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Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs Large Scope July 11, 2011
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Page 1: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet

Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs – Large Scope

July 11, 2011

Page 2: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Overview

Form, fit and function of

telecommunication cabinets

designed IAW MIL-STD-188-125

requirements

Cabinets meet or exceed all

requirements

Three designs

• CS, a single width (standard 19”

equipment rack space) cabinet

• DW, a double width cabinet

• DP, a deeper, single width

cabinet that also meets

TEMPEST requirements

CS Cabinet

DW Cabinet

DPCabinet

Page 3: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

KEY FEATURES• HEMP-survivable rack form factor enclosure for critical electronic equipment

• Double or single racks; 19 or 23 inch rack mount; front and/or rear doors

• Fully compliant with MIL-STD-188-125-1/2;TEMPEST VERSION to 10GHz

available as well

• A& B Power Bus Compatible

• AC or DC Power; Up to 10kW

• Conducted penetrations (only power) –filters reduce residuals to within

MILSTD-188-125-1 limits

• Automatic Built-in Test Equipment (ABITE) to provide real-time status of SE

• Can be designed/built to customer‟s specifications

• Both steel and aluminum versions available

• Can also be designed/built/tested to meet TEMPEST requirements

• NEBS and Zone 4 Compliant

Page 4: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Cabinet Fabrication (Continued)

Page 5: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Acceptance Testing

Page 6: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Prepainted Assemblies

Page 7: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

DW Cabinets (Continued)

Page 8: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Finished Cabinets

Page 9: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mission Equipment Integration

Performed under subcontract by Linkmont in Denver

integration facility

All cabinets finalized for deployment in this facility

Page 10: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIL-STD-188-125 Verification Testing

Conducted in shielded enclosure in

Denver facility

Includes pulsed current injection and

shielding effectiveness testing

Final certification that cabinets meet all

MIL-STD-188-125 requirements

Typical shielding effectiveness

measurement:

0

5 0

1 0 0

1 5 0

2 0 0

1 04

1 05

1 06

1 07

1 08

1 09

M IL -S T D -1 8 8 -1 2 5 -1 S E R e q u ire m e n tM e a s u re m e n t R a n g eF ro n t H o rF ro n t V e r

F re q u e n c y (H z )

Sh

ield

ing

Eff

ective

ne

ss

(d

B)

Margin

0

5 0

1 0 0

1 5 0

2 0 0

1 04

1 05

1 06

1 07

1 08

1 09

M IL -S T D -1 8 8 -1 2 5 -1 S E R e q u ire m e n tM e a s u re m e n t R a n g eF ro n t H o rF ro n t V e r

F re q u e n c y (H z )

Sh

ield

ing

Eff

ective

ne

ss

(d

B)

Margin

Page 11: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

Automated Built-in Test Equipment

(ABITE)

Page 12: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Automatic Built in Test – Objectives and Tasks

Overall Primary Objective – Monitor Shielded Article Condition

• Evaluate the Shielding Effectiveness of an EM Barrier consistently with the

techniques as defined in MIL-STD-188-125

• Monitor incoming Power Protection

• Monitor Alarms as applicable

Primary Task Elements

• ABITE SE Test system cannot interfere with Local functions

- Virtually no external emissions – dictates an internal transmitter

- Internal transmitter kept at lowest possible power level

• Design must be robust and can scale to multiple applications (i.e. various

alarms)

• Remote control and data monitoring

• Install system into HEMP equipment cabinet with transport equipment and

functionality

- Includes packaging to fit in available space

Page 13: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

ABITE System Concept

Shielded

Cabinet

ABITE

Transmitter

ABITE Receiver

Receiver

Cabinet

(unshielded)

SE measurement Is the comparison of the transmitted signal versus the received signal over the required frequency range

Page 14: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

ABITE Production Configuration

Production version of the ABITE includes the following:

• Transmit Function

- One rack mount shelf (not a full shelf)

- Less than 2U‟s of cabinet space (1U = 1.75”) (not including the antenna)

