3.4.6 Current and Emerging Forms of Mobile Network SharingIn many countries that have mobile operators as the dominant service providers, at least one mobile operator may have a near-ubiquitous national transmission network that has potential usefulness beyond the narrow needs of mobile service provision. This network could include the provision of digital backbone facilities from widely dispersed POPs for ISPs. Even if the existing capacity is limited for broadband, an upgrade to provide broadband may be significantly more economic than a completely new network.

In mobile networks, infrastructure sharing might include some physical resources (such as towers and buildings), whole transmission links, or sharing coverage areas (so that different network operators provide equipment in different areas with the understanding that retail customers of the other network operators would be allowed to roam there). Because of the cost savings, infrastructure sharing may be a pre-requisite for receiving Universal Access and Service Fund (UASF) support into new areas. This is seen in several recent UASF subsidy competitions where bidders were required to provide sufficient bandwidth capacity and access to radio towers on any new backbone link financed by the subsidy. Bidders also had to guarantee non-discriminatory open access (on commercial terms) [1].

A Reference document providing a typical Request for Proposal (RFP) and technical specification for this requirement is provided in section   7 of this   Module,   Competing for UAS Subsidies.

In some countries obtaining construction permits for masts, ducts and buildings can be difficult for a variety of reasons, from the purely bureaucratic to environmental policy perspective. Certainly, sharing towers and buildings is often considered desirable for environmental or aesthetic reasons. There might be advantages for regulators requiring that network operators have sharing agreements in place so that these forms of infrastructure can always be open to other network operators, thereby making second and third applications for permits unnecessary. The government and regulator of India, engaged in a comprehensive economic analysis and industry consultation regarding the potential need and benefits of mobile infrastructure sharing. The regulator, TRAI, published its recommendations on infrastructure sharing in April 2007 [2]. An overview of the underlying analysis and outcomes of the initial subsidy competitions are provided in Practice Note "Sharing Mobile Network Infrastructure in India".

Another option is to allow national roaming, where coverage is shared. This is for example the case in India: India has auctioned mobile licences on a regional basis (called circles) and national roaming is crucial for customers travelling outside of their providers’ licensed area. However, where roaming call charges are relatively high, this might not serve customers well. The scenario of operators continuing to generate revenues from expensive calls may act as a disincentive to network expansion unless regulation is enacted to limit retail call charges and enforce coverage obligations. However, in scenarios where one network operator is more dominant, national roaming may give the less powerful network operator an opportunity to compete in areas it has

not covered itself yet. National roaming might be only required for a limited period of time until networks are more evenly built-out.

In several countries, e.g., Austria and Australia, national roaming has been used to support market entry by a 3G network operator that had no 2G network – the 3G network operator has the right to negotiate temporary national roaming agreements covering access to the 2G networks of the network operators that have both 2G and 3G networks.  Without such agreements, the 3G network operator would have very limited coverage.  With these types of agreements, the 3G network operator can have national coverage but can be motivated to enlarge its own coverage by the potential economies of scale. The Practice Note "Debates about National Roaming in the EU" discusses this incentive structure.

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7.5.1. Policy reasons for supporting mobile network sharingThis section sets out various policy reasons for supporting mobile network sharing.  These policy reasons fall into three broad categories: environmental and public health considerations; the facilitation of network deployment; and upgrading technology from 2G (GSM) to 3G (IMT 2000) and beyond.  Each of these categories is discussed below.

Environmental and public health considerations

People generally view wireless communication masts and antennas as negative additions to the landscape.  Local communities may object to the construction of new sites because of the visual impact or environmental considerations.  Also, residents may fear public exposure to electromagnetic fields around masts and antennas. [1] Site sharing can limit such concerns and potential negative effects, since it limits the number of sites while achieving the required coverage. [2] Another beneficial aspect of site sharing is the amount of energy that can be saved when operators share electrical power, which is often in limited supply in developing countries. [3]

While sharing reduces the number of sites marking the landscape, it can also have adverse impacts.  Because antennas generally have to be separated from each other by a minimum distance in order to avoid interference, mast sharing usually requires taller (and more visually disruptive) masts.  Local planning authorities actually may prefer several small towers to one large one. More discrete (or disguised) structures reduce visual intrusion, but cannot support more than one operator’s antenna.

Facilitating network deployment

Civil engineering costs can mount up when the number of building sites is relatively high in a mobile network roll-out.  Moreover, operators often run into practical difficulties in acquiring

and developing adequate sites, obtaining the appropriate regulatory licences, and overcoming public opposition to mobile towers.

Site sharing allows operators to reduce their capital and operating expenditures, bypass nettlesome planning and regulatory hassles, and avoid potential environmental pitfalls.  In short, site sharing can speed up network deployment and make it less expensive.  Lower site-development costs can pay dividends when they result in networks covering larger areas, increasing the likelihood of bringing wireless services to sparsely populated rural areas – and at more affordable prices.

Upgrading technology from 2G to 3G

Infrastructure sharing can ease the transition from “second-generation” (2G) to “third-generation” (3G) mobile networks, by allowing operators to collocate new 3G equipment on their existing towers and masts.  This can help cut costs, even though 3G networks commonly require significantly more sites.  In the European Union, for example, 2G networks were deployed in the 900 megahertz (MHz) spectrum band, while 3G licenses were assigned in the 1900-2100 MHz band.  Because spectrum generally has a shorter range at higher frequencies, 3G networks require more base stations (and therefore more sites) – a significant transition expense for 2G operators.  However, if those 2G operators can collocate 3G equipment on their existing 2G towers, they can enjoy significant savings as a result.

End Notes

[1] Current scientific evidence indicates that exposure to radiofrequency fields, such as those emitted by mobile phones and antennas, is unlikely to have negative health effects. In response to health concerns raised by certain communities, the World Health Organization (WHO) established a project to assess the scientific evidence of possible health effects of electromagnetic fields. See www.who.int/peh-emf/en/index.html. The International Commission for Non-ionizing Radiation Protection (www.icnirp.de) has established guidelines for the maximum level of radiofrequency levels in areas of public access from antennas and for users of mobile handsets.

[2] This principle is established in the European Union Directive [Framework directive], consideration 23: “Facility sharing can be of benefit for town planning, public health or environmental reasons, and should be encouraged by national regulatory authorities on the basis of voluntary agreements. In cases where undertakings are deprived of access to viable alternatives, compulsory facility or property sharing may be appropriate. It covers inter alia: physical collocation and duct, building, mast, antenna or antenna system sharing. Compulsory facility or property sharing should be imposed on undertakings only after full public consultation.”

[3] Today’s standard 3G equipment consumes about 4,000 KWh of Grey energy per year per node, which corresponds to 2.5 tons of CO2, or the equivalent need of 120 trees per node to compensate for the environmental effect. In a developing country with no or little alternative Green energy, network sharing can significantly reduce the environmental impact.

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7.5.2. When might mobile network sharing be appropriate?Determining when mobile network sharing is appropriate requires consideration of both the anticipated benefits of such sharing and the regulatory complexities associated with implementing the sharing arrangements.  

Understanding the anticipated benefits of various forms of sharing helps to identify contexts where these forms of sharing will be appropriate and most desirable. For example, national roaming arrangements are more important in a country that has remote or rural areas that are un-served or under-served than in a smaller country with a largely urban population.

There are some benefits that apply to almost all forms of mobile network sharing. Network-sharing agreements generally benefit operators and the general public from a cost perspective. They help operators avoid costs for building or upgrading redundant network sites and allow them to gain additional revenue streams from leasing access. Operators also can achieve considerable savings in rent, maintenance and transmission costs; these savings can be passed down to end-users through lower rates. Sharing arrangements may also achieve economies of scale by combining operating and maintenance activities. Network sharing may also help operators to attain more efficient coverage, since operators may choose to use only those sites that provide deeper and better coverage, decommissioning sites with poor coverage possibilities. Operators can then reinvest those savings in upgrading their networks and providing better coverage and services to end users.

Network-sharing agreements may also bring substantial environmental benefits, by reducing the number of sites and improving the landscape. These types of benefits may be of particular relevance in contexts where tourism is a major industry in a country. In Caribbean countries, for example, reducing visual disruption caused by mobile towers and antennae is important to maintaining the beautiful landscape and beaches for which these countries are known.

The benefits of various forms of sharing must be weighed against the regulatory measures that will be necessary to facilitate these forms of sharing. There are obstacles to overcome when dealing with network-sharing agreements. From an economic and practical point of view, mobile network sharing is a complex process that requires substantial managerial resources. Some countries (often developing economies) lack the regulatory resources and expertise necessary to address the complex issues that accompany some forms of mobile network sharing such as Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). Regulators need to analyze the potential benefits to be generated by network sharing on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific

characteristics of each market involved, the competition-related concerns that may arise, and the relative difficulty associated with developing and implementing appropriate policies.

Generally speaking, network sharing is a useful tool for regulators and policy makers who want to encourage network deployment in un-served or under-served areas. Several instruments can be used to promote network sharing. National roaming arrangements are probably the most simple and effective arrangements. While roaming leads to a certain level of uniformity among operators’ offerings, this does not necessarily restrict competition significantly. National regulatory authorities that have anti-competitive concerns may allow network sharing for a limited period (for example, one or two years) in order to promote roll-out of initial phases of network deployment. After that, operators could be required to provide coverage using their own networks.

Other types of arrangements, such as active infrastructure sharing, an open access model (allowing and promoting the entry of MVNOs) and functional separation, may also work well to promote roll-out of wireless infrastructure and the advancement of competition. But these types of arrangements may be difficult to monitor and regulate. Such measures require a strong regulator and an effective and efficient judicial system, with appropriate enforcement powers.

When analyzing examples of network-sharing agreements around the world, regulators and policy makers should look at the way each market has developed. For example, it is relevant to note that some network-sharing agreements in developed countries have presaged later mergers between the companies involved. [1] In other cases, the companies involved in network sharing arrangements have not merged with each other, but have seen consolidation take place in the market around them. [2] In the past few years, there has been a large consolidation wave in the global telecommunication market across the globe. [3] Perhaps some of those operators could have survived had they been allowed more freedom to share their infrastructure and to compete based on the quality of their service marketing and delivery.

[1] This was the case with T-Mobile and Orange in the Netherlands and ATT and Cingular in the USA.

[2] After its network sharing arrangement with T-Mobile in the UK and in Germany, the company O2 was acquired by Telefonica.

[3] Worth mentioning are: the acquisition of Bell South by AT&T; the merger between Verizon en MCI; the acquisition of O2 by Telefonica of Spain, the acquisition of Orange Netherlands by T-Mobile; the acquisition of a controlling interest in Telecom Italia by Telefonica.

