. QUILLAR Case: 08-15414 01/28/2010 ID: 7212229 DktEntry: 27-1 Page: 1 of 37
Transcript
Case 08-15414
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
____________________________________________
LEE V. QUILLAR Plaintiff-Appellant
v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
____________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of California Case No. 2:04-CV-01203-FCD-KJM The Honorable Frank C. Damrell, Jr.
____________________________________________
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S OPENING REPLACEMENT BRIEF
____________________________________________
Steven H. Frankel (SBN 171919) Manuel Alvarez, Jr. (SBN 253874)
TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iii JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ......................................................................... 1 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................. 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 3 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................ 7 ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 9 I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING QUILLAR’S REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ...................................9 II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING QUILLAR’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY. ............................................................12 III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING QUILLAR’S CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS MURRAY AND MENDOZA...........14
A. Quillar’s Complaint presented an actual case or controversy.............17
B. Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey ..............................................................................20
C. Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief are not barred by Preiser v. Rodriguez ............................................................................22
D. Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA conform to the letter and spirit of the Act..........................................................23
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING QUILLAR’S ACTION WITHOUT GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND ........................................................27 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 29
Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................10, 11
Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center, 859 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1988) ..............................................................................15
Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., 840 F.2d 797 (11th Cir. 1988) ............................................................................25
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600 (1979)............................................................................................25
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)............................................................................................18
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)..............................................................................................26
Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................................15
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)............................................................................................27
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).....................................................................................passim
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988) ..............................................................................14
L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)..............................................................................................17
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................14
injurious for this court to retain jurisdiction over defendants . . . .” (ER 0014 at ln.
24-25.)
Defendant Rowlett passed away and could not be served with process. (ER
0016-17.) After Quillar failed to identify a substitute party within a set time, the
District Court proceeded to dismiss his entire Complaint without leave to amend
because no defendants remained. (ER 0002-03, 0004-06.)
Quillar timely filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s judgment.
(ER 0028-29.) On July 6, 2009, this Court directed the appointment of pro bono
counsel to assist Quillar with this appeal, directing counsel to:
[A]ddress whether appellant’s claims for injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., are moot or barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and if not, whether the district court should have granted leave to amend or to add an official party defendant.
(July 6, 2009 Order, Docket No. 15.)
Pursuant to that order, this opening replacement brief is submitted on Mr.
Quillar’s behalf.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Lee V. Quillar (“Quillar”) wears a beard in accordance with his
Islamic faith. (ER 0107 at ln. 2-4, 0108 at ln. 2-7 and 19-24.) Until declared
unconstitutional in 2005, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)1 enforced a grooming policy that barred male inmates
from maintaining hair longer than three inches. See generally Warsoldier v.
Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). In January 2005, Quillar, a CDCR
inmate acting pro se, filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC” or the
“Complaint”) against various defendants seeking relief from disciplinary measures
the CDCR had taken against him for violating the unconstitutional grooming
policy by virtue of his beard. (ER 0102-17.)
The Complaint alleged that such disciplinary measures, involving the
issuance of forms called “CDC Form 128-A,” violated Quillar’s protections under
RLUIPA. (ER 0112 at ln. 13-24, 0107-11.) The Complaint also included a prayer
for injunctive relief that would “[r]estore [Quillar’s] rights dating back to October
12, 2000[.]” (ER 0115 at ln. 4-5.)
Shortly after filing the Complaint, Quillar filed a motion requesting leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and requesting the appointment of counsel largely
because his legal work on the case to that point had been confiscated. (ER 0098-
0101.) The District Court granted Quillar’s request to proceed in forma pauperis
but summarily denied his request for counsel. (ER 0023-27.)
On December 5, 2005, the District Court screened Quillar’s Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and determined that it stated cognizable claims for 1 In 2005, CDCR was officially known as California Department of Corrections.
A District Court’s denial of a request for discovery is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.
2008). “[A] plaintiff should be given the opportunity through discovery to identify
[] unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the
identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v.
Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Wakefield v. Thompson, 177
F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999).
