Rationality and Revolution: A Response to Holmstrom on the Logic of Working Class Collective Action

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Rationality and Revolution: A Response to Holmstrom on the Logic of Working ClassCollective ActionAuthor(s): James JohnsonSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 167-174Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231520 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 167 Volume 17, Number 1, March 1987, pp. 167-174

Rationality and Revolution: A Response to Holmstrom on the Logic of Working Class Collective Action*

JAMES JOHNSON The University of Chicago Chicago, IL 60637 U.S.A.

I

In 'Rationality and Revolution'1 Nancy Holmstrom addresses an issue that has gained considerable currency among social and political theorists. She asks what insight, if any, Marxists might glean from rational choice accounts of radical working class collective action.2 The

* Thanks to the participants in the Tuesday evening political theory seminar for comments on the larger project from which these remarks have been extracted.

Special thanks to Russell Hardin, Jack Knight, Mary Jane Milano and Adam Przeworski for comments on this revised version. Any errors or infelicities that remain are my own.

1 Nancy Holmstrom, 'Rationality and Revolution/ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13

(1983) 305-25. All parenthetical citations in the text are to this article.

2 See for example: Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1965); Gordon Tullock, 'The Paradox of Revolution/ Public Choice 11 (1971), 89-99; Allan Buchanan, 'Revolutionary Motivation and Ra-

tionality/ reprinted in Marshall Cohen, et al. eds., Marx, Justice and History (Prince- ton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1980), 264-87; Matthew Edel, 'Note on Collective Action, Marxism and the Prisoner's Dilemma/ Journal of Economic Issues 13 (1979), 751-61; Jon Elster, 'Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory/ Theory and Socie-

ty 11 (1982), 453-82; Gregory Kavka, 'Two Solutions to the Paradox of Revolu- tion,' Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982), 455-72; Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, Two Logics of Collective Action,' Political Power and Social Theory 1

(1980), 67-115; Scott Lash and John Urry, 'The New Marxism of Collective Ac- tion,' Sociology 18 (1984), 33-50; William Shaw, 'Marxism, Revolution and Ration-

ality,' in Terrance Ball and James Farr, eds., After Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984), 12-35.

Among these and other writers, Holmstrom is quite nearly unique in her



168 James Johnson

purpose of this comment is to argue that Holmstrom's unfavorable es- timation of rational choice accounts is ill-conceived.

Holmstrom raises two basic objections to rational choice explanations of working class collective action. First, she contends that such accounts are limited, inadequate or incomplete and indicates several manifesta- tions of this purported deficiency. Second, Holmstrom alleges that rational choice accounts are ideologically suspect and, as such, fundamentally at odds with Marxist explanations of revolutionary action. Holmstrom appears to believe that this second line of criticism 'follows' (309, 318) in some sense upon the first. If so, it would be sufficient to establish the error of her initial line of argument. Because neither of her criticisms can withstand scrutiny, however, indepen- dent reasons will be advanced for rejecting each.

II

Holmstrom begins by acknowledging that rational choice accounts often provide some insight into the dynamics of working class collective action. She repeatedly charges, however, that such accounts nonetheless remain insufficient, incomplete or inadequate (308, 312, 315, 318). The difficulty with her position here is that she seeks to hold rational choice explanations to a standard of adequacy against which she is unwilling to measure Marxist explanations.

Holmstrom admits that Marxist theories do not provide a complete explanation of working class collective action. Against critics of Marxism who make the same point, however, she protests that 'to demand a set of sufficient conditions and to accept nothing less as an explanation seems rather arbitrary' (309). Yet if such a demand is arbitrary in the case of Marxist explanations, it is no less so in the case of rational choice accounts. On this plausible reading, Holmstrom's entire first line of criticism appears to rest on an insupportable double standard.

Holmstrom might, of course, reply that the interpretation just given is incorrect and that her position does not rest on a double standard. She might continue on to say that as against a single standard of adequacy both Marxist and rational choice accounts of working class collective action fall short, but that the former are less inadequate and therefore to be preferred. Holmstrom's essay provides scant textual

thorough repudiation of any relevance of rational choice to the concerns of Marxists. Throughout her article she focuses on 'rationality as Utility maximiza- tion.' The importance of this conception, however, is clearly the role that she sees it as playing in broadly rational choice approaches to social and political theory (306).