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7.5.3. Options for passive mobile network sharingThis section identifies the options available for mobile operators to share passive infrastructure elements of their wireless access networks. The provider of the infrastructure can either be one of the operators or a separate entity set up to build and operate it, such as a tower company. The passive infrastructure in a mobile network is composed mainly of:

Electrical or fibre optic cables; Masts and pylons;

Physical space on the ground, towers, roof tops and other premises; and

Shelter and support cabinets, electrical power supply, air conditioning, alarm systems and other equipment.

Passive Mobile Sharing: Options Available in Site Sharing

Source: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), Recommendations on Infrastructure Sharing

A collection of passive network equipment in one structure for mobile telecommunications is generally called a “site.” Therefore, when one or more operators agree to put their equipment on (or in) the same site, it is called “site sharing” or “collocation.”

In site-sharing arrangements, operators might share space on the ground or on a tower or rooftop. Depending on the location, operators could install antennas directly on the structure (for example, a water tower or roof-top) or share a mast. The next degree of cooperation would involve sharing support systems at the site, such as power supply and air conditioning (often integrated in a site support cabinet, or SSC).  Telecommunication plant (antennas and transmission equipment) is considered active infrastructure, which is discussed in section   7.5.5 . Operators often welcome site sharing as cost-effective, because new sites can be costly, capital intensive, cumbersome to maintain and environmentally risky.

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7.6.5 Competition and sharingCompetition-related issues are a major theme in discussions surrounding sharing initiatives. There are three main dimensions to the relationship between sharing and competition:

First, the capacity of sharing to enhance competition; Second, the risk that sharing will undermine competition; and

Third, anti-competitive conduct that can impede sharing.

The capacity of sharing to enhance competition

There are three ways that sharing promotes competition. First, by reducing the cost of network deployment, sharing mitigates one the biggest impediments to market entry and makes it possible for more players to enter into the ICT sector. Second, sharing offers a means of addressing barriers to competition, such as the control of bottleneck facilities by dominant operators. Finally, sharing has the potential to create new types of players in the market who introduce new dynamics to traditional forms of offering services. For example, sharing has given rise to a new type of core and access competitor, namely, infrastructure providers. Sharing has also introduced new types of service providers who compete with more traditional service providers in various markets. An example is Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs).

In general, it is preferable to take a “light touch” regulatory approach when considering measures that may be adopted to enhance competition through sharing. Thus, there is a preference for measures that facilitate and encourage sharing, but that do not mandate actions unless necessary (e.g., in the cases of operators with Significant Market Power or “SMP”). Some of the measures that regulators and policy makers may take to promote the positive benefits of sharing for competition include:

Incentive-based regulations to encourage non-dominant operators to share infrastructure with each other;

Removing restrictions to sharing that may exist in the terms and conditions of authorizations;

Maintaining central registries of information about certain types of infrastructure that is capable of being shared (e.g., antennae registries or tower logs) so that new entrants can better plan their business strategy and network deployment;

Working with industry groups to formulate recommended “best practices” for various forms of sharing;

Mandating sharing of essential facilities that are owned or operated by dominant service providers/operators with SMP; and

Ensuring that the authorisation framework accommodates new types of players like infrastructure players and MVNOs.

The risk that sharing will undermine competition

Some of the same factors that create the potential for sharing to enhance competition also carry a risk that sharing will undermine competition. The ability of new entrants to enter the market without extensive network infrastructure of their own raises concerns about the health of infrastructure-based competition in the sector. The concern is that there will be inadequate incentives for operators to invest in infrastructure. Moreover, infrastructure owners, operators, and providers may lack sufficient incentives to continue to invest in new infrastructure if they are required to share access to this infrastructure at rates that do not adequately compensate them for the risk involved in deploying new infrastructure.

In addition to concerns about stagnation in infrastructure-based competition, there is a risk that sharing will occur in a manner that allows operators to engage in anti-competitive conduct. For example, dominant operators may provide access to its bottleneck facilities to other operators, but on terms and pricing that prejudice the access-seeking operators. Dominant operators may use sharing to engage in price squeeze practices.  Operators may also use sharing to engage in anti-competitive conduct such as collusion. Sharing raises issues about the access that competitors may have to each other’s commercially-sensitive information, including, for example, plans for expansion, operations data, and lists of customers.  

While the concerns that sharing may undermine competition are legitimate, these concerns are not unique to sharing. Regulators and policy makers have experience in addressing the types of issues that are raised by sharing. Thus, it is not necessary to “re-invent the wheel” when considering how to manage the risk that sharing may undermine competition. Some of the measures that may be adopted to address this risk include:

Ensure that operators that provide access to their infrastructure are permitted to earn a large enough return on their capital investment in order to continue to give them incentives to build out infrastructure;

Require that operators who enter into sharing agreements file the agreements with the regulator;

Require operators sharing facilities to take measures to safeguard the confidentiality of their information;

Allow sharing subject to a “sunset clause” where appropriate: if there is a concern that infrastructure sharing will inhibit competition, but there is a need to facilitate network deployment in the short-term, allow sharing (e.g., network roaming or tower sharing) for a limited time period;

Monitor activity in the sector and enforce competition regulations; and

As a measure of last resort, require functional separation for vertically-integrated operators with SMP that provide access to bottleneck facilities to operators who compete with them in downstream markets.

Anti-competitive conduct that can impede sharing

Where sharing is permitted, concerns may arise that operators will engage in various forms of anti-competitive behaviour to make it difficult for other operators to access their facilities. Common forms of anti-competitive conduct that can impede sharing include:

Delays in responding to requests for access; Refusals to provide access;

Refusals to provide information or delay in providing information about infrastructure available for sharing;

In the case of access to bottleneck facilities owned or operated by a vertically-integrated operator with SMP, price squeeze practices;

Providing access-seeking operators with services at inflated rates or with a poor quality of service; and

Demands for unreasonable access rates.

These types of conduct are not specific to the context of sharing and access to infrastructure. There are a variety of well-established regulatory measures and tactics to address such conduct. Examples of regulatory approaches and measures that may be employed to deter or to address anti-competitive conduct in the provision of sharing include:

Require and enforce the principle of non-discrimination in the provision of access services so that operators are not permitted to offer better rates or levels of services to themselves and their affiliated companies than they do to unrelated operators;

Require transparency in the terms and conditions for access and sharing, particularly in the case of operators with SMP (operators may be required, for example, to post a reference offer on their websites or to file such an offer with the regulator, or operators that enter into a sharing or access agreement may be required to file a copy of the agreement with the regulator);

Adopt a “first come, first served” policy for allocating capacity or responding to sharing requests;

Establish penalties for operators that reserve capacity on networks (including their own) that far exceeds their demonstrated needs (e.g., fine operators that reserve capacity and then fail to use a set threshold of this capacity within a certain period of time);

Establish base level service agreements and rates for sharing and access services;

Allow competitors to negotiate sharing arrangements on a commercial basis subject to the proviso that either party to a negotiation may seek binding arbitration if the parties are unable to reach an agreement on the terms and conditions within a certain period of time;

Establish time deadlines for replying to requests for information or access;

Establish ex ante reasons that will be deemed legitimate and acceptable for refusing to provide access or sharing upon request, along with guidance about what kind of evidence will satisfy the regulator about the legitimacy of a refusal;

Where necessary, mandate functional and/or accounting separations;

Require operators to maintain a log of all requests for sharing or access and require operators either to file annual reports on the log or to maintain accurate records that may be examined or audited if a complaint is filed;

Streamline a process for lodging complaints with the regulator concern anti-competitive conduct; and

Adopt efficient dispute resolution procedures.

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7.5.4. Site Sharing ArrangementsThere are several variations of site sharing arrangements. In terms of access, there are three basic types of site-sharing arrangements:

Unilateral – One operator agrees to provide access to its facilities to another operator; Bilateral – Two operators agree to provide mutual access to facilities; or

Multilateral – Several operators agree on access terms.

Other variations include the number of sites involved in the arrangement: such agreements may pertain to just one site, or they could provide a framework for access at multiple sites in a certain geographic region. Bilateral agreements for regional site sharing may be particularly appealing for operators from an economic point of view. Sharing passive infrastructure in certain regions enables operators to broaden service coverage over a larger geographical area, which is particularly attractive for operators subject to geographical coverage obligations. Regional site sharing allows operators to save capital and operating expenditures and provides an alternative to roaming arrangements.[1] Regulators should be careful, however, to head off collusion between

operators, especially in highly concentrated markets and where incumbent or dominant operators are negotiating bilateral sharing deals.

Standard terms and conditions in site sharing agreements

Objective of the agreement

Obligations of both parties

Term of the agreement

Applicable tariffs

Billing conditions

Service description

Implementation and coordination

Access to facilities and cooperation

Operations and maintenance

Subletting conditions (such as no subletting without the consent of the facility owner)

Term and termination

Penalties

Liability

Confidentiality

Representations and warranties

Amendments to agreement

Force majeure

Governing law and jurisdiction

Source : Camila Borba Lefèvre, Mobile Network Sharing, at:

www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR08/papers.html.

Most site-sharing agreements do not restrict competition between operators because operators generally retain independent control of their respective networks and services. As a result, operators maintain different services and business plans, concentrating on their different market niches. Full competition is assured where operators retain independent control over their radio planning and the freedom to add sites, including non-shared sites. In that way, operators are free to increase their network capacity and coverage. Better coverage and capacity can be a competitive advantage, allowing operators to distinguish themselves based on the quality, capacity and range of their networks. It is therefore important that site-sharing agreements do not contain exclusivity clauses that would prohibit operators from concluding similar deals with other parties.

Site sharing arrangements that fulfill these conditions are not likely to restrict competition among operators. [2] In fact, site-sharing agreements may have a positive impact on competition, since the savings achieved may be passed on to consumers, increasing quality of service and decreasing prices.

Finally, it is important to ensure that exchanges of information between site-sharing competitors are limited to information strictly necessary for this purpose, such as technical information and location data for particular sites. Additional exchanges of confidential information should be avoided in order to protect customers’ proprietary rights and privacy. 

End Notes

[1] National roaming concerns a situation where the cooperating operators do not share any network elements as such but simply use each other’s networks to provide services to their own customers. National roaming arrangements allow the roaming operator to rely completely on the infrastructure of the operator providing national roaming, instead of building its own infrastructure in the roaming area. According to certain competition authorities, national roaming agreements may restrict competition between the roaming operators.

[2] This was the opinion of the European Commission when it judged the site sharing arrangement for 3G mobile communications between T-Mobile Deutschland and 02 Germany: Commission Decision of 16 July 2003, Case COMP/38.36.

