Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policyRaphaëlle Faure, Mikaela Gavas and Anna Knoll

Report

December 2015

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Contents

Key Messages 5

Acknowledgements 6

List of acronyms 7

Introduction 8

The evolution of EU migration and asylum policy 10

European Union competences and legal foundations 10

Progress on harmonisation 11

The external dimension of migration and asylum policy 12

Layers of competences 15

Conflicting objectives and a short-term approach 17

Fragmented financial instruments 19

Conclusion 21

References 23

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 3

List of tables, figures and boxes

Figures

Figure 1: Asylum and new asylum applicants in the 28 countries of the European Union (annual aggregated data) 8

Figure 2: Asylum pressures on selected European Union countries in 2015* 9

Boxes

Box 1: European Union competences 11

Box 2. European Union actors on migration and asylum policy 14

Box 3: Relocation and resettlement 15

Box 4: The Dublin Regulation and the Dublin System 16

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Key Messages• TheEUhasbeencriticisedforalackofleadershipand

coherentandcoordinatedpolicy-makinginthefaceoftherefugeecrisisandforpoorlydesignedresponsemechanisms,allofwhichhaveseverelyconstrainedtimelysolutionsandeffectiveimplementation.Short-termapproacheshavefailedtoaddressthelong-termnatureofthemigrationandrefugeeproblem. 

• TherearethreefundamentalstructuralreasonsforthefailuretodeliveracomprehensiveandeffectiveEUapproachtotherefugeecrisis:thesystemofparallelcompetencesthatallowsMemberStatestopursuetheirownpoliciesalongsideEUpolicy;theco-existenceoftoomanyactorswhowanttheirsayinpoliciesandwho

comefromverydifferentpolicyareaswithvaryingifnotconflictinginterests;andfragmented,andinsomecases,overlappingfundinginstruments.

• ThereareanumberofincrementalstepstheEUcouldtaketoovercometheseconstraints,includingbyappointingaseniorpoliticaladvisortobuildbridgesbetweentheexternalandinternaldimensionofmigrationandasylumpoliciesacrosstheEUsystemandbetweentheEUinstitutionsandtheMemberStates.

• Tobeeffective,theproposedmeasureswouldrequirefargreaterpoliticalrecognitionofthefactthatajointresponseisintheinterestsofEUMemberStatesandtheEUasawhole.

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 5

6 ODI Report

AcknowledgementsTheauthorswouldliketothankAndrewSherriffandMartaForestifortheirinsightfulandinvaluablereviewofthepaper.ThanksarealsoduetoAngelaHawkeforeditingandElizeHeferforproduction.

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 7

List of acronymsCEAS Common European Asylum System

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy

COM European Commission

DCI Development Cooperation Instrument

DG DEVCO Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development

DG HOME Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs

DG EMPL Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

DG NEAR Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement

ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management

ECRE European Council on Refugees and Exiles

EEAS European External Action Service

EDF European Development Fund

EASO European Asylum Support Office

DG ECHO Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument

EU European Union

EUDs European Union Delegations

EUSR EU Special Representative

FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of Member States of the European Union

FPI Foreign Policy Instrument

GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

GPGC Global Public Goods and Challenges

HAI Humanitarian Aid Instrument

HMG Her Majesty’s Government – United Kingdom

ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development

IOM International Organization for Migration

IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession

ISF Internal Security Fund

ODI Overseas Development Institute

PI Partnership Instrument

REC Regional Economic Community

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

LabelledasEurope’sbiggestchallenge,theSyrianrefugeecrisishasrevealedtheseveregapsinEurope’sresponsetocollectiveproblems,asMemberStatesstruggletocopewiththeinfluxanddifferonhowbesttoresettlehundredsofthousandsofuprootedpeople.ThereisagrowingrealisationthattheissuehastobedealtwithcollectivelyattheEuropeanlevelandtherearehighexpectationsthattheEuropeanUnion(EU)willhelpresolvethemigrationchallengesfacedbyitsMemberStates,particularlyoncurbingirregularimmigrationandmanaginglocalpressuresonbordersandasylumprocesses.

Therehasbeenastaggeringincreaseinfirst-timeasylumapplicantsinrecentmonths(Figure1),withan85%increaseinapplicationsbetweenthesecondquarterof2014andthesecondquarterof2015(soaringfrom115,100applicationsto213,200).1Figuresshowthatwhileatotalof626,710asylumapplicationswerereceived

acrossEUMemberStatesin2014,therewere417,430suchapplicationsreceivedinjustthefirstsixmonthsof2015.Meanwhile,Germanyhasreportedthatitmaywellhaveonemillionnewapplicationsin2015.Todate,Germany,GreeceandHungaryhaverecordedthelargestshareofasylumseekers(Figure2).

AccordingtothelatestEurobarometerpoll(Eurobarometer,2015),immigrationandterrorismarethefastest-growingconcernsamongEUcitizens.Onaverage,66%ofrespondentssaidthatmoredecisionsonmigrationshouldbetakenatEUlevel,ratherthanbynationalgovernmentsalone.However,thesurveyfoundmarkednationaldifferences,withthoseinfavourofmoreEUdecision-makingaccountingfor79%to81%ofrespondentsfromCyprus,Germany,Luxembourg,SpainandtheNetherlands,butonly40%fromEstonia,PolandandtheSlovakRepublic.EUcitizensweresimilarly

1 Eurostat(2015).

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Figure 1: Asylum and new asylum applicants in the 28 countries of the European Union (annual aggregated data)

226,330

266,395

260,835

309,820 336,015

432,055

627,780

940,425

-

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

900,000

1,000,000

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (Jan-Oct)

Source: Eurostat, 2015.

Note: An asylum applicant is a person who has submitted an application for international protection or has been included in such an applica-

tion as a family member during the reference period. A new asylum applicant is a person who has submitted an application for international

protection for the first time.

Data from January-October 2015 are not complete for all Member States, so the actual numbers are likely to be higher.

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 9

dividedontheissueofreceivingasylum-seekers,with78%ofrespondents,onaverage,sayingthatasylum-seekersshouldbesharedoutacrosstheEUcountries.ThosemostinfavourofsuchsharingweretheGermans,at97%,contrastingwiththoseleastinfavour:theSlovaksandtheCzechsat31%.Ofthe78%whofavouredthedistributionofasylum-seekersacrossEUcountries,75%werealsoinfavourofdoingsoaccordingtobindingquotassetbytheEU.TheEU,however,hasbeencriticisedforalackofleadershipandcoherentandcoordinatedpolicy-makinginthefaceoftherefugeecrisis,andforpoorlydesignedresponsemechanisms,allofwhichhaveseverelyconstrainedtimelysolutionsandeffectiveimplementation(Collett,2015).Short-termapproacheshavefailedtoaddressthelong-termnatureofthemigrationandrefugeeproblem.Asaresult,theEUhasfounditselfinaviciouscircle:policiestostopthird-countrynationalscomingtotheEUleadasylumseekersandmigrantstolookforalternativewaystogetintoEuropeand,oncetheyarrive,tostayillegally.

ThispapersetsoutthreefundamentalstructuralreasonsforthefailuretodeliveracomprehensiveandeffectiveEUapproachtotherefugeecrisis.First,EUmigrationandasylumpolicyisa‘sharedcompetence’(or‘sharedpower’).ThispermitstheEUtoundertakeactivitiesandconductcommonpolicy,butdoesnotstopMemberStatesexercisingtheirowncompetenceintheseareas,whichhasseverelylimitedtheEU’sconsolidationandcoordinationrolesandhasledtofragmentation.Asthingsstand,the

corebusinessofmigrationpolicy–inotherwords,thenumbersofpeopletobeallowedin–isnotamatterforEUdecision-making,butforeachmemberstatealone.