A Response to Holmstrom on the Logic of Working Class Collective Action 169

support for this type of response. Moreover, when attention is focused on her specific, substantive criticisms of rational choice accounts, it is clear that she retains very little upon which to base a judgement regarding their comparative inferiority.

The inadequacies that Holmstrom purports to identify in rational choice accounts of working class collective action simply do not demand anything like the wholesale repudiation that she imagines necessary. Each of her criticisms can be accomodated within the framework of a rational choice approach. Thus, for example, her insistence that workers often organize in reaction to 'public evils as well as public goods' (309) is readily subsumed under Hardin's discussion of 'collective bads';3 her portrayal of 'identification' (313) as motivating workers to collective action is in all respects identical to Jon Elster's analysis of workers confronting an 'Assurance Game';4 her objection (310) to the static character of Olson's formulation of the logic of collection action is central to several dynamic restatements of the 'free rider' problem;5 and her objection (315n) to the 'single factor' motivational assumption made by Olson, Buchanan and others is obviated by recent treatments of heterogeneous motivation.6

At this juncture Holmstrom might grant that a number of her objections to rational choice explanations can be met through more or less ad hoc technical advances. She might nevertheless insist that technical accomplishment cannot provide answers to the criticisms that she advances against the more fundamental assumptions of rational choice accounts. In part, Holmstrom would be correct here; technique cannot readily be deployed in defense of the fundamental postulates upon which it is constructed. This, however, does not mean that Holm- strom's qualms concerning the underlying premises of rational choice approaches are cogent ones.

Ill

If the particular objections that Holmstrom advances against rational choice accounts miss the mark, the more general tenor of her argu-

3 Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 1982), 68

4 Jon Elster, Ulysseus and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979), 19-22, 143-6; Elster, 'Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory/ 467-72

5 Edel, 753-4; Hardin, 125-38, 145-51

6 Pamela Oliver, Gerald Marwell and Robert Teixeira, 'Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity and the Production of Collective Action/ American Journal of So-

ciology (forthcoming).



170 James Johnson

ment is hardly more persuasive. She begins by identifying rational choice theories as 'ideological' (318). She then seeks to sketch, in broad outline, an alternative Marxist conception of rationality. This latter project, which is aimed at providing the groundwork for the study of working class collective action, proceeds on the basis of a series of contrasts between what Holmstrom portrays as the fundamental premises of rational choice theories and her allegedly superior Marxist conception of rationality. Holmstrom's depiction of rational choice as 'ideological' will be taken up in this section. Her more positive pronouncements will be addressed in the next section.

Holmstrom's characterization of rational choice theory as ideological has three aspects.

1) it is caused by the socio-economic structure; 2) it wholly or part- ly distorts the conditions which cause it, and; 3) it functions to maintain the social (i.e., power) relations of that society (318).

Each aspect of this criticism will be challenged, briefly, in turn. As noted earlier Holmstrom concedes to rational choice accounts a

certain degree of descriptive plausibility and grants that 'most of the time workers seem to act just as the theory describes' (308-9). This plausibility, she contends, is due to the fact that rational choice theory 'reflects the conditions of life in capitalist society' (318). It is important to note, however, that in her endeavors to depict rational choice as reflective of the individualist self-seeking characteristic of advanced capitalism, Holmstrom repeatedly is compelled to posit a connection between strategic rationality and 'psychological egoism' (318). Not the least problem with this move is Holmstrom's own aknowledgement (306) that no necessary relation obtains between rationality and nar- row self-interest.7 This issue will be taken up again below. At present it is sufficient to note that the first aspect of Holmstrom's depiction of rational choice as 'ideological' trades upon an illicit identification of rationality and self-interested motivation.

The second aspect of Holmstrom's charge that rational choice theory is 'ideological' centers on the distorted view that it allegedly presents of capitalist social relations. Here Holmstrom relies directly and exclusively upon the cogency of her characterization of rational choice accounts of working class collective action as inadequate. On

7 While rationality and self-interest sometimes are definitionally related as in Anatol

Rapoport, Two Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press

1966), 130, such a relation is not required by rational choice theories. See, for ex-

ample, Elster, Ulysseus and the Sirens, 116; Shaw, 25.




her account inadequacy breeds distortion. As was made clear in section II above, there is little merit in Holmstrom's complaint about the inadequacy of rational choice accounts of working class collective action. Moreover, while she holds that 'revolutionary action is only one example of behavior that cannot entirely be understood in utility max- imizing terms' (318) Holmstrom neglects to supply additional exam- ples. In the absence of additional, more cogent, indications of inadequacy, further comment on this matter seems unnecessary.