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7.5.6. Active mobile network sharingIn addition to sharing passive infrastructure, operators may also share active elements of their wireless networks. Box 1 outlines the active elements of a wireless network that can be shared. Operators may share those elements and keep using different parts of the spectrum assigned to them. Although active infrastructure sharing is more complex, it is technically possible. Equipment manufacturers can supply packages that have expressly been designed for active mobile sharing.

Box 1: Active elements of mobile networks that may be shared

Antennas Antenna systems

Transmission systems

Channel elements

This section will describe several options available for active mobile sharing. Most of the examples used in this section focus on 3G network sharing, but the techniques could be applied to 2G mobile or broadband wireless networks, as well. [1]

Active mobile sharing may not be permitted under the licensing regimes of some countries. This is the case in India, for example, where the licensing regime for mobile telecommunications does not permit active sharing. Other regulatory agencies may allow active sharing only with strict conditions, in the belief that competing operators should utilize their own infrastructure independently. However, there are indications that many authorities are reconsidering this as operators increasingly compete based on the price and quality of their services and not on the features of their networks. The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has recommended a review of the existing licensing regime in India with respect to active infrastructure sharing.

This section will explore the different options available for operators that wish to share their 3G mobile networks. This information is also relevant for sharing of networks based on other technologies, since their basic configuration is similar. Figure 1 provides a graphical overview of the elements of a 3G mobile network that could be shared. These elements include:

The Node-B: This term refers to a base station placed next to an antenna. The Node-B contains equipment necessary to control the transmission and reception of signals: power

amplifiers, power supplies, air conditioning, support cabinets, alarm systems, the transmission switch (in case of UMTS this is based on asynchronous transfer mode or “ATM” technology) and the TRX. Also described as a transceiver, the TRX contains both a transmitter and a receiver and is responsible for sending and receiving signals at the frequency assigned to the operator. The TRX is a very important device, because it enables communication with mobile handsets.

The Radio Network Controller (RNC): This piece of equipment controls the Node-B. One RNC is usually connected to several Node-Bs (100 to 200). The RNC performs several important functions in a mobile access network, such as traffic and mobility management. The RNC tracks where the subscribers of a mobile network are located and assigns them to the base station closest to them. The RNC also controls the handoff of calls between cells.

Figure 1: Design of a Typical 3G Mobile Network

Source: Camila Borba Lefèvre, Mobile Network Sharing, at: www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR08/papers.html

The Core Network: This is the intelligent part of the network and includes the mobile switching centres (MSCs). In modern mobile network architecture, the MSC is physically split into a mobile gateway (MG) and a mobile switching server (MSS). The MG switches the traffic to and from the radio network and from external networks (the public switched telephone network and other mobile operators). The MSS controls the traffic and customer services. In addition to the switching and control components, the core network contains several databases, such as the subscriber data base or home location register (HLR), which identifies the subscribers that are authorized to use the mobile network

Another element of the core network is the operations and maintenance centre (OMC). Part of the OMC controls the radio network components, such as the RNCs and Node-Bs, and is responsible for traffic management on the network. In more intensive network-sharing agreements, parties may have to share the OMC. This may raise competitive concerns, because operators would be able to access information relating to competitors’ traffic and volume. Regulators may require operators to create an independent OMC to ensure that information from the sharing parties remains separate. This would also allow independent network optimization, ensuring competitive differentiation. Because of these regulatory issues, the OMC may be one of the elements not shared among operators.

[1] Many European mobile operators have contemplated active sharing of their 3G mobile networks. This was triggered, among other reasons, by the high licence costs paid for 3G licences in Europe, the economic downturn that followed the 2000 3G-auctions and the increasing doubt about the development of the UMTS-technology and the availability of adequate handsets. The need for a much larger number of base stations for 3G, as compared with 2G, also made operators contemplate infrastructure sharing in order to reduce costs.

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7.5.5. Encouraging passive mobile sharingIn order to accelerate deployment of mobile networks to rural areas, policy makers and regulators may consider adopting regulatory measures to promote site sharing. This section reviews measures that may be taken in order to encourage passive sharing in mobile networks.

Mandatory sharing

In countries where mobile site sharing is mandatory, operators generally are required to allow third parties to share their facilities upon request. The scope of mandatory site sharing may vary, depending on the needs of local markets and the policy objectives of the government. For example, sharing obligations might only be imposed on operators that have significant market power (SMP) while site sharing remains optional for non-dominant operators. The regulator might elect to require sharing of only certain infrastructure elements. The scope of mandatory sharing may also vary based on the degree of independence operators have in negotiating the specific terms of site sharing agreements.

For information about what regulators should consider when setting a policy for mandatory sharing, please see the Practice Note entitled “Regulating Mandatory Site Sharing Agreements”. A link to this Practice Note is set out below.

Box 1: Site Sharing in New Zealand

Subject to limited exceptions, mobile site sharing is mandatory upon request in New Zealand, although access seekers and access providers are free to set their own pricing arrangements for collocation. In 2007, an investigation conducted by the New Zealand Commerce Commission

(the Commission) found that although collocation agreements for mobile site sharing had been in place for many years, collocation had occurred on less than 0.5% of available towers. The investigation further found that pricing for collocation services was not the impediment to mobile collocation. Instead, the Commission considered that collocation had not occurred more frequently because “incumbent operators had control over optimal co-location sites and incumbents had no or limited incentives to support co-location (sic) by competing networks.” (Commerce Commission, Schedule 3 Investigation into Amending the Co-Location Service on Cellular Mobile Transmission Sites, 14 December 2007, p. 9, para. 49.)

In response to these findings, the Commission undertook a process to determine the Standard Terms for collocation on mobile cellular transmission sites. The Commission released its Determination on these Standard Terms (the “STD” or “Standard Terms Determination”) in December, 2008. The Commission’s STD was aimed at enabling the efficient provision of mobile collocation services and at providing access seekers and access providers with appropriate incentives to make efficient use of mobile network resources for the long-term benefit of end-users. The Commission identified three aspects of the STD in particular that it considered will contribute to more rapid collocation of mobile network transmission and reception equipment:

(1) the standard type site solution process;

(2) the ability for access seekers to make multi-site applications; and

(3) the Service Level capacity limit for each access provider of ten applications per access seeker per five day working period.

The Commission also stated that it would also monitor the implementation of the STD closely, given the limited progress that has been made towards collocation. The Commission stated that it “will be carefully examining the Service Level performance reports, with particular attention on the number of co-location (sic) Applications received and final approvals issued by Access Providers, as well as Service Level defaults.” (Commerce Commission, Standard Terms Determination for the specified service Co-location on cellular mobile transmission sites, Decision 661, December 11, 2008, p. xii, para. xxvii.)

Source: Commerce Commission, Standard Terms Determination for the specified service Co-location on cellular mobile transmission sites, Decision 661, December 11, 2008.

 

Optional sharing

Policy objectives play an important role in deciding whether site sharing should be mandatory or optional. When the policy is geared toward stimulating operators to invest in their own infrastructure, optional sharing may be applied.[1]

In many cases, operators may opt for site sharing voluntarily, in order to reduce costs. Regulators who wish to minimize market interventions may take measures to stimulate site sharing without mandating it. Measures to promote site-sharing arrangements might include: adopting model agreements; facilitating self-regulation; providing guidance on the types of sharing that is permitted; permitting the sharing of government-owned facilities; and providing financial incentives for sharing. A Practice Note containing further information about these options is linked below. This Practice Note is entitled “Measures to Promote Optional Passive Sharing”.

The role of local authorities

The ability to construct sites in certain areas may be limited by local land use or other regulatory restrictions. In most countries, local authorities are involved in granting permission to install masts and towers for wireless communications. These city or township authorities may take part in promoting site sharing, for example by requiring that new masts or towers be designed to accommodate more than one operator. Local authorities may also require operators to place their equipment on existing masts, unless this is not possible for technical reasons.

To promote site sharing successfully, local authorities must work closely with operators and their representatives. Disputes between operators and local authorities can hinder network roll-outs and increase communities’ often-unnecessary fears of negative impacts from tower sites. Associations of operators may be an important factor in establishing a dialogue between local communities and operators, increasing awareness about the presence and the location of masts in their communities and any possible health or environmental effects of those masts. Such associations may also develop, in cooperation with local communities, guidelines for building new sites or installing new equipment at existing sites. The goal is to increase local participation, improve the availability of information and create legal certainty for operators willing to roll out their networks.

It is also possible for national authorities to develop site-selection rules or guidelines to be followed by local authorities. These guidelines could address environmental factors or distinguish between the conditions that apply in urban and rural, less-populated areas.

Encouraging the participation of infrastructure providers (tower companies)

Telecommunications operators that own towers, masts or other infrastructure may have incentives to prevent competitors from sharing their sites. However, the outsourcing of tower operations may be an interesting option from a business perspective. Specialized tower companies have every incentive to sell their services to as many telecommunications service providers as possible.

Tower companies own the towers and masts or, in some case, the whole site. They provide a variety of services to customers, such as: radio and transmission planning; site acquisition; site construction and equipment installation; and/or site maintenance.

Outsourcing deals may create considerable financial value for operators and free them up to focus on their core wireless businesses. Outsourcing of site infrastructure has been particularly

successful in North America, where it is considered one of the key enablers of effective mobile network roll-out.[2]

Although not as well known as in the United States, tower companies also are becoming more common in Europe.[3] For information about how policy makers and regulators may promote the emergence of tower providers, please see the Practice Note entitled “Tower Companies and the Promotion of Passive Sharing”.

Financial incentives

Sharing arrangements can often reduce costs and make wireless deployment more viable in many areas. In this regard, operators have an incentive to pursue sharing arrangements. Governments can also implement various measures to create additional financial incentives. Such measures could include tax and fee exemptions, the reduction of fees imposed by local authorities, and subsidies. The Practice Note entitled “Encouraging Passive Sharing Using Financial Incentives” discusses these measures in greater detail. A link to this Practice Note is set out below. 

[1] Cf. Article 8 of the European Framework Directive, according to which one of the principle policy objectives of the European electronic communications policy is to promote efficient investment in infrastructure.

[2] In the United States, the majority of mobile sites are owned by tower companies, and not by mobile operators. Among successful tower companies in North America are: American Tower, Crown Castle and Spectra Site.

[3] The company Alticom B.V., which is a subsidiary of the French company TDF S.A., has recently entered the Dutch market in order to operate a tower business for wireless transmission. TDF also operates a tower business in other European countries.