Second,amultitudeofdifferentactorshavevarying–orevenconflicting–interestsandaimtoinfluencepolicies.Thishasimpairedcoherentandtimelysolutions,andhasencouragedashort-termapproachtoalong-termgeopoliticalproblem.Thereisnodoubtthatthiswillhaveasignificantandlong-lastingimpactthatwillunderminetheEU’scurrentconceptof‘IntegratedBorderManagement’,whichaimstobalancetheprotectionofmigrants,ensuringopenyetsecuredandcontrolledborders.

Third,theEU’slong-standingandmorerecentlycreatedfinancialinstrumentsthatarebeingusedtorespondtoEurope’srefugeecrisisandfurtherafieldarescattered,ininstitutionalterms,acrosstheEuropeanCommission.Theyhaveverydifferentobjectivesandthewayinwhichtheycanintervenevariesenormously.

Thispaperattemptstounpackcomplexandmultidimensionaldecision-makingonEUmigrationandasylumpolicytohighlightthebarrierstoacomprehensiveapproach.IttracestheevolutionofEUmigrationandasylumpolicy,thecomplexsystemofcompetencesthatunderpindecision-making,conflictinginterestsandapproaches,andtoday’sfinancialarrangements,tosetoutwheretheconstraintslie.Itfindsthatshort-termapproacheshavefailedtoaddressthelong-termnatureoftheproblemandconcludeswithrecommendationstoovercomesomeofthekeyconstraints.

Figure 2: Asylum pressures on selected European Union countries in 2015*

37%

1% 5%

19%

6%

12%

21%

Germany

Greece

Italy

Hungary

Austria

Sweden

Rest of EU 28

Source: Eurostat, 2015.

*Based on available data for the period January-October 2015. Not all countries have complete data for that period (e.g. Greece).

The evolution of EU migration and asylum policy

EUmigrationandasylumpolicyhasevolvedovertime.TherehasbeenconsiderableprogressoncooperationonasylumpolicieswithintheEUsince1999,buttheunderlyingfoundationsforcooperationremainunclear.ThereisafairamountofscepticismabouttheEU’sabilitytotransformmigrationgovernanceanditslimitedroleonthisissue,giventhecontinuedcentralityofthestateasthedriverofcontemporarymigrationgovernance.Withoutstates,ofcourse,therewouldbenosuchthingasinternationalmigration:itisstatesandtheirbordersthatmakeinternationalmigrationvisibleasadistinctsocialandpoliticalprocess(Zolberg,1989).

AttemptstogivemoreauthoritytoEUinstitutionsonmigrationandasylummattershavealwaysbeensubjecttocontroversyandresistancebyEUMemberStates(Eisele,2014).ThedevelopmentofacommonsetofmigrationandasylumpoliciesatEuropeanlevelhas,therefore,beenalongandslowprocess.Despiteachievingsomemilestonesalongtheway,thechallengesposedbythecurrentrefugeecrisishaveunderlinedthefundamentallydysfunctionalnatureoftheEUsystemwhenitcomestoasylumandmigrationissues,theimplementationofthatsystembyEUMemberStates,andEuropeancooperationinthefaceofsuchasituation.DespiteanEUcommitmenttocreateaCommonEuropeanAsylumSystem(CEAS),standardsdifferamongMemberStatesandthechancesofanasylum-seekerbeinggrantedprotectionaresovariedthatithasbeencomparedtoalottery(ECRE,2009).

European Union competences and legal foundations

EuropeancooperationonmigrationcanbetracedbacktothesigningoftheSchengen Convention in 1985.2Theabolitionofinternalfrontiersandthecreationofacommonexternalborderamongsigningpartiesrequiredcross-Europecooperationonshort-termvisapolicy,aswellasonexternalbordermanagement.3AfterthecollapseoftheBerlinWallin1989,andamidfearsofgrowingpressuresfromrefugeesontheEU’sexternalborders,GermanyproposedtogivetheEuropeanCommunitymoreresponsibilityformigrationandasylumpolicies.The Maastricht Treaty of 1992formalisedcooperationinthisarea,replacingexistingbutinformalintergovernmentalcooperationwitha‘third intergovernmental pillar’dealingwithJusticeandHomeAffairs(Peers,2011).

The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999representsaturningpointinmigrationpolicyatEuropeanlevel,movingthecompetenceforimmigration,asylumandcivillawfromMemberStatestotheEUandintegratingtheSchengenAgreementintotheEUTreaties.However,theextentofthosecompetencesremainedlimitedinscope,andMemberStatesremainedatthecentreofmuchofthedecision-making.4What’smore,aftersignificantlobbying,Denmark,IrelandandtheUnitedKingdom(UK)weregiventherighttooptinoroutofspecificproposals.

2 TheSchengenConventionwasoriginallysignedbyBelgium,France,GermanyandtheNetherlands.TheConventioncameintofullforcein1995.

3 ASchengenvisaisashorttermvisagrantingstaysofuptothreemonths.CooperationisregulatedbytheCommunityVisaCode.

4 UndertheAmsterdamTreaty,competencesatEUlevelinmigrationandasylumweregovernedbyspecificinstitutionalruleslaiddowninTitleIVoftheTreaty:TheCommissionandMemberStatessharedcompetenceinintroducinglegalproposals,theEuropeanParliamentonlyenjoyedconsultationrightsandvotingintheCouncilwastotakeplaceunanimously.SeePeers,2011.

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Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 11

The 2010 Treaty of Lisbontransformeddecision-makingonmigrationandasylumandclarifiedsomebasicprinciplesforthedevelopmentofcommonasylumandmigrationpolicies,suchassolidarityandrespectforhumanrights.5ThepreviousrequirementforaunanimousvoteonmigrationandasylumintheCouncilofMinisterswaseasedtoarequirementforqualifiedmajorityvoting(achievedwhen55%ofMemberStatesvoteinfavourofaproposal,whichamountsto16ofthe28States,andwhentheproposalisbackedbyMemberStatesthatrepresent65%ofthetotalEUpopulation).6Thisshift

wasonlymadepossiblebytheTreaty’sestablishmentofacleardistinctionbetweenEUandnationalcompetences.AccordingtoArticle79oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU):‘[measuresonmigrationtakenattheEuropeanlevel]donotaffecttherightofMemberStatestodeterminevolumesofadmissionofthird-countrynationalscomingfromthirdcountriestotheirterritoryinordertoseekwork,whetheremployedorself-employed’.7

5 SeeArticle67,TFEU.

6 Unanimityisstillrequiredforissuesrelatingtopassports,familylawandoperationalpolicecooperation.Thischangehadtheeffectthatsomelegislationthatwasoncedifficulttoagreeonbecameeasiertoadopt(suchastheextensionoflong-termresidencestatustorefugees).Forsomeproposalsthisalsoledtomoreliberalpolicyresults(suchasthesinglepermitformigrantworkers)aftertheentryintoforceoftheLisbonTreaty.SeePeers(2011).

7 TheLisbonTreatyextendedtheopt-outspreviouslygrantedtotheDenmark,IrelandandtheUKtothewholeoftheJusticeandHomeAffairsfieldandstipulatedthatthesecountriescanoptoutofprovisionstowhichtheyhavealreadyoptedin,intheeventthattheseareamended.

Box 1: European Union competences

TheTreatyonEuropeanUnionclarifiesthedivisionofcompetences(e.g.powers)betweentheEUandMemberStates.Itintroducesapreciseclassificationtodistinguishthreemaintypesofcompetence:exclusivecompetences,sharedcompetencesandsupportingcompetences.

• Exclusive competencewhereonlytheEUcanact. • Competences that are shared or parallel betweentheEUanditsMemberStateswheretheMemberStatescanact onlyiftheEUhaschosennotto.ThisarticleoftheTreatyalsolistscertaincompetencesthatwerepreviouslyregardedasparallel:research,technologicaldevelopment,space,developmentcooperationandhumanitarianaid.However,theprincipleofpre-emptiondoesnotapplyintheseareas,inthatMemberStatesmaycontinuetoexercisetheircompetencesinparallelwiththeEU,eveniftheEUhasexerciseditsowncompetencesintheseareas.