Here, the District Court abused its discretion by denying Quillar’s motion
for limited discovery at the same time it dismissed Rowlett from the action and
denied Quillar’s last request for counsel. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 643 (holding
abuse of discretion where district court did not permit discovery on identity of
“John Doe” defendants at the same time it dismissed plaintiff’s complaint). From
purely a practical perspective, taking limited discovery was the only way Quillar
could have possibly identified a proper substitute party for Rowlett.2 Certainly, it
is not clear that the requested limited discovery would have failed to disclose the
identity of Rowlett’s substitute. See id. (with the denied discovery, the “allegations
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) allows the district court to order discovery early in a case and Rule 45 allows service of a subpoena on a non-party. Thus, with leave of the court, Quillar could have issued a subpoena to a non-party within CDCR or elsewhere for the limited purpose of discovering the identity of Rowlett’s successor or representative.
0007-08, 0009-15.) The magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Murray
and Mendoza, however, was based on legal error. In particular, the magistrate
erroneously concluded that Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA
were “speculative and not sufficiently injurious for th[e] court to retain jurisdiction
over defendants Murray or Mendoza.” (ER 0014 at ln. 24-25.)
This Court “review[s] de novo a district court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion to dismiss.” Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 939
(9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 961 (2003); Baker v. McNeil Island
Corrections Center, 859 F.2d 124, 127 (9th Cir. 1988).
RLUIPA provides that
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution … unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “A person may assert a violation of this Act as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding an obtain appropriate relief against a government.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).
Quillar’s Complaint alleged that defendants “punished, caused to be
punished, or failed to prevent plaintiff from suffering years of undu[e] punishment
based on nothing more than plaintiff growing his beard as mandated by his
religious doctrine[,]” and that such punishment was “without any penological
interest … .” (ER 0112 at ln. 13-24.) The Complaint also alleged that, between
2000 and 2005, defendants Murray and Mendoza wrongfully issued, signed or
otherwise authorized the issuance of a multitude of disciplinary reports against
Quillar for wearing a beard in observance of his Islamic faith. (ER 0106-11.)
Those disciplinary actions included:
• A Rules Violation Report signed by Murray documenting a November 9, 2000 CDC Form 115 issued to Quillar for wearing a beard (ER 0107 at ln. 17-21, 0120);
• A Rules Violation Report signed by Mendoza documenting a December 12, 2000 CDC Form 115 issued to Quillar for wearing a beard (ER 0107 at ln. 22-24, 0121);
• A Rules Violation Report reviewed by Mendoza documenting a June 13, 2001 CDC Form 115 issued to Quillar for wearing a beard (ER 0107 at ln. 25-28, 0122);
• A Rules Violation Report signed by Mendoza documenting a March 25, 2003 CDC Form 115 issued to Quillar for wearing a beard (ER 0108 at ln. 13-15, 0125); and
• A Rules Violation Report signed by Mendoza documenting an April 19, 2004 CDC Form 115 issued to Quillar for wearing a beard (ER 0108 at ln. 16-18, 0126).
Finally, Quillar’s Complaint prayed for injunctive relief that would “[r]estore [his]
rights dating back to October 12, 2000[.]” (ER 0115 at ln. 4-5.)
As the District Court properly concluded in its 1915A screening order, these
allegations stated cognizable claims for injunctive relief against Murray and
Mendoza. (ER 0024 at ln. 3-9.)
A. Quillar’s Complaint presented an actual case or controversy.
The District Court’s dismissal of Murray and Mendoza was based on the
magistrate judge’s erroneous conclusion that Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief
were “speculative and not sufficiently injurious for th[e] court to retain jurisdiction
over [them].”3 (ER 0007-08, 0009-15, 0014 at ln. 24-25.) To the contrary,
Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief against Murray and Mendoza were not
speculative, and addressed specific and sufficient injury that, if granted, would
provide actual and practical relief.