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6.5.7. Active Mobile Network Sharing: Extended Site SharingExtended site sharing is when operators share not only the passive elements of a site, but also active equipment such as antennas, combiners and transmission links. In extended site sharing arrangements, operators may also share the TRX (transmitter and receiver). This requires parties to share the spectrum, as well. Spectrum sharing is technically possible, but it can raise regulatory challenges because of rules dealing with spectrum optimization. Nevertheless, the Brazilian regulatory ANATEL has expressly allowed spectrum sharing in case operators decide to share their networks in order to provide coverage in rural or remote areas (communities with less than 30,000 inhabitants).

The extended site-sharing option may increase capital and operating savings when compared with simple site sharing. The amount of additional savings may be limited, however, because the additional costs of antennas and transmission equipment are relatively small.

While it is technically possible for operators using different frequencies to share an antenna, this option poses some technical challenges. It may particularly difficult when radio optimization strategies are not aligned among the operators. While an antenna can be shared, it is usually kept in a certain position, based on the operator’s own radio optimization strategy. The optimization strategy of the sharing operator may require changing the antenna position – something that may be difficult or impossible when the antenna is shared.

Nevertheless, certain equipment manufacturers supply antennas that are adequate for antenna sharing.[1] This equipment includes Multi-Operator Radio Access Network (MO-RAN) technology. Where MO-RANs are deployed they allow for two operators to share the same base station and to share the radio network controller which directs the voice and data traffic back to the operator's own core network.

[1] Nokia, for example, is an equipment manufacturer and supplier that provides equipment intended for network sharing.

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7.5.8 Active Mobile Network Sharing: Sharing the Radio Access Network Rack sharing: In addition to the extended site–sharing option, operators can choose to install their active equipment in a shared cabinet or rack (i.e., the housing frame encompassing the electronic and other hardware). In this rack-sharing option, other elements such as channel elements, transmitter and receiver (TRXs) and power amplifiers remain physically separated, along with the transmission networks and other elements of radio access, such as the Radio Network Controllers (RNCs). Power supply, air-conditioning, ancillary cabinet and alarm installations can be shared.[1]

Depending on the actual situation, rack sharing may provide up to 5 per cent capital expenditure savings for an operator, per Node-B. If battery backup is shared, this option may provide even further savings. Figure 1 graphically illustrates this option.

Figure 1: Rack Sharing (i.e., sharing the physical frame housing electronics and other equipment and ancillary elements such as power supply, air-conditioning, battery back-up, and alarm installation)

Source: Camila Borba Lefèvre, Mobile Network Sharing, at: www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR08/papers.html

Full Radio Access Network (RAN) Sharing: In addition to extended site-sharing and rack sharing, operators may also share all the elements of the Node-B. In case independent frequency control needs to be in place, the TRX and the power amplifier (PA) should remain independent, allowing for radiation at each operator’s assigned frequency range. When the spectrum can be shared, operators may also share the TRX and the PA.

Figure 2: Full RAN Sharing

Source: Camila Borba Lefèvre, Mobile Network Sharing, at: www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR08/papers.html

In the case of full RAN sharing, regulatory authorities may require the shared elements to be functionally separated. In this scenario, operators should retain independent control of all the parameters that determine the quality of the network, such as coverage, speed and the handover parameters. The Dutch regulatory authority required functional separation when it assessed the proposed sharing arrangement for 3G mobile services between operators Ben and Dutchtone.[2]

Functional separation implies that the communication between the RNC and the Node-B has to be under the independent control of one operator, as far as that operator’s service is concerned. This communication may take place using the same cables and connections, but it must be logically separated. In addition, operations, maintenance and network control should be separated. Those elements may be under individual control by each operator or under joint control of an independent third party, which would operate the shared network on behalf of the sharing parties. This independent third party could be a joint venture between the sharing parties or an independent company. Figure3 illustrates a functionally separated RNC, which may be necessary due to regulatory requirements.

Figure 3: Separating the RNC Functions

Source: Camila Borba Lefèvre, Mobile Network Sharing, at: www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR08/papers.html

[1] This situation may also be called “ancillary sharing”.

[2] See Decision of NMa of 11 October 2002, Case No. 2816/35.

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7.5.9 Active Mobile Network Sharing: Core Network SharingSharing of the core network is technically possible. However, core network sharing does raise some commercial concerns. The core network performs several functions in areas essential to service performance, such as billing. The core network also contains a large amount of confidential information on the operator’s business. These matters can complicate sharing the core network. There are, however, other ways to share the core network, such as national roaming, or through a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) structure. In addition, with the emergence of so-called next-generation core networks, in which switching and the control/service functionalities are physically separated, network sharing may move into the domain of core network switching while enabling service differentiation and confidentiality.

National roaming

National roaming refers to an arrangement among operators to use each other’s networks to provide services in geographic areas where they have no coverage. Such arrangements effectively multiply any one carrier’s ability to cover the entire country, without actually having deploying infrastructure everywhere. There are several options for the geographic division of a country for the purpose of national roaming. One common method is to assign different cities, provinces or regions to different operators. For more information on roaming arrangements, please see the Practice Note, “National Roaming”. A link to this Practice Note is set out below.

Wholesale mobile access: Mobile virtual network operators

Broadly speaking, mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are entities that provide mobile services to end-user customers but do not have their own radio spectrum; in some cases, MVNOs also do not have all the infrastructure necessary to provide mobile telephone services. MVNOs offer services to their customers by reselling wholesale minutes that they have purchased from a mobile network operator (MNO). Many MVNOs have backbone and back-office operations (including a billing and identification system) and only require use of the mobile operator’s access (or “last mile”) network. These MVNOs thus avoid having to build out end-to-end mobile networks. One form of MVNO, known as a “mobile service provider,” operates without any network facilities at all, simply buying and reselling minutes to their end users. For more information on MVNOs, please see the Practice Note entitled “Mobile Virtual Network Operators”. A link to this Practice Note is set out below.

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7.5.10 Active Mobile Network Sharing: Backhaul SharingIn certain rural or remote areas, backhaul networks can constitute bottleneck facilities. In areas where mobile traffic is low, the full backhaul capacity may lie unused, making it ideal for sharing among different operators. Accordingly, where passive or active infrastructure is shared on a tower or rooftop, operators may also share backhaul facilities. Backhaul sharing can be achieved either through fibre cables or microwave links.

Regulatory or licensing conditions may preclude operators from sharing backhaul facilities, however, especially when spectrum is employed (as with microwave links). This is often the case in rural or remote areas. For example, sharing of radio backhaul is not permitted under the licensing conditions of mobile operators in India. When backhaul radio facilities cannot be shared, operators have to install separate antennas on the towers, in addition to the antennas used to communicate with handsets. This increases the weight of the antenna on the tower, requiring higher and heavier towers, increasing the cost of construction and adding to visual intrusion. Therefore, it may be more practical to share fibre and limit the sharing of radio backhaul facilities to low-traffic regions. In addition, regulators and policy makers intending to foster wireless broadband deployment may wish to encourage mobile operators to replace microwave links with fibre links to add greater bandwidth.

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7.5.11. Competition and Active Mobile Network SharingActive mobile sharing raises a number of competition-related concerns. The access that operators have to each other’s networks provides them with access to confidential information about each other’s costs, operations, technology, and other key data. Sharing may therefore provide opportunities for collusion on pricing, service packages, and network development.

Even without collusion, some forms of sharing such as national roaming may restrict competition by neutralizing key competition parameters such as coverage, call quality and transmission rates. This neutralization occurs because roaming operators are restricted by the coverage, network quality and transmission speeds available on the visited network, which are a function of the commercial choices made by the visited operator. Regulators may be concerned at the resulting uniformity and lack of market differentiation. These types of concerns were raised by the

European Commission when it evaluated 3G network sharing arrangements between T-Mobile and O2 in Germany and the UK. Although the European Commission restricted national roaming arrangements due to competition-related concerns, this decision was subsequently overturned by the European Court of First Instance (CFI). For more details about the European Commission’s evaluation of national roaming in the aforementioned cases, please see that attached Practice Note entitled “The European Commission’s Review of National Roaming Agreements”.

Sharing may also hinder network roll-out since operators may find that it is cheaper to share infrastructure and provide services in the same geographic areas as their competitors than to roll-out their network to under-served areas. Insofar as sharing increases collaboration and reduces competition in the core and access levels of the network, sharing also reduces the incentive to innovate. Dynamic efficiency may suffer as a result.

Box 1: Ofcom’s concerns regarding the impact of sharing on competition

“Network sharing could also have undesirable consequences for competition. For example, [mobile network operators] could collaborate on network development and gain information about each other’s costs and plans, which may have a chilling effect on competition in the retail market. Dynamic efficiency may also be lower with fewer networks able to provide high quality mobile broadband services. End-to-end competition, i.e. at both the network and service level, could lead to greater innovation, which could bring significant benefits for consumers. We note that the competition concerns would be amplified if the 900 MHz operators were themselves to decide to share a single UMTS 900 network in response to the actions of their competitors. While it is difficult to quantify the potential impact of these effects, Ofcom’s initial view is that there is a significant risk that both competitive intensity and innovation in mobile broadband services would be weakened, with potentially serious impacts on consumer welfare.” 

Source: Ofcom, Application of spectrum liberalization and trading to the mobile sector (20 September, 2007). This public consultation document is available at: www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/liberalisation/liberalisation.pdf.

While the collaborative aspects of sharing pose concerns, sharing may also be used by operators, particularly those with significant market power (SMP), to undermine their competitors. Refusals to grant access to network infrastructure, delays in responding to requests for site sharing, poor service quality, and price gouging can sabotage initiatives to promote sharing where it would otherwise be appropriate. Vertically integrated operators in particular have incentives to delay access and service requests, reduce service quality, and over-charge operators who compete in the same downstream markets as they do.

With these concerns in mind, there are a number of ex ante measures that regulators may to avoid anti-competitive outcomes. These measures include the following:

Impose geographic coverage requirements. Set standards for quality of service indicators and time frames.

Require the publication of RIOs

Restrict exchange of confidential information.

Time limits: allow sharing in certain areas, for a certain amount of time. This allows for benefit of sharing for reducing costs so that can help with roll-out, but phases it out as markets grow.

Functional separation.

Although sharing arrangements raise competition-related concerns, there may also be some competition-related benefits associated with these arrangements. Network sharing agreements may help operators to offer services to more people in more geographic regions. The operators can then compete based on brand, price and customer service. This applies in particular to rural and remote areas. One way to balance the concerns about mobile network sharing with the benefits associated with sharing arrangements is to distinguish between urban and rural areas when judging network-sharing agreements. Brazilian regulator ANATEL, for example, permitted mobile network sharing in communities with less than 30,000 inhabitants, but not in other, larger communities, when it issued licences for the provision of 3G mobile services in 2008. Another option is to allow sharing for a period of time until operators have acquired a substantial customer base in rural areas. Subsequently, the operators may be required to deploy their own networks and eliminate or reduce their reliance on roaming.