• TheEUhascompetencetosupport, coordinate or supplement theactionsoftheMemberStateswheretheEUmay not adoptlegallybindingactsthatrequirethosestatestoharmonisetheirlawsandregulations.

TheTreatyalsogivestheEUthepowertodefineandimplementa commonforeignandsecuritypolicy,includingtheprogressiveframingofacommondefencepolicy.

Sources: Lisbon Treaty (European Union, 2007); HMG (2013); http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq#q1

Common commercial policy Justice and home affairs (migration and asylum policy)

Development cooperation and humanitarian aid

Foreign and security policy

Competence Exclusive Shared Parallel Supporting

Governance model Supervised delegation to the European Commission

Mix of supervised delegation to the EU Presidency or Commission and coordination

Mix of supervised delegation to the EU Presidency or Commission and coordination

Coordination

External representation Commission (based on Council authorisation)

Commission, rotating Presidency and Member States

Commission, rotating Presidency and Member States

Member States (with the High Representative and the President of the European Council)

Progress on harmonisation TherehasbeengreaterprogressinharmonisinglegislativeandoperationalactionatEuropeanlevelinrelationtothesecurity-relatedaspectsofmigrationpolicysuchasbordermanagement,thefightagainstirregularmigrationandshort-termvisapolicy,aswellasaspectsofreturnpolicies(Papagianni,2014;HenryandPastore,2014).Theseaspects‘weretraditionallyseenasthemain“flankingmeasures”fortheabolitionofinternalbordercontrols’ (Papagianni,2014:380), andthecreationofasingleexternalEuropeanborder.Themaindevelopmentshaveincludedtheharmonisationoflawsandstandardsthroughanumberofdirectivesonshort-termvisas,irregularmigrationandreturn,aswellasthecreationoftheEUexternalborderagency,theEuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersofMemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion(FRONTEX)in2004,whichhasexpandeditsrolesandoperationalcapabilities.8

AEuropewithoutinternalbordersalsorequiredtheclarificationofresponsibilitiesandharmonisationoflawontheprovisionofasylumtothird-countrynationalsthroughthedevelopmentoftheCommon European Asylum System(CEAS):9anattempttoachievemoreharmonisedconditionsapplyingtoasylumseekersacrosstheEUMemberStates.TogiveeffecttotheprincipleofsolidaritybetweenEUMemberStates,acommonfund–theEUExternalBorderFund(2007-2013)–wassetuptoprovidefinancialassistanceforEUstatestomanageexternalbordersandvisapolicy.IthasbeensucceededbytheInternalSecurityFund(ISF)-BordersandVisa,withatotalof€3.8billionundertheHomeAffairsbudgetcoveringthe2014to2020timeframe.Inaddition,theAsylum,MigrationandIntegrationFundprovidessupporttoEUstatestohelpthemmanagethereturnofnon-EUnationals,integratethird-countrynationalsaccordingtoEUstandardsandapplytheEUlegislationoftheCEAS.

TheFundhasanoverallbudgetof€3.137billionfortheyears2014to2020.

Despitethisprogress,theEUhasstruggledtoadoptcomprehensivemeasuresonlegalmigrationfromthirdcountries(suchasentry,residenceandfairtreatmentofthird-countrynationals)becauseof‘persistentoppositionandscepticismfromthecapitalsoftheMemberStates’,accordingtoHenryandPastore(2014:179).AtEUlevel,progressonlegalmigrationhaslaggedbehindthatseenonaspectsofborders/visas,asylumandirregularmigration(Peers,2014),despiteclearattemptsbytheEuropeanCommissiontoinitiatestrongercoordinationonlegalmigrationmoregenerally.TheEUhasfollowedasectoralpolicyapproachthatincludesEU DirectivestoharmoniseadmissionproceduresandconditionsfordifferentcategoriesofmigrantstotheEuropeanlabourmarket–anapproachthatis,today,lessambitiousthanoriginallyforeseenbytheCommission.Thecurrentsystemhasbeendescribedasa‘hierarchical,differentiatedandobscureEuropeanlegalregimeonlabourimmigration,whichaccordsdifferentrights,standardsandconditionsforentryandstaytodifferentgroupsandcountriesoforigin’(Carreraetal.,2011).

The external dimension of migration and asylum policy

TheincorporationofanexternaldimensionintotheEU’smigrationandasylumpoliciesbegantoemergeinthe1990s–yetinaratherad-hocandunsystematicway.Initially,theEU’sinterestincooperatingwiththirdcountrieswasdriven,inpart,byarealisationofthelimitsofinternalmigrationcontrolmeasures.Asaresult,policiesfocusedoncombattingirregularmigration,agreeingonreadmissionrules,aswellasaddressing‘rootcauses’ofmigration,whichtranslatedintoasimple‘moredevelopmentforlessmigration’logic(seeCollyer,2011).10

8 TheEUfollowsaconceptof‘IntegratedBorderManagement’thataimstobalancetheprotectionofmigrantswhileensuringopenyetsecuredandcontrolledborders.Seehttps://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/ibm/05-IOM-IBM-FACT-SHEET-Integrated-Border-Management.pdf)

9 TheCEASismadeupoffivelegalinstruments:QualificationDirective(Directive2011/95/EU),theDublinIIIRegulation(Regulation(EU)No604/2013),theReceptionConditionsDirective(Directive2013/33/EU),theAsylumProcedureDirective(Directive2013/32/EU)andtheEurodacRegulation(Regulation(EU)No603/2013).Theseweremostrecentlyin2013andthemajorityhadtobetransposedintoMemberStates’nationallegislationandimplementedasofJuly2015(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/ceas-fact-sheets/ceas_factsheet_en.pdf.).TheseCEASlegalinstrumentsframetheconditionsaroundasylumapplicationproceduresandthelivingconditionsasylumseekersshouldbehavewhiletheywaitfortheexaminationoftheirclaim;specifythegroundsforgrantinginternationalprotection;determinewhichMemberStateisresponsibleforexaminingaclaim;andestablishanEUasylumfingerprintdatabasetopreventanindividualfrommakingmultipleasylumclaimsinvariousEUMemberStates.(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/ceas-fact-sheets/ceas_factsheet_en.pdf).AnagencywascreatedtohelpMemberStatesimplementtheCEAS:theEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO).EASOaimstoenhancepracticalcooperationonasylummattersandhelpMemberStatesfulfiltheirEuropeanandinternationalobligationsandassistthoseStateswhosesystemsareunderparticularpressure(https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/BZ0213822ENC.pdf).

10 ACommissionCommunicationfrom1991confirmsthisthinkingcallingfortheuseofexternalcooperationinstrumentstodetermine‘how,ineachofthecountriesconcerned,potentialmigrantpopulationscanbekeptintheirareasoforigin’.(http://aei.pitt.edu/1260/1/immigration_policy_SEC_91_1855.pdf.)Yet,thesoundnessofthisunderlyinglogichasbeenchallengedextensivelyintheliterature.SeeClemens(2014).

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Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 13

ThislinkbetweentheEU’sinternalandexternalpoliciesandthestrengtheningofpartnershipswiththirdcountrieshavebeenpursuedstillfurther,11andnowincludes‘supportingthirdcountriesinmanagingmigrationflows,enhancingbordercontrolanddocumentingsecurity,promotingrefugeeprotection,fosteringlegalmigrationandpreventingirregularmigration’ (Eisele,2014:83).AmorebalancedandstrategicapproachtotheintegrationofmigrationintotheEU’sexternalpolicieswasadoptedwiththe2005GlobalApproachtoMigration.Thiswasextendedin2011totheGlobal Approach to Migration Mobility (GAMM),whichistheoverarchingframeworkthatdefinestheEU’sexternalmigrationandasylumpolicy.12Whilesecurityaspectssuchasthefightagainstirregularmigrationandmeasurestoenhancebordermanagementstillfeatureprominently,theseareembeddedinamorecomprehensiveframeworkbasedonsuchpillarsashowtomakemigrationworkfordevelopment,establishlegalopportunitiesandensuretheprotectionoffundamentalrightsofmigrantsandasylumseekers.13TheEUhasawiderangeofinstruments,includingmigrationdialogues,legalagreements,visafacilitation,andmobilitypartnerships,aswellasvariousfundingarrangementstoimplementtheexternaldimensionofmigrationandasylum.

