Radical Right Dynamics in France

IntroductionDynamics of radical right salience and support

Conclusion

The Dynamics of Radical Right Party Supportand Mainstream Parties’ Programmatic Change

in France

Kai Arzheimer

University of Mainz/University of Essex

Kai Arzheimer Radical Right Dynamics (1/11)


Conclusion

What’s the problem (I)?

I Radical Right in Western EuropeI Roughly similar profile (the nation, law and order,

anti-establishment, immigration)I Roughly similar voters (working/lower middle classes, male,

moderate levels of formal education)I Roughly similar support?

I Support for the Radical Right highly volatile

I Accross time (within countries)I Across countries

I Demand should be roughly stable

I “Supply Side” (party) and “Contextual” (external) factors



Conclusion





I Support for the Radical Right highly volatileI Accross time (within countries)I Across countries





Conclusion





I Support for the Radical Right highly volatileI Accross time (within countries)I Across countries





Conclusion

A possible solution: context

I Jackman and Volpert, 1996, Knigge, 1998, Lubbers, Gijsberts,and Scheepers, 2002, Golder, 2003a,b, Swank and Betz, 2003:Electoral System, Unemployment, Immigration, Welfare StateInstitutions, political space

I Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: ideological context , i. e. presenceof radical right issues in other parties’ manifestos

I Polarisation, variance, salience:

I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”issues

I Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy

I Would the radical right suffer if all other parties stoppedtalking about their issues?



Conclusion










Conclusion










Conclusion




I Polarisation, variance, salience:I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”

issuesI Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy




Conclusion




I Polarisation, variance, salience:I Radical Right will benefit if other parties talk about “their”

issuesI Direction does no matterI Agenda setting, priming, legitimacy




Conclusion

What’s the problem (II)?

I Tested this in two different multi-level models (respondentsnested in surveys/country-years)

I But: Downsian parties act strategically

I Salience could be a reaction to previous radical right success

I Our findings spurious?

I Salience a cause or a consequence of radical right success?Chicken – egg problem



Conclusion









Conclusion









Conclusion

A different approach: VAR (I)

I Effect of previous radical right success very difficult toincorporate into full multi-level models

I MulticollinearityI InterpretationI Structure of the data set

I Ignore micro-level → macro-political analysis

I No cross-level inference:

I Manifestos and radical right success (as opposed to individualvotes) all system-level phenomena



Conclusion









Conclusion









Conclusion

A different approach: VAR(II)

I Statistical model: Vector Auto Regression (VAR)

I Multivariate time-series analysisI Regress each variable (success/salience) on

I Its own past valuesI The other variable’s past values (4 lags = 2 years)

I Immigration and unemployment as controls

I Addresses two questions:

1. ‘Granger causality’: significant improvement of predictions?2. Dynamic analysis: short and medium-term impact of random

shocks

I So far, for France only (Eurobarometer 1980–2002)

I Limitations of data and design



Conclusion





I Immigration and unemployment as controlsI Addresses two questions:


shocks





Conclusion





I Immigration and unemployment as controlsI Addresses two questions:


shocks





Conclusion

What Are the Main Findings?

I Previous levels of salience significantly improve prediction ofradical right success

I Previous levels of radical right success do not significantlyimprove predictions for salience – no ‘Granger causality’

I Not a straightforward test of causality (would requireexperimental design)

I But circumstantial evidence in support of salience as a cause,not a consequence



Conclusion

What Are the Main Findings?

I Previous levels of salience significantly improve prediction ofradical right success

I Previous levels of radical right success do not significantlyimprove predictions for salience – no ‘Granger causality’

I Not a straightforward test of causality (would requireexperimental design)

I But circumstantial evidence in support of salience as a cause,not a consequence



Conclusion

Consequences of a flash success: nil

-.2

0

.2

.4

.6

0 5 10

order1, rexvote, salienzmean

68% CI impulse response function (irf)

step

Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable



Conclusion

Conclusion

I Findings for France support Arzheimer and Carter, 2006,but. . .

I Very low number of observations within France (n = 35)

I Requires interpolation

I Media content as an additional control/factor?

I Other countries in Western Europe?

I Handling of missing surveys (not a big deal in France)



Conclusion

Conclusion









Conclusion

Conclusion







Thanks for your time!


References

Bibliography I

Arzheimer, Kai (2009). “Contextual Factors and the ExtremeRight Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002”. In: American Journalof Political Science 53.2, pp. 259–275. url:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00369.x.Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter (2006). “Political OpportunityStructures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success”. In: EuropeanJournal of Political Research 45, pp. 419–443.Golder, Matt (2003a). “Electoral Institutions, Unemployment andExtreme Right Parties. A Correction”. In: British Journal ofPolitical Science 33, pp. 525–534.— (2003b). “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme RightParties in Western Europe”. In: Comparative Political Studies 36,pp. 432–466.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00369.x

References

Bibliography II

Jackman, Robert W. and Karin Volpert (1996). “ConditionsFavouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe”. In:British Journal of Political Science 26, pp. 501–521.Knigge, Pia (1998). “The Ecological Correlates of Right-WingExtremism in Western Europe”. In: European Journal of PoliticalResearch 34, pp. 249–279.Lubbers, Marcel, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers (2002).“Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe”. In: EuropeanJournal of Political Research 41, pp. 345–378.Swank, Duane and Hans-Georg Betz (2003). “Globalization, theWelfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe”. In:Socio-Economic Review 1, pp. 215–245.


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Radical Right Dynamics in France

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