- Absolutely no impact on the operation of the equipment within the cabinet

- Interface to a router serial port for signal generator control

- Disable switch for door

• Receive Function

- Allows the flexibility to have a “real” spectrum analyzer available during maintenance

- rack shelf mounted

- Meets dynamic range requirements (-10dBm input compression, <-110 dBm/Hz noise

floor – input terminated/thermal)

- MOV monitoring via optical sensors

- 35 dB selectable attenuation

- 2 antenna control

- Extensive security features

Page 15: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

ABITE Operational Software

Production version of the ABITE includes HMI/Control software

- Remotely hosted in NOC

- IP-based network design – all IP devices mapped identically thru router

- All control executed through secure router via telenet control

- Operator entry for site IP configuration

- Drill-down architecture for site status with applicable indicators

– Data graph and archive at lowest level

- Look up table for site specific calibration

- Interference mitigation algorithm

- SNMP reporting to NOC

Page 16: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

ABITE Details

• Frequency agile (compensates for

ambient background)

• Operates over internet

• Does not require personnel at the

operational site

Remote NCC Control

LAN

RF Amplifier (1 Watt)

Spectrum Analyzer

Signal Generator

Communication Fiber links

Receive

antenna

(isotropic)

HEMP Cabinet

Serial

Driver

SP2T

Switch

LAN/Fiber

LAN/Fiber

35 dB

Variable

attenuator

PC SerialPort

Receive

antenna

(isotropic)

Page 17: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

ABITE System Production Components

Transmitter Tray

Transmitter Power Tray

Mounted in Shielded Cabinet

Receiver Power Tray

Receiver RF Tray

Spectrum Analyzer

Mounted in Unshielded Cabinet

Page 18: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

ABITE – Conclusions

Successfully developed/deployed Shielding Effectiveness ABITE

system within operational shielded cabinet requirements

System is frequency agile to operate in and interference RF

environment

• Detects and compensates for strong signal effect

• Detects and compensates for in-band spurious signals

Scalable to multiple applications to include alarms and other monitoring

Extremely low risk design implementation

Software developed for secure, remote command and control via the

internet

• NOC personnel can monitor the health and wealth of

each system

Page 19: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

Container Security

Presents

July 2011

Page 20: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

20

PulseCode™ Lock

PulseCode™ Key

Technology Overview

PulseCode™ Lock technology is a highly secure lock with no keyhole and requiring no direct contact between lock and key to operate. With no keyhole there is no point from which it can be compromised by picking or tampering.

PulseCode™ Lock technology is the transmission of data through solid materials by a sequence of discrete mechanical knocks, or pulses. The intervals between pulses contain an encrypted code that is the opening combination of the lock.

The opening code can transfer through solids including metal, wood or glass. This enables the lock to be mounted on the inside of a door, concealing it from the outside and making it impossible to detect or vandalize.

The opening code is encrypted and has billions of combinations. It includes a randomly generated portion of the sequence so it never uses the same exact code twice. This makes it impossible to imitate the key even by recording and makes the locking system extremely secure.

PulseCode VAULT™

Access Control Software

Page 21: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Summary Benefits for ISO Container Security

Better security with secure remote

access control using Master Lock’s VAULT software

No “back door” breaching

Nothing on the outside to tamper or compromise

The Container Housing & Security Door Bolt is

specifically designed to enable mounting on hollow

steel ISO Container doors with thru bolts providing

over 5,000 lbs of holding force

Successfully meets ISO Intermodal Specifications

Page 22: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

IRAD 2011

821.2001 – Site P

8201.2003 – Transformer Hardening

Page 23: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Summary of 2011 Projects

8201.2001 Site P

– Objective

• Install and evaluate alternative hardening techniques (188-125 Special

Protective Measures) on an unhardened commercial telecom site

– Expected Results

• SPM surge and field coupling suppressors installed

• Field coupling reduced up to 10x

• Site P withstood 10x CWI SPM Verification test protocol

8201.2003 Transformer Protection

– Objective

• Design and test 188-125 E1 and E2 transient protection to medium voltage

secondary power

transformers

– Expected Results

• A 12.47kV transformer successfully protected and tested to a MIL STD

188.125.1 Appendix B PCI Verification Test

Page 24: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Site P 188-125 Hardening Demonstration