Inthecontextofthecurrentcrisis,however,theEU’sresponsehasnotbeenframedbytheoverarchingGAMM.TheEuropean Agenda on Migration,adoptedin2015,providesarenewedapproachtomigrationthatalsocoversrelationswithcountriesoutsidetheEUandshowsthenewinvolvementoftheEuropeanExternalActionServicewithabroaderscopeoftools.14Yet,theEUAgendaonMigrationmakeslittlereferencetotheGAMMandhasbeencriticisedasbeingdrivenbyasecurityrationale.

Takentogether,howcomprehensiveandcohesivehaveallofthesemigrationpoliciesandactionsbeenacrosstheEUtodate?AstudyfortheEUParliamentpointsoutthat‘thediversenatureandthemultiplicityoftheinstrumentsemployedtodeveloptheEUexternalactiononmigrationhasevidentimplicationsfortheirimpactandeffectiveness’.TheEUdistributionofcompetencesinthisarea(withsharedcompetencesbetweentheEUandthe

MemberStatesbeingtherule–seeBox1)andthevarietyofactorsinvolved(Box2)alsoaffectsthepossibilitiesofacomprehensiveandcoherentexternalapproachaswellastheefficiencyandefficacyoftheexternaldimensionofEUmigrationpolicy(Andradeetal.,2015).AsexploredinSections2and3,theimplementationoftheGAMMhasbeenfocusedmorestronglyonsecurity,readmissionandbordercontrolandhasnotreacheditspotentialintermsofusingmigrationtoolstoachievedevelopmentobjectives.Theuseofnationalforeignpolicychannelsformigration-policyinterestsbyEUMemberStateswithouttakingintoaccounttheimplicationsforotherEUcountrieshasalsocompromisedcoherentandjointaction.Forexample,Hungary’serectionofaborderfencehasincreasedpressurepointsonotherEuropeanentrypointsanditcouldbearguedthattheItalian-Libyancooperationagreementonreadmissionhasre-interpretedinternationalstandardsofprotectionandneglectedthenon-refoulementprinciple(theprincipleininternationallawthatforbidstherenderingofatruevictimofpersecutiontohisorherpersecutor).15

Itseems,therefore,thatasystemofinterlocking,yetnotfullyintegrated,policieshasevolved,bothattheleveloftheEUanditsMemberStates.Thisincludesflexibilitiesintheformofopt-outs,opt-insandderogationsforsomeEUMemberStates,whichhaveunderminedthesystem’sfundamentalfoundingprincipleofsolidarityinacontextofdivergingpriorities.WhathasbecomeevidentisthattheCEAShasbecomedysfunctionalinthefaceoftheself-interestofEUMemberStates,theirlackofcapacitytoimplementsomeoftheagreedharmonisedstandardsanddispersedcompetences(Collett,2015).

Thefollowingsectionsofthisreportlookatthreeinter-relatedaspectsthathaveseverelyconstrainedtheabilityoftheEU’ssystemtodealeffectivelywithmigrationandasylumchallenges:

• thelayersofdifferentcompetencesacrosstheEUandbetweentheEUanditsMemberStates

• theconflictingobjectivesofthemanydifferentactorsinvolved,whichhasledtotheadoptionofshort-termapproaches

• afragmentedsystemoffinancialinstrumentstofundactivities.

11 TheEUTampereCouncilConclusionsforexamplecalledfor‘acomprehensiveapproachtomigrationaddressingpolitical,humanrightsanddevelopmentissuesincountriesandregionsoforiginandtransit”.CounciloftheEU,TampereEuropeanCouncilPresidencyConclusions,15-16.10.1999.

12 TheCommissionnotedthat‘theGAMMshouldbefirmlyembeddedintheEU’sexternalforeignpolicy,andbeimplementedbytheCommission,theEEASandtheMemberStates.Theneedfor‘balance’and‘genuinepartnership’havebeenemphasisedbytheEUCommissiontoguideitsGlobalApproach.

13 ThemainpillarsoftheGAMMrelatetolegalmigrationandmobility,thefightagainstirregularmigrationandtraffickinginhumanbeings,promotinginternationalprotectionandmaximisingthedevelopmentimpactofmigration.Thepreparationforthismorecomprehensiveapproachaimedtoreflectthestate-of-the-artliteratureonthemigrationanddevelopmentnexusandcoincidedwiththemoresystematicincorporationofmigrationwithintheEU’sdevelopmentcooperation.

15 ThishastriggeredcriticismbyUNHCRandtheEuropeanParliament,seeKaunertetal.(2012)p.138.

14 Genetzke(2015).

14 ODI Report

Box 2. European Union actors on migration and asylum policy

AttheEU level,themaininstitutionsandservicesplayinganactiverolearetheEuropeanCommission,theEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)andtheEuropeanCouncil.

TheEuropean Commissionproposeslegislation(suchastheEUReturnDirective),setspolicyguidelines(suchastheGlobalApproachtoMigrationMobility(GAMM)andtheEUAgendaonmigration),andnegotiatespoliticalagreementsonbehalfofMemberStates(e.g.readmissionagreements).TheJunckerCommissionhastakenamuchmoreprominentandpropositionalrolethanpreviousCommissions.ThisappearstobebothareflectionofthestyleofthenewCommissionandthegrowingneedforaconcertedEUresponsetothecurrentrefugeesituation.WithintheCommission,theDirectorateGeneralforMigrationandHomeAffairs(DGHOME)takestheleadonmostoftheday-to-dayworkonmigrationandasylumpolicy.

ThemandateoftheEuropean External Action Service (EEAS)istoensurecoherenceacrossthedifferentexternalrelationspoliciesoftheEUandtosupporttherolloutoftheEU’sCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)andtheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP).TheEEASisinvolvedinmakingdecisionsontheuseoftheEU’sexternal-relationsfinancialinstruments,yetitdoesnotadministerordisbursefundsdirectlytoimplementcommonstrategies.Itsfocusonmigrationandasylumhasincreasedduringthecurrentcrisis,asshownbytheincreaseinthenumberofstaffworkingontheforeign-policydimensionofasylumandmigrationissueswithintheirrespectivegeographicunits.Nevertheless,theEEAShasyettofulfilitsmandatetoprovideguidanceontheexternaldimensionofthecurrentrefugeecrisisandglobalmigrationissuesandhasfailedtoprovideanoverallcoordinatingroleotherthaninrelationtotargetingsmugglersthroughtheCSDPandinitsinvolvementindialoguewithpartnercountries.

EU Delegations(EUDs),madeupofEEASandCommissionstaff,representtheEUabroad.EUDshavehadlittleinvolvementinmigrationpolicyanddecision-making,despitetheirroleintheimplementationofEUcooperationwiththirdcountries(Andradeetal.,2015)andtheirengagementinpoliticaldialoguewithpartnercountries.

TheCouncilistheforuminwhichMemberStatesgathertovettheworkoftheEuropeanCommissionandgiveitamandatetonegotiateagreementswiththirdcountriesontheirbehalf.Onmigration,thisusuallytakesplaceinthejusticeandhomeaffairspolicyareaattheworkinglevel(workinggroups)andtheministeriallevel.However,giventheurgencyofthemigrationcrisis,therehavebeenseveralextraordinaryEuropeanCouncilmeetingsthathavebroughttogetherheadsofstatesandgovernmenttoaddressblockagesandattemptagreementonjointsolutions.Intheory,theCouncilshouldalsobeaspacewhereinformationisexchangedonwhatishappeningattheMemberStatelevelandforthecoordinationofactions.However,thisdoesnotappeartohappeninpractice(Andradeetal.,2015).