The final aspect of Holmstrom's characterization of rational choice as ideologically suspect is that it operates to sustain the status quo by 'presenting radical social change as either impossible or irrational, most likely requiring undemocratic manipulation or coercion' (318). There is no doubt that in certain cases such a portrayal of social change is precisely what is intended.8 Yet Holmstrom is unjustified, at best, in generalizing from such cases in an indiscriminate fashion.

A more charitable interpretation might take rational choice accounts as a reminder, if one were needed, that while 'not theoretically impossible' radical working class collective action is 'far from automat- ic.'9 Such an interpretation would allow Marxists to turn the resources of rational choice theory back upon those who would deploy it for conservative purposes. Elster, for example, argues that the possibility of strategies of conditional cooperation deflates the position of those who insist that working class collective action will emerge, if at all, only as the result of coercive leadership.10 By engaging rational choice accounts on their own terrain rather than decrying them as 'ideological' Marxists such as Holmstrom might be able to identify persuasive responses to conservative pronouncements and at the same time lo- cate considerable affinites between rational choice and Marxist accounts of working class political organization.11

8 Tullock

9 Shaw, 31; Brian Barry puts the point in this way: '... it is hard to see why any reasonable person should object to the reminder that any polity, association or

organization must find a way of providing people with reasons for doing what

they have to do'; 'Methodology vs. Ideology/ in Elinor Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1982), 138.

10 Elster, 'Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory,' 138

11 As Clifford Geertz remarks in a closely related context, if rational choice theories are 'to be countered it cannot be by mere disdain, refusing to look through the

telescope, or by passioned restatements of hallowed truths, quoting scripture against the sun. It is necessary to get down to the details of the matter, to exa- mine the studies and to critique the interpretations . . .', Local Knowledge (New York: Basic Books 1984), 26. Cries of 'ideology' merely afford illusory relief from this task. Although many of the studies cited here in response to Holmstrom appeared



172 James Johnson

IV

Holmstrom might well resist the conclusion of the last section which is at odds with her contention that 'Marxists reject many of the fundamental assumptions of the model of rationality prevalent in Western political theory and have a distinctly different conception' (324). Yet, as the previous two sections indicate, she offers scant justification for rejecting the prevailing conception of rationality as embodied in rational choice theory. And although Holmstrom does not claim 'to produce a theory of rationality' (324) of a distinctively Marxist type, the arguments that she does deploy in this direction are consistently unsatisfactory. These arguments, which take the form of a series of contrasts with the prevailing conception of rationality that she seeks to repudiate, will each be addressed in this section. In keeping with the tentative nature of Holmstrom's comments the responses which follow will be condensed and illustrative.

The most striking of Holmstrom's contentions runs as follows: 'Most fundamentally, Marxists reject the ... basic assumption that the con- cept of rationality is primarily ascribed to the individual, and only in a derivative sense to an action or society. While ... this presupposi- tion does not imply that our conception of a rational individual is of someone capable of existing independently of other persons or society, it does imply that the individual can be properly understood independently. Else why should the individual be the conceptual or analytical starting point?' (319)

This line of argument prompts several observations. First, although rational choice theorists typically are suspicious of notions of 'social' or 'collective' rationality, Holmstrom, once again, is unjustified in generalizing from this propensity in an indiscriminate manner.12 Se- cond, contrary to Holmstrom's view, it is quite plausible to interpret Marx as having replied in his political writings upon just the conception of individual rationality that she seeks to repudiate.13 Moreover, this is not merely an exegetical qualm, but can be seen as crucial if

after her essay was written, the 'in principle' tone of her objections places an ex-

tremely heavy burden upon them.

12 Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983), 26-44, offers a discussion of 'collective rationality' from a rational choice perspective. Although Holmstrom promotes socialism for its collective rationality relative to capitalism (322) it is nonetheless true that it must be individually rational for individual workers to opt for socialism via political organization. In this regard the comment

by Barry cited at note 9 above is particularly apposite.