Regulators need a thorough awareness of the competitive situation in the market when judging network-sharing agreements. Such agreements should not affect important competition parameters, such as price and service packages. Cooperating operators should not be allowed to exchange commercially sensitive information that may influence their future competitive behaviour. Where regulators impose conditions or limitations (such as requiring part of the infrastructure to be functionally separate), they may wish to impose only those obligations that are strictly necessary to preserve sustainable competition.

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7.5.12 Regulatory and legal issuesWhether mobile sharing involves passive or active infrastructure, there are a number of key regulatory issues that must be addressed. These issues are outlined below.

Licensing: Regulators and policy makers must assess the current licensing framework to ensure that it accommodates mobile network sharing, whether in terms of active or passive infrastructure. In particular, regulators and policy makers should consider whether the terms and conditions of existing licensees permit sharing and whether current categories of licences accommodate new types of industry participants such as infrastructure providers (e.g., tower companies) and mobile virtual network operators. Other authorization-related issues will also require considerations, such as fees and universal access obligations.

Mandatory or optional sharing: Regulators and policy makers must determine whether to mandate sharing or to permit it at the option of the operator. A related issue is what types of sharing to permit and on what basis. A good example is spectrum sharing: although it is technically possible to share spectrum, only the Brazilian regulator, ANATEL, has taken steps towards permitting it and then only in certain limited contexts. By contrast, tower sharing is widely permissible around the world, and 3G network sharing is becoming more common. At present, several countries including Jordan, Hong Kong China, and India permit MVNOs, though the terms under which MVNOs may operate differ to quite a degree from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Box 1: Commonly-recognized acceptable grounds for refusing access and sharing requests 

Insufficient capacity (all existing capacity is occupied or reserved). Granting of access is technologically impossible.

The access or sharing request, if granted, would breach safety and reliability standards.

Standard terms and conditions:  Regulators and policy makers may consider adopting standard terms and conditions to govern sharing arrangements. Alternatively, they may opt to require dominant service providers to file Reference Offers for sharing of essential facilities. One other option is to stipulate that operators are free to negotiate their own terms and conditions for sharing on a commercial basis, and to require that operators enter into arbitration or mediation if they cannot reach an agreement within a prescribed period of time.  The Bangladeshi Guidelines for Infrastructure Sharing, for example, provide that parties must negotiate commercial agreements for infrastructure sharing in good faith.  However, if the parties are unable to come to an agreement, either party may ask the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) for assistance.  Any decision issued by the BTRC in such a case is final and binding. The Guidelines for Infrastructure Sharing specifically state that disputes about tariffs or charges are to be resolved by the BTRC and that the BTRC's decision is final and binding.

In most cases, it is preferable to allow operators to negotiate their own arrangements on a commercial basis. Regulators may safeguard against anti-competitive behaviour in this context by setting some general principles for agreement and by establishing time deadlines for completing agreements. General principles that regulators may consider adopting include:

Non-discrimination; Provision of access and capacity on a “first-come, first-served” basis;

A requirement to return excess capacity and penalties for operators who order too much capacity;

Prohibitions on exclusivity arrangements;

Transparency; and

Acceptable grounds for refusing access and sharing requests.

Incentive regulation: Regulators and policy makers may consider implementing various measures designed to create incentives for sharing generally and/or for complying with the terms and requirements surrounding sharing. One common approach is to require that all operators keep a log of access requests, along with notes about the measures taken to respond to these requests. Operators may be required to file these logs with the regulator on a regular basis or may simply be required to keep these records and to produce the logs upon request. [1] Another measure that may be taken to enhance the efficiency of processing access requests is to allow operators to file more than one access request with an operator at one time. In New Zealand, for example, the Commerce Commission approved a set of standard terms for mobile collocation that allows access seekers to make up to ten requests to an access provider at a time.

Pricing: Regulators and policy makers must determine whether to set prices for sharing or to allow operators to negotiate prices, subject to the general requirement that prices be fair and commercially reasonable. This decision typically turns on the infrastructure in question and on the parties involved. Pricing controls are necessary where prices are unlikely to be fair or where pricing may be used to impose a barrier to market entry. Thus, while it may be necessary to regulate the prices charged for access to essential facilities owned and operated dominant service providers, it may not be necessary to set prices in other contexts where competition is healthier, such as tower sharing. Where prices are controlled, the adoption of some form of cost-based methodology is generally considered the best practice.

Dominance or Significant Market Power (SMP): Policies to promote ICT sector development and competition require a comprehensive framework for preventing and managing anti-competitive conduct. Regulators must prevent any abuse of dominance in cases where the infrastructure owner also competes downstream with other service providers in the same market. Such policies should be premised on the understanding that regulatory intervention is primarily needed only when an operator possesses Significant Market Power (SMP) and begins abusing that power. The standard best practices for intervention apply in infrastructure sharing regulation as they would in pricing, interconnection and other areas of competition policy.

Enforcement and dispute resolution: Whether governments choose a policy of mandatory or optional sharing, efficient enforcement mechanisms and dispute resolution processes should be in place. It is not possible to prescribe the exact enforcement measures that regulators should take; each country has its own institutions and laws. The common thread, however, is a solid and effective mechanism for handling complaints and disputes, with sufficient sanctions to discourage violations. See the Practice Note entitled “Dispute Resolution for Mobile Sharing” for more information about dispute resolution.

[1] See Booz Allen Hamilton Inc, "Telecom Infrastructure Sharing – Regulatory Enablers and Economic Benefits", November 2007, p. 8 available online at: www.boozallen.com/media/file/Telecom_Infrastructure_Sharing.pdf.

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INDONESIA

3.4.6 Lancar dan Emerging Bentuk Berbagi Jaringan Mobile

Di banyak negara yang memiliki operator selular sebagai penyedia layanan yang dominan,

setidaknya satu operator selular mungkin telah dekat-di mana-mana jaringan transmisi nasional

yang memiliki kegunaan potensi luar kebutuhan sempit penyediaan layanan mobile. Jaringan ini

dapat mencakup penyediaan fasilitas backbone digital dari POPs tersebar luas untuk ISP.

Bahkan jika kapasitas yang ada terbatas untuk broadband, upgrade untuk menyediakan

broadband mungkin jauh lebih ekonomis dari jaringan yang sama sekali baru.

Dalam jaringan selular, berbagi infrastruktur dapat mencakup beberapa sumber daya fisik

(seperti menara dan bangunan), link transmisi keseluruhan, atau cakupan wilayah berbagi

(sehingga operator jaringan yang berbeda menyediakan peralatan di daerah yang berbeda

dengan pemahaman bahwa pelanggan ritel dari operator jaringan lain akan diperbolehkan

untuk berkeliaran di sana). Karena penghematan biaya, berbagi infrastruktur mungkin pra-

syarat untuk menerima Akses Universal dan Layanan Dana (UASF) dukungan ke daerah baru. Ini

terlihat dalam beberapa kompetisi terakhir subsidi UASF mana penawar diminta untuk

menyediakan kapasitas bandwidth yang cukup dan akses ke menara radio pada link backbone

baru dibiayai oleh subsidi. Penawar juga harus menjamin akses yang tidak diskriminatif terbuka

(pada istilah komersial) [1].

Dokumen Referensi menyediakan Permintaan khas untuk Proposal (RFP) dan spesifikasi teknis

untuk kebutuhan ini diberikan dalam pasal 7 dari modul ini, Bersaing untuk Subsidi UAS.

Di beberapa negara memperoleh izin konstruksi untuk tiang-tiang, saluran dan bangunan bisa

sulit untuk berbagai alasan, dari perspektif murni birokrasi untuk kebijakan lingkungan. Tentu

saja, berbagi menara dan bangunan sering dianggap diinginkan untuk alasan lingkungan atau

estetika. Mungkin ada keuntungan bagi regulator mensyaratkan bahwa operator jaringan

memiliki kesepakatan pembagian di tempat sehingga bentuk-bentuk infrastruktur dapat selalu

terbuka untuk operator jaringan lain, sehingga membuat aplikasi kedua dan ketiga untuk izin

tidak perlu. Pemerintah dan regulator India, terlibat dalam analisis ekonomi yang komprehensif

dan konsultasi industri mengenai kebutuhan potensial dan manfaat dari berbagi infrastruktur

mobile. Regulator, Trai, diterbitkan rekomendasi pada berbagi infrastruktur pada bulan April

2007 [2]. Sebuah gambaran analisis yang mendasari dan hasil dari kompetisi subsidi awal

disediakan dalam Catatan Praktek "Berbagi Infrastruktur Jaringan Mobile di India".

Pilihan lain adalah untuk memungkinkan roaming nasional, di mana cakupan dibagi. Ini adalah

untuk contoh kasus di India: India telah dilelang lisensi selular secara regional (disebut

lingkaran) dan roaming nasional sangat penting untuk pelanggan bepergian ke luar daerah

penyedia mereka 'berlisensi. Namun, di mana biaya telepon roaming relatif tinggi, ini mungkin

tidak melayani pelanggan dengan baik. Skenario operator terus untuk menghasilkan

pendapatan dari panggilan mahal dapat bertindak sebagai disinsentif untuk perluasan jaringan

kecuali peraturan diberlakukan untuk membatasi biaya panggilan ritel dan menegakkan

kewajiban cakupan. Namun, dalam skenario di mana satu operator jaringan lebih dominan,

roaming nasional dapat memberikan operator jaringan kurang kuat kesempatan untuk bersaing

di daerah itu tidak tercakup sendiri belum. Roaming nasional mungkin hanya diperlukan untuk

periode waktu terbatas sampai jaringan yang lebih merata dibangun-out.

Di beberapa negara, misalnya, Austria dan Australia, roaming nasional telah digunakan untuk

mendukung masuk pasar oleh operator jaringan 3G yang tidak memiliki jaringan 2G - operator

jaringan 3G memiliki hak untuk menegosiasikan kesepakatan sementara roaming nasional

meliputi akses ke jaringan 2G operator jaringan yang memiliki kedua jaringan 2G dan 3G. Tanpa

perjanjian tersebut, operator jaringan 3G akan memiliki cakupan yang sangat terbatas. Dengan

jenis perjanjian, operator jaringan 3G dapat memiliki cakupan nasional, tetapi dapat termotivasi

untuk memperbesar cakupan sendiri oleh potensi ekonomi skala. Catatan Praktek "Perdebatan

mengenai Roaming Nasional di Uni Eropa" membahas struktur insentif.