ThecomplexconstellationofMemberStateworkinggroups,dialoguesandcontactgroupsthathavegrownintheCouncilhasbecomeincreasinglydifficulttonavigate.SomeoftheworkinggroupsthatprepareandsupporttheworkanddecisionsoftheCouncil,suchastheHigh-LevelWorkingGrouponImmigrationandAsylum(whichbringsinteriorandforeignministryofficialstogether),haveabroadremit,requiringthepresenceofseveralnationalministries.Othersrequirespecifictechnicalexpertiseandknowledge.Furthermore,thegeographicallyfocusedworkinggroupsintheForeignAffairsCouncilarede-linkedfromtheprioritiesoftheJusticeandHomeAffairsCouncil(Collett,2015).

TwoEU agencies,inparticular,areinchargeofimplementingEUmigrationandasylumpolicy:theEuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersofMemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion(FRONTEX)andtheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice.Theirmandateandbudgetshaveseenanincreaseoverrecentmonthstoenhancetheircapacitytorespondtothecrisis.FRONTEXisinchargeofcontrollingEUbordersandcanalsocarryoutmissionssuchassearchandrescueoperationsatseaorthereturnofthird-countrynationalstotheircountriesoforiginiftheyhavearrivedviairregularmeans.EASOisanagencythatprovidesexpertiseandtechnicalsupporttoMemberStatestohelpthemimplementtheCommonEuropeanAsylumSystem(CEAS).

TheEuropean Parliament playsaminorroleinthispolicyfield,whichislimitedtoapprovinglegislationandgivingitsconsentbeforetheconclusionofagreementswiththirdcountries.Recentevolutioninasylumpolicyhas,verylargely,takentheformofpoliticalandoperationalinstruments,whichdonotgivetheParliamentspacetoengageformally(Andradeetal.,2015).

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 15

Layers of competences

TheEuropeanresponsetothecurrentrefugeesituationisbeingunderminedbyacomplexsystemofcompetencesthatshapethedecision-makingonmigrationandasylumanditsexternaldimension.Therearevaryinglayersofcompetences(powers)acrosstheEUanditsMemberStates.TheseareeithercompetencesthataresharedbetweentheCommissionandtheMemberStates,withtheMemberStatespursuingtheirownpoliciesinparalleltoacommonEUpolicy,orexclusivecompetencesoftheMemberStates,withtheCommissionplayingacoordinatingrole.CompetencesthataresharedcompetencesbytheEUanditsMemberStatesbecomeproblematicwhentherearediverginginterestsandobjectives.

ThefailureoftheprovisionsandimplementationoftheCEASisaprimeexample.The‘first-port’entryprincipleoftheDublinRegulation(seeBox3)putspressureonfrontlinestatesanddoesnothaveanyfairresponsibility-sharingconcept.Atthesametime,therequirementtosendpeoplebacktotheplacewheretheyfirstenteredtheEUhas,forthemostpart,beendisregardedbyMemberStates.Giventhissituation,theCommission’sproposalforrelocationwithintheEU(27May2015)wasanattempttorestoresomeofthecoreprinciplesoffairnessinsharingresponsibilitythatunderpintheEU’smigrationandasylumpolicies(Box3).

TheCommissiondoesnot,however,havethepowertoenforceamandatoryrelocationsystemwithouttheconsentofEUMemberStatesandtheEuropeanParliament.ItalsolackseffectiveenforcementmechanismstoensurecompliancewiththeCEASstandardsanddirectives.Thisisunlikelytochange,assomeMemberStatesareunwillingtocedeauthoritytotheCommissionanddonotbelieveitisintheirinteresttodoso,whileotherMemberStatesseethisasthefutureofafunctioningsysteminthisgreater‘Europeanisation’ofdecision-makingonrelocation,resettlementandbordermanagement.TheresultsofarhasbeenadecisionbysomeEUMemberStatestoparticipateinavoluntaryandtemporaryrelocationschemeof160,000refugees,butnotapermanentandmandatorycrisis-relocationsystemasproposedbytheCommission,whichwouldrequireanamendmenttotheDublinRegulation(Box4).16

Thecompetencefortheachievementoffairresponsibility-sharingmechanismsintheformofresettlementfromthosecountrieshostingalargeamountofrefugeesalsorestswithindividualstatesasitconcernsadmissionnumbers.ThesameappliestotheprovisionofhumanitarianvisasormobilityschemesthatcouldalleviatepressuresonthosecountriesoutsideEuropethathostlargerefugeepopulations.

ThedifferentlevelsofcompetencesmayhavealsolimitedthecomprehensivenessandcohesionofpoliciesandactionsdirectedattheexternaldimensionoftheEU’smigrationpolicies,i.e.instanceswheretheEUworkswithnon-EUcountriestomanagemigrationandasylumandrelatedchallenges(Andradeetal.,2015).TheproblemisthattheEuropeanCommissionalonecannotimplementabalancedapproachthatmakesgooduseofallthepillarsoftheGAMM:thisrequiresthecooperationofEUMemberStates.Asaresult,theconcreteimplementationoftheGAMMhasbeentiltedtowardsafocusonsecurity,readmissionandbordercontrol,ratherthanmakinguseofthefullpotentialofmigrationtoolsfordevelopment.Sofar,externalactionintheareaofmigrationandasylumhasfocusedonareaswheretheEUhascompetence(e.g.mainstreamingmigrationintoEUinstitutions’developmentcooperation/short-termvisapolicy)andwheretheinterestsofMemberStatesarealigned(e.g.themandatefortheEU

16 ThetemporaryandvoluntaryrelocationsystemisbasedonArticle76(3)oftheTFEU,whichallowstheCouncil,onaproposalfromtheCommission,toadoptprovisionalmeasuresintheeventofanemergencysituationcharacterisedbyasuddeninflowofthird-countrynationals.However,apermanentmandatoryschemewouldneedtoamendtheDublinIIIRegulation(RegulationEUNo604/2013)toestablishmandatoryquotasforrelocationandtheassignmentofresponsibilities.

Box 3: Relocation and resettlement

Relocationisthetransferofpersonswhoneed(oralreadybenefitfrom)aformofinternationalprotectioninoneEUMemberStatetoanotherEUMemberStatewheretheywouldbegrantedsimilarprotection.

Resettlementisthetransferofnon-EUnationalorstatelesspersonswhohavebeenidentifiedasinneedofinternationalprotectiontoanEUstatewheretheyareadmittedeitheronhumanitariangroundsorwiththestatusofrefugee.

Source: European Commission Fact Sheet.

tohelpfacilitatethenegotiationofreadmissionagreements).ProgresshasbeenlimitedinareaswheretheCommissionplaysamerecoordinatingrole,suchaslegalmigration.

Theconfusionaroundcompetencesiscompoundedbythefactthat‘policies of Member States often follow their own interest and logic, which at times run counter to EU community level aspirations’ (Piperno,2014:5).Negotiationsoverlap,forexample,onreadmission

agreements,whereactivitiesaresharedbetweentheEUandtheMemberStates.WhiletheCommissionistaskedwithnegotiatingCommunityReadmissionagreements,bilateraltalksbetweenthirdcountriesandindividualMemberStatestakeplaceinparallel.ThisoftenimpairstheEU’smandateandroleandresultsinthedeferralofEUnegotiations(Andradeetal.,2015).