The central issue in an Article III standing or mootness inquiry is whether
plaintiff’s claim, if granted, would result in actual relief from a presently existing
injury. L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (“The plaintiff must show that
he ‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as
the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must
3 The District Court’s stated basis for dismissal is essentially a conclusion that Quillar failed to demonstrate an actual case or controversy as required by Article III. (ER 0014-15 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02).) This Court asked appointed pro bono counsel to address whether Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA are now moot. While those issues might be considered analytically separate from one another, they can both be addressed by discussing Quillar’s presently existing injury and the actual relief that would follow if his claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA were granted.
damages rather than injunctive relief or speedier release from custody. Id. at 478-
79. The trial court dismissed Heck’s complaint because it directly challenged the
legality of his confinement, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the same grounds.
Id. at 479.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court first explained that the holding of Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), did not cover the issues presented in Heck’s
complaint for damages. Preiser dealt with the issue of whether habeas corpus is
the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his
confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release. Id. at 481-82. To determine
whether section 1983 claims for damages were at all relevant, the Court began with
the principle that “42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability,” and
accordingly turned to the common law of torts. Id. at 483. In holding that Heck’s
claim for money damages could not be granted, the Court explained:
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution. [¶] We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
inapplicable to claims brought under specific modern civil rights statutes designed
to apply in the prison context, such as RLUIPA. Id. at 1101.
Finally, Judge Karlton noted that, “had Congress intended for habeas
exhaustion requirements to limit relief under RLUIPA, Congress could surely have
so indicated.” Id. at 1101. Instead, Congress directed that RLUIPA “be construed
in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this Act and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
Stated plainly, the Preiser-Heck rule applies to section 1983 claims that
challenge the legality of a conviction or the length of confinement, but not to
claims for relief under RLUIPA that challenge neither the conviction nor length of
confinement. That is for good reason because the underlying purposes behind
section 1983 and RLUIPA are completely different. On the one hand, section 1983
does “not provide for any substantive rights.”4 Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). Rather, it provides a vehicle for
relief to plaintiffs who have been deprived of rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. See Burch v.
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]”
Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., 840 F.2d 797, 800 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 489 U.S. 1064 (1989), aff’d, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).5
Congress enacted RLUIPA over 25 years after Preiser and it has since
survived constitutional challenge. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062
(9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 815. RLUIPA was enacted with the
specific aim of preventing correctional institutions from restricting “religious
liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways.” 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 (July 27,
2000) (Joint Statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy). Under RLUIPA, “[n]o
government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-1(a)(1). It further states that it “shall be construed in favor of a broad
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of
this Act and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (emphasis added).
Quillar’s claims for injunctive relief fall squarely within the letter and spirit
of RLUIPA -- “to protect the exercise of religion in institutions from unwarranted
and substantial infringement.” Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th
Cir. 2002). Quillar’s claims sought relief from the detrimental and permanent
5 Some examples of the broad sweep of section 1983 claims brought by prisoners include monetary damages for overdetention, Streit v. County of L.A., 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001), deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and suppression or censorship of correspondence, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
complaint). Indeed, “[t]he rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is
particularly important for the pro se litigant.” Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446,
1448 (9th Cir. 1986). “[A] pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit in forma
pauperis is entitled to . . . an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome the
deficiency [in the event of dismissal] unless it clearly appears from the complaint
that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.” Id.
In its 1915A screening order, the District Court determined that Quillar’s
Complaint stated a proper claim for relief against Rowlett under RLUIPA. (ER
0024 at ln. 3-9.) Indeed, the District Court dismissed Rowlett from the action only
because Quillar had failed to identify a specific substitute party within the 30 days
allowed under the July 13, 2007 order.6 (ER 0005 at ln. 4-10.) Therefore, not only
was it clear that Quillar could amend his Complaint to allege RLUIPA violations,
but his Complaint already alleged such violations. Considering that Quillar was
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court erred in dismissing his
Complaint without leave to amend because of Quillar’s alleged failure to name a
substitute party within the requisite time. See Noll, 809 F.2d at 1449 (“Because it
is not absolutely clear that Noll could not amend his complaint to allege
6 As discussed above, the District Court abused its discretion in denying Quillar’s motion seeking permission to take discovery to ascertain Rowlett’s possible successor or representative.