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7.5.1. Kebijakan alasan untuk mendukung berbagi jaringan seluler

Bagian ini menetapkan berbagai alasan kebijakan luar untuk mendukung berbagi jaringan

mobile. Ini alasan kebijakan jatuh ke dalam tiga kategori besar: pertimbangan kesehatan

lingkungan dan masyarakat; fasilitasi penyebaran jaringan, dan teknologi upgrade dari 2G

(GSM) ke 3G (IMT 2000) dan seterusnya. Masing-masing kategori dibahas di bawah ini.

Lingkungan dan kesehatan masyarakat pertimbangan

Orang-orang umumnya melihat tiang-tiang komunikasi nirkabel dan antena sebagai tambahan

negatif lanskap. Masyarakat lokal dapat keberatan dengan pembangunan situs baru karena

dampak visual atau pertimbangan lingkungan. Juga, warga mungkin takut paparan publik untuk

medan elektromagnetik di sekitar tiang-tiang dan antena. [1] berbagi Situs dapat membatasi

keprihatinan seperti itu dan kemungkinan efek negatif, karena membatasi jumlah situs

sementara mencapai cakupan yang diperlukan. [2] Aspek lain yang bermanfaat dari situs

berbagi adalah jumlah energi yang dapat disimpan ketika operator berbagi kekuasaan listrik,

yang sering dalam pasokan terbatas di negara-negara berkembang. [3]

Sementara berbagi mengurangi jumlah situs menandai lanskap, juga dapat memiliki dampak

yang merugikan. Karena antena umumnya harus dipisahkan satu sama lain dengan jarak

minimum untuk menghindari gangguan, berbagi tiang biasanya membutuhkan lebih tinggi (dan

lebih visual mengganggu) tiang-tiang. Otoritas perencanaan lokal benar-benar dapat memilih

beberapa menara kecil satu satu besar. Lebih diskrit (atau disamarkan) struktur mengurangi

intrusi visual, tetapi tidak dapat mendukung antena lebih dari satu operator.

Memfasilitasi penyebaran jaringan

Biaya teknik sipil dapat mount up ketika jumlah situs bangunan relatif tinggi di jaringan seluler

roll-out. Selain itu, operator sering mengalami kesulitan praktis dalam memperoleh dan

mengembangkan situs yang memadai, mendapatkan lisensi peraturan yang tepat, dan

mengatasi oposisi publik terhadap menara seluler.

Situs berbagi memungkinkan operator untuk mengurangi modal dan biaya operasi, bypass

perencanaan nettlesome dan kerepotan peraturan, dan menghindari perangkap lingkungan

yang potensial. Singkatnya, situs berbagi dapat mempercepat penyebaran jaringan dan

membuatnya lebih murah. Rendah-biaya pengembangan situs dapat membayar dividen ketika

mereka menghasilkan jaringan yang meliputi area yang lebih besar, meningkatkan kemungkinan

membawa layanan nirkabel untuk daerah pedesaan yang jarang penduduknya - dan dengan

harga lebih terjangkau.

Upgrade teknologi dari 2G ke 3G

Berbagi infrastruktur bisa memudahkan transisi dari "generasi kedua" (2G) untuk "generasi

ketiga" (3G) jaringan mobile, dengan memungkinkan operator untuk collocate 3G peralatan

baru pada menara yang sudah ada dan tiang-tiang. Hal ini dapat membantu memangkas biaya,

meskipun jaringan 3G biasanya memerlukan situs secara signifikan lebih. Di Uni Eropa,

misalnya, jaringan 2G dikerahkan di band 900 (MHz) spektrum megahertz, sedangkan lisensi 3G

ditugaskan di 1900-2100 MHz band. Karena spektrum umumnya memiliki jangkauan lebih

pendek pada frekuensi yang lebih tinggi, jaringan 3G memerlukan base station yang lebih (dan

karena itu lebih banyak situs) - beban transisi bagi operator 2G. Namun, jika para operator 2G

dapat collocate peralatan 3G pada menara yang sudah ada 2G, mereka bisa menikmati

penghematan yang signifikan sebagai hasilnya.

Catatan Akhir

[1] bukti ilmiah terkini menunjukkan bahwa paparan medan frekuensi radio, seperti yang

dipancarkan oleh ponsel dan antena, tidak mungkin memiliki efek kesehatan negatif.

Menanggapi masalah kesehatan yang diangkat oleh komunitas tertentu, Organisasi Kesehatan

Dunia (WHO) didirikan sebuah proyek untuk menilai bukti ilmiah efek kesehatan yang mungkin

dari medan elektromagnetik. Lihat www.who.int / Peh-ggl / en / index.html. Komisi

Internasional untuk Non-ionisasi Proteksi Radiasi (www.icnirp.de) telah menetapkan pedoman

untuk tingkat maksimum tingkat frekuensi radio di wilayah akses publik dari antena dan untuk

pengguna handset mobile.

[2] Prinsip ini didirikan pada Directive Uni Eropa [Kerangka direktif], pertimbangan 23: "berbagi

Fasilitas dapat bermanfaat untuk perencanaan kota, kesehatan masyarakat atau alasan

lingkungan, dan harus didorong oleh otoritas pengawas nasional atas dasar sukarela perjanjian.

Dalam kasus di mana usaha yang kehilangan akses terhadap alternatif yang layak, fasilitas wajib

atau berbagi properti mungkin tepat. Ini mencakup antara lain: kolokasi fisik dan saluran,

bangunan, tiang, antena atau berbagi sistem antena. Wajib fasilitas atau properti berbagi harus

dikenakan pada usaha hanya setelah konsultasi publik penuh. "

[3] 3G peralatan standar hari ini mengkonsumsi sekitar 4.000 KWh energi abu-abu per tahun

per node, yang sesuai dengan 2,5 ton CO2, atau kebutuhan setara dengan 120 pohon per node

untuk mengkompensasi efek lingkungan. Di negara berkembang tanpa atau sedikit alternatif

energi Hijau, berbagi jaringan dapat secara signifikan mengurangi dampak lingkungan.

http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.3467.html

7.5.2. Ketika mungkin berbagi jaringan mobile tepat?

Menentukan ketika berbagi jaringan mobile yang sesuai memerlukan pertimbangan baik dari

manfaat yang diharapkan dari berbagi tersebut dan kompleksitas peraturan yang terkait dengan

penerapan pengaturan berbagi.

Memahami manfaat yang diharapkan dari berbagai bentuk berbagi membantu untuk

mengidentifikasi konteks di mana bentuk-bentuk berbagi akan tepat dan paling diinginkan.

Misalnya, pengaturan roaming nasional lebih penting di negara yang memiliki daerah terpencil

atau pedesaan yang belum terlayani atau kurang terlayani dibandingkan di negara yang lebih

kecil dengan sebagian besar penduduk perkotaan.

Ada beberapa manfaat yang berlaku untuk hampir semua bentuk berbagi jaringan selular.

Jaringan kesepakatan pembagian keuntungan umumnya operator dan masyarakat umum dari

perspektif biaya. Mereka membantu operator menghindari biaya untuk membangun atau

meng-upgrade situs jaringan berlebihan dan memungkinkan mereka untuk mendapatkan aliran

pendapatan tambahan dari penyewaan akses. Operator juga dapat mencapai penghematan

besar dalam biaya sewa, pemeliharaan dan transmisi; tabungan ini dapat diteruskan ke

pengguna akhir melalui tarif yang lebih rendah. Berbagi pengaturan juga dapat mencapai skala

ekonomi dengan menggabungkan kegiatan operasi dan pemeliharaan. Berbagi jaringan juga

dapat membantu operator untuk mencapai cakupan yang lebih efisien, karena operator

mungkin memilih untuk hanya menggunakan situs-situs yang menyediakan cakupan yang lebih

dalam dan lebih baik, situs dekomisioning dengan kemungkinan cakupan miskin. Operator

kemudian dapat menginvestasikan tabungan mereka di upgrade jaringan mereka dan

menyediakan cakupan yang lebih baik dan layanan kepada pengguna akhir.

Jaringan kesepakatan pembagian juga dapat membawa manfaat lingkungan yang besar, dengan

mengurangi jumlah situs dan meningkatkan lanskap. Jenis manfaat mungkin relevansi khusus

dalam konteks di mana pariwisata merupakan industri utama di sebuah negara. Di negara-

negara Karibia, misalnya, mengurangi gangguan penglihatan yang disebabkan oleh menara

seluler dan antena penting untuk menjaga pemandangan yang indah dan pantai yang negara-

negara ini dikenal.

Manfaat dari berbagai bentuk berbagi harus ditimbang terhadap regulasi yang akan diperlukan

untuk memfasilitasi bentuk-bentuk berbagi. Ada hambatan untuk mengatasi ketika berhadapan

dengan jaringan-kesepakatan pembagian. Dari segi ekonomi dan praktis pandang, berbagi

jaringan mobile merupakan proses yang kompleks yang memerlukan sumber daya manajerial

besar. Beberapa negara (sering negara berkembang) kekurangan sumber daya peraturan dan

keahlian yang diperlukan untuk mengatasi masalah yang kompleks yang menyertai beberapa

bentuk jaringan mobile berbagi seperti Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNOs). Regulator

perlu menganalisis manfaat potensial yang akan dihasilkan dengan berbagi jaringan

berdasarkan kasus per kasus, dengan mempertimbangkan karakteristik spesifik dari setiap pasar

yang terlibat, kompetisi yang berhubungan dengan kekhawatiran yang mungkin timbul, dan

kesulitan relatif terkait dengan pengembangan dan menerapkan kebijakan yang tepat.

Secara umum, berbagi jaringan adalah alat yang berguna untuk regulator dan pembuat

kebijakan yang ingin mendorong penggelaran jaringan di daerah un-dilayani atau terlayani.

Beberapa instrumen dapat digunakan untuk mempromosikan berbagi jaringan. Nasional

pengaturan roaming mungkin pengaturan yang paling sederhana dan efektif. Sewaktu roaming

mengarah ke tingkat tertentu keseragaman di antara persembahan operator ', ini tidak selalu

membatasi persaingan secara signifikan. Otoritas nasional yang anti-persaingan kekhawatiran

memungkinkan berbagi jaringan untuk jangka waktu terbatas (misalnya, satu atau dua tahun)

dalam rangka untuk mempromosikan roll-out fase awal penyebaran jaringan. Setelah itu,

operator dapat diminta untuk menyediakan cakupan menggunakan jaringan mereka sendiri.