16 ODI Report

Box 4: The Dublin Regulation and the Dublin System

EuropeanUnionregulationsarelegalactsoftheEUthatbecomeimmediatelyenforceableaslawinallMemberStatessimultaneously.TheDublin Regulationisoneexample:itestablishesahierarchyofcriteriaforidentifyingtheMemberStateresponsiblefortheexaminationofanasylumclaiminEurope.Thisexaminationiscarriedoutpredominantlyonthebasisoffamilylinks(subjecttoanumberofrequirements).ThenresponsibilityisassignedbasedontheStatethroughwhichtheasylumseekerfirstentered–theStateresponsiblefortheirentryintotheterritoryoftheEUMemberStates(orIceland,Liechtenstein,NorwayandSwitzerland,whovoluntarilysubjectedthemselvestotheDublinRegulation).However,Denmark,IrelandandtheUKhaveoptedoutofmanyoftheelementsoftheCommonEuropeanAsylumSystem(CEAS);theyarenotbound,therefore,byalltheelementsoftheselegalacts.TheRegulationaimstomakeMemberStatesresponsiblefortheexaminationofanasylumapplication,todetermultipleasylumclaimsandtodeterminetheresponsibleMemberStateasquicklyaspossibletoensureeffectiveaccesstoanasylumprocedure. 

TheDublinRegulationispartofthe‘Dublin System’oflegalinstruments,suchastheregulationestablishingEurodac,adatabaseforcomparingfingerprintsofasylumseekersandsomecategoriesofillegalimmigrantstodeterminetheEUcountryresponsibleforasylum-applicationexaminationandsendtheindividualsconcernedbacktothatcountry.

Source: European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), available at: http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/10-dublin-regulation.html

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 17

Conflicting objectives and a short-term approach

AccordingtoCollett(2015),therearetwomainreasonsforthefailureofmechanismstodevelop,agreeuponandimplementEUpolicyonmigration:

• thecoexistenceoftoomanyactorswhowantasayinpoliciesandwhocomefromverydifferentpolicyareaswithvarying,ifnotconflicting,interests

• thelackofajoined-upapproachacrosstheCommissionandtheEEAS,whichleadstouncoordinatedresponses.

Migrationandasylumpolicyisled,forthemostpart,byofficialswithahomeaffairsportfolio–whetherintheCommissionorintheCouncil/MemberStates–withafocusontheinternalsecurityaspectsofmigrationandasylum.Carreraetal.(2013)havesuggestedthattheEuropeanCommissionDirectorateGeneralforMigrationandHomeAffairs’(DGHOME)moveintotheexternaldimensionofmigrationpolicywasmotivatedbythelimitedscopeithadtogetinvolvedintheinternaldimension,suchasharmonisingpoliciesandstandards,asitfacedgrowingresistancefromEUMemberStates.Instead,ithassucceededintakingaleadroleintheinternalpreparationandnegotiationsofdialogueswiththirdcountries,suchasMobilityPartnerships17withoutinvolvingthepartoftheinstitutionsdealingwithexternalrelationsi.e.theEEASortheForeignAffairsCouncil.

ThismovehasposedchallengesasDGHOMEtransposesitsconcernforEUinternalsecuritytotheexternaldimensionofmigrationandasylumpolicy.Assuch,DGHOME’soutlookonmigrationtendstobeshort-termandfocusedonsecuritythreatsinsidetheEU.Thismeansthatitsactionsaim,primarily,torestricthumanmobilityandstemirregularimmigration(Carreraetal.,2013).TheCommission’sDirectorate-GeneralforEmployment(DGEMPL)hasnotbeenstronglyinvolvedinthediscussion,eventhoughitcouldbringadifferentandvaluableangletotheissueofirregularmigrationandsmugglingcentredaroundlabourmarketstructuresandinformalwork.

Thisshort-termapproachhasfailedtoaddressthelong-termnatureoftheproblem.Asaresult,theEUhasfounditselfinaviciouscircle,withthereinforcementofpoliciespreventingthird-countrynationalsfromenteringtheEUleadingasylumseekersandmigrantstolookforalternativewaysintotheEU,orencouragingthemtostayirregularly(Flahaux,2014;deHaas,2015).

Withmigrationandasylumpolicyextendingbeyondtheremitofthehomeaffairsportfolio,thisapproachhasclashedwiththatoftheexternal-relationsdirectoratesoftheEuropeanCommission,andinparticulartheDirectorate-GeneralforInternationalCooperationandDevelopment(DGDEVCO).Theresult,insomecases,hasbeenconflictingpolicygoals.Forexample,returnandreintegrationpolicieshavedivertedattentionfromtheprocessofwidereconomicandpoliticalreformandobstructeddevelopmentobjectivesinpartnercountries.Inaddition,theinsertionofreadmissionclausesincertainagreementshascomplicatednegotiationswiththirdcountries(Carreraetal.,2013).Nevertheless,despiteallofthediverginginterests,regularcommunicationbetweenDGHOMEandDGDEVCOhasfacilitatedcoordinatedactionandthejointelaborationofoverarchingCommissionpoliciesasformulatedinitscommunications.18

Todate,theroleoftheEEAShasbeenrestrictedtotakingtheleadincomponentsoftheEUresponse,suchasCSDPmissionsaspartofacomprehensiveapproach,withoutnecessarilysucceedingininjectingalonger-termstrategicvisionintotheEU’soverallresponse.ThisisinspiteoftheJunckerCommission’snewclusterstructure,whichgivestheHighRepresentativeoftheEuropeanUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy/Vice-PresidentoftheEuropeanCommission(HR/VP)responsibilitytocoordinatetheCommissionersinchargeofexternalrelationsportfolios.WithintheEEASitself,thenumberofstaffworkingonmigrationissueshasincreasedinrelationtotheirrespectiveregionalportfolios.Yet,itdoesnotalwaysseemtobeclear‘whodoeswhat’onmigrationand

17 MobilityPartnershipsprovideacomprehensiveframeworktoensurethatmovementsofpersonsbetweentheEUandathirdcountryarewell-governed.TheybringtogethermeasurestoensurethatmigrationandmobilityaremutuallybeneficialfortheEUanditspartners,includingopportunitiesforgreaterlabourmobility.TheMobilityPartnershipistailor-madetothesharedinterestsandconcernsofthepartnercountryandEUparticipants(COM,2011).

18 Someexamples:COM(2011)TheGlobalApproachtoMigrationandMobility;COM(2013)MaximisingtheDevelopmentImpactofMigration;COM(2015)AEuropeanAgendaonMigration.

asylum.InterviewswithofficialsfromtheCommissionrevealedthatthereislittleknowledgeofwhattheEEASdoesonmigrationotherthancoordinatingmissionstotargetanddestroysmugglers’vessels.Ingeneral,effectivecoordinationwithallactorsremainsachallengemostofthetime,eventhoughtheEEAS’sinvolvementisvalued,giventheclearforeignpolicydimensionoftheasylumcrisis.TheestablishmentofnewDeputySecretaryGeneralpositionswithintheEEAS,andespeciallytheonetaskedwithEconomicandGlobalissues,maybeanopportunitytoestablishstrongercoordinationwithrelevantCommissionServicesontheissueofmigration.

Thelackofanoverarchinglong-termvisionalsoseemsapparentwhenexaminingsomeoftheEU’srelationswithexternalpartners,thewayinwhichthesediffer,

andhowpartnershavereactedtotheEU’sdifferentiatedapproaches.Forexample,theEU-TurkeyJointActionPlanincludesTurkey’sresponsibilitytoenhanceexternalbordercontrols,increasereturnsofunwantedmigrants,andgranttheEU’sborderagencyFRONTEXmorepowerstoexpelrejectedasylumapplicantsbacktoTurkey(Nielsen,2015).InexchangeTurkeyreceives€3billioninEUaid,acommitmentto‘re-energise’theprocessofitsaccessiontotheEU,andtheremovalofvisarestrictionsforitscitizens.ThishasnotgoneunnoticedinAfrica,whereaTrustFundthatwillbesharedbetweenamultitudeofcountriesandthreeregionswillreceivejust€1.8billioninfundingfromtheEUinstitutions.Thisshort-termopportunisticrapprochementwithTurkeyhasthepotentialtoharmrelationshipswithothercountriesinthelongerrun.