13 John Maguire, Marx's Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1978), 113-37




Marxists are to avoid overly mechanistic explanations of political and social change in terms of supra-human forces.14 Holmstrom simply mis- interprets rational choice approaches such as game theory if she be- lieves that they claim to understand individual choice and action in isolation from the choices and actions of other individuals. It is precisely as a technique for analysing the intricacies of interdependent de- cision that game theory is promoted as of value in the study of class formation and organization.15

The second of the contrasts that Holmstrom seeks to draw is between rational choice theorists who proceed upon a 'rigid exclusion of emotions and moral convictions from rational motivation' and Marxists, who recognize 'emotions and moral considerations' as 'playing a motivating role, even an essential motivating role' in the genesis of working class collective action (318). As noted earlier, Holmstrom concedes that the conception of rationality embodied in rational choice accounts does not entail narrowly self-interested motivation. Absent some argument (which is not forthcoming) to the effect that strategic rationality nevertheless excludes other-regarding motivations, Holmstrom's assertions in this regard are subverted by her own equivocation. Simi- larly, it simply is not the case that the methodological individualism characteristic of rational choice accounts demands the exclusion, rigid or otherwise, of other-regarding motivations.16

Finally, Holmstrom attempts to compare her preferred Marxist conception of rationality to the prevailing view in terms of the substantive nature of the former and the purely formal, instrumental character of the latter. Toward this end she makes two criticisms of the prevailing conception of rationality. First, she contends that rational choice theory trades upon 'the assumption that all sorts of different ends can be compared meaningfully along a single, quantifiable and open-ended dimension of utility' (320-1). 17 Second, she charges that rational choice accounts operate on 'the fundamental assumption that rationality has solely to do with means, that, no matter how silly and destructive the

14 Ibid., 117; much of the discussion of game theoretic analysis of working class collective action emerged from recent debates over Marxism and functionalist ex-

planation. For a succinct and fair, if partisan, overview of the issues involved see

John Roemer, 'Methodological Individualism and Deductive Marxism/ Theory and

Society (1982), 513-20.

15 Elster, 'Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory/ 464-5, 477

16 Ibid., 474; Barry, 138

17 Hardin, 102, and Elster, Ulysseus and the Sirens, 126-7, acknowledge the difficul- ties which this problem poses for rational choice theories.



174 James Johnson

end, an act is rational so long as it is an efficient pursuit of that end' (321). Marxists, on Holmstrom's view, repudiate both of these assumptions.

Here finally, it appears as though there might be some substance to Holmstrom's objections. Yet the stridency of her tone obscures the extent to which her criticisms suggest not the repudiation, but the elaboration or emendation of the conception of rationality embodied in rational choice explanations. Thus, the first of Holmstrom's criticisms might be taken as a partial specification of the limits to our conception of strategic rationality and as identifying points at which it needs to be augmented for purposes of social and political research.18 Conversely, her second criticism might be seen as recommending the extension of our common conception of strategic rationality, perhaps along lines such as Elster's discussion of substantive rationality and of preference formation or Sen's treatment of 'meta-preferences.' Both of these projects squarely address the problem of the rationality of ends.19

A theoretical strategy of this sort would require that Holmstrom re- vise her assessment of rational choice explanation and abandon the 'either-or' logic embodied in the quest for a distinctively 'Marxist' conception of rationality. Given the overall weakness of her case against rational choice accounts of working class collective action there would seem to be very little standing in her way.

Received March, 1985

18 In this regard it is instructive to compare: (a) the comments in Rapoport, 202-3, 214, concerning the limits' of strategic rationality; (b) Elster's discussion of the distinction between 'parametric' and 'strategic' rationality in Ulysseus and the Si- rens; and (c) the typology of 'instrumental/ 'strategic' and 'communicative' ra-

tionality in Jurgen Habermas, 'A Reply to My Critics/ in John Thompson and David Held, eds. Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1982), 236-64. Offe and Wiesnethal seek to exploit the notion of 'communicative' ration-

ality as a solution to the logic of working class collective action.

19 Elster, Sour Grapes, chapters 1 and 3; Amartya Sen, 'Rational Fools/ Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976-77), 317-44



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Rationality and Revolution: A Response to Holmstrom on the Logic of Working Class Collective Action

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