Objective:

• Demonstrate a cost effective (<5%)

installation at Site P by performing a

full 188-125 verification test

Need:

• Unhardened TELCO sites limit

endurability of new cabinets to battery

life only

• Total site hardening to 188-125 = $M‟s

per site

• Need less expensive methodology

• Special Protective Measures (SPM) in

188-125 protocols need to be

evaluated for TELCO sites

Technical Approach:

• Use EMI/EMC emissions control

technology (ferrites suppressors) in

reverse to limit HEMP coupling

• Install surge suppressors to handle

residual coupling

• Pulse at full 188-125 10x CWI levels and

demonstrate that no failures occur

Expected Results:

Site P successfully SPM tested with

no failures

Site P CWI testing shows an average of

85% reduction in coupled Currents

Page 25: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Requirements and Costs

Global Barrier Shield ~ Site P Cost Estimated at $2.1M

– Would require basic demolition and rebuilding of entire structure

– 80+dB welded steel shield

– 100dB CORCOM filters

– Acceptance Testing/Verification Testing

– Would not need Telco Cabinet (Saves ~$30 - $60k per cabinet)

Alternative Approach ~ Site P Cost (In volume) ~ $100-$130k –

– MIL-STD-188-125 Special Protective Measures for Endurable Systems

• Surge Suppression

• Ferrites

• Transformer E1, E2 and E3 Long Line Protection

– MIL-STD-188-125 Full Compliance for Survivable Systems

• Telco Rack – Single Wide, Double Wide or DP

Page 26: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Transformer Hardening

Objective:

Demonstrate a solution to protecting

transformers from E1, E2 (and

lightning)

Need:

Medium voltage distribution transformers

are vulnerable to EMP and currently

unprotected

Lead time for replacement is 6 months –

from China

Not enough diesel fuel or trucks to keep

facilities running for 6 months

No one has ever looked at medium

voltage issues before

Technical Approach:

Evaluate Medium Voltage surge

suppressor technology to E1, E2

Evaluate Harmonic and Reactive Power

Capacitors technology to E1, E2

Marry the two technologies and evaluate

Full scale test on real transformer at full

voltage

Expected results

Protection and test technology for

12.47kV transformer evaluated

Test bed with prototype hardening

installed and tested

Protection and test technology

successfully demonstrated

Page 27: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Transformer Hardening „Live

Test‟

Description:

480V Generator is connected to Step-Up Transformer.

Step-Up transformer steps up voltage from 480V to12470V.

E1 1k/5k Pulser is connected to XRMR Hardening Kit.

XRMR Hardening Kit is connected to individual phases,Phase A, Phase B and Phase C,

of Step-Up and Step-Down transformers.

Step-Up transformer is connected to Step-Down transformer Step-transformer steps

down transformer. Down voltage from 12470V to 208V.

Step-Down transformer is connected to Load Bank.

Load Bank balances each phase at 208V.

Transients from E1 1k/5k pulser are injected into XRMR

Hardening Kit which is connected to each individual power phase.

10 CM shots at each level 1000A, 1800A, and 3600A were injected with the intention

of hitting the top of a phase peak.

10 CM shots at each level, and at a 5000A transient level, were also injected.

Page 28: Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet · 7/11/2011  · Qwest's Critical Infrastructure Secure Cabinet Hector Rojo, Manager Federal Programs –Large Scope July 11, 2011.

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Objective:

To determine if arc breakdown on the primary side of the medium voltage distribution

(Step-Down) transformer occurs.

Expected Conclusion:

No arc breakdown on the primary side of the Step-Down transformer will occurr during

„Live Test‟..

Transformer Hardening „Live

Test‟


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