18 ODI Report

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 19

Fragmented financial instruments

EUfundingtoaddresstheexternaldimensionofmigrationandasylumisspreadacrossarangeofdiversefinancialinstruments,eachgovernedbytheirownlegalbasis.Thesystemisthe‘result of a long process of accumulation […] of different EU policies (migration and asylum, development cooperation, external relations, neighbourhood policy and humanitarian aid)’inwhichmigrationandasylumplayanincreasingrole.Asaconsequence, ‘the implementation [ofactionsrelevanttoacomprehensiveapproachonmigrationandasylum]and the funding sources are institutionally scattered among DG DEVCO, DG HOME, DG NEAR (Neighbourhood and Enlargement) in the Commission as well as the EEAS, with very different objectives and intervention formats’(Andradeetal.,2015).Assuch,allofthesefundshavedifferentprogrammingrules.Thishasresultedinfragmentation.

MostfundingfortheEU’sexternaldevelopmentassistanceisprovidedthroughthegeographicaldevelopmentcooperationfundsoftheEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF),theDevelopmentCooperationInstrument(DCI),administeredbyDGDEVCO,theEuropeanNeighborhoodInstrument(ENI)andtheInstrumentforPre-Accession(IPA)administeredbyDGNEAR.Theseinstrumentshavebeenusedtofundmigrationanddevelopment,albeitnotasapriorityarea.Thereis,however,acleartrendtowardthegreaterintegrationofmigrationintheEU’sgeographicaldevelopmentcooperation.19ThemuchsmallerPartnershipInstrument(PI)administeredbytheForeignPolicyInstrumentServiceoftheCommission,whichworksincollaborationwiththeEEAS,alsofundsmigration-andasylum-relatedactivitiesinstrategicpartnercountries,whetherdevelopedordeveloping.

Inaddition,aspartoftheThematicProgrammeonGlobalPublicGoodsandChallenges(GPGC)undertheDCI,theEUhasabudgetof €344millionfrom2014-2020focusedonthemanagementofmigratoryflows;themaximisationofthedevelopmentimpact,protectionandhumanrightsofmigrants;andsupporttopeople’sregional

andglobalmobility.20ThePan-AfricanProgramme,againundertheDCI,supportsmigration-relatedprojectsaspartoftheJoint-AfricaEUStrategyonmigrationandmobility.

TheHumanitarianAidInstrument(HAI),administeredbyDGHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection(ECHO),contributedmorethan€854millionorsome71%ofitsannualhumanitarianaidbudgetin2014toprojectshelpingrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonsin33countries.ThemainpartnersthroughwhichECHOchannelsfundsincludeUNagenciessuchastheUNHighCommissionerforRefugeesandtheInternationalOrganizationforMigration,andnon-governmentalorganisationssuchastheRedCross.

Therearealsointernalfundsformigrationandasylum,suchastheAsylum,MigrationandIntegrationFundadministeredbyDGHOME (€3.137billionforthe2014-2020period).Itsmainobjectiveisto‘strengthen and develop all aspects of the Common European Asylum System, including its external dimension’.ThisallowsDGHOMEtofinanceregionalprotectionandreadmissioninthirdcountries.Thisisanewprovisionunderthecurrentbudgetaryperiodandhasemergedfromtheneedtohaveabudgetforfinancialincentivesforthirdcountriestoallowcooperationonreadmissionandbordermanagement(ICMPDandECDPM,2013).Thisexternaldimensionofthebudgetis,however,limitedandismeanttocomplementsupporttotheexternalaidinstrumentsthatremain‘themainfundingtoolfortheexternaldimensionofHomeAffairspolicies’(DGHOME,2015).Nearly90%ofthefundsareactuallymanagedbyMemberStatesthemselvestofinanceactivitiessuchasresettlement,relocationandsupporttonationalmigrationandasylumsystems.

Inanattempttoinstituteamorestrategicresponse,theEUhascreatedtwomulti-donorTrustFunds.First,theMadadfund(EuropeanCommissioncontributionsupto€500milliondrawnfromtheENI,theIPAandDCI),managedbyDGNEARtorespondtotheSyrianrefugeecrisisinneighbouringcountries.Second,theEUEmergencyTrustFundinAfrica(with€1.8billionfromtheEDF,DCI,

19 In2014,theEUDevelopmentCouncilagreedspecificallytoincorporatemigrationmorestronglyasatopicfortheEU’sdevelopmentcooperation.Andradeetal.pointoutthatthereiscleargrowthinfundsallocatedtomigration.Insomenationalprogramming,suchasinMorocco,migrationtop-upfundsandindicatorshavebeenaddedtosectoralbudgetprogrammes.

20 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mip-gpgc-2014-2017-annex_en.pdfTheGPCGfocusesonglobalandmulti-regionalinitiativesasacomplementtoregionalandbilateralfunds.

DGHOMEBudget,HAIandENI),whichaimstoaddresstherootcausesofdisplacementandirregularmigrationinAfricancountriesandismanagedbyDGDEVCO.ThesefundspoolmoneyfromacrosstheEUbudget,theMemberStatesandothers.

Thismultitudeoffinancialinstrumentshasalsocreatedfragmentationatthecountrylevel.Somepartnercountriesandregionshavenumerousprogrammes,eachwithdifferenttermsandconditions.Insomecases,theEUinstitutionshavenogeneraloversightofwhatistakingplaceontheground(Andradeetal.,2015). Thisleadstoduplicationandfragmentationoffundsandprogrammesandcreatescomplexrequirementsforrecipientcountrieswhohavetoabidebydifferentsetsofrules.Thisalsoillustratesthelackofageneralstrategytoguidethesediversefundstowardsonecoherentapproach.Arecentstudysuggeststhattherearebetweensixand15differentfundsandprogrammesoperatingindifferentregions.‘As a consequence, there is a multiplicity of projects in each country, with different legal and institutional frameworks, not always aligned and often overlapping with each other. In many countries there is not even a comprehensive list of such EU-funded programmes’(Andradeetal.,2015).Martínetal.(2015)suggestthat,attimes,thispromotesparallelactivitiessuchastrainingandbusinesscreationprogrammes,ratherthanreinforcingpublicschemesthatarealreadyworkingatthenationallevel.

WhethertheTrustFundscanhelptoaddressthisfragmentationremainstobeseen.Nevertheless,thespeedatwhichtheyhavebeensetupandtheirprogrammeshavebeenidentified,hasraisedconcernsaboutthelackofstrategyandcomplementaritywithdevelopmentprogrammesthatalreadyexist.Inaddition,thereisdebateovertheextenttowhichthegovernancearrangementsoftheTrustFunds21arecompatiblewiththespiritofownershipandco-management.ThisisespeciallytruefortheEmergencyTrustFundinAfrica.DGDEVCO,forexample,communicateditsdecisiontoshiftfundsfromtheEDFintotheTrustFundwithlittleconsultationwithsomeRegionalEconomicCommunities(RECs)throughwhichtheEDFmoneywouldhaveotherwisebeenchanneled.22

TheTrustFundsmayhavethepotentialtorespondmoreswiftlyandinalessfragmentedmannerthanthemultitudeoffinancialinstrumentscurrentlyinplace,yetthedirectmanagementandquickdecision-makingproceduresthatallowforthisflexibilityalsoposesomerisks.Politicalpressurestocommitanddisbursefundsquicklymay‘createthewrongincentivesandleadtoprogrammingchoicesthatrespondmoretoEUpoliticalprioritiesthantolocalrealities’.23Itisvital,therefore,toinvolvelocalstakeholdersandprovidewell-informedanalysisaswellasensuringthatanynewprojectscomplementexistingprogrammes.