Jenis lain dari pengaturan, seperti berbagi infrastruktur aktif, model akses terbuka

(memungkinkan dan mempromosikan masuknya MVNOs) dan pemisahan fungsional, juga

dapat bekerja dengan baik untuk mempromosikan peluncuran infrastruktur nirkabel dan

kemajuan kompetisi. Tapi ini jenis pengaturan mungkin sulit untuk memonitor dan mengatur.

Tindakan semacam itu membutuhkan regulator yang kuat dan sistem peradilan yang efektif dan

efisien, dengan kekuatan penegakan yang sesuai.

Ketika menganalisis contoh jaringan-kesepakatan pembagian di seluruh dunia, regulator dan

pembuat kebijakan harus melihat cara masing-masing pasar telah dikembangkan. Sebagai

contoh, adalah relevan untuk dicatat bahwa beberapa jaringan-kesepakatan pembagian di

negara-negara maju telah diramalkan merger kemudian antara perusahaan yang terlibat. [1]

Dalam kasus lain, perusahaan yang terlibat dalam pengaturan berbagi jaringan belum

bergabung dengan satu sama lain, namun telah melihat konsolidasi berlangsung di pasar sekitar

mereka. [2] Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, telah terjadi gelombang konsolidasi besar di pasar

telekomunikasi global di seluruh dunia. [3] Mungkin beberapa dari mereka operator dapat

bertahan hidup seandainya mereka diberi kebebasan lebih untuk berbagi infrastruktur mereka

dan untuk bersaing berdasarkan kualitas layanan mereka pemasaran dan pengiriman.

[1] Ini adalah kasus dengan T-Mobile dan Orange di Belanda dan ATT dan Cingular di Amerika

Serikat.

[2] Setelah pengaturan berbagi jaringan dengan T-Mobile di Inggris dan di Jerman, O2

perusahaan diakuisisi oleh Telefonica.

[3] Worth menyebutkan adalah: akuisisi Bell South oleh AT &T; merger antara Verizon en MCI,

akuisisi oleh Telefonica O2 dari Spanyol, akuisisi Orange Belanda oleh T-Mobile, akuisisi saham

mayoritas di Telecom Italia oleh Telefonica.

http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.3468.html

7.5.3. Pilihan untuk berbagi jaringan pasif selular

Bagian ini mengidentifikasi pilihan yang tersedia untuk operator mobile untuk berbagi elemen

infrastruktur pasif jaringan nirkabel mereka akses. Penyedia infrastruktur dapat menjadi salah

satu operator atau entitas yang terpisah dibentuk untuk membangun dan mengoperasikannya,

seperti perusahaan menara. Infrastruktur pasif dalam jaringan selular terutama terdiri dari:

• Listrik atau kabel serat optik;

• tiang-tiang dan tiang;

• fisik ruang pada tanah, menara, atap dan bangunan lainnya;

• Tempat Penampungan dan dukungan lemari, pasokan listrik, AC, sistem alarm dan peralatan

lainnya.

Pasif Handphone Berbagi:

Tersedia dalam Berbagi Situs Pilihan

Sumber: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai), Rekomendasi Berbagi Infrastruktur

Sebuah koleksi peralatan jaringan pasif dalam satu struktur untuk telekomunikasi seluler

umumnya disebut "situs." Oleh karena itu, ketika satu atau lebih operator setuju untuk

menempatkan peralatan mereka (atau dalam) situs yang sama, hal itu disebut "situs berbagi"

atau " kolokasi. "

Dalam situs-pengaturan pembagian, operator mungkin akan berbagi ruang pada tanah atau

pada menara atau atap. Tergantung pada lokasi, operator bisa memasang antena langsung

pada struktur (misalnya, menara air atau atap-atas) atau berbagi tiang. Tingkat berikutnya

kerjasama akan melibatkan berbagi sistem dukungan di situs, seperti power supply dan

pendingin udara (sering diintegrasikan dalam kabinet mendukung situs, atau SSC).

Telekomunikasi tanaman (antena dan peralatan transmisi) dianggap infrastruktur aktif, yang

dibahas dalam bagian 7.5.5. Operator sering menyambut situs berbagi sebagai biaya-efektif,

karena situs baru dapat mahal, padat modal, rumit untuk mempertahankan dan lingkungan

berisiko.

http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.3469.html

7.6.5 Persaingan dan berbagi

Kompetisi-isu terkait adalah tema utama dalam diskusi sekitar inisiatif berbagi. Ada tiga dimensi

utama hubungan antara berbagi dan persaingan:

• Pertama, kapasitas berbagi untuk meningkatkan persaingan;

• Kedua, resiko bahwa berbagi akan melemahkan persaingan, dan

• Ketiga, perilaku anti-persaingan yang dapat menghambat berbagi.

Kapasitas berbagi untuk meningkatkan persaingan

Ada tiga cara yang berbagi mempromosikan persaingan. Pertama, dengan mengurangi biaya

penggelaran jaringan, berbagi meringankan salah satu hambatan terbesar untuk masuk pasar

dan memungkinkan lebih banyak pemain untuk masuk ke sektor TIK. Kedua, berbagi

menawarkan cara mengatasi hambatan untuk kompetisi, seperti kontrol fasilitas bottleneck

oleh operator dominan. Akhirnya, berbagi memiliki potensi untuk menciptakan jenis baru dari

pemain di pasar yang memperkenalkan dinamika baru untuk bentuk-bentuk tradisional

menawarkan jasa. Misalnya, berbagi telah melahirkan jenis baru inti dan pesaing akses, yaitu,

penyedia infrastruktur. Berbagi juga telah memperkenalkan jenis baru dari penyedia jasa yang

bersaing dengan penyedia layanan yang lebih tradisional di berbagai pasar. Contohnya adalah

Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNOs).

Secara umum, adalah lebih baik untuk mengambil "sentuhan ringan" pendekatan peraturan

ketika mempertimbangkan langkah-langkah yang dapat diadopsi untuk meningkatkan

persaingan melalui berbagi. Jadi, ada preferensi untuk langkah-langkah yang memfasilitasi dan

mendorong berbagi, tetapi yang tidak mandat tindakan kecuali diperlukan (misalnya, dalam

kasus operator dengan Kekuatan Pasar signifikan atau "SMP"). Beberapa langkah yang regulator

dan pembuat kebijakan mungkin diperlukan untuk mempromosikan manfaat positif dari

berbagi untuk kompetisi meliputi:

• Insentif berbasis peraturan untuk mendorong operator non-dominan untuk berbagi

infrastruktur dengan satu sama lain;

• Menghapus pembatasan untuk berbagi yang mungkin ada dalam syarat dan kondisi otorisasi;

• Mempertahankan pendaftar pusat informasi tentang jenis tertentu dari infrastruktur yang

mampu sedang bersama (misalnya, pendaftar antena atau menara log) sehingga pendatang

baru yang lebih baik dapat merencanakan strategi bisnis mereka dan penyebaran jaringan;

• Bekerja dengan kelompok industri untuk merumuskan direkomendasikan "praktek terbaik"

untuk berbagai bentuk berbagi;

• mandat berbagi fasilitas penting yang dimiliki atau dioperasikan oleh penyedia layanan yang

dominan / operator dengan SMP, dan

• Memastikan bahwa kerangka otorisasi mengakomodasi jenis baru dari pemain seperti pemain

infrastruktur dan MVNOs.

Resiko bahwa berbagi akan melemahkan persaingan

Beberapa faktor yang sama yang menciptakan potensi untuk berbagi untuk meningkatkan

persaingan juga membawa risiko bahwa berbagi akan merusak persaingan. Kemampuan

pendatang baru untuk memasuki pasar tanpa infrastruktur jaringan yang luas mereka sendiri

menimbulkan kekhawatiran tentang kesehatan infrastruktur berbasis persaingan di sektor ini.

Kekhawatiran bahwa akan ada insentif memadai bagi operator untuk berinvestasi di bidang

infrastruktur. Selain itu, infrastruktur pemilik, operator, dan penyedia mungkin kurangnya

insentif yang cukup untuk terus berinvestasi dalam infrastruktur baru jika mereka diwajibkan

untuk berbagi akses ke infrastruktur ini dengan harga yang tidak memadai kompensasi untuk

risiko yang terlibat dalam menyebarkan infrastruktur baru.

Di samping kekhawatiran tentang stagnasi dalam infrastruktur berbasis kompetisi, ada resiko

bahwa berbagi akan terjadi dengan cara yang memungkinkan operator untuk terlibat dalam

perilaku anti-kompetitif. Misalnya, operator dominan dapat memberikan akses ke fasilitas

hambatan untuk operator lain, tetapi pada syarat dan harga bahwa prasangka akses-mencari

operator. Operator dominan dapat menggunakan berbagi untuk terlibat dalam praktek-praktek

pemerasan harga. Operator juga dapat menggunakan berbagi untuk terlibat dalam perilaku anti

persaingan seperti kolusi. Berbagi menimbulkan masalah tentang akses yang pesaing mungkin

harus komersial-informasi yang sensitif satu sama lain, termasuk, misalnya, rencana untuk

ekspansi, operasi data, dan daftar pelanggan.

Sementara kekhawatiran bahwa berbagi dapat merusak kompetisi yang sah, keprihatinan ini

tidak unik untuk berbagi. Regulator dan pembuat kebijakan memiliki pengalaman dalam

menangani jenis masalah yang diangkat oleh berbagi. Jadi, tidak perlu untuk "menemukan

kembali roda" ketika mempertimbangkan bagaimana mengelola resiko bahwa berbagi dapat

merusak persaingan. Beberapa langkah yang dapat diadopsi untuk mengatasi risiko ini meliputi:

• Pastikan bahwa operator yang menyediakan akses ke infrastruktur mereka diizinkan untuk

mendapatkan kembali cukup besar pada investasi modal mereka untuk terus memberi mereka

insentif untuk membangun infrastruktur;

• Mensyaratkan bahwa operator yang masuk ke dalam perjanjian file sharing kesepakatan

dengan regulator;

• Membutuhkan operator berbagi fasilitas untuk mengambil tindakan untuk menjaga

kerahasiaan informasi mereka;

• Memungkinkan berbagi dikenakan "klausul matahari terbenam" mana yang sesuai: jika ada

kekhawatiran bahwa berbagi infrastruktur akan menghambat persaingan, tetapi ada kebutuhan

untuk memfasilitasi penggelaran jaringan dalam jangka pendek, memungkinkan berbagi

(misalnya, jaringan roaming atau berbagi menara ) untuk jangka waktu terbatas;

• Memantau kegiatan di sektor ini dan menegakkan peraturan kompetisi, dan

• Sebagai upaya terakhir, memerlukan pemisahan fungsional untuk secara vertikal-yang

terintegrasi dengan SMP operator yang menyediakan akses ke fasilitas bottleneck untuk

operator yang bersaing dengan mereka di pasar hilir.