21 Haucketal.(2015).

22 InterviewEUOfficial,Brussels,19November,2015.

23 Haucketal.(2015:12)

20 ODI Report

Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy 21

Conclusion

TheEU’sresponsetotherefugeecrisishasbeen,andcontinuestobeseverelyunderminedbythreekeyfactors:

• thesystemofparallelcompetencesthatallowsMemberStatestopursuetheirownpoliciesalongsideEUpolicy

• theco-existenceoftoomanyactorswhowanttheirsayinpoliciesandwhocomefromverydifferentpolicyareaswithvarying–ifnotconflicting–interests

• fragmented,andinsomecasesoverlapping,fundinginstruments.

Inconclusion,weenvisageanumberofincrementalstepstoovercometheseconstraints.Tobeeffective,however,theproposedmeasureswouldrequirefargreaterpoliticalrecognitionofthefactthatajointresponseisintheinterestsofEUMemberStatesandtheEUasawhole.ThismeansthatbilateralapproachesneedtobebetterreconciledwithandembeddedinonecomprehensiveEUapproach.Thecurrentpoliticaldirectionoftravelis,however,intheoppositedirection,eventhoughtherecentEurobarometerstudyfindssome(ifdifferentiated)recognitionamongEuropeancitizensthatajointapproachisdesirable.

1. Appoint a senior political advisor to build bridges between the external and internal dimension of migration and asylum policies across the EU system. ThepositionwouldhaveamandatetobridgegapsbetweenEUinstitutionsandEUMemberStates,complementtheworkoftheCommissionerforMigration,HomeAffairsandCitizenship(Collett,2015)andengageinternationallywithcountries,regionalorganisationsandtheUN.Theaimwouldbetoinjectalonger-termstrategicvisionintotheEU’smigrationandasylumpolicies,includingitsexternaldimension.Themandateofsuchapositionwouldneedtobeclearlydelineated,butwouldincludeworkingtowardsabalancedEUapproachtomigration,developmentandsecurityandprovidingleadershipforpolicydevelopmenttosupportthemigrationdimensionoftheEU’sGlobalStrategy.ThepositioncouldbeemployedasSpecialAdvisortoFredericaMogherini,theHR/VP,inherrolesasHighRepresentativeandCommissionVice-

president.24ItisimportantthatsuchapositionisabletobuildbridgesbetweendifferentinstitutionsandservicesaswellasEUMemberStates.Thispositioncouldalsoadviseonpoliticaldialoguewiththirdcountriestoensurethatsuchdialogueiseven-handedandrespectful–similartotheroleassumedbyPierreVimontinthecontextofdialoguebetweenEuropeanandAfricancountriesduringtheVallettaSummit.

2. Establish an overarching EU strategy for international migration and asylum policy to overcome the disconnect at strategic levels between the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s policies on migration as well as security. ThiscouldbeachievedbyhavingmigrationaspectsreflectedmorestronglyintheEU’snewGlobalStrategyonForeignandSecurityPolicyledbytheHR/VP.ThenewGlobalStrategyisanopportunitytosetbroadpolicyandoperationalguidelinesthatapplyacrossthedifferentpartsoftheCommission,theEEASandtheMemberStates,andtobringcoherencetotheexistingsetofinstruments.Thestrategywouldtakealong-termperspectiveandhelptomovethediscourseawayfromreactiveshort-termresponsesinconjunctionwithanimproved‘toolbox’ofinstruments.

3. Ensure better information exchange and coordination of national policies at the EU level on both the internal and external dimensions of asylum and migration policy. TheCouncilworkinggroupscouldplayastrongerroleinassessingtheimplicationsofMemberStates’policiestoensurecoherenceofvariouspolicies,dialoguesandinstrumentsdeployed.

4. Strengthen the EU institutions’ arbitration role so that they have the authority to ensure that EU rules are interpreted and applied consistently across Member States.TheEUshouldcontinuetoholdMemberStatesaccountablefortheircommitments(e.g.throughinfringementproceedings)andhavetoolsavailabletoenforceimplementation.TheEuropeanAsylumSupportOfficecouldworkmorecloselywithEUMemberStatestoensureharmoniousdecisionsontherecognitionofrefugeesacrosstheEU(Peers,2015).Naturally,thisneedstorecognisethedifferentobligationsoftheMemberStates,giventheirspecificopt-inoropt-outderogations.

5. Move towards a more permanent relocation system of asylum seekers within the EU over the longer term.

24 AnotherpossibilitywouldbetocreateaEUSpecialRepresentativeforsuchafunction.WhilesuchRepresentativeshavetheflexibilitytorecruitstaff,theyareaspecificfunctionoftheEU’sCommonSecurityandDefensePolicyand,assuch,reportonlytotheEEASandnottotheEUCommission.Theymaynot,therefore,beinagoodpositiontobridgethegapsbetweenthedifferentinstitutionsandservices.

Thiswouldensurefairnessinresponsibilitysharingandcouldincludefinancialcompensationoptionsforcountriesthatareunabletotakerefugeesaccordingtojointlyagreedcriteria.Thesystemalsoneedstotakeintoaccountsomeofthepreferencesofrefugeestoreducetheironwardmovement.ThiswouldmeanamendingtheDublinIIIRegulationandchangingsomeofitsunderlyingprinciples.IntermsofprovidingsafeandlegalwaysforrefugeestocometotheEU,thecurrentvisacodecouldestablishanexplicitobligationtoprovidehumanitarianvisasinexceptionalcircumstancesthroughtheembassiesofEUMemberStates.

6. Address the fragmentation of the EU’s financial instruments through short, medium and long-term approaches.Intheshortandmediumterm,overlapsbetweenfundingsourcesatdifferentthematicorgeographiclevelsshouldbereducedbystrengtheningcoordinationandcoherenceandbyraisingawarenessofexistingfundingsources.WhilethenewclusterworkingmethodoftheCommissionisanimprovementatpoliticallevel,ithasnotyettranslatedintobettercoordinationmechanismsatthetechnicallevel.Themid-termreviewsofexistingfinancialinstrumentsareanopportunitytoensurethatexistinginstrumentsandprojectscomplementeachother.TheyshouldalsobeusedtoensurethatmoneyisnotdivertedawayfromcomprehensivestrategiesfordevelopmentandtowardsEuropeanmigrationobjectives.TheEuropean

Parliamentandcivilsocietyhaveimportantrolestoplayinscrutinisingtheuseofdevelopmentfundsinthecontextofrespondingandaddressingmigrationissuesexternally.Thereisalsoapressingneedfordiscussiononhowtoaddressfragmentationinthelongerterminthecontextofsettingupnewfinancialinstrumentsforthepost-2020phase.

7. Be clear in communicating the strategy and rationale behind the creation of new financial mechanisms, such as the EU Trust Funds. Thewayinwhichtheywillalignwithexistingstrategiesinpracticeshouldbespecified,aswellashowshort-termandlonger-termrequirementswillbebalanced.ManyofthestrategicandoperationalissuesaroundtheTrustFundshaveyettoberesolved.

8. Devolve responsibility for oversight and management of the different in-country programmes and funding streams to EU Delegations (EUDs). Thisapproachwouldneedtobebackedupbyaseriousinvestmentinhumanresourcesatcountrylevel,ensuringthatEUDshaveaccesstothenecessaryexpertise.InacontextinwhichEUDsareincreasinglybeingaskedtodo‘morewithless’,highqualityaidandimpactrequireadequatesupportstructuresandresources.ThereisalsoaneedtotakeamuchcloserlookathowEUDscanbeinvolvedoperationallyinsupportingthegrowingnumberofregionalapproachesandstrategies,aswellascross-borderinitiativestodealwithinternationalmigrationissues.

22 ODI Report

Challenges to a comprehnsive EU migration and asylum policy 23

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24 ODI Report

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