Anti-kompetitif perilaku yang dapat menghambat berbagi

Dimana berbagi diijinkan, mungkin timbul kekhawatiran bahwa operator akan terlibat dalam

berbagai bentuk perilaku anti-persaingan untuk membuat sulit bagi operator lain untuk

mengakses fasilitas mereka. Bentuk umum perilaku anti-persaingan yang dapat menghambat

berbagi meliputi:

• Penundaan dalam menanggapi permintaan untuk akses;

• Penolakan untuk menyediakan akses;

• Penolakan untuk memberikan informasi atau keterlambatan dalam memberikan informasi

mengenai infrastruktur yang tersedia untuk berbagi;

• Dalam kasus akses ke fasilitas hambatan yang dimiliki atau dioperasikan oleh operator secara

vertikal terintegrasi dengan SMP, harga praktek pemerasan;

• Menyediakan akses-mencari operator dengan layanan dengan harga meningkat atau dengan

rendahnya kualitas pelayanan; dan

• Tuntutan tingkat akses tidak masuk akal.

Jenis perilaku yang tidak spesifik untuk konteks berbagi dan akses ke infrastruktur. Ada berbagai

mapan regulasi dan taktik untuk mengatasi perilaku tersebut. Contoh pendekatan peraturan

dan langkah-langkah yang dapat digunakan untuk mencegah atau mengatasi perilaku anti-

kompetitif dalam penyediaan berbagi meliputi:

• Meminta dan menegakkan prinsip non-diskriminasi dalam penyediaan layanan akses sehingga

operator tidak diizinkan untuk menawarkan harga yang lebih baik atau tingkat pelayanan

kepada diri mereka sendiri dan perusahaan afiliasi mereka daripada yang mereka lakukan untuk

operator yang tidak terkait;

• Meminta transparansi dalam syarat dan kondisi untuk mengakses dan berbagi, khususnya

dalam kasus operator dengan SMP (operator mungkin diperlukan, misalnya, untuk mengirim

menawarkan referensi di situs Web mereka atau untuk file seperti menawarkan dengan

regulator, atau operator yang masuk ke dalam berbagi atau perjanjian akses mungkin

diperlukan untuk file salinan perjanjian dengan regulator);

• Mengadopsi "pertama datang, pertama dilayani" kebijakan untuk mengalokasikan kapasitas

atau menanggapi permintaan berbagi;

• Menetapkan hukuman bagi operator yang kapasitas cadangan pada jaringan (termasuk

mereka sendiri) yang jauh melebihi kebutuhan mereka menunjukkan (misalnya, operator halus

yang kapasitas cadangan dan kemudian gagal untuk menggunakan ambang batas yang

ditetapkan kapasitas ini dalam jangka waktu tertentu);

• Membangun dasar perjanjian tingkat layanan dan tingkat untuk berbagi dan layanan akses;

• Biarkan pesaing untuk bernegosiasi pengaturan berbagi tentang topik secara komersial untuk

ketentuan bahwa salah satu pihak untuk negosiasi dapat mencari arbitrase mengikat jika para

pihak tidak dapat mencapai kesepakatan tentang syarat dan kondisi dalam jangka waktu

tertentu;

• Menetapkan tenggat waktu untuk menjawab permintaan untuk informasi atau akses;

• Menetapkan ex ante alasan yang akan dianggap sah dan dapat diterima untuk menolak untuk

memberikan akses atau berbagi atas permintaan, bersama dengan panduan tentang jenis bukti

akan memuaskan regulator tentang legitimasi penolakan;

• Jika diperlukan, mandat fungsional dan / atau pemisahan akuntansi;

• Membutuhkan operator untuk mempertahankan log dari semua permintaan untuk berbagi

atau akses dan memerlukan operator baik ke file laporan tahunan tentang log atau untuk

memelihara catatan yang akurat yang dapat diperiksa atau diaudit jika pengaduan;

• Merampingkan proses untuk mengajukan pengaduan dengan melakukan perhatian regulator

anti-kompetitif; dan

• Mengadopsi prosedur penyelesaian sengketa yang efisien.

http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.3486.html

7.5.4. Situs Berbagi Pengaturan

Ada beberapa variasi dari pengaturan situs berbagi. Dalam hal akses, ada tiga tipe dasar dari

situs-pengaturan pembagian:

• unilateral - Operator Satu setuju untuk menyediakan akses ke fasilitas ke operator lain;

• Bilateral - Dua operator setuju untuk menyediakan akses bersama untuk fasilitas; atau

• Multilateral - Beberapa operator setuju dengan persyaratan akses.

Variasi lainnya termasuk jumlah situs yang terlibat dalam pengaturan: perjanjian tersebut dapat

berhubungan dengan hanya satu situs, atau mereka bisa menyediakan kerangka untuk akses di

beberapa situs di wilayah geografis tertentu. Perjanjian bilateral untuk situs berbagi daerah

mungkin sangat menarik bagi operator dari sudut pandang ekonomi. Berbagi infrastruktur pasif

di wilayah tertentu memungkinkan operator untuk memperluas cakupan layanan melalui

wilayah geografis yang lebih besar, yang sangat menarik untuk operator dikenakan kewajiban

cakupan geografis. Situs berbagi daerah memungkinkan operator untuk menghemat modal dan

pengeluaran operasi dan memberikan alternatif untuk pengaturan roaming [1]. Regulator harus

berhati-hati, namun, untuk mencegah kolusi antara operator, terutama di pasar yang sangat

terkonsentrasi dan di mana operator incumbent atau dominan adalah negosiasi bilateral

berbagi kesepakatan.

Standar persyaratan dan ketentuan dalam perjanjian pembagian situs

Tujuan perjanjian

Kewajiban kedua belah pihak

Jangka waktu perjanjian

Berlaku tarif

Penagihan kondisi

Layanan deskripsi

Pelaksanaan dan koordinasi

Akses ke fasilitas dan kerjasama

Operasi dan pemeliharaan

Subletting kondisi (seperti tidak ada subletting tanpa persetujuan dari pemilik fasilitas)

Jangka dan penghentian

Penalti

Kewajiban

Kerahasiaan

Pernyataan dan jaminan

Amandemen perjanjian

Force majeure

Pemerintahan hukum dan yurisdiksi

Sumber: Camila Borba Lefevre, Berbagi Jaringan Mobile, di:

www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR08/papers.html.

Kebanyakan situs-kesepakatan pembagian tidak membatasi persaingan antara operator karena

operator umumnya mempertahankan kontrol yang independen dari jaringan masing-masing

dan jasa. Akibatnya, operator mempertahankan layanan yang berbeda dan rencana bisnis,

berkonsentrasi pada ceruk pasar yang berbeda. Kompetisi penuh terjamin mana operator

mempertahankan kontrol independen terhadap perencanaan radio dan kebebasan untuk

menambahkan situs, termasuk non-berbagi situs. Dengan cara itu, operator bebas untuk

meningkatkan kapasitas jaringan dan cakupan. Cakupan yang lebih baik dan kapasitas dapat

menjadi keuntungan kompetitif, memungkinkan operator untuk membedakan diri didasarkan

pada kapasitas, kualitas dan jangkauan jaringan mereka. Hal itu penting bahwa situs-

kesepakatan pembagian tidak mengandung klausul eksklusifitas yang akan melarang operator

dari menyimpulkan kesepakatan serupa dengan pihak lain.

Pengaturan situs berbagi yang memenuhi kondisi ini tidak mungkin untuk membatasi

persaingan antara operator. [2] Bahkan, situs-kesepakatan pembagian mungkin memiliki

dampak positif pada persaingan, karena penghematan yang dicapai dapat diteruskan kepada

konsumen, meningkatkan kualitas layanan dan penurunan harga.

Akhirnya, penting untuk memastikan bahwa pertukaran informasi antara situs-berbagi pesaing

terbatas terhadap informasi benar-benar diperlukan untuk tujuan ini, seperti data informasi

dan lokasi teknis untuk situs tertentu. Pertukaran tambahan informasi rahasia harus dihindari

dalam rangka untuk melindungi hak-hak kepemilikan pelanggan dan privasi.

Catatan Akhir

[1] jelajah Nasional menyangkut situasi di mana operator bekerja sama tidak berbagi elemen

jaringan apapun sebagai seperti itu tetapi hanya menggunakan jaringan masing-masing untuk

memberikan layanan kepada pelanggan mereka sendiri. Pengaturan roaming nasional

memungkinkan operator roaming untuk bergantung sepenuhnya pada infrastruktur operator

menyediakan roaming nasional, bukan membangun infrastruktur sendiri di daerah roaming.

Menurut otoritas persaingan tertentu, perjanjian roaming nasional dapat membatasi kompetisi

antara operator roaming.

[2] Ini adalah pendapat Komisi Eropa ketika dinilai pengaturan situs berbagi untuk komunikasi

mobile 3G antara T-Mobile Deutschland dan 02 Jerman: Komisi Putusan dari 16 Juli 2003, Kasus

COMP/38.36.

http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.3470.html

7.5.6. Aktif berbagi jaringan selular

Selain berbagi infrastruktur pasif, operator juga dapat berbagi elemen aktif dari jaringan

nirkabel mereka. Kotak 1 menguraikan elemen aktif dari sebuah jaringan nirkabel yang bisa

dibagi. Operator dapat berbagi elemen-elemen dan tetap menggunakan bagian yang berbeda

dari spektrum yang ditugaskan kepada mereka. Meskipun berbagi infrastruktur aktif lebih

kompleks, secara teknis mungkin. Produsen peralatan dapat menyediakan paket-paket yang

tegas telah dirancang untuk berbagi ponsel aktif.

Kotak 1: elemen aktif jaringan mobile yang dapat dibagi

• Antena

• Antena sistem

• Transmisi sistem

• Saluran elemen

Bagian ini akan menjelaskan beberapa pilihan yang tersedia untuk berbagi ponsel aktif.

Sebagian besar contoh yang digunakan dalam fokus bagian berbagi jaringan 3G, namun teknik

dapat diterapkan untuk 2G seluler atau jaringan broadband nirkabel, juga. [1]

Berbagi ponsel yang aktif mungkin tidak diizinkan di bawah rezim lisensi dari beberapa negara.

Ini adalah kasus di India, misalnya, di mana rezim lisensi untuk telekomunikasi seluler tidak

mengizinkan berbagi aktif.